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A comparative study of provincial policy in China: The political economy of pollution control policy

Maa, Shaw-Chang, Ph.D.

The Ohio State University, 1993

UMI 300 N. ZeebRd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PROVINCIAL POLICY IN CHINA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POLLUTION CONTROL POLICY DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By Shaw-Chang Maa, B.S., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University

1993

Dissertation Committee: Approved bv R. William Liddle Kevin J. O'Brien Advisor Judith S. Kullberg Department of Political Science Copyright by Shaw-Chang Maa 1993 To my family

ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Behind this endeavor are too many encouragements and supports from committee members, friends and my family, without which this dissertation will never be born. I would like to express my indebtedness and great appreciation to Dr. Liddle not only for his guidance in this dissertation but for his teachings in the classes from which I learned so much. Special thanks go to Dr. O’Brien for his valuable suggestions and patience with my English. Gratitude is expressed to Dr. Chhibber, who was once in the advisory committee, for helping me design the structure of this dissertation. I am grateful to Dr.

Kullberg’s helpful comments. Additionally, the work herein was impossible without Mr.

Zhu Guanglei and Mr. Li Lianjiang’s help in data collection. They deserve my sincere gratitude. To my wife, I offer sincere thanks for your understanding and encouragement throughout the entire endeavor. VITA

February 26, 1958...... Born - Taipei, Taiwan 1980 ...... B.S., National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan 1986 ...... M.A., Graduate Institute of Political Science, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan

Major Field: Political Science Studies in comparative public policy, Third World politics, democratization process, and comparative foreign policy. TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... iii VITA...... iv

LIST OF TABLES...... vii

1IST OF FIGURES ...... X

CHAPTER PAGE I. INTRODUCTION...... 1 The puzzle...... 1 The necessity of reassessing provincial politics...... 2 Critical review of studies on provincial politics...... 5 The scope of analysis...... 9 Research query...... 12 Data...... 26

CHAPTER II. THE ISSUE AND THE SETTING...... 36 The issue...... 37 The national policy context...... 51 The organizational context...... 61

CHAPTER III. THE COMPARISON OF PROVINCIAL POLLUTION CONTROL POLICY...... 77 Concepts and indicators...... 77 Pollution control effort reflected in policy output...... 79 Pollution control effort reflected in policy process...... 86 Pollution control effort reflected in policy implementation...... 89 The formation of an index...... 95

v CHAPTER IV. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND PROVINCIAL POLLUTION CONTROL POLICY...... 98 Politics and pollutioncontrol policy...... 99 Results and discussion...... 107 Conclusion...... 119

CHAPTER V. SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS AND PROVINCIALPOLLUTION CONTROL POLICY...... ,124 Economic growth and environmental protection A dilemma...... 124 Economic accounts in China...... 128 Uneven spatial development and provincial pollution control policy...... 131 Urbanization, education, and pollution control effort...... 141 Conclusion political variables vs. socioeconomic variables...... 149

CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION...... 163 Summary of analysis...... 163 Suggestions for further research...... 166

APPENDICES A. Local regulations regarding pollutioncontrol from 1980 to 1987...... 168 B. Policy innovation...... 177 C. Data about provincial elites...... 196 D. Correlation matrix of all variables...... 200 E. A summary table of all variables...... 201 F. The definition of urban places and urban population in China...... 204 Bibliography...... 209

vi LIST OF TABLES

TABLE PAGE 1.51 Hypothetical impact of independent variables on provincial pollution control policy...... 25

2.11 The percentage of industrial waste water in total waste water (in rank order)...... 39

2.12 The percentage of treated industrial waste water that reaches state standard (In rank order)...... 4 3 2.13 Emissions of Sulphur dioxide (S02) and Nitrogen oxide (N02) in selected countries, 1982...... 45

2.21 National Laws and Regulations regarding pollution control (in chronological order)...... 52

2.22 Pollution control measures in the laws and regulations ...... 55 3.21 The number of laws and regulations regarding pollution control from 1980-1987...... 82 3.22 The score of each province in policy innovation (in rank order)...... 85 3.31 The score of response speed...... 88 3.41 The funding for treating pollution as a percentage of national income (by province) from 1981-1987....91 3.42 The average ratio of the number of staff to the number of enterprises from 1981-1987...... 93 3.43 The ratio of the number of sets of equipment to the number of enterprises...... 94 3.44 The pollution control effort of provinces reflected in implementation (Standard score)...... 95 3.51 Index of seriousness in pollution control by province...... 96

vii 4.11 Political generations and education of provincial leaders from 1980-1987...... 104 4.12 Political generations and career pattern...... 105 4.21 Provinces with cities selected as key point cities of environmental protection...... 108 4.22 Provinces that set up environmental protection commission and EPB as the first rank organization before 1986...... 110 4.2 3 The number of laws enacted by PPC from November 1979 to December 1987...... 112 4.24 The percentage of service time of the second- generation political leaders ...... 113 4.25 The percentage of service time of technocratic bureaucrats...... 115 4.26 The percentage of service time of provincial leaders who had attended college...... 116 4.27 The percentage of service time of native leaders..117 4.28 The frequency of elite change from 1980 to 1987...118 4.29 The number of provinces and the frequency of elite turnover...... 118 4.30 Correlation coefficients between PCE and political variables...... 119 5.31 The share of national income by province...... 134 5.32 The average national income per capita by province from 1980-1987 ...... 136 5.33 The average share of GVIO in GVAIO from 1980 to 1987...... 137 5.34 Correlation matrix between PCE and economic variables...... 138 5.35 Average growth rate of NIPC and GVAIO per capita from 1980 to 1987...... 140 5.41 Pressure points in LDC and MDC Cities by size of Centre...... 14 3 5.42 The average level of urbanization from 1980-1986..145

viii 5.4 3 The percentage change of urbanization between 1980 and 1986...... 146 5.44 The average number of enrolled college students every one thousand people from 1980-1987...... 148 5.51 Correlation matrix of socio-economic variables.... 150 5.52 The correlation coefficients between PCE and "the rate of modernization" variables with the level of economic development controlled...... 152 5.53 Pearson correlation coefficients between PCE and political and socioeconomic variables...... 153 5.54 Correlation between career pattern, education of leaders and the level of economic development.... 155 5.55 Correlation coefficient between PCE and the level of economic development with political variables controlled...... 155 5.56 Index of modernization...... 156 5.57 Regression analysis...... 158 B.l The number of policy innovation...... 177 B. 2 The number of complementary items...... 184 B.3 The number of relatively more restrictive items...193 F.l The number and population of towns in three census...... 205 F.2 The level of urbanization...... 207

ix LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURES PAGE 2.11 Total Waste Water...... 41 2.12 Total Waste Water (adjusted)...... 42 2.13 Industrial Waste Water...... 42 2.14 The emission of S02 in 1982...... 46 2.15 The emission of S02 in 1982 (adjusted)...... 47 2.16 The emission of smoke in 1982...... 47 2.17 The emission of smoke in 1982 (adjusted)...... 48 2.18 The emission of suspended particles in 1982...... 48 2.19 The emission of suspended particles in 1982 (adjusted)...... 49 2.20 Total industrial solid waste ...... 50 2.21 Total industrial solid waste (adjusted)...... 50 2.31 The administrative structure of environmental protection system...... 69 2.32 Tasks of the State Environmental Protection Bureau and the provincial environmental protection bureau...... 71 3.31 The scale of response speed...... 87 5.11 Location of environmental policy...... 126 5.51 A causal relationship of pollution control effort...... 154 6.21 An example of complicated causal relationship 166

x CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The puzzle

In most studies of Chinese policies, it is an unquestioned assumption that politics is paramount. This assumption is generally based on the recognition that the Chinese political system is weakly institutionalized and thus leaves room for bureaucrats and political leaders to maneuver. This attention to human agency and the assumption of political determinism is appropriate for some policies, but not necessarily appropriate for all. Taking the primacy of leaders and politics for granted may, in a word, provide an incomplete understanding of the policy process.

In the domain of pollution control policy, this dissertation will reveal great variation among provinces. For example, some provinces devise more regulations than others; some respond more quickly to national regulations than others; some provinces invest more on pollution control than others. What factors cause these variations among provinces in socialist China? Can political variables explain these differences?

I will argue that political variables frequently explored by scholars, e.g. interest group models, factional models, fragmented authoritarianism, and studies of elites characteristics do not adequately explain the range of outcomes found. In his summary of policy research from the 1960s to the 1970s, Thomas Dye notes that

1 2

One of the questions which has inspired research into determinants of public policy is whether political structures and processes, or socioeconomic needs and resources are more influential in shaping public policy.1

This agenda, however, has never been adopted by scholars who study the Chinese policy process. Since political variables fail to explain pollution control policy adequately, I believe we should look for socioeconomic variables which might have more impact on different levels of pollution control effort in China’s provinces. Moreover, it is time to evaluate both political variables and socioeconomic variables in a systematic way in the study of Chinese policies.

The necessity of reassessing provincial politics

Most studies of China’s politics focus either on the top or on the bottom of the system. All major models of the policy-making process in China, such as factional models, tendency models, normative models, etc., are derived from studies centering on

Beijing.2 Yet at the same time, a rising trend of exploring the lower reaches of the system, i.e., county, city, or village, is also evident in the large number of books and articles devoted to this level of Chinese politics since 1978.3

It is, however, surprising that the intermediary level, the province, is largely missing in the study of Chinese politics. The provinces are important because they control some important sources of power, a fact recognized by most scholars. In his description of the importance of the provinces in dealing with the central government, David

Lampton notes that 3

Provinces are potent bargainers because they often are represented in the Central Committee and have complex interpersonal and other ties with those in the elite; because they have the principal power to appoint (with central approval) those occupying key positions in both territorial and functional units within the province; because they often are major sources of central revenue; and, in the end, because it is they who must implement policy.4

In short, the provinces not only play a significant role in national policy formation, but also implement national policies. According to Lampton’s description, any national policy lacking the provinces’ support will not be implemented in the way that national leaders expect insofar as the provinces are capable of sabotaging national policies. In a word, it is doomed to fail.

Although his description is indeed true, one important point is missing and needs further amplification: the provinces also make their own local policies for dealing with local problems and implementing national policies.5 Most national policies are flexible in some respects so that provinces can accommodate them to "local needs," a term which has never been clearly defined. In some cases, national policies are so flexible that they will not be implemented if provincial governments do not make corresponding regulations, i.e., provincial policies.6

In brief, if there is room for the provinces to maneuver, there will be provincial policies. Provincial policy is important and worth studying not only because it is necessary for the implementation of national policy but also because provincial governments might modify national policy procedurally or substantially. No scholars will assume that each province will respond in the same way, to the same degree, to a national policy. A national policy does not automatically predetermine a provincial policy. In other 4

words, the provincial policy process is part of the whole picture, a chain in the national

policy process, and neglect of it may distort our understanding of the integrated policy

making system.7

The previous discussion of provincial politics implies a certain degree of

provincial autonomy, which has indeed increased since the onset of reform in 1978. In

order to modernize, the Chinese communist regime has gradually given more autonomy

to localities in recent years. This trend of decentralization has been evident in financial

reform and legal reform.8 Legal reforms, in particular, have allowed the provinces to

make local laws to accommodate local conditions as well as national laws and polices.

According to official statistics, over one thousand local laws were enacted by the

Provincial People’s Congresses (PPCs) from November 1979 to December 1987.9 Those

local laws enacted by the PPCs and regulations made by provincial governments reflect local policies regarding various issues. To what degree do local policies reflect local

interests? What are the similarities and differences among provincial policies, and what

causes those similarities and differences? How and how much do the provinces adjust

central policy, substantially and procedurally, to their own needs? How are provincial

policies formed? How does provincial policy process vary with policy type? To study

public policy in China, these questions cannot be ignored. Unfortunately, we have no

systematic studies of provincial policies and very few comparative studies of any aspect

of provincial politics.

In the next section, I will briefly critique previous studies of provincial politics

primarily from a methodological point of view so as to lay out the justification for a new 5 perspective on provincial politics, which should be comparative, theoretical, policy relevant, and focusing on the reform era.

Critical review of studies on provincial politics

Three aspects of provincial politics are of overriding interest to scholars: elite analysis, central-local relations, and public policy.10 Over the years, the first two have been the major foci of scholars, and some scholars have used elite analysis to illustrate central-local relations.11

With respect to elite analysis, topics studied have included elite change, elite stability, power struggle among elites, etc. George Sung’s China’s Regional Politics: A

Biographical Approach is a typical example of elite analysis. This monograph is composed of two parts. In the first part, he analyzes "the background of those persons who were elected to secretarial positions in the CCP provincial committees between

December 1970 and August 1971-1112 His analysis shows a clear correlation between the later establishment of local (provincial and municipal) Party committees and other background factors such as professional career, field army (FA) affiliation, military region

(MR) affiliation, etc. He finds that "insiders" and military men dominated provincial politics, a sign of "localism," and that "outsiders" were more vulnerable during times of crisis.13 In the second part, he compares the composition of provincial Party secretaries in 1971 with that of those who held the same positions in 1966. The major conclusion from this comparison is that

provincial politics tend to be less tense both in the strongholds of clearly powerful FA or MR bases and in clearly weak FA or MR territories 6

presumably because they are either strong enough totally to resist outsiders whether in MR or FA affiliation terms, or contrariwise, are too weak to put up any resistance to them at all.14

This study, although useful, is more informative than explanatory. Although this kind of description is important, it is not capable of answering the questions of "how did these circumstances come to exist and how did they affect a policy."

By focusing on one of the most seriously factionalized provinces, Yunnan,

Dorothy Solinger attempts to explain elite behavior (i.e. the strategy elites took in factional struggles) at both the central and provincial level.15 Her explanation is based on assumptions regarding the goals of both central and local elites. The actions of leaders are assumed to be goal-oriented, and their purpose is to protect or increase their power.

For provincial elites, they are "naturally concerned about protecting and improving their own careers" in general, and they are "conscious of maintaining and constantly fighting for their own power within the province."16 As a result, they will show obedience and loyalty to patrons in the center and expand their own factions within the province.

However, she fails to make a theoretical connection between goals and strategies. Her method of identifying factions is also problematic, which she herself admitted.17 Like

Sung’s work, her study does not refer to policies. Finally, the power struggle that she finds among elites may not be factionally-based, but she does not defend the assumption that it is.

Frederick Teiwes, in his Provincial Leadership in China: The Cultural Revolution and Its Aftermath, demonstrates how political events affect elite stability and the change of elites’ characteristics such as general and bureaucratic background in four periods: "the 7 establishment of Revolutionary Committees during the Cultural Revolution, 1967-68; the consolidation of those Committees, 1969-70; the founding of the new Party Committees,

December 1970-August 1971; and Party Committees from the purge of Lin Biao to the

Tenth Party Congress, September 1971-August 1973."18 One phenomenon common in all four periods stands out in his comparison; extreme elite instability.19 Comparing the pre-Cultural Revolution era with the Cultural Revolution period, he also finds that the

Cultural Revolution is a unique event and that there was no common factor affecting elite stability in those two periods. In addition, he finds that central personal cliques had extended to the provinces since 1967, which made personal relationships with central leaders increasingly important. Another finding of his study concerns the decline of localism during the Cultural Revolution, which is inconsistent with Sung’s finding partly due to their different indicators of localism. His work does not inform us how provincial elites interact with one another and how their interaction relates to policy. In other words, like Sung’s analyses, his work is also more informative than explanatory.

Keith Forster’s Rebellion and Factionalism in a Chinese Province is a detailed and chronological analysis of the change in the nature of factions and how they struggled with each other during the decade long Cultural Revolution. He identified different types of factions of different periods, and his analysis provides an interpretive understanding of

Zhejiang politics instead of a positivist explanation. His book is full of detailed description, but he still leaves some important questions unanswered. For example, his detailed analysis of some actors does not focus on their personalities and motives at the micro-level nor the socioeconomic structure at the macro-level. In other words, no effort 8 to explain elites’ actions is made. Ultimately, his analysis is more historical than theoretical and, again, does not refer to or distinguish between various policies.

David Goodman’s Centre and Province in the People’s Republic of China: Sichuan and Guizhou. 1955-1965 is a sophisticated and intelligent comparative study of central- local relations in China. Unlike other scholars, he sees central-local relations from a policy perspective. In his study, he identifies five basic types of provincial variation from central policies. However, the provincial variation he finds is not the result of provincial power because it "was either allowed, explicitly encouraged, or resulted from central debates."20 He also finds that Sichuan’s policies differed from central policy only marginally while Guizhou’s policies resulted to a greater extent from provincial conditions.21 Is his finding applicable to other provinces? Are his findings still valid today in the post-Mao era? And why is the pattern of divergence from central policies different in Sichuan and Guizhou? These are questions which require further research.

These earlier studies make a considerable contribution to our understanding of provincial politics. However, they share some drawbacks or limitations. First, the subject of their studies is provincial politics under Mao. However, since reform began in 1978, two profound changes may have had significant impact on provincial politics. The first change is the increasing autonomy of the provinces. The second change is the rise of economic activity both in urban and rural areas.22 It is therefore necessary to study provincial politics in the era of reform to fill this lacuna. Second, from the perspective of methodology, these are case studies, except Sung’s and Teiwes’s works, and their conclusions are definitely limited by the small number of cases. Third, their works are, 9 in general, short of explanation. They do offer us some important information; however, we want to know not only "what" but also "how" and "why." Finally, they pay considerable attention to the analysis of the elites with little, if any, research of policy, save Goodman’s work. Harry Harding’s criticism of the policy making models is still valid for studies of this level of politics:

we may have been too concerned with who makes policy in Communist China, and have neglected the complementary questions of when, why, where, how, and so what."23

Acknowledging the limitations of previous studies of provincial politics, I contend that we need to study provincial politics from a new and complementary perspective. In other words, this research is policy relevant; its subject is provincial pollution control policy. It is comparative since all provincial-level units are included except the Tibet autonomous region and Hainan province. It is also theoretical insofar as it attempts to explain the results of the policy- making process. Finally, this research focuses on provincial politics after reform to supplement previous studies of pre-reform provincial politics.

The scope of analysis

Since there is a wide variety of provincial policies, it is impossible for any study to cover all of them. One feasible strategy is to choose a particular policy for study. In this dissertation, provincial pollution control policy has been chosen for the reasons of significance, methodology and theory. 10

The significance of pollution control is self-evident. Environmental protection has already appeared on the global agenda and every country shares a responsibility for preventing the environment from degradation. The impact of China on the global environment is apparent and great due to its large size and rapid growth. Unfortunately, because of long-term neglect of environmental protection, various forms of pollution in

China have become serious and need immediate treatment. Motivated by a concern with the earth in general and China in particular, I intend to explore what the pollution control policy in each province is, how much attention is paid to pollution issues, and what determines pollution control policy.

As for methodological concerns, first of all, if we want to study public policy, we should select an important policy insomuch as it can tell us more about politics than a trivial one. In his speech to participants of the International Conference on China’s

Environmental Problem, Premier Li Peng said:

The Chinese government has made lots of policies so as to govern the country, but there are only two basic national policies—population control and environmental protection.24

Baruch Boxer also notes that

In no other developing Asian country over the past 20 years has there been a greater outpouring of creative ideas, strategies for legal, technical, and scientific approaches to environment and resource protection...(E)nvironmental protection is firmly established as a high priority national policy.25

Secondly, each provincial-level unit except Tibet has enacted some local laws and regulations regarding pollution control. Therefore, a comparative study of all provincial- level units, except Tibet and Hainan, the newly-created province, is possible. Furthermore, 11 pollution control policy is, in contrast to many other policies, a new policy. This policy began in 1972 and became a basic national policy in late 1983. Hence, we needn’t consider long-term historical factors in dealing with this policy. A new policy induces new organizations; a new organization has no historically based interest conflict with other organizations. Therefore, we can view central-provincial relations and bureaucratic interaction with less interference from hoary bureaucratic battles of the past.

As to theory, the focus of current studies of China’s policies largely falls on economic and financial policies. One major conclusion about policy-making in China, according to these studies, is that policy is the result of bargaining among bureaucracies.

The interest of scholars in economic and financial policies arises in part from the easy access to data.26 In this dissertation, I also intend to expand the scope of analysis as discussed earlier by studying provincial pollution control policy. Second, most studies of

China’s public policies assume the predominance of political variables and downplay the effect of socioeconomic variables. In other words, the importance of political factors is taken for granted. In this research, I intend to correct this tilt toward political variables by examining the relative weight of both socioeconomic and political variables.

Pollution in this dissertation refers to air, water, and solid waste pollution. Noise pollution is not included because data are not available. Ocean pollution is excluded because it is relevant only to the coastal provinces.

In political science, few concepts have widely-accepted definitions. Unfortunately,

"policy" is not one of them.27 Policy is loosely defined in this dissertation. If there exist alternative measures for dealing with an issue, the measures adopted will be considered 12 a policy. In this dissertation, policy is composed of effort, laws, regulations, speeches, etc., which can be collected from official publications, newspapers, and magazines.

Nevertheless, speeches of leaders will not be taken into account in this dissertation because they are incomplete on the one hand, and because pollution control policy must be legalized in order to be effective on the other.28

The scope of this research covers the period from 1980 to 1987 primarily because of the availability of data. Although 1979 is the year the Environmental Protection Law

(for trial implementation), the first national environmental protection law, was promulgated by the National People’s Congress, only one provincial environmental regulation was enacted in that year.29 Furthermore, most provincial data from 1979 are not available. Therefore, the year 1979 is excluded from the scope of this research.

The provincial-level unit includes provinces, directly- administered cities and autonomous regions. There are thirty provincial-level units in China: 22 provinces, 3 directly- administered cities, and 5 autonomous regions. Hainan province is excluded because it was established in 1988; Tibet autonomous region is also excluded because it has no major pollution problems.

Research Query

In policy studies, scholars generally try to explain four aspects of policy: process, content, implementation, and impact. Explanation of one aspect may involve variables in another. As a matter of fact, most scholars highlight one aspect and use variables in other aspects as independent variables. For example, studies of policy making process argue 13 that types of policy determine in part policy making process, while studies of policy content point out with equal force that policy making process affect the output. In this dissertation, I will not concentrate on one single aspect. On the contrary, I will focus on an element which is reflected in the first three aspects: the pollution control effort. Put differently, the pollution control effort of provincial governments is reflected in terms of process, content, and implementation. However, it is not necessarily reflected in policy impact because policy impact has no necessary relationship with the effort undertaken and is sometimes unintended. Therefore, it is more difficult to detect the effort of governments by studying policy impact. In sum, far from researching questions about how to control pollution efficiently in Chinese province and what should be done about pollution, this dissertation aims at discerning the variations in provincial pollution control efforts and discovering chief factors that determine these variations. The pollution control effort of provincial governments is worth studying because it is a necessary condition for the success of pollution control. More effort may not lead to successful pollution control, but successful pollution control is impossible without serious effort.

After comparing the pollution control effort of provincial governments, the next step is to explain why some provinces work harder than others in controlling pollution.

Are the variations caused by local factors or by politics at the center? Do political variables or socioeconomic variables have more impact on the variations? To explain policy formation, scholars may focus on factors at different levels. One level is the economic, political and social conditions that explain policy in a statistically significant sense, in other words, the macro level.30 The second level, which is the micro level, 14 concerns actors participating in the policy process. The last level is the institutional arrangements which refers to "the decision rules, the procedure, indeed, the history of the manner in which society has dealt with such problems over time."31 This dissertation intends to combine variables drawn from each of these three levels.

Although studies of actors always involve some qualitative variables, such as attitudes and beliefs, I contend that variables at the actors’ level can also be dealt with statistically depending on the nature of variables. When it is difficult to get qualitative data about what political actors think and want, as is the case in China, quantitative data could be complementary. There are no absolute standards by which we can judge which kind of data is better. It depends in part on the questions we ask. If possible, they both can be used to support arguments, in different ways, of course.

A. Political variables

In the earliest comparative studies of states’ policy in the U.S., political variablessuch as party competition, voter participation, Democratic or Republican control of state government, and malappointment, were crucial independent variables, while economic variables were downplayed. This arose, as Dye points out, because of

America’s pluralist ideology, which highly values the variables mentioned above and focuses the attention of political scientists to political process.32 The incorporation of economic variables in later policy studies of American states reached a different conclusion: the level of economic development had more impact than political variables in determining the provision of government services.33 In his study of 64 countries,

Harold Wilensky also notes that 15

economic growth and its demographic and bureaucratic outcomes are the root causes of the general emergence of the welfare state—the establishment of similar programs of social security, the increasing fraction of GNP devoted to such programs, the trend toward comprehensive coverage and similar methods of financing.34

In contrast, the predominance of political variables still persists in studies of

Chinese policies. The impact of socioeconomic factors has rarely been evaluated systematically. The continuing neglect of socioeconomic factors is not due to the pluralist belief of scholars as it is in the studies of American states, but probably due in part to the recognition of the importance of politics in socialist countries where policy process is less institutionalized, which is especially true in China.35 It is doubtless that "politics" is important in China, but its primacy has diminished since reforms began. The first part of explanatory work is to determine to what extent what political variables affect provincial pollution control effort.

In studies of comparative public policy, political variables always include some system variables such as type of regime, type of political organization (federal or unitary), form of government, etc.36 Insofar as the unit of analysis in this research is the provinces within a communist system, the political variables stated above will not be considered.

Other political variables investigated in studies of public policies in Western democracies, such as party system and party ideology, will not be examined for they are irrelevant in

China, where there is only one party, one official ideology.37

From a general perspective, political variables in studies of Chinese policies can be grouped into three categories within two levels. At the state level, there are two 16 categories: organizational structure and political leadership variables.38 At the social level, some scholars have adopted interest group models.39

Interest group models are less useful here because, as mentioned in Chaptern, there are no voluntary environmentalist groups in China. Collective actions periodically occurs, such as protests against factory pollution, but they are sporadic, endemic, and unorganized.40 Therefore, it will not be explored in this research.

At the state level, models which have frequently been explored in studies of

Chinese policies such as tendency models and factional models are not particularly useful either when studying pollution control policy. Tendency models typically describe

"Chinese Communist politics as a tension among enduring alternative policy preferences."41 In brief, politics is perceived to hinge on the conflict of ideas. To apply tendency models, the first thing is to isolate conflicting ideas proposed by different fractions of leaders regarding a policy problem. In the case of pollution control, there is, however, little disagreement about pollution control among political leaders, neither between conservatives and reformers nor between the centre and the locality. All agree that pollution control is important for sustainable development. If an independent variable does not vary, it cannot explain the variation of dependent variable.

With respect to factional models, the practical problem is "the identification of membership of specific factions in the People’s Republic."42 It is especially true at the provincial level because there are even fewer data here than concerning Beijing. In addition to this practical problem, we also find no reference of any factional struggle 17 centering around pollution control policy in any document In other words, there is no empirical base for us to explore the impact of factional politics on pollution control effort.

Political variables that will be explored in this dissertation include central government’s actions, the number and nature of institutions involved, elite stability, and attributes of provincial leaders.43 I will provide some justification for the selection of those political variables in the following sections.

Before exploring political variables at the local level, it is necessary to see whether and to what extent central government’s actions affect provincial pollution control effort.

Since environmental protection is a national policy, and a regulation was even issued in

1985 regarding environmental protection in foreign economic development zones (for which the major point is that environment should not be sacrificed for the sake of economic development even in such development oriented zones), it is less likely that the center would wittingly allow a province to ignore pollution control. The impact of the center, if any, should be positive instead of negative on provincial pollution control efforts.

In the 1973 Regulation, eighteen cities, which were located in 15 provincial units, were designated as key point cities for environmental protection.44 In the 1981 Decision, four cities in four provinces, i.e., Beijing, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Guizhou, were named as key point cities for environmental protection.45 Did those provinces in which cities were designated as key point cities work harder in pollution control? Most scholars might think yes because environmental protection was new for Chinese leaders and because selection of key point cities was a way of unfoldinging a new policy in China. However, 18 given increasing provincial autonomy, the impact of central government’s actions cannot be taken for granted.

According to several recent studies of economic policy making in China, the policy making structure can be described as "fragmented authoritarianism," which means that "authority below the very peak of the Chinese political system is fragmented and disjointed."46 In addition, some explorations even suggest that fragmented authoritarianism is "most severe in the domain from the ministries through the provinces."47 Under this structure, policy is thus the result of bargaining, which depends in part on authority relationships among organizations. As stated above, this model is essentially based on studies of economic policy making, and my task is to find out whether it applies to pollution control policy. Is there a correlation between the relative importance of environmental protection organization and the pollution control effort? Or, to what extent does this structure affect pollution control effort? Because there are at least short-term conflicts between environmental protection agencies and industrial agencies, it is reasonable to hypothesize that a province with stronger environmental protection organization will gain more in bargaining with industrial agencies.

Besides administrative organizations, the role of provincial legislatures is also worth studying. The Provincial People’s Congress (PPC) is a local legislature, which makes local laws. The role of deputies in the People’s Congress has undergone significant changes since reform. Deputies do not only rubber stamp state policies; sometimes, they also play the role of remonstrator regarding particular issues.48 Will this change in 19 deputy role spur PPC’s involvement in pollution control work and then force provincial governments to invest more on pollution control than they would?

Elite stability is defined in this dissertation as the frequency of elite turnover. The success of a policy requires a certain degree of elite stability. If there is a frequent turnover of leaders, then they will devote more effort to maintaining their positions than to promoting policies. In other words, they will be occupied with political struggles instead of policies. Hence, it is necessary to examine whether elite stability will affect pollution control efforts.

One common impression of Chinese political system is that political leaders play a significant role in policy formation. Despite this, the question of what attributes of provincial leaders affect pollution control policy has not been answered. To appreciate the impact of political leaders on policy, their beliefs and attitudes should not be excluded from analysis. Yet, it is difficult to survey provincial leaders’ beliefs and attitudes because of the wide dispersion of provinces. An alternative is to study the background of elites.

Some recent studies of Chinese elites describe a few trends of elite circulation: the rise of technocratic bureaucrats, generational changes, and the rise of localism.49 Will these changes of elites attributes affect pollution control policy?

"Political generations" is a term people use in their everyday life. For example,

Bill Clinton is said to represent a generation born after World War II. Political generations in this sense refers to some basic historical experience. Despite different standards of classification of political generations in China, scholars expect the impact of generational change on policy. As noted by William deB. Mills, "(T)he possibility that 20 the entire ruling generation could be replaced quite rapidly by a group notably younger, less experienced, and with very different attitudes, at the very least, increases the probability of dramatic shifts in policy."50 However, what exactly the impact is on policies has not been researched. In this study, China’s provincial elites are classified into two generations.51 The first generation joined the party before 1949, the birth year of the

PRC, and the second generation joined the party thereafter. The first generation excelled at guerrilla wars and revolution, while the second generation faced the task of consolidating and building a new state. Will the second generation work harder at pollution control than the first generation? Moreover, the first generation leaders received less education than the second generation leaders. Will the more educated leaders attach more importance to pollution control than less educated leaders?

With respect to career pattern, I will classify political leaders into two types: technocratic bureaucrats and political bureaucrats. Technocratic bureaucrats refer to provincial leaders whose major experiences lie in technocratic positions. Political bureaucrats are leaders whose major experiences are related to political work. Generally speaking, political bureaucrats are better at propaganda, while technocratic bureaucrats are more pragmatic than political bureaucrats. In the reform era, technocratic bureaucrats have been recruited to serve the purpose of modernization. Will technocratic leaders sacrifice the environment for the sake of economic development? Or will they put more effort into environmental protection than political bureaucrats because they will focus on technology and specialized personnel instead of propaganda and mass movements? Of course, the 21 distinction between technocratic bureaucrats and political bureaucrats is not unambiguous, but the impact of career experience on policy deserves exploration.

During the Mao period, the designation of leaders to their native provinces were avoided to prevent localism. The situation has been reversed since the reform: more leaders serve their native provinces. However, the impact of this transformation on policy has not yet been widely examined. Will provinces with native leaders be more serious about pollution issues than those with "outsider" leaders because native leaders are more concerned with sustainable development of their hometown? This is one question I will explore in this dissertation.

There are two possibilities concerning the effect of political variables on provincial pollution control effort. If they have a impact, then it is necessary to determine their relative importance in contrast to socioeconomic variables. If they cannot explain provincial pollution control effort, it is even more necessary to examine the effect of socioeconomic variables.

B. Socioeconomic variables

Socioeconomic variables to be explored here can be grouped under two categories.

The first category is the "modernization level" variables, which include economic development, level of industrialization, level of urbanization, and education. The second category is the "modernization pace" variables, which include rate of economic growth, pace of urbanization, and pace of industrialization.

According to the study of postmaterialism, which is based on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, economic development and rising level of education will lead to an increasing 22 concern with postmaterial values.52 Good environmental quality is one postmaterial value. This argument about economic development and environmental protection is supported by the history of environmentalism: the developed industrialized countries first expressed concern about environmental degradation. This very fact shows that environmentalism is part of the pursuit of quality of life along with economic success. It is also in accord with A. H. Maslow’s theory of the hierarchy of needs. Once basic needs have been fulfilled, then those concerned with quality of life predominate. As Michael

Redclift and David Goodman put it,

The ’quality of life’ considerations which play such a large part in dictating the political priorities of developed countries surface precisely because of the success of industrial capitalism in delivering relatively high standards of living for the majority (but by no means all) of the population.53

Although there has been growing concern with environmental protection in developing countries, these countries face a more difficult situation than developed ones primarily because of their poverty. The first response of political leaders in developing countries to the demand for environmental protection is often that it is inconsistent with the pursuit of economic prosperity. "Third World nations consider such concerns a luxury."54 In her address to United Nations Conference on Human Environment in

Stockholm, 1972, then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said that:

The rich countries may look upon development as the cause of environmental destruction, but to us it is one of the primary means of improving the environment of living, of providing food, water, sanitation and shelter, of making the deserts green and the mountains habitable...We do not want to impoverish the environment any further, [but] we cannot forget the grim poverty of large numbers of people... When they themselves feel deprived, how can we urge the preservation of animals? How can we speak to those who live in villages and in slums about keeping the oceans, 23

rivers and the air clean when their own lives are contaminated at the source? Environment cannot be improved in conditions of poverty. Nor can poverty be eradicated without the aid of science and technology.55

Due to environmental crises such as global warming and the depletion of the ozone layer, the widespread fear in developing countries about the conflict between economic growth and environmental protection has been replaced by the recognition that ignorance of environmental protection will lead to an unsustainable economy. But this recognition does not mean that the problem has been solved.56 Ozone depletion exemplifies this problem. The developing countries still ask for a reprieve in discontinuing use of chemicals that cause ozone layer depletion so as to protect their economies from sudden shocks. However, these chemicals are prohibited in developed countries.

Environmental protection, in the long term, is doubtlessly necessary for sustainable economic growth, while there is still a conflict over scarce resources such as capital in the short term.

In the 1980s, "increasing poverty in the least developed countries...forced many of the governments to reduce their expenditures in environmental maintenance, in pollution-control mechanisms, and in the integration of ecological concerns into their development planning and other activities."57 As Tulchin and Rudman put it,

Most central to the debate and most controversial is the question of how the concern for the environment can be reconciled with the need of some nations to exploit their own national resources to achieve the growth necessary to improve the lives of their citizens.58

There seems to be no easy solution to this conflict. The optimal economic solutions may not be realistic in real political life. 24

In China, will provinces with higher levels of modernization, work harder at pollution control than other provinces? Or, will the environment be sacrificed for the sake of quick modernization?

Pollution control demands capital investment which is scarce and necessary for economic growth. In other words, there is at least a short-term conflict between economic growth and pollution control. This is especially true in China because the government is the owner of many enterprises on the one hand and the guardian of the environment on the other.59 Therefore, we should explore how provincial governments cope with the tradeoff between economic growth and pollution control.

Level of industrialization should also not be ignored in explaining pollution control efforts. Industrial output contributes greatly to national income. Industrial pollution is also the major source of pollution in China. Will provinces with higher levels of industrialization invest more in pollution control than those with lower levels of industrialization? Or will more industrialized provincial governments tolerate more pollution than those less industrialized provinces in order to protect their revenues?

With respect to education, it is reasonable to assume that people with higher education are more likely to be concerned with environmental quality. In China, great variation exists among provinces in terms of the level of education, and we need to know whether this has an impact on provincial pollution control policy, and to what degree.

The last socioeconomic factors to explore are the level and pace of urbanization.

Urban areas produce more wastes, domestic and industrial, than rural areas. This is 25 especially true when the pace of urbanization is high. What is the relative impact of those two factors on pollution control efforts?

The hypothetical impacts of above variables are summarized in Table 1.51.

Questions regarding weight of impact and relationships among independent variables remain open at this stage and will be answered in the following chapters.

Table 1.51 Hypothetical impact of independent variables on provincial pollution control policy

Variables direction Variables direction of impact of impact

Level of Central policy + modernization + Rank of EPB + Pace of modernization Existence of EPC +

Activeness of PPC + Political generations: first Career pattern: second + Political bureaucrats + Technocratic bureaucrats - Localism: native + outsider Education level of leaders +

EPB: Environmental Protection Bureau. EPC: Environmental Protection Commission. PPC: Provincial People’s Congress. 26

Before ending this section, I want to point out that these socioeconomic variables are not independent of each other. Therefore, it would be a mistake to just consider the correlation between each socioeconomic variable and the dependent variable separately.

How these socioeconomic variables relate to each other and how they work together to affect pollution control effort shall also be explored in order to prevent devising an explanation based on a spurious relationship.

There are four possible relationship between the variables cited above. The first possibility is that neither kind of independent variable has an impact on the dependent variables. The second possibility is that either socioeconomic or political variables have a major impact on the dependent variable. The third possibility is that both kinds of independent variables have independent impacts on the dependent variable. The last possibility is that one of the independent variables operates as an intervening variable.

Statistical control methods will be used to determine which relationship, if any, exists among the variables.

DATA

One difficulty of studying policy making in China is the lack of data about what happened inside the policy-making bodies; we often do not know who said what to whom. These data are defined as confidential and are not revealed to outsiders. The data that are revealed are partial and reflect the interests of those who release them. Incomplete information may lead to distortion of reality. In other words, something of a black box exists both at the national and the provincial level. This, however, does not mean that we 27 should not study those phenomena which are worth studying. There are ways to mitigate these problems. One is to do comparative studies with which we can cross-check relationships between variables across provinces. For example, we may find one factor which is particularly important in one province but is insignificant in most other provinces if a comparison is made.

Some statistical data are available from official publications. It has often been argued that scholars should be cautious about official statistical data published by the

Chinese government. There had been no systematic collection of data before Deng’s reform, as its importance had not been recognized until then. In this dissertation, I will check, if possible, the data from different sources to reduce the probability of misusing statistical data. There are also some specific problems with the data used in this dissertation, and they will be discussed in the following chapters in due course.

The following are some sources of data:

1. State Environmental Protection Bureau, Huan Jing Tong Ji Zi Liao Hui Bian. 1981- 1985 (The compendium of environmental statistical data, 1981-1985). Beijing: Zhong-Kuo Huan Jing Ke Xue Chu Ban She, 1988. It contains relatively complete environmental data in all the provinces and some important cities from 1981 to 1985.

2. State Statistical Bureau, Zhong Guo Tone Ji Nian Jien. (China Statistical Yearbook). The yearbook is published annually since 1981. It contains economic data and some environmental data.

3. UNEP, Environmental Data Report, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989. It contains some comparative environmental data.

4. Statistical Office of the European Communities, Environmental Statistics (Luxembourg: Eurostat, 1989). It contains numerous environmental data of EEC countries from 1970 to 1987 which can provide us a comparative perspective of the environmental conditions in China. 28

5. United Nations, Environment Statistics in Europe and North America: An Experimental Compendium in Statistical Standards and Studies, Vol. 39 (New York: United Nations, 1987) This compendium contains environmental data ranging from the 1970s to 1986.

5. State Environmental Protection Bureau. Chuan Guo Di Fan Huan Jing Bao Hu Fa Guei Hui Bian, Vol. 1. (The compendium of local environmental protection laws and regulations) As the title says, it contains most local environmental protection laws and regulations. But it is difficult to determine how many local regulations have been promulgated, so this compendium is the major, though not only, source of local regulations.

6. Goodman, David S. G. China’s Provincial Leaders: 1949-1985 Vol. 1: Directory (Wales: University College Cardiff Press, 1986). It contains information about the flow of provincial governors.

7. Who’s Who in China: Current Leaders (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1989). It contains background information such as age, birth place, education, and career pattern of current leaders.

8. Gendai Chugoku Jinmei Jiten 1986 (Japanese) (Tokyo: Kazankai, 1986). It also contains background information of political leaders, but it does not limit to current leaders.

9. The Almanac of China’s Economy. The Almanac is published annually since 1981. It contains abundant economic data.

10. State Statistical Bureau, China’s Statistical Yearbook. It is published annually since 1981. It contains economic accounts and environmental data.

This dissertation will consist of six chapters. The second chapter is composed of three parts. The first part outlines the environmental condition in China as a whole from a comparative perspective, and then the environmental condition in each province. The subject of the second part is the national policy context, including a brief historical review of the development of Chinese pollution control policy at the center. I will also summarize the general measures and specific measures of national pollution policy and how much room is left for the provinces to maneuver. The third part portrays the 29 organizational setting of provincial pollution control policy. Chapterin will compare the dependent variable, the seriousness of the provinces in dealing with pollution, across provinces. Chapter IV explores the impact of political variables on the dependent variable, and Chapter V explores the impact of socioeconomic variables. In conclusion, I will summarize the findings and consider the implications of this research for China studies in particular and comparative politics in general. 30

Endnotes

1. Thomas R. Dye, "Politics Versus Economics: The Development of the Literature on Policy Determination," in Policy Studies Journal. Vol. 7, No. 4, 1979, p. 653.

2. Please see Harry Harding, "Competing Models of the Chinese Communist Policy Process: Toward a Sorting and Evaluation," in Issue and Studies, February 1984. He sorts through various models into eight categories, in which structural models, normative models, Mao-in-command models, factional models, tendency models and generational models are derived from politics in Beijing. The rest of them, bureaucratic models and interest group models, are not necessarily related to politics in Beijing.

3. By "the top," I mean the national level politics, while "the bottom" refers to the level lower than the province such as county and village. For the discussion of "bottom" politics, see John P. Burns, Political Participation in Rural China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Richard Madsen, Morality and Power in a Chinese Village (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Jean C. Oi, State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy of Village Government (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Edward Friedman, Paul G. Pickowicz & Mark Selden, Chinese Village. Socialist State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); and Joseph W. Esherick and Mary Backus Rankin, eds. Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

4. David Lampton, "A Plum for a Peach: Bargaining, Interest, and Bureaucratic Politics in China," in Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, eds. Bureaucracy. Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 43.

5. Policy is flexibly defined in this research as a set of measures taken by a government to tackle issues.

6. One example is the regulation regarding effluent charge. In the national Environmental Protection Law (For trial purpose) enacted in 1979, there is one article about the effluent charge. However, it will be ineffective if provincial governments do not make corresponding regulations according to this article.

7. Policy process refers to agenda setting, policy-making process, policy implementation, policy outcome, and feedback.

8. In 1980, a financial contract system allowed the provinces to keep certain revenues according to an agreed upon ratio set out in the budget contract. The introduction of the financial contract system weakened the ability of the central government to control provincial governments in pursuing their own interests. See Christopher Findlay and Jiang Shu, "Interest Group Conflicts in A Reforming Economy," in Andrew Watson, ed. 31

Economic Reform and Social Change in China (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 21-24. Also see Michel Oksenberg and James Tong, "The Evolution of Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations in China, 1971-1984: The Formal System," in The China Quarterly, No. 125, March 1991.

9. It is calculated according to the Index of Local Laws enacted bv the provinces, autonomous regions, and directly ruled cities’ People’s Congress compiled by the general office of National People’s Congress.

10. Those three aspects are not exclusive. On the contrary, they can be merged in an analysis.

11. For the study of central-local relations, see Victor C. Falkenheim, "Provincial Leadership in Fukien: 1949-66," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed. Elites in the People’s Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972); Dorothy J. Solinger, "Politics in Yunnan Province in the Decade of Disorder: Elite Factional Strategies and Central-local Relations, 1967-1980," in China Quarterly, Vol. 29, December 1982. David S. G. Goodman, Centre and Province in the People’s Republic of China: Sichuan and Guizhou, 1955-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). For the analysis of elite, see Keith Forster, Rebellion and Factionalism in a Chinese Province: Zhejiang, 1966-76 (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990); Frederick C. Teiwes, Provincial Leadership in China: The Cultural Revolution and Its Aftermath (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1973), and George C. S. Sung, China’s Regional Politics: A Biographical Approach (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1974).

12. George Sung, China’s Regional Politics, p. 1.

13. Ibid, pp. 11-15. He defined "insiders" as "those secretaries who had been in the same MR (military region) for at least one full generation prior to their appointment." (p. 5)

14. Ibid, p. 21.

15. Dorothy Solinger, "Politics in Yunnan Province in the Decade of Disorder."

16. Ibid., p. 629.

17. As a matter of fact, this is the methodological difficulty of factional approach.

18. Frederick C. Teiwes, Provincial Leadership in China, pp. 13-14.

19. Ibid, p. 130.

20. David S. G. Goodman, Centre and Province in the PRC, p. 184. This statement is debatable if we look at provincial politics in the reform era. 32

21. Ibid. p. 20.

22. According to some incomplete statistics, the gross value of country and neighborhood enterprises compose 26.6% of gross social product in 1991. See Liuching Young, "Some statistics regarding country and neighborhood enterprises," in China Times Weekly, No. 35, August 30, 1992, p. 45.

23. Harry Harding, "Competing Models of the Chinese Communist Policy Process," p. 19.

24. Li Peng, "Lun Yo Zhong Guo Te Se De Huan Jing Bao Hu," (On Environmental Protection with Chinese characteristics), Beijing: Zhong Guo Huan Ching Ke She Chu Pan She, 1992, p. 95. The declaration of environmental protection as a basic national policy was first initiated at the end of 1983 in his speech to The Second National Environmental Protection Conference.

25. Baruch Boxer, "China’s environmental prospects," Asian Survey. Vol. 29, No. 7, July 1989, p. 669.

26. They admit the limitations of their conclusions. See Lieberthal & Lampton, eds. Bureaucracy. Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China.

27. Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt define policy as "a ’standing decision’ characterized by behavioral consistency and repetitiveness on the part of both those who make it and those who abide by it." The disadvantage of this definition is that it ignores policy change. See Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt, Labyrinths of Democracy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), p. 465. Melvin J. Dubnick and Barbara A. Bardes define public policy as "what governments say and what governments do," which I think is too broad. See Melvin J. Dubnick and Barbara A. Bardes, Thinking about Public Policy: A Problem- Solving Approach (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), p. 7. Robert Nakamura and Frank Smallwood define policy as "a set of instructions from policy makers to policy implementers that spell out both goals and the means for achieving those goals." Robert T. Nakamura and Frank Smallwood, The Politics of Policy Implementation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980), p. 31. The point is that there exists no correct definition. The definition depends on the purpose of your study.

28. Although Charles O. Jones argues that laws, executive orders, regulations, etc., are "simply the formal ingredients or legal expressions of programs and decisions," any program without legalization is not a program, especially in the domain of environmental protection. See Charles O. Jones, 3rd ed., An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy (Monterey: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1984), p. 27.

29. It is "The temporary regulation regarding the protection of Xian River (For trial implementation)," promulgated by the Hunan provincial government in February 25,1979. 33

30. Dean Mann, "Introduction," in Dean E. Mann, Environmental Policy Formation: The Impact of Values, Ideology, and standards (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1981), p. 5.

31. Ibid.

32. Thomas Dye, op cit. pp. 653-656.

33. See Richard E. Dawson & James A. Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Politics in the American States," in Journal of Politics, Vol. 25, 1963. Richard Hofferbert, "The Relation between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," in APSR, Vol. 60, No. 1,1966. Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

34. Harold Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditures (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. xiii.

35. See Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

36. For forms of political organization, see David R. Cameron and R. Hofferbert, "The Impact of Federalism on Education Finance: A Comparative Analysis," in European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 2, 1974. For the impact of political regimes, see H. Leichter, "Politics and Policy in Two Philippine cities," in Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 8, January 1976.

37. For the impact of party , see Francis G. Castles, The Impact of Parties: Politics and Policies in Democratic Capitalist States (Severely Hills: Sage Publications, 1982); D. Cameron, "The expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," in American Political Science Review, Vol. 72, 1978; Robert C. Fried, "Party and Policy in West German Cities," in American Political Science Review, Vol. 70, No. 1, 1976.

38. With respect to organizational structure, see William W. Whitson, "Organizational Perspectives and Decision-Making in the Chinese Communist High Command," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed. Elites in the People’s Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972); Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton, eds. Bureaucracy. Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). With respect to political leadership, see Michael Yahuda, "Political Generations in China," The China Quarterly. No. 80, December 1979; Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein, "The Chinese Political Spectrum," Problems of Communism. Vol. 23, No. 2, March-April 1974; Parris Chang, 3rd ed. Power and Policy in China (Debuque: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Com., 1990); Andrew J. Nathan, "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics," in The China Quarterly Vol. 53, January 1973. 34

39. See Michel Oksenberg, "Occupational Groups in Chinese Society and the Cultural Revolution," in M. Oksenberg, el al., eds. The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968); David S. G. Goodman, ed. Groups and Politics in the People’s Republic of China (Cardiff, United Kingdom: University College Cardiff Press, 1984).

40. In his book, Huan Jing Bao Hu Zhi Fa Dao Lun (An Introduction to the Implementation of Environmental Protection Laws), (Shanghai: Xin Hua, 1988), Chen Ren collected 13 cases of collective actions against factory pollution, and all of them are sporadic, local, and unorganized.

41. Harry Harding, op cit., pp. 15-16.

42. Ibid., p. 27.

43. In terms of methodology, the research design of this research is the "most similar systems" design.

44. Those cities are Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Shengyang, Dalian, Jilin, Harbin, Qingdao, Nanjing, Hangzhou, Wuhan, Changsha, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Congqing, Lanzhou, Xian, and Taiyuan.

45. Those four cities are Beijing, Hangzhou, Suzhou, and Guilin.

46. Lieberthal and Lampton, eds. Bureaucracy. Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, p. 8.

47. Ibid, p. 20.

48. See Kevin J. O’Brien, "Agents and Remonstrators: Role Accumulation by Chinese People’s Congress Deputies," (forthcoming).

49. For the rise of technocratic bureaucrats, see Li Cheng and Lynn White, "Elite Transformation and Modem Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy," in The China Quarterly, No. 121, March 1990; Xiaowei Zang, "Elite Formation and the Bureaucratic-Technocracy in Post-Mao China," in Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 24, No. 1, March 1991. For generational changes, see William deB. Mills, "Generational Change in China," in Problems of Communism. Vol. 32, November-December, 1983; Ting Wang, "An Analysis of the P.R.C.’s Future Elite: The Third Echelon," in Journal of Northeast Asian Studies. Vol. 4, No. 2, Summer 1985. For the rise of localism, see Cheng Li and David Bachman, " Localism, Elitism, and Immobolism: Elite Formation and Social Change in Post-Mao China," in World Politics. Vol. 42, No. 2, January 1990; Xiaowei Zang, "Provincial Elite in Post-Mao China," in Asian Survey. Vol. 31, No. 6, June 1991.

50. William deB. Mills, "Generational Change in China," p. 16. 35

51. Different classification of generations will be discussed in Chapter IV.

52. For the study of post-materialism, see Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase, eds. Poiiticai Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979).

53. Michael Redclift & David Goodman, "Introduction," in David Goodman & Michael Redclift, ed. Environment and Development in Latin America: The Politics of Sustainability (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), p. 4.

54. Joseph S. Tulchin & Andrew I. Rudman, "Introduction," in Joseph S. Tulchin & Andrew I. Rudman, eds. Economic Development and Environmental Protection in Latin America (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), p. 1.

55. Quoted from Susan Hadden, Environmental Protection and Economic Development in India (Austin: The University of Texas at Austin, 1984), p. 1.

56. For general studies, see William J. Baumol, The Theory of Environmental Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Lynton Keith Caldwell, International Environmental Policy: Emergence and Dimensions (1990); Frank J. Dietz, et al., eds. Environmental Policy and the Economy (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1991); Avijit Gupta Ecology and Development in the Third World (London: Routledge, 1988); Chris C. Park, Environmental Policies: An International Review (London: Croom Helm, 1986). For area studies, see Susan Hadden, op cit.: Tulchin and Rudman, op cit.: Redclift and Goodman, op cit.: Bernhard Glaeser, Learning from China: Development and Environment in Third World Countries (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987).

57. Yusuf J. Ahmad, "A Least-Developed-Country Perspective," in Arthur H. WEsting, ed. Disarmament, Environment, and Development and Their Relevance to the Least Developed Countries (New York: United Nations, 1991), pp. 24-25.

58. Tulchin and Rudman, p. 2.

59. Eduard B. Vermeer, "Management of Pollution Abatement by Chinese Enterprises," in China Information. Vol. 6, No. 1, Summer 1991. CHAPTER H

THE ISSUE AND THE SETTING

To study a provincial policy, first of all, we need to know the issue which the policy in question is designed to address. However, a policy issue is not, in most cases, isolated from other issues; they are intertwined in some way. In the case of pollution control policy, pollution control is related to economic development insofar as they both require scarce resources. The problem, in the broad context, becomes how to control pollution without retarding economic development. Before exploring the relationship between these two issues, I will examine the pollution issue itself in this chapter, that is, the state of air, water, and solid waste pollution in each province.

To understand provincial pollution control policy also requires the understanding of two settings: the national legal and policy setting, and the organizational setting. The first setting confines the variation of provincial policy. Legally, provincial policies cannot violate national laws and policies. Organizational setting refers to involved organizations in which provincial policies are initiated, decided and implemented. The latter setting is important for it determines the success of a policy. As Park put it,

A key prerequisite to the successful formulation, implementation and review of environmental policies is appropriate institutional and organizational support.1

36 37

Therefore, we have to explore how authorities are divided among these organizations and how they interact with each other.

Although the provinces are important actors in China, we cannot disregard politics in Beijing when we discuss provincial politics. Central politics and provincial politics are interactive. Sometimes, national policy is determined to a great degree by some provinces.

For example, the National Environmental Protection Law (For trial purpose) was drafted by seven provinces.2 Sometimes, it is national leaders who determine the content of a particular policy such as the cadre retirement policy. However, no matter who formulates a national policy, it delineates the boundary for a corresponding provincial policy.

The issue

Not all discharge of wastes is considered pollution. Pollution is determined by the nature and amount of waste, the intensity of discharge, and the capacity of the environment to absorb it. In this section, I will discuss only the nature and the amount of wastes. The purpose of this discussion is to reveal the relative severity of pollution in each province. However, a comparison of China with other countries will be made, if data are available, so as to gain an idea of the state of pollution in China as a whole.

A. W ater pollution

Water pollution has always been considered the most serious pollution in China due to its widespread and immediate effects on people, animals, and plants.3 According to one report, "over 90 percent of industrial and municipal waste water is released untreated into the country’s waterways."4 Another report says that "(O)f 78 monitored 38 rivers, 54 were polluted; 14, including all the major streams, were seriously polluted."5

One report notes that "47 percent of all navigable rivers can not be used for either drinking water or fishing, and half of China’s major lakes are seriously polluted."6

Generally speaking, water pollution comes from two sources; domestic waste water and industrial waste water. The most dangerous pollutants such as mercury, lead, cyanide, cadmium, chromium, arsenic and phenol are contained in industrial waste water.

Furthermore, industrial waste water is the larger source of water pollution.7 Industrial waste water consists of 78.13 percent of total waste water on average. (Table 2.11) In

Jiangxi, over 91 percent of waste water came from industrial waste water in 1981. In

Beijing, which had the lowest percentage of industrial waste water, 57.42 percent of waste water came from industry. 39

Table 2.11 The percentage of industrial waste water in total waste water (in rank order)

Year: 1981

Province % Province % Province %

Beijing 57.42 Guangdong 78.13 Fujian 82.92 Xinjiang 61.60 Hunan 78.29 Shandong 83.67 Qinghai 65.88 Shanxi 78.72 Zhejiang 83.92 Neimonggol 67.28 Shanghai 78.81 Guizhou 85.48 Heilongjiang 70.58 Yunnan 79.07 Hebei 86.03 Henan 73.78 Tianjin 79.11 Jiangsu 86.84 Hubei 74.14 Jilin 79.29 Gansu 89.30 Shaanxi 75.85 Anhui 80.19 Jiangxi 91.09 Guangxi 76.77 Liaoning 81.86 Ningxia 77.30 Sichuan 82.40

Source: State Environmental Protection Bureau, Huan Jing Tong Ji Zi Liao Hui Bian, 1981-1985 (The compendium of environmental statistical data, 1981-1985).

To compare the severity of water pollution in each province, I will juxtapose the absolute and relative amounts of total waste water and industrial waste water discharged in 1981. The comparison of absolute amounts of emission may be misleading because the severity of pollution depends also on the size of the area and population. Since the size 40 of the area and population varies to a great extent in China, it is necessary to adjust these absolute amount accordingly. Generally speaking, area is negatively related with pollution while population is positively related with pollution. Therefore, I will multiply the population density by the amounts of waste water and then divide the product by a certain number to make the scale smaller and easily understandable.8

In absolute terms, Sichuan, Jiangsu, and Liaoning discharged over two billion tons of waste water in 1981.(Figure 2.11) Figure 2.12 shows that water pollution in general is most serious in Shanghai in relative terms. Regarding industrial waste water, Figure

2.13 shows that ten provinces have discharged over one billion tons of industrial waste water. 41

300000

l:Beijing; 2:Tianjin; 3:Hebei; 4:Shanxi; 5:Neimonggol; 6:Liaoning; 7:Jilin; 8:Heilongjiang; 9:Shanghai; 10:Jiangsu; ll:Zhejiang; 12:Anhui; 13:Fujian; 14:Jiangxi; 15:Shandong; 16:Henan; 17:Hubei; 18:Hunan; 19:Guangdong; 20:Guangxi; 21:Sichuan; 22;Guizhou; 23:Yunnan; 24:Shaanxi; 25:Gansu; 26:Qinghai; 27:Ningxia; 28:Xinjiang.

Figure 2.11 Total Waste Water 100 w JL InJHLL., 9 U 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 0 10 12 14 IB IB 20 22 24 26 26 1981

Figure 2.12 Total Waste Water (adjusted)

I total India trial vast* water

299090

fi lOflOM I LU

Figure 2.13 Industrial Waste Water 43

However, the discharge of waste water does not necessarily mean that it will produce pollution. Treatment of waste water can decrease degree of pollution.

Unfortunately, only 14.48 percent of waste water on average had been treated before its discharge. Although the rate of treatment was a little higher regarding industrial waste water, 26.16 percent, it was still relatively low. In addition, treatment of water may not reach the standard set by the state. On average, only 5.21 percent of treated industrial waste water reached the state standard in 1982, with .69 percent as the lowest and 14.32 percent the highest. (Table 2.12) From these data, we can conclude that water pollution is very serious in China, though varied among provinces, and still in need of serious attention.

Table 2.12 The percentage of treated industrial waste water that reaches state standard (In rank order)

Province % Province % Province %

Neimonggol 0.69 Beijing 5.02 Tianjin 7.65 Xinjiang 4.09 Guangxi 5.47 Hebei 7.67 Zhejiang 4.22 Guizhou 5.57 Jilin 7.88 Anhui 4.57 Heilongjiang 5.60 Shanxi 8.28 Ningxia 4.59 Henan 5.96 Hubei 10.17 Jiangxi 4.60 Jiangsu 6.14 Shanghai 11.61 Guangdong 4.63 Shandong 6.48 Gansu 14.32 Yunnan 4.69 Liaoning 6.93 Shaanxi 5.05 Hunan 6.97 *The data of Qinghai, Fujian and Sichuan provinces are not available. Source: same as Table 2.11 44

B. Air pollution

The effects of air pollution on human health, plants, and earth temperature are well known to most people. The pollutants in air pollution which will be discussed are S02

(sulfur dioxide), smoke, and suspended particles. First of all, I will compare air pollution in China with other nations.

Table 2.13 shows that the emission of sulphur dioxide in China in 1982 was the second highest one, behind that of only the United States. Although it was lower than that of the U.S., the population of the U.S. was only a quarter of that of China. In addition, the GDP of the U.S. was ten times higher than that of China. "China’s share in the world’s emissions of S02 increased from 8.7 percent in 1980 to 9.6 percent in 1986.1,9

With respect to the range of annual average concentrations of particles in world cities which had been monitored from 1980 to 1984, five of the ten most serious cities are in

China: Shenyang, Xian, Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.10 45

Table 2.13 Emissions of Sulphur dioxide (SOz) and Nitrogen oxide (NOz) in selected countries 1982 (103t a'1)

Country Sulphur Nitrogen GDP (millions of dollars in dioxide dioxide 1980) Canada 3,570 1,896 253,350 USA 22,000 19,500 2,587,100 China 13,270 4,138 252,230 Thailand 310 127 33,450 Germany 2,880 2,990 819,140 UK 4,020 1,812 522,850 France 2,668 1,767 651,890 Source: UNEP. Environmental Data ReDort, 2nded., (Oxford: Basil Blackwel 1989/90). The World Bank, World Development Report 1982 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).

Generally speaking, air pollution is more serious in northern China than in southern China, and in cities than in rural areas. The absolute amounts of waste gas discharged is the greatest in Liaoning province. However, Shanghai stands out as the most serious air pollution area in relative terms. S02 is the major pollutant causing acid rain, and it is very serious in Shandong and Sichuan in absolute terms. (Figure 2.14) However, 4 6 the relative index shows that Shandong, Shanghai, and Jiangsu have more serious S02 problems than any other province. (Figure 2.15) The province with the largest amount of

smoke is Liaoning in absolute amount; Shanxi and Henan are also very serious, though

somewhat less than Liaoning. (Figure 2.16) However, in relative amount, Shanghai,

Henan, Shandong, and Liaoning had the most serious smoke problems in 1981. (Figure

2.17) Finally, with respect to industrial suspended particles, Shanxi was the province which had the most serious problem with suspended particles in 1982 both in absolute and relative amounts. Jiangsu province was the second most afflicted area.

i.5 e + 0 6

l.OstOB

500000

0 2 4 a e la 12 * 4 is is 20 22 2 4 20 2a 1982

Figure 2.14 The emission of S 02 in 1982 47

600

400

200

0 2 4 6 0 Id 12 14 IS IS 30 32 24 26 26 1982

Figure 2.15 The emission of S 02 in 1982 (adjusted)

2.0e+06

1.58+06

l.Oe+OB

500000

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 2 4 6 0 10 13 Id 16 10 20 22 2d 20 20 1982

Figure 2.16 The emission of smoke in 1982 1982

Figure 2.17 The emission of smoke in 1982 (adjusted)

300

200

100

2 4 6 a IQ 12 14 IS 10 20 22 24 2B 23 1982

Figure 2.18 The emission of suspended particles in 1982 49

600

400

200

0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 29 27 2 4 6 0 10 13 14 IB IS 20 22 24 2B 20 1QR9

Figure 2.19 The emission of suspended particles in 1982 (adjusted)

C. Solid waste pollution

In this section, I consider industrial solid wastes, which includes coal dust, metallurgy, chemical materials, and radioactive material. One major problem with solid waste is that it occupies space. Another issue is that solid wastes such as radioactive material, are particularly dangerous to human beings and plants. The total industrial solid waste is highest in Liaoning both in absolute and relative terms probably because it has long been the center of heavy industry in China. Shanghai and Shandong were the second most seriously-afflicted provinces. (Figure 2.20 and Figure 2.21) (Ten thousand tons) iao 200 150 2000 6000 4000 0000 0 2 oa ide sld waste solid indue. Total ■ 4 6 oa idsra oi wse (adjusted) waste solid industrial Total l 3 4 B B 0 3 4 6 26 26 34 23 30 IB IB 14 13 la B oa idsra oi waste solid industrial Total 1981 iue 2.20 Figure Figure 2.21 2.21 Figure 1901 50 51

The national policy context

A. The rise of concern about environmental protection

No policy will be formulated if policy makers do not recognize the existence of an issue. That was the case in China before 1973 regarding pollution. Two reasons account for this phenomenon. The first is related to ideology. Before 1973, Chinese leaders believed that China had no pollution problem because socialist states were unlike capitalist states in which enterprises produced pollution because of the pursuit of private interests without regard for public welfare. In other words, Chinese leaders believed that pollution was not the by-product of production processes in socialist states. The second reason is China’s isolation from the world in the 1960s when the concern about pollution increased elsewhere in the world. Due to its isolation, China felt no international obligation to review the severity of its pollution, not to mention taking action against it, which would require an allocation of considerable resources.

As a matter of fact, it was the international attention that brought environmental protection onto the agenda of national leaders. As Wu Zijin put it:

Only after the country made preparations for, and took part in, the Stockholm Conference on Human Environment in 1972, did environmental management begin to be viewed as vital to protecting the ecosystem, safeguarding socialist construction, and guaranteeing the health of the population."

In 1973, the first national conference on environmental protection was held.

Between 1973 and 1978, two regulations about environmental protection were promulgated, one in 1973, one in 1977. (Table 2.21) Actually, the first regulation was doomed to be ineffective for the following reasons. First, it adopted exclusively the direct 52 regulation approach for implementation. Second, it did not provide incentives for successful enforcement of policy such as rewards for compliance and punishment for noncompliance. Third, there were no relevant complementary regulations. Some stipulations are too general to be effective and require other regulations to make them concrete. Finally, environmental protection lacked institutional support which is requisite for successful implementation of policy. This regulation was even drafted by the State

Planning Commission because no state environmental protection organ existed in 1973.

Table 2.21 National Laws and Regulations regarding pollution control (in chronological order)

Date Code Name of Laws and Regulations 8-29-73 R1 Some regulations on protecting and improving the environment (SPC) 4-14-77 R2 Some regulations on controlling the industrial "three wastes" and developing comprehensive utilization (SPC, SCCC, MF, SCLGEP) 9-13-79 LI Environmental Protection Law of the PRC (for trial implementation) (NPC) 12-30-79 R3 Circular related to procedures governing the retention of profits from products derived from multiple use of the ’three wastes’ in industrial and mining enterprises (MF, SCLGEP) 2-24-81 R4 State Council decision on strengthening environmental protection work in the period of national economic readjustment (SC) 5-11-81 R5 Environmental protection procedures regarding the management of environmental protection in capital construction projects(SPC, SCCC, SEC, SCLGEP) 2-5-82 R6 Provisional measures for the assessment of effluent fees (SC) 53

Table 2.21 (Continued)

2-6-83 R7 Some regulations regarding combining technological renovation and controlling industrial pollution (SC) 11-11-83 R8 Measures of the management of environmental protection standards of the PRC (URCEP) 5-8-84 R9 Decision on environmental protection work (SC) 5-11-84 L2 Water pollution prevention and control Law (NPC) 6-10-84 RIO Circular regarding the regulation of the channels for environmental protection fund (URCEP, SPC, SSTC, SEC, MF, CBCP, CICB) 9-27-84 R 11 Regulations regarding the environmental management of country and neighborhood industries (SC) 10-29-85 R12 Provisional regulations on issues concerning the multiple use of resources (SEC) 3-4-86 R13 Provisional regulations for environmental management in foreign economic development zones (SEPB) 9-5-87 L3 Law of the PRC on atmospheric pollution control (NPC)

Note: Rn=Regulation or decision; Ln=Law; SC=State Council; SEC=State Economic Commission; SPC=State Planning Commission; SCCC=State Capital Construction Commission; MF=Ministry of Finance; SCLGEP=State Council Leading Group on Environmental Protection; URCEP=The Department of Urban and Rural Construction and Environmental Protection; NPC=National People’s Congress; SEPB=State Environmental Protection Bureau; SSTC=State Science and Technology Commission; CBCP=Construction Bank of China’s People; CICB=China Industrial and Commercial Bank.

After the fall of the Gang of Four and the rise of the reformers, pollution control has gained greater leadership attention, and, from a developmental point of view, the policy has gradually become more pragmatic, specific, comprehensive, and effective. In the 1978 Constitution, environmental protection and pollution control appeared for the first time as a key state responsibility. Article 11 of that constitution stipulated that "the 54 state protects the environment and natural resources and prevents and eliminates pollution and other hazards to the public." In 1979, the first national law on environmental protection, Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (for trial implementation), was enacted. Although economic development remains the focus of modernization, it has often been repeated that environmental protection must go hand in hand with economic development.

Next, I will describe general measures, particular measures, and auxiliary measures in national pollution control policy which are the basis of provincial pollution control policy.12 By general measure I mean measures which are applicable to any kind of pollution and any place. By particular measures I mean measures which are applicable to a particular form of pollution or to a particular place(s). Auxiliary measures are those that make the policy enforceable. These measures of national pollution control policy are drawn from national laws and regulations. (Table 2.22) 55

Table 2.22 Pollution control measures in the laws and regulations

General Measures Regulations mention- ing Specialized the measures regulations

Overall planning R1,R2,L1,R4,R13 Rational distribution R1,L1,R5,R11,R13 Comprehensive utilization R1,L1,R10 R2, R3 Three simultaneous R 1 ,R2,L 1 ,R4,R5,R9, R10,R11,R13 Effluent fees system L1,R4,L2,R9,R11,R13, R6 L3 Environmental impact report L1,R4,L2,R13,L3 R5 Date certain measure L1,L2,R11,R13,L3 Research, propaganda & R1,L1,R4 education

Particular Measures

keypoint cities R1,R4 production limitation R ll energy selection R1,L1,R4,R7 R12 technological renovation R1,L1,R9,R11 R7

Auxiliary measures

punishments and rewards R2,L1,R4,R5,R7,L2, R3,R6 R11,R13,L3 funds for environmental R1,R2,R7,R9,R10 protection Note: For the codes, please see Table 2.2L 56

B. Genera! measures

As a result of the 1973 national conference, on August 29,1973, the State Council promulgated a directive "Some regulations about protecting and improving the environment (draft for trial implementation)," which for the first time laid out the guidelines for environmental protection: overall planning, rational distribution, comprehensive utilization, conversion of the harmful into the beneficial, reliance upon the masses, everyone taking a part, protecting the environment, and benefiting the people. These guidelines were abstract, but the first three guide lines have actually become more and more concrete in laws and regulations enacted later.*3 I’ll begin with those three guide lines. i. Overall planning China is a planned economy in which the state controls most economic activities, though the scope of control is decreasing. Before 1973, environmental protection had never been taken into account in national economic planning. Since environmental protection is highly related to economic activities, it has to be incorporated into national economic planning to ensure coordination and effectiveness. As stated in the beginning of "Some regulations on controlling the industrial

’three wastes’ and developing comprehensive utilization,"

We must fully enhance the superiority of the planned economy and sincerely incorporate environmental protection in the national economic plan.

As a matter of fact, this directive also stipulated that any equipment required for environmental protection construction should be incorporated into the distribution plan of materials and be provided in this manner. 57 ii. Rational distribution This measure refers to the distribution of industry and the selection of sites for enterprises. Leaders in the center noticed that the selection of sites is an important part of controlling pollution and abating its harmful impacts.

Enterprises which discard pollutants are not permitted in residential areas, scenic areas, watershed conservation districts, natural preserves, etc.; for existing enterprises, it is their responsibility to bring pollution under control otherwise they will run the risk of being closed down or relocated. iii. Comprehensive utilization Comprehensive utilization means using wastes to produce useful goods. National leaders believe that this deserves the most encouragement. Two directives were enacted to encourage comprehensive utilization.

(Table 2.22) Various incentives, like tax abatement or exemption, and retention of benefits for a certain period, have been designed to encourage enterprises to develop comprehensive utilization. iv. The "three synchronicity" principle This means that pollution prevention equipment must be designed, constructed, and operated simultaneously with main projects.

This is one of the most frequently repeated measures in laws and regulations after its first appearance in the 1973 Regulation. (See Table 2.22) In Li Peng’s speeches regarding environmental protection, this is also the most oft-mentioned measure. Indeed, it’s one of the most important measures for pollution control. v. The assessment of effluent fees This is the most important economic approach in the implementation of pollution control policy in China. It first appeared in Article 18 of the 1979 Environmental Protection Law which stipulated that "Effluent fees shall be 58 assessed according to the amount and concentration of pollutants as stipulated by regulations on enterprises that discard more pollutants than the state standards permit"

However, it did not stipulate the standards of fees or who is in charge of assessing fees.

It was not until 1982 when the State Council promulgated "Provisional measures for the assessment of effluent" fees that national fee standards were laid out, although numerous provincial-level governments had already enacted local measures for assessing effluent fees. The assessment of effluent fees for waste water is different from others. The "Water

Pollution Prevention and Control Law" requires that any discharge of waste water will be assessed for effluent fees no matter whether it exceeds state standards or not. This is partly because water pollution is the most serious pollution in China. vi. The environmental impact report institution This measure was first stipulated in the 1979 Environmental Protection Law which require that for new construction, renovation projects or expansion projects, an environmental impact report shall be submitted to environmental protection departments for review and approval. The

"Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law" and "Law of the PRC on Atmospheric

Pollution Control" also emphasized this measure. vii. The "date certain” measure This measure requires that enterprises which produce serious pollution should bring it under control within a certain period. However, who decides the length of this period is left open in national laws and regulations. viii. Research, propaganda, and education Because they are often mentioned together, these three are considered herein as a single measure. Research is in fact, however, extremely different from propaganda and education because of its scientific 59 nature. Since environmental protection work is also science-based, research is indispensable for the making and implementation of environmental protection policy.

Research has been emphasized due to the influence of pragmatists in the policy-making process which was evident after the reform in 1979. The building of research institutes has been required both at the national and provincial level. As for propaganda and education, due to its nature as a socialist state, these are two important mechanisms of controlling people for the Communist regime in China. In addition, they require fewer resources. It is therefore not surprising that they have been frequently emphasized in policy documents. As Li Peng said in 1985,

"For a pretty long time in the past, I have thought that many things can be solved with economic measures. For now, it is not the way things are, even though it is still a measure available. We still need to use administrative and public opinion measures...to promote environmental protection work."14

C. Particular measures i. Keypoint cities Since China lacked experience in environmental protection, selecting some keypoint cities was a good strategy to gain experience. Some cities such as Beijing were selected because they are important, some such as Lanzhou because they had serious pollution. The 1973 Regulation selected 18 keypoint cities for gaining experience in environmental protection: Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Shenyang, Dalian,

Jilin, Harbin, Qingdao, Nanjing, Hangzhou, Wuhan, Changsha, Guangzhou, Chendu,

Chongqing, Lanzhou, Xian, and Taiyuan. In the 1981 Decision, four cities were selected as keypoint cities: the capital, Beijing, and three scenic cities, Hangzhou, Suzhou, and

Guilin. This decision also required each provincial-level government to grasp 60 environmental protection work in one or two cities in order to improve urban environmental quality. ii. Use of energy Some pollution, especially air pollution is caused by the use of energy sources such as coal. Coal is the major energy resource for domestic use, and it creates serious air pollution and solid ashes pollution in China, especially in cities.

Therefore, the State Council encouraged the development of more efficient heating methods and of energy forms like liquid gas which produce little or no pollution. iii. Technological renovation Some pollution is caused by outdated equipment. Some pollution cannot be controlled, or cannot be controlled efficiently because no advanced technology is available. Technological renovation is therefore necessary for controlling pollution. The State Council even promulgated a directive especially regarding technological renovation in 1983. iv. Production-itemlimits Not all industries create pollution problem, but some do create more serious pollution than others. In "Regulations regarding the environmental management of rural and neighborhood industries," those industries are not allowed to produce goods such as leather and paper which cause serious pollution.

D. Auxiliary measures i. Funds for environmental protection As stated in Chapter I, pollution control requires scarce resources, especially financial ones. In a planned economy which emphasizes development, such as China, it is necessary to stipulate the fees for pollution control or no funds can be collected. The 1973 Regulation only mentioned that the renovation, renewal, and expansion projects should include funds for treating "three 61 wastes," but it did not stipulate how much should be included. In the 1984 Decision, it stipulated the minimum percentage of the renovation fund to be devoted to environmental protection. ii. Punishments and rewards No policy will be enforced if there are no positive and/or negative incentives. The punishment included fines, compensation, effluent fees, relocation, halts in production, shut-downs, and other administrative and criminal penalties. Rewards included retention of benefits, tax abatements or exemptions, and subsidy, except literal encouragement. Actually, the policy emphasizes negative incentives more than positive incentives.

The organizational context

In modern political systems, it is impossible to discuss the policy process without referring to organizations. They are indispensable part of modern politics regardless of the nature of the political system. Different kinds of organizations play different roles at each stage of the policy process. Policy may be made within an organization, or it may be the result of bargaining among organizations. In Western democracies, we witness the active roles of interest groups, parliaments, and bureaucratic organizations in the environmental policy-making process. In the implementation process, bureaucratic organizations are the most important actors because policy will not be enforced without them. In this section, I will briefly describe organizations and their roles in the pollution control policy-making process and the implementation process in China. 62

Since voluntary organizations are generally forbidden in China, I founnd no significant environmentalist interest groups. Although numerous local protests against pollution were reported, they were sporadic and unorganized. In China, it is the party, the

Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the state that enact and implement policy.

Therefore, only organizations within the Party and the state will be discussed in this section.

"Public policies are rarely self-executing."15 The implementation of any policy requires organizations, which are equipped with personnel, expertise, equipment, and authority. A new policy will sometimes be incorporated into the functions of an existing organization; sometimes, elites may create new organizations to coordinate with other organizations, to supervise the implementation, to review the policy, and/or to implement the policy. As far as environmental protection policy is concerned, its work is related to numerous departments, such as economic, industry, agriculture, communication, water conservancy departments, etc., and therefore could not easily be incorporated solely into any existing department. In addition, a policy will be less effective if it relies on many organizations for its implementation. Another reason for the creation of new organizations might be that policy-makers want to stress the importance of this policy. In China, these two reasons accounted for the establishment and development of the administrative system of environmental protection.

The organizational context also reflects formal and informal authority relations.

With respect to pollution control, the following questions about organizational context cannot be ignored. What organization makes the policy? What are the functions of 63 national and provincial environmental protection agencies? Put differently, how are labor and authority divided between them? What other organizations are involved in the formation and implementation of pollution control policy, and what are their relationship with the environmental protection agency? I will first discuss the role of the Chinese

Communist Party in pollution control policy formation, and then turn to the administrative system.

A. The Chinese Communist Party and environmental protection

In China there exist numerous political parties, but only one party counts: the

Chinese Communist Party. Before 1982, there was no separation between party and state.

As a matter of fact, the party dominated the state in almost every aspect. This is a picture commonly agreed upon by scholars.16 Although major political decisions were made within the party, it did not imply that the Party made all policies. The rise of concern about environmental protection seemed to have little direct input from the party. As discussed above, the first leading group, though informal, was set up in 1971 under the

State Council to supervise the preparation, which was definitely carried out by the State

Council staff members, for the Stockholm conference. Since the party machine then was still under the control of the Gang of Four, it seems unlikely that they would have paid attention to this kind of problem because of ideological factors and political struggle.

The organizational structure of the CCP changed during the early 1980s with the

Secretariat being restored in 1980. "(It) meets at least once a week, coordinates all administrative work of the Party machine, and it prepares the meetings of the Politburo as well as those of the Politburo’s Standing Committee."17 There is one General Office 64 and five departments for propaganda, organization, united front work, international party relations, and investigation, which work under the Secretariat. Since the Politburo does not meet often, the Secretariat has become "the executive agency of the Politburo and its

Standing Committee."18 As Zhao Ziyang said in July 1984,

the Politburo does not meet often; they meet only when there is necessity to discuss important issues. It is the Secretariat and the State Council that are responsible for regular functions of government.19

The number of members of the Secretariat is not fixed, but they are divided like the staff departments of the Central Committee. Although one of them is responsible for economic planning, it seems unlikely that it was where the environmental policy came from. First, environmental policy is highly technological in the sense that technology is important in determining the level of pollution and in treating pollution, and all research institutes of environmental problems are supervised by the State Council. Second, there have rarely been discussion of environmental problems in the Secretariat or the Politburo. Third, no national leader has expressed his opinion regarding environmental protection as a member in the Politburo or the Secretariat. Fourth, most discussions of environmental problems in magazines rarely mentioned the role of the Party. Mentioning the environmental protection work during the Cultural Revolution, Qu Geping, the director of the State

Environmental Protection, says that "during the ten chaotic years...Premier Zhou’s many directives on environmental protection could not really be implemented."20 Finally, the high consensus among leaders regarding environmental problems is probably the most significant reason that pollution control policy does not have to go to inner-party decision­ making body.21 One indicator of this consensus is that the director of the State 65

Environmental Protection Bureau, Qu Geping, has stayed in this position for more than ten years during which there occurred an economic readjustment period in 1981, the fall of Hu Yaobang, a reformer, in 1987, and then the fall of Zhao Ziyang in 1989. In China,

"(W)hen circumstances permit, however, leaders try to purge their rivals and replace them with their own supporters in an unending game of factional politics."22 In his study of environmental policy in China, Lester Ross points out that "(A)genda setting is primarily a function of factional politics."23 It might be true in forest policy, but does not appear valid for pollution control policy for the reasons provided above.

To summarize, the role of the Party in environmental policy-making is not as direct and initiative as its roles in political affairs. One aspect of political system reform after 1980 is the separation between the Party and the state. The major roles of the Party are confined to leadership, supervision, and coordination, leaving management and implementation to the state. But this is just a general principle which has exceptions. In the domain of environmental protection, the state assumes even the role of leadership in terms of policy initiation.

B. The tasks and development of the administrative system of environmental protection

Since there was no environmental policy before 1973, there was no necessity for administrative organizations to take care of environmental protection work. The informal N leading group set up in 1971 was not a standing organization for dealing with environmental problems. As mentioned above, the first policy statement regarding environmental protection was drafted after the 1973 national conference by the State

Planning Commission and then came the Environmental Protection Office in 1974 which 66 was more like a staff than an executive organization. It was staffed with only twenty people, too small to implement a policy; its work was therefore confined to coordination and planning.24 Moreover, its designation as an "office" meant that it lacked the prestige of a bureau and therefore had no vertical authority over subordinate levels of government as other departments do. From the perspective of the development of bureaucratic structure, environmental policy was not deemed important by national leaders before 1982 even though they recognized the existence of environmental problems. Actually, most laws and regulations regarding pollution control were enacted during the 1980s. (Table

2.21)

Although the 1979 environmental protection law stipulated that an environmental protection organization should be set up under the State Council, it did not come to exist until 1982. In 1982, the Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction and Environmental

Protection (MURCEP) was set up, under which there was an environmental protection bureau. However, as Ross put it,

environmental protection resembled an appendage rather than an integral component of the new ministry, with most of its offices located in a separate compound.25

In addition, its Leading Group on Environmental Protection, which had the authority to coordinate various bureaucracies, was abolished,.

The Environmental Protection Commission, chaired by then Vice Premier Li Peng, was established in 1984 to coordinate various organizations whose work had impact on the environment. Its tasks were, as designated in the 1984 Decision, "to research and review guidelines and policies related to environmental protection, to propose planning 67 requirements, to lead, organize, and coordinate national environmental protection work."

Its members included representatives from 22 relevant commissions and departments. Its general office was set in the Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction and Environmental

Protection. This Commission meets quarterly to discuss environmental protection work and review policies proposed by the Environmental Protection Bureau. Given this nature, it cannot really perform the role of leadership and organization. Its major functions are to coordinate various departments and to provide an occasion for various departments to express their opinion regarding environmental protection measures proposed by the environmental protection bureau. In other words, it’s a consensus building process.

In December of 1984, in order to enhance the role of the Environmental Protection

Bureau, it was renamed "State Environmental Protection Bureau" so that it could act independently, though still under the leadership of MURCEP.26 The State Environmental

Protection Bureau is a standing bureaucracy responsible for various tasks delineated in different documents. Its tasks or powers are:

1. planning, coordinating, supervising, and guiding national environmental protection (’84 circular, See Table 2.21);

2. supervising the implementation of the principle of "three synchronicity" (’81 Decision,

’84 circular);

3. setting national environmental quality standards (’83 Measures, ’87 Law);

4. reviewing and approving the environmental impact report of large-scale capital constructions (’81 Decision, Procedures);

5. setting up the monitoring system (’81 Decision). 68

To summarize, State Environmental Protection Bureau’s major tasks are planning for environmental protection work, coordinating with various relevant organizations, setting national environmental standards and supervising the implementation of environmental policies. However, it does not monopolize this work; it has to share power with some other organizations. With respect to planning, the funds, materials, and equipment for environmental protection and comprehensive utilization falls within the domain of the State Planning Commission. It also has to share the power of supervision with various departments such as Communication. Although it directs a monitoring system, there are also monitoring stations under the control of other departments and commissions. Figure 2.31 is the administrative structure of the environmental protection system which gives us an idea of how many bureaucracies are involved with environmental protection work.

This Figure also shows that the State Environmental Protection Bureau has line authority. In other words, there is an environmental protection system from the state level down to the grassroots level. For a provincial bureaucratic organization, there are always two kinds of leadership relationships, tiao-dao and kuai-kuai leadership. 69

State Council

State Environmental State Planning Protection Economic Commission Commission Commission

Province The Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction and Environmental Protection

Other relevant Provincial provincial Environmental Protection organizations. Bureau

Figure 2.31 The administrative structure of environmental protection system

As explained by Schroeder, "The lines of authority connecting the units are either within the same system (xitong) or come from units in a different functional system."27

Tiao-dao leadership relation refers to the vertical relationship between organizations in the center and the locality, while kuai-kuai refers to the leadership relationship between organizations within a district such as province. "There has been an uneasy tension between the two types of leadership over the years as the Center and provinces have vied for either authority over policy implementation or control of economic and political activity."28 Since our subject is the environmental policy in the provinces, we also discuss the provincial environmental protection agency’s tiao-tiao and kuai-kuai leadership relationships in the next section. 70

C. The provincial government

There are twenty one provinces, four autonomous regions, and three directly ruled cities, excluding Tibet and Hainan, which will be studied in this dissertation. In each province, a provincial-level environmental protection bureau, though varying in terms of rank, has been established to implement policies.29 The provincial environmental protection bureau does not work in isolation. In fact, it is embedded into a network with tiao-tiao and kuai-kuai leadership relationships. Its tiao-tiao leadership relationship will be discussed first because national environmental protection organizations have been already discussed above.

Being a bureau in Beijing, it is difficult for the State Environmental Protection

Bureau to implement the pollution control policy it makes. It has to rely on provincial governments to enforce laws and regulations. Figure 2.32 shows the comparison of tasks between the State Environmental Protection Bureau and the provincial Environmental

Protection Bureau. To prevent new pollution, it is the provincial environmental protection organizations that supervise the implementation of the "three simultaneous" principle and reviews the environmental impact report of new construction. To deal with old pollution, it is they who determine the effluent charges and fines. The period for enterprises to treat pollution also falls within the jurisdiction of the provincial government. In addition, the provincial government has the authority to order the enterprises, except those directly under the center, with serious pollution which was not controlled within a certain period to stop production or to shut down. To summarize, the environmental protection system 71 is a very decentralized system in a tiao-tiao leadership relationship. The provincial organization has a great deal of room to maneuver.

State Environmental Protection Bureau: —sets policy and regulations —makes environmental protection plan —coordinates with other relevant national organizations and provincial organizations —supervises the implementation of policy and regulations —sets national environmental protection standards

Provincial environmental protection bureau: —sets local environmental protection standards —participates in the examination and approval of completed capital construction projects —supervises and inspects environmental protection in small-scale capital construction projects —allocates environmental protection subsidization fund in conjunction with financial departments —determines effluent charges —collects environmental statistical data

Figure 2.32 Tasks of the State Environmental Protection Bureau and the provincial environmental protection bureau

We now turn to the kuai-kuai leadership relationship. Each provincial level government has a people’s congress with functions that approximate a legislature. Given the nature of a communist state, it is the executive department, the provincial people’s 72 government, that governs a province. Therefore, I will focus primarily on the executive organizations.

As shown clearly in the above sections, the power of the environmental protection organizations is severely limited. Too many organizations’ actions have influence on the effectiveness of the environmental protection organizations. In a conference regarding the system of effluent charge held in 1981, the representative of the Department of Electric

Power said: "Our department refused to pay the effluent fees in 1980 when this system was effective."30 The Department of Communication also refused to pay effluent fees regarding the discharge from boats. There were even more complaints about the way how this system works.31 In his speech to the second meeting of the State Council

Environmental Protection Commission in 1984, Li Peng admitted that "only about 50% of projects seriously observe [the principle of "three simultaneous]."32 Below is a list of those organizations and their functions related to pollution control.

* The Planning Commission: reviews model environmental projects and prepares the plans for investments in environmental protection by the EPB.

* The Economic Commission: composes budgetary allocation plans for technical transformation and comprehensive utilization of waste materials, approves individual investment items, and monitors the realization of targets.

* The State Science and Technology Commission: formulates Science & Technology plans, develops research, and investigates the environmental impact of toxic waste etc. 73

* The Bureau of Agricultural Techniques: protects land resources, inspects of pesticide and chemical fertilizer use, and monitors the use of irrigation water from urban and industrial waste water.

* The Forestry Bureau: protects nature reserves, forests and wildlife, and draws up and implements afforestation plans.

* The Water Conservation Bureau: together with the environmental protection departments, prevents and treats river basin pollution, and prohibits exploitation of water resources.

* The Bureau of Rural and Township Enterprise Management: make environmental protection plan and location policies in this sector.33

Since national pollution control policy leaves a great leeway room for the provinces to maneuver, it is not surprising that numerous local laws and regulations have been enacted in the provinces. Some of regulations are made by the environmental protection agency alone and some in conjunction with other bureaucracies. Moreover, due to the scarcity of financial resources, various organizations including environmental protection bureau vie for the lion’s share. It is in this policy-making process that the kuai- kuai relationships matter. Due to the difficulty of getting interviews with policy-makers in the provinces we study, I will try to understand the kuai-kuai relationships from one major result of policy making process, i.e., the allocation of financial resources. 74

Endnotes

1. Chris Park, "Environmental Policies in Perspective," in Chris C. Park, ed. Environmental Policies: An International Review (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 35.

2. See Lester Ross, Environmental Policy in China (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 139. He did not explicitly name the provinces, but they are industrialized northern and eastern provinces in China.

3. Baruch Boxer, "China’s environmental prospects," in Asian Survey, Vol. 29, July 1989, p. 677. For the effects of water pollution, see Collier’s Encyclopedia, 1991 ed., s.v. "Water Pollution," by Samuel Fogel.

4. Lester Ross, Environmental Policy in China, p. 133.

5. Vaclav Smil, The Bad Earth: The Environmental Degradation in China (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1984), p. 100.

6. Eduard B. Vermeer, "Management of Environmental Pollution in China: Problems and Abatement Policies," in China Information, Vol. 5, No. 1., Summer 1990, p. 44.

7. As a matter of fact, industrial pollution is the primary source of environmental pollution in China. See State Environmental Protection Bureau, Zhong Guo Huan Jing Bao Hu Shu Ye (Environmental Protection Enterprises in China) ( Beijing: Zhong Guo Huan Jing Ke Xue Chu Ban She, 1988), p. 58.

8. The selection of this number is arbitrary and depends upon the product. Since the product in each province is divided by the same number, the ratio will not change.

9. Ibid., pp. 42-43.

10. UNEP, Environmental Data Report. 2nd ed., (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989/90), p. 15.

11. Wu Zijin, "The Origins of Environmental Management in China," in Bernhard Glaeser, ed. Learning From China: Development and Environment in Third World Countries (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 111.

12. Eduard B. Vermeer points out that "Chinese ideas about fundamental principles of environmental pollution control have not changed much in the past decade." The principles include: (l)emphasis on prevention; (2)comprehensive utilization of materials; (3)the polluter responsible for treating his own pollutants; (4)the harmony between development and the economy; (5)reliance on mass mobilization; (6)reliance on science and technology, but also on propaganda; (7)no sacrifice of environment for economic growth; (8)proper division of responsibilities; (9)recognition of the necessity of regional 75 adjustments; (lO)effective punishments and rewards; and (11) international cooperation and participation in global program. See Eduard B. Vermeer, "Management of Environmental Pollution in China: Problems and Abatement Policies," pp.51-52.

13. The forth guide line is the same as the third one. "Reliance on the masses" and "everyone taking a part" sound more like a political slogan, which is often seen in policy statements. The last two guide lines, "protecting the environment" and "benefiting the people," are the purpose of environmental protection policy.

14. Li Peng, Lun You Zhong Guo Te Se De Huang Jing Bao Hu (On Environmental Protection with Chinese Characteristic), (Beijing: Zhong Guo Huang Jing Ke Shue Chu Ban Se, 1992), p. 32.

15. George C. Edwards HI, Implementing Public Policy (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1980), p. 1.

16. Susan L. Shirk, "The Chinese Political System and the Political Strategy of Economic Reform," in Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David Lampton, Bureaucracy. Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). Jurgen Domes, The Government and Politics of the PRC: A Time of Transition (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985). Hsin-min Zhu, Zhong Gong Zhen Zhi Ti Zhi Gai Gur Yan Jiou: Ba Shi Nien Dai Ho Zhong Guo Da Lu De Zhen Zhi Fa Zan (A Research of political system reform in China: Political Development of China after 1980) (Taipei: Yong Ran Wen Hua Chu Pan She, 1991).

17. Jurgen Domes, The Government and Politics of the PRC, p. 75.

18. Alan P. L. Liu, How China Is Ruled, p. 66.

19. A. Doak Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process (Washington, D. C.: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 9-12.

20. Qu Geping and Woyen Lee, eds., Managing the Environment in China (Dublin, Ireland: Tycooly International Publishing Ltd., 1984), p. 11.

21. There have been no debates about environmental policy among elder leaders. In addition, no quotations of elder leaders’ speech about environmental protection have been found in Chinese sources.

22. Lester Ross, Environmental Policy in China, p. 190.

23. Ibid., p. 210

24. Ibid. p. 138.

25. Ibid. p. 141. 76

26. See "Circular regarding setting up State Environmental Protection Bureau," promulgated on December 5, 1984 by the General Office of the State Council. A chronological development of administrative system of environmental protection work is shown below:

Date Organization

1971 An informal Leading Group was set up 1974 Environmental Protection Office was set up 1982 The Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction and Environmental Protection (Environmental Protection Bureau) was set up 1982 Leading Group on Environmental Protection was abolished 1984 The Environmental Protection Commission was set up 1984 Environmental Protection Bureau renamed as State Environmental Protection Bureau

27. Paul E. Schroeder, Regional Power in China: Tiao-Tiao Kuai-Kuai Authority in the Chinese Political System (PhD Dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1987), p. 13.

28. Ibid., p. 10.

29. The rank of provincial environmental protection agency will be discussed in Chapter Four.

30. State Environmental Protection Bureau, Zhong Guo De Pai Wu Sou Fei: Jong He Pian, 1979-1985 (Beijing: Zhong Guo Huan Jing Ke Xue Chu Ban She, 1989), p. 245.

31. Ibid., pp. 243-255.

32. Li Peng, Lun Yo Zhong Guo Te Se De Huan Jing Bao Hu, p. 24.

33. This list is from Eduard B. Vermeer, "Management of Environmental Pollution in China: Problems and Abatement Policies," pp. 52-53. CHAPTER IH

THE COMPARISON OF PROVINCIAL POLLUTION CONTROL POLICY

Concepts and indicators

One major problem impeding the development of social science is measurement.

In social science research, many concepts, such as political attitudes, political efficacy, classes, economic development, to name just a few, are so abstract that they cannot be observed directly. To use these concepts in empirical study, we need to develop various indicators that are grounded in the empirical world. "It is through such indicators that theories and hypotheses may be tested against concrete data."1 However, we social scientists never know for certain if we are measuring what we intend to measure, even though some methods have been developed to help confirm our claim of validity of indicators.2

The dependent variable in this dissertation, the pollution control effort of provincial governments, is actually an abstract concept which cannot be observed directly.

Yet, the primary task of this chapter is to measure it. In this chapter, I will explain the indicators adopted and discuss their validity as measures of the dependent variable. As

I noted in Chapter I, the effort in controlling pollution is reflected in policy making process, policy content, and policy implementation. Therefore, it will be measured with indicators drawn from these three aspects of policy process.

77 78

In total, six indicators will be used to measure the pollution control effort of provincial governments: response speed, the number of local regulations, policy innovation, funds for treating pollution, the size of staff members, and the amount of equipment. With respect to the policy-making process, response speed will be used as the only indicator.

Regarding policy output, the number of regulations and policy innovation will be used as indicators. Furthermore, three sub-indicators will measure policy innovation: the number of creative items, the number of complementary items, and the number of more restrictive items.

Finally, regarding policy implementation, funding, staffing and the amount of equipment are the indicators of the pollution control effort I will specify the reasons for the selection of these indicators and their meanings in the following sections.

Before the discussion of these indicators, however, one important methodological note needs to be addressed. When indicators are used to measure a concept, the most crucial requirement is validity on which inferences and conclusions are based.3 Criterion- related validity is not applicable in this research because there exists no criterion, in the present or in the future, with which we can determine how valid are the indicators of the pollution control effort of provincial governments. Construct validity is also not applicable in this research because there is still some debate about the relationships between independent and dependent variables.

In this research, content validity will be used to confirm my claim of the validity of the indicators. To attain content validity, it requires that "the empirical indicators must 79 fully represent the domain of meaning of the underlying concept."4 In this sense, the indicators used for measuring the pollution control effort of provincial governments are valid because they cover the full domain of this concept. In other words, the effort can be reflected in policy making process, policy output, and policy implementation, and the indicators are drawn from these three aspects of policy process.

A final note about the relationships between indicators: when multiple indicators are used to measure a concept, some might argue that the correlation between those indicators should be high enough to confirm that they do measure the same thing. But this is not the case regarding the indicators we discussed here for the reasons below. If both

A and B are required for successful implementation of policy M, government X may allocate more resources to A while government Y may allocate more resources to B.

However, there is no reason to argue that government X is more serious than government

Y with respect to policy M. And the correlation between indicators A and B may not be correlated. In this way, it is the theory itself that supports the validity of indicators, not statistical methods.

Pollution control effort reflected in policy output

I will begin with two indicators of policy output.

(1) The number of regulations. From the standpoint of economics, pollution is the form in which enterprises impose external costs on society. The degradation of the environment is due in part to market failure.5 Free market mechanisms are unable to solve pollution problems, and governmental intervention is therefore imperative. Governmental 80 intervention does not necessarily imply the adoption of a regulatory approach to environmental issues. Moral persuasion and economic incentive approaches are two other ways of intervention. Of course, the way a government intervenes may vary from state to state. Except for moral persuasion, both the regulatory approach and the economic incentive approach require legalization in some form for the sake of implementation.

Briefly speaking, any pollution control policy, if not legalized, is ineffective.

Under the rule of Mao, the role of law was insignificant at best, especially in contrast to moral persuasion or propaganda. After 1979, the role of law has been recognized by political leaders as a key ingredient crucial to the success of reform. The open door policy also requires legalization regarding a variety of economic activities, without which there would be no foreign investment Under this circumstance, it is reasonable to assume that the number of regulations reflects, to some extent, the pollution control effort of provincial governments.

There are a variety of names for local regulations. Some are called "regulations," some "measures," some "rules," some "decisions," some "circulars," and some "detailed rules." Different names imply different status of these local laws, in which "decisions" and "circulars" are two of the lowest status. Therefore, "decisions" and "circulars" will be given only 0.5 point while other local regulations will be given 1 point.

Data Sources The local regulations are collected from the compendium of local laws and regulations of each province and The Compendium of Local Environmental Protection

Laws and Regulations. (See Chapter I) Of course, there is no way to determine whether they are complete or not because some circulars and decisions may be regarded as 81 confidential. For the purpose of this dissertation, local regulations which are not published publicly are not important because they are not binding for the public, especially for private enterprises. Therefore, only those local laws which have been published publicly will be analyzed in this dissertation. All indicators except those regarding policy implementation are based on this data source.

Data about policy implementation are not available before 1981. To form an index, the most consistent way is to use data from the same period. But fifteen provincial regulations regarding pollution control were promulgated in 1980, which composed 11.36 percent of the total regulations. In addition, five of them were enacted by the provincial government of Heilongjiang. Therefore, I believe that exclusion of these regulations will distort the validity more than inclusion. 82

Table 3.21 The number of laws and regulations regarding pollution control from 1980-1987

Province # Province # Province # Guangxi 1 Qinghai 3 Tianj in 6 Gansu 2 Sichuan 3.5 Hunan 6 Jiangxi 2 Hubei 3.5 Jiangsu 6 NeiMenggu 2 Liaoning 4 Guangdong 6.5 Anhui 2 Xinj iang 4 Shanhai 8 Shaanxi 2 Guizhou 4 Shanxi 8.5* Yunnan 2 Jilin 4.5" Heilongj iang 8.5** Heibei 2.5* Fuj ian 4.5 Beij ing 13.5* Ningxia 3 Henan 5 Zhej iang 3 Shandong 5.5

* One of these regulations was promulgated together by those provincial governments. ** One of these regulations was promulgated together by those provincial governments. Note: 1. The total number of local regulations is 132. 2. For the complete list of those local regulations, see Appendix A.

(2) Policy innovation: To measure the pollution control effort of provincial governments, we have to look at not only the form but also policy content. In this regard, I will consider three indicators: the number of creative items, complementary items, and more restrictive items.

Innovation by provincial governments indicates provincial activeness, and we may infer that the more innovation, the more serious the provincial government is in treating pollution. By creative items, I mean measures in a local regulation but absent in national policy at the time when the local regulation is promulgated.6 A typical example is the 83 initiation of effluent charge system as a measure of controlling pollution by Jilin province in 1978. In general, policy innovation is related with "to do or not to do" decisions.

The second indicator is complementary regulations which refers to stipulations that make general national measures more specific and as a result more enforceable. It is reasonable to argue that provinces that make more complementary regulations are more serious in dealing with pollution than those that make fewer. In contrast to creative items, complementary regulations are related with decisions regarding "how to do." For example, the national environmental protection law stipulated that any violation of environmental protection law and local regulations can be fined, but it did not say a word about the amount of the fine. Therefore, fines for units and individuals are deemed as complementary only when the activity will be fined for certain and when the range for the amount of the fine is clearly specified.

The last one is the stipulation which is more restrictive than national regulations, and it is called "more restrictive items." It is also reasonable to infer that provinces that are more serious in dealing with pollution will make regulations much more restrictive than the center or other provinces. For instance, the "Temporary measures of the assessment of effluent fees" stipulates that certain activities will be assessed at double the regular fee. However, some provinces may require three or more times the regular fee for those activities.

These three indicators are counted not in terms of articles but in terms of items because an article may contain numerous items and because numerous articles may comprise only one item. An item contains only one subject. For example, the restriction 84 of new construction in certain areas may be stipulated in more than one article, but they will be considered as one item. In another case, one article may contain more than one item such as the fine for different kinds of activities. For the content of those items, see

Appendix B.

These three indicators will be given different weights because they represent different degrees of pollution control effort. For each creative item, 2 points will be given for it is more difficult and thus takes more effort to create. The more restrictive items will be given 1.5 points because they take less effort to create than the creative items. 1 point will be given to each complementary items because it takes the least effort to create among the three indicators. Table 3.22 shows the sub-total and total score of each indicator of policy innovation. Henan is the province with the highest score in policy innovation. Seven provinces score higher than 20: Beijing, Shanxi, Shanghai, Henan,

Hunan, Guangdong, and Xinjiang. The scores of eight provinces are between 10 and 20.

And the remaining thirteen provinces have scores lower than 10, with NeiMenggu and

Anhui having no score at all. 85

Table 3.22 The score of each province in policy innovation (in rank order)

Score Score Score Total Province in Cl* in CMI* in RI* score Rank Henan 20 19 10.5 49.5 1 Hunan 8 21 3 32 2 Bei j ing 18 10 1.5 29.5 3 Shanxi 16 12 0 28 4 Guangdong 22 5 0 27 5 Shanghai 14 9 1.5 24.5 6 Xinj iang 8 9 6 23 7 Fuj ian 8 8 1.5 17 .5 8.5 Ningxia 12 4 1.5 17.5 8.5 Tianj in 4 8 4.5 16.5 10.5 Liaoning 10 5 1.5 16.5 10.5 Heilongj iang 6 6 0 12 13 Shandong 2 4 6 12 13 Sichuan 4 8 0 12 13 Jiangsu 2 8 0 10 15 Qingha.i 2 5 0 7 16 Guizhou 0 6 0 6 17 .5 Shaanxi 0 3 3 6 17.5 Hebei 0 5 0 5 19 Jilin 4 0 0 4 21 Zhej iang 2 2 0 4 21 Gansu 4 0 0 4 21 Yunnan 2 0 0 2 23 Jiangxi 0 1 0 1 25 Hubei 0 1 0 1 25 Guangxi 0 1 0 1 25 NeiMenggu 0 0 0 0 27.5 Anhui 0 0 0 0 27 .5

Note: Cl: Creative items. CMI: Complementary items. RI: More restrictive items. 86

Pollution control effort reflected in policy process

With respect to policy process, I will consider only response speed.

I assume that if a provincial government is seriously concerned about pollution control, it will act positively to central laws and regulations at its quickest speed.

Response speed reflects how soon a province reacts to relevant central laws and regulations. In general, provinces react to four kinds of central laws and regulations: (1) the general environmental protection law; (2)the environmental management of township and neighborhood industries; (3)the environmental management of capital constructions;

(4)the effluent charges system. In the 1979 Environmental Protection Law, there is a provision about effluent charges, and many provinces enact local laws and regulations to enforce effluent charges. However, when the State Council promulgated provisional measures of effluent charges in 1982, the local laws and regulations about effluent charges made before 1982 were abolished and new regulations were enacted according to the State Council’s Measure. Therefore, the reactions to those two different legal resources of effluent charge will be measured separately.

The score will be given according to the following rules. If a province does not respond to national regulations, it gets 0 points. If it responds within half a year, it gets

7 points. Six points go to provinces responding between half a year and a year. A province that responds between 1 and 1.5 years gets 5 points. A province gets 4 points if it responds between 1.5 to 2 years. 3 points go to provinces that respond between 2 to

2.5 years. A province gets 2 points if it respond between 2.5 to 3 years. Finally, 1 point goes to provinces that respond after 3 years. For those that initiate a regulation before the 87 promulgation of national regulation, an even higher score will be awarded. (See Scale below, Figure 3.31)

Score 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

no 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 -0.5 -1 -1.5 -2 -2.5 -3 res- I I I I I I I I I I I I ponse 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0-0.5 -1 -1.5 -2 -2.5 (unit: year)

♦Positive numbers mean the number of years after the promulgation of national laws. Negative numbers mean the number of years before the promulgation of national laws.

Figure 331 The scale of response speed 88 Table 331 The score of response speed

Province (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Total

Beijing 4 9 7+1* 21 Heilongj iang 9 6 5 20 Shandong 6 6 1+1 6 20 Henan 2 8 5+1 4 20 Hebei 13 6 19 Zhej iang 5 7 5 17 Shanxi 1 4 1 1+1 7 15 Liaoning 8 1 6 15 Ningxia 8 7 15 Fuj ian 1 7 2 4 14 Hunan 4 3 1 6 14 Sichuan 5 8 13 Tianj in 3 2+2 5 12 Guizhou 1 4 6 11 Shaanxi 6 5 11 Shanghai 4 3 3 10 Jiangsu 3 6 9 Xinj iang 2+2 5 9 Jiangxi 7+1 8 Guangdong 7+1 8 Hubei 2 4 6 Yunnan 1 5 6 Guangxi 5 5 Qinghai 4 4 NeiMonggol 2 2 Jilin 1 1 Anhui 0 Gansu 0

*: Tow relevant regulations responded at different times. Note: 1: general environmental protection law; 2:the environmental management of township industries; 3:the environmental management of capital construction; 4:the effluent charges (pursuant to the 1982 State Council Measure); 5:the effluent charges (pursuant to the 1979 Environmental Protection Law) 89

Pollutioncontrol effort reflected inpolicy iroleroeBitation

What indicators in the implementation process can we use to express the pollution control effort of provincial governments? They should meet the requirement of validity to the greatest extent For the sake of validity, those indicators must he directly related to the leader’s intention rather than to low-level staff member’s actions. As examined above, most pollution control policy interventions are regulatory, which seek to control the activities of enterprises, both public and private. The only economic incentive method is die effluent fee system. The success of regulations and the collection of effluent fees depends in great part on the ability of the government to enforce them. The enforcement of these measures requires adequate funding, equipment, and a large number of trained staff members.7 Then chairman of the Environmental Protection Commission, Li Peng also pointed out: "Increasing a little personnel and a little monitoring equipment is the least costly and most efficient way."8

Hence, the number of staff members, the amount of financing, and the amount of monitoring equipment should be more valid than the amount of effluent charges collected and the increase or decrease of pollution because the latter two indicators are also greatly affected by the collector’s actions.

Because of the vast variety among provinces in area, population, the level of economic development, etc., the indicators shown below have been adjusted with appropriate methods. Table 3.41 shows the share of funds for treating pollution in the national income by province. In Chinese economic statistics, national income is the net 90 value created in die production process. It is the sum of net value in agriculture, industry, construction, transportation, and commerce.9

Data Sources Data about funds for treating pollution in each province from 1981-85 are collected from The Compendium of Environmental Statistical Data. 1981-1985: data in

1986 and 1987 are collected from China Statistical Yearbook. Generally speaking, the data in those two sources are consistent The problem with these data is that we don’t know whether they are at current or constant prices. However, it is highly likely that they are at current prices because most accounts, unless otherwise indicated, are shown at current prices.

There is a problem regarding the data about national income. There are two sources for this data. One is The Almanac of China’s Economy, which has been published annually since 1981. It contains data about national income in each province each year.

Another source is The China Statistical Yearbook which contains data about national income of each province after its 1985 edition. When I compare the data from each source, I found that there are some differences existing between those two sources regrading national income in each province. The data from The Almanac of China’s

Economy are lower than the data from The China Statistical Yearbook. One possible reason is that data in the former source are compiled earlier than that in the latter source and are based on estimation. But because national income data about some provinces in

1984 and 1985 are not available in The Almanac of China’s Economy, I decided to use the data from the statistical yearbook for those two years for consistency. In addition, 91 since data of most provinces are underestimated in the Almanac, it makes little difference in the results. Finally, the national income is at current prices.

TaMe 3.41 The funding for treating pollution as a percentage of national income (by province) from 1981-1987

Province Fund Province Fund Province Fund

Beijing 0.73% Shaanxi 0.36% Fuj ian 0.25% Liaoning 0.65% Xinj iang 0.36% Hebei 0.24% Tianj in 0.62% Hunan 0.36% Yunnan 0.23% Heilongj iang 0.58% Jilin 0.33% Anhui 0.22% Shanxi 0.49% Henan 0.31% Zhejiang 0.20% Shanghai 0.43% Jiangsu 0.29% Guangdong 0.20% Gansu 0.38% Jiangxi 0.29% Shandong 0.17% Guizhou 0.37% Guangxi 0.28% Ningxia 0.10% NeiMenggu 0.37% Hubei 0.27% Hunan 0.36% Qinghai 0.26%

Source: The China Economic Almanac The China Statistical Yearbook The Compendium of Environmental Statistical Data. 1981-1985

In this table, only Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, and Heilongjiang exceed 0.5%, while

Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Shandong, Guangdong, Yunnan, and Ningxia are below

0.25%. The remaining sixteen provinces fall between 0.25% and 0.50% percent 92

Regarding staffing and equipment, I use the number of enterprises instead of gross value of industrial output to adjust the figure for two reasons. First, gross industrial output can be affected significantly by a few big industries. For example, Xinjiang had 4106 industrial enterprises in 1981, but 5 large enterprises produced 29% of the gross value of industry.10 Second, the greater the number of enterprises, the greater the need for staff members and equipment, especially when most policy instruments are regulatory in nature.

DsM Sources Data about the number of enterprises are collected from the China

Statistical Yearbook in each year. The number of enterprises do not include country and neighborhood industries because the data before 1987 are not available. Data about the number of environmental staff members and sets of equipment in 1981-1985 are collected from The Compendium of China Environmental Statistical Data. 1981-1985 and data in

1986 and 1987 are from China Statistical Yearbook.

Table 3.42 shows the average ratio of die number of staff members to the number of enterprises from 1981-1987. In Beijing, the ratio of the number of environmental staff to the number of enterprises is about 1:4, the highest in all provinces. Nine provinces have a ratio equal to or higher than 0.10, including Beijing. 93

Tabie 3A2 The average ratio of the number of staff to the number of enterprises from 1981-1987

Province Ratio Province Ratio Province Ratio

Beijing 0.26 Shaanxi 0.10 Yunnan 0.07 Tianjin 0.17 Hebei 0.09 Hubei 0.06 NeiMenggu 0.15 Heilongj iang 0.09 Jiangsu 0.05 Liaoning 0.15 Shandong 0.09 Anhui 0.05 Ningxia 0.14 Hunan 0.09 Fuj ian 0.05 Gansu 0.13 Qinghai 0.09 Jiangxi 0.05 Xinj iang 0.11 Jilin 0.08 Sichuan 0.04 Shanxi 0.10 Henan 0.08 Zhej iang 0.02 Shanghai 0.10 Guangdong 0.08 Guizhou 0.10 Guangxi 0.07

Source: The Compendium of China Environmental Statistical Data. 1981-1985 The China Statistical Yearbook

Table 3.43 is the average ratio of the number of sets of equipment to the number of enterprises from 1981-1987. In this respect, only six provinces have a ratio higher than

0.10. However, the correlation between the ratio of environmental staff members and sets of equipment to the number of enterprises is very high, 0.94, which means that the provinces which invest in equipment also invest in personnel. 94 Table 3.43 The ratio of the number of sets of equipment to the number of enterprises

Province Ratio Province Ratio Province Ratio

Beijing 0.25 Shaanxi 0.08 Jiangsu 0.05 Tianj in 0.18 Shanxi 0.07 Fuj ian 0.05 Ningxia 0.13 Hunan 0.07 Henan 0.05 Xinj iang 0.13 Hebei 0.06 Qinghai 0.05 Gansu 0.12 Jilin 0.06 Anhui 0.04 Liaoning 0.10 Hubei 0.06 Jiangxi 0.03 NeiMenggu 0.09 Guangdong 0.06 Sichuan 0.03 Shanghai 0.09 Guangxi 0.06 Zhejiang 0.02 Guizhou 0.09 Yunnan 0.06 Shandong 0.08 Heilongj iang 0.05

Source: See Table 3.42

The final step is to add these indicators up. To do so, I will first translate them into standard score, that is, z score, so that they are comparable, and then add those standard scores to represent the variation of effort reflected in implementation.11 Table

3.44 shows the result of this translation and adding process. In this table, the scores of twelve provinces are positive, while the rest are negative. 95 Table 3.44 The pollution control effort of provinces reflected in implementation (Standard score)

Provinces Score Provinces Score Provinces Score

Beij ing 9.55 Ningxia 0.30 Hubei -1.66 Tianj in 5.46 Shaanxi 0.26 Guangdong -1.85 Liaoning 3.57 Hunan -0.19 Jiangsu -1.91 Gansu 1.86 Jilin -0.96 Sichuan -2.16 NeiMenggu 1.51 Shandong -1.22 Fuj ian -2.29 Xinj iang 1.41 Henan -1.23 Jiangxi -2.31 Heilongj iang 0.87 Hebei -1.27 Anhui -2.59 Shanghai 0.80 Guangxi -1.32 Zhejiang -3.60 Shanxi 0.72 Qinghai -1.33 Guizhou 0.50 Yunnan -1.62

The form ation of am index

As I noted above regarding die pollution control effort reflected in these three aspects of policy process, there is no theoretical reason that we can focus just on one aspect, and nor is there any theoretical reason that we can give more weight to any aspect Therefore, the final index of the pollution control effort will be the sum of the indices in these three aspects. To add them up, we first need to transform these indicators into standard score so that they are comparable. Table 3.51 shows the result of calculating the final index. From this index, we see that Beijing is the province that is most serious about pollution control, while Anhui is the province that shows the least effort In addition, the index shows a significant difference in pollution control effort among provinces. In the next two chapters, I will try to explain the differences with socioeconomic and political factors. 96 Table 3.51 Index of seriousness in pollution control by province

Policy Response Province Output Speed Implementat ion Index

Beijing 4.67 1.67 9.55 15.89 Tianj in 0.83 0.17 5.46 6.46 Liaoning 0.09 0.67 3.57 4.33 Shanxi 2.70 0.67 0.72 4.08 Heilongj iang 1.39 1.50 0.87 3.76 Henan 3.16 1.50 -1.23 3.43 Shanghai 2.23 -0.17 0.80 2.85 Hunan 2.10 0.50 -0.19 2.41 Xinj iang 0.62 -0.33 1.41 1.70 Ningxia -0.20 0.67 0.30 0.76 Shandong 0.28 1.50 -1.22 0.56 Guizhou -0.77 0.00 0.50 -0.27 Guangdong 1.87 -0.50 -1.85 -0.48 Shaanxi -1.51 0.00 0.26 -1.25 Hebei -1.41 1.33 -1.27 -1.34 Fuj ian 0.36 0.50 -2.29 -1.43 Gansu -1.68 -1.83 1.86 -1.65 Jiangsu 0.30 -0.33 -1.91 -1.95 NeiMenggu -2.00 -1.50 1.51 -1.99 Sichuan -0.47 0.33 -2.16 -2.29 Jilin -0.75 -1.67 -0.96 -3.38 Qinghai -1.06 -1.17 -1.33 -3.56 Hubei -1.37 -0.83 -1.66 -3.86 Zhej iang -1.31 1.00 -3.60 -3.90 Yunnan -1.84 -0.83 -1.62 -4.30 Guangxi -2.29 -0.10 -1.32 -4.61 Jiangxi -1.92 -0.50 -2.31 -4.74 Anhui -2.00 -1.83 -2.59 -6.43 97

Endnotes

1. John L. Sullivan & Stanley Feldman, Multiple Indicators: An Introduction (Beverely Hills: Sage Publications Ltd., 1979), p. 10. i 2. Ibid.. p. 19.

3. Therese L. Baker, Doing Social Research (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1988), p. 119. Another requirement is reliability. It will not be discussed because this research is not based on survey. In addition, a valid indicator must also be a reliable indicator. Therefore, I will focus on validity without regard to reliability. For discussion of validity, also see Edward G. Carmines & R. A. Zeller, Reliability and Validity Assessment (Beverly Hills: Sage publications, 1979).

4. Therese L. Baker, Doing Social Research, p. 119.

5. The Work! Bank, World Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 64-65.

6. Sometimes, national policy will adopt creative ideas expressed in local regulations.

7. David Goodman, "Introduction" to David Goodman & Michael Redclift, eds. Environment and Development in Latin America: The Politics of Sustainability (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), p. 14. Susan Hadden, Environmental Protection and Economic Development in India (Austin: The University of Texas, 1984), pp. 53-54.

8. State Environmental Protection Bureau, China’s Environmental Protection Enterprise (Beijing: Zhong Guo Huan Jing Ke Xue Chu Ban Se, 1988), p. 166.

9. State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo Tongji Nianiian 1985 (China Statistical Yearbook 1985) (Beijing: Zhong Guo Tung Chi Chu Bang She, 1985), p. 659.

10. State Statistical Bureau, Statistical Yearbook of China 1981 (Hong Kong: Economic Information and Agency, 1981), p. 216.

11. The formula for computing z score is:

ZHX-X)/D X: mean D: standard deviation CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND PROVINCIAL POLLUTION CONTROL POLICY

Environmental issues have been generally researched under two disciplines: economics and political science. All too often, economists focus on questions about the most efficient approach to environmental protection with little consideration of politics.

Nevertheless, what is appropriate in economic analysis may not be feasible in real politics for so many interests are involved in environmental policy-making. What political scientists are interested in is how those interests interact with each other and how the interactions affect results. In Western democracies, the environmental issue is definitely a political issue since it is related to the allocation and reallocation of values.

Environmental groups, businesses, Congress, the administration, and even individual citizens all take part in the policy process.

In socialist China, environmental issues are also deemed a political issue, although the players are different from those in western democracies. However, the political nature of environmental issues does not promise the predominance of political factors in shaping environmental policy. Actually, this is an empirical question to be answered only by empirical evidence. The purpose of this chapter is to test the hypotheses of political

98 determinism in studies of Chinese policies from the perspective of pollution control policy.

Politics and pollution control policy

In this section, I will scrutinize the political variables which have been briefly discussed in the introduction.

From an organizational perspective, Chinese policy process has been described as a bargaining process in which different organizations vie for resources and power.

According to the description of "fragmented authoritarianism" model, it is evident that this model should apply to provincial pollution control policy. First, the provincial level, at which authority is seriously fragmented, is at issue here. Second, pollution control requires financial resources which are scarce in the provinces. Gain for environmental protection bureaus in resource allocation are losses for other organizations.

Given that authority is fragmented at the provincial level and, as described in

Chapter II, that a variety of organizations have a hand in environmental protection work, coordination becomes very critical for the formulation and implementation of pollution control policy. In China, "commission" is a cross-department institute which provides a formal mechanism for coordination, i.e., bargaining, among relevant departments with respect to a particular task. In addition, the establishment of an environmental protection commission is important for a new organization like an environmental protection bureau because it connotes the significance of environmental protection work. In China seventeen provinces had established environmental protection commissions before 1986.1 Will they

99 100 work harder in pollution control than other provinces without environmental protection commission as the fragmented authoritarianism model expects?

Because of the fragmentation of authority, results of bargaining are determined in part by the authority relationships among organizations, which are determined by three factors: "where in the social and bureaucratic hierarchies the respective parties are located, who the various parties to the authority relationship are, and what resources they possess."2 For the sake of validity, those three factors should be taken into account in measruing the relative strength of EPB. However, data about the last two factors are not available, so I will use the first one to test the fragmented authoritarianism.3 One indicator of the bureaucratic hierarchies of an environmental protection bureau is its formal rank in the provincial organizational scheme. In eleven provinces before 1986, the environmental protection bureau was at the first rank while in others it was at the second rank.4 In the next section, I will test whether those provinces with EPB’s at the first rank work harder in pollution control effort.

In addition to the bureaucratic organizations, the provincial legislature, the

Provincial People’s Congress (PPC), may also have an impact on provincial pollution control effort. Throughout Mao’s era of China, the People’s Congress played only the role of a rubber stamp. Any deputy who intended to play the role of representative would be sanctioned. However, after the 1978 reform, "evolving expectations, rapid societal change, and institutional reforms have transformed the duties of ’people’s representatives’ and have created deputy identities that are increasingly multi-layered and fraught with contradictions."5 According to one study, deputies are not only the regime agents but also 101 remonstrators. They are expected to "help people with the greatest problems they face in daily life, to participate in inspections that root out waste and mismanagement, and to confront officials with problems they identify."6 Pollution is one of the problems that people suffer in daily life.7 With this change in role perception of deputies, will

Provincial People’s Congress have positive impact on pollution control effort? According to O’Brien, the remonstrators "seek to rearrange priorities and to add items to the agenda of district, municipal and provincial governments..."8 Despite the difficulty, if not impossibility, of determining how many deputies play the role of remonstrator in each

PPC, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the more active the PPC, the more impact it would have on pollution control effort.

The second category of political variables is political leadership. By political leaders, I mean provincial governors and secretaries. The second-level elites may also have impacts on pollution control effort because of their participation in policy-making process. A rigorous analysis should include second-level elites, but they are excluded from analysis for the deficiency of data.

Tendency models, factional models, generational models, role analysis, etc., are all related to some characteristics of political leadership. Tendency models are derived from ideologies or beliefs of political leaders.9 Factional models focus on the patronage network of political leaders. Generational models are based on the background of political leaders.10 Role analysis emphasize the career pattern of political leaders.11 The emphasis on political leadership is primarily due to the Chinese political structure. As explained by Hong Yung Lee, 102

These two contradictory aspects of Chinese politics —the powerful party- state and the utter lack of institutionalization—lead one to view the Chinese state as a political elite rather than as institutionalized sets of offices whose incumbents are empowered to exercise the state’s authority.12

In the domain of pollution control, the attention of provincial leaders is frequently claimed by various provincial leaders to be one of the determinants of successful pollution control. "The mayor must be personally in charge of environmental protection so that coordination will be easier and results remarkable," says the vice-major of Beijing.13

Four aspects of political leadership will be explored in this dissertation: generations, career patterns, localism, and elite stability. Political generations is a concept which has yet to be precisely defined. But it is used in our everyday life, no matter what the system is.14 Political generations has been defined by Marvin Rintlar as "a group of individuals who have undergone the same basic historical experience during their formative years."15 Applying this principle, Yahuda classified five kinds of political generations in accordance with education and "whether or not the ...formative years (17 to 25) were experienced before the Liberation of 1949, during the ’Soviet period’ of the

1950s, or during the Cultural Revolution of 1965-76."16 Those five generations are: "old cadres" who joined the Party or the army before 1949; "old intellectuals" who received higher education before 1949; those who completed their senior secondary school or tertiary education during the 1950’s; those who became for the first time during the

1950s; and the lost generation whose secondary and tertiary education took place during the Cultural Revolution.17 Yahuda’s classification is not appropriate for this research 103 because intellectuals are not studied and because no provincial elites are from the lost generation.

A different classification scheme by Ting Wang, which is based on the judgement of the date when one becomes a party cadre, groups leaders into three generations. The first-generation leaders are those who joined the party before the "Long March" of 1934.

Those who joined the revolution between "Long March" and 1949 are second-generation leaders. The third-generation are those who became cadres after 1949.18 As a matter of fact, the difference between the first two generations are much smaller than that between them and the third generation. Moreover, few provincial leaders of the 80’s became the cadre before 1934, so the distinction between the first and the second generation is not necessary in this dissertation.

As a matter of fact, the classification of political generations depend in part on the subjects studied. Since political leaders in this dissertation refer to provincial cadres only and since no provincial governors and first secretaries in the 1980’s were recruited from the generations whose formative years were experienced during the Cultural Revolution,

I will group those provincial leaders under two generations. The first generation consists of the leaders who joined the CCP before 1949, while the second generation refers to the leaders who joined the CCP thereafter.

Will the differences in experience afftect leaders’ attitudes toward pollution control? Unfortunately, there is no theory which can guide the formation of a hypothesis.

One may argue that the first generation is less educated than the second because they spent their formative periods in the liberation war against the Nationalist Party (KMT), 104 and because party members at that time were recruited from "the least well educated and most disadvantaged social groups in the rural area."19

With respect to provincial leaders from 1980 to 1987,1 also found that the first generation leaders are less educated than the second generation leaders in terms of percentage as shown in Table 4.11. The value of chi square is 15.57 at a significant level.

In other words, there is a difference between political generations regarding the level of education of political leaders. Since the first generation leaders are less educated, it may be more difficult for them to appreciate the importance of pollution control. Another relevant characteristic of the first generation leaders is that they stressed "moralized politics" and "mass movements," and emphasized mass mobilization, which is less costly than strengthening personnel and equipment.20 But is there really a correlation? This question will be addressed in the next section.

Table 4.11 Political generations and education of provincial leaders from 1980-1987

Political Generation First Second Education College 40 28 (32.79%) (66.67%) Below 82 14 College (67.21%) (33.33%) Total 122 42 (100%) (100%) Note: 1. Chi square = 14.78 (pc.001) 2. Gamma = -.61 tau-b = -.30 3. 6 missing cases. 105

As for career patterns, two types are developed in this dissertation: political bureaucrats and technocratic bureaucrats. Political bureaucrats are those whose major career is in political work. Technocratic bureaucrats refer to those who have at least ten years experiences in technocratic or functional works such as engineers in factories.21

Both types of political leaders are termed "bureaucrats" in that in a party-state like China, bureaucracy is the only channel to leadership.22 Regarding the whole bureaucracy, Hong

Yung Lee points out the trend that bureaucratic technocrats are replacing revolutionary cadres after the beginning of the 1978 reform.23 At the level of provincial leadership, we also find that there are more technocratic bureaucrats than political bureaucrats in the second generation leaders.24 Table 4.12 is the contingency table of the relationship between political generations and career patterns. The value of chi square is 18.67 at a very significant level. There does exist a difference in career patterns between the two political generations.

Table 4.12 Political generations and career pattern

Political Generation First Second Career Pattern Political 95 17 bureaucrats (76.61%) (40.48%) Technocratic 29 25 bureaucrats (23.39%) (59.52%) Total 124 42 (100 %) (100 %) Note: 1. Chi Square = 18.67 (pc.001) 2. Gamma = .66 tau-b = .34 3. 4 missing cases. 106

Political bureaucrats are different from technocratic bureaucrats in terms of role perceptions. For political bureaucrats, it is more important to follow national policies than to promote local interests. Since the national policy emphasizes that economic development should go hand in hand with environmental protection, it will be more faithfully implemented under political bureaucrats. However, the recruitment of technocratic bureaucrats after the 1978 reform is for the implementation of modernization, which in turn affects their perceptions of their roles as promoters of the economy instead of guardians of the environment. Therefore, the hypothesis is that technocratic bureaucrats will place more emphasis on economic development and less on pollution control than political bureaucrats.

One trend regarding elite transformation detected by some recent studies is the rise of native provincial leaders after 1979. Before 1979, non-natives were promoted to high positions in provincial governments as a way to curb localist tendencies within the provincial elite. However, things have changed since the inception of the "second revolution."25 We witness more natives in important provincial posts. In Xiaowei Zang’s analysis of the provincial elites based on the data drawn from Who’s Who in China:

Current Leaders. 43.8% of provincial elites are natives of the province they govern, and

73% of them have devoted their entire careers to the provinces where they serve.26

Cheng Li and David Bachman also find the same trend at the municipal level.27 One possible consequence of this trend is the rise of localism. Localism refers to the conflict of interests between central and provincial governments regarding resources and power allocation. Li and Bachman point out three types of localism: political localism, military 107 localism, and economic localism.28 Economic localism, which means that provincial leaders are capable of rejecting economic decisions from the center, is the one that dominates in China today. Will this economic localism accelerate economic competition among provinces and then sacrifice the environment for that purpose?

Another force which might work in the opposite way against localism is that native leaders might have more concern with the sustainable development of his or her homeland than non-native leaders who might focus only on economic development. In other words, native leaders will work harder in pollution control than non-native leaders.

The last political variable to be explored is elite stability. Elite stability refers to the frequency of elite turnover from 1980 to 1987. As argued by Hong Yung Lee, "the less institutionalized a political system, the more likely political elites will bring the ideology, experiences, and outlook of the social classes from which they came into the political process."29 Therefore, the turnover of provincial leaders is likely to cause the change of policies. Policy continuity is more likely to be disrupted if elite stability is low.

Moreover, if elite stability is low, elites will devote their energy to maintaining their positions instead of promoting policies. Therefore, I hypothesize that pollution control effort will be higher in provinces with high elite stability than in low elite-stability provinces.

Results and Discussion

To make the expression concise, the correlation coefficient used in this dissertation is Pearson’s r unless otherwise specified. 108

Starting with the effect of central policy on provincial variation, Table 4.21 shows the provinces in which one or more cities were selected as key point cities of environmental protection. To measure the correlation coefficient, provinces with key point cities will be given value one while others will be given value zero. The correlation coefficient between PCE and the existence of key point cities is .36 (pc.10). The strength is moderate but not significant at the .05 level.

Table 4.21 Provinces with cities selected as key point cities of environmental protection

Province Province Province

Beijing X Zhej ian X Sichuan X Tianj in X Anhui Guizhou X Hebei Fuj ian Yunnan Shanxi X Jiangxi Shaanxi X NeiMenggu Shandong X Gansu X Liaoning X Henan Qinghai Jilin X Hubei X Ningxia Heilongj iang X Hunan X Xinjiang Shanghai X Guangdong X Jiangsu X Guangxi

X: Provinces with key point cities designated by central government. Source: 1. "Some regulations on protecting and improving the environment" promulgated in 1973 by State Planning Commission. 2. "State Council decision on strengthening environmental protection work in the period of national economic readjustment" promulgated in 1981 by State Council. 109

A nonparametric test, Wilcoxon or Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, is also adopted to see if those two kinds of provinces differ from each other in medians of PCE. This test is used because it does not assume either equal variances or normality, which are problematic in our data. The null hypothesis is that both kinds of provinces have the same medians. The Z statistic of this test is -2.05, with which we can reject the null hypothesis at the .05 significance level. In other words, we found significantly different medians with this test However, the relationship between PCE and the existence of key-point cities is moderate at best. It might disappear if socioeconomic variables are taken into account.

Briefly, it is still necessary to search for political variables at the provincial level.

"Fragmented authoritarianism" is the first provincial political variable to be explored. Table 4.22 shows the provinces that set up environmental protection bureaus

(EPBs) as the first rank organization and provinces that established environmental protection commission (EPC). From this table, we can see that there is no relationship between them.30 The provinces that set up EPB as the first rank organizations may not establish an environmental protection commission.

The correlation coefficient between PCE and the establishment of environmental protection commissions is .16 (p>.40), too small to be accepted. In other words, the hypothesis that provinces with environmental protection commissions will work harder in pollution control is rejected.31 However, the correlation between PCE and the rank of

EPBs is stronger than the above. It is .35 (pc.10), a moderate relationship. One interpretation of this result is that the role of environmental protection commission is nominal and less important than the rank of an EPB in bargaining with other 110 organizations. In other words, it is the rank of an EPB that matters when it bargains with other organizations. However, the correlation coefficient is significant at the .10 level.

Therefore we are not confident in the relationship between PCE and the rank of EPB. The

Wilcoxon rank-sum test was also performed. The Z statistic is 1.53, with which we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal medians. Thus, we are less confident on the relationship found here than that between central policy and PCE.

Table 4.22 Provinces that set up environmental protection commission and EPB as the first rank organization before 1986

Province A B Province A B Province A B

Beij ing X X Zhej iang XX Sichuan X Tianj in X Anhui X Guizhou X Hebei Fujian X Yunnan Shanxi X Jiangxi X Shaanxi NeiMenggu Shandong X X Gansu X X Liaoning X X Henan X Qinghai Jilin Hubei X Ningxia X Heilongj iang X Hunan X Xinj iang X Shanghai X Guangdong X X Jiangsu X Guangxi X

Source: State Environmental Protection Bureau, Zhong Guo Huan Jine Bao Hu Si Ye, 1981-1985 (China’s Environmental Protection Enterprises, 1981-1985) (Beijing: Huan Jing Ke Xue Chu Ban She, 1988), pp. 265-66. Note: A: The existence of environmental protection commission B: EPB as the first rank organization Ill

As noted above that the rank of EPB and the existence of EPC are factors affecting PCE in accordance with the arguments of fragmented authoritarianism, I also combined them to determine their impact on PCE. For provinces in which EPB is at the first rank and a EPC exists, they will be given three points. For provinces with either EPB at the first rank or the existence of EPC, they will be given two points. One point goes to provinces with EPB at the second rank and the absence of EPC. The correlation between this variable and PCE is 0.32 (p<. 10), a moderate relationship, though weaker than that between the rank of EPB and PCE.

Because of a lack of data about the activity of the PPC’s members in all provinces, I will use the number of local laws enacted by the PPC as the indicator of its activeness. As mentioned in Chapter I, one aspect of legal reform in 1979 was to allow the PPC to make local laws to accommodate local conditions. However, we know very little about the division of tasks between the PPC and provincial governments in terms of law-making. So far no patterns have been detected. For example, in Zhejiang, Jiangxi,

Shandong, Henan and Ningxia provinces, regulations about effluent charge systems were enacted by the PPC, while they were promulgated by provincial governments in other provinces. Table 4.23 shows the number of local laws, except those regarding pollution control, enacted by the PPC from November 1979 to December 1987.32 During this period, only one province has enacted over 51 local laws; eleven provinces have enacted local laws between 40 and 51; twelve provinces have enacted local laws between 30 and

40; four provinces have enacted local laws fewer than 30. 112

The correlation coefficient between PCE and the activeness of the PPC is only .16

(p>.40), which indicates a very weak relationship. This result could be due to the invalidity of the indicator. Another possible explanation is that even though the role of the PPC has undergone changes since 1979, it is still the executive department that determines how much effort is appropriate for pollution control. Moreover, the role of remonstrator is sporadic and uninstitutionalized, and its impact on pollution control effort is therefore sporadic and weak. The preliminary conclusion is that the PPC has little impact on pollution control effort according to our data.

Table 4.23 The number of laws enacted by PPC from November 1979 to December 1987

Province # of Province # of Province # of laws laws laws Beij ing 36 Zhej iang 40 Sichuan 42 Tianj in 41 Anhui 44 Guizhou 41 Hebei 41 Fujian 33 Yunnan 40 Shanxi 35 Jiangxi 35 Shaanxi 30 NeiMenggu 18 Shandong 36 Gansu 17 Liaoning 59 Henan 46 Qinghai 39 Jilin 39 Hubei 32 Ningxia 31 Heilongj iang 40 Hunan 31 Xinj iang 21 Shanghai 43 Guangdong 42 Jiangsu 38 Guangxi 19 Mean = 36.25 Standard Deviation = 9.32

Source: Chuan Guo Ren Da Can Wei Hui Ban Gong Ting (General Office of NPC’s Standing Committee), Ge Shen. ii Zhi Chu. Zhi Xia Shi Ren Min Dai Biao Da Hui ii Chi Can Wu Wei Yuan Hui Zhi Ding De Pi Fang Xing Fa Gui Mu Lu (Index of local laws enacted by People’s Congress and its Standing Committee in Provinces, Autonomous Regions, and Directly Ruled Cities). 113

Finally, I will examine the impacts of political leadership. Data about the characteristics of provincial leaders are drawn mainly from Who’s Who in China: Current

Leaders and Gendai Jugoku Jinmei Jiten 1986 (Japanese).33 First of all, I will test the hypothesis regarding political generations. Table 4.24 shows the percentage of service time of the second-generation leaders from 1980 to 1987.34

Table 4.24 The percentage of service time of the second-generation political leaders

Province % Province % Province % Beij ing 0 Zhej iang 0 Sichuan 60.94 Tianj in 54.95 Anhui 33 .07 Guizhou 45.99 Hebei 0 Fuj ian 40.63 Yunnan 14.84 Shanxi 29 .43 Jiangxi 23 .18 Shaanxi 2.08 NeiMenggu 0 Shandong 11.02 Gansu 29.43 Liaoning 45.31 Henan 2.86 Qinghai. 23.21 Jilin 13 .49 Hubei 8.18 Ningxia 4.17 Heilongj iang 0 Hunan 78.91 Xinjiang 63.54 Shanghai 0 Guangdong 0 Jiangsu 29.43 Guangxi 15.10 Mean = 22.49 Standard Deviation = 22 .99 Note: 1. 2 9.58% of Hebei unknown. 2. 8.85% of NeiMengu unknown. 3. 28.65% of Liaoning unknown. 114

Will the second-generation leaders pay more attention to pollution control? The correlation coefficient between PCE and political generation is .03. Since there are some unknown data in three provinces, I also tried to count them as the second-generation leaders with different combinations. However, the results show no significant change.

Therefore, we can conclude that political generations make no difference in pollution control effort. One possible reason for this result is the atmosphere of larger society in the reform era, which emphasizes the market mechanism and de-emphasizes mass line and ideology, overwhelms the effect of political generations.

The next variable to be explored is career pattern. Table 4.25 shows the percentage of service time of technocratic bureaucrats. According to the hypothesis, technocratic bureaucrats are more interested in economic development and less in pollution control.

The correlation coefficient between economic development and career pattern is .58

(pc.001), a moderately strong relationship which supports the first part of the hypothesis.35 However, the correlation coefficient between PCE and career pattern is only

0.20 (p>.30). Although the direction is not negative, the relationship is too weak to conclude that it has an impact on pollution control. In addition, when I control career pattern, the correlation coefficient between PCE and economic development drops only

.02. In other words, the relationship between PCE and economic development has nothing to do with the career pattern of political leaders. 115

Table 4.25 The percentage of service time of technocratic bureaucrats

Province % Province % Province % Beij ing 43.49 Zhej iang 28.13 Sichuan 15.63 Tianj in 17 .71 Anhui 53.13 Guizhou 0.00 Hebei 4.19 Fujian 40.63 Yunnan 14.84 Shanxi 29 .43 Jiangxi 15.63 Shaanxi 3 .65 NeiMenggu 0.00 Shandong 11.02 Gansu 36.72 Liaoning 15.63 Henan 71.09 Qinghai 23 .21 Jilin 16.40 Hubei 38.78 Ningxia 24.13 Heilongj iang 16.15 Hunan 21.94 Xinj iang 13 .54 Shanghai 96.77 Guangdong 29.69 Jiangsu 29.43 Guangxi 15.10 Mean = 25.94 Standard :Deviation = 21.23 Note: 28.65% of Liaoning unknown.

Will the education level of political leaders have any impact on pollution control?

Table 4.26 shows the percentage of service time of provincial leaders who had attended college. The correlation coefficient between PCE and education of political leaders is 0.32 at the significant level of .10. However, if leaders with unknown levels of education are counted as leaders with college levels of eduction, then the correlation coefficient rises significantly to 0.45 (p<.05). In other words, the education level of political leaders may have more impact than expected. Compared with political generations and career patterns, the education level of leaders, however, has more weight on pollution control effort. 116

Table 4.26 The percentage of service time of provincial leaders who had attended college

Province % Province % Province % Beij ing 73 .44 Zhej iang 31.25 Sichuan 32 .29 Tianj in 29.69 Anhui 31.25 Guizhou 15 .78 Hebei 18.32 Fuj ian 53 .91 Yunnan 14 .84 Shanxi 50.00 Jiangxi 65.63 Shaanxi 2 .08 NeiMenggu 50.00 Shandong 63 .50 Gansu 36. 72 Liaoning 15.63 Henan 48.96 Qinghai 37 .70 Jilin 30.42 Hubei 32 .29 Ningxia 24 .74 Heilongj iang 15.63 Hunan 28.91 Xinj iang 24 .74 Shanghai 65.86 Guangdong 29.95 Jiangsu 29.43 Guangxi 15.10 Mean = 33.47 Standard Deviation = 17.06 Note: 1. 28.65% of Liaoning unknown. 2. 8.85% of NeiMengu unknown. 3. 33.07% of Tianjin unknown.

What is the impact of the rise of native provincial leaders on pollution control policy? Table 4.27 shows the percentage of service time of provincial leaders who govern their native provinces. Five provinces have native leaders who served over 50% of the period from 1980 to 1987: NeiMenggu, Hunan, Guangxi, Xinjiang, and Jiangsu. All political leaders of Jiangsu are natives. However, ten provinces have no natives who held political leadership positions. The correlation coefficient between PCE and the percentage of service time of native leaders is -.14 (p>.45), which means that the relationship between them is very weak. In addition, the correlation coefficient between economic development and the percentage of service time of native leaders is -.22 (p>.25). These data are problematic because in fourteen provinces I found leaders with unknown origins. 117

Therefore, we cannot make any conclusion regarding the impact of the rise of native leaders on PCE.

Table 4.27 The percentage of service time of native leaders

Province % Province % Province % Beij ing 0.00 Zhej iang 0.00 Sichuan 45.31 Tianj in 37 .24 Anhui 23.70 Guizhou 30.21 Hebei 32.20 Fuj ian 11.20 Yunnan 44.79 Shanxi 29.43 Jiangxi 23.18 Shaanxi 47.92 NeiMenggu 50.00 Shandong 38.23 Gansu 0.00 Liaoning 36.20 Henan 0.00 Qinghai 0.00 Jilin 0.00 Hubei 0.00 Ningxia 0.00 Heilongj iang 0.00 Hunan 78.91 Xinj iang 50.00 Shanghai 0.00 Guangdong 29.95 Jiangsu 100.00 Guangxi 65.10

Note: 1. 33.77% of Hebei unknown. 8. 21.09% of Hunan unknown. 2. 49.21% of Liaoning unknown. 9. 33.85% of Heilongjiang unknown. 3. 15.63% of Shanxi unknown. 10. 14.83% of Guangdong unknown. 4. 40.63% of Zhejiang unknown. 11. 34.88% of Guangxi unknown. 5. 20.57% of Fujian unknown. 12. 18.49% of Sichuan unknown. 6. 35.16% of Henan unknown. 13. 32.87% of Guizhou unknown. 7. 13.21% of Hubei unknown. 14. 12.76% of Gansu unknown.

With respect to the elite stability, Table 4.28 shows the frequency of elite turnover from 1980 to 1987. Table 4.29 shows the number of provinces by the frequency of elite turnover. Two provinces that have the most frequent elite turnover are Hubei and Qinghai; 118 two provinces that have the least elite turnover are Guangxi and Guizhou. The correlation coefficient between PCE and elite stability is -.12 (p>.05), which means that there is little relationship between them. We can conclude that elite stability has little impact on pollution control effort.

Table 4.28 The frequency of elite change from 1980 to 1987

Province # Province # Province # Beij ing 4 Zhejiang 3 Sichuan 4 Tianj in 4 Anhui 6 Guizhou 2 Hebei 5 Fuj ian 4 Yunnan 3 Shanxi 3 Jiangxi 5 Shaanxi 4 NeiMenggu 3 Shandong 5 Gansu 4 Liaoning 6 Henan 5 Qinghai 7 Jilin 6 Hubei 7 Ningxia 3 Heilongj iang 3 Hunan 3 Xinj iang 3 Shanghai 6 Guangdong 5 Jiangsu 3 Guangxi 2 Mean : 4.21 Standard Deviation : 1.42

Table 4.29 The number of provinces and the frequency of elite turnover

Frequency 2 3 4 5 6 7 # of province 2 9 6 5 4 2 119

Conclusion

Table 4.30 summarizes the correlation coefficients between PCE and the political

variables explored above. The rank of environmental protection bureau and the education

level of political leaders are two political variables which have moderate correlations with

provincial pollution control effort at the .10 significant level. The correlations between

PCE and the remaining political variables are not significant even at the .10 level. At this

moment, we can conclude that those political variables are not determining factors of

provincial pollution control effort according to the above data. But readers should be

reminded that measurements of political variables are crude in this dissertation because

of limited availability of data. In the next Chapter, I will examine socioeconomic variables to see if they have more effect on pollution control effort than political

variables.

Table 4.30 Correlation coefficients between PCE and political variables

A B C D E F G H PCE 0.03 0.20 -0 .14 0.32** 0.18 -0.12 0.35** 0.16

** pc.10 A: Political generations B: Career patterns C: Natives D: Education E: Activeness of PPC F: Elite stability G: Rank of environmental protection bureau H: The existence of environmental protection commission 120

Endnotes

1. State Environmental Protection Bureau, Zhong Guo Huan Jing Bao Hu Si Ye 1981- 1985 (China’s Environmental Protection Enterprise) (Beijing: Zhong Guo Huan Jing Ke Xue Chu Ban Se, 1988), p. 266.

2. David M. Lampton, "A Plum for a Peach: Bargaining, Interest, and Bureaucratic Politics in China," in Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, eds. Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 34.

3.

4. State Environmental Protection Bureau, Zhong Guo Huan Jing Bao Hu Si Ye 1981- 1985. p. 265.

5. Kevin J. O’Brien, "Agents and Remonstrators: Role Accumulation by Chinese People’s Congress Deputies," forthcoming, China Quarterly, p. 1.

6. Ibid., p. 2.

7. Ibid., p. 18. In O’Brien’s interviews with deputies, pollution problems are those that have been frequently reflected by deputies.

8. Ibid., p. 13. "Remonstrator" is the concept developed by O’Brien as one subrole of deputies.

9. See Oksenberg and Goldstein, op cit.: Dorothy Solinger, "The Fifth National People’s Congress and the Process of Policymaking: Reform, Readjustment, and the Opposition," in King-Yuh Chang, ed. The Emerging Teng System: Orientation. Policies, and Implications (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1982); Harry Harding, "A Political Scientist’s Perspective," in Wm. Theodore deBary, et al., China’s Future and Its Implications for U.S.-China Relations (Washington, D.C.: East Asia Program, The Wilson Center, 1980).

10. See Michael Yahuda, "Political generations in China," in The China Quarterly. No. 80, December 1979.

11. See Hong Yung Lee, "From Revolutionary Cadres to Bureaucratic Technocrats," in Brantly Womack, ed. Contemporary Chinese Politics in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

12. Hong Yung Lee, "From Revolutionary cadres to bureaucratic technocrats," p. 180. 121

13. "Guowu Yuan Huanjing Baohu Weiyuan Hui Ju Xin Di Yi chi Hui Yi," (The Environmental Protection Commission of the State Council held the first meeting), in Huanjing Baohu (Environmental Protection), No. 9, 1984, p. 4. Numerous vice governors also make the same argument in various meetings.

14. For example, the election of U.S. president, Bill Clinton, has been claimed as the coming of a new generation.

15. Marvin Rintala, "Generations: political generations," in The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), p. 93.

16. Michael Yahuda, o p cit.. p. 796.

17. Ibid.

18. Ting Wang, "An Analysis of the P.R.C.’s Future Elite: The Third Echelon," in Journal of Northeast Asian Studies. Vol. 4, No. 2, Summer 1985, pp. 20-21.

19. Hong Yung Lee,o p cit., p. 182.

20. Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 392.

21. "Technocratic bureaucrats" and "bureaucratic technocrats" are used interchangeably.

22. Hong Yung Lee notes that "(A) series of campaigns eliminated any source of power in society, whether in the form of class, social institution, or political group; and the party-state imposed its bureaucratic structure on every functional field of society for the sake of the socialist revolution. Consequently, in China, possession of political power because of an official position in the bureaucratic system is what defines elite status." See Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China, p. 4.

23. Ibid., pp. 180-206.

24. My criteria of classification is the career patterns, which is different from Lee’s classification based on time. Therefore, there are technocratic bureaucrats in the first generation, and there are also political bureaucrats in the second generation.

25. "Second Revolution" is the term used by Harry Harding to describe the reform in Deng’s era. See Harry Harding, China’s Second Revolution: Reform after Mao (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987).

26. Xiaowei Zhang, "Provincial Elite in Post-Mao China," in Asian Survey, Vol. 31, June 1991, pp. 521-524. 122

27. Cheng Li and David Bachman, "Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism: Elite Formation and Social Change in Post-Mao China," in World Politics, Vol. 42, No. 2, January 1990.

28. Political localism occurred in the early 1960s when many provincial leaders held positions for over a decade. Military localism occurred during Cultural Revolution because it was the only organization to escape the disaster, and many military commanders held top provincial leadership positions in early and mid-1970s.

29. Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China, p. 387.

30. This is the contingency table of the rank of EPB and the existence of EPC.

The existence of EPC

No Yes Total

First 6 11 17 of EPB Second 5 6 11

Total 11 17 28 Note: 1. Chi square=0.28 p>0.6 2. Gamma=-0..21 tau-b=-0.10

31. Since the correlation coefficient is so low, no other nonparametric test will be performed.

32. The number of laws regaring pollution control is excluded because it has been used to form an index of the dependent variable: pollution control effort. 123

33. For the characteristics of political leaders, see Appendix C.

34. To calculate the percentage of service time, first, I add up the service time of all leaders, and then divide it by the service time of a certain type of leaders.

35. See Chapter Five for data about economic development. CHAPTER V

SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS AND PROVINCIAL POLLUTION CONTROL POLICY

As shown in the last chapter, the correlations between political variables and pollution control effort are weak. Neither structural variables nor political leadership variables are able to explain significantly the variation among provinces. In this chapter,

I will examine the relationship between socioeconomic variables and pollution control effort to see if they are the determining factors.

Economic growth and environmental protection—A dilemma?

Although environmental protection is a necessary condition for a sustainable economy, the conflicts between short-term and long-term interests still persist. From the perspective of China’s provinces, this problem is even more difficult to resolve for two reasons. The first reason involves the nature of the economic system. As mentioned in the introduction, the government is the owner and banker of many enterprises on the one hand and the guardian of the environment on the other.1 In a capitalist society, on the contrary, only a relatively few enterprises are owned by government. The revenue of government comes primarily from taxes rather than enterprise benefits. In China, the government owns a relatively large number of enterprises which is the major source of

124 125 the government’s revenue.2 If provincial governments work harder at pollution control, they might have to run the risk of decreasing revenue, at least in the short run. Although the short-term conflict between economic growth and pollution control effort exists in each country, unlike other countries, this conflict in China is embedded in the structure.

Another reason for intensive conflict between long-term and short-term interests is the provincial competition for investment and wealth. Economic growth requires capital and technology, which, especially the former, are scarce in China. Over the years, provinces have been competing for foreign investment with every effort. Foreign investment will go to provinces which provide relatively favorable economic conditions.

Given similar levels of cheap labor, other conditions such as resources, transportation, land, and the cost of pollution control, will become determining factors. Prevention of environmental damage is costly. For enterprises, "(W)orkers must be employed to operate pollution control equipment. Capital must be invested in the equipment. Land must be used to locate the equipment or to hold wastes for future release."3 For governments, the administration of pollution control also requires abundant staff and equipment for monitoring, both of which require scarce capital controlled by governments, not to mention the funds invested in pollution control. The total cost of pollution control is the opportunity cost of the resources used. The discussion does not suggest that pollution control and economic growth are completely incompatible, but there is an apparent conflict between them in terms of resources allocation within provinces; The problem is how much pollution control effort is deemed necessary, given the need for economic growth. 126

If we see emphasis on short-term interests and long-term interests as two extremes of environmental protection policy, then the environmental policy of any state falls in between those two extremes. (Figure 5.11) The question then becomes where it falls in between those two extremes. At this moment, there are no available methods by which we can locate environmental protection policy of a country. In addition, environmental protection policy is more like an umbrella concept which is composed of various policies regarding water resources, land use, forest, wild life, pollution, etc. This complexity renders it too difficult to form an index for environmental protection policy. Despite the difficulty of locating environmental protection policy as a whole, we can still compare pollution control efforts, as we did in Chapter HI.

Short-term interests long-term interests

Lax <-- Location of > stringent pollution control policy

Figure 5.11 Location of environmental policy

Most Chinese political leaders, both at the national and local level, claim in their public speeches that pollution control should go hand in hand with economic growth. The idea of "pollution first, treatment later" is not acceptable. However, to say is one thing, to do is another. In addition, what national leaders say may not automatically become a 127 policy in provinces, and even if it becomes a policy, diversity still exists in terms of effort.

Two hypotheses can be drawn from the discussion above. The first one is that there is a positive relationship between the level of economic development and pollution control effort because a wealthy country has more financial capability to invest in pollution control. "Economic development refers to the growth in the total economic activity and output of the society."4 In other words, economic development increases the capacity of society to deal with more needs such as the demand for clean environment.

In addition, according to Maslow’s theory, once the basic biological needs have been satisfied, individuals will pursue higher-order needs. M. Joseph Sirgy says that "the central argument common to most human developmental theories reflects the notion that people grow through a progression of satisfaction of needs that are structured hierarchically, from lower-order needs (basic, biological maintenance needs) to higher- order needs (self-fulfillment, psychological enhancement needs)."5 Although the need for a clean environment is not mentioned in Maslow’s theories, it is certainly not a basic biological need, which is exemplified by the history of environmentalism discussed above.

Indeed, the subject of Maslow’s theory is individuals, but it can also be applied to societies. It has often been argued that in developed societies, there is a relatively high proportion of people who are concerned with higher-order needs than in developing societies.6 Economic development means the relative satisfaction of basic, lower-order needs, and then the higher-order needs. In China, an inference can be made that provinces 128 with higher levels of economic development would work harder in pollution control than those with lower levels of economic development.

The second hypothesis is that a country with rapid economic development, that is, a high rate of economic growth, will be less serious in pollution control than those with slow economic development because most resources are invested in productive processes instead of environmental protection. In China, therefore, an inference can be made that the provinces with high rates of economic growth would put less effort into pollution control than would the provinces with low growth rates. These two hypotheses are formulated at the state level, but they should also be applicable at the regional level because the logic is the same.

In this Chapter, I will first examine the relationship between the levels of economic development, the rates of economic growth, and the pollution control effort in each province.

Economic accounts in China

Economic development and economic growth are concepts with an abundance of meanings, and many debates have occured about these meanings and their measurements.7 In spite of the debates, economic accounts are deemed by most scholars important, or even necessary, indicators for these two concepts. Since China’s economic accounts are somewhat different from those used in capitalist states, it is therefore necessary to discuss them before we start analyzing. 129

The first problem with China’s statistical data is their reliability. The rise of this problem could be understood from the history of statistical work before 1979. The collection of statistical data had been sporadic and nonsystematic until 1952 when the

State Statistical Bureau was established.8 At that time, the importance of statistical work was recognized and emphasized by some leaders. However, in the history of Communist

China, statistical work suffered from two disasters in which statistical work were either distorted or abolished: the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution.9

It was not until 1979 that statistical work gained its unprecedented importance.

Abundant statistical data, including provincial data, have been published systematically and periodically, which makes this research possible. I do not suggest that these data are reliable, but they are better than data collected before 1979. In addition, similar data from different sources will be cross-checked, if possible.

Two major sources of economic accounts are used in this dissertation. One is the

China Statistical Yearbook published annually since 1981. Another is The Almanac of

China’s Economy also published annually since 1981. Most data in those two sources are identical, but some are different. When they differ, I will try to ascertain which one is more valid.

Some economic accounts used in China are different from those used in capitalist states and require further illustration. Gross national product (GNP) is one of the most frequently used indicator of economic development in the community of Western economists. It is defined as "the total value of all final goods and services produced in the economy in a given period of time."10 The data about the GNP at the national level 130 in China are not available until 1985; at the provincial level, gross product data are not available until 1987. Therefore, they will not be used as an indicator of economic development in this research.

However, two economic accounts in China are similar to GNP. They are "Total

Product of Society" (TPS) and "National Income" (NI).11 TPS is different from GNP in two major respects. First, services are not calculated in the TPS as they are in the GNP.

Second, TPS includes raw materials, fuels, etc., consumed in the production process while they are not contained in the GNP. As a result, the value of the TPS is always higher than the GNP.

The value of "National Income" is closer to GNP than TSP because it refers to the net value created in the production process. In other words, national income is the value of TPS minus the raw materials, fuels, etc., consumed in the production process. It is different from GNP in that economic activities which are not directly related to the material production process, such as the services sector and governmental administration, are not included in National Income.

To compare economic development in different regions, two requirements should be met. The first one is that the same indicators should be used for the sake of consistency. The second requirement is that the price should be comparable. Constant price is better than current price because it takes into account inflation and therefore is comparable.

Since GNP is not available, I have decided to use NI per capita as the measure of economic development because it reflects the net value of production, and is closer to 131

GNP than TPS. For example, in 1987, the GNP of Hebei province is 5.12 billion, the NI

4.42 billion, and the TSP 10.27 billion. Unfortunately, NI is counted at current prices in both resources. Therefore, it should be transformed into constant price by using a price index. The price index which will be used is the "General Indexes of Retail Prices" available in China’s Statistical Yearbook.

Uneven spatial developmentand provincial pollution control effort

Almost every large country in the world has internal diversity in terms of geography, politics, economics, and/or culture. Uneven spatial economic development is one of the obvious features in developing countries. This feature is partly because of uneven distribution of resources. However, economic development policy could either widen the gap between the rich and poor regions, prevent it from becoming wider, or reduce it to a certain extent.12 In the 1950s, there were substantial differences between

China’s provinces in economic development, which were primarily due to the uneven spread of industry and commerce.13 To reduce these inequalities, provincial self- sufficiency and even development were the main themes of economic development policy in the period under Mao. "The core of this development strategy was investment in industry and infrastructure in China’s interior, especially the ’third front’ program during the 1960s."14 However, these experiences were painful to most Chinese because they brought about economic poverty rather than prosperity.

China under Deng is extremely different from China under Mao in economic development policy. After the death of Mao, came the period of reform led by Deng 132

Xiaoping. Self-sufficiency was overtaken by "efficiency" to encourage provincial integration and an "open door" policy to gain capital and technology from abroad. Even development was also replaced by coastal-led development. During this period, "the new strategy emphasizes regional comparative advantage, accepts regional disparities as inevitable, encourages foreign investment and international interaction, and seeks to foster technological innovation."15 The coastal region gets the lion’s share of investment in fixed assets and more foreign investment. The result of these policies is the trend of uneven development between the coastal region and the interior region.16

Even though there is an increasing gap between the development of coastal and interior regions, this trend may not remain when we compare the provinces. Table 5.31 shows the share of national income by province.

The sub-total row in this table shows results consistent with Dali Yang’s research.17 The share of national income of the coastal region increases from 52.48 in

1981 to 53.85 in 1987, while that of both central and western regions decreases. Looking at the provinces as a whole, the trend of uneven development is also apparent. The mean share is the same for each year, but the standard deviation, which represents the trend of dispersion, increases from 2.18 in 1981 to 2.28 in 1987. The maximum share also increases from 7.53 in 1981 to 8.36 in 1987. The difference between the maximum share and the minimum also increases from 7.22 in 1981 to 8.06 in 1987.

Intriguingly, the significance of the classification of regions fades when we see each province as a unit. Although the share in national income in the coastal region increases as a whole, the share of national income in five of the total eleven coastal 133 provinces drops. In the western region, the share of national income in four of nine provinces increases.

This table can only tell us the trend of uneven development among provinces. It does not take into account the size of provinces in terms of population. To see the level of economic development, national income per capita is a better indicator than the share of national income.

Computing National Income per capita The data about national income per capita is available only from 1981 to 1987 at current prices. I will use the data in these years to predict data in 1980. There are four steps in computing the average national income per capita of each province from 1980 to 1987. First, I will transform national income at current prices from 1981 to 1987 into national income at 1980 constant price by using the "General Indexes of Retail Prices." The next step is to use the average percentage change of national income from 1981 to 1987 to impute national income in

1980. The third step is to divide the national income by provincial year-end population to get national income per capita. The last step is to sum national income per capita of each year and divide it by 8, the total number of years. Table 5.31 The share of national income by province

1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

Liaoning 5. 29 5 .82 6 .04 5 ,.96 5 .93 6,.02 6,.00 D Beij ing 2 .54 2 . 66 2 .79 2 ,.65 2 .71 2 ,.58 2 ,.50 D Tianj in 2 .42 2 .23 2 .18 2 .05 2 .10 2 ,.08 1,.97 D Hebei 3 .94 4 . 64 4 .83 4 .75 4 .75 4 ,.71 4 ,.75 I Shandong 7 ..52 7 .41 7 .39 8 .05 7 .69 7 ,.45 7 ,.80 I Jiangsu 7 .53 7 .47 7 .56 7 .85 8 .05 8 ,.30 8..36 I Shanghai 6 .66 6 .58 6 .15 5 .74 5 .70 3 ..32 5,.02 D A Zhej iang -a . 48 4 . 57 4 .47 4,.66 5,.09 5,.28 5 ..39 I Fuj ian 2 .25 2 .21 2 .15 2 ,.17 2 .29 2 ..30 2 ..40 I Guangdong 6 .34 6 .31 6 .17 6,.69 7 ,.00 7 ,.09 7 ..46 I Guangxi 2 .51 2 .53 2 .38 2 ,.16 2 ,.15 2 ..21 2 ..20 D

Sub-total 52 .48 52 .43 52 ,.11 52 ..73 53 ,.46 53 ..34 53 .,85

Heilongj iang 4 .76 4 . 57 4 ,.68 4 ..46 3 ,.92 4..13 4 ., 05 D Jilin 2 .31 2 .27 2 ,.59 2 ..48 2 ,.36 2 ..37 2 ..52 I NeiMonggol 1 . 52 1 .63 1..63 1 ..62 1..65 1..59 1..53 I Shanxi 2 .39 2 .47 2 ,.52 2 ..56 2 ,.40 2 ..25 2 ,.00 D Kenan 5 .01 4 .99 5 ,.02 5 ..15 5,.20 5 ..25 5 ,.38 I Anhui 3 .13 3 .60 3 . 6 6 3 ,.72 3 ,.78 3 ..89 3 ..79 I Hubei 4 .97 4 .83 4..78 4..94 4,. 99 5..00 4..93 D Jiangxi 2 .70 2 .60 2 ..50 2 ..38 2 ,.41 2 ..37 2 ..32 D Hunan 4 .58 4 .53 4 ,.50 4..17 4 ,.19 4..27 4..25 D

Sub-total 31. 37 31 .49 31,.88 31..48 30,.90 31,.12 30 ..77

Xinj iang 1 . 30 ]_.25 1 ..26 1.,25 1..24 1..27 1..27 D Gansu 1 . 45 1 .38 1 ,.37 1..40 1 ,.42 1 ,.47 1,.41 D Ningxia 0 . 32 0 .30 0 ,.32 0 ,.31 0 .31 0 ..33 0 ,.30 D Shaanxi 2 .13 2 .07 2 ..05 2 ..05 2 ,.04 2 ,.01 1..99 D Qinghai 0 .32 0 .32 0 .33 0 ,.33 0 .34 0,.36 0 ,.34 I Sichuan 7 .10 7 . 09 6 .99 6,.79 6 .84 6,.62 6,.62 D Guizhou 1.43 1.50 1 .51 1,.59 1 .50 1,.52 1,.49 I Yunnan 2 .10 2 . 17 2 .16 2 ,.06 1,.94 1,.95 1..95 D CO Sub-total 16. 15 16 o 15 .99 15,.78 15,.63 15,.53 15,.37 Total 100 100 99 .99 99,.99 99 .99 99,.99 99 .99 Mean 3 .57 3 .57 3 .57 3 ,.57 3 .57 3 ,.57 3 ,.57 S.D. 2 .18 2 .15 2 .13 2 ,.21 2 ,.22 2 ,.22 2 ,.28 Maximum share 7 ..53 7 .47 7 .56 8 .05 8 .05 8 .30 8 .36 Minimum share 0 .31 0 .30 0 .32 0 .31 0 .31 0 ,.33 0 ,.30

D: Drop I: Increase Mote: 1. Tibet is excluded from calculation. 2. The total may not be 100 due to rounding. Sources: The China Statistical Yearbook The Almanac of China's Economy 135

Table 5.32 shows the average national income by province from 1980 to 1987.

Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai are the three provinces whose average national income per capita exceeds one thousand yuan. Eight provinces fall between five hundred and one thousand yuan, while seventeen provinces have national income per capita lower than five hundred yuan. The province with the highest national income per capita is Shanghai, 2540 yuan, and the province with the lowest income per capita is Guizhou, 270 yuan. The standard deviation is 471 yuan. From this data, we can conclude that the level of economic development in the provinces is very diverse.

The hypothesis about the relationship between PCE and economic development is supported by the high correlation coefficient between them, r=0.54 (pc.Ol). (See Table

5.34) In other words, the wealthier the province, the more resources they devote to pollution control. Since there are three extreme values, i.e., NIPC of Beijing, Tianjin, and

Shanghai, which might inflate Pearsonr coefficient, I will also test the hypothesis with

Spearman’s /s, which is not sensitive to extreme values.18 The Spearman’srs is 0.45

(pc.Ol). These two coefficients are consistent. In other words, the hypothesis that provinces with higher level of economic development will work harder in pollution control is not rejected. 136

Table 5.32 The average national income per capita by province from 1980-1987 unit: yuan Province NI Province NI Province NI Coastal Region Central Region Western Region Liaoning 858 Heilongj iang 664 Xinj iang 499 Beij ing 1410 Jilin 538 Gansu 372 Tianj in 1419 NeiMenggu 418 Ningxia 403 Hebei 438 Shanxi 474 Shaanxi 360 Shandong 537 Henan 360 Qinghai 435 Jiangsu 671 Anhui 382 Sichuan 360 Shanghai 2540 Hubei 540 Guizhou 270 Zhej iang 624 Jiangxi 367 Yunnan 323 Fujian 427 Hunan 406 Guangdong 528 Guangxi 307 Mean: 605 Standard Deviation: 471 Source: Data after 1984 are from The China Statis Yearbook, and the rest of data are from The Almanac of China's Economy. Note: 1. Data in few provinces are not available in some years, and they were imputed by using regression analysis.

Since industry constitutes the major share of national income, I will also test how it is related with the pollution control effort. Table 5.33 shows the average degree of industrialization in each province from 1980 to 1987. By degree of industrialization, I mean the share of the gross value of industrial output (GVIO) of the total gross value of agricultural and industrial output (GVAIO). The larger the share of the gross value of industry, the higher the degree of industrialization. Ironically, industry is the major source of both pollution and revenues.19 But because of this combination I hypothesize that 137 provinces with higher degree of industrialization will worker harder in pollution control.

Industry is the major source of revenues so it provides financial capability; it is the major source of pollution so there is a stronger necessity to treat pollution.

The correlation coefficient between the degree of industrialization and the PCE is even higher than that between the level of economic development and the PCE. It is 0.66 at the significance level of .003, which means a moderately strong relationship. In addition, if GVIO constitutes the major part of national income, then the correlation between NIPC and PCE should decrease to a certain degree when we control the level of industrialization. The result of the control shows that the correlation coefficient stated above drops to -.06. In other words, the relationship disappears after control.

Table S.33 The average share of GVIO in GVAIO from 1980 to 1987

Province % Province % Province % Beij ing 91.27 Zhej iang 67.89 Sichuan 59 .71 Tianj in 90 .84 Anhui 56.17 Guizhou 54.71 Hebei 66.06 Fuj ian 60.59 Yunnan 57.48 Shanxi 71.84 Jiangxi 58.10 Shaanxi 67.76 NeiMenggu 60.38 Shandong 63.62 Gansu 71.46 Liaoning 84.13 Henan 57 .76 Qinghai 61.91 Jilin 71.20 Hubei 68.80 Ningxia 64.30 Heilongj iang 74.38 Hunan 58.58 Xinj iang 57 .23 Shanghai 94.88 Guangdong 67.42 Jiangsu 71.39 Guangxi 54.84 Mean=67.31 Standard Deviation=ll.2 Source: The China Statistical Yearbook from 1981 to 1988. 138

In the last Chapter, I found that the selection of key-point cities does make a difference in PCE, but I doubt its impact still holds after the control of socioeconomic variables. Since the selection of key-point cities is also related to the level of industrialization (r=.60, p<.01), I will control the latter to see whether the correlation coefficient between PCE and the existence of key-point cities still holds or decreases significantly. The result shows that it drops to -.02. It is because most key-point cities selected are large industrialized cities that affect the level of industrialization in a province. Therefore, we can conclude that it is the level of industrialization that affects decisions of the center regarding the selection of key-point cities.

Table 5.34 Correlation matrix between PCE and economic variables

AB C D E F G A 1.00 B 0.54" 1.00 C 0.66" * 0.85***' 1.00 D -0.41" -0.51** -0.45" 1.00 E -0.26 ■-0.41** -0.45** 0.26 1.00 F 0.35* 0.93*** 0.68*"--0.46** -0 .33 1.00 G -0.40**-0.31 -0.30 0.66*** 0.23 -0.34 1.00

* p<. 10 ** p<.05 *** p<001 A: Pollution control effort B: The level of economic development C: The level of industrialization D: Economic growth E: Pace of industrialization F: Seriousness of pollution G: Pace of Gross value of Industrial and agricultural output per capita. 139

The next question to address is whether the severity of pollution affects the pollution control effort. The severity of pollution is the sum of the standard score, i.e., z score, of the degree of each kind of pollution from 1981 to 1987, which is the result of the amount of discharge multiplied by population density because both the size of population and area have to be taken into account in determining the relative degree of pollution.20 The correlation coefficient between them is .13, too weak to claim a relationship between them.

The second hypothesis is about the relationship between economic growth and the pollution control effort. To measure economic growth rate, western economists always use

GNP or GDP per capita as the base. In the case of China, I will use the average percentage change of national income per capita (NTPC) from 1980 to 1987 as the indicator. Another indicator candidate is the percentage change of gross value of agricultural and industrial output (GVAIO) per capita from 1980 to 1987. Table 5.35 shows the average growth rate of NIPC and the gross value of agricultural and industrial output (GVAIO) per capita. And I will test the correlation between pollution control effort and these indicators to see if they are in the same direction. 140

Table 5.35 Average growth rate of NIPC and GVAIO per capita from 1980 to 1987

Province NIPC GVAIO Province NIPCGVAIO Beij ing 6.13 7.05 Shandong 9.37 10 .31 Tianj in 4.25 7.57 Henan 9.37 8.67 Hebei 10 .87 7.88 Hubei 8.39 12 .16 Shanxi 5.55 6.77 Hunan 5.84 8.22 NeiMenggu 7 .86 9.75 Guangdong 9 .43 16.22 Liaoning 6.74 8.32 Guangxi 4.44 8.05 Jilin 8.98 10.34 Sichuan 7 .78 9.37 Heilongj iang 4.64 7.66 Guizhou 8.86 10 .50 Shanghai 2 .93 6.32 Yunnan 6.89 9.07 Jiangsu 9 .52 13 .40 Shaanxi 6.89 9.20 Zhej iang 9 .95 15.15 Gansu 7.58 9 .37 Anhui 11.63 12.40 Qinghai 8.12 9.20 Fuj ian 8.00 11.82 Ningxia 6.56 11.36 Jiangxi 5.52 6.14 Xinj iang 7 .66 11.76

The correlation between PCE and the average growth rate of the NIPC is -0.41

(p<.05). It supports the hypothesis that provinces with higher growth rates will be less serious in pollution control because more resources are allocated for the purpose of growth. Furthermore, the level of economic development and economic growth is inversely correlated; the correlation coefficient is -0.51 (p<.05). The correlation coefficient between PCE and the average growth rate of GVAIO is also negative, -0.40 (p<.05) and only slightly different from that between PCE and the growth rate of NIPC. (See Table

5.34) However, the relationship between the pace of industrialization and PCE is weak, with Pearson r--. 26 at the significant level greater than .10, though it is negative in direction which is consistent with our hypothesis. When the level of industrialization is 141 controlled, the correlation coefficients between PCE and pace of industrialization and economic growth drop significantly to .05 and -0.17 respectively. At this moment, we can conclude that provinces with higher level of economic development will work harder in pollution control at the expense of economic growth.

Urbanization, education, and pollution control effort

Before beginning discussion of the meaning and measurement of urbanization and education, a justification for the selection of these variables is warranted. The discussion about economic development is generally about the capacity of societies to satisfy the needs of people. In this section, the discussion of urbanization and education is about the values, needs and aspirations of societies and subsequent pressures on government.

Urbanization and education have been used as indicators of social mobilization. In studies of modernization, social mobilization, as described by Samuel Huntington, refers to:

a change in the attitudes, values, and expectations of people from those associated with the traditional world to those common to the modem world. It is a consequence of literacy, education, increased communications, mass media exposure, and urbanization.21

In sum, urbanization, the increase of education and communications, etc., will increase the needs of societies and then increase pressures on governments.

Urbanization is defined as "the process by which urban population increases in absolute number and in proportion to rural population, either through the increase in population of existing cities or through the growth of new ones."22 (For the definition of urban places and urban population in China, see Appendix F.) The question here is about the relationship between urbanization and pollution control effort. Urbanization can 142 affect pollution control effort in two ways. First, other things being equal, urbanization will worsen the level of pollution because it produces more waste, both domestic and industrial. The correlation coefficient between the level of urbanization and the degree of pollution is .56 (pc.Ol) in China’s provinces. The director of State Environmental

Protection Bureau, Qu Geping, commented in 1985 that the environmental state of many large and medium cities approximated or even exceeded the severity of pollution in industrialized states in the 50’s and 60’s during which pollution is the most serious, particularly air and water pollution.23 It is especially true with air pollution, which has an impact on acid rain and the global warming effect. Almost all big cities in the world are confronted with air pollution problems. In China, air pollution is particularly serious in cities because of the consumption of large amounts of coal as domestic fuel.

Table 5.41 shows the pressure points in cities in less developed countries (LDC) and more developed countries (MDC). In this table, we find that large cities in both LDC and MDC bear the same high pressure in environment. In addition, large cities have higher pressure in environment than medium and small cities. Furthermore, large cities in less developed countries are confronted with high pressure in almost every aspect of social problems, which also means the existence of conflicts of resources allocation.

However, the difference of pressure in environment and other aspects between large cities and small cities shall not be ignored. In medium and small cities, pressure in environment is low in contrast to pressure in other aspects. Therefore, small and medium cities will work harder on other aspects than environment, and we still expect that large cities will work harder on the environment than small and medium cities. 143

Table 5.41 Pressure points in LDC and MDC Cities by Size of Centr

LDC MDC Large 1 Small/Medium Large2 Small/Medium Job opportunities H M L M Food H M L L Water H (L) M LL Energy H H LL Education H H LL Transportat ion HM LL Recreation L L M H Health H H L M Environment H L HM Crime ML HL Housing H L H L

H = High pressure point M = Medium pressure point L = Low pressure point (L) = different strength of pressure point for low income and MDC populations 1 Plus low-income populations in MDC 2 Plus upper-income populations in LDC Source: Richard Stren, Rodney White & Joseph Whitney, Sustainable Cities: Urbanization and the Environment in International Perspective (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 16.

However, the difference between urban and rural areas in terms of pressure on the environment is still large enough for us to expect that urban areas will work harder at pollution control than rural areas.

Another line of argument posed by Rodney White and Joseph Whitney points in a different direction. It argues that in a centralist political system, problems in cities will not get special attention because of the lack of representation and because it is the poor 144 people in cities that suffer the most from pollution.24 In China, however, various research concludes that urban life is better than rural life. Only with empirical data can this debate be solved.

In addition to the level of urbanization, the pace of urbanization is also relevant here. As pointed out by Yue-man Yeung, "(A)s urbanization proceeds, space development policy, the energy utilization pattern, and industrialization may all go hand in hand with little regard to their effect on the environment."25 This is especially true when urbanization proceeds quickly. With respect to the pace of urbanization in China,

Xiangming Chen notes that

It took three decades for China’s urban population to double from 10.6 per cent to about 20 percent of the total population, whereas it more than doubled to over 50 percent in only eight years in the 1980’s.26

In short, the pace of urbanization is very high during the 1980’s. A high pace of urbanization may cause two consequences. First, it will create more problems. Second, the existing problems will become more acute. As a result, the pressure on governments will be higher in places with a high pace of urbanization than in places with a low pace of urbanization. Will this accelerated urbanization in the 1980’s have any impact on pollution control effort? Will provinces with higher urbanization paces work harder to control pollution? These are questions to be answered in this section. 145

Table 5.42 The average level of urbanization from 1980-1986

Province % Province % Province % Beij ing 66.01 Fuj ian 31.25 Guizhou 24.37 Tianj in 63 .60 Xinj iang 30.32 Hebei 22 .86 Shanghai 60.44 Ningxia 29.88 Jiangsu 22 .03 Liaoning 52.80 Guangdong 29.38 Hunan 21.61 Jilin 49.53 Shaanxi 28.89 Yunnan 20.06 Heilongj iang 49.18 Zhej iang 26.67 Sichuan 19.41 Shanxi 9.76 Qinghai 26.46 Anhui 18.42 Shandong 36.89 Gansu 25.82 Henan 16.40 NeiMenggu 36.63 Jiangxi 25.22 Hubei 32 .26 Guangxi 24.85

Source: See Appendix F.

The correlation coefficient between PCE and the average level of urbanization from 1980 to 1986 is .69 (pc.001), even higher than that between PCE and the level of industrialization. In other words, the hypothesis that provinces with higher levels of urbanization will work harder at pollution control than others is supported by our data and

White and Whitney’s argument is falsified.

With respect to the pace of urbanization, I used the percentage change of urban population between 1980 and 1986 as the indicator. (Table 5.43) It is negatively correlated with PCE; the correlation coefficient is -.39 (p<.05). The reason for this negative correlation is that provinces with a high pace of urbanization are often those with a low level of urbanization (r=-.45, p<.05) and that high pace of urbanization will impose more pressure on governments and require more resources for various urban facilities. 146

Table 5.43 The percentage change of urbanization between 1980 and 1986

Beij ing 4.57 Zhej iang 194.08 Sichuan 120.66 Tianj in -21.62 Anhui 115.97 Guizhou 53 .73 Hebei 176.03 Fujian 121.08 Yunnan 131.96 Shanxi 180.27 Jiangxi 16.13 Shaanxi 114.40 NeiMenggu 65.47 Shandong 305.29 Gansu 201.16 Liaoning 69.50 Henan 74.51 Qinghai 70.83 Jilin 64.48 Hubei 181.54 Ningxia 92.23 Heilongjiang 58.94 Hunan 159.63 Xinj iang -7 .35 Shanghai 8.78 Guangdong 219 .00 Jiangsu 116.18 Guangxi 248.01

The last socioeconomic variables considered in this dissertation is the level of education. As stated by Samuel Huntington, "(U)rbanization, increases in literacy, education, and media exposure all give rise to enhanced aspirations and expectations."27

Most studies of the impact of education conclude that education is likely to change people’s values. The study of postmaterialism in Western societies shows that increases in the level of education will lead to increase in concern about postmaterial values.28 In

China, intellectuals have more understanding of and demand for democracy than ordinary people. The 1989 democratic movement exemplified this difference of value between the intellectuals and ordinary people. In addition, educated people tend to have more access to information, such as environmental protection, and may be concerned more about pollution than other people. If there is strong enough concern about pollution control, it is more likely that a government would respond to that concern. 147

With respect to the measurement of the level of education, many scholars use the percentage of literate people in a certain population as the indicator. In China’s provinces, the only data available about the literacy rate are those from 1982, collected in the third national census. Another indicator candidate is the number of persons with education higher than junior high school per one thousand people in 1982. The problem with these two indicators is that they cover only one year: 1982. Therefore, I will use the relative number of enrolled college students as the indicator, based on data from 1980 to 1987.

However, this indicator may represent two things. The first one is the level of education.

The second one is the emphasis of provincial leaders on education. If it represents the second phenomenon, then the explanation will be different. If there is a positive relationship between this indicator and pollution control, I will say that a province that emphasizes education will also emphasize pollution control. The problem is that we have no other data to help us determine which phenomenon this indicator measures best. To ameliorate this problem, the first two indicators stated above will be used as a supplement. Table 5.44 juxtaposes these three indicators. 148

Table 5.44 The level of education of the provinces

Province ABC Beijing 11.37 85.03 226.11 Tianj in 5.09 82 .80 155.71 Hebei 0.93 70.45 79.03 Shanxi 1.46 75.65 79.90 NeiMenggu 1.32 68.92 79.86 Liaoning 2.26 83.42 103.02 Jilin 2 .28 78.22 116.39 Heilongj iang 1.70 77.83 100.30 Shanghai 8.00 83 .30 239 .22 Jiangsu 1.63 65.37 75.75 Zhej iang 1.16 68.80 56.17 Anhui 0.82 53.77 43 .41 Fuj ian 1.36 62 .85 62 .82 Jiangxi 1.28 67.88 59.32 Shandong 0.91 63.24 61.93 Henan 0.74 63.04 65.78 Hubei 1.85 68.88 81.12 Hunan 1.13 76.13 69.37 Guangdong 1.00 77.10 81.70 Guangxi 0.71 75.04 80.51 Sichuan 0.97 68.04 43 .81 Guizhou 0.68 52 .12 33.33 Yunnan 0.80 50 .74 30.98 Shaanxi 2 .40 66.79 86.83 Gansu 1.15 51.95 67 .49 Qinghai 1.57 53.19 58.79 Ningxia 1.39 56.96 59.04 Xinj iang 1.34 69.28 70 .40

A: The average number of enrolled college students every 1000 people from 1980-1987. It is calculated from The Almanac of China’s Economy 1981 to 1988. B: The percentage of semi-literate and literate people over 12 year-old in 1982. C: Number of people with education higher than junior high school every 1000 people in 1982. B and C are collected from Zhongguo Renkou Nianiian. 1985. 149

The correlation coefficient between PCE and the relative number of enrolled college students is the highest one in contrast to the correlation coefficients we find above. It is 0.73 (pc.Ol), which represents a strong relationship. The hypothesis is buttressed by the data. However, three extreme values might inflate the Pearson correlation coefficient. Therefore, I also use Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient rs, which is less sensitive to extreme values, to test the hypothesis. The Spearman’s rs is .40

(p<.05). Although the coefficient drops significantly, it is still at the moderate level and statistically significant.

Since the validity of the above indicator is not clear, I also tried to determine the correlation coefficients between PCE and the other two indicators of the level of education as supplements to the above coefficient. The correlation coefficient between

PCE and percentage of semi-literate and literate people above 12 years old in each province in 1982 is .57 (pc.Ol); the correlation coefficient between PCE and the number of persons with educaton higher than junior high school in 1982 is .68 (pc.001).29 The results are consistent with the hypothesis. In addition, the correlation coefficient between the number of enrolled college students and the number of persons with education higher than junior high is extremely high, 0.93.

Conclusion—political variables vs. socioeconomic variables

So far, we have already considered several political and socioeconomic factors.

Those socioeconomic variables discussed in this chapter are types of block-booked variables, which means that they are related to each other in some way. For example, blue 150 collar workers tend to be more poorly educated; they are more likely to be Catholic; they are more likely to come from large families; and so on.30 And it is because of this very fact that test variables need to be introduced to see if the relationship is spurious. In this research, industrialization, urbanization, education, and economic development are related to each other.31 Table 5.51 shows the correlation matrix of the socioeconomic variables explored above. It is apparent that they are highly correlated with each other and with the dependent variable too. Therefore, a control is necessary to see which variable affects

PCE.

Table 5.51 Correlation matrix of socio-economic variables

A B C D E F G

A 1.00 B 0.85 1.00 C 0.83 0.80 1.00 D 0.77 0.87 0.78 1.00 E -0.51 -0.45 -0.46 -0.54 1.00 F -0.26* -0.45 -0.47 -0.52 0.26* 1.00 G -0.43 -0.35* -0.49 -0.45 0.35* 0.46 1.00

A: NIPC B: Level of industrialization C: Education level D: Level of urbanization E: Growth rate of NIPC F: Pace of industrialization G: Pace of urbanization *: p>.05 151

For example, in section III, I have controlled the level of industrialization to see if the relationship between NIPC and PCE still holds. The result is that the positive relationship disappears. Therefore, we know that it is the level of industrialization that affects the PCE, not the level of national income per capita.

From this table, it is apparent that there are two sets of variables that are inversely related to the dependent variable. The first set of variables is composed of variables A,

B, C, and D, all of which are positively correlated with PEC. What is interesting is that those variables have been blocked as a concept, the level of modernization. The factor analysis also delivers a similar result.32 The second set is composed of variables E, F,

G, which can be blocked as "the rate of modernization." They are negatively correlated with the level of modernization as well as pollution control effort, but positively correlated with each other.

However, the correlation coefficients between the second set variables are not high enough for us to treat them as a block, though they act at the same direction.

Furthermore, when we control both kinds of variables, the relationship between "the rate of modernization" variables and PCE becomes weaker, while little change occurs between the "level of modernization" variables and PCE. Table 5.52 shows the correlation coefficients between PCE and "the rate of modernization" variables when the level of economic development is controlled. From Table 5.51 and 5.52, the message is apparent.

Briefly, provinces with lower levels of modernization devote less resources and attention to pollution control because they have less resources than other provinces and because they need to allocate more resources to the productive sector for the sake of quick 152 development. They cannot afford serious pollution control. By the same token, provinces with higher level of modernization face the pressure for pollution control on the one hand and have the capability to control pollution on the other at the expense of economic growth.

Table 5.52 The correlation coefficients between PCE and "the rate of modernization" variables with the level of economic development controlled

economic pace of pace of growth rate industrialization urbanization o o PCE -0.19 i -0.21 p > . 30

The main purpose of this dissertation is to evaluate the relative significance of socioeconomic variables against political variables. Of the eight political variables explored in the last chapter, only three have correlation coefficients with PCE that exceed

.30 (pc.10): the central policy, the rank of EPB, and education level of political leaders.

Moreover, none of these coefficients is larger than "the level of modernization" variables, i.e., economic development, and the level of industrialization, urbanization, and education.

"The rate of modernization" variables, such as the rate of economic growth and pace of urbanization, also have stronger relationship with PCE than the political variables stated 153 above. (See Table 5.53) From the comparison of these correlations, we can conclude that it is the socioeconomic variables that have a much stronger relationship with pollution control effort than political variables, a result contradictory to the assumption of political determinism.

Table 5.53 Pearson correlation coefficients between PCE and political and socioeconomic variables

Pol itical variables Socioeconomic variables A: 0.36’ J 0.54*** B: 0.35* K 0.66**** C: 0.16 L 0.69**** D: 0.18 M 0 .73**** E: 0.03 N -0.41** F: 0.20 O -0.26 G: -0.14 P -0.40** H: 0.32* Q 0.13 I: -0.12

**** p<.001 *** pc.Ol ** p<.05 * pc.10 A: Central policy. B: Rank of EPB. C: Existence of EPC. D: Activeness of PPC. E: Political generation. F: Career pattern. G: Localism. H: Education level of leaders. I: elite stability J: Economic development. K: Level of industrialization. L: Level of urbanization. M: Level of education. N: Rate of economic growth. O: Pace of industrialization. P: Pace of urbanization. Q: Severity of pollution. 154

Two political variables that have significant correlation coefficients with economic development deserve further analysis. They are career pattern and education level of provincial leaders. It has often been argued that political leaders make a difference in economic development This is supported by our data. The correlation coefficient between career pattern and economic development is .58 (pc.Ol), and that between education level of political leaders and economic development is .41 (p<.05).

(See Table 5.54) However, it is presumptuous to assume a causal relationship such that political leaders affect economic development which in turn constrains pollution control effort, as shown in Figure 5.51. To test this causal model, I controlled these three political variables to see if the relationship between economic development and PCE disappears.

The result shows that the partial correlation coefficient between PCE and economic development is only slightly different from the zero order coefficient. (See Table 5.55)

In other words, socioeconomic variables’ impact on pollution control effort is independent of political variables.

Political— >Level of economic----- >Pollution variables development control effort

Figure 5.51 A causal relationship of pollution control effort 155

Table 5.54 Correlation between career pattern, education of leaders and the level of economic development

Career Education pattern of leaders Economic 0.58** 0.41* development ** p < .01 * p<.05

Table 5.55 Correlation coefficient between PCE and the level of economic development with political variables controlled

Variables Career Education controlled pattern of leaders 0.52** 0.47* ** pc.Ol * p < . 05

The last question to address is how much variation in pollution control effort can be explained by variables studied in this dissertation and what the major determinants are.

Regression analysis is used to determine the relative importance of variables and the total 156 amount of variation explained by those variables combined. Since the "level of modernization" variables are highly correlated with each other, as shown in Table 5.51,

I decided to combine them into an index of modernization to prevent the multicollinearity which violates the assumption of the classical linear regression model.33 Table 5.56 shows the index of modernization for each province. Its correlation coefficient with PCE is 0.70 (pc.001), a strong relationship and consistent with the results shown above.

Table 5.56 Index of modernization

Province Index Province Index Province Index

Shanghai 11.00 Shandong -0.67 Jiangxi -2.20 Beij ing 10.08 Zhejiang -0.73 Hunan -2.39 Tianj in 7 .27 Guangdong -0.84 Sichuan -2 .61 Liaoning 3 .53 Gansu -1.01 Guangxi -2.88 Heilongj iang 1.78 NeiMenggu -1.06 Yunnan -2.91 Jilin 1.48 Ningxia -1.19 Anhui -3.01 Shanxi 0.36 Fuj ian -1.38 Guizhou -3.02 Hubei -0.14 Qinghai -1.50 Henan -3 .09 Jiangsu -0.45 Xinj iang -1.61 Shaanxi -0.62 Hebei -1.65

Five variables from three levels are included in the regression. As for socioeconomic variables, only "the level of modernization" is included because it is highly correlated with PCE. "The rate of modernization" variables are excluded because they are 157 primarily affected by the level of modernization. With respect to structural variables, both the rank of EPB and the existence of environmental protection commission are included.

Two political leadership variables are also included: elite stability and education of elites.

Table 5.57 is the result of regression analysis.34 Together, they can explain 63% of the variation of PCE, but the level of modernization alone can explain almost half of the variation.35 The Beta weight of the level of modernization is also the greatest one in contrast with the rest of the variables. Moreover, it is the most significant variable for its

T value is the greatest one among all. In other words, the regression analysis also delivers the message that the level of modernization is the most important factor affecting pollution control effort of each province. However, it also shows that two political variables are significant at the . 10 level: elite stability and the existence of environmental protection commission. The statistical reason they are significant is that they are the two variables which are least correlated with the "level of modernization" variables, which meant least multicollinearity among them. In addition, the correlation coefficients between

PCE and elite stability and the existence of environmental protection are -.40 and .40

(p<.05) respectively with the level of modernization controlled, while the partial correlation coefficients between other political variables and PCE decrease. The theoretical reason for this result is that the existence of a mechanism for coordination and consensus building is important for the formation and implementation of a task which involves several organizations. Table 5.57 Regression analysis

Dependent variable: Pollution Control Effort

Independent variables A BC D E Beta 0.7758 0.2236 0.0113 0.0484 -0.2564 T 4.74 1.57 0.07 0.32 -1.807

R2: 0.63 Adjusted R2: 0.55 A: The level of modernization. B: The existence of environmental protection commission. C: The rank of environmental protection bureau. D: The education of elites. E: Elite stability. 159

Endnotes

1. Although decentralization is the national policy after 1979, the provincial governments are unwilling to loosen their control over enterprises. See Paul E. Schroeder, Regional Power in China: Tiao-Tiao Kuai-Kuai Authority in the Chinese Political System, Dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1987.

2. Tiandong Xue & Xiaoming Ouyang, "An International comparison of China’s financial revenue and expenditure," (in Chinese), in Jinyuan Yu, Rouhua Siu, and Tiandong Xue, eds. Research on China’s Economic Reform and Development (Beijing: Sang Wu Ying Su Guan, 1990), pp. 37-41.

3. Paul B. Downing, Environmental Economics and Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984), p. 27.

4. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 33.

5. M. Joseph Sirgy, "A Quality-of-Life Theory Derived from Maslow’s Developmental Perspective: Quality is Related to Progressive Satisfaction of a Hierarchy of Needs, Lower Order and Higher," in The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 45, July 1986, p. 331.

6. Ibid., pp. 329-330.

7. See A. Sen, "Concept of development," in Handbook of development economics

8. The history of China’s statistical work is based on Wang Yifu’s Xin Zhong Guo Tung Ji Shu Gau (A statistical history of New China) (Beijing: Xin Hua Chu Ban She, 1986).

9. At that time, anyone who criticized the Great Leap Forward policy would be considered as a rightist, which meant personal disaster.

10. Karl E. Case & Ray C. Fair, Principles of Macroeconomics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1989), p. 59.

11. For the explanation of those economic accounts, see State Statistical Bureau, China’s Statistical Yearbook 1985 (Beijing: Zhongguo Tong Ji Chu Ban She, 1985), pp. 659-665. It is also available in statistical yearbook published in other years.

12. An economic development policy could be successful or unsuccessful. Therefore, an economic development policy which intended to reduce spatial inequalities may not achieve its goal. 160

13. Nicholas R. Lardy, "Regional Growth and Income Distribution in China," in Robert F. Dernberger, ed. China’s Development Experience in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 158-162. Carl Riskin, China’s Political Economy: The Quest for Development since 1949 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 225.

14. Penelope B. Prime, "China’s Economic Reforms in Regional Perspective," in Gregory Veeck, ed. The Uneven Landscape: Geographic Studies in Post-Reform China (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1991), p. 10.

15. Dali Yang, "Patterns of China’s Regional Development Strategy," in The China Quarterly. No. 122 (June 1990), p. 230.

16. Ibid., pp. 246-251.

17. Dali Yang uses the share of gross value of industrial output and the share of gross value of industrial and agricultural output to show the trend.

18. By extreme values or extreme outliers, I mean values above or below 3 interquatile range.

19. The correlation coefficient between the degree of industrialization and the level of economic development is .85 (pc.001), and that between the degree of industrialization and degree of pollution is .68 (p<.001).

20. Water pollution is measured by the amount of industrial waste water. Air pollution is measured by the amount of industrial paritcles which are complete from 1981 to 1987. Solid waste pollution is measured by the amount of industrial solid waste. The following table shows the standard score of the severity of pollution in each province from 1981 to 1987.

Province Score Province Score Province Score

B e ij in g -0.93 Zhej ia n g -0.09 S ich u a n 0.60 T ia n j in -0.92 Anhui 1.57 G uizhou -1.89 H eb ei 2.25 Fu j ian -1.75 Yunnan -2.13 S h a n x i 0.30 J ia n g x i -0.88 S h a a n x i -1.93 NeiM engu -2.55 Shandong 3.57 Gansu -2.47 L ia o n in g 3.69 Henan 2.45 Q in g h a i -2.66 J ilin -1.91 H ubei -0.07 N in g x ia -2.59 Heilongj iang -1.83 Hunan 0.87 X in j ia n g -2.65 S h a n g h a i 7.34 Guangdong 0.30 J ia n g s u 5.79 G uangxi -1.46

Source: Huan Jincj Toner Ji Zi L ia o Hui Bian. 1981-1985 Statistical Y earb ook .

21. Samuel P. Huntington, op c it, p. 33. 161

22. Zhang Xing Quan, "Urbanisation in China," in Urban Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1991, p. 41.

23. Qu Gepin, "Kai Fa Cen Shi Huan Jing Zong He Zheng Zhi," (Developing comprehensive environmental treatment in cities) in Environmental Protection (Chinese), No. 11, 1985, p. 4.

24. Rodney White and Joseph Whitney, " Cities and the environment: an overview," in Richard Stren, R. White, and J. Whitney, eds. Sustainable Cities: Urbanization and the Environment in International Perspective (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 37.

25. Yue-man Yeung, "China and Hong Kong," in Richard Stren, Rodney White, and Joseph Whitney, eds. Sustainable Cities: Urbanization and the Environment in International Perspective (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 263.

26. Xiangming Chen, "China’s city hierarchy, urban policy, and spatial development in the 1980s," in Urban Studies. Vol. 28, No. 3, 1991, p. 342.

27. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 47.

28. See Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase, eds. Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies (Beverely Hills: Sage Publications, 1979); and articles in Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 17, January 1985.

29. Data are drawn from the 1982 census data.

30. Morris Rosenberg, The Logic of Survey Analysis (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1968), pp. 30-31.

31. It is difficult to determine the causal relations between them. Most of them have two- way influence with others, such as the relationship between the level of urbanization and the level of industrialization. 162

32. The following table is the result of rotated factor analysis:

(varimax rotation) Rotated Factor Loadings Variable II 2 3 4 Uniqueness + ------A 10.870 -0.188 -0.140 0.169 0.159 B 10.941 -0.113 -0.015 -0.077 0.096 C 10.817 -0.332 -0.071 0.126 0.202 D 10.844 -0.297 -0.175-0.178 0.137 E 1-0.465 0.204 0.346 -0.003 0.622 F 1-0.394 0.498 0.007 0.086 0.589 G 1-0.334 0.547 0.147 -0.055 0.564

33. Index is formed by first transforming the value within each variable into z score and then adding them up.

34. Because the size of subjects is small in our data, I tested two critical assumptions of regression analysis: the normality, homoscedasticity, and autocorrelation. Both the skewness and kurtosis tests shows that it is a normal distribution at the .05 significant level. The Spearman’s rank correlation test was used to test homoscedasticity, and found no existence of heteroscedasticity. For the procedure of this test, see Damodar N. Gujarati, 2nd ed., Basic Econometrics (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1988), pp. 331-33. The Durbin-Watsond test was used to test autocorrelation, and found the value of d is 1.92, with which we can reject the null hypothesis of autocorrelation at the .01 level.

35. The R2 is 0.49. CHAPTER V I

CONCLUSION

Summary of analysis

This dissertation challenges the assumption of political determinism in studies of

Chinese policies from the perspective of pollution control policy. All too often, scholars have downplayed the impact of socioeconomic factors on Chinese policies. Models developed by scholars of Chinese politics, such as bureaucracy models, factional models, tendency models, generational models, interest group models, to name just some well- known ones, are models focusing on political factors primarily. Indeed, this assumption is based on the solid fact that the Chinese political system is weakly institutionalized and therefore leaves enormous discretionary power for political leaders. However, there is another fact that should not be ignored in studying policies, that is, the constraint of socioeconomic factors on choices available to political leaders. Thomas Dye also argues that socioeconomic factors should be studied together with political factors to see which ones are more influential in shaping policy. In some cases, the constraint of socioeconomic factors is very loose; however, in other cases, it is stringent and leaves few options for political leaders. There is no reason to assume an insignificant role of

socioeconomic factors in policy process. Thus, we need to evaluate their effect on policies

together with political factors in studies of Chinese policies. 163 164

Political variables examined in this dissertation included structural variables and political leadership variables: central policy, activeness of the Provincial People’s

Congress, the rank of environmental protection bureaus, the establishment of environmental protection commissions, elite stability, political generation, career pattern and education of provincial leaders, and localism. This research finds that structural variables had more impacts than background variables of political leaders.

Although the data suggest weak relationship between political variables and PCE, it does not imply that political variables have actually weak impact on PCE. Due to the lack of data, some political variables are measured in a crude way. Therefore, the weak relationship could be the result of the invalidity of measurement. Improvement of measurement may modify the findings in this dissertation, which is suggested for further research.

Contrary to the expectation based upon political determinism, none of these variables have an impact on PCE greater than "the level of modernization" variables, i.e., economic development, and the level of industrialization, urbanization, and education.

"The rate of modernization" variables, such as the rate of economic growth and pace of urbanization, though have a stronger relationship with PCE than the political variables stated above, are greatly affected by the level of modernization.

To conclude, the level of modernization constrains pollution control effort to the extent that few political variables have significant impact. Modernization implies the increase of pressure on governments to control pollution because of the severity of 165

pollution and because of the awareness of the general public. Modernization also implies

the increase of capability of governments for dealing with pollution.

For China studies, one implication of this research is the finding of variations in

provincial pollution control policy affected primarily by local factors. The implementation

of central policies relies in no small part on the provinces, and therefore, central policies

will not automatically become provincial policies. The logic in national politics may differ

from that in provincial politics. However, provincial politics has not gained much

attention which it deserves from scholars. I hope this research will stimulate further

studies on the dynamics of provincial policies.

The implication of this research for comparative politics is that socioeconomic variables constrain policies in the same way regardless of the types of regime. The impact of socioeconomic variables on policies in industrialized states and Third World states has been widely researched, while it has often been neglected in studies of Chinese policies.

Although this research explores pollution control policy at the sub-nation level, it may also be valid at the international level because the logic is the same. China and India, different types of regime with identical problems of poverty, face similar pollution issues, and their efforts are constrained by socioeconomic factors, though in different degrees.

Thus far, my analysis focused on the pollution control policy, and I am not confident that

socioeconomic factors have similar effects on other policies. However, socioeconomic factors should not be taken for granted in comparative development studies; they deserve

serious exploration. 166

Suggestions for further research

Although this research shows that socioeconomic variables have a much stronger relationship with pollution control effort than do political variables, it is still unclear

through what mechanism they affect provincial governments’ effort. For instance, will people in a highly urbanized province have stronger opinions about pollution control,

which then in turn affect government’s actions? Figure 6.21 shows an example of causal relations among variables. Our research shows only the relationship between A, B, and

F, without the knowledge of relationship between A (B) and C, and that between C and

F.

Figure 6.21 An example of complicated causal relationship

A C ------>F B A: urbanization B: Level of education C: public attitude toward pollution D: PCE

According to the regression model in the last section, 37% of variation of PCE still is not explained. There could be some other undiscovered important factors. For example, this research studies only provincial leaders at the highest level such as governors and secretaries, and it is possible that political leaders at the second highest level, such as directors of EPB, also affect provincial pollution control effort. 167

One suggestion arises concerning research methods for further research. A conclusion supported by different methods is stronger than that supported by one method and rejected by another. Since data in this dissertation are cross-sectional, a further time series analysis would improve our understanding of the relationship between PCE and political and socioeconomic factors. 168

APPENDIX A

LOCAL REGULATIONS REGARDING POLLUTION CONTROL FROM 1980 TO 1987*

Beijing: 1. The review system of environmental impact reports regarding construction projects (for trial implementation). (10-28-80)

2. Implementing measures of State Council’s "Provisional measures for the assessment of effluent fees." (5-18-82)

3. Provisional regulation regarding the rearrangement of electroplate plants. (7-30-82)

4. Provisional measures for preventing air pollution. (3-8-84)

5. Standards for the discharge of waste air. (3-8-84)

6. Regulation regarding setting a segregation area along city rivers. (11-15-84)

7. Measure for protection of Guanting river system and its source (with Hebei and Shanxi provincial governments). (12-11-84)

8. Protection measure of the source of Miyun dam, Huairou dam, and Jingmi canals. (7-3- 85)

9. Rules of implementing "PRC’s law of prevention and control of water pollution." (10- 11-85)

10. Standards of the discharge of waste water (for trial implementation). (10-15-85)

11. Circular regarding the assessment of effluent fees for waste water exceeding standards according to Beijing’s "standards of the discharge of waste water." (12-14-85)

12. Detailed rules of "protection measure of the source of Miyun dam, Huairou dam, and Jingmi canals. (4-86)

13. Provisional measures for the management of environmental protection of town and neighborhood enterprises. ( 6-13-86) 169

14. Regulating measures for the protection of underground resources of city waterworks. (6-15-86)

Tianjin: 1. Rules regarding the protection of water system and source of Hai river in the Tianjin region. (1-29-81)

2. Circular regarding implementing "Controlling indicators for industrial waste water discharge of Jizhuanzi discharge system (Provisional)." (7-9-83)

3. Standards for water pollutants discharge. (7-27-83)

4. Provisional measures for the assessment of effluent fees. (10-81-84)

5. Circular about implementing "provisional measures for the assessment of effluent fees." (12-11-84)

Hebei: 1. Decision regarding faithfully doing environmental protection work. (11-22-80)

2. Detailed rules for the provisional measures of the assessment of effluent fees. (8-7-82)

Shanxi: 1. Regulation about charges and fines for the discharge of harmful and toxic pollutants that exceed standards. (3-10-80)

2. Detailed rules for implementing "Provisional measures for the assessment of effluent fees." (5-16-85)

3. Some regulations about environmental protection. (5-24-85)

4. Supplementary circular about implementing "provisional measures for the assessment of effluent fees." (6-21-85)

5. Provisional regulation regarding the environmental protection responsibility of relevant departments and Di, Shi, and Xian governments. (6-23-86)

6. Measures for the management of environment of township and neighborhood enterprises. (6-23-86)

7. Implementation measures of examining qualification for evaluation of environmental impact of construction items. (8-1-86) 170

8. Detailed rules of implementing "Environmental protection measures for construction items." (8-15-86)

NeiMonggol: 1. Rules for environmental protection. (6-30-82)

2. Rules for the comprehensive treatment of environment in Baotou city. (11-5-86)

Liaoning: 1. Provisional regulations for the charges and fines for the discharge of pollutants. (80-5- 15)

2. Provisional rules for the management of smoke and dust. (9-27-83)

3. Some regulations regarding the environmental management of small industries. (5-31- 84)

4. Some regulations regarding the improvement of the assessment of effluent fees. (12-9- 85)

Jilin: 1. Standards for the environmental quality of the Sonhua river system (for trial implementation) (with Heilongjiang provincial government). (6-2-81)

2. Standards for the total amount of discharge of pollutants into the second Sonhua river. (1-27-83)

3. Provisional regulations of environmental protection. (7-31-85)

4. Provisional measures for the verification of the qualification for the evaluation of environmental impact of construction items. (11-16-85)

5. Circular about transmitting "Circular regarding the issue of ’Measures for the management of environmental protection of construction items.’" (4-25-86)

Heilongjiang: 1. Provisional regulation regarding the faithful implementation of the "three synchronism" in renovation, reconstruction, and expansion projects. ( 7-21-80)

2. Decision regarding environmental protection work. (11-7-80)

3. Provisional regulation regarding charges and fines for discharge of harmful and toxic pollutants that exceed state standards. (11-7-80) 171

4. Provisional rules for the work of monitoring environment. (8-28-80)

5. Detailed rules for the work of monitoring environment. (10-4-80)

6. Discharging standards of pollutants for the Sonhua river system. (10-20-81)

7. Controlling standards of five-day total B.O.D. for Sonhua river system. (10-20-81)

8. Measures for the assessment of effluent fees. (9-3-82)

Shanghai: 1. Measures for the charges and fines for the discharge of pollutants by business and enterprises. (8-12-80)

2. Measures of safety management of dangerous chemical stuff. (1982)

3. Provisional measures for preventing new environmental pollution. (5-12-83)

4. Measures for the assessment of effluent fees and fines. (5-11-84)

5. Detailed rules of "Measures for the assessment of effluent fees and fines." (7-4-84)

6. Regulations regarding the protection of source of the upper stream of the Huangpu river. (4-19-85)

7. Environmental protection detailed rules of "Measures of safety management of dangerous chemicals." (10-25-85)

8. Provisional measure for the environmental protection of township and neighborhood industries. (7-4-86)

9. Provisional regulation for the management of beaches. (12-7-86)

Jiangsu: 1. Trial measure for the assessment of effluent fees and fines. (8-22-80)

2. Regulation of the protection of source of the Tai Lake. (5-30-82)

3. Regulation for discharge of boilers and smoke and dust. (10-31-84)

4. Measure for environmental management of township and neighborhood enterprises. (12- 7-86) 172

Zhejiang: 1. Provisional regulation for the control and prevention of environmental pollution. (3-9- 81)

2. Provisional regulation for the assessment of effluent fees and fines. (3-9-81)

3. Provisional regulation for the assessment of effluent fees and fines. (6-7-82)

Anhui: 1. Regulation for the protection of source of Cao Lake. (8-25-87)

2. Measure for the protection of water quality of the source of Dongpu dam of Hefei city. (12-20-87)

Fuiian: 1. Provisional regulation for the assessment of fees for discharges that exceed standards. (6-26-81)

2. Regulation regarding the enhancement of the management of the assessment of fees for discharges that exceed standards. (11-16-84)

3. Circular regarding enforcement of "State Council’s regulation for the environmental management of township and neighborhood enterprises. (12-28-84)

4. Environmental protection regulation of Xiamen city. (8-30-85)

5. Provisional measure for the report and registration of the discharge of pollutants. (2-15- 86)

Jiangxi: 1. Provisional measure for the assessment of effluent fees. (6-19-82)

2. Supplementary regulation of "The provisional measure for the assessment of effluent fees." (5-30-85)

Shandong: 1. Trial regulation for the assessment of fees for the discharge of harmful waste water. (5-18-80)

2. Environmental protection measures for small basic construction, technological items, and enterprises of commune teams, neighborhood, and joint venture of agricultural, labor, and commercial sectors. (2-82) 173

3. Ordinances regarding the prevention and treatment of smoke style air pollution in cities. (8-30-83)

4. Measures for the environmental management of township and neighborhood enterprises. (7-21-85)

5. Measure for the assessment of effluent fees. (3-27-86)

6. Financial management measures for the effluent fees. (5-12-86)

Henan: 1. Environmental protection measures for basic construction and technological projects. (12-25-80)

2. Provisional measures for the assessment of fees for the discharge of pollutants that exceed standards. (5-28-81)

3. Measures for the assessment of effluent fees. (2-26-83)

4. Detailed rules for the assessment of effluent fees in Luoyang city. (7-12-85)

5. Measures for the environmental management of township and neighborhood enterprises. (7-19-87)

Hubei: 1. Decision regarding seriously enforcing environmental protection work and ’sanitary movement.’ (7-11-80)

2. Provisional environmental protection regulation. (4-3-82)

3. Provisional measures for the renovation of industrial boilers. (3-2-83)

4. Provisional measures for the environmental management of township and neighborhood enterprises. (7-7-86)

Hunan: 1. Rules of the work of environmental monitoring station in each level. (3-11-81)

2. Provisional regulation of environmental protection. (5-31-81)

3. Measures for the assessment of effluent fees and fines for polluting the environment. (1-19-83)

4. Measures for the management of the quality of monitoring work. (1-30-83) 174

5. Detailed rules of "Environmental protection measures of construction items." (10-5-86)

6. Measures for the environmental management of township and neighborhood enterprises. (12-31-86)

Guangdong: 1. Provisional measures for the prevention of pollution by electroplating plant. (1-7-81)

2. Provisional regulation for the protection of the Dong river system. (1-7-81)

3. Provisional regulation for the elimination of smoke and dust. (1-7-81)

4. Measures for the assessment of effluent fees. (7-10-82)

5. Circular regarding the prohibition of manufacturing arsenic with traditional methods. (10-16-82)

6. Circular regarding the continuing enforcement of "Trial standards for the discharge of three industrial wastes." (6-2-84)

7. Circular regarding the improvement and enhancement of the work of the assessment of effluent fees. (4-30-86)

8. Regulation regarding the prevention of drinking water pollution. (1-22-87)

Guangxi: 1. Measures for the management of effluent fees. (6-29-83)

Sichuan: 1. Provisional environmental protection measures of basic construction. (1-10-81)

2. Provisional measures for the elimination of smoke and dust. (11-17-84)

3. Ordinances regarding the prohibition of manufacturing sulphur with traditional methods which pollute environment. (8-5-85)

4. Provisional measures for the environmental management of township and neighborhood enterprises. (1-21-86)

Guizhou: 1. Regulation regarding the encouragement of comprehensive use of three wastes and the assessment of fees and fines for discharging three wastes. (5-6-80)

2. Detailed rules for the assessment of effluent fees. (11-12-83) 175

3. Measures for the environmental management of small basic construction, and technological items. (8-12-85)

4. Provisional measures for the report and registration of the discharge of pollutants. (6- 25-86)

Yunnan: 1. Regulation for the management of discharging pollutants. (11-9-80)

2. Provisional environmental protection regulation. (7-3-86)

Shaanxi: 1. Trial measures for the assessment of fees for discharging pollutants. ( 3-7-81)

2. Regulation regarding the implementation of State Council’s "Provisional measures for the assessment of effluent fees." (11-12-82)

Gansu: 1. Provisional regulation for the prevention and treatment of air pollution in cities. (9-17- 86)

2. Regulation regarding monitoring worker. (9-17-86)

Qinghai: 1. Provisional measures for the elimination of smoke and dust. (11-12-81)

2. Provisional measures for the assessment of effluent fees. (1-23-84)

3. Circular regarding some problems about the assessment of effluent fees. (1984)

4. Circular regarding the use of effluent fees collected from the discharge of pollutants that exceed standards. (1985)

Ningxia: 1. Provisional measures for the assessment of effluent fees. (5-15-82)

2. Regulation regarding the enhancement of environmental management of township and neighborhood enterprises. (5-4-84)

3. Detailed rules for the management of the monitor of the environment. (4-19-85)

Xinjiang: 1. Regulation for the elimination of smoke and dust. (3-18-81) 176

2. Concrete regulation regarding the implementation of State Council’s "Provisional measures for the assessment of effluent fees. (7-25-83)

3. Regulation regarding the review and approval of the report of environmental impact of developing construction items. (1-25-84)

4. Concrete regulations for the environmental management of small scale basic construction (for trial implementation) (1-25-84)

* The provincial title of each regulation is ommitted. 177

APPENDIX B

POLICY INNOVATION

Table B.l The number of policy innovation

Province Item 123456789 Beijing * * * * * Shanxi * * Liaoning * Jilin * Heilongjiang * * Jiangsu * Guangdong * Sichuan * Gansu *

Content of items: 1. Reducing the number of electroplate plants and establishing a specialized coordination center for electroplating.

2. "License for electroplate" system.

3. Power plants should use three kinds of coal as major fuel. 4. The discharge of waste gas should use exhaust pipe.

5. No spray paint, burning tar, asphalt felt, rubber, plastic, etc., in city and densely populated area.

6. Limitation on the number of boats in dens.

7. Particular regulation about the BOD and COD of water.

8. The making of local environmental standards.

9. Charge 5 dollars of effluent fee for every ton of a special kind of coal (Tu Jiau) coked. 178

Table B.l (Continued) Province Item

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Beij ing ** Shanxi ★ * * * Liaoning * * * Jilin * Shanghai *** Fuj ian * Shandong * Henan * ★ Hunan * ** Guangdong * Ningxia ★ * Xinj iang *

Content of items: 10. Charge 10% of sale price for every ton of sulphur coked. 11. The allocation of fine.

12. Regulation of the height of chimney pipe with respect to the density of smoke and dust.

13. Specific regulation about the quantities of pollutants discharged by certain plants.

14. The shift of pollution to small enterprises or township and neighborhood enterprises is not allowed.

15. Provincial government should assign one comrade responsible for managing small enterprises or township and neighborhood enterprises.

16. Fine for pollution shift

17. Fine for burning tar, asphalt felt, rubber, plastic, etc., in city and densely populated area.

18. Only one discharge port is allowed in new construction item. 179

Table B.l (Continued)

Province Item 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Tianjin * * Heilongjiang * Shanghai * Zhejiang * Fujian * Henan * * * * * Hunan * Guangdong * Ningxia *

Content of items: 19. Individual enterprises and peasants are not allowed to produce products which also produce three wastes.

20. The making of local discharge standards.

21. The waive of effluent fees diming the period of ceasing production or discharge.

22. Fine for discharging without compliance with stipulation in the license.

23. Scientific research of pollution problem of township and neighborhood enterprises should be deemed as an important task of environmental protection department (EPD) and research institute.

24. Effluent fees may be waived or reduced for products form comprehensive utilization of three wastes.

25. Effluent fees may be waived or reduced for limekiln far away from densely populated area.

26. Divide the clean waste water from the dirty waste water and recycle as much as possible to reduce the discharge of waste water.

27. For waste water which contains first type of pollutants, it will be assessed according to the situation at the final port. If it does not exceed standards at the final port, it will be assessed according to the situation at the branch port. 180

Table B.l (Continued)

Province Item 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 Guangdong Gansu Qinghai Xinj iang

Content of items: 28. Effluent charge for boilers.

29. The boiler operator requires a license to operate it.

30. Responsibility system for the collection of effluent fees.

31. High efficiency smoke and dust removing equipment is required for two kinds of boilers.

32. Mechanical boilers should be used for one ton/hour boilers.

33. Mechanic and automatic operation for fuel-boiler.

34. Effluent fee for wastes containing radioactive material. 35. Effluent fee for storing solid wastes without flood prevention facilities.

36. No manufacturing of arsenic with indigenous method. 181

Table B.l (Continued)

Province Item 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 Beij ing ★ Shanghai ★ Henan Guangdong Sichuan Yunnan Ningxia ★ * * Xinj iang ★ *

Content of items: 37. Place for storing arsenic must be examined and accepted by the EPD.

38. No new construction, expansion, or renovation of plants producing sulphur with indigenous method.

39. Local government should organize cross-regional pollution treatment work.

40. The reduction of effluent fees for units that treat pollution but still exceed state standards because of technology unavailability.

41. The effluent fees can be delayed during period of treating pollution.

42. Two special kinds of boilers (Fei Ten boilers and Pen Fen boilers) are not allowed.

43. The production of products that cause pollutants which cannot be dissolved in the human body is not allowed in township and neighborhood enterprises.

44. Different grades of environmental standards for different areas.

45. Waste water discharge license system. 182 Table B.l (Continued)

Province Item 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 Beijing * Shanxi * * Liaoning * Shanghai * Fujian * * Henan * *

Content of items: 46. Discharge license will be issued after the test of EPA for neighborhood enterprises. It will be suspended for not reporting significant change of pollutants.

47. New construction or expansion of large and medium power plant should reach the following indicators.

48. EPD at each level should establish an arbitration institute to solve pollution dispute.

49. For the environmental protection subsidized items, the responsibility system should be adopted.

50. The use of dangerous chemicals requires a "use license."

51. After two years of production of large and medium construction items, an evaluation of the environmental impact report should be made and the problem detected shall be solved.

52. Any unit should apply for the license of discharging wastes, which is valid for 2 years. Temporary licenses may be issued to the units that exceed standards temporarily.

53. Seasonal production for production items which produce waste gas and not ready for treatment.

54. "Environmental protection license" as the requirement of production for neighborhood enterprises. Table B.l (Continued)

Province Total item Bei j ing 9 Tianj in 2 Hebei 0 Shanxi 8 NeiMonggol 0 Liaoning 5 Jilin 2 Heilongj iang 3 Shanghai 7 Jiangsu 1 Zhej iang 1 Anhui 0 Fuj ian 4 Jiangxi 0 Shandong 1 Henan 10 Hubei 0 Hunan 4 Guangdong 11 Guangxi 0 Sichuan 2 Guizhou 0 Yunnan 1 Shaanxi 0 Gansu 2 Qinghai 1 Ningxia 6 Xinj iang 4 184 Table B .2 The number of complementary items

Province Item

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Beij ing ★ * Shanxi Liaoning Shanghai Henan * Hubei * Hunan ★ Guangdong Sichuan Xinj iang

Content of items: 1. The effluent fee will be assessed in double for those that discharge waste water, which exceed state standards, directly into water conservancy, and scenic areas.

2. No manufacturing and sale of boilers without smoke and dust removing equipment.

3. Big and medium mines should extract other materials such as sulphur with coal.

4. Open-air mines should make land-use plan to prevent the damage of land.

5. The extraction of coal should prevent the destruction of low-level ground water and tropology.

6. Shaft gas and coal gas from coking should be utilized for domestic use or for chemical factory.

7. Fine for discharging wastes containing radioactive materials with violation of regulations.

8. Bank and financial department should support the neighborhood enterprises to treat pollution.

9. Fine for the production and sale of boilers which discharge smoke and dust that exceed state standards. 185 Table B .2 (Continued)

Province Item

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Beij ing ******* Tianj in * Hebei * * * Shanxi * * ★ * * Liaoning Heilongj iang Zhej iang Jiangxi * Henan * * * * Hunan * * * Guangdong * Guangxi * Guizhou * * Shaanxi * * Qinghai * * * Ningxia * * * Xinj iang * * *

Content of items: 10. Only brief environmental impact report is required for less pollution construction items.

11. PL A should pay effluent fees to provincial government except for local branch units.

12. The content of "environmental impact survey"

13. Double effluent fee for not meeting deadline for treating pollution.

14. Double effluent fee for dilution of pollutants. (Beijing, Zhejiang, Henan, Hunan, Ningxia, Xinjiang

15. Double effluent fee for concealing or forging about pollution.

16. Double effluent fee for discharging toxic and harmful wastes through seepage pits or crevices.

17. More specific regulation about the allocation of EPSF.

18. Fine for non-compliance with "three simultaneous" principle. 186 Table B .2 (Continued) Province Item

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Beij ing * Tianjin * Hebei ★★ Shanxi * ic * Liaoning * * Heilongj iang ** Shanghai * * Jiangsu * Henan * * Hunan ★* * * Sichuan * Qinghai ie Xinj iang *

Content of items: 19. The directors will be fined for some pollution related phenomena.

20. Double effluent fee for those that create serious pollution in densely populated area or upper stream of water conservancy and that do not treat pollution positively.

21. The definition of pollution source treatment and comprehensive treatment.

22. Fine for pollution accidents which cause economic loss and harm human health.

23. Fine for production of boilers without authorization.

24. The content of environmental impact report.

25. No "simple production," "partial production," or "trial production" can be used as an excuse before the check and acceptance by EPD.

26. Fine for new construction, expansion, or renovation items which still produce pollutants exceeding state standards after the promulgation of Environmental Protection Law.

27. Fine for those not operating or removing pollution control facilities. 187

Table B.2 (Continued)

Province Item 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 Tianj in * Shanghai * * * * Jiangsu * * * * Fuj ian * * Henan ★ Hunan ★ ★ Guizhou ★ Xinj iang ★

Content of items: 28. Fine for pollution accidents due to inappropriate management.

29. Fine for not meeting the deadline for pollution control. 30. Fine for washing toxic materials in rivers.

31. Fine for discharging waste water containing toxins.

32. Extra charge of effluent fees should be paid from benefits.

33. Fine for production of forbidden products.

34. Fine for selection of inappropriate sites.

35. Fine for not making environmental impact report

36. Fine for using forest, mountain, etc., as place to store solid wastes. 188 Table B .2 (Continued)

Province Item 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 Jiangsu * Fujian ****** Shandong * Henan * Hunan * *

Content of items:

37. Fine for not reporting accident

38. Fine for refusing to close, merge, or transform.

39. Fine for forging about environmental impact report.

40. Fine for not renewing environmental impact report after the change of construction project.

41. Fine for diverting pollution treatment fund.

42. Fine for refusing or hampering the process of monitoring.

43. Fine for concealing or delaying report of pollution accident.

44. Fine for pollution accidents.

45. Double effluent fee for concealing the quantity and density of pollutants. 189

Table B .2 (Continued)

Province Item 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 Tianjin * * Shanxi * Heilongjiang * Henan * * * Hunan * * * * Guangdong * Sichuan * * Guizhou *

Content of items: 46. Fine for discharge of toxic and harmful waste water through seepage pits or crevices.

47. The content of environmental protection chapter in the design document.

48. The selection of sites should be organized under the EPD and other relevant departments.

49. Fine for illegal discharge of pollutants and concealing pollution.

50. Fine for the leak and loss of pollutants during transportation.

51. Fine for design unit that violates EPD’s comments.

52. Fine for construction unit that produces pollution during the construction.

53. Fine for boats that cause pollution.

54. Existing sulphur plant should be treated within deadline or be closed, transformed, or merged. 190 Table B .2 (Continued) The number of complementary items Province Item 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 Tianjin * Shanxi * Heilongjiang * Shandong * * Henan * * * Sichuan * * Guizhou * Ningxia * Xinjiang *

Content of items: 55. Double effluent fee for those who do not use fund provided by their superior.

56. Fine for discharging wastes into water.

57. Explicit deadline for the review of environmental impact report by EPD.

58. Design department shall not undertake the project which has no pollution control plan.

59. Explicit deadline for the change of fuel for some boilers.

60. Explicit deadline for treatment of pollution.

61. Specific principles for the selection of sites for construction.

62. Environmental impact report should be rewritten if there is a change in construction scale or products.

63. Explicit requirement of environmental impact report for some particular industries. 191

Table B.2 (Continued)

Province Item

64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 Tianjin * Shanxi * * Heilongjiang * Shanghai * * Jiangsu * Henan * * Guangdong * * Sichuan * * Shaanxi * Qinghai * Xinjiang *

Content of items: 64. Fine for continuous pollution after notification, criticism, or warning.

65. Fine for assessment unit for assessing environmental impact without compliance with regulations.

66. The content of environmental protection chapter in design document.

67. The content of pollution control design.

68. The definition of dangerous chemicals. (Shanghai)

69. The export of dangerous chemicals from other provinces should be approved by the EPD. (Shanghai)

70. No new construction of arsenic coking plant. (Guangdong)

71. The site selection, design, etc. of industries with foreign capital should be participated by the EPD. (Sichuan)

72. Bank will collected effluent fees directly from the account for those that delay or refuse to pay effluent fees. 192

Table B.2 (Continued)

Province Item 73 74 75 76 77 total number Beijing 10 Tianjin * 8 Hebei 5 Shanxi 12 NeiMonggol 0 Liaoning * 5 Jilin 0 Heilongjiang 6 Shanghai 9 Jiangsu * 8 Zhej iang 2 Anhui 0 Fujian 8 Jiangxi 1 Shandong * 4 Henan 19 Hubei 1 Hunan * * * 21 Guangdong 5 Guangxi 1 Sichuan * 8 Guizhou 6 Yunnan 0 Shaanxi 3 Gansu 0 Qinghai 5 Ningxia 4 Xinjiang 9

Content of items: 73. No Environmental Protection Subsidy Fund (EPSF) for units that pollute environment and which are not qualified for treatment.

74. All dust and smoke removing equipment should be examined and accepted by the Environmental Protection Department (EPD).

75. Fine for industries in which leaders ignore and delay the treatment of pollution.

76. Fine should be paid from the benefits.

77. Two stages of environmental impact evaluation. 193

Table B.3 The number of relatively more restrictive items Province Item 12345678 Beijing * Tianjin * * * Shanghai * Shandong * * * * Henan * Shaanxi * Ningxia *

Content of items: 1. More restrictive deadline for paying effluent fee.

2. Double or triple effluent fee for new construction, expansion, or renovation items which discharge wastes that exceed standards after the promulgation of the Environmental Protection Law.

3. Two to five times of regular effluent fee for those discharging pollutants which exceed standards after the promulgation of the Environmental Protection Law.

4. Double or triple effluent fee for those not operating or removing pollution control facilities.

5. Two to five times of regular effluent fee for not operating or removing pollution control facilities.

6. Double or triple effluent fee for those not meeting the deadline for pollution treatment.

7. Two to five times of regular effluent fee for not meeting the deadline for treating pollution.

8. Triple effluent fee for not meeting the deadline for pollution treatment. 194

Table B.3 (Continued)

Province Item 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Liaoning * Fujian * Henan * * * * * Hunan * * Shaanxi * Xinjiang *

Content of items: 9. Double to triple effluent fee for township and neighborhood enterprises not meeting the deadline for pollution treatment.

10. Less subsidy for enterprises to treat pollution.

11. Extra charge of6% of regular fee for those that do not change at all after 3 years of collection of effluent fee.

12. Triple effluent fee for concealing facts.

13. Four times of regular effluent fee for concealing facts during accident.

14. Triple effluent fee for dilution.

15. Triple effluent fee for discharging toxic and harmful waste water through seepage pits or crevices.

16. Triple effluent fee for discharging waste water intensively. 195

Table B.3 (Continued)

Province Item 17 18 Total number Beijing 1 Tianjin 3 Hebei 0 Shanxi 0 NeiMonggol 0 Liaoning 1 Jilin 0 Heilongjiang 0 Shanghai 1 Jiangsu 0 Zhej iang 0 Anhui 0 Fujian 1 Jiangxi 0 Shandong 4 Henan * 7 Hubei 0 Hunan * 2 Guangdong 0 Guangxi 0 Sichuan 0 Guizhou 0 Yunnan 0 Shaanxi 2 Gansu 0 Qinghai 0 Ningxia 1 Xinjiang * * 4

Content of items: 17. Triple effluent fee for discharging waste water which exceeds standards into densely populated areas, scenic area, or water conservancy.

18. Extra 50 dollars fines for boilers which discharge smoke and dust that exceed grade 2 of Ringelman Density. 196

APPENDIX C

DATA ABOUT PROVINCIAL ELITE

NAME PROVINCE MONTH GEN CAR NAT An Pingsheng Yunnan 66.5 1 1 2 Bai Dongcai Jiangxi 33 .0 1 1 2 Bai Dongcai Jiangxi 32.5 1 1 2 Bai Jinian Shaanxi 35.0 1 1 1 Bai Lichen Ningxia 8 .0 2 2 2 Bai Rubing Shandong 38.5 1 1 2 Buhe NeiMonggol 56.5 1 1 1 Chen Beichen Liaoning 10 .5 1 1 - Chen Guangyi Fuj ian 21.5 2 2 1 Chen Guangyi Gansu 37 .0 2 2 2 Chen Guodong Shanghai 63 .5 1 2 2 Chen Huiguang Guangxi 29.0 2 2 1 Chen Lei Heilongj iang 65.0 1 1 • Chen Pixian Hubei 38.5 1 1 2 Chen Puru Liaoning 29.0 1 1 . Chen Weida Tianj in 5.5 1 1 2 Chen Weida Tianj in 58.0 1 1 2 Chen Xitong Beij ing 57.5 1 1 2 Cheng Weigao Henan 5.5 2 2 2 Chi Biqing Guizhou 61.5 1 1 • Dai Suli Henan 25.0 1 1 2 Duan Junyi Henan 12 .5 1 2 2 Duan Junyi Beij ing 41.0 1 2 2 Feng Jixin Gansu 24 .5 1 1 • Gao Dezhan Jilin 25.5 2 2 2 Gao Di Jilin 31.0 1 1 2 Gao Yang Hebei 35.0 1 1 2 Gu Xiulian Jiangsu 56.5 2 2 1 Guan Guangfu Hubei 57.5 1 2 2 Guo Feng Liaoning 55.0 ••• Guo Zhenqian Hubei 19.5 2 2 2 Han Ningfu Hubei 31.5 1 1 • Han Peixin Jiangsu 9.0 1 1 1 Han Peixin Jiangsu 6 6 .0 1 1 1 He Zhiqiang Yunnan 28.5 2 2 1 He Zhukang Henan 51.0 1 2 2 He Zhukang Jilin 5.5 1 2 2 Hei Boli Ningxia 48.5 1 1 2 Ho Shilian Shanxi 30.0 1 1 • Hou Jie Heilongj iang 31.0 1 2 2 Hou Zongbin Shaanxi 3.0 1 2 2

Hu Jintau Guizhou 29.5 2 1 2 HtOtOtOtOHHPWWtOH* H . W W • H H (O (OH tO H H tOH tO W H tO HH tO H H HW PH W NAME PROVINCE MONTH GEN CAR NAT EDU Hu Ping Fuj ian 52 .5 2 2 2 1 Hu Qili Tianj in 23 .0 1 1 2 1 Huang Huang Anhui 39.5 2 1 2 2 Huang Jingbo Qinghai 30.0 1 1 2 2 Huang Jingbo Qinghai 31.5 1 1 2 2 Huang Zhizhen Hubei 15.5 1 1 2 2 Huang Zhizhen Hubei 45.0 1 1 2 2 Hui Yuyu Jiangsu 30.5 1 1 1 2 Ismail Amat Xinj iang 72.0 2 1 1 2 Jia Zhijie Gansu 19 .5 2 2 2 1 Jiang Chunyun Shandong 5.5 1 1 1 2 Jiang Minkuan Sichuan 30.0 2 2 2 1 Jiang Weiqing Jiangxi 32 .5 1 1 2 2 Jiang Zemin Shanghai 29.0 1 2 2 1 Jiang Zemin Shanghai 1.5 1 2 2 1 Jiaon Rouyu Beij ing 26.0 1 1 2 2 Jin Ming Hebei 30.0 1 1 2 2 Kong Fei NeiMonggol 39.5 1 1 1 1 Li Changan Shandong 25.5 2 2 2 1 Li Changchun Liaoning 17.5 2 2 2 1 Li Dengying Gansu 39.5 1 1 2 2 Li Erzhong Hebei 30.5 1 1 1 2 Li Fengping Zhej iang 39.5 1 1 . 2 Li Guixian Liaoning 12 .5 2 2 1 1 Li Guixian Anhui 18.0 2 2 2 1 Li Lian Heilongj iang 40.5 1 1 2 2 Li Ligong Shanxi 56.5 1 1 1 2 Li Qingwei Shaanxi 53 .5 1 1 2 2 Li Ruihuan Tianj in 4.0 2 1 1 2 Li Ruihuan Tianj in 67.5 2 1 1 2 Li Ximing Beij ing 42 .5 1 2 2 1 Li Xuezhi Ningxia 96.0 1 1 2 2 Li Ziqi Gansu 57.5 1 1 2 2 Liang Buting Shandong 25.5 1 1 1 1 Liang Buting Shandong 57 .5 1 1 1 1 Liang Buting Qinghai 36.5 1 1 2 1 Liang Lingguang Guangdong 29.0 1 2 2 2 Liao Zhigao Fuj ian 25.5 1 1 2 1 Lin Hujia Beijing 12 .5 1 1 2 2 Lin Hujia Beij ing 12 .5 1 1 2 2 Lin Rou Guangdong 29.5 1 1 1 1 Liu Bingyan Hebei 8 .0 1 2 • 2 Liu Jie Henan 14.5 1 2 • 2 Liu Jie Henan 53.0 1 2 • 2 Liu Minghui Yunnan 39.5 1 1 2 2 Liu Tianfu Guangdong 28.5 1 1 * 2 Liu Zhen Hunan 25.5 2 1 1 1 Lu Dadong Sichuan 35.5 1 1 • 2 Lu Rongj ing Anhui 6 .0 2 2 1 2 Luo Guibo Shanxi 39.5 1 1 2 1 Ma Wanli Qinghai 30.0 1 1 2 2 NAME PROVINCE MONTH GEN CAR NAT EDU Ma Wenrui Shaanxi 57 .0 1 1 1 2 Ma Xin Ningxia 39.5 1 2 2 1 Ma Xingyuan Fuj ian 39.5 1 1 . 2 Mao Zhiyong Hunan 96.0 2 1 1 2 Ni Xiance Jiangxi 16.0 1 2 2 1 Ni Zhifu Tianj in 34.0 2 2 2 1 Pen Chong Shanghai 3.5 1 1 2 1 Pen Chong Shanghai 2.5 1 1 2 1 Pu Chaozhu Yunnan 28.0 1 1 1 2 Pu Chaozhu Yunnan 29.5 1 1 1 2 Qiang Xiaochu Jilin 43 .0 1 1 2 2 Qiao Xiaoguang Guangxi 67.0 1 1 - 2 Qin Yinji Guangxi 39.5 1 1 1 2 Quan Shuren Liaoning 39.0 2 1 1 2 Quan Shuren Liaoning 18.0 2 1 1 2 Ren Zhongyi Guangdong 56.0 1 1 2 2 Ren Zhongyi Liaoning 10 .5 1 1 2 2 Rui Xingwen Shanghai 28.5 1 2 2 1 Sehn Yinluo Hubei 15.5 1 2 2 2 Song Hanliang Xinj iang 26.0 2 2 2 1 Song Ping Gansu 14.0 1 2 2 1 Song Ruixiang Qinghai 29.0 2 2 2 1 Su Gang Guizhou 39.5 1 1 2 2 Su Yiran Shandong 39.5 2 1 2 2 Su Yiran Shandong 39.5 2 1 2 2 Sun Guozhi Hunan 40.5 1 2 • 2 Sun Weiben Heilongj iang 25.5 1 1 2 2 Tan Qilong Sichuan 38.0 1 1 2 2 Tie Ying Zhej iang 38.5 1 1 . 2 Tomur Dawamat Xinj iang 24.0 2 1 1 2 Wan Li Anhui 2.5 1 2 2 1 Wan Shaofen Jiangxi 30.5 2 1 1 1 Wang Chaowen Guizhou 56.6 2 1 1 2 Wang Daohan Shanghai 57.5 1 2 2 1 Wang Enmao Jilin 2 2 .0 1 1 2 2 Wang Enmao Xinj iang 48.5 1 1 2 2 Wang Fang Zhej iang 54.0 1 2 2 2 Wang Feng Xinj iang 21.5 1 1 2 1 Wang Qian Shanxi 9.5 1 1 2 2 Wang Qin NeiMonggol 4.0 1 1 2 2 Wang Quanguo Hubei 15.5 1 1 2 2 Wang Shenhao Shanxi 56.5 2 2 2 1 Wang Yuzhao Anhui 50.5 1 1 2 2 Wang Zhaoguo Fuj ian 4.0 2 2 2 1 Wei Chunshu Guangxi 56.6 1 1 1 2 Wu Guanzheng Jiangxi 14.0 2 2 1 1 Xi Zhongxun Guangdong 10 .5 1 1 2 2 Xi Zhongxun Guangdong 10.5 1 1 2 2 Xiang Nan Fuj ian 49.0 1 1 2 2 Xie Feng Hebei 2 0 .0 1 • 2 Xing Chongzhi Hebei 31.0 1 1 1 2 199 NAME PROVINCE MONTH GEN CAR NAT EDU Xiong Qingquan Hunan 30.0 2 1 1 1 Xu Jiatun Jiangsu 30.0 1 1 1 2 Xue Ju Zhej iang 56.5 1 1 2 1 Xue Ju Zhej iang 3.5 1 1 2 1 Yang Rudai Sichuan 56.5 2 1 1 2 Yang Xizong Sichuan . 30.5 2 1 1 1 Yang Xizong Henan 30.5 1 1 2 1 Yang Yichen Heilongj iang 30.0 1 1 2 1 Ye Xuanping Guangdong 28.0 1 2 1 1 Yin keshen Qinghai 29.5 2 2 2 1 Yu Ke Jilin 26.5 1 1 2 1 Yu Mingtao Shaanxi 39.5 1 1 2 2 Zhang Boxing Shaanxi 4.0 2 2 2 1 Zhang Gensheng Jilin 1 0 .0 1 1 2 2 Zhang Guosheng Qinghai 35.5 1 1 2 2 Zhang Jingfu Anhui 14.5 1 2 1 1 Zhang Jingfu Anhui 25.0 1 2 1 1 Zhang Shuguang Hebei 36.5 • 1 • 2 Zhang Shuguang NeiMonggol 17 , 0 • 1 2 . Zhao Haifeng Qinghai 30.0 1 1 2 2 Zhao Xiu Jilin 25.5 1 1 2 2 Zhao Zenyi Jiangxi 33 .5 1 1 2 2 Zhao Ziyang Sichuan 1.5 1 1 2 1 Zhou Hui NeiMonggol 75.0 1 1 2 2 Zhou Zijian Anhui 25.0 1 2 2 2 Zhou Zijian Anhui 1 1 .0 1 2 2 2

NOTE: 1. Month: month of service in a leadership position such as governor or secretary. 2. Gen: 1: first generation. 2: second generation. 3. Car: 1: political bureaucrats. 2 : technocratic bureaucrats. 4. Nat: 1: native leader. 2: non-native leader. 5. Edu: 1: college. 2: below college. 200

APPENDIX D

CORRELATION MATRIX OF ALL VARIABLES

1 pee modern avenipc aveindus urlevel aveedu agrnipc

pee | 1.0000 modern | 0.7022 1.00 00 avenipc j 0.5370 0.9283 1.0000 aveindus j 0.6565 0.9496 0.8525 1.0000 urlevel j 0.6899 0.9210 0.7670 0.8733 1.0000 aveedu j 0.7283 0.9186 0.8311 0.8035 0.7828 1.0000 agrnipc | -0.4107 -0.5281 -0.5062 -0.4539 -0.5448 -0.4579 1.0000 agrind j -0.2635 -0.4984 -0.4089 -0.4508 -0.5219 -0.4715 0.2562 urpace | -0.3914 -0.4618 -0.4329 -0.3454 -0.4467 -0.4926 0.3462 keycity | 0.3628 0.4563 0.3620 0.5696 0.4409 0.3226 -0.1666 rankl | 0.3478 0.5115 0.5139 0.5965 0.3794 0.4108 -0.0847 commit | 0.1554 -0.1772 -0.2273 -0.1911 -0.0984 -0.1416 0.0699 lawppc | 0.1757 0.2425 0.2755 0.3153 0.1904 0.1187 0.1929 gen j 0.0289 -0.1763 -0.1439 -0.1836 -0.1393 -0.1890 -0.1009 career | 0.2017 0.4152 0.5778 0.3635 0.1717 0.4313 -0.1055 native | -0.1362 -0.2865 -0.2215 -0.2713 -0.3031 -0.2694 -0.0106 edu j 0.3205 0.3862 0.4068 0.2527 0.3099 0.4681 -0.1190 stab | -0.1188 0.2280 0.2498 0.2580 0.1759 0.1634 0.2326

1 agrind urpace keycity rankl commit lawppc gen

agrind | 1.0000 urpace j 0.4622 1.0000 keycity j -0.2175 0.1164 1.0000 rankl | -0.2394 0.1893 0.6471 1.0000 commit | 0.0813 0.1506 -0.0481 -0.1016 1.0000 lawppc | 0.0650 -0.2088 0.2330 0.1675 0.0173 1.0000 gen | -0.0371 -0. 1773 0.0868 0.0318 0.0723 -0.0006 1.0000 career | -0.0683 -0.1382 0.0329 0.2940 0.0651 0.2348 -0.1953 native j 0.1089 0.1784 0.0103 0.0460 -0.2412 -0.1544 0.4549 edu | -0.1848 -0.1270 -0.0201 0.2316 0.1675 -0.0294 -0.1581 stab | -0.2921 -0.0645 0.0187 0.1906 -0.2429 0.4050 -0.1839

1 career native edu stab

career | 1.0000 native | -0.4266 1.0000 edu j 0.5026 -0.3170 1.0000 stab j 0.3888 -0.4508 0.2640 1.0000

pee: pollution control effort; modem: index of modernization; avenipc: average national income per capita; aveindus: average level of industrialization; urlevel: level of urbanization; aveedu: level of education; agrnipc: average growth rate of national income per capita; agrind: average growth rate of industrialization; urpace: pace of urbanization; keycity: selection of keycity; rankl: rank of EPB; commit: existence of EPC; lawppc: number of laws enacted by PPC; gen: generations; came: career pattern; native: natives or outsiders; edu: education of leaders; stab: elite stability. 201

APPENDIX E

A summary table of all variables

Province A B c D E F

Beij ing 15.89 X X X 37 0 Tianj in 6.46 X X 43 54.95 Hebei -1.34 42 0 Shanxi 4.08 XX 36 29.43 NeiMonggol -1.99 20 0 Liaoning 4.33 X X X 61 45.31 Jilin -3 .38 X 41 13 .49 Heilongj iang 3 .76 XX 42 0 Shanghai 2.85 XX 44 0 Jiangsu -1.95 X X 43 29 .43 Zhej iang -3 .90 X X X 43 0 Anhui -6.43 X 46 33.07 Fuj ian -1.43 X 36 40.63 Jiangxi -4.74 X 37 23 .18 Shandong 0.56 X XX 38 11.02 Henan 3 .43 X 50 2 .86 Hubei -3 .86 X X 34 8.18 Hunan 2 .41 X X 32 78.91 Guangdong -0 .48 X X X 43 0 Guangxi -4.61 X 19 15.10 Sichuan -2.29 XX 42 60.94 Guizhou -0.27 XX 43 45.99 Yunnan -4.30 42 14.84 Shaanxi -1.25 X 31 2.08 Gansu -1.65 X X X 17 29.43 Qinghai -3 .56 39 23 .21 Ningxia 0.76 X 32 4.17 Xinj iang 1.70 X 22 63 .54

A: Index of PCE B: Provinces with key point cities designated by the center. C: Provinces with environmental protection commission. D: Provinces with EPB as the first rank organization. E: The number of laws enacted by PPC from Nov. 1979 to Dec. 1987. F: The percentage of service time of the second-generation political leaders. 202

(Continued)

Province GHEJK ]

Beij ing 43 .49 73 .44 0 4 1410 91 .27 Tianj in 17 .71 29 .69 37 .24 4 1419 90 .84 Hebei 4 .19 18 .32 32 .20 5 438 66 .06 Shanxi 29,.43 50 .00 29 .43 3 474 71,.84 NeiMonggol 0 50 .00 50 .00 3 418 60,.38 Liaoning 15 .63 15 .63 36 .20 6 858 84 .13 Jilin 16,.40 30 .42 0 6 538 71,.20 Heilongj iang 16,.15 15 .63 0 3 664 74,.38 Shanghai 96,.77 65 .86 0 6 2540 94,.88 Jiangsu 29,.43 29 .43 100 ,.00 3 671 71..39 Zhej iang 28,.13 31 .25 0 3 624 67..89 Anhui 53 ,.13 31 .25 23 ,.70 6 382 56.,17 Fuj ian 40 ,.63 53 .91 1 1 ,.20 4 427 60.,59 Jiangxi 15..63 65 .63 23 ,.18 5 367 58,,10 Shangdong 1 1 ,.02 63 .50 38,.23 5 537 63 ,.62 Henan 71,.09 48 .96 0 5 360 57..76 Hubei 38 ..78 32 .29 0 7 540 6 8 ,.80 Hunan 2 1 ,.94 28 .91 78..91 3 406 58,.58 Guangdong 29.,69 29 .95 29., 95 5 528 67..42 Guangxi 15..10 15 .10 65.,10 2 307 54,.84 Sichuan 15.,63 32 .29 45.,31 4 360 59,.71 Guizhou 0 15 .78 30.,21 2 270 54..71 Yunnan 14.,84 14 .84 44.,79 3 323 57 ,.48 Shaanxi 3 .,65 2 .08 47.,92 4 360 67..76 Gansu 36.,72 36 .72 0 4 372 71..46 Qinghai 23 .,21 37 .70 0 7 435 61.,91 Ningxia 24 .,13 24 .74 0 3 403 64.,30 Xinj iang 13 .,54 24 .74 50.,00 3 499 57.,23

G: The percentage of service time of technocratic bureaucrats. H: The percentage of service time of provincial leaders who had attended college. I: The percentage of service time of native leaders. J: The frequency of elite turnover from 1980 to 1987. K: The average national income per capita by province from 1980 to 1987. L: The degree of industrialization. (Continued)

Province M N O P

Beij ing 6 .13 66 .0 1 4 .57 11 .37 Tianj in 4 .25 63 ..60 -21,.62 5,.09

Hebei 10 .87 22 .86 176,.03 0 ,.93 Shanxi 5 .55 39,.76 180,.27 1 .46 NeiMonggol 7 ,.86 36,.63 65,.47 1 ..32 Liaoning 6 .74 52,.80 69,.50 2 ,.26 Jilin 8 ,.98 49,.53 64,.48 2 ..28

Heilongj iang 4..64 49..18 58,.94 1 ..70 Shanghai 2 .93 60 .44 8 ,.78 8 ..00

Jiangsu 9,.52 22 ,.03 116,.18 1 ,.63

Zhej iang 9 ..95 26,.67 194,.08 1 ,.16

Anhui 1 1 ,.63 18,.42 115,.97 0 ..82 Fuj ian 8 ,.00 31,.25 1 2 1 ,.08 1 ,.36

Jiangxi 5..52 25,.22 16,.13 1 ,.28

Shangdong 9 ,.37 36,.89 305..29 0 ,.91

Henan 9,.37 16,.40 74,.51 0 ..74 Hunan 8 ,.39 32..26 181..54 1 ..85

Hubei 5,.84 2 1 ..61 159..63 1 ..13

Guangdong 9,.43 29..38 219 ..00 1 ,.00

Guangxi 4,.44 24..85 248..01 0 ..71 Sichuan 7 ,.78 19 ..41 1 2 0 ,.66 0 ..97

Guizhou 8 ,.86 24 ..37 53 ..73 0 .,68

Yunnan 6 ..89 20 ..06 131..96 0 ..80 Shaanxi 6 ,.89 28 ..89, 114..40 2 ..40 Gansu 7 ,.58 25.,82 2 0 1 ..16 1 ..15 Qinghai 8 ,.12 26.,46 70..83 1 ..57

Ningxia 6 ,.56 29..88 92..23 1 ..39

Xinj iang 7 ,.66 30.,32 -7 ..35 1 ..34

M: Average growth rate of NIPC from 1980 to 1987. N: The average level of urbanization from 1980 to 1986. O: The percentage change of urbanization between 1980 and 1986. 204

APPENDIX F

THE DEFINITION OF URBAN PLACES AND URBAN POPULATION IN CHINA

In China, the definition of urban places has been changed three times, and different definitions of urban population have been used at different periods, which makes the actual size of urban population a "demographic mystery."1

Basically, urban places in China refers to the municipality (shi) and the town

(zhen). The definition of the municipality is fairly consistent in each period. It is the change in the definition of town that confuses the scholars.2 During the first census in

1953, there was no explicit definition of town. Most towns had populations over two thousand; however, there were over nine hundred towns with populations between one thousand and two thousand. In 1955, the State Council officially defined town as settlements with populations over two thousand, of which non-agricultural population should be no less than 50%. Seats of village governments were also qualified as towns.3

The second change took place in 1963. The new definition was more restrictive than before. The required population for a town was raised to three thousand, of which non-agricultural population should be no less than 70%. Or, a settlement with a population between 2500 and 3000, of which non-agricultural population was no less than

85%, could also be designated as a town. The 1984 change is minimal. The only change was that seats of village government with populations over 2000 were also qualified as towns. 205

However, these changes had little effect on the total size of the urban population

because these changes involved only the lowest layer of the urban hierarchy and because

95 percent of the urban population were found in cities and larger towns.4 For example,

there were 5404 towns in the first national census in 1953, 920 of which had populations

fewer than 2000, including 193 towns with populations less than 1000. Table 5.42 shows

that what is affected are only small number of towns. It is the definitions of urban

population that make significant difference.

Table F .l The number and population of towns in three national census

Census total '# town population as % City population as year of towns of total population % of total population 1953 5404 5.8 7.5 1964 3148 N.A. N.A.

1982 2664 6 .1 14.3 1984 6211 13.0 18.5

Source: Xiangming Chen, "China’s City Hierarchy, Urban Policy and Spatial Development in the 1980s," in Urban Studies. Vol. 28, No. 3, 1991, p. 243-245.

To understand urban population, we first need to get acquainted with three relevant

concepts: population of municipalities and towns (PMT), population of city and town

(PCT) and non-agricultural population of cities and towns (NPCT). City refers to the city 206 proper of a municipality, which also includes suburban counties, such as Beijing and

Shanghai. PMT is not a good indicator of urban population because it includes population living in suburban counties. NPCT is the most restrictive criterion of urban population because it excludes agricultural population living in and sharing all facilities in cities and towns. PCT was used to report urban population between 1949 and 1963, while NPCT was used between 1964 and 1981. After 1982, PCT replaced NPCT as urban population.

Therefore, urban populations at different periods are not comparable and cannot be used to track the growth of urban population.

The urban population data available are those of 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985,

1986. (See Table F.l) Data about urban population in 1980, 1982, and 1984 are collected from Zhong Guo Ren Ko Nian lian 1985 (China’s demographic yearbook 1985), which is based on PCT.5 The 1983 urbanization data are collected from Digest of National

Economic Statistics, which is also PCT data.6 However, the 1985 and 1986 urbanization data are incomplete. The data about Jiangxi and Sichuan are missing in both 1985 and

1986, and those about Gansu are missing in 1986. Since the urbanization data in 1985 and

1986 are missing in some provinces, we have to predict their values according to the trend of urbanization so that we can see the relationship between pollution control effort and the level of urbanization.7 207 Table F .2 The level of urbanization

Province Year 80 82 83 84 85 86

Beij ing 64,.56 64,.70 6 6 ,.06 6 6 ,.31 66 .91* 67 ..51* Tianj in 6 8 ,.18 6 8 ,.70 6 8 ,.69 69,.09 53 ,.53 53 .43 Hebei 12 ,.98 13 ,.70 15..57 27 ,.54 31 .51 35 .84 Shanxi 20 ,.32 2 1 ,.30 27 ,.68 55,.88 56 .45 56 .94 NeiMonggol 28,.50 29,.12 29,.16 42,.52 43 ,.29 47 .16 Liaoning 40,.69 42 ,.40 42 ,.60 54,.77 67 ,.34 68 .97 Jilin 38,.63 39,.50 38,.68 54 ,.99 61,.87 63 .53 Heilongj iang 38,.48 42 ..90 42 ..89 51,.35 58 ,.26 61 .16 Shanghai 58,.20 58,.80 59 ,.55 61,.16 61,.60 63 .31 Jiangsu 15..19 15,.80 2 0 .!03 22 ,.62 25 ,.69 32 .84 Zhejiang 14 ,.87 14,.98 22 ..89 25,.49 38 ,.07 43 .72 Anhui 13 ,.55 14,.30 16..55 17 ..93 18,.91 29 .26 Fuj ian 19..78 2 1 ,.18 22 .. 65 37 ,.28 42 ,.87 43 .72 Jiangxi 28..29 19 ,.40 20 ,.95 22 ,.24 27 ,.60* 32 .,86* Shandong 14 ..12 19..10 29..28 48 ..50 53 ,.13 57 .22 Henan 12 ..29 14..50 15..48 16,. 05 18,.67 21 .44 Hubei 16..78 28 ,.72 28..85 33 ..78 38 ,.19 47 .24 Hunan 12 ..71 14..21 15..88 23 ..18 30 ,.67 32 .99 Guangdong 18.,49 2 1 ..40 2 1 ..40 26..00 30 ,.02 59 .00 Guangxi 1 0 ..97 1 1 ..80 12 ..22 37..68 38 ,.29 38 .17 Sichuan 13 ..60 14 ..30 15..83 18,.39 24,.33* 30.,02* Guizhou 19..55 19..00 18..99 29..13 29,.50 30 .06 Yunnan 12 ..48 12 ..90 13 ,,47 26 ..12 26 ,.47 28 .95 Shaanxi 18..44 19 ..69 19..69 37 ..12 38,.87 39 .53 Gansu 15..12 17 ..96 17..96 20 ..59 37,.79 45 .53' Qinghai 19,.89 19..59 19..59 31..84 33 ,.85 33 .99 Ningxia 20 ..83 27 ..38 27 ..39 28..33 35,.30 40 .05 Xinj iang 29..07 25..98 33..08 40.,48 26 ,.36 26 .94

* Imputed value. See note 7 for imputing methods. 208

Endnotes

1. Kam Wing Chan & Xueqiang Xu, "Urban population growth and urbanization in China since 1949: Reconstructing a baseline," in China Quarterly, No. 104, December 1985, p. 583.

2. The following discussion of the change of definition of town is based on Zhong Guo Renkou Nianiian 1985 (The Almanac of China’s Population) (Beijing: Zhong Guo She Huei Ke Xue Chu Ban She, 1986.

3. Agricultural and non-agricultural population is differentiated according to occupation and the relationship of dependency. See Ibid., p. 805.

4. According to Kam Wing Chan and Xueqiang Xu’s calculation, the change of definition in 1963 caused the difference of one percentage point of the urbanization level in 1964.

5. Demographical reserach center of China social science institute, Zhong Guo Ren Ko Nian Jian 1985 (China’s Demographical Yearbook 1985) (Beijing: Zhoug Guo She Huei Ke Xue Chu Ban She, 1986). It juxtaposes NPCT and PCT, so I use PCT for the sake of consistency.

6. State Statistical Bureau, National Economic Statistical Digest cited from A Brief of PRC’s Administrative Division 1985 (Translation) edited by the Domestic Department of PRC, (Beijing: Cher Hui Chu Ban She, 1985), p. 150.

7. The methods of predicting those missing values are different. Since Chinese government try to control the pace of urbanization in Beijing, it growth rate won’t escalate too much. Therefore, I compute the average growth rate from 1980 to 1984 and then use it to predict the urbanization level in 1985 and 1986 in Beijing. From Table 4.43, we find that there is a great change between 1983 and 1984. Therefore, I decide to use urbanization data in 1984 and 1986 to predict missing data in 1985 and then use data in 1984 and 1985 to predict missing data in 1986. 209

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