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From peace-through-strength to peace-through-denuclearization: A cognitive analysis of Ronald Reagan's Soviet policy
McAuliffe, Amy Ann, M.A. The American University, 1993
Copyright @1993 by McAuliffe, Amy Ann. All rights reserved.
U·M·I 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106 l
FROM PEACE-THROUGH-STRENGTH TO PEACE-THROUGH DENUCLEARIZATION: A COGNITIVE ANALYSIS OF RONALD REAGAN'S SOVIET POLICY
by Amy McAuliffe submitted to the School of International Service of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs
w Dean~ of the ~hu'---College or School ~{e 1-pY• / ) /qq3
1993 The American University Washington, D.C. 20016
T:iIE AHE.RlCAH UNIVERSITY LIBRA.R1 {§) COPYRIGHT
by
AMY MCAULIFFE
1993
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED i
FROM PEACE-THROUGH-STRENGTH TO PEACE-THROUGH
DENUCLEARI ZATION: A COGNITIVE ANALYSIS OF
RONALD REAGAN'S SOVIET POLICY
BY
Amy McAuliffe
ABSTRACT
This analysis answers a pertinent question: did changes
in President Ronald Reagan's belief system prompt him to
adopt a more conciliatory soviet policy? Defining Reagan's
core beliefs as anti-Communism, anti-sovietism and anti
nuclearism, the paper examines the major events in u.s.
Soviet policy through the prism of Reagan's belief system.
The author finds that changes in Reagan's Soviet policy were not a result of changes in his belief system but the
result of the interaction of a number of factors, including
the rise of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the culmination
of the U.S. military buildup, and personnel turnover in the
Reagan Administration. These factors allowed Reagan to disassociate the Soviet Union from Communism and to engage genuinely in arms control and reduction talks.
At the end of his Presidency, Reagan's anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism remained intact but began to lose their
salience. As these beliefs became less pronounced, Reagan's
anti-nuclearism became more salient. His core beliefs
remained in place but assumed a new hierarchy. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Dr. William Kincade for his valuable insights and editing skill. I would also like to thank my parents for their encouragement. ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ...... 1
II. Cog~itive ~n~ Lear~ing Approaches to Foreign Policy Dec1s1onrnak1ng •••••••••••••••••••••••• 9
III. Reagan•s Belief systern ••••••••••••••••••••••• 24 Anti-sovietism ...... 24 Anti-communism ...... 26 Anti-Nuclearism ...... 31 Reagan's View of Mutually Assured Destruction ...... 3 3
IV. The Early Years: 1981-1982 ••••••••••••••••••• 38 Reagan and Arms Control •....•...••..•.••.•••• 44 Influence of Advisors ..•...••....•..•.••.•••• 48 The INF Negotiations ...... ••..•.•...•••.••.• 55 The Walk-in-the-Woods .••...... •....••.•••• 62 v. Relations Oscillate: 1983-1984 ••••••••••••••• 68 Major Influences on Reagan ...... •..••.••••• 72 The Shultz Memo ...... •.•...••• 7 9
VI. Reagan and Gorbachev Redirect Relations ...... 87 Geneva Summit ...... 9 3 Reengagament at Rekjavik ..••••...•....•..•••• 99
VII. A New Era in Relations: 1987-1988 •••••••••••• 106 Washington Summit .•...... •.•.••••••••• 109 Moscow Summit . •...... •..•••.••••. 114 Conclusion ...... 120 I. INTRODUCTION
Speaking before the National Association of Evangelicals in 1983, President Ronald Reagan labeled the Soviet Union the "focus of evil in the modern world." In 1988, Reagan addressed a group of soviet students in Moscow, the Soviet capital, and asserted that "freedom stirs in the air. 11
These disparate images reflect the historic changes that occurred in u.s.-soviet relations during the Reagan
Auministration (1981-1989).
Ronald Reagan's policy toward the Soviet Union changed dramatically during his two terms in office. The man who had once been seen as the epitome of a Cold Warrior was ultimately remembered as Mikhail Gorbachev's partner in forging a new era in u.s.-soviet relations. The man who had seemed to reject the negotiated regulation of conventional and nuclear weapons came to the brink of eliminating nuclear weapons in 1986 at the Reykjavik Summit. As in his soviet policy, Reagan himself appeared to have changed. This analysis attempts to answer a pertinent question: did changes in his belief system prompt Reagan to adopt a more conciliatory Soviet policy? The following pages outline the author's finding that changes in Reagan's Soviet policy were not a result of changes in his belief system. These policy
l 2
changes were, rather, the result of the interaction of a
number of international and domestic factors.
Reaqan•s Belief system
A leader's belief system has been defined as his set of
core values, encompassing his theories about the nature of
politics and ideology and his images of international
adversaries and his own nation. 1 As this an~lysis attempts
to document, when Reagan entered office, his belief system was characterized by three dominant beliefs: anti-Communism,
anti-Sovietism and anti-nuclearism. Through his
denunciations of the Communist system and ideology and his
attacks on Soviet 'expansionism,' Reagan regularly voiced
his anti-Communist and anti-soviet views for domestic and
international audiences. However, the President's other
essential belief--his anti-nuclearism--was shrouded from the
public by Reagan's advisors. Despite a few public comments
about nuclear abolition, such as the President's 1983 speech
before the Japanese Diet, Reagan's anti-nuclear beliefs were
unknown to the American and international public before the
Reykjavik summit.
1 Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: the Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 230-231. 3
Impediments to Policy Change
Throughout his first term, Reagan's soviet policy was
influenced by his anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism,
preventing the President from engaging in more than a
limited u.s.-soviet dialogue. For example, the President's
interest in u.s.-soviet arms control was primarily driven by
political considerations, including his desire to push his defense program through a reluctant Congress and pressure
from the European allies to adopt a less confrontational
Soviet policy. 2 Reagan's half-hearted dedication to arms
control was evident in the inequitable proposals tabled at the intermediate nuclear forces (INF) talks by the U.S.,
such as the "zero option," which required larger reductions by the U.S.S.R., including weapons covering China. In the
President's mind, however, u.s.-soviet detente could not occur until the Soviet Union began to reform itself and the
U.S. had transformed the military and nuclear balance. 3
Although Reagan was, at the time, a nuclear abolitionist in principle, his anti-nuclear beliefs were less salient than his anti-Communism and anti-sovietism.
2 See, for instance, Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nucl ear strategy, 2nd ed. (New York: st. Martin's Press, 1989), pp. 403-404; and John P. Cartwright, MP and Julian Critchley, MP, Cruise, Pershing and ss-20 (New York: Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1985), p. 12.
3 Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: An American Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1990), pp. 548-549. Hereinafter cited as Life. 4
In addition to Reagan's two most salient beliefs-- anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism--a number of other elements prevented the U.S. from sustaining a policy of improved relations with the Soviets in his first term. The
Reagan Administration was replete with anti-Communists who adopted an uncompromising approach to u.s.-soviet relations. 4 Led by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger,
Assistant Security of Defense for International Security
Policy Richard Perle and National Security Assistant William
Clark, administration hardliners joined together to block arms control proposals and recommendations for improved u.s.-soviet relations. 5 These advisors consciously bolstered Reagan's own anti-communist and anti-Soviet beliefs in a concerted effort to block any substantial progress in u.s.-soviet arms control. 6
Two other important factors which barred Reagan from pursuing a more conciliatory Soviet policy were his views of
4 For a discussion of the views of the Soviet Union held by members of the Reagan Administration, see Ronald Brownstein and Nina Easton, Reagan's Ruling Class, Portraits of the President's Top 100 Officials (Washington, D.C.: The Presidential Accountability Group, 1982).
5 See Brownstein and Easton, Reagan's Ruling Class; Keith L. Shimko, Images and Arms Control: Perceptions of the Soviet Union in the Reagan Administration (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1991), chapter 5; and Strobe Talbott, The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Age (New York: Knopf, 1988), chapter 5.
6 Ibid. 5
the relationship of U.S. military, especially nuclear, strength and arms control. According to the President, the
U.S. could only compel the Soviets to negotiate once it had revitalized its conventional and nuclear capabilities. 7
Reagan was truly dedicated to such a policy of 'peace- through-strength.' In the President's thinking, the Soviet response to a U.S. military and nuclear expansion would seriously strain the already-ailing Soviet economy. The
Soviets would, therefore, be forced to negotiate. 8
Additionally, in order for the U.S. to agree to genuine arms reductions, Reagan believed the Soviets themselves would have to agree to substantial cuts.
Factors Influencing Policy Change
By his last year in office, although Reagan's Soviet policy had evolved significantly, the President's core beliefs remained unchanged. His anti-nuclearism was now revealed. Reagan's dream of nuclear abolition was exposed at the 1986 Iceland summit. 9 It appeared, however, that the President had abandoned his anti-Communist and anti-
Soviet philosophy. Reagan was now willing to conduct
7 Reagan, Life, pp. 561-564.
8 Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1991), pp. 296-297. Hereinafter cited as Role.
9 For a discussion of Reagan's dream of nuclear abolition, see Cannon, Role, pp. 289-291. 6
serious,extended negotiations with Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev. The President even visited Moscow for a summit in
1988.
A closer analysis of the President's belief system,
however, reveals that Reagan never abandoned his opposition
to the Communist system and ideology. Rather, Reagan's
attacks on Soviet expansionism and ideological
indoctrination ceased only because the President believed
that the Soviet Union was changing. In the President's mind, Gorbachev's Soviet Union was different from the
country with which he had negotiated during his first
term. 10 The nation was led by a new, reformist leader who
attempted to promote 'new thinking' in Soviet foreign policy
and new freedom and economic restructuring in Soviet
domestic politics. Gorbachev was also a man who was willing
to agree to the deep cuts in the soviet arsenal called for
by American conservatives for years. Additionally, Reagan was able to groom a personal relationship with Gorbachev, a
relationship to which the President accorded great
importance. Reagan, therefore, no longer attacked those
features of the Communist system which he believed were
being reformed in Moscow: the soviet approach to foreign
policy and Soviet attempts at ideological hegemony. He did,
10 Reagan, Life, p. 707; Don Oberdorfer, The Turn: From Cold War to a New Era (New York: Poisedon Press, 1991), p. 294. Hereinafter cited as The Turn. 7
however, continue to denounce those aspects of the Communist
system which he felt were being perpetuated by Moscow, such
as human rights violations.
As Reagan began to disassociate Gorbachev's Soviet Union
from Communism, the following analysis demonstrates that the
President's anti-Communism and anti-sovietism, although
remaining intact, started to lose their salience. As these
beliefs became less prominent, the President's anti-
nuclearism became more pronounced and his belief system
began to assume a new hierarchy. Indeed, the rise of
Gorbachev interacted with Reagan's emerging pronounced anti-
nuclearism and other important factors--the culmination of
the U.S. military buildup and personnel turnover in the
Reagan Administration--to propel Reagan to pursue
rapprochement with the Soviets. By 1985, the United States
had significantly increased spending for its conventional military and strategic nuclear forces. 11 Additionally,
although the Reagan Administration was still divided over
Soviet policy, a number of more moderate advisors had become
a part of Reagan's national security team. Prominent among them was Secretary of state George Shultz, who fought to
implement his blueprint for improved u.s.-soviet relations
11 Ronald J. Sullivan, "Dealing with the soviets" in American Defense Policy, 6th ed., Schuyler Foerster and Edward N. Wright, eds. (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), pp. 182-184. 8
Although Reagan's policy toward the Soviet Union was
greatly different in 1988 from his policy in 1981, Ronald
Reagan never reassessed his belief system. The three most
important components of his belief system, anti-Communism,
anti-Sovietism and anti-nuclearism, remained in place but
assumed a new hierarchy. The President's willingness to view the Soviet Union differently was not a result of a
reevaluation of his core beliefs. It was, rather, a result
of the confluence of a number of factors. What prompted
Reagan to engage the Soviets was the interaction of his
anti-nuclear beliefs with changes that occurred in his own
administration, in the military balance, and in the Soviet
Union itself. The interaction of these factors allowed
Reagan's anti-nuclearisrn to become the most prominent
feature of his belief system. The policy implications of this interaction were historic. Reagan's policy of peace through-strength was transformed into a policy of peace through-denuclearization II. THE COGNITIVE AND LEARNING APPROACHES TO FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONMAKING
Certain cognitive theorists, including Robert Jervis,
Robert Axelrod and Richard Ned Lebow, have long been
concerned with policy and decisionmaking errors resulting
from misperceptions. 12 Recently, the study of
decisionmaking has begun to focus on "learning theory" or
"governmental learning." The analytic approach used in this
work utilizes both cognitive analysis and foreign policy
learning analysis to explain the dramatic shift in Ronald
Reagan's Soviet policy.
The cognitive Model
An umbrella term for an approach to foreign policy
decisionmaking, the cognitive model concentrates upon the
psychological aspects of information processing and
decisionmaking. The cognitive model posits that
decisionmakers frequently simplify complex decisions by
filtering incoming information through their belief system
12 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperceptin in International Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton and University Press, 1976). Herinafter cited as Perception and Misperception. Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of Internation Crisis (Balitmore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 1981). Hereinafter cited as Peace and War. Robert M. Axelrod structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites (Princeton, New Jersy: Princeton University Press, 1976). Herinafter cited as Strcuture of Decision.
9 10
As defined by Ole Holsti, a leader's belief system
comprises:
••• both theories about international politics and images of other actors. The latter consists of expectations, both general and specific, about the short- and long-term objectives of these actors, their capabilities, willingness to use force, and general diplomatic style. 13
Ingrained and deeply-held mindsets, leaders' belief
systems are relatively stable and difficult to alter.
Individuals, including decisionmakers, resort to these
stable simplifications for a variety of reasons: to organize
information and minimize information conflict; to avoid
ambiguity; and to cope with value complexity. 14 Incoming
information that may contradict decisionmakers' belief
systems and force a reappraisal of their core beliefs is
often dismissed. Rather than accepting discrepant
information, leaders frequently ignore the information or
downgrade its importance or source. Because the belief
systems of foreign policy elites tend to be so stable, the
cognitive model assumes that the policy formulated by these
13 Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy," in David Finley, Ole Holsti, and Richard Fagen, eds., Enemies in Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), pp. 25-96, as quoted in Lebow, Between Peace and War, p. 230.
14 See Alexander George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), chapter 2. Hereinafter cited as Presidential Decisionmaking. 11
elites is also difficult to alter. Policy tends to change only incrementally.
Images and Policy
A wide array of literature focuses on the cognitive model and the psychological aspects of the decisionmaking process. Robert Jervis's Perception and Misperception in
International Politics is one of the original efforts to employ the cognitive model. 15 In this seminal work, Jervis emphasizes the relevance of the cognitive model in explaining the decisions of foreign policy elites:
••• it is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decisionmakers' beliefs about the world and their images of others. 16
According to Jervis, leaders' images of their adversaries are crucial components of their belief systems.
Indeed, policymakers develop particular images of their adversaries to which they become committed. These images predominate in the minds of policymakers and the behavior of their adversaries is primarily viewed through these prisms.
Information that contradicts these images will generally be ignored or viewed as adversaries' attempts to deceive their opponents. Adhering to these images despite discrepant information, policymakers are attempting to maintain
"cognitive consistency." According to Jervis:
15 Jervis, Perception and Misperception.
16 Ibid., p. 28. 12
Consistency can largely be understood in terms of the strong tendency for people to see what they expect to see and to assimilate incoming information to pre existing images. 17
The psychological need to maintain cognitive consistency
has major implications in the realm of policymaking. Jervis
emphasizes that cognitive consistency tends to breed both
"satisficing" and "incrementalism" in images and
policymaking. Satisficing implies that a leader accepts the
first image of an adversary that "provides a decent fit. 1118
Rather than developing a more explanatory, generally more
complex, image, policymakers tend to choose one that is merely satisfactory. These images, in turn, contribute to
policy formulation. Thus, policy, like the images upon which it is based, is formulated according to a satisficing
rather than an optimizing decision rule:
Because the search for a course of action that will yield the highest possible payoff is often impractical, most people settle for a course of action that is •good enough, ' one that offers a sufficient rather than a maximum payoff. 19
The need of policymakers to maintain cognitive
consistency often also results.in reliance on the strategy
of incrementalism. According to Alexander George, another
cognitive theorist, incrementalism involves considering a
17 Ibid., p. 25.
18 Ibid., p. 191.
19 George, Presidential Decisionmaking, p. 40. 13
"narrow range of policy options that differ only slightly
from existing policies and aim at securing marginal rather
than dramatic improvements." 20 Examining only a limited
realm of policy options which conform to their pre-existing
images, decisionmakers encourage policy stability and
incrementalism. Major policy overhauls are avoided and
policy is changed only gradually over long periods of time.
Jervis also details the major factors which shape the
images of policymakers. One of these factors is the
memories statesman hold of important events in international
history. Often, policymakers employ past events as
analogies for present situations. Jervis warns that such
use of analogies may have detrimental effects on policy
formulation:
[Analogies] often obscure aspects of the present case that are different from the past one. For this reason, a dramatic and important experience often hinders later decision-making by providing an analogy that will be employed too quickly, easily, and widely. 21
According to Jervis, certain types of events tend to have a more powerful impact upon policymakers: those events that
are seen firsthand, those that occur early in their adult
lives and those that affect both the policymakers and their
countries. 22 In Jervis' application of the cognitive
20 Ibid.
21 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, p. 220.
22 Ibid., p. 281. 14
model, then, policymakers tend to see what they expect.
They steadfastly cling to their images of their opponents despite discrepant and contradictory information. Changes in images and, consequently, changes in policy, are rare.
Thus, "premature cognitive closure," the tendency of statesmen to hold to an established view and quickly reject discrepant information, contributes to incrementalism, satisficing and policy stagnation. 23
Cognitive Mapping
Another early application of the cognitive model is
Robert Axelrod's Structure of Decision, in which Axelrod utilizes the theory of cognitive mapping to examine the cognitive processes of foreign policy elites. 24 Axelrod's cognitive maps, abstracted by observers of decisionmakers, consist of points, which are concepts used by decisionmakers, and arrows, which are the causal links between the points. The author asserts that, in the realm of foreign policy, there are not necessarily "direct linkages between beliefs and actions ... " 25 Beliefs are one of a number of factors, including domestic politics and international rules of conduct, which influence policy
23 Ibid., p. 187.
24 Robert Axelrod, Structure of Decision.
25 Ibid. I p. 34. 15
formulation. Cognitive maps, then, are not "direct guides
to actions" of foreign policymakers but, rather, are tools
that form a lens or prism through which an observer can
examine the policymaking process. 26
Axelrod argues that the cognitive processes of
decisionmakers produce lenses through which international
events are viewed. The cognitive model, in Axelrod's case,
the cognitive map, represents 11 ••• one of several clusters of
intervening variables that may shape and constrain decision
making behavior." 27 The author notes, however, that
cognitive processes are only one of the variables which
shape decisionmaking. However helpful the cognitive model may be, it can never fully explain decisionmaking in any
particular instance. In many instances, bureaucratic
politics, organizational behavior, or partisan politics have
some effect on the decisionmaking process. As this analysis
documents, in devising policy, a leader's belief system
interacts with a host of domestic and international
conditions. In sum, cognitive mapping is "one specific
approach to belief systems [which] focuses on causal beliefs
and values and their structural relationships." 28
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid. p. 108 16
International crises In Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis, cited earlier, Richard Ned Lebow examines the role of cognitive processes in international crises. He distinguishes between two types of approaches: one focuses on cognitive bias or error; the other, on motivated bias or error •. Cognitive bias implies that foreign policy elites see what they expect in the international arena. An analysis focusing on motivated bias, on the other hand, "emphasizes the importance of motivation as a source of perceptual distortion." 29 This model assumes that human beings are emotional, rather than rational, and are seriously affected by emotional stress when they are in the process of making important decisions. This stress prevents decisionmakers from making rational decisions. In such instances, decisionmakers respond by "procrastinating, rationalizing, or denying (their] responsibility for the decision. 11 30 Although Lebow attempts to distinguish between these two constructs, he admits that it is often difficult to separate them.
29 Ibid., p. 107. Lebow is following the work of Irving Janis and Leon Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment (New York: Free Press, 1977). 30 Ibid., p. 108. 17
For the purposes of this analysis, both the cognitive and the motivational approach will be considered in tandem as part of the cognitive model. The distinction between them can, in fact, be dismissed, on the assumption that distortion in human information processing has both cognitive and motivational sources, without the observer being able to determine the relative proportions. The specific cause of a misperception is less relevant than the fact that a misperception had a substantial impact upon the formulation or implementation of policy.
Lebow's application of the cognitive model to international crises reveals the central role played by misperception in crisis situations. The study concentrates primarily on what Lebow deems brinksmanship crises.
According to the author, these crises involve "the art of intentionally forcing crises to the brink of hostilities in order to compel the other side to retreat." 31 Lebow•s study suggests that it is not the objective presence of a vulnerable commitment that is a precondition of a brinksmanship crisis. Instead, it is the "perception by the initiator that such a vulnerable commitment exists" that is most likely to precipitate such a crisis. 32 Using the cognitive approach, Lebow's analysis highlights the
31 Ibid. I p. 80.
32 Ibid. I p. 91. 18
limitations of human cognitive processes and how these limitations distort the decisionmaking process. Like
Jervis, Lebow stresses the importance of national self- images and policymakers' images of their adversaries. The author also examines cognitive consistency and how this psychological process may cause "systemic bias in favor of information consistent with information that (one] has already assimilated·" 33 Like Jervis, Lebow stresses that the stability of leaders' images or mindsets contribute to the stability of policy.
The Cognitive Framework and Deterrence
In Psychology and Deterrence, authors Richard Ned Lebow, Robert Jervis and Janice Gross Stein examine deterrence through a cognitive framework. 34 Although the topic of deterrence is not central to this analysis, the book provides additional insights into the role of cognitive processes in decisionmaking. The authors demonstrate how, in reality, deterrence does not function according to contemporary American theory. Due to defects in policymakers' information processing and decisionmaking,
"the effects of threats often differ from those posited by
33 Ibid., p. 104.
34 Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985). 19
deterrence theory." 35 The authors point out that cognitive or psychological biases actually perform an important role for policymakers: these biases "conserve cognitive resources and allow people to avoid being overwhelmed by complexity and ambiguity." 36 Yet, at the same time, these biases cause both misperceptions and misguided policy.
The authors' analysis of deterrence failures, failures caused to some degree by failures in signalling and threats, is extremely relevant in understanding the cognitive approach to decisionmaking analysis. Lebow, Jervis and stein argue that perceptions and images held by adversaries are crucial to the successs or failure of deterrence:
Signals that seem clear to the sender are missed or misinterpreted by the receiver; actions meant to convey one impression often leave quite a different one; attempts to deter often enrage, and attempts to show calm strength may appear as weakness. 37
Although the authors examine the impact of cognitive processes on deterrence, their conclusions are applicable to international relations in general. Misinterpreted signals and threats impact the daily interactions of nations because the way decisionmakers process information has a major impact on their foreign policy decisions. Leaders' overall images of their adversaries are part of the prisms through
35 Ibid., p. 2.
36 Ibid. I p. 4.
37 Ibid. I p. 1. 20
which they filter incoming data about the international actions of other nations. Thus, if leaders have negative image·s of other nations which are ingrained, actions by the adversarial nations that are intended to be benign or conciliatory may be viewed as provocative. Even in the face of counter-evidence, decisionmakers tend to cling to their pre-existing images. This image stability encourages policy stability, as leaders employ strategies of incrementalism and avoid major policy revisions.
Policymaking constraints In Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice, Alexander George examines the constraints policymakers experience when making difficult decisions. 38 George utilizes the concept of 'operational code,' a variant of Jervis' 'images' and other theorists 'mindsets.' According to George, a leader's operational code: [refers to beliefs] that serve as a prism or filter that influence[s) the actor's perception and diagnosis of political situations and that provide[s) norms and standards to guide and channel his choices of action in specific situations. 39 According to George, there are two main constraints faced by policymakers: value-complexity and uncertainty.
38 George, Presidential Decisionmaking. 39 Ibid. , p. 45. 21
Value-complexity refers to the "presence of multiple,
competing values and interests that are imbedded in a single
issue.'' 40 Uncertainty refers to the inadequate or
insufficient knowledge available regarding the decision.
George argues that, to deal with these constraints, foreign
policy elites use a number of psychological tools, tools
which influence the decisionmaking process. one such
psychological tool is bolstering, when decisionmakers
increase the attractiveness of the preferred policy option
in their own mind and downgrade the appeal of alternative
policy options. 41 Other psychological aids include: the use
of a satisficing decision rule, the strategy of
incrementalism and the reversion to consensus politics. 42
Oftentimes, when these tools are employed, the resultant
policy is altered only incrementally over time, even if a
policy overhaul is necessary.
Utility of the Cognitive Model
The works by Jervis, Lebow, Jervis et al., Axelrod, and
George all provide relevant insights regarding the cognitive model. Most importantly, all of the authors analyze not
40 Ibid., p. 26.
41 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
42 Consensus politics refers to decisions in which policymakers develop policy based on what a majority of their advisors favor, rather than on a thorough analysis of policy options. Reverting to consensus politics avoids major policy disputes. 22
only the belief systems of decisionmakers but also the
effect that these mindsets have on policy formulation and consistency. However, because the authors attempt to explain policy consistency, they do not examine situations
in which major policy changes are not preceded by the substantial revision of a leader's belief system.
A 1991 compendium, edited by political scientist George w. Breslauer and psychologist Philip Tetlock, Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy, provides a useful discussion of policy change unaccompanied by belief system change. 43
According to the editors, "The real challenge is to discern empirically when behavioral change is in fact not accompanied by cognitive restructuring or improved understanding." 44 An essay by Tetlock draws the critical distinction between adaptation and learning. As defined by
Tetlock, adaptation is when "one adapts or changes one's behavior in response to new events but without questioning one's beliefs about basic causation or underlying issues."45
Learning, in contrast, involves "a transformation in mode of
43 George w. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, eds. Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991).
44 Ibid. I p. 11.
45 Ibid., p. 45. 23
thinking--a reassessment of fundamental beliefs and values ••• " 46 · This analysis combines the cognitive and foreign policy learning models and advances evidence to show that the shift in Ronald Reagan's Soviet policy was a case of adaption unaccompanied by a change in his core beliefs. Reagan, thus, fits the model of an unrestructured mindset that is, nevertheless, capable of significant policy change.
46 Ibid. III. REAGAN'S BELIEF SYSTEM
During Ronald Reagan's first three years in office, the
President's belief system was comprised of three major
components around which he molded his policy toward the
Soviet Union: anti-Sovietism, anti-Communism and anti-
nuclearism. The most salient of these was Reagan's intense
anti-sovietism, evident in his public denunciations of the
Soviet Union. Reagan railed against various aspects of the
Soviet Union, including what he believed was the lack of
morality of the Soviet leadership:
.•• as good Marxist-Leninists, the soviet leaders have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they realize is that which will further their cause ••• Morality is entirely subordinate to the interests of class war. 4 7
In an address to the British Parliament in 1982, Reagan
again derided the Soviet Union, depicting it as a nation
"that runs against the tide of history by denying human
freedom and human dignity to its citizens." 48 One of
Reagan's most famous attacks on the Soviet Union came in
March 1983 when he told the National Association of
Evangelicals that the Soviet Union was the "focus of evil in the modern world." 49 Much of the President's criticism
47 Reagan, Life, p. 569.
48 Quoted in Cannon, Role, p. 314.
49 Reagan, Life, p. 570.
24 25
characterized the u.s.s.R. as an expansionist military
threat. In a November 1982 news conference before the
National Press Club, the President cited the "relentless
buildup of Soviet military power." 50 Reagan frequently
also criticized Soviet expansionism: "the Soviet Union we
faced during my first winter in the oval off ice was guided
by a policy of immoral and unbridled expansionism." 51 In
1982, the President characterized the Soviet Union as "an
empire whose territorial ambition has sparked a wasteful
arms race." 52 Reagan's anti-sovietism was obviously a
pronounced feature of his first administration. Indeed, in
an editorial written in 1981, Ronald steel identified anti-
Sovietism as the focus of the President's foreign policy:
"The Reagan administration's policy is simple and direct.
Anti-sovietism is its name." 53
The Reagan Administration's consistent anti-Soviet
policy focus is evidence of this component of the
President's belief system. It is unlikely that the
President would have embarked on a confrontational anti-
50 Ronald Reagan, 11 u.s. Program for Peace and Arms Control," State Department Bulletin 81, No. 2056 (Nov. 1981), p. 11.
51 Reagan, Life, p. 548.
52 As quoted in Shimko, Images and Arms Control, p. 103.
53 Ronald Steel, "Cold War, Cold Comfort," The New Republic (April 11, 1981), p. 15. 26
Soviet policy, and the international dangers this policy
implies, without firmly believing that the Soviet Union did
pose a substantial international threat.
Anti-communism
Reagan's anti-Sovietism was directly linked to his anti-
Communist beliefs, formed as a result of his experiences in
Hollywood in the 1940s. 54 Reagan was a staunch anti-
Communist, as is evident in his own assessment of his views:
"I'd spent most of my life sounding a warning about the
threat of Communism to America and the Free World." 55 The
President's anti-Communism was a special case of a common
phenomenon among Democrats (as Reagan then was) in the late
1940s and the 1950s. 56 His abhorrence of Communism,
combined with his view of the Soviet Union as the model of
the Communist ideology, translated into intense anti-
Sovietism. Reagan's anti-Soviet outlook was, therefore,
primarily a response to his view of the Soviet Union as the worldwide symbol of Communism.
54 For a discussion of Reagan's experiences with Communism as a Hollywood actor in the 1940s, see cannon, Role, pp. 82-87.
55 Reagan, Life, p. 15.
56 Some Democrats, like Reagan, denounced Communism and moved even more to the right and the Republican Party. Others denounced it but maintained liberal domestic views (e.g., Senator Henry Jackson or the more liberal Americans for Democratic Action). 27
According to Keith L. Shimko, who has analyzed the
prevalent images in the Reagan Administration, Reagan's
beliefs about the soviet Union "did not emerge from any
careful consideration of Soviet history, ideology or
policies .•• " 57 Instead, his anti-Sovietism was "simply a
generalized reaction to the Soviet Union as a communist
phenomenon." 58 Indeed, in denouncing the Soviet Union,
Reagan often identified Communism as the source of Soviet misconduct. At the his January 1981 press conference, the
President derided Soviet expansionism, stressing that the
ultimate objective of the u.s.s.R. was "the promotion of
world revolution and a one-world Socialist or Communist
state •.. 11 59 Discussing what he believed was the imminent
collapse of Communism, Reagan argued that the "decay of the
Soviet experiment should come as no surprise to us. 11 60 In
his 1982 speech to members of the British Parliament, Reagan
termed the Soviet Union the "home of Marxism-Leninism." 61
Reagan's anti-Communist and anti-soviet beliefs molded
the President's negative image of the Soviet Union. In sum,
57 Shimko, Images and Arms Control, p. 120.
58 Ibid.
59 U.S. Department of State, State Department Bulletin (March 1981), p. 12.
60 Reagan, Life, p. 555, emphasis added.
61 Quoted in cannon, Role, p. 314. 28
Reagan viewed the U.S.S.R. as an untrustworthy nation bent on expansionism and the spread of the Communist ideology.
As later chapters reveal, Reagan's image of the Soviet Union did not evolve significantly and had a direct influence on the formation of his soviet policy.
Rhetorical Commitment Versus Actual Policies
Although the President's rhetorical support for anti communism and anti-Sovietism was evident in his public statements, it has been suggested that his actual policies did not reflect these beliefs. For instance, Reagan's rhetorical commitment to rolling back Communist gains, termed the 'Reagan Doctrine' by columnist Charles
Krauthammer, was evident in the early years of his administration. 62 The President intended to "send a signal that the United States intended to support people fighting for their freedom against Communism wherever they were ..• " 63
In his biography of the President, however, Lou Cannon argues that the so-called Reagan Doctrine was not a consistent, articulated or practiced policy of the u.s government. 64 Rather, Cannon cites U.S. commitment to a
62 Ibid., p. 369.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., p. 372. 29
Marxist regime in Mozambique and the lack of substantial
U.S. support for anti-Communist movements in countries other than Afghanistan and Nicaragua as evidence of the absence of a consistent U.S. policy.
The lack of a comprehensive U.S. policy to eradicate
Soviet client states worldwide does not, however, disprove the thesis that Reagan's anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism affected his policy toward the U.S.S.R. The U.S. lacked the economic and military means, as well as regional allies and indigenous forces, to support anti-Communist movements in many parts of the globe. The Reagan Administration, nevertheless, provided assistance to movements in countries where Reagan believed Communist rulers were threatening U.S, national security interests. For the President, U.S. national security interests were at stake in Nicaragua, where the Soviets "aid and abet subversion in our hemisphere." 65 Afghanistan was to him a glaring example of
Soviet expansionism: "In Afghanistan, they were brutally trying to suppress a revolt against Communist rule with tanks and rockets." 66 For tactical and political reasons, the Reagan Administration's roll-back policy was selective and a selective policy is not necessarily an inconsistent one.
65 Quoted in cannon, Role, p. 366, emphasis added.
66 Reagan, Life, p. 267. 30
Rather than confronting Soviet clients everywhere, the
Reagan Administration employed less direct policies to signal the soviets of U.S. intent. One such policy was the administration's focus on "state-sponsored terrorism."
According to the President, the Soviets and their surrogates utilized "violent campaigns of subversion and terrorism." 67
By sharply attacking state-sponsored terrorism, Reagan was attempting to demonstrate U.S. resolve. Although most of the administration's denunciations of terrorism focused on
Iranian- and Syrian-backed terrorism, an apparently firm
U.S. policy on this issue was designed to deter the Soviets also. 68 Additionally, as the next chapter reveals, Reagan tended to formulate grand oversimplifications but was uninterested in the details of U.S. foreign policy. The President's rhetorical support for a worldwide fight against Communism reflects his tendency to employ broad themes to define his foreign policy. Reagan's commitment, however selective, to those fighting what he viewed as Moscow's proxies, demonstrates Reagan's sincere abhorrence of Communism. The
President tended to view all Communist movements and most terrorism as centralized efforts by Moscow to advance its
67 Ibid., pp. 267-268.
68 See Cannon, Role, chapter 15. 31
interests. He was willing, therefore, to voice support for
anti-Communist movements worldwide.
Finally, the effect of Reagan's anti-Communist and anti
Soviet beliefs was most evident in his policy toward the
Soviet Union rather than his policy toward what he viewed as
Soviet proxies. For the President, it was the influence of the Soviet Union, the leader of Communism, that had to be most firmly countered. As the next chapter demonstrates,
Reagan's core beliefs, bolstered by his advisors, prevented him from engaging in serious arms control negotiations in his first administration.
Reaqan•s Anti-Nuclearism
The final vital component of Reagan's world view--his
intense aversion to nuclear weapons--was less visible during
Reagan's first two years as President. In his autobiography, Reagan recounts reading a 1980 Pentagon document which predicted that at least 150 million Americans would die in a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union. He thus became more firmly dedicated to the goal of nuclear abolition:
A nuclear war is aimed at people ... as long as nuclear weapons were in existence, there would always be risks they would be used .. My dream, then, became a world free of nuclear weapons. 69
69 Reagan, Life, p. 550. Taken from Reagan's memoirs, this quote is somewhat self-serving. However, Reagan's later actions, such as agreeing to the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, demonstrate the President's anti-nuclear beliefs. 32
This document reinforced Reagan's anti-nuclearism, a belief the President appears to have developed in the late-1960s when he became fascinated with Armageddon. Indeed, Cannon
links Reagan's interest in Armageddon to his fear of nuclear weapons:
In responding to the challenge of Armageddon, Reagan's imagination held sway. He saw it as his mission to protect Americans from the risk of nuclear annihilation." 70
Reagan's Arms Control and Disarmament Association (ACDA) director, Kenneth Adelman, also attests to the President's genuine desire to rid the world of nuclear weapons. As recalled by Adelman, at the beginning of his administration, the "President's advisor's had heard him speak of a world without nuclear weapons •.. '' 71 Reagan expressed his abhorrence of nuclear weapons in a letter which he personally drafted to General Secretary Brezhnev in
1981. Then-Secretary of State Alexander Haig confirmed that the Reagan letter discussed eliminating nuclear weapons:
[the letter] talked about a world without nuclear weapons, it talked about disarmament ... it reflected a demeanor that if only those two men could sit down as rational human beings, the problems of the world would be behind us. 72
70 Cannon, Role, p. 290.
71 Kenneth Adelman, The Great Universal Embrace (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), p. 65. Hereinafter cited as Universal Embrace.
72 As quoted in Cannon, Role, p. 301. 33
Haig, a proponent of U.S. nuclear deterrence policies, convinced Reagan not to send the letter. None of Reagan's national security advisors "shared Reagan's vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and some of them believed it was a dangerous vision." 73 The evidence indicates, therefore, that the President's advisors regularly quashed any references Reagan may have attempted to make to his anti-nuclear ism.
Reaqan•s View of Mutually Assured Destruction
Linked to Reagan's anti-nuclearism was his aversion to the strictures of deterrence, based on the condition of superpower nuclear stalemate or mutually assured destruction
(MAD). By the early 1960s, both superpowers had sufficient nuclear retaliatory forces to survive a first-strike by the other side; thus, neither country had much incentive to launch a preemptive strike. Destruction was, and continued to be, mutually assured. In his memoirs, Reagan is unequivocal about his opposition to what he saw as the MAD
'doc~rine,' though it was, in fact, simply a condition of the nuclear age and never a U.S. policy:
73 Ibid. 34
I came into office with a decided prejudice against our tacit agreement with the Soviet Union regarding nuclear missiles. I'm talking about the MAD policy ••• the idea of deterrence providing safety so long as each of us had the power to destroy the other with nuclear missiles if one of us launched a first strike. 74
Reagan's opposition to traditional deterrence theory was evident in his plans for the strategic Defense initiative
(SDI), announced in March 1983. The President originally believed that a defensive missile system could free the
American public from the hostage position in which MAD placed them. Reagan thought the development of SDI technology "could produce an invulnerable space shield that would protect the civilian population from nuclear annihilation." 75
Opposition to the condition of MAD was prevalent among right-wing conservatives such as Richard Perle. They attacked the MAD condition primarily because it was a condition that tended to stymie major anti-soviet initiatives by the West. These conservatives opposed to the strategic stalemate which MAD fostered and would have preferred that the U.S. adopt a more compellent, rather than merely deterrent, posture. It appears, however, that Reagan lacked the detailed knowledge of strategic doctrine to oppose the MAD condition for any reason besides his stated one: that it held the U.S. population hostage.
74 Reagan, Life, p. 547.
75 Cannon, Role, p. 281. 35
Indeed, on many occasions, Reagan's inability to understand the central elements of nuclear strategy and arms control was evident. Although he had vowed to close the
"window of vulnerability" during his campaign, Reagan was unable to adequately explain this concept when questioned by members of the press. 76 In an April 1982 press conference, when asked if the soviet Union possessed a first-strike capability against the U.S., Reagan replied incomprehensibly:
I think that at the moment, on the strategic intercontinental ballistic program and on our triad, I think that we do. Those who say that we have something of a deterrent now, yes, I think so too. 77
In Images and Arms Control, Keith L. Shimko characterizes
Reagan's understanding of nuclear doctrine in these terms:
Obviously, Reagan had trouble dealing with these questions [about nuclear strategy) once he was forced to move beyond the level of phrases and simple characterizations. 78
Without a firm understanding of strategic doctrine, it is unlikely that Reagan, like other right-wing Republicans, opposed the MAD condition because it prevented the U.S. from adopting a more pro-active or compellent nuclear posture.
76 Reagan Administration officials claimed that •a window of vulnerability• existed through which U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were vulnerable to a soviet first-strike because increased missile accuracy reduced the need to assign two warheads to each hardened missile silo.
77 Shimko, Images and Arms Control, p. 112.
78 Ibid. 36
His opposition appears to be based solely on his emotional
reaction (fueled by his anti-nuclearism) to what he viewed
as a situation in which the survival of the American public was threatened. Indeed, Reagan's view of the MAD condition
is consistent with both his personality and his ignorance of
strategic doctrine.
Images of the United states
The President often characterized the Soviet Union by the way in which it differed from the United states.
Therefore, a full understanding of his image of the Soviet
Union, requires an examination of his view of the U.S. The
President's image of the United States stresses three major
components: freedom; capitalism and the free-market economy;
and morality.
Reagan's belief in America as a land of freedom was
expressed at a 1984 Reagan-Bush election rally:
America's future will always be strong because our nation will always be strong. And our nation will be strong because our people will be free. 79
According to former Ambassador for Long-Range Theater
Nuclear Force Negotiations Paul Nitze, Reagan was a strong
believer in both America and its free-market economy. so In
79 Quoted in Cannon, Role, p. 493.
80 Author's interview with Paul Nitze, Johns Hopkins University's Advanced School of International studies, Washington, o.c., 10 November 1992. 37
fact, the President believed American capitalism could
indirectly influence the soviet Union:
[he] viewed capitalism as a cornucopia from which material abundance overflowed and he believed that Western economic success would promote longing for change in Eastern Europe and even in the Soviet Union. 81
Finally, Reagan believed the United states and most Western nations were morally superior to the Soviet Union because their people were free. 82
Playing Roles
Some analysts, including Lou cannon, have posited that
Reagan had no deeply held beliefs; he merely expressed convenient ideas for reasons of politically expediency.
However, using the three-prong belief system described above, this analysis demonstrates that Reagan held firmly throughout his Administration to those ideas he espoused at the beginning of his Presidency. Indeed, he retained his anti-Communist, anti-Soviet and anti-nuclear beliefs in situations in which they went against the beliefs of most of his advisors and the tide of popular opinion. For instance, the President aired his anti-nuclear opinions early in his administration despite the opposition of his national security advisors and the hostile character of u.s.-soviet relations. Later in his Presidency, Reagan remained an
81 Quotted in Cannon, Role, p. 279. 82 Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 285. 38
anti-Communist even in the wake of Gorbachev's
internationally acclaimed reforms.
As displayed in later chapters of this analysis,
Reagan's beliefs at the end of his presidency were
strikingly similar to those at the beginning of his presidency. Although Reagan, like all presidents, allowed politics to influence some of his decisions, his Soviet policy was primarily guided by anti-communism, anti
sovietism and anti-nuclearism, his core beliefs. IV. THE EARLY YEARS: 1981-1982
The central elements of Reagan's belief system, embodied in his images of the United States and the Soviet Union, were a major influence on his Soviet policy. The
President's core beliefs, reinforced by his advisors, prevented him from pursuing a more conciliatory policy toward the Soviet Union, such as the detente policy implemented by President Richard Nixon and Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger during the 1970s.
Ronald Reagan's first two years in office are primarily remembered for his strident rhetoric toward the Soviet Union and his impassioned call for the revitalization of American economic and military power. However, this analysis of
Reagan's early years in office reveals a view of the Soviet
Union significantly more complex than the stereotype supposedly held by the Cold Warrior Reagan was then considered.
Ronald Reagan entered office as a man of simple visions.
He articulated an overall strategy for dealing with the
Soviet Union, a strategy embodied in the simple phrase
"peace through strength." Yet he was unconcerned with, and uninterested in, the intimate details of his administration's Soviet policy. According to Washington
39 40
Post correspondent Don Oberdorfer, in his book on the change in U.S. Soviet policy, Reagan was "often bored with military hardware questions or broad foreign policy issues but was fascinated with the plight of individual people." 83
Indeed, Kenneth Adelman, who would become director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in January of 1983, described Reagan as a man with a penchant for drawing
"magnificent plans," while allowing others to determine the means by which to implement the plans. 84 Reagan biographer Lou Cannon asserts that Reagan had firm
"convictions and improbable dreams, but he never mastered the nuclear calculus or the details of complicated issues. 1185
Because he was unconcerned with the details of his administration's Soviet policy and because he often delegated much of his authority, Reagan was especially subject to the influence of his most trusted advisors in formulating his policy toward the Soviet Union. In his second biography of Reagan, Cannon notes that the
President's advisors learned to exploit the President's lack of knowledge: "Over time, skilled subordinates learned how
83 Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 19.
84 Adelman, Universal Embrace, p. 27.
85 Cannon, Role, p. 304. 41
to manipulate Reagan by framing their advocacies to activate the response they wanted to produce." 86
The influential roles played by a number of officials in the Defense Department in the first two years of the Reagan
Administration are critical to understanding Reagan's evolving policy views. Officials such as Secretary of
Defense Weinberger and Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy Richard Perle had a major effect upon the formulation of Reagan's early soviet policy.
In 1981 and 1982, it was men such as Weinberger and Perle, men who adopted an uncompromising approach toward the Soviet
Union, who became the primary architects of the President's
Soviet policy, especially in the area of arms control.
These men were able to influence the President's Soviet policy because they successfully bolstered two of Reagan's core beliefs: anti-Sovietism and anti-Communism.
Administration hardliners buttressed Reagan's negative image of the Soviet Union and reinforced the most salient components of his belief system. With the concurrence of the majority of the members of his national security team, the President's beliefs, already firmly held, were strengthened.
86 Ibid., p. 292. 42
Reaqan•s Belief system and Policy Approach
An analysis of Reagan's first few years in office, however, reveals apparent contradictions in Reagan's belief system and policy approach. Despite his vehement anti-
Sovietism and anti-communism, Ronald Reagan appeared willing to establish channels of contact with the Soviets. Indeed, the President drafted two letters to General Secretary
Brezhnev in 1981 which seemed to attest to his readiness to engage the Soviets. In the first letter, crafted solely by
Reagan in late April 1981, the President questioned
Brezhnev:
Is it possible that we have permitted ideology, political and economic philosophies, and governmental policies to keep us from considering the real, everyday problems of peoples? 87
As noted, members of the State Department and National
Security Council edited the letter, which Secretary of State
Haig argued "naively undercut the administration's militant strategy in dealing with the soviets." 88 White House aide
Michael Deaver, however, convinced the President to send his original draft. Reagan also attempted to send another letter to Brezhnev in which he expressed his goal of nuclear abolition. According to Haig, the President's letter
"talked about a world without nuclear weapons, it talked
87 Quoted in Cannon, Role, p. 299.
88 Ibid. 43
about disarmament. " 89 On this occasion, the Secretary of
State convinced Reagan not to send the letter.
A number of Reagan's policy decisions in 1981 and 1982
appear to demonstrate that the President was an advocate of
increased contact with the Soviets. At a NATO foreign ministers' meeting in May 1981, Haig disclosed that the
President "had indicated to Brezhnev his willingness to begin arms limitations talks on intermediate-range missiles
in Europe •.• " 90 In April 1982, Reagan announced that the grain embargo of the Soviet Union, begun by President
Carter, would be lifted.
Upon closer examination, however, Reagan's policy decisions demonstrate that his belief system and his policy toward the Soviet Union were generally consistent. Reagan's decision to lift the grain embargo was primarily a result of domestic political concerns, particularly the opposition of the American farm lobby. In his memoirs, the President argues that his decision was in no way intended to signal a new tone in u.s.-soviet relations: "I didn't want to send a message that I approved of what the Russians were doing. 1191
Although the President approved u.s-soviet INF negotiations,
89 Ibid., p. 301.
90 John D. Lees and Michael Turner, eds., Reagan's first four years: A new beginning? (New York: Manchester University Press, 1988), p. 127.
91 Reagan, Life, p. 238. 44
the U.S. did not table any negotiable arms control proposals in his first administration, as will be seen. His
•approval' of the INF negotiations was merely pro forma to pacify the European allies, as no date was set for the resumption of the INF talks started under former President
Jimmy carter. Reagan's interest in drafting personal letters to General Secretary Brezhnev was primarily a result of his anti-nuclear beliefs.
Early in his administration, however, the President's anti-sovietism and anti-nuclearism were more salient than his anti-nuclearism. These beliefs, bolstered by his advisors, precluded Reagan from negotiating on the basis of the great-power pragmatism of the Richard Nixon-Henry
Kissinger era. Yet, at the same time, the President's anti nuclearism prevented him from totally shunning any contact with the Soviets, as was evident in the letters he wrote to
Brezhnev.
Reagan and Arms control
During his first term, Reagan's view of arms control appeared to be in line with the pessimistic attitude prevalent in his administration. In an article written in the winter of 1982, foreign policy analysts seweryn Bialer and Joan Afferica expressed a common assessment of the administration's, and the President's, attitude toward arms control: 45
It was certainly not the aim of the Reagan Administration in taking office in 1981 to return arms control to the focal point of East-West relations. 92
Reagan's view of arms control, however, was considerably more complex. The President's attitude toward arms negotiations was formed as a result of numerous influences: his anti-Soviet and anti-Communist beliefs; his view of the balance of military power; his advisors; his anti- nuclearism; and domestic and international political influences.
Reagan's intense anti-Sovietism and anti-Communism interacted with his view of the military balance to convince him that, as an immoral and expansionist regime, the soviet
Union had no reason to engage in serious arms control in the early 1980s. The President's anti-Communist and anti-Soviet beliefs generated a deep distrust of the Soviet Union. This mistrust was heightened by what Reagan perceived as a military balance favoring the Soviet Union. The President often used historical analogies to describe the Soviet
Union's militaristic intentions. 93 One analogy which
Reagan often invoked compared the situation of the United
92 Seweryn Bialer and Joan Afferica, "Reagan and Russia," Foreign Affairs 61, No. 2 (Winter 1982/1983), p. 16.
93 Alexander Dallin, "Learning in U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union in the 1980s," in George w. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, eds., Learning in U.S. and soviet Foreign Policy, p. 406. 46
States in the 1970s and 1980s to that of Europe in the
1930s:
One of the great tragedies of this century was that it was only after the balance of power was allowed to erode and a ruthless adversary, Adolf Hitler, deliberately weighed the risks and decided to strike that the importance of a strong defense was realized too late ••• For those of us who lived through that nightmare, it's a mistake that America and the free world must never make again. 94
Employing a past event--the rise of Hitler--as an analogy
for the Soviet military buildup allowed Reagan to simplify his analysis of Soviet motives. According to the President, the Soviets were immoral and possessed a military advantage over the U.S. and, therefore, had no reason to seriously engage in arms control. As explained by Reagan, because the
U.S. " •.• viewed the soviets through the prism of reality, we knew we would never get anywhere with them at the arms control table if we went there in a position of military
inferiority." 95
Indeed, Ronald Reagan was well known for the often- proclaimed strategy of "peace through strength." According to the President, in order to rebuild American prestige and to gain a genuine arms control agreement with the soviets-- an agreement not unequal in the Soviets' favor--the u.s. had to increase its nuclear and conventional capabilities. In a
94 Quoted in Shimko, Images and Arms Control, p. 103. 95 Reagan, Life, pp. 548-549. 47
November 1981, speech before the National Press Club, Reagan cited his decision to "strengthen all three legs of the strategic triad - sea, - land, - and air-based." 96 In his memoirs, the President asserts that he believed that peace
11 could, in fact, result from military might, ••• if we were going to sue them [the Soviets) for peace, we had to do it from a position of strength. 11 97
Although the phrase 'peace through strength' was one of the Republican party's 1980 campaign slogans and was a staple of Cold War rhetoric, it was a formulation in which
Reagan truly believed. However, the President's conception of "peace through strength" differed from that of many of his advisors. 98 Reagan did believe, as the phrase suggests, that a U.S. program of military and nuclear expansion would encourage the Soviets to negotiate. He also contended that the Soviet economy was so weak that it could not withstand an arms race. Hence, the U.S. military program would compel the Soviet Union to choose: negotiate an arms control agreement or risk bankrupting its economy.
96 Ronald Reagan, "U.S. Program fop Peace and Arms Control," State Department Bulletin 81, No. 2056 (Nov. 1981), p. 11. 97 Quoted in cannon, Role, p. 297.
98 As interpreted by others, peace through strength meant various things from an eternal competition to peace through coercion to peace through victory. For Reagan, it had a near-term operational significance not always shared by his advisors, as their reactions to Gorbachev's later concessions attests. 48
Throughout his first Administration, Reagan frequently assessed the state of the Soviet economy:
I think there's every indication and every reason to believe that the soviet Union cannot increase its production of arms .•. Right now we're hearing of strikes and labor disputes because people aren't getting enough to eat. 99
As explained by Cannon, the President believed "a U.S. buildup would inevitably promote the soviets to seek negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons." 100 In the early
1980s, the Reagan Administration had not yet fully implemented its expansion of U.S. military and nuclear capabilities. The President believed, therefore, that the
U.S. lacked the leverage to coerce the Soviets to engage in substantial arms reduction agreements. His intense anti-
Communism and anti-sovietism contributed to his belief that the Soviets were not interested in negotiating equitable arms agreements while they were in a position of what he believed was military superiority.
The Influence of Advisors
Reagan's anti-Soviet and anti-Communist beliefs, his view of the military balance, and his opposition to arms control were bolstered by his national security advisors, the majority of whom took a hardline view of Soviet Union
99 Cannon, Role, p. 297.
100 Ibid. 49
and arms control. In Reagan's first two years as President, the Pentagon, in particular, was filled with men who took an uncompromising approach to the soviet Union and the prospects for arms control. Secretary Caspar Weinberger,
Jr., shared Reagan's anti-Communist beliefs and was described in 1982 as '"one of the few genuine anti-communist cold warriors.'" 101 In the same year, in an address to
United Press International, Weinberger cited the Soviet military build-up and geostrategic extension throughout the world as trends the U.S. must counter. 102 Although he had previously been known for his fiscal austerity, as Secretary of Defense, Weinberger soon became the proponent of a major military build-up: " ... [he) defended nearly every tank, missile, and machine gun ... " 103
From 1981 to 1982, Weinberger was one of Reagan's most trusted advisors and enjoyed ready access to the President:
With his easy access to Reagan and frank hardline talk, Weinberger has exerted unusual influence over foreign policy .•. 104
101 Brownstein and Easton, Reagan's Ruling Class, p. 434.
102 Caspar Weinberger, "Requirements of Our Defense Policy," Department of State Bulletin 81, No. 2052 (July 1981), p. 46.
103 Brownstein and Easton, Reagan's Ruling Class, p. 435.
104 Ibid., p. 40. 50
Weinberger's beliefs about Soviet expansionism and U.S. military weakness, coupled with his direct communications with Reagan, allowed the Secretary to play a major role in the formation of U.S. arms control policy in the early years of the Reagan Administration. Indeed, Paul Nitze explained that the Secretary of Defense had an "enormous influence" on
Reagan in his first administration, meeting with the
President about once every two days. 105
One of the most well-known officials at the Defense
Department was Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs Richard Perle. Perle, a leading critic of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT
II), was a man known throughout Washington for his anti-
Sovietism and his opposition to arms control. According to
Reagan's Ruling Class, Perle was the consummate cold warrior: he had a "passionate distrust of the Soviet
Union •.. [and was) an ideologue, focused on the Soviet
Union." 106 Perle was especially critical of past U.S.-
Soviet arms control agreements and "argued that the Soviets had violated every major treaty they signed with the United
States •.• " 107 As an aide to Senator Henry Jackson (D.,
105 Interview with Paul Nitze, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International studies, Washington, D.C. 10 November 1992.
106 Brownstein and Easton, Reagan's Ruling Class, p. 497.
107 Shimko, Images and Arms Control, p. 76. 51
Washington) in the 1970s, Perle had years of experience
fighting arms control treaties. 108
Other important members of the Defense Department
included Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred Ikle and
Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, Jr. Although these men
had a less direct influence on President Reagan, the
hardline views about the Soviet Union and arms control that .
they shared reflected the overall attitude about u.s.-soviet
relations prevalent at the Pentagon.
The members of the State Department involved in the arms
control process were also concerned with the increase in
Soviet military capabilities and the spread of Communism.
Secretary of State Haig, like President Reagan, frequently voiced his anti-Soviet attitudes. He believed that the
Soviets had a penchant for exploiting their opponent's weakness: 11 ••• where the U.S. was soft or inconsistent or
ambiguous on its policies, the Russians were increasingly willing to take risks." 109 Haig attempted to form a worldwide "strategic consensus" against the U.S.S.R. because he believed the Soviet Union represented "the prime threat
108 See Cannon, Role, p. 303; and Strobe Talbott, Master of the Game, p. 159.
109 Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan Publishing co., 1984), p. 95. Hereinafter cited as caveat. 52
to peace and stability ... 11 110 Although the Secretary of
State shared Weinberger and Perle's anti-Soviet and anti-
Communist beliefs, he was a proponent of constant U.S.-
Soviet communication. 111 Additionally, Haig was a committed Atlanticist concerned with the effect that deteriorating u.s.-soviet relations would have upon U.S. relations with its European allies. 112
Although President Reagan had declared at the start of his administration that his Secretary of state would be his primary foreign policymaker (as presidents often disingenuously do), Haig had limited access to the
President. In his memoirs, Haig complains of what he calls
Reagan's "cabinet council system," controlled by White House staffers Edwin Meese, Michael Deaver and James Baker:
neither (National Security Advisor) Allen nor I had direct, regular access to the President. Allen had to go through Meese. No route at all had been pointed out to me ••. 113
When Haig resigned on June 25, 1982, it was widely reported that he had, in fact, lost regular access to Reagan. Before
Haig's resignation, Weinberger had publicly criticized the
110 George c. Church, "The Vicar takes Charge," Time (March 16, 1981), p. 12.
111 Haig, caveat, p. 105.
112 Ed Magnuson, "The Shakeup at state," Time (July 5, 1982), p. 9.
113 Haig, caveat, p. 84. 53
Secretary of State's stance on a number of foreign policy issues. 114 It was obvious that Haig lacked the access to the President enjoyed by Weinberger.
The details of arms control negotiations were handled by a group of men at the State Department's Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA): Eugene Rostow, director of ACDA;
Edward Rowny, U.S. Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations; and Paul Nitze, Ambassador for
Long-Range Theater Nuclear Force Negotiations. 115 All of these men were known for their hardline views of the Soviet
Union. Rostow argued that the Soviets were disruptive to world peace: "the Soviets ... are the principal culprits behind the current disruption of world order." 116 Rowny viewed arms control negotiations as a forum "in which to defeat the Soviets. 11 117 Finally, Nitze, the influential author of NSC-68, was known as a tough arms control bargainer who advocated increased defense spending to counter the Soviet threat.
114 Magnuson, "The Shakeup at State," Time (January 23, 1982), p. 9.
115 Long-Range Theater Nuclear Force Negotiations was the name for what would become the Intermediate Nuclear Force Negotiations (INF).
116 Brownstein and Easton, Reagan's Ruling Class, p. 505.
117 Ibid., p. 511. 54
The President's anti-Sovietism and anti-Communism were buttressed by members of his national security team, as was his view of the u.s.-soviet military balance. These beliefs, in turn, translated into an unfavorable view of arms control. Reagan's own beliefs, bolstered by his advisors, made it cognitively difficult for him to believe that the Soviets would agree to equitable arms control negotiations in 1982. A number of other factors, however, influenced the President to maintain some degree of contact with the Soviets. Reagan was, in effect, leaving the door open for future negotiations and agreements.
Other Factors
One factor which compelled Reagan to maintain communication with the Soviets was his anti-nuclearism. As remembered by the President, he "tried to send signals to
Moscow indicating we were prepared to negotiate a winding down of the arms race if the soviets were also sincere about it." 118 A number of other domestic and international political influences convinced Reagan that he could not appear to be totally opposed to arms control.
Domestically, one of Reagan's main priorities was the passage of his defense modernization program, which included plans to deploy the MX missile, the B-1 bomber, and a 600-
118 Reagan, Life, p. 548. SS
ship Navy. 119 By 1982, Reagan was faced with congressional opposition to his military program: "My critics in Congress began chipping away, then slashing away, at the money we needed to rebuild our military forces." 120 The President was also confronted with public criticism, as a nuclear freeze movement gained strength in the U.S. This movement followed the large anti-nuclear and peace demonstrations that had begun in Europe in 1981. 121
Finally, U.S. allies in Europe, under pressure from their publics, began to criticize the Reagan
Administration's apparent opposition to arms control. 122
According to foreign policy analysts strobe Talbott and
Michael Mandelbaum, public pressure was, in fact, the major impetus behind the administration's entry into arms control negotiations:
It was public pressure from Western Europe that forced a resumption of arms-control talks on intermediate range weapons in late 1981, and similar pressure from the U.S. Congress led to the re-opening of strategic arms talks in 1982. 123
119 Schuyler Foerster and Edward N. Wright, eds., American Defense Policy, 6th ed. (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).
120 Reagan, Life, p. 552.
121 Cartwright, MP and Critchley, MP, Cruise, Pershing. and SS-20 I p. 12.
122 Ibid., p. 20.
123 Michael Mandelbaum and strobe Talbott, Reagan and Gorbachev (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), p. 30. 56
The interaction of all of these factors influenced
Reagan to maintain contact with the Soviets and to enter
into arms control negotiations. As will be seen, however,
the Reagan Administration did not table any seriously
negotiable proposals in the intermediate nuclear forces
(INF) negotiations-in 1981 and 1982.
The INF Negotiations
The first nuclear arms control negotiations into which
the Reagan Administration entered focused on the issue of
intermediate nuclear forces (INF) in Europe. The issue of
INF weapons had been a contentious one between the U.S. and
the Soviet Union since the late-1970s. In the mid-1970s,
the Soviets had supplemented their intermediate-range
nuclear missiles in Europe, the SS-4 and the ss-5, with the more accurate and threatening multiple-warhead ss-20. The
introduction of the ss-20, combined with general concern
about the state of NATO's deterrent forces and the
prospective impact of SALT II on strategic nuclear forces,
compelled the alliance to adopt the 1979 'dual track
decision.' This decision coupled a U.S. commitment to
deploy INF weapons (572 Pershing-IIs and ground-launched
cruise missiles) in Europe with a simultaneous NATO
commitment to pursue arms control with the Soviets to limit
deployment of such forces. If an acceptable agreement
regarding the size and structure of INF deployments could 57
not be reached, NATO would proceed with its plans to deploy
the full complement of weapons by 1983. 124 It was against
this backdrop that the United States and the Soviet Union
resumed INF arms control negotiations in 1981.
The Zero option
In the opening round of the Geneva INF negotiations in
1981, the U.S. tabled the so-called 'zero-option.' Within
the U.S. government, there were several zero proposals yet
the basis of each one was the same: 11 ••• the United States
would forego the deployment of its Pershing IIs and [ground-
launched cruise missiles) GLCMS in exchange for the
elimination of soviet INF. 11 125 For a number of reasons,
the zero option first tabled by the U.S. was inequitable and
insincere. First, it required the Soviet Union to eliminate
all of its SS-20s, including those "deployed in the Far East
against China," even though the INF talks were focused on
arms control in Europe. 126 Second, as originally tabled,
the zero option stipulated that the Soviets dismantle their
already existing INF weapons in return for a U.S. promise
not to deploy its weapons. According to John Lewis Gaddis,
124 See Cartwright, MP and Critchley MP, cruise, Pershing and SS-20, p. 12; and Jed Snyder, "The Rights and Wrongs of Mr. Layne," The National Interest (Fall 1988), p. 33. 125 Shimko, Images and Arms Control, pp. 151-154. See also Talbott, Master of the Game, pp, 169-173. 126 Talbott, Master, p. 96. 58
an historian of u.s.-soviet affairs, the U.S. zero option
was not a genuine bid for arms control:
The administration's proposals on arms control seemed designed to subvert rather than advance that process. Perle himself proposed the elimination of all Soviet SS-20s--whether in Europe or in Asia--in return for NATO's agreement not to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles: despite complaints that the Russians would never agree to trade eventual missiles for nonexistent ones. . • 127
The zero option was typical of the arms control
proposals tabled in the first years of the Reagan
Administration in that it required more significant
reductions in the soviet arsenal. Primarily forced to
pursue arms control for reasons of "political expediency,"
the President entered negotiations believing that "the U.S.
must find a way of pursuing an American arms buildup
simultaneously with cutbacks in Soviet forces." 128 Indeed,
according to Strobe Talbott, Reagan's belief that the
military balance was already unequal in the Soviets• favor
convinced him that "reductions meant first and foremost
reductions in the Soviet side. 11 129
The zero option was, however, favored by Perle and
Weinberger who fought to have it approved as the official
127 John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union and the United states: An Interpretive History, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), p. 316.
128 Talbott, Deadly Gambits, p. 7.
129 Ibid. 59
U.S. position. According to a number of sources, Weinberger and Perle backed the zero option for two reasons. First, they knew it would appeal to Reagan's anti-nuclear beliefs.
Second, they knew it was an ill-fated proposal: the soviets would never agree to dismantle already-deployed weapons in exchange for a U.S. promise not to install its own INF in
Europe. 130 Indeed, Reagan biographer Lou Cannon emphasizes that Weinberger and Perle "devoted [their] considerable energies to devising a proposal ... the Soviets would never accept." 131 Perle and Weinberger had never hid their distrust of conducting negotiations with the Soviets.
Before Nitze left for the Geneva INF negotiations, Perle expressed his wary view of arms control before the Senate
Armed Services Committee. The Assistant Secretary of
Defense implicitly likened the role of Nitze to that of
Samuel Hoare, the British politician labeled as an appeaser in the 1930s. Perle quoted Hoare as follows:
I had been caught up in the toils of a critical negotiation. The longer it went on and the more serious the issue became, the more anxious I grew to see it succeed. 132
130 See Cannon, Role, p. 313; Shimko, Images and Arms Control, pp. 151-152; and Talbott, Master of the Game, p. 177.
131 cannon, Role, p. 302.
132 Talbott, Master of the Game, p. 171. 60
Perle's comparison was a warning to Nitze: if you pursue
an arms agreement too wholeheartedly, you risk becoming an
appeaser. According to Strobe Talbott, Perle's warning was
even less subtle: do not pursue any type of INF agreement with the Soviets because the Pentagon has no intention of
allowing the negotiations to succeed. 133
Perle and Weinberger eventually convinced the President
to approve the zero option as the official U.S. INF
position. The proposal was particularly appealing to Reagan
because it was simple and involved arms reduction:
The absolute zero option had several things going for it in the struggle for Reagan's support. First, it was simple and easy to understand; there were no complicated trade-offs or sublimits to worry about or explain. Second it contained an apparentl/ reasonable demand for equality in weapons. 13
In his memoirs, the President claims that he was attracted
to the zero option because it was the "first step toward the
elimination of all nuclear weapons from the earth ••• " 135
In reality, Reagan was motivated to endorse the proposal for
a number of reasons.
Reagan's acceptance of the zero option appears to demonstrate that he was duped by Perle and Weinberger and did not understand that it was an inequitable proposal the
133 Ibid., p. 170.
134 Shimko, Images and Arms Control, p. 154.
135 Reagan, Life, p. 551. 61
Soviets would not accept; or that he disingenuously pursued
arms control to appease Congress and the American and
European publics. Neither of these hypotheses, however,
adequately explains the President's decision. Although he
approved the zero option, Reagan did not believe, as
Weinberger and Perle did, that it should be the final U.S.
position. In his memoirs, Reagan recounts his willingness
to revise the U.S. INF position:
If we first announced that our goal was the total elimination of intermediate-range nuclear weapons from Europe and then hinted we might be willing to leave a few, we'd be tipping off the bottom line of our negotiating position. 136
Strobe Talbott, a well-informed explicator of U.S.-
Soviet affairs, verifies Reagan's assertion that he was
amenable to eventually retreating from the zero option,
citing a conversation the President had with Secretary of
State George Shultz in 1983. In this conversation, Reagan was "receptive in the abstract that sooner or later
something would have to give in the U.S. position in
INF. 11137 Reagan's willingness to eventually revise the U.S.
position lends credence to the argument that he was aware
that the zero option was not a proposal which the Soviets would accept.
136 Ibid., p. 297.
137 Talbott, 62
It appears, therefore, that Reagan approved the zero option for two reasons. One, it would provide him with an example of his administration's commitment to arms control, a commitment which had increasingly been criticized domestically and internationally. Indeed, according to nuclear specialist Lawrence Freedman, the domestic and international anti-nuclear movement "encouraged the Reagan
Administration to offer a more moderate image than it seemed inclined to do." 138 The tabling of the zero option was part of this more moderate image. Appearing to be more moderate would also assist Reagan in pushing his proposals for increased military spending through an increasingly reluctant Congress.
Second, Reagan's anti-nuclear beliefs precluded him from totally severing relations with the soviets. Reagan wanted to foster some degree of communication so that, when the
U.S. had rebuilt its military strength and the Soviet Union had reformed itself, the two countries could negotiate genuine arms agreements. As Gaddis argues, the President's later pursuit of arms reduction in his second administration demonstrates that he was not inherently opposed to arms negotiations:
138 Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear strategy, p. 400. 63
••• [Reagan] may have had cynical advisors but was not cynical himself. It would become apparent with the passage of time that when the chief executive talked about "reducing" strategic missiles he meant precisely that; the appeal of the "zero option" was that it would really get rid of intermediate-range nuclear forces ••• A simple and straightforward man, Reagan took the principle of "negotiations from strength" literally: once one had built strength, one negotiated. 139
The Walk-in-the-woods
In contrast to the Pentagon officials, Nitze, the
principal INF negotiator, did not believe that the zero
option should be a firm and final, rather than an opening,
U.S. proposal. He felt that the negotiating was a
"dialectical process'' in which each side made concessions
that standing on an original formula will prevent.
According to Nitze:
I did not think a 'step by step' exchange of concessions was likely to be the best path to a sound agreement. When two negotiating partners have laid down their formal positions, there are strong reasons against making unilateral concessions. 140
By the summer of 1982, Nitze and his negotiating team
reached a "consensus that the time had come to cut through
the morass of issues and negotiate a deal." 141 Nitze had
139 Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States, p. 325.
140 Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost (New York: Grove Weidenfield, 1989), p. 375.
141 Ibid., p. 374. 64
decided that the U.S. could never reach an agreement by
clinging to the zero option. In his famous 11 walk-in-the
woods, 11 the U.S. negotiator attempted to formulate an
agreement outside the constraints of the zero option and his
official negotiating instructions.
The walk-in-the-woods occurred on July 16, 1982 when
Nitze and his soviet counterpart, Yuli Kvitsinsky, took a
walk in the Jura Mountains near Geneva. In his book, From
Hiroshima to Glasnost, Nitze acknowledges the informal
nature of the •walk' and argues that he veered from
negotiating instructions because the "payoffs seemed
immense." 142 Additionally, because Nitze and his
counterpart were taking the initiative themselves, "the U.S.
government, were it to find the results unsatisfactory"
could disavow Nitze's actions. 143
During their •walk,' Nitze presented Kvitsinsky with a
draft proposal, which they modified sitting in the drizzling
rain. The final draft they produced would have restricted
the U.S. INF deployment in Europe to ground-launched
Tomahawk cruise missiles (GLCMs) but would have allowed the
U.S. a numerical advantage in warheads. Specifically,
according to the walk-in-the-woods formula:
142 Ibid., p. 375.
143 Ibid. 65
Each side would be allowed 75 INF launchers in Europe. For the Soviets, that meant 75 mobile launchers with one missile each for the triple-warhead ss-20--a two thirds reduction from the number then deployed. For the United States, it meant 75 Tomahawk launchers, each armed with four cruise missiles. Thus, there would be a total of 300 American cruise missiles based on the territory of Western Europe to offset the 225 SS-20 warheads . • • 144 ·
Nitze and Kvitsinsky agreed to take the proposal home to
their respective governments for review.
When Nitze returned to Washington, he and Rostow met with National Security Advisor Clark and Clark's NSC
assistant, General Richard Beverie. A few days later, a meeting chaired by Reagan was convened to discuss the walk-
in-the-woods formula. According to Nitze, at this megting,
"the attitude of all the senior officials seemed to be
favorable. 11 145 In order to further analyze the proposal,
Reagan issued a memo which instructed each of the officials
to inform an additional individual of the package. In his
book, Nitze argues that U.S. consideration of the proposal
never went much farther because the administration
interpreted lack of contact from the Soviets as a veto of
the proposal.
Nitze is diplomatic in his explanation of the demise of
the walk-in-the-woods formula. According to a number of
sources, it was the concerted efforts of Richard Perle,
144 Talbott, Master of the Game, p. 174.
145 Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, p. 386. 66
rather than the lack of communication from the Soviets, that caused the proposal's demise. 146 Although Perle criticized many aspects of the walk-in-the-woods formula, his primary criticism was that it allowed the Soviets to maintain their advantage in ballistic cissiles. In convincing Reagan to veto the package, Perle casterfully ~anipulated Reagan's lack of knowledge about nuclear weaponry. Reagan's understanding of the differences between ballistic and cruise cissiles was scant: ••• Reagan had learned that cruise :issiles, which vere so:eti~es called 'slc•-!lyers,• were good {that is. instru::ents of retali~tion) ... while, ballistic :issiles. which were calle~ "!ast-!lyers' vere bad because they ~ere i~stru:ents o! a !irst strike. 147
For P.eaga~. the~. the r~ck~ge •as ~:;.acceptable because it
in the end,
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~~~": ....~~""~fE..,; ~~ "'-:-i"i:"":;:-c::~~ i{4:;~..:'!,~:-· Jl.~~~c :~ ~.¢':~ ;u. - 67
Reagan did not, however, reject the package outright.
After the initial meeting, in which Nitze described the
reaction as 'favorable,' the President directed further
discussion with an increase in the number of decisionmakers.
According to Shimko, "Reagan was apprehensive about the
Nitze deal at first .•. it appears that he could have been
persuaded to go along." 148 Perle and Weinberger, however, worked wholeheartedly to convince the President to reject
the proposal. A memo by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which
argued that the "Pershing !Is were not essential and could
be traded away, if the Soviets offered appropriate
concessions" was intercepted by Perle and Weinberger before
the President could read it. 149
Reaqan•s Belief system and the Nitze Proposal
In torpedoing the proposal, Perle and Weinberger
skillfully played upon Reagan's elementary knowledge of
nuclear weapons and his view of the military balance.
Drawing upon the black-and-white distinction between
ballistic and cruise missiles they had presented to Reagan,
148 Shimko, Images and Arms Control, p. 156.
149 Although the Joint Chiefs of staff report did not clearly recommend giving up the Pershing !Is, according to Talbott, the report was favorable enough to have provided the President with a basis upon which to accept the walk-in the-woods formula. For details on the report, see Shimko, Images and Arms Control, p. 15; Talbott, Master of the Game; and Wallach, "A Walk in the Woods," p. 76. 68
the President could only view the proposal as favoring the
Soviet position. Reagan was extremely concerned with the balance of u.s.-soviet military power and, in his opinion,
Nitze•s formula would have preserved the current inequitable and dangerous balance. The walk-in-the-woods formula was the type of inequitable arms control proposal Reagan believed the untrustworthy and opportunistic soviet Union had succeeded in obtaining in the 1970s.
The walk-in-the-woods episode is particularly telling, as it is typical of the way in which arms control policy was formulated in the early years of the Reagan Presidency.
Reagan was guided by his most prominent beliefs, his anti communism and anti-Sovietism, which convinced him that the
Soviets were only interested in gaining unfair arms control concessions from the United States. Additionally, he lacked knowledge of even the most essential details of arms control and nuclear strategy. These details were provided by his advisors, whose own beliefs mirrored the President's and who used Reagan's lack of knowledge to push their own agendas. V. RELATIONS OSCILLATE: 1983-1984
u.s.-soviet relations oscillated throughout the years
1983 and 1984. The first half of 1983 was marked by
increased contact with the Soviets, spurred by the efforts
of the new Secretary of state, George Shultz. With the
Soviet shoot down of the Korean airliner KAL 007 in 1983, however, relations again turned cold. Relations turned even
chillier toward the end of the year, when the U.S. invaded
Grenada in October and the Soviets walked out of the Geneva
arms control talks on INF in November. By late 1984,
relations had slightly improved, as Reagan attempted to
negotiate with the new Soviet leader, Konstantin Chernenko.
Two factors propelled Ronald Reagan to pursue
negotiations with the Soviets in this period. First, the
personnel turnover in the Reagan Administration that had
begun in the summer of 1982 started to influence Reagan's
Soviet policy. Two more moderate advisors, George Shultz at the Department of State and Robert McFarlane at the National
Security Council, pushed Reagan towards a more conciliatory
stance. Second, due to his anti-nuclearism, the President was interested in maintaining contact with the Soviets.
Despite the slight improvements in u.s.-soviet relations
in early 1983 and 1984, a few factors blocked Reagan from pursuing detente with the Soviets. First, according to
69 70
Reagan, Soviet conduct had not changed. Influenced by his anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism, Reagan said that Soviet expansionism and intransigence in the area of arms control precluded an agreement to hold a u.s.-soviet summit. Second, the Kremlin leadership was in disarray. With the death of
Brezhnev, the Soviet Union was successively headed by two ailing men, each of whom held power for only a short period.
Finally, despite the more conciliatory policy pushed by
Shultz and McFarlane, the administration was still staffed with men who took an uncompromising approach to the Soviet
Union. These men continued to bolster Reagan's own anti
Soviet and anti-communist beliefs.
Reaqan•s Dual Policies
An examination of this two-year time period reveals two apparently contradictory policies pursued by the Reagan
Administration. on the one hand, Reagan consented to the conduct of back-door diplomacy with the Soviets, conducted solely by the State Department. On the other hand, the
President continued to publicly criticize the Soviet Union's conduct, while introducing his concept of a space shield to defend the United States from a ballistic missile attack.
Beginning in February of 1983, Shultz and soviet
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin began to meet privately.
Reagan, at Shultz•s urging, had decided earlier in the month 71
to assign higher priority to relations with the Soviets. In
fact, on February 15, 1983, the Ambassador was secretly
brought to the White House to meet with the President
himself. 150 Even as early as 1983, Reagan did not express
any hesitancy in engaging the Soviets: "According to Shultz,
the President never wavered when given the opportunity to
engage in dialogue with the soviets." 151 In his memoirs,
Reagan describes his rationale for his administration's
'back-door' diplomacy with the Soviets:
I still believed they had done nothing to merit inviting them to a summit meeting •.. but I decided to experiment with some personal diplomacy using back channels to the Kremlin, outside the spotlight of publicity through which both sides could speak frankly. • • 152
Reagan's comment that the Soviets "had done nothing to merit inviting them to a summit meeting" is telling. The
President's anti-Communism and anti-sovietism were obviously
still salient features of his belief system: he believed a
change in Soviet conduct was a necessary precursor to major
improvements in u.s.-soviet relations.
Despite his view that the Soviets had not yet changed their conduct significantly, the President continued, primarily for political reasons, to approve state Department
150 Oberdorfer, The Turn, pp. 17-19.
151 Ibid., p. 21.
152 Reagan, Life, p. 567. 72
recommendations to improve u.s.-soviet relations. For
instance, in a controversial decision, the White House gave
approval to Shultz in March to discuss strategic arms with
Dobrynin "without Pentagon participation." 153 In these
discussions, Shultz was accompanied by Rowny and several of
his aides but Perle and Ikle, "the two key Pentagon
officials dealing with arms control, were neither told of
the meetings nor given the results." 154 Reagan's
willingness to exclude the participation of the Department
of Defense in the crucial area of strategic arms
demonstrated the growing influence wielded by Shultz.
While advocating this engagement with the Soviets, however,
Reagan continued to voice his anti-communist and anti-Soviet
beliefs publicly. In his March 1983 speech to the National
Association of Evangelicals, Reagan asserted:
••• while [the Soviets) preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict the eventual domination of all peoples on earth, the¥; are the focus of evil in the modern world •.• 1 5
The phrase, "focus of evil in the modern world,"
subsequently appeared in newspapers and news broadcasts throughout the U.S. What reporters neglected, however, were
153 Leslie Gelb, "Expanding Contacts with Soviet: Shultz and Dobrynin Make a Start," New York Times (June 30, 1983), p. Al3.
154 Ibid., p. 12.
155 Reagan, Life, p. 570. 73
Reagan's statements earlier in the speech, statements which expressed a positive attitude toward u.s.-soviet dialogue.
In that same speech, Reagan had reasoned:
This doesn't mean we should isolate ourselves and refuse to seek an understanding with them. I intend to do everythinq I can to persuade them of our peaceful intent •.• 15 ~
Maior Influences on Reagan
During the period spanning 1983 and 1984, Reagan's anti communist and anti-soviet beliefs precluded him from pursuing full rapprochement with the Soviets. At the same time, however, a number of factors influenced the President to soften the confrontational approach his administration had taken toward the Soviet Union during its first two years.
One of these factors was Reagan's own anti-nuclear beliefs. The President was haunted by a fear of nuclear holocaust and realized that unstable u.s.-soviet relations increased the danger of nuclear war. Reagan expressed his anti-nulcearism in an unedited letter he drafted to General
Secretary Andropov in July 1983. In the draft letter,
Reagan urged:
156 Ibid., p. 569. 74
Let me assure you the govt. & the people of the United States are dedicated to the cause of peace and the elimination of the nuclear threat •.• If we could both agree on mutual, verifiable reductions in the number of nuclear weapons we both hold could this not be a first step toward the elimination off all such weapons? 157
Aghast at Reagan's frank discussion of nuclear disarmament, Reagan's National Security Advisor, William
Clark, convinced the President to delete all references to nuclear weapons from the letter. This editing was done before the letter was sent to Andropov. 158
Reagan's commitment to anti-nuclearism was most evident
in his commitment to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which the President introduced to the public in a televised
White House speech in March 1983. As first envisioned by
Reagan, SDI was to be a defensive system which would protect the American public from a ballistic missile attack.
Throughout the rest of Reagan's presidency, commentators speculated that Reagan intended to use SDI as a bargaining chip, a chip that could be redeemed for major Soviet concessions at the arms control table. Reagan was, however, authentically dedicated to SDI, which he saw as the ultimate means to avert nuclear war:
157 Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 38.
158 Ibid. 75
••• The strategic Defense Initiative was not a
"bargaining chip'' and we were going to stick with it no
matter what the Russians wanted. The SDI might take
decades to develop, but what more important mission did
we have than finding the means to neutralize the
terrible weapons produced by the nuclear age? 159
Reagan's deeds as well as his words demonstrated his genuine commitment to develop SDI. Throughout the arms control negotiations conducted with the Soviets during the remainder of his two terms, Reagan refused to relinquish the
U.S. right to develop SDI. The status of defense systems proved to be the most contentious issue between Reagan and
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Reagan was so committed to the defense shield that he abandoned the plan formulated at
Reykjavik to eliminate nuclear weapons. 160
The President's attachment to SDI also displays his genuinely emotional reaction to the condition of MAD.
Unlike other conservatives who believed that U.S. acceptance of a strategic stalemate prevented a compellent U.S. nuclear posture, the President was simply averse to the position in which mutually assured destruction placed the American
159 Reagan, Life, p. 608.
160 For details on the role of SDI in u.s.-soviet relations, see Reagan, Life, chapter 81; Oberdorfer, The Turn, chapter 5; and David Hoffman and Don Oberdorfer, "Leaders Central Compromise: Missile Defense Tests 'as Required"' Washington Post (December 13, 1987). 76
public. As explained by Strobe Talbott, Reagan's conception of SDI was rudimentary:
[SDI was] population defense so comprehensive and so close to being impregnable that the Soviet Union would have no choice but to cooperate in a transition to which defense would be the dominant .•. 161
Paul Nitze subsequently confirmed that the President's opposition to the MAD condition was emotional: Reagan believed the circumstance of MAD was "distasteful." 162 For
Reagan, SDI represented technology which would defend the
American public and free it from the reprehensible condition of mutually assured destruction.
Other factors which pushed the President to soften his
Soviet policy were the upcoming 1984 Presidential election and his difficulty in persuading Congress to approve his plans for deployment of the MX missile. Prior to the 1984 election, Republicans were concerned about portrayals of
Reagan which painted the President as a •nuclear cowboy.'
Indeed, according to John Lewis Gaddis, Reagan was
"sensitive to Democratic charges that [he] was the only postwar president not to have met with a soviet leader. 11163
Attempting to push a central element of his defense program,
161 Talbott, Master of the Game, p. 189, emphasis added.
162 Interview, Paul Nitze, Johns Hopkins Advanced School of International Studies, Washington, D.C., 10 November 1992.
163 Gaddis, Russia, the United states, and the Soviet Union, p. 327. 77
the MX missile, through Congress, Reagan was also faced with a combatant Congress which accused his administration of
"failing to take arms control seriously." 164 It eventually took the recommendations of the bipartisan Scowcroft
Commission to salvage a limited number of MX deployments. 165
Reagan's problems with Congress, as well as his bid for reelection, made it politically expedient for the President to improve relations with the Soviets slightly. However,
Reagan's willingness to engage the Soviets was not entirely disingenuous. As argued above, his anti-nuclear beliefs may also have played a role in his decisions to increase U.S.-
Soviet contact. The KAL 007 Shootdown
The progress made between the two nations in 1983 was soon eradicated when it was discovered that the soviet Union had shot down a civilian Korean airliner (flight KAL 007) on
164 Freedman, Nuclear strategy and Arms Control, p. 41.
165 The Scowcroft Commission, a bipartisan Commission chaired by General Brent Scowcroft, was created by the Reagan Administration to save the MX. The commission issued a report which recommended a small MX deployment combined with the deployment of a single-warhead missile, the Midgetman. 78
August 30. 166 In his speech to the nation following the incident, Reagan had some tough words for the Soviets:
This was the Soviet Union against the world and the moral precepts which guide human relations among people everywhere. It was an act of barbarism, borne of a society which wantonly disregards individual rights and the value of human life ... 167
Reagan's statement displays the moralism which permeated his belief system. For the President, Soviet Communists were immoral and did not feel bound·by the rules of international conduct.
In response to the shootdown, the U.S. placed restrictions on the landing rights of Aeroflot and stopped implementation of a number of bilateral agreements that had been signed with the Soviets. Interestingly enough, in his memoirs, after assailing the Soviet Union for its behavior,
Reagan links the incident to the dangers of nuclear weapons:
"If anything, the KAL incident demonstrated how close the world had come to the precipice and how much we needed nuclear arms control." 168 At the time, Reagan was, in principle, an advocate of nuclear abolition; even a terrible
166 The shootdown appeared to Air Force intelligence to be an accident, and not intentional, as alleged by Reagan and his advisors. For details on the KAL 007 incident, see Seymour Hersh, The Target is Destroyed: What Really Happened to Flight 007 and What America Knew About It, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1986).
167 Reagan, Life, p. 584.
168 Ibid. 79
incident like the downing of the KAl 007 reminded him of the
danger of nuclear weapons. However, the President's anti-
communism and anti-Sovietism, which were more salient,
prevented him from pursuing his goal of nuclear abolition in
his first administration. At this time, Reagan did not
believe that the Soviets could be trusted to adhere to
international agreements. For the President, rogue soviet
behavior, demonstrated in the Korean airliner shoot-down,
reinforced his image of the nation as an immoral, power-
hungry regime.
Throughout the remainder of the summer of 1983 and into
1984, u.s.-soviet relations continued to oscillate.
Shultz's meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in
Madrid, Spain on September 9, 1983, seemed to signal a
slight improvement in relations in the wake of the KAL
incident. Relations deteriorated rapidly, however, when the
U.S. invaded Grenada in October. Soon thereafter, the
Soviets walked out of the Geneva arms control negotiations when the U.S began its INF deployment.
Relations did not improve again until the summer of
1984, when Reagan and the new General Secretary Konstantin
Chernenko began exchanging letters in June. 169 In July, the
U.S. and Soviet Union began a series of offers and
169 Andropov died at the beginning of February 1984 and was succeeded by Konstantin Chernenko. 80
counteroffers relating to the resumption of arms control agreements. 170 The most promising result of this period was
Gromyko's September 1984 visit to the White House. Although no concrete agreements emerged from this meeting, it provided Reagan with "an opportunity to stress that U.S.-
Soviet relations had his personal attention and high priority." 171 Late in 1984, Reagan's willingness to keep open communications with the soviets again became evident.
As with his attempts to maintain a u.s.-soviet dialogue earlier in his administration, Reagan was partially driven by his anti-nuclearism:
And I just happen to believe that we cannot go into another generation with the world living under the threat of those [nuclear) weapons ... My hope has been, and my dream, that we can get the Soviet Union to join us in starting verifiable reductions of the weapons. 1 72
The Shultz Memo
A specific episode in the period spanning 1983 and 1984 is particularly telling: the formulation of George Shultz's memorandum in March of 1983 on u.s.-soviet relations. This episode demonstrates the rising influence of Shultz and how
170 For details on the arms control proposals, see Oberdorfer, The Turn, pp. 84-85.
171 Cannon, Role, p. 743.
172 "Interview with the President, " Time (November 16, 1984), p. 52. 81
he prodded Reagan to begin negotiating with the Soviets. It also reveals, however, that formidable resistance to engaging the Soviets in serious negotiations still existed in the Reagan Administration. National Security Assistant
Clark and Secretary of Defense Weinberger tried to block the efforts of the State Department to improve relations.
In March 1983, Shultz presented Reagan with a memo entitled, "Next steps in u.s.-soviet Relations." In retrospect, Reagan's approval of this memo represents a concrete example of his willingness to negotiate with the
Soviets and of Shultz's increasing influence. This memo proposed "wide-ranging, high-level contacts with the soviet
Union on trade, arms control, regional differences and human rights ••• " 173 Although the policy memorandum advocated increased contacts, it did not recommend the specific policy positions to be taken by U.S. officials. 174 According to a
New York Times account at the time:
••• [the memo) laid out the road ahead in terms of a series of possible meetings: Shultz-Gromyko and Shultz Andropov in July, Shultz-Gromyko at the United Nations in September, followed by Gromyko-Reagan in Washington. 175
173 Gelb, "Expanding Contacts," New York Times (June 30, 1983), p. Al.
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid. 82
Finally, the memo also proposed that these discussions be
followed by a Reagan-Andropov meeting in 1984. 176
The memo was written primarily by members of the State
Department's European Bureau, and their plan for increased
high-level u.s.-soviet contact was adamantly opposed by
Secretary of Defense Weinberger and National Security
Assistant Clark, along with other members of the National
Security Council (NSC). According to Oberdorfer, "Clark was
strongly opposed to moving rapidly with relations with
Moscow." 177 Weinberger was also reluctant to improve u.s.
Soviet relations. Weinberger, Clark and members of the NSC
did their best to convince Reagan to reject Shultz•s
recommendations.
According to a White House official, Clark sent Reagan
his own memo in connection with the Shultz document. In his memo, Clark argued that Reagan should not seek to improve
relations with the Soviets. 178 Members of the NSC were
also adamantly opposed to the steps advocated by Shultz. In
a New York Times account at the time, a member of the NSC
stated that he had written a memo to National Security
Assistant Clark arguing against a Reagan-Andropov summit·.
176 Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 35.
177 Ibid., p. 35.
178 Ibid. 83
According to the account, the official's argument was
vitriolic:
[he argued] strongly against Mr. Reagan's meeting with anyone who had called him a liar or, in his words, even being seen with Mr. Andropov when Soviet forces were killing Afghans and oppressing the Polish people. 179
Additional members of the NSC staff also denounced the
recommendations made in the state Department memo. 180
Shultz and his advisors at the State Department were, however, clever in framing their recommendations in
terms of the arguments that Weinberger, Clark and Perle had used to veto improved relations with the Soviets:
But the memorandum also said, according to Administration officials, that Mr. Reagan's military buildup and toughness had turned the tide in world affairs, that he was now in a position to negotiate from strength. . . 181
By claiming that the U.S. was now strong enough militarily to negotiate, the state Department drafters of the memo masterfully played upon the 'position of strength' argument that the President, backed by the more hardline members of his administration, had been using for three years.
In the immediate aftermath of the state Department memorandum, it was unclear whether or not Reagan had decided
179 Gelb, "Expanding Contacts," New York Times (June 30, 1983), p. A12.
180 Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 35.
181 Gelb, "Expanding Contacts," New York Times (June 30, 1983), p. A12, emphasis added. 84
to accept its recommendations. 182 It was not until June, when Shultz testified before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, that Reagan's decision became evident. According to the New York Times, two weeks before Shultz was to appear before the committee his draft statement was submitted to
Reagan for editing. In the statement, Shultz asserted that the United States was "now strong enough to begin a
'constructive dialogue."' with the soviet Union. 183
Although several members of the National Security
Council wanted this and other statements which advocated improved u.s.-soviet relations deleted, Reagan "specifically approved keeping them." 18 4 The events following Shultz's testimony also revealed that Reagan had decided to increase contact and improve relations with the soviets. In his speech to the committee, Shultz stressed the U.S. desire to negotiate with the Soviets:
Having begun to rebuild our strength •.• we now seek to engage the Soviet leaders in a constructive dialogue- a dialogue through which we hope to find political solutions to outstanding issues .•• l85
182 Cannon, Role, pp. 313-314.
183 Gelb, "Expanding Contacts," New York Times (June 30, 1983), p. Al2.
184 Ibid.
185 As quoted in Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 36. 85
Shultz•s call for increased contact with the Soviet
Union was, however, tempered by his articulation of a U.S. policy for countering Soviet power projection. Shultz's somewhat contradictory messages were interpreted differently in the next day's editions of the Washington Post and the
New York Times. While the Times analyzed the testimony as advocating a more conciliatory Soviet policy, the Post emphasized Shultz•s statements on checking the Soviet Union.
This same day, aides at Foggy Bottom "were authorized to conduct briefings along the lines of the Times version of the testimony." 186 This action by the State Department was significant because it demonstrated the administration's approval of a more conciliatory Soviet policy.
Reaqan•s Belief system and the Shultz Memo
The episode surrounding the drafting and approval of
Secretary of State Shultz's 1983 memorandum reveals the influence of Reagan's belief system upon his formulation of policy. First, the President was influenced by his view of the balance of military power. Convinced that the U.S. was now becoming strong enough to negotiate from strength,
Reagan was willing to increase contacts with the Soviets.
Furthermore, the President's anti-nuclearism continued to prod him toward improved u.s.-soviet relations.
186 Ibid., pp. 36-37. 86
However, it is also important to note that Reagan chose
to ameliorate u.s.-soviet relations quietly and that he
simultaneously approved the more confrontational portions of
Shultz's speech. These two facts reveal that anti-Communism
and anti-Sovietism continued to be prevalent features of the
President's belief system. Reagan was still strongly
opposed to the central tenets of the Soviet system. His
anti-nuclearism and view of the balance of military power
influenced him to improve the state of u.s.-soviet
relations. Until Reagan viewed the Soviet union itself as
changing, however, his anti-communism and anti-sovietism would prove a block to his pursuit of complete detente with
the Soviets. Reagan's actions in this period follow a
pattern posited by cognitive theorists. The stability of
the President's belief system prevented him from changing
his belief system and, thus, undertaking major changes in
his policy toward the Soviet Union.
This particular episode also demonstrates the increasing
influence of George Shultz, to the exclusion of more
hardline members of the administration. The waning
influence of the President's more hawkish advisors was
evident in the President's decision to exclude Perle and
Ikle from the discussions of strategic arms. Additionally, he was not swayed by the arguments of members of the NSC
opposed to increased u.s.-soviet contacts. Indeed, Shultz•s 87
influence was evident by the fall of 1983 when Shultz and
Reagan began meeting one-on-one in regularly scheduled meetings. 187 Reagan also began to make an effort see
Shultz and his wife socially. 188 In news accounts at the time, the resignation of William Clark at the end of 1983 was at least partially attributed to Shultz's complaints about "policymaking disarray" at the White House. 189
At the same time, however, the opposition of Weinberger and Clark to the major recommendations of the Shultz memo demonstrates the aversion to increased u.s.-soviet contact that was still prevalent in the administration. By the beginning of 1984, personnel turnover in the Reagan
Administration had begun bringing men into the administration who were less adamantly anti-Soviet. At the end of 1983, Robert McFarlane replaced William Clark as
National Security Assistant. In the spring of 1983, Richard
Pipes, the hardline chief Soviet expert on the NSC staff was replaced by Jack Matlock, "a career professional with extensive Soviet experience." l90 Despite some personnel
187 Don Oberdorfer, "DISGRACE: Shultz's Roar on Policymaking Got Results," Washington Post {October 23, 1983), A7.
188 Ibid.
189 Ibid.
190 Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 35. 88
turnover, however, the majority of the President's advisors were still opposed to improved relations with the Soviets: Indeed, Shultz seemed out of step with the strongly anti-Soviet tenor of the administration's rhetoric and military buildup, and especially with the reluctance of Secretary of Defense Weinberger to contemplate any conciliatory moves toward Moscow. 191 This opposition, combined with Reagan's anti-communism and anti-Sovietism, would continue to block the President from embarking fully on a policy of approchement with the Soviets.
191 Ibid. VI. REAGAN AND GORBACHEV REDIRECT RELATIONS: 1985-1986
In the period 1985-1986 Ronald Reagan's Soviet policy
changed radically. The assumption of power by Mikhail
Gorbachev, coupled with the growing influence of moderate
officials in the Reagan Administration and Reagan's belief
that the U.S. had regained its military strength, spurred an
increasingly cooperative u.s.-soviet relationship. Ronald
Reagan's belief system, did not, however, substantially
change. Rather, as the President began to view Gorbachev as
a reformer of the corrupt Soviet system, his anti-Communism
and anti-Sovietism became less salient features of his
belief system. As the strength of these beliefs waned, his
anti-nuclearism became more prominent, allowing Reagan
genuinely to pursue arms agreements.
This chapter reveals that Mikhail Gorbachev and the
reformist policies he championed allowed Reagan to change
his Soviet and arms control policy without substantially
altering his core beliefs. For the President, Gorbachev was
not a typical Soviet leader: rather than pushing
expansionism, he negotiated on Cambodia and Afghanistan;
rather than continuing domestic repression, he advocated glasnost and perestroika. Reagan was advocating detente with a changed Soviet leader, indeed, with a changing Soviet
Union.
89 90
Pre-Summit Communications
Secretary of State Shultz continued to play an important role in encouraging Reagan to pursue more conciliatory relations with the Soviets. Even before Gorbachev came to power in March of 1985, Shultz had begun to lay the groundwork for a solid U.S. commitment to improved relations with the Soviets. In meetings on January 7 and 8, 1985
Shultz met with Gromyko in Geneva to discuss the future of u.s.-soviet arms control. The outcome of these meetings was an ambiguous agreement stating, "the subject of negotiations
[would] be a complex of questions concerning both space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate range." 192
However ambiguous, the agreement was important because it committed both sides to the resumption of arms control talks. Shultz and Gromyko met again in Vienna in May and, although they did not agree to firm dates for a Reagan-
Gorbachev summit, they continued to demonstrate an open u.s.-soviet dialogue. 193
With Gromyko's resignation in July, Eduard Shevardnadze, who would become as much of an architect of 'new thinking'
192 "Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko Agree on New Arms Control Negotiations," Department of State Bulletin (March 1985), p. 30.
193 Then-Vice-President Bush presented Gorbachev with a summit invitation at Chernenko's funeral. 91
in soviet foreign policy as Gorbachev, was named foreign minister. Shultz and Shevardnadze met for the first time at the end of July in Helsinki. Ostensibly attending a meeting designed to mark the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki
Accords, the two men prepared for the November summit to which the Soviets had agreed earlier in the month. In
Helsinki, Shultz and his Soviet counterpart had a three-hour meeting. According to Oberdorfer, at this first meeting,
Shevardnadze made a favorable impression upon Shultz:
Shultz reported to Reagan that he was impressed with the new foreign minister. He was tough, but quite a different person from Gromyko. l94
Over the course of the second Reagan Administration, Shultz and Shevardnadze, like Reagan and Gorbachev, would develop a personal relationship which would complement their professional one.
The Secretary of state and the Foreign Minister met again in November when Shultz flew to Moscow two weeks before the summit. The ensuing negotiating sessions between
Shultz and Gorbachev proved to be argumentative and frank.
During the meetings, a feisty and somewhat agitated
Gorbachev attacked a wide array of U.S. policies and actions. In a rapid barrage, Gorbachev criticized U.S. disinformation about the Soviet Union; U.S. failure to ratify the SALT II accords; U.S. attempts to link arms
194 Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 123. 92
control and regional issues; and U.S. efforts to reinterpret the ABM Treaty to permit development of SDI. 195 As recounted by Oberdorfer, National Security Assistant
McFarlane described Gorbachev as, "curious, vigorous, active, articulate, argumentative, self-assured (and] occasionally impulsive." 196
Shultz, however, was undaunted by the aggressive negotiating style adopted by Gorbachev. He attempted to swing the argument away from the General Secretary's criticisms of the U.S. and toward a discussion of the upcoming Geneva Summit and the state of u.s.-soviet relations. The Secretary of State emphasized Reagan's commitment to a more constructive relationship, especially in the realm of arms control. Near the end of the discussions, Gorbachev expressed his vision of the Geneva
Summit. The Soviet leader stressed that the meeting should focus on more than Reagan and Gorbachev getting acquainted and setting an agenda for the future. Gorbachev said he wanted to discuss with Reagan his own proposal to reduce
"nuclear forces to zero on the condition that the two sides prevent the militarization of space." 197 He also agreed
195 Ibid., pp. 120-139.
196 Ibid., p. 137.
197 Ibid. 93
to discuss regional and bilateral issues and alluded to a discussion of human rights.
Reaqan•s Expectations
Ronald Reagan was enthusiastic about the Geneva Summit and the opportunity to meet a Soviet leader. In his memoirs, the President expresses the importance he placed on personal communication:
Starting with Brezhnev, I'd dreamed of personally going one-on-one with a soviet leader because I thought we might be able to accomplish things our countries' diplomats couldn't do because they didn't have the authority. 198
Reagan believed his personal relationship with Gorbachev would be a crucial element in u.s.-soviet relations. If he and Gorbachev formed a personal relationship, they could accelerate the arms reduction process. According to Reagan,
"in Geneva I'll have to get him (Gorbachev] alone in a room and set him straight." 199
Because Reagan viewed the summit as crucial to cementing the new cooperation in u.s.-soviet relations, he intensely prepared for his upcoming meeting with the General Secretary despite his lack of interest in details. According to
Cannon, "Reagan probably prepared with greater care for the
Geneva summit than for any event of his presidency." 200
198 Regan, Life, p. 634.
199 Ibid., p. 632.
200 Cannon, Role, p. 748. 94
In particular, two of the President's advisors captured his
attention. One was Jack Matlock, the NSC staff's Soviet
expert. Matlock wrote 25 papers on various aspects of the
Soviet Union, detailing "Soviet objectives, strategy and
negotiating tactics as well as Russian culture and
history." 201 Matlock masterfully related his papers to
Reagan's own experiences, insights and prejudices, capturing
the President's attention. 202 The other advisor who gained
Reagan's interest was Russian historian and author Suzanne
Massey who influenced the President's thinking about the
Soviets by emphasizing the "positive virtues of the Russian
people." 203 Massey thus convinced the President to view
the soviet Union in a different context. Rather than viewing the nation through the prism of Soviet Communism,
she prodded him to view it through the lens of Russian
culture.
In addition to his desire to form a personal
relationship with Gorbachev, Reagan had an additional goal
at Geneva: to restructure the nature of the nations'
strategic relationship. In a pre-summit news conference,
Reagan expressed his dream of a new nuclear environment:
201 Ibid., p. 748.
202 Ibid.
203 Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 142, emphasis added. 95
.•• I think at this summit meeting what we should take up is the matter of turning toward defensive weapons as an alternative to this plain naked nuclear threat of each side saying we can blow up the other. 204 Reagan hoped the Geneva Summit would spur arms control negotiations to eliminate offensive weapons, while preserving defensive ones. The President's idea for restructuring the premise upon which the U.S. and Soviet Union had based their nuclear relationship for over forty years--the dominance of the offense--was quite radical: What Reagan was proposing was nothing short of a revolution in the nuclear order. If what he called for could be achieved it would be as revolutionary a change in international politics and Soviet American relations as the invention of the bomb itself. 205 As previous chapters have revealed, Reagan's dedication to nuclear defense, embodied in SDI, was driven by his anti nuclear beliefs. Beginning at Geneva, the President's anti nuclearism began to become a more prevalent feature of his belief system, revealing the beginnings of the ensuing shift in his Administration's Soviet policy.
The Geneva summit The Geneva Summit was the beginning of what Reagan characterized as a personal relationship with Soviet leader Gorbachev. Although the only concrete agreement that emerged from the summit was a decision to hold another
204 Ibid., p. 129.
205 Talbott and Mandelbaum, Reagan and Gorbachev, p. 124. 96
summit, the meeting solidified the positive trend in U.S.-
Soviet relations and played a crucial role in influencing
Ronald Reagan's view of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union. As
the President's view of the Soviet Union became more
favorable and his anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism became
less prominent, his policy toward the Soviet Union,
specifically in the realm of arms control, began to evolve.
At the summit, Reagan's initial impression of the Soviet
leader was positive. As remembered by the President:
There was something likable about Gorbachev. There was a warmth in his face and his style, not the coldness bordering on hatred I'd seen in most senior Soviet officials I'd met until then. 206
Because Reagan was committed to developing a close
relationship with the General Secretary during the summit,
his initial impression of Gorbachev was ''crucial." 207
Despite Reagan's positive assessment of the Soviet leader,
the sessions between the two leaders were stormy, with both
Reagan and Gorbachev adamantly arguing their positions.
In the initial plenary session, the "two leaders
expressed the basic ideological convictions of the Cold
War." 208 Gorbachev derided the military-industrial complex
in the United states, while Reagan railed against state
206 Reagan, Life, p. 635.
207 Cannon, Role, p. 730.
208 Ibid., p. 750. 97
control of the Soviet economy. After a lunch break, the two
leaders embarked on an arms control meeting. Gorbachev was
amenable to a portion of an American package which dealt with a 50 percent cut in offensive arms, but had questions
regarding an INF agreement. He was, however, passionately
opposed to an American proposal that the Soviets "accept and
cooperate with SDI." 209 Reagan vehemently argued for a
broad interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty and offered to share U.S. research with the
Soviets. 210 Gorbachev, however, questioned the genuineness
of Reagan's offer:
Gorbachev, without saying it in so many words, suggested that when I'd made mv offer to share our SDI research .•. ! was lying. 21 r
To break the impasse, Reagan suggested that they take a walk. The leaders journeyed to a pool house near the
chateau where the negotiations were being conducted, and
continued their discussion in front of a fireplace. Sitting before the fire, in accordance with a plan that had been
scripted earlier by the White House, the leaders continued their conversation. Although they did not broker an
209 Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 146.
210 Members of the Reagan Administration who were proponents of SDI argued for a 'broad interpretation' of the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty, claiming that deployment of ABM systems such as SDI were within the treaty constraints.
211 Reagan, Life, p. 639. 98
agreement dealing with SDI in the pool house, walking back
to the chateau, the two leaders agreed to two future
summits. Reagan invited Gorbachev to a summit in Washington
and the Soviet leader "quickly proposed a follow-up summit
in Moscow, to which Reagan readily agreed.'' 212 For the
remainder of the summit, the leaders discussed human rights
and regional issues.
Drafting the final summit communique proved to be
contentious. Beginning in the summer of 1985, U.S. and
Soviet negotiators had been discussing possible summit
agreements in advance. The state Department and the NSC had
been conducting these negotiations without the knowledge of
the Defense Department. In October, Shultz provided Reagan with a draft of the summit communique and "explained each
point orally and obtained the President's approval." 213
Later in October, Weinberger, unaware of these negotiations,
"learned about the draft communique through Washington leaks
after the Soviets had already been given a copy." 214
Furious at having been excluded from the important
discussions, the Secretary of Defense attacked the draft
communique in a private meeting with the President. After
212 Cannon, Role, p. 732.
213 Ibid., p. 151.
214 Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 151. 99
hearing Weinberger's criticisms, Reagan decided to veto the
prenegotiated communique.
Thus, near the end of the Geneva Summit, u.s.-soviet
negotiators were forced to redraft a communique. After some
disagreements and last minute negotiations, the communique
was completed. Although the accord did not mention the
contentious issues of the ABM Treaty or SDI, it did detail a
number of important general principles relating to security
relations and war prevention:
The sides ••. have agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Recognizing that any conflict between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. could have catastrophic consequences, they emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority. 215
More importantly, in the statement, the two countries agreed to strive for a 50 percent reduction in nuclear arms and to "accelerate progress" on an INF agreement. 216
The Importance of Geneva
For Ronald Reagan, the Geneva Summit was a crucial event
in the more conciliatory u.s.-soviet relationship which he
and Gorbachev would cement. In the aftermath of the meeting, it was the personal relationship he and Gorbachev
had started to which Reagan attached the most importance.
In his memoirs, the President explains that he had "finally
215 Ibid., p. 153.
216 Cannon, Role, p. 754. 100
met a soviet leader [he) could talk to. 11 217 According to
cannon, Reagan's personal impression of the Soviet leader made an indelible mark on the President, causing him to
"always see Gorbachev in human terms even when they
disagreed the most profoundly." 218 In his recollections of
his first engagement with Gorbachev, Reagan continually
notes the ways in which Gorbachev differed from other soviet
leaders. In his memoirs, Reagan explains what made
Gorbachev unique:
•.. Not once during our private meetings or at the plenary meeting did he express support for the old Marxist-Leninist goal of a one-world Communist state or the Brezhvev Doctrine of Soviet expansionism. 219
The Geneva Summit and the preparatory meetings preceding
it also demonstrated the rising and waning influence of a number of administration officials. The influence of Shultz was evident in his role as the administration's principal arms control strategist in the pre-summit meetings and
Reagan's consent to secret State-NSC contacts with the
Soviets regarding the communique. Weinberger's authority was clearly on the decline .. He was omitted from the secret talks and was not even a member of the U.S. Geneva delegation. Not invited to attend the summit, Weinberger
217 Ibid., p. 641.
218 Cannon, Role, p. 750.
219 Reagan, Life, p. 640. 101
wrote urging the President to end adherence to SALT II limits. This letter was leaked to the press on the first day of the summit, most likely by the Pentagon, forced to use the press to advocate policy positions. 220
Reenqaqement at Reykjavik
u.s.-soviet relations declined, however, in the period following the Geneva summit. Arms control negotiations were stalled and, despite the fact that he had agreed to a summit in Washington, Gorbachev was reluctant throughout the early months of 1986 to agree to "a full-scale summit meeting in the United States without assurances that tangible accords would come of it." 221 Relations were exacerbated in late
July, the soviets seized U.S. News and World Reports correspondent Nicholas Daniloff, accusing him of being an
American spy. 222
A breakthrough occurred in September 1986 when Gorbachev sent Reagan a letter requesting a meeting preliminary to the summit at a neutral location. In the letter, Gorbachev urged Reagan to personally join him in recapturing the momentum they had started at Geneva:
220 Cannon, Role, pp. 749-750.
221 Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 184.
222 The Soviets seized Daniloff in retaliation for the earlier U.S. seizure of soviet spy Gennadi Zakharov. See Cannon, Role, pp. 762-763. 102
[Negotiations] will lead nowhere unless you and I intervene personally. I am convinced that we shall be able to find solutions ... This is exactly what the whole world is expecting from a second meeting between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States. 22·3
Reagan and Shultz were eager to negotiate once again
with the soviet leader and neither White House Chief of
Staff Donald Regan nor National Security Advisor John
Poindexter advised the President against accepting
Gorbachev's offer. Once Reagan had accepted Gorbachev's
offer to meet in Iceland, however, he and his advisors made
no special preparations for the pre-summit. Reagan's scanty
preparations for Reykjavik were in contrast to his immersion
in details prior to the summit in Geneva: "In Washington,
the preparations for the meeting were much less than
preparations had been for Geneva ... " 224 Obviously, the
President's advisors did not believe that there was any
chance that major agreements might be reached in Iceland.
As ACDA Director Adelman expresses in his survey of arms
control, the U.S. "did not expect much •.. [beyond] a 'howdy
and hello session." 225
Once the negotiating sessions at Reykjavik were underway, it became evident, however, that officials in the
Reagan Administration would be forced to reevaluate their
223 Quoted in Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 186. 224 Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 186.
225 Adelman, The Great Universal Embrace, p. 35. 103
limited assessments of the agenda at Iceland. Gorbachev had
come to the 'pre-summit' with arms control proposals
designed to gain propaganda points if the U.S. refused to
genuine negotiations. Gorbachev's proposals included the
following: a 50 percent reduction in strategic forces; the
elimination of u.s.-soviet INF weapons in Europe; and
adherence to the ABM Treaty for 10 years, "during which SDI
research would be confined to the laboratory." 226
In his account of u.s.-soviet relations, Oberdorfer
implies that the Soviets deliberately gave the U.S. "the
impression that the discussion would focus primarily on the
less fundamental issues of Euromissiles and nuclear
testing. " 227 According to Oberdorfer and other analysts, then, the U.S. was caught off-guard by the proposals tabled
by Gorbachev. 228 Although the U.S. negotiators were
generally unprepared for Gorbachev's arms control offers,
Reagan was thrilled by the Soviet leader's initiatives. The
President believed he had found a partner who was interested
in the eradication of nuclear weapons. In his memoirs,
Reagan asserts, 11 ••• for a day and a half, Gorbachev and I made progress on arms reduction that even now seems
226 Cannon, Role, p. 765.
227 Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 187.
228 Lou cannon and Kenneth Adelman, in previously cited accounts, also conclude that the U.S. was unprepared for Gorbachev•s proposals. 104
breathtaking." 229 Reykjavik displayed Reagan's view of nuclear weapons:
•.• here was pure Ronald Reagan. At every other session with Mikhail Gorbachev, he was carefully scripted, surrounded by advisors, and boxed in with other engagements. Not at Reykjavik. This man, feared as a wild cowboy about to fire off nuclear weapons, was here unmasked as more of a visionary about to bargain away nuclear weapons. 230
The progress made in the area of arms reduction by
Reagan and Gorbachev throughout the meeting at Reykjavik was, indeed, remarkable. The two leaders came to the brink of approving an agreement to eliminate "all strategic nuclear arms" or "all ballistic missiles," depending upon whose post-summit comments are analyzed. In the wake of the historic meeting, Reagan and other members of his administration argued that the President had nearly agreed to eliminate "all ballistic missiles." In his memoirs,
Reagan explained the negotiations as follows:
In addition to (ballistic] nuclear missiles, we said we would try to reduce and eventually eliminate other nuclear weapons as well ... 231
However, a Washington Post article, published after the summit's conclusion, contended that Reagan admitted in a briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee that "he agreed at the Iceland summit to scrap all nuclear strategic
229 Reagan, Life, p. 675.
230 Adelman, The Great Universal Embrace, p. 20.
231 Reagan, Life, p. 676, emphasis added. 105
arms, not just ballistic missiles •.. " 232 In his biography of the President, Cannon also argues that Reagan agreed to eliminate all strategic nuclear weapons. 233 Whichever interpretation is believed, Reagan's aversion to nuclear weapons was revealed for the entire world at the Iceland summit.
An arms reduction agreement was, however, eventually blocked by a continued impasse over SDI. Gorbachev and the
Soviets pushed for a ten-year period in which both nations would strictly adhere to the terms of the ABM Treaty, confining SDI to the laboratory. The U.S. developed a counterproposal in which compliance with the ABM Treaty would be divided into two five-year periods. In the first period, both sides would eliminate 50 percent of their ballistic missiles while adhering to the ABM Treaty. They would continue abiding by the terms of the treaty in the second five-year period if "all ballistic missiles were eliminated during that time." 234 At the end of ten years,
232 See George c. Wilson, "Reagan Arms Plan Questioned," Washington Post (October 17, 1986).
233 Cannon, Role, p. 768. Reagan's public post-Reykjavik characterization of what he agreed to may have been influenced by the reaction of the U.S. European allies who were aghast at Reagan's renunciation of nuclear weapons, and the 'decoupling' of u.s.-European defense which this implied.
234 Ibid., p. 767. 106
each side would be allowed to deploy a strategic defense system.
In the end, the leaders were unable to reach an agreement on SDI. Reagan claimed Gorbachev was determined to confine SDI development to laboratory research. The
President, however, argued that he was unwilling to relinquish his plans for deployment:
I've said again and again the SDI wasn't a bargaining chip. I've told you, if we find out that the SDI is practical and feasible, we'll make that information known to you and everyone else so that nuclear weapons can be made obsolete. 235
Despite the fact that the Reagan-Gorbachev negotiations broke down over the issue of SDI, the Iceland Summit was an historic event in u.s.-soviet relations. Previously, u.s.
Soviet relations had been marked by long and tortuous arms control negotiations. In three days at Reykjavik, Reagan and Gorbachev discussed eliminating a significant portion of their nuclear arsenals.
Lessons of Reykjavik
Reagan the •gunslinging cowboy' was thus exposed as a man with a vision of nuclear disarmament at Iceland. A number of factors converged in 1986 which allowed Reagan to pursue his dream of arms reduction. Both the Soviet Union and its leader had changed. The country he had once termed
235 Reagan, Life, p. 677. 107
the "evil empire" was now headed by a congenial man, a man
whose vision of domestic and foreign policy change for the
Soviet Union was becoming evident in both his domestic and
foreign policies. At home, Gorbachev had called for
"openness in public life" and had cited publicly the
deficiencies in the Soviet economy. 235 He had also
implemented significant changes in the personnel of the
Politburo and the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union. In the realm of foreign policy, the
Soviet leader was advocating "new thinking" and redefining
security in terms of "reasonable sufficiency." 237
As Adelman sums up the changes in Reagan:
Taking office considering Soviet behavior the world's prime problem, Reagan came to consider nuclear weapons its main problem ... taking office believing that Western security rested on an arms buildup, President Reagan came to believe that it rested largely or significantly on arms control. 238
236 Talbott and Mandelbaum, Reagan and Gorbachev, pp. 84-85.
237 See Raymond Garthoff, Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1990) .
238 Adelman, The Great Universal Embrace, p. 126. Although the description is telling, by emphasizing Reagan's role in arms control, Adelman, former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, is bolstering his own historical role. VII. A NEW ERA IN RELATIONS: 1987-1988
Reagan's last two years in office marked the beginning of a new era in u.s.-soviet relations, an era in which relations would be characterized by cooperation and coordination, rather than competition. For Reagan, the two most important events in this period were the signing of the
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and his historic trip to Moscow for the 1988 summit. In Reagan's mind, the
INF Treaty, the first real arms reduction treaty signed by the two nations, was a step toward his goal of nuclear abolition. According to the President, the treaty, "marked the first time in history that any nations had ever agreed not only to stand down but to destroy nuclear missiles. 11239
Reagan's trip to Moscow was highly symbolic, demonstrating that the President no longer viewed the soviet Union as the evil empire: "I was talking about another time, another era ••• " 240
An analysis of the events of this period affirms, however, that Reagan's belief system was not greatly altered. The President never needed to reassess his views because, in his mind, the Soviet Union was itself changing.
Gorbachev's personal relationship with the President,
239 Reagan, Life, p. 700.
240 As quoted in Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 470.
108 109
combined with the domestic and foreign policy reforms he introduced, allowed Reagan to establish a lasting, cooperative relationship with a Communist country undertaking reform.
Quiet Diplomacy
For approximately a year following the Iceland Summit, u.s.-soviet relations were stalled over the issue of SDI.
Despite the agreement that had been reached in Iceland,
Gorbachev refused to set the date for another summit due to the disagreement over SDI. According to Reagan, Gorbachev
"kept insisting that we must surrender our right to conduct research on space-based missile defenses." 241 Although the impasse over SDI continued, progress was made in some other areas of u.s.-soviet relations. As recounted by the
President, the U.S. engaged in •quiet diplomacy' in the area of human rights, providing Gorbachev with lists of individuals who wanted to emigrate. Gorbachev eventually approved exit visas for a number of Soviet citizens. 242 In the area of arms control, in late February 1987, Gorbachev proposed that the issue of INF weapons be unlinked from other arms control agreements; Reagan accepted this
241 Reagan, Life, p. 687.
242 Ibid., pp. 686-687. 110
proposal. 243 During meetings in September, Shultz and
Shevardnadze signed an agreement to establish crisis centers in the U.S. and Soviet Union designed to reduce the risks of accidental war. 244 At one of these sessions, the Soviet
Foreign Minister also informed Shultz of the Soviet Union's impending pullout from Afghanistan.
Regardless of the lack of progress in confirming a summit meeting, Reagan realized that important achievements were occurring in other aspects of u.s.-soviet relations. In his memoirs, the President emphasizes, the U.S. was "at last seeing real deeds from Moscow.'' 245 Additionally, Reagan was acutely aware of the reforms being pioneered by
Gorbachev inside the Soviet Union:
We were seeing more and more evidence that Gorbachev was serious about introducing major economic and political reforms in the Soviet Union. There would be the first free elections in the Soviet Union; there was official encouragement to entrepreneurs to establish businesses in the Soviet Union; and, on the seventieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution, Gorbachev made a blistering attack on Stalin, opening the way for a new freedom to examine the Soviet past and its mistakes. 246
Due to his anti-Communist and anti-soviet beliefs, Reagan believed major change in the soviet system was a necessary precursor to genuine u.s.-soviet rapprochement. The
243 Cannon, Role, pp. 771-772.
244 Reagan, Life, p. 691.
245 Ibid., p. 687.
246 Ibid., p. 686. 111
totalitarian party-state which remained stagnant prior to
Gorbachev was not an international regime with which the
United states could pursue conciliatory relations.
Gorbachev's reforming regime, on the other hand, was transforming itself into an acceptable partner.
Reagan also remained hopeful regarding the prospects for the next summit, asserting that he believed "Gorbachev was serious about wanting a summit and that he was simply trying to hold out for all the concessions he could get. 11 247 The
President's hopes for a summit were confirmed when
Shevardnadze travelled to Washington at the end of October,
1987. The Foreign Minister delivered a Gorbachev letter to
Reagan proposing a new summit beginning on
December 8, 1987. 248 Reagan agreed to Gorbachev's proposal, pleased that the Soviet leader had dropped a number of his demands: 11 ••• he dropped his insistence that we had to accept limits on SDI development as a prerequisite to signing the INF Treaty, signing the START Treaty, or setting an agenda for our next summit ... 11 249
The Washington summit
247 Ibid., p. 687.
248 Oberdorfer, The Turn, pp. 256-257.
249 Reagan, Life, p. 697. 112
The Washington Summit would prove to be more symbolic
than substantive, as Reagan and Gorbachev publicly displayed
their personal relationship and the warming of u.s.-soviet
ties it represented. Both leaders had recently suffered
domestic political setbacks--Reagan, the Iran-contra
revelations; Gorbachev, conservative backlash to his reform
program--and this was their opportunity to gain acclaim on
the world stage. Oberdorfer describes the summit in the
following terms:
Reagan and Gorbachev spoke to each other--and to the domestic and global audiences--with words, deeds and body language that dramatized the easy familiarity that they had developed in two years. The easing of tension between them and the nations the headed was on display .•. Gorbachev's visit was a political event of historic significance. 250
The major agreements of the Washington Summit--the INF
Treaty and the decision to hold a summit in Moscow--had been
reached in advance. However, according to a Washington Post
account at the time, the summit marked the cementing of the
improved relationship between the former Cold War
adversaries: 11 ••• the summit appears to have been an
important landmark on the road to an improved political understanding ... " 251
250 Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 258.
251 David Hoffman and Don Oberdorfer, 'Leaders Central Compromise: Missile Defense Tests 'as Required,'" Washington Post (December 13, 1987), p. Al. 113
At the Washington Summit, this policy of improved U.S.-
Soviet relations was, for the first time, advocated by the majority of Reagan's national security advisors. Both
Weinberger and Perle had resigned early in the fall of 1987.
Weinberger was replaced as Secretary of Defense by former
National Security Advisor Frank Carlucci, a "much more
pragmatic figure." 252 Carlucci was succeeded as National
Security Advisor by Lieutenant General Colin Powell, a man who "shunned ideology." 253 Powell and Carlucci worked well with Shultz and the three men began to meet daily to
discuss the administration's foreign and defense policy.
Reagan was no longer bombarded with a cacophony of different
foreign policy positions from within his administration:
With Weinberger gone and the new team in place, the administration for the first time had a group of foreign and defense officials at the top who could work together on most issues ... While they did not always see eye to eye, the three men managed to work out the fundamental points of administration positions in foreign and defense fields •.. 254
Reagan, therefore, entered the Washington Summit with a unified national security team that was generally in favor
of improved u.s.-soviet relations.
The grand moment of the summit occurred when Reagan and
Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty, requiring both countries to
252 Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 265.
253 Ibid., p. 265.
254 Ibid., p. 266. 114
eliminate all land-based missiles with ranges between 300 and 3400 miles. The treaty was a landmark in u.s.-soviet relations and helped to cement the positive tone of the relationship. Gorbachev, in signing the treaty, agreed to the zero option, marginalizing Perle and Weinberger (prior to their resignations) and demonstrating to Reagan that the
Soviet leader was forthcoming. Reagan viewed the accord as one of his administration's most important achievements:
"Not only did the INF treaty provide for the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons ... it contained teeth to assure compliance." 255
Nuclear weapons were a primary focus of the Washington
Summit. In addition to the INF agreement, both Reagan and
Gorbachev hoped that progress would be made on the pending
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) during the meeting.
U.S. and Soviet negotiators worked throughout the summit to define the general principles for START but progress was blocked by continuing disagreements between the two sides, primarily regarding sea-launched cruise missiles and SDI. 256
Although Reagan never succeeded in signing a strategic arms reduction accord while in office, the President attributed great importance to this type of agreement.
Reagan recalls that he and Gorbachev "agreed [in Washington]
255 Reagan, Lifg, p. 699.
256 Ibid., p. 701. 115
that our next goal was to achieve a fifty-percent reduction
of strategic missiles on both sides." 257 At the close of
the Washington Summit, the President "still expressed hope
that a strategic arms treaty could be signed before he left
office ••• 11 258 As with the INF agreement, START would
eliminate a portion of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals.
Most importantly, START would regulate the two sides' most
threatening and imposing weapons: strategic arms. As a
proponent of arms reduction, the START accord was appealing
to Reagan. And, because his anti-Communism and anti-
Sovietism were becoming less pronounced, Reagan could now
act upon his anti-nuclearism rather than remaining merely a
proponent of nuclear reduction in principle.
Other Issues
For the remainder of the Washington Summit, the two
leaders discussed SDI and regional issues. Regarding SDI,
Gorbachev appeared to have dropped his strong opposition to
U.S. deployment of the defensive system. The Soviet leader,
says Oberdorfer:
suggested that the Soviet Union would no longer object as a matter of treaty law or principle to eventual U.S. deployment of SDI, but would act in its own national interest to counter SDI ..• 259
257 Ibid., p. 700.
258 Cannon, Role, p. 782.
259 Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 267. 116
The two leaders eventually signed an ambiguous agreement concerning SDI which allowed both sides to conduct research, development and testing as permitted by the ABM Treaty. In the area of regional issues, Reagan and Gorbachev concentrated on Central America and Afghanistan. The leaders discussed various proposals for the termination of weapons shipments to various Central American factions, although no agreement was reached. Concerning Afghanistan,
Gorbachev pledged that Soviet troop withdrawal would occur within one year if the U.S. pledged a cutoff of its aid to the mujaheddin. 260
Despite the lack of full agreement on SDI, strategic arms and important regional issues, the Washington Summit was a crucial event in u.s.-soviet relations. The summit meetings demonstrated the new tone in u.s.-soviet relations.
As expressed by Gorbachev at the close of the summit, the meetings had displayed the newly cooperative u.s.-soviet relationship:
I believe that what we have accomplished here during the meeting and discussion will, with time, help considerably to improve the atmosphere in the world at large, and in America itself, in terms of its more correct and tolerant perception of my country, the Soviet Union. 261
260 Ibid., p. 269.
261 Ibid., p. 271. 117
The more tolerant perception of the Soviet Union articulated by Gorbachev would become strikingly evident in Reagan's visit to the Soviet Union for the Moscow summit. The Moscow Summit As with the Washington summit, the Moscow Summit was representative of the newly cooperative u.s.-soviet relationship. Prior to Reagan's May 1988 visit to Moscow, the last American president to travel to the Soviet Union had been an embattled Richard Nixon in 1974, near the end of his administration. The imagery of the Moscow Summit spoke volumes about the progress in u.s.-soviet relations: Ronald Reagan, who had been viewed as the ultimate Cold Warrior, was visiting the very evil empire he had frequently attacked during his first four years in office. Despite the summit's symbolic importance, little substantive progress was made in Moscow. In part, this was due to continuing u.s.-soviet differences regarding SDI and START. The lack of progress may also partially be attributed to the fact that the Reagan Administration was nearing its end. As recounted by Oberdorfer, a Soviet official had told him during the summit: "For all practical purposes, the Reagan administration is over for us. 11 262 In Moscow, the two nations did sign an agreement to provide for advance notice of ballistic missile tests and to develop 262 Ibid., p. 293. 118
a procedure for verification. However, it was Reagan's presence in Moscow and the comments he made during the summit, rather than this minor agreement, that marked the summit's significance.
The increasingly favorable image of the Soviet Union held by Reagan was evident throughout his visit to Moscow.
The President repeatedly commented on Gorbachev's uniqueness as a Soviet leader and the reforms he was implementing to change the soviet Union. Looking back on the summit in his memoirs, the President describes Gorbachev•s distinctiveness:
But he (Gorbachev] was different than the Communists who had preceded him at the top of the Kremlin hierarchy. Before him, every one had vowed to pursue the Marxist commitment to a one-world Communist state; he was the first one not to push Soviet expansionism, the first to agree to destroy nuclear weapons, the first to suggest a free market and to support open elections and freedom of expression. 263
Indeed, ACDA Director Adelman was cognizant of Reagan's ability to differentiate his view of Gorbachev and his changing Soviet Union from his perception of soviet
Communism. According to Adelman, Reagan viewed Gorbachev as
"the first Soviet leader to accede to real reductions in nuclear arms and the first not to be expansionist." 264
263 Reagan, Life, p. 707.
264 Adelman, The Great Universal Embrace, p. 125. 119
Speaking at Moscow state University, Reagan argued that the
students were living in a time of change:
Your generation is living in one of the most exciting, hopeful times in Soviet history. It is a time when freedom stirs the air. 265
These comments demonstrate that Reagan believed the
Soviet Union was undergoing a genuine process of change:
there was no more talk of Communist expansionism, only of
openness and restructuring. Reagan's words and deeds show
he had accepted the Soviet Union as a legitimate partner in
world affairs:
If Reagan could sit with Gorbachev in the Kremlin, talk with Soviet citizens in Red Square and give a speech to Soviet students in front of a giant bust of Lenin at Moscow state University, who could deny that the soviet Union had a legitimate place in the world? 266
Despite the favorable image of the Soviet Union he had
developed, Reagan had not abandoned his anti-communist and
anti-soviet beliefs. In addition to praising Gorbachev and
his program of reform, Reagan also criticized the Soviet
leader for his policies in one area: emigration. According
to Cannon, Reagan informed the Soviets prior to the summit
that "he intended to make human rights the focus of the
Moscow summit." 267 To commiserate with the plight of
265 Quoted in Cannon, Role, p. 787. 266 Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 294.
267 Cannon, Role, p. 783. 120
Soviet Jews, Reagan had planned to visit a refusenik family,
the Ziemans, while in Moscow. Warned by the soviet Foreign
Ministry that his visit would prevent the family from ever
emigrating, Reagan decided to cancel his plans. 268
The President did, however, broach the subject of
emigration when Gorbachev began discussing u.s.-soviet trade
and most-favored-nation-trade status during one of their
sessions. 269 Reagan provided Gorbachev with a list of 14
"emigration cases of particular interest to the United
States" and argued for more religious freedom for Soviet
Jews. 270 The President's commitment to human rights in the
Soviet Union was most evident when he hosted a meeting of a
group of human rights activists and refuseniks. 271 This was one of the "most moving episodes of the summit ••• Reagan
spoke of the unshakable American commitment to human
rights." 272 Although he had emphasized human rights
throughout the summit, at his final press conference,
Reagan toned down his criticism. It is likely, as cannon
268 Ibid., p. 784.
269 Under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade ACT, the granting of most-favored nation-status (MFN), which mandates lower tariff rates for designated countries, was linked to Soviet emigration policies for Jews.
270 Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 295.
271 A refusenik was a person who applied to emigrate from the Soviet Union but was denied a visa.
272 Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 297. 121
argues, that Reagan "believed that Gorbachev had heard his message and would respond to it. 11 273 Indeed, Reagan
genuinely believed Gorbachev was a man of change.
Reagan's criticism of the Soviet Union's human rights
record reveals that the President had not changed his view that Soviet Communism was immoral and repressive. Gorbachev
and the reforms he championed allowed Reagan generally to disassociate the 'new' Soviet regime from the totalitarian party-state of the past. However, the President continued to assail what he considered to be continuing injustice in the Communist system. This injustice was embodied in the plight of the emigres. Gone from Reagan's remarks were denunciations of Soviet expansionism and desire to spread
Communism because the President believed that Gorbachev's
Soviet Union was neither expansionist nor bent on a world
Communist revolution. However, according to Alexander
Dallin, Reagan never reassessed his core beliefs:
Several former official who claim to have known Reagan well privately agree that, after all his experience with Gorbachev and the'new Russia,' his basic view of communism had scarcely changed. There is nothing to suggest that, as far as Ronald Reagan was concerned, the altered u.s.-soviet relationship prompted or required, any systematic, ideological reconceptualization. 274
273 Cannon, Role, p. 789.
274 Dallin, "Learning in U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union," in Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 416. 122
Reagan's view of the soviet Union had changed but not
because Reagan reassessed his belief system. His
perceptions changed, in a large part, because Reagan viewed
the Soviet Union as a nation that was radically different
under Gorbachev. The President was willing to negotiate
with a nation that was undertaking internal and forei.gn
policy reforms. For Reagan, the Soviet Union had become an
acceptable negotiating partner in the world forum.
The President's favorable view of the Soviet Union,
combined with his view of a more equitable military and
strategic balance and the influence of moderate national
security officials, allowed Reagan to alter substantially
the state of u.s.-soviet relations. The last two years of
the Reagan Administration marked the beginning of the end of
the Cold War.
Conclusion
Examining the evolution of Ronald Reagan's belief
system, and the impact it had upon his Soviet policy, has
important implications for the cognitive study of foreign
policy. Ronald Reagan and his changing soviet policy
conform to many of the central tenets of the cognitive
approach to decision-making analysis.
Ronald Reagan's image of the Soviet Union was consistent with his Soviet policy, as predicted by cognitive theorists.
The President's anti-Communism and anti-sovietism molded a 123
negative image of the Soviet Union as an expansionist, ideological regime and an unacceptable negotiating partner.
Reagan's negative image of the u.s.s.R., bolstered by the majority of his national security advisors, resulted in a confrontational Soviet policy throughout his first administration. Although the President's anti-nuclearism and other domestic and international factors influenced
Reagan to keep channels of u.s.-soviet communication open, not until the Soviet Union itself began changing could
Reagan alter his negative image.
Incremental Changes
Indeed, as cognitive theorists posit, Ronald Reagan's belief system evolved slowly. Even the combination of evolutionary changes in the Soviet Union, substantial personnel chatlges in the Reagan Administration, and his own altered perception of the military and strategic balance did not substantially alter the President's beliefs. Anti communism, anti-Sovietism and anti-nuclearism remained the central components of his belief system. It was, rather, the relative salience of these beliefs which was altered.
Gorbachev•s reformist policies allowed the President to separate his view of Gorbachev's Soviet Union from his vehement opposition to Communism, which remained intact.
Incremental changes in Reagan's belief system, in turn, resulted in incremental changes in Soviet policy throughout 124
most of his Presidency. The policy of improved Soviet
relations in Reagan's last two years may have appeared to be
a sudden, major policy change to the American public. It
was, however, the culmination of a series of smaller
improvements in u.s.-soviet relations begun as early as
1983. However, until Gorbachev began changing the Soviet
system, Reagan's anti-communism, anti-Sovietism and need to
maintain cognitive consistency blocked any full-scale u.s.
Soviet rapprochement.
Learning Versus Adaptation
The concept of learning, which implies a reassessment of
one's fundamental beliefs, does not accurately describe the
changes which occurred in Ronald Reagan's belief system. At
the end of his second administration, the President's core
beliefs--anti-Communism, anti-sovietism, and anti
nuclearism--remained intact. Rather, Reagan adapted his
administration's Soviet policy in response to changes in the
national and international environment but never repudiated
.his core beliefs The concept of adaptation best describes
the evolution of the President's belief system.
By adapting to his changing environment, Reagan was able
to maintain cognitive consistency. He remained a vehement
anti-Communist, but disassociated the Soviet Union from
Communism, allowing his anti-Communism to be a less salient
feature of his belief system. As the President's anti- 125
Communism became less pronounced so too did his anti
Sovietism, which had been primarily based on his view of the
Soviet Union as the leader of Communism. As the President's anti-Communism and anti-sovietism became less pronounced, his anti-nuclearism evolved into the most salient component of his belief system. Reagan's anti-Communism and anti
Sovietism were •negative' beliefs, while his anti-nuclearism was, in part, a positive belief, a vision of a world free of nuclear holocaust. Under proper conditions, the positive component of his belief system overcame the negative components.
Ronald Reagan's heralded shift from the ultimate Cold
Warrior to the champion of arms reduction was not an abrupt transformation. The evolution of his belief system and, in turn, his Soviet policy, was gradual and the result of a number of factors: the transformation of the Soviet Union begun by Mikhail Gorbachev, the President's perception of
U.S. military and strategic capabilities and the personnel turnover in the Reagan Administration. The beliefs which guided Ronald Reagan in 1988 were not drastically different from those which had guided him in 1981. Changes in both the domestic and international environment, however, allowed the President to alter substantially his Soviet policy. The proponent of 'peace-through-strength' had become an advocate 126
of •peace-through-denuclearization' and the unlikely architect of new age in u.s.-soviet relations. 1
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INTERVIEW
Nitze, Paul. Interview, 10 November 1992.