Daf Ditty: 32, TREES

Francie notices the Tree of Heaven that has grown and re-sprouted in the building's yard despite all efforts to destroy it, seeing in it a metaphor for her family's ability to overcome adversity and thrive

A Tree Grows in Brooklyn, Betty Smith

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MISHNA: If one placed his eiruv in a tree above ten handbreadths from the ground, his eiruv is not a valid eiruv; if it is below ten handbreadths, his eiruv is a valid eiruv. If he placed the eiruv in a pit, even if it was a hundred cubits deep, his eiruv is a valid eiruv.

GEMARA: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba sat, and with him sat Rabbi Asi and Rava bar Natan, and Rav Naḥman sat beside them, and they sat and said: This tree mentioned in the mishna, where does it stand?

If you say it stands in the private domain, what is the difference to me whether the eiruv is placed above ten handbreadths or below ten handbreadths? The private domain ascends to the sky, and there is no difference whether an object is above or below ten handbreadths.

Rather, say that the tree stands in the public domain; but in that case the question arises: Where did the person intend to establish his residence? If you say that he intended to establish his Shabbat residence in the tree above, he and his eiruv are in one place. Consequently, the eiruv should be valid, even if is at a height of more than ten handbreadths.

Rather, say that he intended to establish his Shabbat residence on the ground below; but isn’t he making use of the tree if he accesses his eiruv? It is prohibited to make use of a tree on Shabbat, and therefore his eiruv should invalid even if it is less than ten handbreadths above the ground because it is inaccessible to him.

Rashi

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The Gemara answers: Actually, we can accept the latter assumption that the tree stands in the public domain, and that he intended to establish his Shabbat residence on the ground below, in the public domain.

And with regard to the prohibition against making use of a tree, this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: Anything that is prohibited on Shabbat not by law, but rather due to a rabbinic decree [shevut], the Sages did not issue the decree to apply during twilight, which is neither definitively day nor definitively night.

Since using a tree is only prohibited due to a shevut, it is permitted to make use of the tree and remove one’s eiruv from it during the twilight period, which is when the eiruv establishes the person’s Shabbat residence.

Therefore, the eiruv is valid, provided that it is below ten handbreadths. If, however, the eiruv is above ten handbreadths, it is invalid. At that height, removing the eiruv from the tree entails violation of the Torah prohibition of carrying from a private domain to a public domain, which is prohibited even during twilight.

The Mishnah states that when one places the food of his in a tree within ten Tefachim from the ground, the Eruv is valid, because he and his Eruv are in the same domain (Reshus ha'Rabim), and therefore the Eruv is accessible on Shabbos.

The Gemara suggests that even if an Eruv is placed high up in the tree, if the person and his Eruv are in the same domain (Reshus ha'Yachid), then the Eruv is valid. The Gemara challenges this assertion and says that the Eruv should not be valid, because when one places the Eruv in the tree, he uses the tree ("Mishtamesh b'Ilan"), and the Rabanan prohibited the use of a tree on Shabbos.

What "use" of the tree occurs when one places his Eruv in it? He does not need to climb the tree to get the Eruv, since it is only ten Tefachim high. One is not prohibited to remove the Eruv from the tree, because there is no use of the tree involved in such an act.

Indeed, the Gemara in Shabbos (153a) clearly states that one is permitted to remove items from the back of an animal, even though the use of an animal, like the use of a tree, is prohibited. The fact that the tree holds something that one placed there before Shabbos also cannot be considered

4 use of the tree, because the Gemara in Shabbos (45a) says that one may place a candle in a tree to remain there during Shabbos. (RITVA, RASHBA)

The RITVA cites one opinion that says that even to derive a Halachic benefit from a tree (i.e., his Eruv in the tree makes the tree his primary place of Shabbos dwelling and thereby alters his Techum Shabbos) is considered "Mishtamesh b'Ilan."

The Ritva rejects this answer. One cannot compare Halachic benefit derived from the tree with use of the tree, because the decree against use of a tree on Shabbos was enacted in order to prevent one from accidentally cutting down a branch. There is no concern that one might cut down a branch when he derives Halachic benefit from the tree.

The Ritva explains that the Rabanan were concerned that one might lean on the tree while he removes the food of his Eruv.

Orach Chayim 336:1

If It Is Permissible to Walk on Grass or Climb a Tree,:

We do not climb a tree, whether it is wet or dry, nor do we hang from it, nor do we use anything attached to the ground. This is a rabbinic decree lest one come to climb the tree and pick something from it. If someone climbed a tree on Shabbat by mistake, he is permitted to descend. If he did it on purpose, he is not allowed to descend. If he climbed the tree when it was still day on Friday, he is always allowed to descend after it gets dark. There are some who say that this only applies when it was his intention to descend while it was still day, but if it was not his intention to descend while it was still day, he should not descend when it gets dark, as he intended to sit in a forbidden place.

Rem"a: This only applies to a person who ascended the tree, but if he left an object there while it is still day, it is forbidden for him to remove it from there on Shabbat (Magaid Chapter 21). All of

5 this applies to a tree or the like, but one is permitted to use reeds that are soft like an herb, even if they are connected to the ground, because there is no prohibition against using herbs (Hagahot Oshr"i Perk Bechol Me'arvin in the name of the Or Zarua and Beit Yosef).

Above, the REMA (OC 336:1) rules that one may not remove any object from a tree on Shabbos, because one might lean on the tree:

Tosafos

תופסות ה"ד המ יל הלעמל המ יל הטמל י ה למ ל מהדתפו Tosfos explains why he did not ask about using the tree.

אתשה יתכאד אל קיסא היתעדא יתאד יברכ וה י יצמ ושקאל י י ןיבד הלעמל יבו ן הטמל אל היהי בוריע םושמ םושמ בוריע היהי אל הטמל ן יבו הלעמל שמתשמד אב י ל ןליא שתמ

Now that it did not yet cross his mind that [our Mishnah] is like Rebbi, he could have asked that both above and below it is not an Eruv, because [to take his Eruv] he uses a tree (which is forbidden mid'Rabanan)!

אלא ךירפד יכ ו ן הטמלד וה י בוריע אלו תפכיא ןל המב שמתשמש ןליאב הלעמל ימנ והיל י בוריע אוהד ובוריעו וויו ודברע הל מ העל לא מששהב לתכאאו וי יו טל ןוי יפ ל קמב ו ם דחא ה ו א ח מ

Answer: He asked that since below it is an Eruv, and we are not concerned that he uses a tree, also above it should be an Eruv, for he and his Eruv are in one place.

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MISHNAH: The Mishnah discusses placing the eruv on a tree [or in a pit.]1

Clarifying the Mishnah A group of Amoraim sat before R’ Nachman to analyze the details of the case in the Mishnah. They concluded that the tree was standing in a public domain and the person intended to establish residence on the ground below the tree.

The reason there is no issue as far as using the tree on Shabbos is that the Mishnah follows the opinion of Rebbi who maintains that rabbinic prohibitions are not in force during bein hashmashos.

R’ Nachman approved of this interpretation and Shmuel is also quoted as explaining the Mishnah in this way Rava ruled: The case of the Mishnah invalidating an eruv in a tree above a height of ten tefachim applies only if the tree is outside the outskirts of the city, but if it was within the outskirts of the city it should be valid.

The Gemara demonstrates that according to this rationale, even if the tree is beyond the outskirts of the city it should still be valid.

R’ Yitzchak the son of R’ Mesharshea explains that the Mishnah refers to a branch that extends more than four amos from the trunk and the person intended to establish residence at the base of the tree.

AN ERUV IN A TREE (our Dr Seuss equivalent)

Mishnah: If an Eruv was in a tree above 10 Tefachim, it is invalid;

If it is below 10 Tefachim, it is valid;

If it is in a pit, even 100 Amos deep, it is valid.

Gemara - R. Chiya bar Aba, R. Asi and Rava bar Noson) Question: Where is the tree?

If it is in Reshus ha'Yachid, there is no distinction whether the Eruv is above or below 10, for Reshus ha'Yachid extends up to the sky!

Answer: It is in Reshus ha'Rabim.

Objection: Where did he intend his Shevisah to be?

If he wanted to be Shoves above [on the tree], he and his Eruv are in the same place! (Even if it is above 10 it should be valid.)

1 Daf Digest

7 Answer: He wanted to be Shoves below [in Reshus ha'Rabim. Therefore, if his Eruv is above 10, i.e. in Reshus ha'Yachid, he cannot get to it during Bein ha'Shemashos].

Question: [Even if it is below 10, he may not take it, for if he does,] he uses the tree!

Answer: Indeed, the tree is in Reshus ha'Rabim, and he intended to be Shoves below;

The Isur to use a tree is mid'Rabanan. Our Mishnah is Rebbi, who permits Shevus during Bein ha'Shemashos.

THE BASKET CASE (to rhyme with casket if following the Dr Seuss poetry)

QUESTION2: The Gemara Shabbes 155 cites a Beraisa that states that when one attempts to make an Eruv Techumin by hanging a basket of food above ten Tefachim on a peg that protrudes from a tree, his Eruv is not valid because he cannot take the food from that basket on Shabbos without transgressing the prohibition of Hotza'ah (carrying from the basket, which is a Reshus ha'Yachid, to Reshus ha'Rabim).

If he hangs the basket of food on the tree below ten Tefachim, the Eruv is valid because he can take the food out of the basket without transferring from one Reshus to another (since everything below ten Tefachim in Reshus ha'Rabim is considered to be part of Reshus ha'Rabim).

Why is his Eruv valid in the second case? The dimensions of the basket itself are four Tefachim by four Tefachim. (This is evident from the first case, where the Beraisa considers the basket to be a Reshus ha'Yachid. A Reshus ha'Yachid must be at least four by four Tefachim.) The basket should be considered a Karmelis, like any object that is four by four Tefachim and less than ten Tefachim high), and one is prohibited mid'Rabanan to carry from a Karmelis into another Reshus on Shabbos. The Eruv should be invalid.

TOSFOS answers that a usable vessel, such as a basket, cannot become a Karmelis (Tosfos 5a, DH Kan; Rashi 8a, DH Pachos). Rather, it becomes subordinate to the Reshus in which it rests. Therefore, in this case the basket becomes part of Reshus ha'Rabim.

TOSFOS suggests another answer. The Beraisa follows the opinion of Rebbi, who maintains that when the Rabanan enacted Isurim d'Rabanan for Shabbos, they did not apply those Isurim during Bein ha'Shemashos (Shabbos 8b, Eruvin 32b). Since the food in the basket can be accessed during Bein ha'Shemashos (because carrying from a Karmelis to a Reshus ha'Rabim is Asur only mid'Rabanan), the Eruv is valid.

This answer is problematic. Rav Mordechai Kornfeld suggests the Gemara explains that the Beraisa permits one to take food from a basket that is hanging from a tree at a point lower than ten Tefachim only because one does not thereby use the tree.

2 Daf Advancement Forum

8 He uses only "Tzidei Tzedadin," since the basket is hanging from a peg in the tree and not from the tree itself. According to Tosfos, however, even if the basket is hanging from the tree itself, only an Isur d'Rabanan is involved (the Isur of "Mishtamesh b'Ilan," using the tree). Since it is only an Isur d'Rabanan, it should be permitted during Bein ha'Shemashos, and the Eruv should be valid even if the basket is hanging from the tree itself (and not just from Tzidei Tzedadin)!3

REBBI AKIVA EIGER (in Tosfos Rebbi Akiva, Eruvin 3:3) answers based on the words of the BARTENURA in Eruvin (3:3). The Bartenura there explains that an act which involves only one Isur d'Rabanan is permitted Bein ha'Shemashos, but not an act which involves two Isurim d'Rabanan.

Hence, according to Tosfos one is permitted to take food from the basket that hangs on a peg into Reshus ha'Rabim during Bein ha'Shemashos, because that act involves only one Isur d'Rabanan (carrying from a Karmelis into a Reshus ha'Rabim).

One is not permitted to take the food from the basket when the basket hangs directly from the tree, because that act involves two Isurim d'Rabanan (carrying from a Karmelis into Reshus ha'Rabim, and using the tree). (See Rebbi Akiva Eiger, ibid., who strongly questions the Bartenura's rule from the Gemara in Eruvin 32b.)

The use of a Tree in an Eruv4

3 REBBI AKIVA EIGER in Gilyon Hashas; SEFER HA'KOVETZ to the Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 24:10; and others. 4 Rav Daniel Mann: http://www.eretzhemdah.org/newsletterArticle.asp?lang=en&pageid=48&cat=7&newsletter=1104&article=4165

9 This a tzurat hapetach (the form of a doorway), which consists of two vertical posts (lechis) and a horizontal wire from one to the other (kaneh [al gabeihen]). Regarding whether a tree can be used as a lechi, the gemara (Eruvin 11b) says clearly that it can. However, there are several conditions that you will have to meet, and it will take careful explaining on our part and clear perception of the halacha and the engineering on your part for you to fulfill them correctly.

The main reason that trees are rarely used as lechis is probably the halacha that the horizontal wire must be straight above the lechi (although there can be vertical space between them), not to its side. Therefore, if one were to tie a rope around the trunk of a tree or attach a string to it with a nail, it would be invalid. The string cannot be attached to branches for two reasons: almost all branches are horizontal, and it does not help that they extend from the vertical trunk (see Netivot Shabbat 19:(72)); the branches generally sway too much in the wind to be valid lechis (see , Orach Chayim 362:1). What can be done (in some trees) is to attach a string (using a nail or by wrapping) on top of the trunk where it splits into main branches. See picture 1.

Another possibility is to connect the string to the tree in a manner that is not valid in relation to the tree but to attach a lechi to the tree in a manner that the string goes directly over the lechi. This must be checked with a plum line going down from the string to see that there is a point on the string that is directly above the lechi. This system will only succeed if the tree is very straight or leans in the correct direction in relation to the lechi. The lechi must be connected somewhat strongly so that it will not be uprooted or swayed by normal winds (Shulchan Aruch, OC 363:5). It must be at least ten tefachim tall and start within three tefachim of the ground (ibid. 362:11). See picture 2.

Regarding the side of the house, there is also what to be concerned about. A wall cannot serve as a lechi, which must be somewhat distinct as part of the doorway and not part of the rest of a structure (Magen Avraham 363:28). On the other hand, as a doorpost, the lechi can be connected to or protruding from the wall (ibid.). Therefore, if there is a thin protrusion from the main direction of the wall or you can attach a valid lechi to the side of a wall (with the same requirements as above), that suffices. If by slats, you mean that you want to attach the string to a horizontal or diagonal protrusion from the house, this would have the same problem that we discussed regarding attaching a string to branches.

Because of the complicated nature of some of these issues, we urge you to arrange an on-sight consultation with someone who knows the laws of eruvin.

Picture 1 Picture 2

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Manhattan Eruv

Trees, Eruv and Modern Towns

There exists disagreement between rabbis about some of the technical requirements of a valid eruv. Thus, there are instances where Orthodox rabbis dispute the validity of a particular eruv (and therefore instruct their followers not to use it), or even dispute whether any eruv can be built in a certain location. One of the oldest halakhic disputes in the United States revolves around the issue of an eruv in Manhattan, New York. In 1905, Rabbi Yehoshua Seigel created an eruv on Manhattan's Lower East Side, bounded by seawalls which once protected the island as well as the Third Avenue El; however, some other rabbis ruled the eruv to be invalid.

In the 1950s, a proposal by Rabbi Menachem Mendel Kasher to establish an eruv in Manhattan gained the support of many prominent rabbis, including Rabbis Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, Dovid Lifshitz, andEphraim Oshry, and the Kopishnitzer, Novominsker and RadzinerRebbes. Other authorities, such as Rabbis Aharon Kotler and , raised objections, and a major controversy ensued. In the end, the opponents Agudas Horabonim issued a declaration opposing it.

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In June 2007, the East Side portion of the internal Manhattan Eruv was completed, offering an eruv within Manhattan to Orthodox Jews living on the East, Upper East, and Upper West Sides. There are also two eruvin in Manhattan's Washington Heights neighborhood, one covering the area and another that is part of Mount Sinai Jewish Center and covers the Fort Washington area.

Reb Moshe signature on eruv p’sak

Another ongoing dispute is the status of two inter-connected eruvin in Brooklyn: the Flatbush and Boro Park eruvin. The Boro Park eruv, from its initial construction, was rejected by most of the Hasidic community (though acceptance there has increased over time), and was rejected by most of the non-Hasidic "Lithuanian yeshiva" communities.

The Flatbush eruv was originally built with the support of the Modern Orthodox community, and was later enhanced with the support of some local "non-Modern Orthodox" families. It was totally rejected by the many "Lithuanian yeshiva" communities led by the rosh yeshivas ("deans") of the large yeshivas Yeshiva Rabbi Chaim Berlin, Mir Yeshiva, and Yeshiva Torah Vodaas that are based in the Flatbush section of Brooklyn. In the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn, there is some dispute over the making of an eruv, with Rabbi Zalman Leib Teitelbaum, theSatmar of Williamsburg leading the opposition to an eruv.

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The installation of eruvin has been a matter of contention in many neighborhoods around the world, with notable examples including the London Borough of Barnet; Outremont, Quebec; Tenafly, New Jersey; Agoura Hills, California; Westhampton Beach, New York; and Bergen County, New Jersey.

As the property-owner is the owner of the public streets, sidewalks and the utility poles on which symbolic boundaries are to be strung, some authorities have interpreted Jewish law as requiring the local government to participate in the process as one of the property owners by

13 agreeing to the creation of the eruv, and to give permission for the construction of a symbolic boundary on its property.

In addition, because municipal law and the rules of utility companies, in general, prohibit third parties from stringing attachments to utility poles and wires, the creation of an eruv has often necessitated obtaining permissions, easements, and exceptions to various local ordinances.

These requirements that government give active permission for an eruv have given rise to both political and legal controversy.

Legal Status

In the United States, legal controversies about an eruv in a community often focus on provisions of the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which addresses relations between government and religion.

Opponents of an eruv typically take the view that the government participation in the eruv process necessary to approve its construction violates the First Amendment's prohibition of governmental establishment of religion. Proponents take the view that it constitutes a constitutionally permissible accommodation of religion rather than an establishment.

Proponents have also argued that the Free Exercise Clause affirmatively requires government acceptance, on the grounds that government interference with or failure to accommodate an eruv

14 constitutes discrimination against or inhibition of the constitutional right of free exercise of religion.

In the 2002 decision on Tenafly Eruv Association v. Borough of Tenafly, Judge Ambro, writing for the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals, held that Eruv Association members had no intrinsic right to add attachments to telephone poles on Borough property and that the borough, if it wished, could enact a general, neutral ordinance against all attachments to utility poles that could be enforced against the eruv.

However, Judge Ambro held that in this case, the Borough had not enacted a genuinely general or neutral ordinance because it permitted a wide variety of attachments to utility poles for non- religious purposes, including posting signs and other items.

Because it permitted attachments to utility poles for secular purposes, the court held, it could not selectively exclude attachments for religious purposes. The United States Supreme Court declined to hear the case. It was subsequently cited as precedent by a number of other federal courts deciding disputes between an eruv association and a local government.

R.Gil Student writes:5

5 https://www.torahmusings.com/2020/01/private-eruvin-and-emergency-keys/

15 Many people have their own private eruvin, structures that allow them to carry on Shabbos. They do this with one or more neighbors by ensuring the area is closed, whether by gates, walls or doorway-like structures — a complicated matter that requires rabbinic oversight or approval. Additionally, they keep food for two communal meals, usually matzah, in a central location. This will be the focus of our discussion. (We will be discussing eruvei chatzeiros, which permit carrying that is otherwise rabbinically forbidden, although the same applies to eruvei techumin, which permit walking beyond the rabbinically limited range.)

I Access to Eruv Matzah

The Mishnah and Gemara in Eruvin (26b-36b) discuss the need for the eruv food to be accessible at the beginning of Shabbos, during the few minutes of bein ha-shmashos after sunset. For example, if the eruv is placed in a tree, we are not allowed to climb a tree on Shabbos. However, since the requirement is that the food be accessible during bein ha-shmashos, and generally speaking rabbinic prohibitions do not apply bein ha-shmashos (with some exceptions), you have to be able to access the food only without violating biblical prohibitions of Shabbos. Climbing a tree is only rabbinically forbidden, so the eruv would be good for you even if the food is in a tree (setting aside reshus ha-rabbim issues, as discussed in Eruvin 32b).

As a rule, if you cannot access the eruv matzah without violating a biblical prohibition, you cannot carry within that eruv. Our Daf discusses cases in which the key to the box or house containing the eruv matzah is lost. If the food is kept inside a wooden box, then you can carry because breaking the box is only rabbinically prohibited. But if the food is inside a house, you cannot carry because breaking down the wall is biblically forbidden. Presumably, this means that you must have keys to your neighbor’s house, if that is where you keep theeruv matzah. If your neighbor goes away for Shabbos, you must be able to access the matzah in their home without violating a biblical prohibition. Otherwise, you cannot carry within the eruv.

II. Breaking Into Your Neighbor’s House

Perhaps it is sufficient to be able to break into your neighbor’s house, whether by breaking the door’s lock or a window. Since you can do that in theory, you have access to the eruv matzah and do not have to actually break into the house. But is this rabbinically or biblically prohibited? If it is biblically prohibited, then it is insufficient to permit carrying in the eruv.

The general rule is that it is biblically forbidden to destroy a building (even partially) in order to rebuild it; just to destroy it without intent to rebuild is rabbinically prohibited. If you destroy a door or lock in order to get into the room, is that biblically or rabbinically forbidden? Rav Yitzchak Halevi Segal (brother of the Taz, 17th cen., ; Responsa Mahari Halevi, no. 30) discusses whether you are allowed to ask a gentile to pick a lock on your door on Shabbos, or are we concerned that he might break it? He says that at most breaking the lock is only rabbinically forbidden and therefore you are allowed to ask a gentile to pick the lock, even if it might break.

16 Rav Chaim Yosef David Azulai (18th cen., ; Machazik Berakhah, Orach Chaim 314:2) quotes the Zera Emes who disagrees and forbids asking a gentile to pick a locked door. Chida doesn’t quote the details of the case but Rav Chaim Mordechai Margoliyos (19th cen., Poland; Sha’arei Teshuvah 314:2) does. A synagogue’s ark was locked shut on Shabbos. The Zera Emes permits asking a gentile locksmith to open the door but only if he does not break the lock. If he has to break the lock, they should instead leave the ark closed and bring a Torah scroll from another synagogue. The Zera Emes seems to consider breaking a lock to be biblically prohibited.

The same would seem to apply to breaking into a house any other way — you are destroying (partially) a house in a way that you will rebuild. According to Mahari Halevi, this is rabbinically forbidden and therefore does not pose an eruv problem. According to the Zera Emes, it is biblically forbidden and an eruv problem.

III. Possible Solutions

Rav Avraham Danzig (19th cen., Lithuania; Nishmas Adam 72:1) asks why the Gemara concerns itself with the distinction between rabbinic and biblical prohibitions. This can all be alleviated very simply. The whole concern is the brief time after sunset of bein ha-shmashos. During bein ha- shmashos, you are allowed to ask a gentile to perform for you even biblically prohibited labors (Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chaim 261:1). Therefore, whether the eruv matzah is up a tree or in a locked house or anywhere, since you can ask a gentile to get it for you, the eruv must be good. Why doesn’t the Gemara give this answer? Rav Danzig struggles with this and suggests that the Sages made a special exception of asking a gentile regarding aneruv. His answer seems a bit forced.

Perhaps we can answer with an explanation of Rav Gershon Ashkenazi (17th cen., Poland; Avodas Ha-Gershuni, no. 104). He addresses a case in which the eruv is placed beyond the reach of where you are allowed to walk. Why, he asks, can you not have different people pass (in theory) the matzah hand to hand, person to person, so it will be in your reach? He explains that the rule is that you must be able to access the eruv food. If you need someone to bring it to you, then you do not really have access to it. He proves it by pointing the case of eruv food in a cemetery for a kohen. The Gemara (Eruvin 30b) has to find creative ways for a kohen to enter a cemetery (in a portable box that somehow prevents him for becoming impure).

Why can’t he just ask a Yisrael to get him the eruv food from the cemetery? Rather, if he cannot access the food himself, he does not have access and therefore cannot carry in the eruv. Similarly, we can say, if you need a gentile to access the food, you do not have access yourself and cannot carry in the eruv.

Rav Shlomo Zalman Braun (20th cen., US; She’arim Metzuyanim Ba-Halakhah, Eruvin 35a) deduces from the Ritva’s commentary (Eruvin 35a s.v. ba-sadeh) that while you must have access to the eruv food yourself, you can have help accessing the key. Therefore, he allows an eruv if you can ask a gentile to bring you the key from someone’s house.

17 Even in a place where carrying is biblically prohibited, asking a gentile to carry it is only rabbinically forbidden.

According to our (tentative) conclusion, if your neighbor has the eruv matzah and goes away for Shabbos, someone nearby must have an emergency key to their house.

Carving out space for a stress-free Sabbath By Shira Springer Boston Globe Staff, September 28, 2014, 12:00 a.m.6 5

6 https://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/2014/09/27/what-eruv/QhCLHQGaEYVJYAne3YVCwO/story.html

18 Trees in Rabbinic Thought

Steven Arnoff writes:7

If the cycle of four new years provides a periodic measure for discerning how the Jewish people as a whole relates to God, trees serve as a symbol and metaphor for the spiritual choices of individuals.

A tree stood at the very center of the first human moral dilemma, when Adam and Eve ate of the Tree of Knowledge. One rabbinic tradition holds that this was a fig tree. Even though the fig tree, according to this (interpretive literature), allowed Adam and Eve to doom themselves and their descendants to a life in exile from paradise, the tree also offered them the first step towards spiritual redemption, by providing Adam and Eve fig leaves to cover their nakedness (Babylonian Sanhedrin 70a-b). Here, and in many other rabbinic stories and interpretations, trees provide a kind of litmus test for human behavior.

According to another midrash, Honi the Circle Maker fell asleep for 70 years, only to discover that a carob tree outlives the one who plants it. Planting trees, a particularly beloved practical and symbolic act in the rabbinic imagination, hence embodies Jewish responsibility for each generation to cultivate resources for the next (Taanit 23a). Such deeply practical action within a spiritual framework is magnified by the dictum of Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai, “If you have a sapling in your hand and are told, ‘Look, the Messiah is here,’ you should first plant the sapling and then go out to welcome the Messiah” (The Fathers According to Rabbi Natan/Avot de-Rabbi Natan, Version B 31).

Trees are among the most dependable and useful vessels to guide people to be steadfast in the face of challenges both hidden and revealed, particularly in moments of transition.

When they behave properly, people are compared to the lasting physical and spiritual stature of trees, as they are when God fells them with a thundering crash for behaving badly (T B bechorot 45). The life and example of trees mirror human experience, and trees are provided special protection in times of dispute (Deuteronomy20:19). In a play on one of the Hebrew words for tree or brush–siah–it is said that trees are created as friends and partners for human beings, engaging them (mesihim) in constant dialogue (Gen Rabba 13:2)

In the traditional liturgy for the conclusion of the Torah service, the rabbis insert the verse, “She is a tree of life to them that grasp her, and all who hold onto her are happy” (Prov 13:8) This saying epitomizes rabbinic tradition’s most famous metaphorical use of the tree–as a symbol of Torah. Throughout the rabbinic canon, texts refer to the Torah as a tree of infinite knowledge, producing the fruits of new teachings and students over the generations.

Because no Jewish object or concept garners more respect or is more central than the Torah within rabbinic tradition, it is illuminating that the Rabbis choose the tree as a primary symbol for the presence of Torah in the world. If humanity’s failure of the moral litmus test at the Tree of Life in

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19 the Garden of Eden sets humankind on its journey into the world beyond paradise, the Tree of Life of Torah emerges as the source of protection, sustenance, and proper living that allows humankind to continually reconnect with its highest self.

20 A man was travelling through the desert, hungry, thirsty and tired, when he came upon a tree bearing luscious fruit and affording plenty of shade, underneath which ran a spring of water. He ate of the fruit, drank of the water and rested beneath the shade.

When he was about to leave, he turned to the tree and said: “Tree, O tree, with what should I bless you?

“Should I bless you that your fruit be sweet? Your fruit is already sweet.

“Should I bless you that your shade be plentiful? Your shade is plentiful. That a spring of water should run beneath you? A spring of water runs beneath you.

“There is one thing with which I can bless you: May it beG-d’s will that all the trees planted from your seeds should be like you . . .”

Taanis 5b

The Gemara relates: When they were taking leave of one another, Rav Naḥman said to Rabbi Yitzḥak: Master, give me a blessing. Rabbi Yitzḥak said to him: I will tell you a parable. To what is this matter comparable?

It is comparable to one who was walking through a desert and who was hungry, tired, and thirsty. And he found a tree whose fruits were sweet and whose shade was pleasant, and a stream of water flowed beneath it. He ate from the fruits of the tree, drank from the water in the stream, and sat in the shade of the tree.

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And when he wished to leave, he said: Tree, tree, with what shall I bless you? If I say to you that your fruits should be sweet, your fruits are already sweet; if I say that your shade should be pleasant, your shade is already pleasant; if I say that a stream of water should flow beneath you, a stream of water already flows beneath you. Rather, I will bless you as follows: May it be God’s will that all saplings which they plant from you.

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