Specters of “Isolationism”? Debating America’s Place in the Global Arena, c.1965-1974 by Erin Black A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of History University of Toronto © Copyright by Erin Black, 2009 Specters of “Isolationism”? Debating America’s Place in the Global Arena, c.1965-1974 Erin Black Doctor of Philosophy Department of History University of Toronto 2009 ABSTRACT The United States emerged from the Second World War determined to play a leading role in the maintenance of international order. Increasing levels of tension between the United States and the forces of communism after 1945, however, slowly forced a redefinition of what might be more distinctly termed America’s “global” responsibilities, such that by 1961 John F. Kennedy declared that the United States would “pay any price. .in order to assure the survival and success of liberty.” An identifiable Cold War consensus took shape based on the assumption that it was America’s responsibility to lead, protect, and defend, the “free-world.” Since America was effectively waging a battle to ensure the successful spread of its own values, the Cold War consensus also served to severely limit debate—dissent essentially implied disloyalty. By the mid-1960s, however, the Cold War consensus began to crack and a debate over American foreign policy began to emerge. That debate is the focus of this dissertation, which looks at the opposition to Cold War policies which emerged in the Senate, most notably among the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—many of whom had once played a role in developing the very foreign policies they now protested. The war in Vietnam provided the focal point for much of the dissent, but the foreign aid program also became heavily criticized, as did America’s ii iii NATO policy, particularly the size of the American military presence in Europe. More important, however, Senate dissenters came to question the United States’ very position as the principle defender of the free world. They did not dispute the idea that America had a significant role to play in the global arena, but they did not believe that role should consist of being the world’s policeman, the self-appointed arbiter of other’s affairs, and the keeper of the status quo. Because of their views, the so-called dissenters were labelled as “neo- isolationists.” They saw themselves the true “internationalists,” however, believing that the Cold War had led to confusion between internationalism and indiscriminate global involvement. Acknowledgements This dissertation would not have been possible without the aid and support of a number of different people and agencies. The University of Toronto and the Ontario Graduate Scholarship program funded much of my graduate education, though the majority of the research for this project was funded by the (Canada - U.S.) Fulbright Exchange Program, which also afforded me a wonderful year living in the United States. For offering me a welcoming home during that time, I wish to thank James Goldgeier, the George Washington Cold War Group at IERES, and the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. I am also indebted to the staff at a number of research facilities, in particular: Rodney Ross, an extremely helpful Congressional Archivist at the National Archives of the United States, Washington DC (Archives I); Vera Ekechukwu, the care-taker of the J. William Fulbright Papers at the University of Arkansas, Fayetteville; Donna McCrae, who assisted me in my research in the Mike Mansfield Papers at the K. Ross Toole Archives in the Mike and Maureen Mansfield Library, University of Montana, Missoula; and the general staff at the National Archives in College Park, MD (Archives II). Much closer to home, I would like to extend my gratitude to Ronald Pruessen, my supervisor. His unflagging support, encouragement, wisdom, and guidance have seen me through this project in ways that I can never repay (and that he probably is not even aware of). Similar thanks are also owed to Margaret MacMillan and Robert Bothwell, both of whom served on my dissertation committee. I would also like to acknowledge Carol Chin. She has been an incredible mentor to me and her support, both intellectual and moral, carried me through a number of frustrating times. In particular, when faced with the sheer volume of my iv v research, Carol helped get me writing in the first place (and she helped keep me writing by offering sage advice on balancing teaching responsibilities with completing the dissertation). Last, though he is not so close to home, I would like to thank Thomas Zeiler of the University of Colorado at Boulder. Dr. Zeiler served as my external appraisal and I could not have asked for a more detailed, thoughtful, and helpful review of my dissertation. I am also fortunate to have had a great group of people in the graduate history program sharing this journey with me. The cohort I entered the program with went out of its way to create a network amongst itself both inside and outside of graduate life. Others, who were either already in the program or came later, also became key sources of support, and life-long friends. Though hesitant to single out people (for fear of offending others), I do wish to extend a special thanks to Mairi MacDonald. She has graciously served as my principal sounding board, both for matters pertaining to this project and matters of life in general. Her support on both fronts will be forever appreciated. Outside of “PhD’dom” I would like to recognize Liviya Mendelsohn. Liv, quite frankly, helped keep me sane on several occasions. Last and certainly not least, this would not have been possible without the encouragement and support of my family—especially my sister, Rose, who has also been my roommate for the vast majority of this journey. She deserves recognition not only for consistently supporting me, but for having also managed to put up with me in the many moments when I was undoubtedly unbearable to live with! It is to Rose, and to my mother, that I dedicate this thesis. Also to the Boys (who shall remain unidentified beyond this simple description). Table of Contents Abstract ii Acknowledgements iv Introduction 1 Chapter 1: Cracks in the Cold War Consensus 21 Chapter 2: Foreign Aid: “One of the Most Vexing 65 Problems of American Foreign Policy” Chapter 3: Vietnam, Part I: 101 “All Choices Open to Us Are Bad Choices” Chapter 4: Vietnam, Part II: 150 “The Most Troublesome Question Before Our Country” Chapter 5: NATO: The Call for 197 “A Long Over Due Adjustment” Chapter 6: “The Time has Come for Congress to Draw the Line”: 231 Debating Foreign Aid, Vietnam, and NATO in the Nixon Administration Chapter 7: Debating America’s Place in the Global Arena: 275 Specters of “Isolationism”? Bibliography 325 vi Introduction The question of what constitutes an appropriate role for the United States in the global arena is of central importance to understanding American foreign relations. This dissertation examines a period, c.1965-1974, when the struggle to answer that question was particularly pronounced. More specifically, it focuses on a debate emerging between the Johnson and Nixon administrations and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The former subscribed to the Cold War consensus, which operated on the assumption that because of everything the United States stood for, America’s immense power obligated it to assume the role of protector and defender of the “free world.” The latter, while not disputing the idea that the United States had significant responsibilities in the global arena, nonetheless came to reject the idea, originally inspired by the Cold War, that the United States should function as the world’s policeman—the self-appointed arbiter of others’ affairs, and the keeper of the status quo. America’s sense of its role in the global arena has, of course, evolved over time. Indeed, the struggle to answer the question of what constitutes an appropriate role for the United States within the global arena has in many ways determined the construction of foreign policy throughout the history of the United States. There have been periods of both consensus and disagreement. For example, through much of the nineteenth century Americans sought to actively insert themselves in the international economy while refraining from becoming too closely connected or “entangled” politically with European nations and their interests.1 This 1 “Entangled” is in reference to Thomas Jefferson’s 1801 declaration that the United States would have “peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.” See James Richardson, Ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1798-1897 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898), Vol.1, 323. Jefferson’s statement was a reiteration of George Washington’s 1796 Farewell Address. 1 2 position is often referred to as “isolationism,” though few Americans actually intended to isolate the United States. Rather, it was believed that since America’s interests were so fundamentally different from those of Europe—the United States was, after all, committed to democratic principles not reflected in the structure of European monarchies and politics—it was unnecessary for America to involve itself in European affairs. As America’s role in the world expanded, however, there were instances of profound disagreement as to what the nature of that role should be. The 1898 debate over the annexation of the Philippines provides a good example of this, with some Americans being deeply opposed to that action because they feared that by participating in the larger colonial order, the United States would more likely be drawn into international conflict.