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Ann Arbor, MI 48106 l FROM PEACE-THROUGH-STRENGTH TO PEACE-THROUGH DENUCLEARIZATION: A COGNITIVE ANALYSIS OF RONALD REAGAN'S SOVIET POLICY by Amy McAuliffe submitted to the School of International Service of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs w Dean~ of the ~hu'---College or School ~{e 1-pY• / ) /qq3 1993 The American University Washington, D.C. 20016 T:iIE AHE.RlCAH UNIVERSITY LIBRA.R1 {§) COPYRIGHT by AMY MCAULIFFE 1993 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED i FROM PEACE-THROUGH-STRENGTH TO PEACE-THROUGH DENUCLEARI ZATION: A COGNITIVE ANALYSIS OF RONALD REAGAN'S SOVIET POLICY BY Amy McAuliffe ABSTRACT This analysis answers a pertinent question: did changes in President Ronald Reagan's belief system prompt him to adopt a more conciliatory soviet policy? Defining Reagan's core beliefs as anti-Communism, anti-sovietism and anti nuclearism, the paper examines the major events in u.s. Soviet policy through the prism of Reagan's belief system. The author finds that changes in Reagan's Soviet policy were not a result of changes in his belief system but the result of the interaction of a number of factors, including the rise of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the culmination of the U.S. military buildup, and personnel turnover in the Reagan Administration. These factors allowed Reagan to disassociate the Soviet Union from Communism and to engage genuinely in arms control and reduction talks. At the end of his Presidency, Reagan's anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism remained intact but began to lose their salience. As these beliefs became less pronounced, Reagan's anti-nuclearism became more salient. His core beliefs remained in place but assumed a new hierarchy. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Dr. William Kincade for his valuable insights and editing skill. I would also like to thank my parents for their encouragement. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction . ................................ 1 II. Cog~itive ~n~ Lear~ing Approaches to Foreign Policy Dec1s1onrnak1ng •••••••••••••••••••••••• 9 III. Reagan•s Belief systern ••••••••••••••••••••••• 24 Anti-sovietism .......... ..................... 24 Anti-communism .. ............................. 26 Anti-Nuclearism .............................. 31 Reagan's View of Mutually Assured Destruction . ................................. 3 3 IV. The Early Years: 1981-1982 ••••••••••••••••••• 38 Reagan and Arms Control •....•...••..•.••.•••• 44 Influence of Advisors ..•...••....•..•.••.•••• 48 The INF Negotiations .......••..•.•...•••.••.• 55 The Walk-in-the-Woods .••.........•....••.•••• 62 v. Relations Oscillate: 1983-1984 ••••••••••••••• 68 Major Influences on Reagan ........•..••.••••• 72 The Shultz Memo . ....................•.•...••• 7 9 VI. Reagan and Gorbachev Redirect Relations . ................................... 87 Geneva Summit . ................................ 9 3 Reengagament at Rekjavik ..••••...•....•..•••• 99 VII. A New Era in Relations: 1987-1988 •••••••••••• 106 Washington Summit .•.............•.•.••••••••• 109 Moscow Summit . •..................•..•••.••••. 114 Conclusion ................................... 120 I. INTRODUCTION Speaking before the National Association of Evangelicals in 1983, President Ronald Reagan labeled the Soviet Union the "focus of evil in the modern world." In 1988, Reagan addressed a group of soviet students in Moscow, the Soviet capital, and asserted that "freedom stirs in the air. 11 These disparate images reflect the historic changes that occurred in u.s.-soviet relations during the Reagan Auministration (1981-1989). Ronald Reagan's policy toward the Soviet Union changed dramatically during his two terms in office. The man who had once been seen as the epitome of a Cold Warrior was ultimately remembered as Mikhail Gorbachev's partner in forging a new era in u.s.-soviet relations. The man who had seemed to reject the negotiated regulation of conventional and nuclear weapons came to the brink of eliminating nuclear weapons in 1986 at the Reykjavik Summit. As in his soviet policy, Reagan himself appeared to have changed. This analysis attempts to answer a pertinent question: did changes in his belief system prompt Reagan to adopt a more conciliatory Soviet policy? The following pages outline the author's finding that changes in Reagan's Soviet policy were not a result of changes in his belief system. These policy l 2 changes were, rather, the result of the interaction of a number of international and domestic factors. Reaqan•s Belief system A leader's belief system has been defined as his set of core values, encompassing his theories about the nature of politics and ideology and his images of international adversaries and his own nation. 1 As this an~lysis attempts to document, when Reagan entered office, his belief system was characterized by three dominant beliefs: anti-Communism, anti-Sovietism and anti-nuclearism. Through his denunciations of the Communist system and ideology and his attacks on Soviet 'expansionism,' Reagan regularly voiced his anti-Communist and anti-soviet views for domestic and international audiences. However, the President's other essential belief--his anti-nuclearism--was shrouded from the public by Reagan's advisors. Despite a few public comments about nuclear abolition, such as the President's 1983 speech before the Japanese Diet, Reagan's anti-nuclear beliefs were unknown to the American and international public before the Reykjavik summit. 1 Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: the Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 230-231. 3 Impediments to Policy Change Throughout his first term, Reagan's soviet policy was influenced by his anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism, preventing the President from engaging in more than a limited u.s.-soviet dialogue. For example, the President's interest in u.s.-soviet arms control was primarily driven by political considerations, including his desire to push his defense program through a reluctant Congress and pressure from the European allies to adopt a less confrontational Soviet policy. 2 Reagan's half-hearted dedication to arms control was evident in the inequitable proposals tabled at the intermediate nuclear forces (INF) talks by the U.S., such as the "zero option," which required larger reductions by the U.S.S.R., including weapons covering China. In the President's mind, however, u.s.-soviet detente could not occur until the Soviet Union began to reform itself and the U.S. had transformed the military and nuclear balance. 3 Although Reagan was, at the time, a nuclear abolitionist in principle, his anti-nuclear beliefs were less salient than his anti-Communism and anti-sovietism. 2 See, for instance, Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nucl ear strategy, 2nd ed. (New York: st. Martin's Press, 1989), pp. 403-404; and John P. Cartwright, MP and Julian Critchley, MP, Cruise, Pershing and ss-20 (New York: Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1985), p. 12. 3 Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: An American Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1990), pp. 548-549. Hereinafter cited as Life. 4 In addition to Reagan's two most salient beliefs-- anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism--a number of other elements prevented the U.S. from sustaining a policy of improved relations with the Soviets in his first term. The Reagan Administration was replete with anti-Communists who adopted an uncompromising approach to u.s.-soviet relations. 4 Led by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Assistant Security of Defense for International Security Policy Richard Perle and National Security Assistant William Clark, administration hardliners joined together to block arms control proposals and recommendations

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