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Notes and References NOTES AND REFERENCES Introduction 1. R. S. McNamara (with B. Van De Mark), In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York, 1995), p. 212. 1 Origins And Alternatives: Comments, Counter-facts and Commitments 1. David G. Marr, Vietnam 1945. The Qy,estfor Power (Berkeley, 1995) pp. 280- 281. 2. Stein Tpnnesson, The Vietnamese Revolution of 1945: Roosevelt, Ho Chi Minh and de Gaulle in a World at War (Oslo-London, 1991) p. 405, fn. 193. 3. RobertS. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York, 1995); reviewed in Asian Affairs, February 1996. 4. A. J Stockwell (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire Malaya Part II: The Communist Insurrection 1948-1953 (London, 1995). 5. Tpnnesson, op. cit., p. 364. 6. Tpnnesson, 'Did FDR provoke the Japanese Coup of 9 March 1945 in French Indochina?', paper presented to the Society of Historians of Amer­ ican Foreign Relations, June 1992. 7. S. Tpnnesson, 1946: Declenchement de laguerre d'Indochine (Paris, 1987). 8. A. Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya (London, 1975) p. 60. 9. William J Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (2nd edn) (Boulder, Colorado 1996). 10. Ronald H. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam. Advice and Support: The Early l:iiars 1941-1960 (Washington, DC, 1983). 11. Foreign Relations of the United States -1953, vol XII, p. 433. 12. Ibid. p. 1305. 13. Jacques Dalloz, The War in Indo-China 1945-54 (Dublin, 1990), p. 169. 14. Francois Joyaux, La Chine et le Reglement du Premier Conflit d'Indochine (Paris 1979) p. 297, 15. William Conrad Gibbons, The US Government and the Vietnam War Part: I 1945-1961 (Washington, DC 1984) p. 261. 16. Foreign Relations of the United States- 1954, voL XIII, p. 2154. 17. Gibbons, op. cit., p. 260. 18. Robert Buzzanco, Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era (Cambridge 1996), p. 55. 219 220 Notes and References 19. United States-Vietnam Relations I945-I967 (The 'Pentagon Papers'), bk 2, IV, A5, p. 90. 20. Ibid. p. 92. 21. Gibbons, op. cit., part 11: I96I-I964, p. 15. 22. Quoted in A. Short, The Origins of the Vietnam War (London, 1989), p. 1239. 23. McNamara, op. cit., p. 39. Other quotations may be found in Short, The Origins of the Vietnam War. 2 Coping With The United States: Hanoi's Search for an Effective Strategy I. T. Hoopes, as cited in Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington, 1979) p. 22. 2. For further accounts, see Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars, I945-I990 (New York 1991) p. 103; and Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: john Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (London 1990). 3. See Mark Bradley, in Jayne Werner and Luu Doan Huynh (eds), The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives (New York, 1993) ch. I. 4. 'Resolution of the Enlarged Plenum Conference of the ICP Central Com­ mittee, 15-17 January 1948', Party Documents (Hanoi, val. 6, 1964) p. 5. 5. See Chen Jian, 'China and the First Indochina War', China Quarterly, no. 133 (March 1993) pp. 93-5. 6. Ho Chi Minh, Selected Writings, val. 5 (Hanoi 1985) p. 122. 7. Party Documents (vol. 9) p. 60. 8. As Andrew Rotter pointed out, the DRV was the last communist regime to recognise the PRC. In a memorandum to Secretary of State Acheson, American ambassador to Thailand, Edwin Stanton, quoted a reliable source who reports that the decision on whether to accept Chinese aid remained a 'tremendous problem for the Ho Chi Minh government'. See A. Rotter, The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia (Ithaca, 1987) pp. 100, 171. 9. It might well be the reason why American officials called the DRV's offers for bilateral cooperation with the US during this period 'naive'. Interview by the author with Nordic historian Stein Tpnnesson, February 1995. 10. For more debate, see Robert Garson, The United States and China Since I949, (London, 1994) p. 41. ll. Party Documents, vol. 8, p. 260; Tran Buoi, The Anti-American Resistance of the Vietnamese People (Hanoi, 1985) p. 33; Institute of Party History, Party Events, vol. 3: I954-I975 (Hanoi 1985) pp. 34-5. 12. For further accounts, see Institute oflnternational Relations, President Ho Chi Minh and Diplomatic Activities (Hanoi, 1990) pp. 163-4. See also 'Diplo­ matic Initiatives and Foreign Relations of the DRV' in Carlyle A. Thayer, War by Other Means: National Liberation and Revolution in Vietnam, I954- I960 (Sydney, 1989) pp. 33-7, 73-9, 159-67. 13. Quang Loi, On the Last 8 rears of Implementing the Geneva Accords in Vietnam (Hanoi, 1962) pp. 10-ll. Notes and References 221 14. Bui Dinh Thanh, Vietnam: 45 Thars of Combating, Constructing and Renovat­ ing (Hanoi 1990) p. 49. 15. Geir Lundestad, East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics, 1945-1990 (Oslo 1994) ch. 4, pp. 101-21. 16. Nguyen Khac Vien, Contemporary Vietnam (Hanoi 1981) p. 173. 17. Nguyen Huu Tho, 'The National Liberation Front: A Founding Part of the Vietnamese History', in Vietnamese Father Front, Under the Same Banner (Hanoi, 1993) p. 16. 18. Le Duan, On the Vietnamese People's War (Hanoi, 1994) p. 103. 19. Institute of International Relations, President Ho Chi Minh and Diplomatic Activities, p. 170. 20. Nhuyen Huu Tho, 'The National Liberation Front', p. 20. 21. Tran Bach Dang, 'The Armed Struggle in the South', Under the Same Banner, p. 835. 22. Ibid. p. 835. 23. Ibid. p. 836. 24. The Institute of Army History, A History of the Anti-American War, voi. 11 (Hanoi, 1990) pp. 45-6. 25. Phan Minh Thao, 'The Truong Son Route', Under the Same Banner, p. 599. 26. Interview of researchers in Hanoi by the author, December 1994. 27. See George Herring, America's Longest War: United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, lst ed. (New York 1979) pp. 73-5. 28. The Third VWP National Congress Documents, voi. I (Hanoi, 1960) p. 23; see also US Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967 Pentagon Papers (Washington, 1971) IV. A. 5, pp. 65-6. 29. 'Nguy' is the Vietnamese term for the US-nurtured Saigon regimes. 30. Le Duan, 'Letter to Muoi Cue [Nguyen Van Linh]', Letters to the South (Hanoi, 1985) p. 60. 31. Ibid. p. 60. 32. Le Duan, On the Vietnamese People's War, p. 160. 33. Interviews of researchers in Hanoi by the author, December 1994. 34. For more accounts on Laos, see Ralph Smith, 'Laos: The Limits of Detente', in An International History of the Vietnam War, voi. I (New York, 1983) pt 11, ch. 7, pp. 115-34. See also, Kaysone Phomvihane, On the Main Experience and Questions of the Lao Revolution (Hanoi, 1979). 35. Le Duan, On the Vietnamese People's War, pp. 157-8. 36. Ibid. p. 186. 37. For example, see Thomas McCormick, America's Half- Century: United States Foreign Policy in the cold war (Baltimore, MD, 1989) p. 150. 38. Geir Lundestad, East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics, 1945-1990 p. 123; George MeT. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York, 1987) p. 397. 39. See Jeffrey Kimball, 'How Wars End: The Vietnam War', Peace & Change, 20 (January 1995) p. 191. 40. Le Duan's speech 'On the Vietnamese Revolution's Methods', given in the Journal of People's Army Editorial Board's Meeting in March 1967, first published in Le Duan, On the Vietnamese People's War, pp. 293-4. 222 Notes and References 41. Le Duan, 'Letter to the COSVN November 1965', On the VietnamRse People's War, pp. 240-293. 42. Le Duan, 'Letter to Xuan [Nguyen Chi Thanh], May 1965', On the VietnamRse People's War, p. 205. 43. Le Duan, 'Letter to the COSVN, November 1965', On the VietnamRse People's War, p. 241. 44. Events in Party's History, p. 392. This timing coincides with Ngo Vinh Long's estimation that Hanoi made its decision for the general offen­ sive-general uprisings by the end of December 1966. See Ngo Vinh Long, 'The Tet Offensive and Its Aftermath', Indochina Newsletter, no. 49 (January-February 1988) p. 3. James J. Wirtz, however, argued that the decision was made in July 1967 at a party conference following the funeral of Nguyen Chi Thanh. See James J. Wirtz, The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (Ithaca, 1981) p. 66. 45. Le Duan, 'Letter of 18 January 1968 to COSVN', On the Vietnamese People's War, pp. 338-9. 46. In the American historiography of the Vietnam War, the Vietnamese general offensive and general uprisings has been known as the Tet offen­ sive. For more American accounts of the Tet offensive, see 'A Very Near Thing: Tet offensive and After, 1968', in George Herring, America's Longest War: United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York 1979) ch. 6, pp. 183- 216; Wirtz, The Tel Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War; and 'Tet', in Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (London 1994) ch. 14. 4 7. Quoted in Tran Van Tra, 'Tet: The 1968 General Offensive and General Uprisings', in The Vietnam War: VietnamRse and American Perspectives, p. 40. 48. Ibid. pp. 52-3. 49. Tran Bach Dang, 'Tet: A Strategic Repertoire', in Under the Same Banner, p. 317. 50. Nguyen Co Thach, 'Interview', given to the SRV's MOFA, journal of International Relations (September 1990) Hanoi. 51. Chester Cooper, The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam (New York, 1970) p. 517; and George Ball, 'A Dissenter in the Government', in Andrew Rotter (ed.), Light at the End of the Tunnel: A Vietnam War Anthology (New York, 1971) ch.
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