School of Politics University College The University of New South Wales
Thach Hong Nguyen
A thesis submitted to the University ofNew South Wales in the fulfillment ofthe requirements for the degree ofDoctor ofPhilosophy Declaration
I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and, to the best of my knowledge, it contains no material previously published or written by another person, nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNS W or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by colleagues, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, during my candidature is fully acknowledged.
I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance for others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.
Thach Hong Nguyen June 2000
111 Acknowledgement
I wish to thank the University ofNew South Wales for offering me a three-year post graduate scholarship to complete this research. I am also highly indebted to Professor Carlyle Thayer and Professor James Cotton, successive Heads of the School of Politics at Australian Defence Force Academy, for their help in arranging to share the payment of my tuition fees, and the expenses of my field trips to Beijing and America. As my supervisor, Professor Thayer also gave me valuable advice during the research. Professor Cotton shared with me his insightful comments, though he did not directly supervise my research. I am grateful to Associate Professor Hugh Smith, Senior Lecturer David Kelly, my thesis co-supervisors, and Dr. Greg Austin, my thesis panellist. Dr. Greg Austin gave me 'preliminary lessons' in writing a high quality academic paper. My special thanks to Professor David Marr, whose knowledge of Vietnamese history, war-time experience in military intelligence, and his way of being 'amateur of logic' while reading my drafts were not only a 'challenge' to my research, but also a help to me, making my points much sharper. I am also grateful for his patience in carefully reading all my drafts twice over. I wish to thank all the participants at the two seminars I gave during the research, in January 1999, at the School of Politics, ADF A, and in April 1999 at the Third Triennial Conference organised by the Texas Tech University's Vietnam Centre, for their comments. I benefited as well the service from the following libraries: the Menzies and Chiefly and Hopes libraries in the ANU, and ADF A library (Canberra), Beijing Library, the libraries of Beijing, Qinghua, and Renmin universities, and the reading room of the Chinese Institute of American Studies (Beijing), the Library of Social Sciences, the Army Library, the Library of the Institute of Military History, the Library of the Institute of International Relations (Hanoi), the Vietnam Archive (Lubbock, Texas), the US National Archives at Maryland University, and the National Security Archive at George Washington University (Washington DC) and the Indochina Centre (Berkeley, California).
IV My thanks also go to Ms. Shirley Ramsay for all sorts of administrative assistance she offered me during my three-year stay in the School of Politics; to Ms. Fiona Cotton and Pamela Hewitt for their editing assistance. I am indebted toLe Cong Phung, Assistant to the Foreign Minister, and Nguyen Ba Cu, Deputy Head of the China Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for allowing me to read the department's files. Mr. Cu also shared his valuable time in helping me to read Chinese sources, as my Chinese was not fluent enough to read them in a limited time. My thanks also to the Vietnamese Embassy in Beijing, and especially to Counsellor-Minister Ho Xuan Son, for his help during my stay in Beijing. The late Premier Pham Van Dong was not only the highest-ranking official, who twice granted me an interview, but he won my heart with his charm and his devotion to the fatherland. He shared with me the importance of the research, and he encouraged me in the endeavour. To me, it became much more than a simple Ph.D. dissertation. I wish to thank all my other interviewees for sharing with me their knowledge and assessments of the events this research covers. Among them were the late Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, former Deputy Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co, Former Head of the Central Committee for External Relations Nguyen Thanh Le, Former Assistant to the Foreign Minister Luu Van Loi, former Ambassadors Ha Van Lau, Mai Van Bo, Ngo Dien, Dang Nghiem Hoanh, and China's former Ambassador to Vietnam Zhang Qing. I am greatly indebted to my parents, Nguyen Van Duong and Pham Thi Thanh V ang, my sister Nguyen Thanh Ha, and my parents-in-law Nguyen Bi and Nguyen Thi Lap who in their own way helped me and encouraged me to complete my research. Finally and most importantly, without the love, understanding and sacrifice of my beloved Xuan, this work could not have been undertaken.
Nguyen Hong Thach June 2000. Table of Contents
Declaration ...... iii Acknowledgement ...... , .. iv Table of Contents ...... •...... vi Table ofFigures ...... ix Abstract ...... x Glossary ...... xi Introduction 1
Chapter 1 Sino-American Estrangement and Separate Recognition of Vietnam, 1950 ...... 10
Sino-American estrangement ...... 10 Chinese recognition of the DRV ...... 12 American recognition of the State ofVietnam ...... 16 Conclusion ...... 19 Chapter 2 Sino-American Confrontation and partition of Vietnam, 1950-1954 ...... 21
Sino-American Confrontation ...... 22 American intervention in Vietnam ...... 25 Increasing Chinese aid to the DRV ...... 38 Conclusion ...... 48 Chapter 3 The Quasi War between China and America, and the Vietnam War, 1954-1968 ...... 51
The Sino-American Quasi War ...... 53 US bellicosity towards China ...... 54 PRC restraint towards the United States ...... 60 The US war against the DRV ...... 63
Vl China's avoidance of a confrontation with the US over Vietnam ...... 80 Conclusion ...... 93 Chapter 4 Sino-American Rapprochement and Peace for Vietnam, 1969-1973 ...... 98
Sino-American rapprochement ...... 100 The constant US search for rapprochement ...... 100 The circuitous Chinese route towards rapprochement ...... 104 The US presses for 'peace with honour' ...... 109 China presses for 'peace at any price' ...... 118 Conclusion ...... 130 Chapter 5 Sino-American Hesitancy to Normalise and Reunification of Vietnam, 1973-1977 ..... 13 3
Sino-American hesitancy over normalisation ...... 135 American reluctance to normalise Sino-American relations ...... 135 Hardening ofChinese attitude towards Sino-American normalisation ...... I40 US disengagement from Vietnam ...... 144 Chinese cold attitude towards Vietnam's reunification ...... 160 Conclusion ...... 172 Chapter 6 Sino-American Limited Strategic Co operation and Isolation of Vietnam, 1978-1988 ...... 176
Sino-American Limited Strategic Co-operation ...... 178 America's Contradictory China Policy ...... 178 The Chinese shift from unitedfront to an independent policy ...... 184 The US crusade to isolate Vietnam ...... 192 China's 'Bleeding Vietnam White' ...... 203 Conclusion ...... 214
Vll Chapter 7 Sino-American Normality & Normalisation with Vietnam, 1989-1995 ...... 217
Sino-American Normality ...... 218 American comprehensive engagement with China ...... 219 China's conciliatmy attitude towards the United States ...... 223 A difficult American normalisation with Vietnam ...... 227 Difficulties in Chinese normalisation with Vietnam ...... 239 Conclusion ...... 251 Conclusion 254
Bibliography 265
Official Documents ...... 265 Interviews ...... 268 Memoirs ...... 268 Monographs and Articles ...... 271
Vlll Table of Figures
Figure 2.1 American Aid to Indochina ...... 28
Figure 3.1 China's Aid to the DRV, 1964-1968 ...... 90
Figure 4.1 China's Military Aid to the DRV, 1968-1973 ...... 120
Figure 5.1 Value of arms shipments to North and South Vietnam, 1972-1975 ...... 153
Figure 5.2 China's Military Aid to the DRV, 1973-1975 ...... 163
IX Abstract
Vietnam is a tragic land, which has witnessed three successive wars since it won independence in 1945. The purpose of this dissertation is to seek answers to the question of why so many tragedies struck the Vietnamese people, and in particular to examine the contribution made by Sino-American competition to this tragic history. Analysing the IMP ACT of Sino-American relations on Chinese and American policies towards Vietnam, the study finds that Vietnam never was the primary subject of American foreign policy, though America was deeply involved in Vietnam during the twenty-five years between 1950 and 1975. Washington's Vietnam policy was largely based on its perception of China. Likewise, Beijing's policy towards Vietnam was greatly affected by the state of its relations with Washington. Vietnam was a victim of their confrontation. The analysis shows that the increase in American involvement during the last stage of the first Vietnam War and the start of the second Vietnam War was due to enmity between China and the United States. US neglect was a result of Sino-American rapprochement while US isolation of Vietnam resulted from Sino-American strategic co-operation. Though the third Vietnam War was a consequence of Sino-Soviet competition, Washington also indirectly encouraged Beijing to be tough with Vietnam, as it needed Chinese support in its relations with Moscow. Analysing changes in Chinese and American polices towards Vietnam, the study observes that when a small state is caught in an intra-power struggle, big powers will always try to use the small state as a tool in their rivalry. The main lesson for small states is to avoid being caught in such big-power competition. Politicians in small states should also avoid taking sides with big powers lest this create opportunities for big power interference and draw the small state into big power competition. This needs the political acumen and flexibility to distinguish national interest from self-interest.
X Glossary
ARVN Army of Republic ofVietnam cc Central Committee CCP Chinese Communist Party CMAG Chinese Military Advisors Group CMC Central Military Commission CPV Communist Party of Vietnam DAO Defence Attache Office DK Democratic Kampuchea DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam JCS Joint Chiefs Staff MACV Military Assistance Command in Vietnam MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRV) NLF National Liberation Front NSC National Security Council oss Office of Strategic Services PAVN People's Army ofVietnam PLA People's Liberation Army PRC People's Republic of China PRG Provisional Revolutionary Government ROC Republic of China SRV Socialist Republic of Vietnam SVN State ofVietnam UN United Nations WPV Workers' Party ofVietnam, or Laodong
Xl Introduction
When the DRV established diplomatic relations with China and the Soviet Union in January 1950, some Vietnamese were concerned that Vietnam would become a battlefield between the two blocs. 1 Their worries proved to be grounded. War in Vietnam continued for more than twenty years until the two big powers reached rapprochement in the early 1970s. The SRV's official line holds that the war was the result of US attempts to invade Vietnam, and to turn South Vietnam into a neo-colony. Many Americans still cannot understand why they were accused of invasion when, in their view, they were trying to help the Vietnamese nationalists resist communist 'enslavement'. The gap in perception is broad, but the two sides can agree that during those years the United States involved itself deeply in Vietnam. Why did the United States become embroiled in Vietnam for so long, and pay so dearly for it? The main reason was the perceived communist threat and, above all, perceived Chinese communist 'expansion'. This explains why, following Sino-American rapprochement, Vietnam lost its place in America's strategic plan. As big powers, Chinese and American policies towards Vietnam were little more than a product of their policies towards each other. 'Vietnam caught between China and the United States' is an accurate description of how, as a small state, Vietnam has been so greatly affected by the state of relations between these two powers. Why choose China and the United States for analysis? During the entire period, these two powers were permanently present and played active roles in Vietnamese events, in both the first and second Vietnam wars. 2 While the US role was not obvious in the Cambodian-Vietnamese border war, China played an important role of outside power in this conflict. Although disengaged from Indochina after its rapprochement with China, the United States continued to play an important role in the Sino-Vietnamese border war, as its limited strategic relationship with China encouraged the latter to be tough with Vietnam. As the two most important powers dominating
1 See 'Resolution ofthe Indochina Party's Central Committee dated 4 February 1950', in Dang Cong san Vietnam, Ban chap hanh trung uong, 1986, Van kien Dang, 1945-54 (Party's Documents, 1945-54), Vol. 2, book 2, p. 431. 2 The term 'Indochina wars' is more commonly used, but this dissertation focuses on the events in Vietnam, and addresses only partially the events in Laos and Cambodia. I, therefore, prefer to use the term 'Vietnam War' instead of 'Indochina Wars'. As for the third Indochina War, I use the term Cambodian-Vietnamese and Sino-Vietnamese border wars. 1 international relations in Southeast Asia, the roles of China and the United States in post-Cold War affairs in the region cannot be ignored. The choice of the 1950-95 period is based on their importance. The former indicates the beginning of the competition between China and the United States in Vietnam, and the latter marks an entirely new era in the relationship between the three countries. For the first time, a united Vietnam maintains diplomatic relations with both big powers. It would be a mistake to attribute all Vietnam events to relations between China and the United States. Other outside powers - the Soviet Union and France - also played a role, but not comparable to those of China and America. The Soviet Union took part in events in Vietnam only occasionally. Although Soviet recognition of the DRV was cited as a prime reason for American recognition of the State of Vietnam in early 1950, the Soviet presence was insignificant during the first Vietnam War, except for its participation in the 1954 Geneva Conference. The Soviets became actively involved in Vietnam only from late 1964, after the fall of Khrushchev. This ceased to be the case after the end of the Cold War. Russia, re-emergent and weak, is not powerful
~ enough to participate in events far from home. France's role is even weaker than the Soviet, following its withdrawal from Vietnam in the mid-1960s. This dissertation does not exclude those states. They are discussed when necessary to highlight the role as well as the limits of the two main factors - China and the United States - in events in Vietnam. Was the relationship between China and the United States the main factor in shaping these two countries' policies towards Vietnam? This is the hypothesis this dissertation seeks to test, through empirical examination of the relationship between China and the United States, and their respective policies towards Vietnam over the period 1950-95. This is my contribution to the debate over relations between small states and big powers, one ofthemes of International Relations Theory (IRT). This is more meaningful when one thinks of there being a kind of 'blank area' in IRT discussion over the position of small states in competitions between big powers. When common sense holds that the small state is a victim of an inter-power struggle, 3 it
3 Spence wrote, 'the 'most obvious fact about small powers is that their foreign policy is governed by the policy of others. It follows that the student of small power policy, even more than the student of great power policy, must concentrate on the environment in which his subject exists'. See Spence John, 1965, Republic Under Pressure: A Study ofSouth African Foreign policy, p. 6. 2 comes as a surprise that one can hardly find a comprehensive work to prove the point. Handel rightly notes that 'the studies of modem diplomatic history and the theories of international relations have usually been based on the relations among the great powers ... the study of the weak states, on the other hand, has been sorely neglected' .4 The role of small/weak states in inter-power struggles has been even more neglected. To my knowledge, only a few works deal with the role of small state in the world politics.5 Small States in International Relations, edited by August Schou and Arne Olav Brundtland, was a product of Nobel Symposium 17 (in 1970), in which 25 participants representing small states of Europe, Asia and Africa took part. All the papers prepared for this symposium discussed the role of small states in world politics but, surprisingly, none analysed the role of small states in a competition between the big powers, the topic I intend to discuss here. Some tried to explore the relation between big and small states, but I do not agree with their conclusion. For instance, Ronald P. Barston argues that there are circumstances in which a small state can exercise disproportionate influence.6 His example of the South Vietnamese leadership's influence on the US conduct of the Vietnam War between 1963 and 1969 is one-sided and selective. My analysis will show that, on the whole, US policy towards China dictated its policy towards Vietnam, though some specific events indicate the influence of South Vietnamese leaders on US policy. This dissertation contributes another perspective to the present discussion of international events in Vietnam over the last fifty years. An enormous number of monographs and articles have been written on Sino-American relations, Sino-Vietnamese relations and American-Vietnamese relations, as well as on the three Indochina wars. Some have dealt with the question of how Sino-American relations affected Chinese and American policies towards Vietnam. However, none of these has treated this topic in a systematic way, covering the whole period from the recognition of
4 Handel Michael, 1981, Weak States in the International System, p. 3. 5 Among them are: Barston, Ronald P., 1971, 'The External relations of Small States,' in August Schou and Arne Olav Brundtland (eds.), Small States in International Relations. Fox Annette Baker, 1959, The Power ofSmall States: Diplomacy in World War II; Handel Michael, op. cit.; Mathisen Trygve, 1971, The Functions ofSmall States; Modelski George, 1972, Principles ofWorld Politics; Palmer, Norman D. & Perkins, Howard C., 1954, International Relations, The World Community in Transition; Pettman, Ralph, 1976, Small Power Politics and International Relations in South East Asia; Spanier John, 1987, Games Nations Play. Vital David, 1967, The Inequality ofStates; Vital David, 1971, The Survival ofSmall States. 6 Barston, op. cit., p. 46. 3 different governments of Vietnam by China and the United States in 1950 to their normalisation with the SRV in the early 1990s. Authors have described wholly or partly the Vietnam wars, but not the China factor in America's Vietnam policy.7 Some monographs have focused on China's role in the Vietnam War, but they fail to discuss the US factor in Chinese policy towards Vietnam. Qiang Zhai's latest work is one of the best covering Sino-Vietnamese relations over a rather long period of time, but it almost ignores of the impact of Sino-American relations on China's Vietnam policy during that period. Nor does it cover the American side ofthe story. 8 In the same way, Ang Chengguan's monograph is limited by its time frame. 9 Franr;ois Joyaux's research describes most clearly how the US factor affected China's attitude at the Geneva conference of 1954, but it does not cover how the China factor shaped American attitudes there, nor at other periods of time. 10 Besides these works on Sino-Vietnamese relations, one can consult works by Nayan Chanda, Chang Pao-min, William Duiker, Anne Gilks, Steven Hood, Eugene Lawson and Robert Ross. 11 The US factor is not the focus of these works. There are also some studies of the Vietnam wars from IRT perspectives, but these works take a different approach from the one held by this dissertation. Leslie Gelb's The Irony of Vietnam, for instance, explains how the domestic decision-making system worked in the case of the second Vietnam War. The China factor is barely touched on in this work. Park Jong-chul's PhD dissertation, 'The China factor in US decision-making towards Vietnam, 1945-1965', focuses on the difference between levels within the American hierarchy in their perception of the China factor. Min Chen's PhD dissertation 'The Strategic Triangle and Regional Conflicts: Lessons from the Indochina Wars' also looks at Vietnam events from an IRT perspective, but focuses on
7 See for instance Anderson, D., Bator, V., Cable, J., Cooper, C., Davidson, P., Dalloz, J., Devillers and Lacouture, Duiker, W., Gibbon, W.C, Gravel, Gruening, E., Gurtov, M., Herring, G., Hess, G., Irving, Kahin, G., Kamow, S., King, Chen, Kattenburg, P., Maclear, M., Nixon, R., Patti, A., Short, A., Turley, W., Young, M. Their works will be cited later in the dissertation. 8 Consult Qiang Zhai, 2000, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975. 9 Consult Ang Chengguan, 1997, Vietnamese Communists' Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962. 10 Consult Fran~ois Joyaux, 1979, La Chine et le reglement du Premiere conflict de I 'lndochine (China and the solution of the first Indochina conflict). 11 Chanda Nayan, 1986, Brother Enemy, The War after the War; Chang Pao-min, 1982, Beijing, Hanoi, and the Overseas Chinese; Chang Pao-min, 1985, Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam; Duiker, W., 1986, China and Vie,tnam: The Roots of Conflict; Gilks, Anne, 1992, The Breakdown ofthe Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 1970-1979; Hood, Steven 1., 1992, Dragon Entangled, Indochina and the China-Vietnam War; King, Chen, 1987, China's War wit~ Vietnam; Lawson, E., 1984, The
4 analysing the ramifications of changes in the triangle between China, the United States and the Soviet Union for the Vietnam wars. My focus is on Chinese and American policies towards Vietnam. Chen pays little attention to Chinese attitudes towards Vietnam. Moreover, he also limits his analysis to events between 1964 and 1980, a different time frame to the one adopted here. Recently, the Chinese have written extensively on Sino-Vietnamese relations, but they almost ignore the influence of Sino-American relations on the two countries' policies towards Vietnam. The Chinese attitude towards Vietnam is seen as unrelated to US policy towards China. 12 While Chinese scholars have paid much attention to Sino-American relations, they do not discuss how Vietnam figures in this relationship. 13 As far as Vietnamese sources are concerned, little has been written on the topic under discussion in this dissertation. Many works have treated the history of anti-French and anti-American resistance, but none has touched on the topic of the impact of Sino-American relations on Chinese and American policies towards Vietnam. 14 Neither does Nguyen Van Toan's monograph- 'Su that ve nhung !an xuat quan cua Trung Quoc' (The truth about the Chinese dispatches of troops abroad). Only one work- 'Su that ve quan he Viet Trung 30 nam qua' (The truth about Sino-Vietnamese relations over the last thirty years)- analyses how Chinese perception of the American threat impacts upon their attitude towards Vietnam, but it is rather polemic and some of its claims are doubtful. A few Vietnamese works focus on describing US-DRV diplomatic exchanges during the Vietnam War, but they too ignore the China factor. 15
Sino-Vietnamese Conflict; Ross Robert, China's Vietnam policy, 197 5-1979: the politics ofalliance termination. 12 See for instance the Editorial Group of the History of Chinese Military Advisory Group. 1990, Zhongguo guwentuan yuanYue kangMei douzheng shishi (A Factual History of Chinese Military Advisory Group in the Struggle of Assisting Vietnam and Resisting America),. Guo Ming, (ed.), 1992, ZhongYue guanxi yanbian sis hi nian (Forty years of Sino-Vietnamese Relations) and Huang Guoan, 1986, ZhongYue guanxi yanbian (Evolution of Sino-Vietnamese Relations). 13 One ofthe best works on this theme is Gong Li, 1992, Gua Yue Hong Gou: 1969-1979 nian ZhongMei guanxi de yanbian (Overcoming the gap: 1969-1979, evolution of Sino-American relations). 14 Ban chi dao tong ket chien tranh true thuoc bo chinh tri, 1996, Tong ket Cuoc Khang chien chong My Cuu nuoc, Thang loi va Bai hoc (Summing up the anti-US resistance War, Victories and Lessons). Vi en Lich Su Quan Su {Institute of military History, Ministry ofDefence) published some works on the Vietnam wars. For instance, Lich su khang chien chong thuc dan Phap, 1945-1954, (History of anti French Colonialism Resistance, 1945-54), Lich su cuoc khang chien chong My cuu nuoc, 1954-1975 (History of Anti-American Resistance War, 1954-1975), Vols. 1, 2 and 3. Cuoc Khang Chien Chong My Cuu Nuoc 1954-1975: Nhung Su Kien Quan Su (The Anti-US Resistance War for National Salvation, 1954-1975: Military Events). . 15 Mai Van Bo, 1985; Tan Cong Ngoai giao Tiep xuc Bi Mat (Diplomatic Offensive and Secret Contacts); Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu, 1990, Tiep Xuc Bi Mat VietNam- Hoa Ky Truoc Hoi Nghi Pari (Pre Paris Conference Vietnam-US diplomatic contacts); Luu Van Loi, 1996, Dam phan Paris giua Le Due Tho va Kissinger (Le Due Tho-Kissinger Paris Talks). Luu Van Loi, 1996, Nam Muoi Nam Ngoai Giao 5 This work falls within an inter-disciplinary framework, combining both historical and political approaches. Of them, the historical approach is the more salient. This is not a theoretical work but, as mentioned above, an empirical test of a hypothesis. Being a historical work, the dissertation tries to describe how Sino-American relations, and Chinese and American Vietnam policies, evolved during the forty-five years in question. Within this framework, Chinese and American Vietnam policies are given priority, and are discussed in more detail than Sino-American relations, as the latter serve mainly as background to explain the two powers' policies towards Vietnam. There is no consensus on how to divide Sino-American relations into periods. Western Sinologists more or less agree on dividing Sino-American relations into four phases: 1949-72, 1972-79, 1979-89 and 1989-present. The Chinese include the year 1982, when the Twelfth Party Congress took place, as another defining moment in their relations with the United States. I am inclined to agree with the former periodisation, as I do not think the year 1982 really witnessed a big change in Sino--American relations. However, I divide the first and third phases into smaller parts depending on events occurring in Vietnam. As a result, the dissertation is divided into seven chapters. In Chapter 1, I argue that Sino-American estrangement following the PRC's establishment encouraged China and the United States to recognise different governments of Vietnam in early 1950. At that time, the two countries did not consider each other immediate enemies and therefore their policies towards Vietnam were not affected greatly by their attitudes towards each other. Recognition was a continuation of earlier policies, and based mostly on ideological calculation. The situation changed immediately after the Korean War escalated, when the two countries became caught up in direct military conflict. After that, their Vietnam policies were a product of their confrontation. Chapter 2 shows how their enmity forced them to increase their aid to different sides in Vietnam, and ended in partition of Vietnam in 1954. Partition was in itself a 'cease-fire' in the 'fighting' between China and the United States, as the Korean War showed that neither of them could win a military conflict between them. The two countries then arrived at a kind of quasi war, which Chapter 3 argues was one of the main reasons for the Vietnam War. The logic is that the quasi war forced the two countries to maintain the status quo established by the partition, but the latter was imposed on the Vietnamese, and did not reflect the real balance of forces in Vietnam,
VietNam, 1945-1995 (Fifty Years of Vietnamese Diplomacy). Vol. 1; Nguyen Thanh Le, 1998, Cuoc 6 and therefore soon came under threat. In order to maintain the status quo, the United States increased its commitment to South Vietnam, which resulted in the outbreak of the Vietnam War. China also had to follow the Americans' lead by increasing its commitment to North Vietnam in ord~r to avoid defeat, and a breakdown in the status quo that would have been unfavourable to China. Chapter 4 documents how Sino-American rapprochement facilitated the end of the war. Now both countries tacitly agreed that they would support maintaining the status quo by peaceful means. Both pressed for peace, which was achieved in January 1973. Like the situation in 1954, the status quo was artificially imposed by outsiders, and soon broke down. In contrast with the situation in the early 1960s the United States did not jump in to maintain the status quo, as Sino-American rapprochement suggested that there was no need for the United States to block Chinese 'expansion'. Chapter 5 shows how the new Sino-American relationship allowed the Vietnamese to unite their country with rapidly and at low cost. After the rapprochement, Vietnam had lost its previous privileged position in American foreign policy. The United States became indifferent towards Vietnam. Moreover, its need to develop a limited partnership with China encouraged the latter to be tough with Vietnam during the 1980s. Chapter 6 demonstrates how the second round of the Cold War put Vietnam on the other side of the battle line with China and the United States, and Vietnam became a victim of their efforts to isolate it. The end of the Cold War brought normality to Sino-American relations. There was no longer outright enmity or strategic partnership between the two, as in the past. The new relationship combines competition and co-operation. In this new context, their policies towards Vietnam were no longer a direct product of their relationship. Other factors had the upper hand in shaping their Vietnam policies. The last chapter shows that in the new era, Vietnam does not play a significant role in either Chinese or American foreign policies. Therefore the normalisation process was extremely difficult for Vietnam. The main argument of this dissertation is that the state of Sino-American relations largely shaped their policies towards Vietnam. Due to the role of these two states, their policies towards Vietnam, in turn, greatly influenced events in Vietnam. However, it does not argue that this relationship predicted or necessarily shaped them.
Other factors in~uenced Vietnam affairs. The Soviet Union, France and, above all, the
Dam Phan Paris ve VietNam, 1968-1973 (Paris Talks on Vietnam, 1968-1973). 7 Vietnamese themselves were also important factors in the development of Vietnam events. Although the dissertation focuses on relations between unitary actors - states it does not exclude other actors and factors. Of these, domestic politics, institutional/organisational relations, the influence of individual leaders and supra-state factors are important. However, I hold that when state boundaries exist the state remains the most important actor in international relations. Other factors play only a secondary or additional role in that process. Moreover, due to the 45-year period the dissertation covers, it is impossible to explore other factors in full. Besides a large amount of western literature, I use Vietnamese, Chinese and some Russian sources to add fresh food for discussion. Recently, the Chinese have started to write intensively on international relations, which gives this dissertation an advantage over previous works. The Vietnamese still lag behind the Chinese in writing on international relations, though there is more material now than in the past. A series of official works has been compiled under the supervision of the CPV's Politburo and the Ministry of Defence, which recounts the Vietnamese side in the first and second Vietnam wars (the anti-French and anti-American resistance wars in Vietnamese terms). Also, some former diplomats have published their accounts of important events such as secret American-Vietnamese contacts before and during the Paris talks. Interestingly, a highly classified note of comrade B, who is believed to be Le Duan, talking on China in 1979 was 'leaked' to the outside world and made available for researchers. A memoir of a former ranking diplomat, who prefers to remain anonymous, also sheds light on the Vietnamese side of the Cambodian question in the 1980s. I also use some still confidential MOF A China Department materials. As an addition to these Vietnamese sources, I interviewed a number of former Vietnamese decision makers. Among them are the late Premier Pharo Van Dong, the late Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, former Deputy Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co, Former Assistant to the Foreign Minister Luu Van Loi, former Ambassadors Ha Van Lau, Mai Van Bo, Ngo Dien, Dang Nghiem Hoanh, and quite a few other middle-ranking officials who wish to remain anonymous. I also interviewed China's former Ambassador to Vietnam, Zhang Qing. In order to diversify the use of nouns indicating Vietnam, China and the United States, I use various synonyms, except in cases where a differentiation is made clear. The terms Vietnamese, the Vietnamese Communists, the DRV (before 1976) and Hanoi are relevant to North Vietnam when the country was divided. These terms and the term 8 the SRV (after 1976) refer to Vietnam after reunification. The terms the Vietnamese 'Nationalists', the SVN, the R VN and Saigon indicate South Vietnam up to 197 5. The Chinese, the Communist Chinese, the PRC, Beijing and the Chinese mainland are used for China. Terms such as the Americans, America, and Washington mean the United States. Chinese names are Latinised using the pinyin method, except for some commonly-known Nationalist names such as Chiang Kai-shek, Formosa, KMT, Quemoy, Matsu and Tachen, which are used in discussion of the Taiwan crises, and names of some Taiwanese, Singaporean and Hong Kong authors.
9 Chapter 1 Sino-American Estrangement and Separate Recognition of Vietnam, 1950
This short chapter analyses the prelude to a complicated relationship between Sino-American relations and these two countries' policies towards Vietnam. It covers the several months between the October 1949 establishment of the People's Republic of China and the June 1950 outbreak of the Korean War. During those months US-China relations can be characterised as estrangement. They held back from recognising each other, but neither did they confront each other. In this context, China and the United States separately recognised the Ho Chi Minh and Bao Dai governments. The main argument of this chapter is that while China and the United States did not consider each other as enemies, this state of affairs had little effect on their separate policies towards Vietnam. Their policies towards Vietnam represented a continuation of policies adopted prior to 1950. Chinese and American recognition of the DRV and State of Vietnam (SVN), respectively, was more ideologically motivated than security-based. That motive was also manifest in their aid to the DRV and SVN following the grant of diplomatic recognition.
Sino-American estrangement
After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Communists and the Americans were suspicious of each other, they both took a wait-and-see attitude. They were neither ready to recognise each other, nor to confront each other. On 12 January 1950, talking on China, US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, said 'let the dust settle'. This was the best way to describe American policy towards China at that juncture. On the one hand, the United States refused to recognise the new people's republic and urged other Western countries to follow the American lead. 1 On the other hand, the Americans hoped for the development of Sino-Soviet friction and that the Chinese would follow a Titoist path. In this situation, the Americans tried not to complicate their already fragile relations with the Chinese. They announced that they
1 See more details in Acheson Dean, 1969, Present at Creation, pp. 328, 340.
10 did not have any 'predatory designs' on Taiwan or any other Chinese territory. They also promised not to interfere in Chinese affairs, or to provide aid or advice to Chinese forces on Taiwan. A little earlier, a National Security Council directive- NSC 48/2- dated 30 December 1949 even reconciled the Americans to the loss of Taiwan to the communist mainland.2 This US wait-and-see policy can also be seen in the question of Chinese admission in the United Nations. The Truman Administration not only refused to admit the new China into the world organisation, but also tried to block moves to do so by other countries.3 However, the United States seemed to oppose only the immediate admission of the PRC to the UN; the opposition was not total or indefinite. The future Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, who at that time already worked for the State Department, wrote in his book, War and Peace, that if China proved its ability to govern without serious domestic resistance, it should be admitted to the UN. 4 The Chinese also chose to postpone establishing relations with the United States, though for different reasons. Their ideological differences and their experiences during the civil war made them suspicious of American intentions towards China. After the establishment of the PRC, the Chinese Communists followed a policy of 'yi bian dao' (leaning to one side). Their relations with the Soviets also had an element of mutual suspicion, but probably not to such a great extent.5 The main purpose ofthe policy of 'leaning to one side' was to rely on the Soviet Union to meet the perceived challenges from the capitalist world.6 In early 1950, Chinese fear of American intervention still haunted them. When visiting the Soviet Union in early 1950, Mao was quoted as asking Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, whether the Americans would attempt to occupy Taiwan. 7 Because of their suspicions about the United States, the Chinese postponed the question of establishing diplomatic relations with America. In his conversation with
2 Foreign Relations ofthe United States, hereafter FRUS, 1949, Vol. VII, pt2, pp. 1215-1220. 3 See for instance the way America persuaded the Ecuadorians to vote against Chinese admission in March 1950. See more details in Qiang Zhai, 1994, The Dragon, the Lion and the Eagle, pp. 100-101. 4 Quoted in Berding, E.H. 1965, Dulles on Diplomacy, p. 57. 5 On difficulties in Mao-Stalin relations during Mao's first visit to Moscow consult Shi Zhe, 1991, Zai lishi juren shenbian: Shi Zhe huiyilu (Together with Historical Giants: Shi Zhe's Memoirs), Chen Jian, 1994, China's road to the Korean War, pp. 78-85. 6 See for instance in Han Nianlong, 1990, Diplomacy ofContemporary China, pp. 6-7, Wenxianyu Yanjiu, October 1984, pp. 1-3. See also Shu Guang Zhang, 1994, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, p. 15. 7 Archive ofForeign Policy, hereafter AFP, Russian Federation. Quoted in Cold War International History Project, hereafter CWIHP, Bulletin, Issues 8-9, p. 233. 11 Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov on 17 January, Mao stated that 'we need to win time to put the country in order, which is why we are trying to postpone the hour of recognition by the USA. The later the Americans receive legal rights in China, the better it is for the People's Republic of China'. 8 At this meeting Mao also confirmed Chinese rejection of an American proposal for Ambassador Phillip Jessup to meet with the PRC's representative for negotiations.9 Though highly suspiCious of American intentions in China, the Chinese seemed to be willing to do business with America. In a telegram from Moscow, Mao suggested that 'while we should naturally give top priority to the Soviet Union, we should at the same time prepare to conduct normal business with ... the United States'.10 In another telegram from Moscow, Mao included the United States as one of China's trade partners for the year 1950.ll In early 1950, the Chinese communists also decided to postpone an attack on Taiwan. One of the reasons was their unwillingness to provoke an American counter-attack either in the Taiwan Strait or elsewhere along the Chinese coast. 12 Thus, after the People's Republic was established, both China and the United States, due to their different ideological beliefs, looked upon each other with a great deal of suspicion. However, they both tried to avoid direct conflict.
Chinese recognition of the DRV
Almost two months after the establishment of the PRC, Ho Chi Minh sent his first publicised cable of congratulations to Mao Zedong. King Chen observed that Ho Chi Minh's cable was written in 'moderate and cautious terms' and 'no militant or communist words were mentioned' while Mao's reply was 'more aggressive'. In part, Mao said: 'China and Vietnam are on the front line of an anti-imperialist struggle'. 13
8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Mao Zedong, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedongwengao (Mao Zedong's manuscripts since the founding of the People's Republic), hereafter the Manuscripts, Vol. 1, p. 197. 11 The Manuscripts, Vol. I, p. 218. 12 See more details in Shu Guang Zhang, 1994, op. cit., pp. 72-73. 13 Jiefang Ribao 26 November 1949. Cited in King Chen, 1969, Vietnam and China 1938-1954, p. 228. LeVan Hien, who was then the DRV Minister of Finance, confirms that right after the establishment of the PRC, the DRV government was in favour of promoting 'people's diplomacy', but not 'government's diplomacy' in relation to the new republic, which meant that the DRV was not in favour of establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC. Only in mid-January under the pressure of possible establishment of diplomatic relations'between the PRC and France, which would have put the DRV in unfavourable conditions, the latter initiated a 'diplomatic attack' to obtain diplomatic recognition of China before France recognised the People's Republic. (See more details in LeVan Hien, 1995, Nhat Icy cua mot bo truong (Diary of a Minister), pp. 117, 171. Other authors also mention the same cautious behaviour on Ho 12 Mao repeated this point in another telegram from Moscow congratulating Ho Chi Minh on Soviet recognition of the DRV. 14 After this exchange of messages, on 14 January, the DRV stated it was ready to establish diplomatic relations with other countries, and the next day recognised the PRC. Three days later the PRC recognised the DRV and asked the latter to send a representative to Beijing. The speed of recognition shows that the Chinese were eager to establish relations and put Vietnam on the list of countries which formed the democratic people's block and received 'prompt diplomatic establishment' without negotiation. 15 The Chinese also attached great importance to relations with the DRV. When Ho Chi Minh arrived in Beijing, Liu Shaoqi sent a telegram to Mao in Moscow to inform him of Ho's arrival. In this cable Liu also reported to Mao that a powerful committee, headed by Zhu De, Vice Chairman of the Central People's government and General Commander of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), had been set up to deal with the issues raised by Ho Chi Minh. 16 Moreover, they promised that the CCP Central Committee would do its best 'to offer every military assistance needed by Vietnam in its struggle against France' .17 As well as this, China helped Ho Chi Minh to obtain Soviet recognition of the DRV. 18 Mao instructed from Moscow: 'our Foreign Ministry should pass the Vietnamese government's statement requesting establishing diplomatic relations with foreign countries to the Soviet Union and the other new democratic countries' .19 The Soviet Union was not very interested in the Vietnam question. Stalin was suspicious of Ho Chi Minh's nationalism20 and asked the Chinese to take charge ofhelping Vietnam's
Chi Minh's side and explained it by Ho Chi Minh's fear of remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's army. This probably is partly right. Yet I would argue that the main reason was that at that time Ho Chi Minh was more a nationalist than a communist. But that is another subject. 14 Mao Zedong, the Manuscripts, Vol. I, p. 254. 15 Han Nianlong, op. cit., p. 11-12. 16 Luo Guibo, 1988, 'Comrade Shaoqi sent me to Vietnam', in He Jingxiu eta!. Mianhuai Liu Shaoqi, p. 238. Cited in Qiang Zhai, 1994, op. cit., p. 134. 17 Quoted in Chen Jian, 1993, 'China and the First Indochina War, 1950-54', the China Quarterly (London), No. 133, p. 89. 18 See more details in Hoang Van Hoan, 1988, Giot nuoc bien ca: Hoi k:y each mang Hoang Van Hoan (A Drop in the Ocean: Hoang Van Hoan's Revolutionary Reminiscences), pp. 277-78; Chen Jian, 1994, op. cit., pp. 103-04, CWHIP, Bulletin, Issues 8-9, pp. 234-35. 19 The Manuscripts, Vol. 1, p. 238. 20 A popular story has it that Ho Chi Minh asked Stalin for his autograph on the cover of a Soviet journal, but later the KGB stole back the journal, as Stalin was afraid that Ho Chi Minh could use it in an 'improper' purpose .. To Khrushchev, Stalin treated Ho Chi Minh insultingly during the latter's visit to the Soviet Union in early 1950 (see more details in Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remmbers, pp. 154-56). Ho Chi Minh, however, had another copy with Stalin's autograph to show the Viet Minh's cadres (See Hoang Van Thai, Tran danh ba muoi nam [The thirty-year Battle], p. 439). He probably did not want to 13 revolution as, to him, the Chinese understood the situation in Asia better than the Soviets. 21 Another sign of Chinese enthusiasm to recognise the DRV was that in so doing, they understood that they lost the chance of being recognised by France.22 Why did China recognise the DRV and bet on its victory? The calculation was probably based on both ideology and national interests. The above analysis shows that Mao Zedong placed strong emphasis on the anti-imperialist ideological basis of Sino-Vietnamese relations. King Chen made a thorough study of the Chinese communists' plan to export the Chinese model of revolution to Asian countries.23 Where could the Chinese export their revolution first, if not to Vietnam? Liu Shaoqi, who was second to Mao in the CCP leadership, stressed to Luo that 'it is the duty of those countries which have achieved a victory in their own revolution t? support peoples who are still conducting a just struggle for liberation', and that 'it is our international obligation to support the anti-French struggle of the Vietnamese people' .24 Moreover, Chinese and Vietnamese communists shared a long history of good relations,25 which undoubtedly was an encouraging factor in establishing diplomatic relations. The CCP leaders also believed that standing by their Vietnamese comrades would serve their goal of safeguarding China's national security interests. They saw supporting the Vietnamese communists as an effective means of strengthening their position against US threats to their national security. In the autumn and winter of 1949, the CCP leaders believed that China should be preparing to confront the American threat in three inter-related areas: Vietnam, Korea and the Taiwan Strait. They also believed, as later noted by Zhou Enlai, that a conflict between Communist China and the United States was inevitable.26 So, there were different reasons for the PRC's
disappoint the Vietnamese revolutionaries. Ironically the latter believed so much in Stalin, who was suspicious of their leader- Ho Chi Minh. 21 For more details, see Qiang Zhai, I 994, op. cit., p. 37. 22 Qiang Zhai, 1994, op. cit., p. 42, Dalloz J., The War in Indochina, 1945-54, p. 129; CWIHP, 1998, 77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977, hereafter 77 Conversations, p. 104. 23 See more details in King Chen, 1969, op. cit., pp. 214-27. 24 Chen Jian, 1993, op. cit., p. 87; see Lou Guibo, op. cit., pp. 233-34. 25 See more details ii1 Hoang Tranh, 1990, Ho Chi Minh voi Trung Quoc (Ho Chi Minh and China), pp. 209-222; and King Chen, 1969, op. cit., pp. 155-212. 26 See more in Chen Jian, 1993, op. cit., pp. 93-94; and Chen Geng, Chen Geng's Riji (Chen Geng's Diary). 14 recognition of Vietnam, one of which was the American threat to China's security, though this was not the main reason. 27 After the establishment of diplomatic relations, China immediately started to involve itself in Vietnam. A 'Sino-Vietnamese Trade Agreement on Military Supplies', signed on 18 January, provided that China would sell the Viet Minh 150,000 Japanese rifles, 10,000 American carbines and ammunition?8 King Chen provides a good account of measures taken by the Chinese to help the Viet Minh. This includes the opening in February of an office in Nanning to direct the transportation of Chinese military supplies and organising training classes for Viet Minh cadres?9 In particular, in March, Lou Guibo was given the task of providing the CCP Central Committee with a clear idea about the way in which Chinese military, economic and financial aid should be given to the Vietnamese and how this aid could reach Vietnam. He was also asked to study the overall situation in Vietnam so that he could offer the CCP Central Committee advice about how to prepare long-term conditions for beating the French colonialists.30 Probably at Lou's suggestion, in April, China signed an agreement on military aid with the DRY. In the same month, at the DRY's request, China agreed that it would dispatch advisers to help the DRY army.31 Why did the Chinese increase their aid to the Viet Minh? Chinese aid was intended to support the cause they chose when they recognised the DRY, both to export their model to their southern neighbour and to safeguard their border in that direction. At this stage, the American threat was not mentioned much as a motivation for the Chinese decision.
27 Qiang Zhai discusses at length Mao's motives in establishing diplomatic relations with the DRY in his latest book. He also agrees with my point here. See Qiang Zhai, 2000, op. cit., pp. 20-24.
28 King Chen, 1969, op. cit., p. 261. Vo Nguyen Giap disclosed that Mao, while in Moscow, promised Ho Chi Minh to arm one division and one artillery unit, and to help Vietnam transport Soviet aid to Vietnam. See more details in Yo Nguyen Giap, 1995, Chien dau trongvong vay (Fighting under siege), pp. 410-413. There are no Chinese sources to confirm this claim. 29 King Chen, 1969, op. cit., pp. 261-62. Consult also Luo Guibo, op. cit.; Chen Geng, op. cit.. The Editorial Group of the History of Chinese Military Advisory Group. I 990, Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi (A Factual History of Chinese Military Advisory Group in the Struggle of Assisting Vietnam and Resisting France). 30 Quoted in Chen Jian, 1993, op. cit., p. 9I. 31 Qiang Zhai, 1994, op. cit., p. 134. 15 American recognition of the State of Vietnam
Three days after the Lower House of the French Assembly ratified the Elysee Agreement, on 29 January 1950, Dean Acheson wrote to Truman to explain the motivations behind the US recognition of the State of Vi,etnam: Recognition by the US of the three legally constituted governments of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia appears desirable and in accordance with US foreign policy for several reasons. Among them are: encouragement to national aspirations under non-communist leadership for peoples of colonial areas in Southeast Asia; the establishment of stable non-communist governments in areas adjacent to Communist China; support to a friendly country which is also a signatory to NATO; and as a demonstration of displeasure with Communist tactics which are obviously aimed at eventual domination of Asia, working under the guise of indigenous nationalism.32
The anti-Communist factor was clearly salient in this report; three of four reasons for recognising the Bao Dai government dealt directly with the 'communist threat'. The fourth reason also addressed it indirectly, as supporting the French aimed at nothing short of consolidating anti-Communist unity in Western Europe. This anti-Communist Vietnam policy was not new. Shortly after the establishment ofthe DRV in September 1945, the Americans adopted an anti-Viet Minh policy. Archimedes Patti, who served as Head of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) team in Vietnam, confirmed that their departure from Vietnam 'was being interpreted as official American approval for the French return' .33 Different speeches made by US Secretaries of State, George Marshall and Dean Acheson, in the years between 1945 and 1950 were also clear expressions of this tendency in American policy towards Vietnam. 34 Moreover, by the time the Indochina war began in earnest in late 1946, US military equipment had been given to French forces to use against the Viet Minh. The United States had allegedly arranged for France to purchase $160 million worth of vehicles and miscellaneous industrial equipment for use in Indochina.35 The pro-France and anti-Viet Minh policy was consistently followed in the whole period 1946-50.36 In these circumstances it is understandable why the United States left unanswered Ho Chi
32 Gravel, 1971, The Pentagon Paper, Vol. 1, p. 65. 33 Patti A., 1994, Why Vietnam? Prelude to America's Albatross, p. 377. 34 Consult Siracusa, 1974, 'The United States, Vietnam, and the Cold War: A Reappraisal', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore), Vol. V/1, 1974. 35 Gravel, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 51.
16 Minh's repeated appeals for US support. The Pentagon Papers also disclosed that there were at least eight communications from Ho Chi Minh to the US President or Secretary of State. 37 Before the Chinese and Soviet recognition of the DRV, the anti-Viet Minh orientation of America's Vietnam policy was already fixed. On 10 May 1949, the US State Department sent the following instruction to Saigon: 'Since there appears to be no other alternative to established Commie pattern in Vietnam, [the State] Department considers no effort should be spared by France, other western powers, and non communist Asian nations to assure experiment best chance succeeding' .38 The cable went on to confirm that at the 'proper time and under proper circumstances' the United States would be prepared to play its part by extending recognition to the Bao Dai Government, which had been established a month earlier in April 1949. However, Washington attached some conditions for recognition- that France would make all the necessary concessions to ensure that the Bao Dai solution was attractive to the Vietnamese nationalists.39 After World War II, America championed the anti-colonialist cause and met considerable difficulties with the French in Indochina whenever the discussion touched on the question of independence for the Vietnamese.40 However, when the Americans had to choose between colonialists and communists-nationalists they did not hesitate to support the former. The 'proper circumstances' referred to by the State Department arose when China, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries recognised the DRV, and France ratified its Elysee Agreement. On 7 February, Washington recognised the three states Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.41 Joseph Siracusa gave a precise assessment of relations between the recognition of the DRV by socialist countries and this statement of US Vietnam policy: 'Acheson skilfully utilised Soviet recognition to confirm publicly something he had previously not the slightest doubt about' .42
36 See more in Irving, 1975, The First Indochina War, p. 99; Short, 1989, 'The Origins ofthe Vietnam War', pp. 62-70; Siracusa, op. cit., pp. 82-101. 37 Gravel, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 46. See also Patti, op. cit., pp. 380-81. 38 Ibid., p. 63. 39 Ibid. 40 See more details in for instance in Gurtov, 1967, The First Vietnam Crisis, pp. 35-52. Congressional Research Service, I ~84, the US Government and the Vietnam War, Part 1: 1945-60, (hereafter the US Gov. and the VN War), p. 14. 41 Acheson, op. cit., p. 672. 42 Siracusa, op. cit., p. 97. Emphasis added. 17 Acheson also admitted that 'the Americans and British had tried to get some Asian states to take the lead in recognising the three new states, but while they hung back, the Soviet Union recognised Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh regime in Vietnam. On February 7, thereupon Washington recognised the three states' .43 This once again highlights the ideological factor in the American recognition of the Bao Dai government. American recognition of the Bao Dai government was clearly a continuation of its Vietnam policy prior to the establishment of the PRC, which was dictated mostly by ideological belief. Moreover, the Soviet factor was emphasised as reason for American recognition of the state of Vietnam. However, the decision was not made without reference to the situation in China. Sino-American estrangement, too, probably played a role in hastening recognition. If there had not been Chinese recognition there would probably have been no rush for American recognition. Washington probably would have pressed Paris to meet more conditions before it recognised the SVN, and therefore recognition would have been more difficult and less hasty. Like China, after recognition, the United States undertook to provide Vietnam with aid via the French. A March mission headed by Allen Griffin of the State Department proposed to increase aid for the Bao Dai government since 'the State of Vietnam was considered not secure against internal subversion, political infiltration, or military aggression' .44 The last-mentioned motivation for increasing American aid clearly showed American concern about the Chinese in Indochina. The Americans were looking for measures to address that emerging issue. The same month, Acheson was said to have advised the President to allocate $15 million to France for Indochina.45 In addition to aid, the Americans made clear to the French that the US Government was opposed to France negotiating wjth the Vietnamese Communists or recognising Mao Zedong. Acheson put this view to French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and Minister for the Associated States Jean Letourneau on 11 April 1950.46 At the US-France talks in Washington, Acheson also promised an immediate expansion of the aid program on the condition that the French granted a larger measure of independence to the Associated States. The US Secretary of State also insisted 'the
43 Acheson. op. cit., p. 672. 44 Gravel, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 66. 45 Kamow S., I 983, Vietnam a History, p. 192. Yet Truman signed the military aid legislation only in July, after the Korean War started. 46 Le Monde 13 April 1950. Quoted in Irving, op. cit., p. 101. 18 majority of the aid' go directly to the Associated States.47 On 1 May 1950 President Truman approved $10 million for urgently needed military assistance items for lndochina.48 The President's decision was allegedly taken in the context of the successful amphibious attack of nationalist-defended Hainan by the communist Chinese army.49 Significantly, US President Truman, on 24 April 1950, approved memorandum NSC 64, 'The Position of the United States With Respect to Indochina'. This was a very brief document stating that 'it is important to United States security interests that all practicable measures be taken to prevent further communist expansion in Southeast Asia' .50 The document confirmed that US assistance was essential because of the Chinese presence on the Indochina border, and because the French were not capable of matching Ho' s forces should they be strengthened by either Chinese Communist troops crossing the border, or Communist-supplied arms and material. NSC 64 was in fact the proclamation of the 'domino theory', which has been frequently and erroneously attributed to the Eisenhower administration. It clearly linked US efforts in Indochina with what the Americans perceived as communist expansion.
Conclusion
After the establishment of the PRC, the relationship between the new republic and the United States was one of estrangement. Their attitude was at once suspicious, but not yet hostile. The two countries adopted a wait-and-see attitude in their relations. Under such circumstances, the Sino-American relationship did not have a significant effect on their decisions to recognise different governments in Vietnam. The decision was largely a continuation of their pre-1950 relations. The Chinese communists wanted to export their model of revolution to Vietnam, whereas the United States wanted to support the nationalists in Vietnam. How high a priority either would set on these goals was yet to be seen. The Chinese on different occasions emphasised Vietnam's entry into an anti imperialist front. Not a word about the US threat was mentioned in Chinese statements concerning Vietnam. The Americans also followed a path determined by ideology,
47 Ibid. 48 Gravel, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 66. However, Kamow insisted that Truman did not sign the military aid legislation until July"26, 1950. See Kamow, op. cit., p. 177. 49 Gravel, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 66.
5°FRUS, 1950, Vol. VI, pp. 745-47. 19 making clear that their rejection of the Viet Minh was based on their belief that the latter was a 'communist organisation in disguise'. The Americans were not yet concerned about the Chinese threat or expansion in Indochina. Though in both cases recognition was largely dictated by ideological motives, the establishment of the PRC, and its grant of diplomatic relations to the DRV hastened the US process of recognising the SVN. If it had been no Red China and its recognition of Viet Minh, the Americans were likely to have delayed recognition and pressed the French for more concessions in Indochina before it recognised the SVN. The role of Soviet recognition of the DRV was also important. The Americans rushed to recognise Vietnam immediately after Soviet recognition. This demonstrated that. when China and the United States were not in direct competition with each other, their bilateral relations did not affect much their respective policies towards Vietnam. Instead, other elements, such as the Soviet factor or the ideological factor, played a bigger role in shaping Chinese and American policy towards Vietnam. This contrasted with the situation, which will be analysed in the next chapter, when the two countries embarked on a confrontation path.
20 Chapter 2 Sino-American Confrontation and partition of Vietnam, 1950-1954
On.25 June 1950 the Korean War broke out. With Chinese and Soviet endorsement, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) forces moved rapidly to the South. They were close to final victory when they were prevented by the intervention of the UN forces headed by the United States. The UN forces forced the DPRK' s forces back to north of the thirty-eighth parallel, which had been the earlier demarcation line between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea. In early October, despite China's warnings, the Truman Administration decided to cross the thirty-eighth parallel, expanding the war to the North of the peninsula and approaching the Yal u river, the boundary between China and the DPRK. This US move led the Chinese to bring their volunteers into Korea. Direct confrontation, which they had tried to avoid, now became a reality. Their relations were then charged not with suspicion as in the months before, but with outright hostility. These developments had an immediate impact on both Chinese and American policy towards Vietnam. They both increased their military aid to and involvement to opposite sides, the DRV and France/State of Vietnam. The Americans became increasingly worried about the perceived 'Chinese expansion'. Their increasing aid, calls for united military action and other measures were all aimed at blocking the Chinese influence in Indochina. Like the Americans, the Chinese increased their involvement in Vietnam because of their worry about American intervention. They saw the American troop presence in Korea as a threat to China's security. They certainly could not allow another American intervention in Vietnam to succeed, and therefore they increased their aid to the DRV. If, prior to the Korean War, the Chinese recognised the Viet Minh on the basis of their ideological premises, now their increasing aid to Vietnam was explained by their increasing worry about American intervention. Results on the battlefield in Korea showed eventually that neither China nor the United States could win. The two sides agreed on an armistice. This was the harbinger for the partition of Vietnam. As the stronger side, the United States was not willing 'to lose half to the Vietnamese communists. However, it had no choice but to accept the 1954 peace deal in Geneva which left half of Vietnam to the 'free world'. Being the
21 weaker side, the Chinese were more willing to accept half measures, even the smaller half. They pressured the Viet Minh to agree, however bitterly the latter felt.
Sino-American Confrontation
Sino-American relations did not fall immediately into a state of antagonism. In the beginning, both sides tried not to provoke hostile actions from the other. Though one of the three countermeasures taken by the Truman Administration hours after the start of the Korean War was to send the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits, the action was intended to prevent another conflict from breaking out. The Americans were worried that either the Chinese Communists or Chiang Kai-shek's forces would take advantage of the situation to attack each other. Being anxious to avoid Chinese intervention, the Americans rejected Chiang Kai-shek's offer oftroops for Korea. Truman also tried to keep General Douglas MacArthur, the flamboyant commanding general, who had personal sympathy for Chiang Kai-shek, from causing the Chinese communists to misunderstand American China policy .1 The same restraint was evident on the Chinese side. On 28 June, Zhou Enlai condemned the sending of the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Straits as constituting 'armed aggression', but the Chinese Premier stated calmly that he was sure the United States would not want to start a world war by aggression against Taiwan and intervention in Korea? The statement was clearly aimed at discouraging the Americans from escalating the war. Later, Zhou Enlai rejected a suggestion by the North Koreans to send a military observation team to Korea. Instead, the Chinese sent a team of intelligence officers to the Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang. This was clearly a less warlike gesture. The Chinese apparently also decided to defer their attack on Taiwan.3 They may have lacked the capability to do so at that moment, but the timing of the decision also indicates China's willingness to avoid fuelling tension in the region. This postponement was seen by some observers as a tactic to choose a better time for the attack.4 Whatever its motivation, this Chinese action helped restrain the Americans.
1 See more on the American restraints in the beginning ofthe war in Acheson Dean, op. cit., pp. 402-13; Truman Harry, 1956, Memoirs by Harry Truman, Vol. 2 Years ofTrial and Hope, pp. 331-48. 2 Quoted in Qiang Zhai, 1994, The Dragon, the Lion, & the Eagle, p. I 08. 3 Xiao Jingguang, 1989, 'Xiao Jingguang Huiyilu' (Xiao Jinguang's memoir), p. 26. Quoted in Chen Jian, 1994, China's Road to the Korean War: the Making ofthe Sino-American Confrontation, p. 131. 4 See for instance Whiting A. 1960, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 62-64. 22 The months of July, August and September saw the tension in Sino-American relations increase. In July, the Americans sent two divisions to Korea to reinforce forces already stationed there. The Americans rejected British and Indian proposals to admit the PRC into the UN Security Council. They also opposed a Soviet proposal to invite the PRC to the UN to discuss the Korea question. In addition, the MacArthur trip to Taiwan and his statement there, though not sanctioned by the Administration, fuelled Chinese concerns. US aircraft also allegedly strafed Chinese villages bordering the Yalu River. These American moves could not but worry the Chinese. The CCP Politburo met in early August to discuss the question of sending volunteers to Korea. After that, the Chinese accelerated their preparations for entering the war in Korea.5 However, the Chinese decided to postpone their intervention, planned for late August or early September,6 further evidence of Chinese restraint at the beginning ofthe war. Tensions in Sino-American relations reached the point of no return in early October. Despite Chinese warnings that they would not sit back and let the Americans approach the Sino-Korean border, the Americans decided to cross the thirty-eighth parallel. It is likely that, after their quick victory against the North Koreans, the Americans had become over-confident. In William Cohen's words, 'with success had come the usual enlargement of war aims' .7 American decision makers then favoured advancing into North Korea in order to create a 'unified, independent and democratic government of Korea'. 8 But they did not understand the Chinese attitudes; being extremely suspicious about the Americans, could not accept having them at their border. The Chinese decided to send their troops into Korea on 15 October. On the eve of Chinese entry into Korea, the Chinese learned of Soviet refusal to offer air cover for the Chinese troops in Korea. The troop dispatch was postponed for a week, but in the end was done without Soviet air support. This decision highlighted how worried the Chinese were about the Americans approaching their border. In late November, the Chinese started to counter-attack along the entire Korean front and were close to driving the UN forces out of the peninsula. Direct confrontation, which the Americans and Chinese had shied away from since the establishment of the People's Republic, became a reality.
5 See more details in Chen Jian, 1994, op. cit., pp. 146-57. 6 Chen Jian, 1992, 'The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War', CWIHP Working paper No.I, pp. 26-27. 7 Cohen W.I., 1971. America's Response to China, p. 204. See more details about the discussion on broadening aims ofthe Korean war in Acheson, op. cit., pp. 445-46; 451-54. 8 Acheson, op. cit., p. 445. 23 After the Chinese entered the war, Sino-American relations went further down the path of confrontation. The Americans once again rejected the British proposal to admit China to the UN as a means of solving the war. The Soviet proposal to invite Chinese representatives to discussions in the United Nations met the same fate. The Chinese also no longer felt restrained. They refused to discuss the Korean question at the UN, or to go along with an Indian proposal for talks between a UN three-man committee and a Chinese envoy. Washington responded to the Chinese rejection by freezing Communist China's financial assets in America, establishing a complete embargo on all trade, forbidding US ships from calling at China's ports, and refusing visas for any American to travel to China. It then moved to introduce in the UN Assembly a resolution calling upon the United Nations to declare the People's Republic of China an aggressor for its intervention in North Korea. The Sino-American confrontation then reached the point of no return. On the other hand, the stalemate on the Korean battlefield in 1951-53 showed that the Americans could not deal with the Chinese solely by force. NSC 166/1, adopted on 6 November 1953, categorically repudiated the idea that the United States could overthrow the communist regime in China by armed force, either on its own or in collusion with the Chinese Nationalists.9 The American Administration also discouraged Chinese Nationalist attempts to reoccupy the mainland. Nor did it want to sign a security treaty with Taiwan, which might encourage the nationalists to provoke the mainland communists. Though the decision to withdraw the Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Strait in early 1953 allowed the nationalists to wage 'strike-and-run' attacks against the mainland, its main purpose was to pressure the Chinese to sign an armistice on Korea. The United States did not intend to help Taiwan reoccupy the mainland. It wanted to fortify the island only for defensive purposes. As before, the Americans did not want to engage in another direct conflict with the Chinese. The price of the Korean War had been too high for the Americans to contemplate another similar war. However, they found a different way to deal with what they perceived as a Chinese threat. NSC 166/1 asserted that American policy should aim to develop the military and economic resources of non-communist Asian countries and to stifle the PRC's economic growth. Aiding non-Communists in Vietnam conformed with this policy.
9 'US Policy towards Communist China', FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIV, pt. 1, pp. 279-306. 24 The Chinese, in their turn, did not alter their perception of the American threat. The American decision to withdraw the Seventh Fleet made them no less concerned than when the Americans brought the fleet in. They understood the Americans remained the barriers preventing them from liberating Taiwan. The Chinese also considered increased American aid to the French in Indochina as another intervention that they had to oppose to protect their security. Nevertheless, like the Americans, the Chinese wanted to avoid direct confrontation with the Americans. Their losses during the Korean War, and their shattered economy forced them to look for peace. On 28 July, the day after the armistice agreement on Korea was signed, the Renmin Ribao wrote that 'there was no international conflict that could not be solved by negotiation' .10 Clearly, the PRC had Indochina in mind when making that statement. 11 The tension in Sino-American relations was obvious in preparations for and during the Geneva Conference. Initially, the Americans even rejected the Soviet initiative of having the Chinese at an international conference to solve Far Eastern issues. However, under pressure from its allies - Great Britain and France - the United States became reconciled to the convening of the Geneva Conference, but they were never reconciled to the presence of the Chinese delegation at that conference. Dulles was reported to have succeeded in not recognising the presence of Zhou Enlai during the entire conference. 12 The Korean phase of the conference achieved nothing because of the US veto. The Indo-Chinese session was not doomed to the same fate, as the Americans did not have the deciding voice, but their veto at the talks on Korea had its impact on the Chinese behaviour at the talks on Indochina.
American intervention in Vietnam
The causal relationship between the start of the war in Korea and developments in America's Vietnam policy is obvious as one of the six measures taken by the US Administration two days after the war started was to increase aid to Indochina and to
10 Renmin Ribao 28 July 1953. Cited in Joyaux, 1981, Trung Quae va viec giai quyet cuoc chien tranh Dong duong !an thu nhat, (China and the settlement ofthe First Indochina War), p. 141. 11 See more details on the Chinese willingness to seek a negotiated settlement for Indochina in Joyaux, op. cit., pp. 141-46. Joyaux was reasonable to claim that the Viet Minh's decision to negotiate over the end of the war was a result of the pressure of the socialist countries including Chinese pressure. 12 See Randle Robert, 1969, Geneva 1954: the Settlement of the Indochinese War, pp. 171-72. 25 send a strong military mission there. 13 The later half of 1950 witnessed further American moves to strengthen their involvement in Indochina. In July, Donald Heath arrived as US Ambassador to the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. 14 It was claimed that he came with a new military mission. 15 That same month, Truman signed military aid legislation. In August 1950, a joint State-Defence MDAP (Mutual Defence Assistance Program) survey mission completed an extensive trip to the Far East, including Vietnam. On 7 August, its Chairman, John F. Melby, said that 'Indochina is a keystone of the Southeast Asia defence arch. Failure here will inevitably precipitate balance of Southeast Asia mainland into Communist orbit' .16 So, with the outbreak of the Korean War, Indochina became increasingly important in American security considerations. In December, an aid agreement was signed in Saigon between American, French and Vietnamese representatives. This first agreement signed between the United States and State of Vietnam marked the beginning of formal US involvement in Vietnam. Moreover, Secretary of State, Acheson, rejected all suggestions to reconsider Washington's policy towards Vietnam. Livingston Merchant, who had been working on French military problems, suggested that in view of French ineffectiveness it would be better for France to pull out if it could not provide sufficient force to hold Indochina, and that the Americans should strengthen a second line of defence in Thailand, Malaysia, Laos, Cambodia, the Philippines and Indonesia. 17 Before the November 1950 disaster in Korea, John Ohly of the State Department urged Acheson to take a second look at where the America was going in Indochina. Acheson, however, decided that 'having put our hand to the plow, we would not look back' .18 In addition, there were voices outside the Administration, cautioning against the danger of US involvement in Indochina, of which then House Representative J. F. Kennedy's opinion was significant in November 1951. 19 As Irving later asserted, however, American aid remained meagre throughout 1950, partly owing to continued misunderstanding about French policy, and partly
13 Acheson, op. cit., p. 408. 14 Some sources still refer to him as Minister. See for instance 'the Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State', 25 July 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. VI, p. 837. 15 Irving, Ronald E., 1975, The First Indochina War: French and American policy, 1945-54, p. 101. 16 The US Gov. an d t"h e VN War, pt. 1, p. 78. 17 Acheson, op. cit., p. 674. 18 Jbid 19 See more details in Gravel, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 72. 26 because Korea had first priority.20 In 1950 only $10 million worth of aid arrived in Indochina?1 The aid included seven Dakotas, forty Gruman Hellcat fighters and three shiploads of light arms?2 The year 1951 saw a threefold increase in US military aid to Indochina. The peninsula received second highest priority after Korea in the worldwide American military aid program?3 In February, forty American fighter-bombers and six heavy bombers arrived in Indochina. 24 The aid target for this year was $30.5 million. Politically, the Americans, on various occasions, reaffirmed Indochina's important role in the US global security plan. In January, the Truman and Rene Pleven communique recognised the Indochina war as part of the world struggle against 'communist aggression'. It also promised more aid to France and the Associated States. At the same time, it confirmed that the United States would not intervene in Indochina unless the Chinese did so. 25 By US intervention, the American and French leaders probably meant the use of US armed forces in Vietnam. Unlike the Americans, the Vietnamese Communists considered American aid to the French as a sign of US intervention. The American determination to defend this part of the world against 'communist attack' was ambiguous, however. NSC 48/5, approved in May, reflected US policy makers' consensus that the United States was not in a position militarily to prevent a communist takeover from happening if the Chinese were to invade the area.26 In August 1951, the JCS warned against any statement that would commit US armed forces to Indochina and, according to Acheson, the Americans did not waver from this policy. 27 So, it seemed that at that time the Truman Administration was ready to 'lose' Indochina ih case of attack by the Chinese communists. This seemed to contradict the American-French communique mentioned above. Probably, in political terms, Washington saw the importance of the defence of Indochina from the 'communist aggression', but in military terms it saw that it was not able to fulfil that obligation. This directive highlighted the secondary level of Indochina's importance in the overall
20 Irving, op. cit., p. IOI. 21 Gravel, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 78. 22 Irving, op. cit., p. I 02. 23 Gravel, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 83. 24 Irving, op. cit., p. i 02. 25 FRUS, I95I, Vol. VI, Pt. I, p. 367. 26 FRUS, op. cit., I95I, Vol. VI, pp. 34-9. 27 Acheson, op. cit., p. 675. 27 American security plan, compared with Korea. It also showed once again that the United States looked at Vietnamese affairs through the lens of its China policy.
Figure 2.1 American Aid to Indochina (in US$ million)
1500
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
Source: Compile from US Government and the Vietnam War, op. cit., p. 117. Gravel, op. cit., p. 77, and Irving, op. cit., p. I 04.
Figure 2.1 shows that 1952 was the turning point in the amount of US aid to Indochina, which increased more than 15 times from $30.5 million to $525 million.28 This is explained by the fact that by the end of 1951 the United States increasingly feared Chinese intervention in Indochina, which would bring them to another conflict like that in Korea. Moreover, the shift in Korea away from heavy fighting towards negotiations also enabled the Truman Administration to give more attention to Indochina. Lastly, the increase in aid was available because the Americans had tried to buy French agreement on European questions?9 The year 1952 also witnessed the greater American discussion of Chinese .intervention in Indochina and measures to meet this challenge. In January, at a meeting of the British, French and American Chiefs of Staff in Washington, the Americans held that such an intervention would be a matter for the United Nations. NSC 124/2, adopted in June, however, stressed that direct US involvement in Indochina was to be limited to dealing with direct Chinese involvement. It took a stronger position than either NSC 48 or 64, calling for US military action against China itselfifthis was necessary to save
28 Acheson claimed that in 1951 American military aid mounted to over half a billion dollars (see Acheson, op. cit., p. 674). Either he was imprecise with the year, or he meant that the decision to provide this amount of aid was made in 1951. He himself admitted that the turn in American Indochina policy and therefore its aid was made in 1952 (Acheson, op. cit., p. 671). 29 See more details in Acheson, op. cit., pp. 608--610. 28 Southeast Asia. Moreover, it provided that such action could be taken unilaterally by the United States if need be. 30 On the other hand, the directive insisted that the United States would provide only air and naval support while the French Union forces would provide ground troops. 31 In June, Acheson tried to persuade the French and British to issue a joint communique urging the Chinese against military intervention in Indochina, but he failed. Besides this, the Americans increased pressure on the French for a bigger American role in running the war, though this too was unsuccessful. The reason for Washington's failure in pressing Paris was that it needed French support for its rearmament plan in Europe.32 This failure showed both that issues other than just the Chinese factor were present, and the importance of the China factor in shaping US Vietnam policy. On the one hand, the need to obtain French support in resolving European questions affected America's stand over Vietnam. On the other hand, the Americans were so concerned about Chinese influence in Vietnam that, despite pressure to buy French support, they still demanded a greater voice in Indo-Chinese affairs as they were not satisfied with the way the French were running the war. 33 The year 1953 saw stronger US commitment in Indochina. This was due to the advent of a Republican Administration and the armistice in Korea. The Republicans had been criticising the Democrats for a long time over the 'loss' of China, and did not want to follow their political opponents by 'losing' Indochina. Secretary of State Dulles, the main architect of the Eisenhower Administration's foreign policy, wrote before the election that he regarded Southeast Asia as a key region in the conflict with communist 'imperialism'. He spoke too of the importance of drawing the line of containment north of the 'rice bowl' of Asia- the Indochinese peninsula.34 As for the impact of the armistice in Korea, President Eisenhower warned in a speech on 16 Aprill953 that any armistice in Korea that merely released armed forces to pursue an attack elsewhere
30 See more details in 'Report to the NSC by Executive Secretary (Lay)', FRUS, I 952-54, Vol. XII, pp. 125-34. 31 The US Gov. and the VN War, pt. 1, p. 1 I 7. 32 See more details in Acheson, op. cit., p. 676. 33 As onlookers the American military circles believed that they would do a better job than the French. Ironically, during the next 20 years, the Americans could not achieve what, in 1954, they thought they could- to prevent the Communists' victory in Vietnam- though they paid much more money and lost over 55,000 bodies there. 34 Gravel, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 85. 29 would be a fraud. 35 Secretary Dulles also continued this theme m a speech on 2 36 September 1953. . As in previous years, the Indochina question was never dealt with outside the China context. Dulles even linked issues in Korea, China and Vietnam in an extraordinary way, stressing that: Korea and Indochina are two flanks. There is a large force [Communist China] in the centre. If that force in the centre can be without danger shifted to one flank or then the other flank it is very difficult to see how any satisfactory peace can be established either in Korea or in Indochina. It is necessary, I believe to create some sort of a threat in the centre to hold and pin them down and then there is a better chance of getting some success of the two flanks. 37
The first year of the Republican Administration witnessed an increase in aid to Indochina (see Figure 2.1), the dispatch of General John W. ('Iron Mike') O'Daniel, to Saigon to confer with the French Army, and the decision to send 200 military technicians to Indochina. This marked another step in American involvement in Indochina.38 This decision raised a big public debate in the United States as to whether it went contrary to the US commitment not to send ground forces to Indochina. Different high-ranking decision makers argued that these technicians were 'maintenance forces not ground forces'. In the end, Eisenhower promised that these mechanics would be withdrawn by 15 June. Whatever the Americans labelled this group of technicians, the decision was important in itself, marking another step in the increasing American involvement in Vietnam. The Eisenhower Administration seemed to be sceptical about the success of the Navarre plan to fight against the Viet Minh, but the United States had little choice. The new JCS Chairman, Admiral William Radford, told a NSC meeting that the Navarre plan 'offered the last chance of putting Indochina War on the right track' .39 In September, the NSC approved a new aid program for Indochina, albeit with some conditions attached.40 If in previous years the main US concern in Indochina was Chinese intervention, m 1954, besides this concern the Americans were increasingly worried about the possibility of a French surrender in Indochina. NSC 5405, approved early in the year,
35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Dulles Papers [File i.B.1], p.8; Quoted in Gurtov M., 1967, The First Vietnam Crisis, pp. 27-8. 38 See more details iri the US Gov. and the VN War, pt. 1, p. 155--63. The part followed relied on this source and does not refer to it any more. 39 Quoted in the US Gov. and the VN War, pt. 1, p. 137. 40 See more details in the US Gov. and the VN War, pt. 1, p. 139. 30 said that the United States should employ all feasible means to influence the French government against concluding the struggle on terms 'inconsistent' with basic US objectives.41 The directive went further in stating that, 'a nominally non-communist coalition regime would eventually turn the country over to Ho Chi Minh with no opportunity for the replacement of the French by the United States or the United Kingdom'. 42 Thus, NSC 5405 mentioned for the first time the American intention to replace France in Indochina to fight against communism, though it was put in hypothetical form. However, the United States seemed to be unwilling to intervene with ground forces unless it was in charge and assured of success. Dulles wrote to Eisenhower: 'If the US sent its flag and its own military establishment into the Indochina war, then the prestige of the US would be engaged to a point where we would want to have a success' .43 Eisenhower later confirmed that he would 'never agree to send our ground troops as mere reinforcements for French units, to be used only as they saw fit'. 44 What the Americans wanted at that time was a united action by western countries, not a unilateral move by the United States. With the failure of Dien Bien Phu at hand, the Americans pressured consistently for united action. The aim of the strategy was to prevent, if possible, the fall of Dien Bien Phu, or of Indochina in the case of Dien Bien Phu's loss. The united action idea was first found in Dulles's famous speech of29 March 1954 before the Overseas Press Club.45 At his press conference two days later, President Eisenhower approved his Secretary of State's idea. This was a change in Eisenhower's point of view as he was quoted as saying two months earlier that he could think of no greater tragedy for America than to become involved in an all-out war in any of 'those regions', i.e. Indochina' .46 Now, however, the American President was ready to intervene should there be a coalition of western allies. The Americans were more than ready. They were enthusiastic about the plan. On 3 April Dulles met with the French Ambassador, and a meeting took place between Dulles, Chief of Staff Radford, Deputy Secretary of Defence Roger Kyes, and eight
41 See more details on NSC 5405 in 'Statement of Policy by the NSC on United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia', FRVS, 1952-1954, Vol. XII, pt. 1, pp. 372-75. 42 Gravel, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 87. 43 Eisenhower Dwight D., 1963, The White House Years, Mandate for Change, p. 345. 44 Eisenhower, 1963, op. cit., p. 345. 45 See more details in Randle, op. cit., p. 58. 46 Quoted in Randle, op. cit., p. 61. 31 Congressional leaders who all called for support for a united action plan. Radford was quoted as outlining at the meeting a plan for an air strike on the Vietnam People's Army at Dien Bien Phu using 200 planes from the aircraft carriers Essex and Boxer, stationed on manoeuvres in the South China Sea.47 When it was clear that congressional support would be contingent upon meeting three conditions- a coalition of western nations, French agreement to accelerate their independence program for the Associated States, and a French commitment to keep their forces in Indochina to fight - Eisenhower rushed to write to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, urging 'an establishment of a new, ad hoc grouping or coalition composed of nations which have a vital concern in the checking of Communist expansion in the area' .48 Even before the British and French had replied to the proposed united action demarche, Administration officials contacted the ambassadors ofNew Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, South Korea and Taiwan to secure their consent to the plan for such a coalition, and on 6 April, the Administration dispatched notes on these proposals to the above-mentioned governments. The French and British did not offer the necessary support. Britain's priority was first to attempt a peaceful solution at the Geneva Conference on Indochina, which was agreed with the Soviets to be convened in early May. At the time, French policy was ambiguous. On the one hand, the French wanted 'immediate armed intervention of the US carrier aircraft at Dien Bien Phu' to save the situation.49 On the other hand, given domestic pressure they knew that they had to look for a peaceful solution. As a result the French suggested the matter be given further study.50 The French probably asked for American unilateral intervention, as this would help the French without their involvement and risk of domestic condemnation. The British and French responses put the American united action plan on the verge of failure. The Eisenhower government was still enthusiastic about the idea and decided to send Dulles to Paris and London to persuade these American allies to form a regional grouping before the opening of the Geneva Conference. The Dulles trip,
47 Gravel, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 100. 48 Eisenhower, 1963, op. cit., p. 346. 49 Quoted in Radford William, 1980, From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam, p. 399. 50 Quoted in Randle, op. cit., p. 73. The domestic pressure to end Ia sale guerre (the dirty war) so high that in the end, in early June 1954, the Laniel Government fell and the Mendes-France government had to make a promise that it would resign if failed to get peace in a month time. 32 however, was a failure, taking British-American relations to the lowest point since 1 World War II. 5 Another attempt to secure united action occurred during the NATO meeting in April. With a request in hand for a powerful air strike from General Navarre, Commander-in-Chief of French forces in Indochina, Dulles told Anthony Eden that if the British supported the Americans 'he was prepared to recommend the President to ask Congress for war powers'. 52 At the meeting between Dulles, Eden and Georges Bidault the next day, the US Secretary of State pressed for united action, suggesting 'to move armed forces into Indochina and thus internationalise the struggle and protect Southeast Asia as a whole' .53 When Eden returned to London for a Cabinet meeting, Dulles pressed one more time for united action. He proposed that an immediate declaration be made on behalf of the governments of the United States, United Kingdom, France, the Philippines and the Associated States to proclaim their common will to check the expansion of communism in Southeast Asia and to use 'eventual military means' for this purpose. At the same time Bedell Smith had told the French Ambassador in Washington that if Britain would join in a declaration of common purpose, Eisenhower would seek Congressional authority and try to attack the besiegers of Dien Bien Phu on 28 April. 54 Churchill, however, did not support the American plan, using his veto against the American united action plan. Along with these efforts to press for united action, the Americans even pushed ahead with military planning and preparations for united action should it be authorised. 55 The above overview of American aid and commitment to Indochina during 1950-54 shows that Americans gradually increased their aid to Indochina, and became ever more involved in the conflict in the peninsula. Within five years, American aid to Indochina had increased 100 times, from $10 million in 1950 to $1,063 million in 1954. Indochina became second only to Korea as a recipient of American military aid. Although, up to 1952, the United States committed itself not to send ground forces to Vietnam, it broke the commitment in 1953 when it sent 200 technicians to Vietnam
51 See more details in Beal, 1957, John Foster Dulles: 1888-1959, Eden Anthony, 1960, Full Circle, pp. 106-09. 52 Eden, op. cit., p. 113. Though Eden was not sure about the use ofthe term 'war powers', but he was sure that Dulles meant presidential special powers. 53 Eden, op. cit., pp. 114-16. 54 Quoted in Cable James, 1986, the Geneva Conforence of 1954 on indochina, p.64. 55 See more details in Radford, op. cit., p. 405. 33 who, they argued, were 'maintenance forces', not ground forces. If, up to 1954, Americans insisted they would intervene in Indochina only in case of Chinese intervention, they changed their policy in that year, actively pressuring for united action to save the French from defeat in Dien Bien Phu in particular, and Indochina in general. This was in the absence of Chinese intervention. If previously under the terms of their intervention, the Americans restricted their participation in the war to air and naval forces, the later offer indicated that they were ready to send troops if there was French and British agreement. In addition, the Americans also increasingly pressured for a role in planning the war. NSC 5405 marked for the first time the American intention to replace the French in Indochina. Was this because of Vietnam itself? All American plans and statements showed that what they were worried about in Indochina was Chinese and/or Communist 'expansion'. 56 Each time the Americans gave their motivation for increasing aid or their increasing commitment, they cited not Vietnam, but China. In the context of the Cold War, Washington must have believed that Beijing would benefit greatly from a Viet Minh victory even without Chinese intervention. It therefore tried to prevent such an outcome in Indochina. There were factors other than China in the America's Indochina calculations. As mentioned above, the Americans needed French support in solving European questions and yielded to French requests over Indochina. Another minor factor in deepening American involvement in Vietnam was American domestic politics, the coming of the Republicans to power. But the Republicans were different from the Democrats only in that they were more concerned about the Chinese threat in Indochina and more eager to deal with that threat by any means. Both Republicans and Democrats looked at Vietnam affairs through the lens of their concerns about China and the Cold War. What was the Eisenhower Administration's policy towards the Geneva Conference? To Eisenhower, any agreement on Indochina would mean the partition of Vietnam, and would thus lead to Communist 'enslavement' of millions in the northern partitioned area. 57 On 12 May, President Eisenhower emphasised that 'the free world ought not write off Indochina' and that 'we ought to look at this thing with some
6 ; Stalin died in March 1953, but by 1954 the new Soviet leadership had not yet adopted a new foreign policy. The Cold War still was on high gear in those years. At the time, the communist block was seen as monolithic. The Chinese Communists were seen as organiser of the communist attacks in the Far East, in Korea and Vietnam. 57 Eisenhower, 1963, op. cit., p. 357. 34 optimism and determination' .58 Eisenhower's optimistic v1ew was based on his administration's military option for Indochina. As Eden observed on 1 May at a dinner with his American counterparts when they were discussing American-British co ordination in Indochina policy, the Americans 'were searching about for some expedient which would serve to restore or at least to hold the situation' .59 Believing in a military solution to the Indochina problem, the Americans refused to take active part in the negotiations, or to accept any negotiated settlement. The American mood was so much against conducting negotiations that to them, an agreement to negotiate was by itself a confession of weakness and an admission of the strength of the Viet Minh.60 Eisenhower admits in his memoirs that he instructed the US delegation not to associate itself with any proposal from any source for a cease-fire. 61 An outcome of this policy was the American attempt to downgrade their own delegation's status. In May, when negotiations in Geneva stalled, the Americans accused the Communists of prolonging the negotiations for their own purposes, and used this as a pretext to downgrade the delegation's stature. On 10 June, Eisenhower sent a message to Smith instructing him to leave a diplomat of lesser rank in charge of the delegation, and suggesting the United Kingdom do the same.62 Two days later, Eisenhower decided that 'it was best for the United States to break off major participation in the Geneva Conference' .63 By mid-June, then, the Americans were seen to be eager to break off the negotiations in Geneva. Even the six-point proposal made by Zhou Enlai, which was widely recognised as a significant concession to the Western countries, was considered by the American representative as 'unacceptable' .64 The American statement even surprised Eden. The second attempt to downgrade the American delegation's status occurred at the beginning of the second phase of the conference. Dulles refused to go to Geneva and would not allow his deputy to return. Finally, under pressure from the allies, Dulles went to Paris only to meet Eden and Mendes-France to talk about this matter. Although
58 New York Times 16 May 1954. Quoted in Randle, op. cit., 217. 59 Eden, op. cit., p. 125. 60 Quoted in Randle, op. cit., p. 192. 61 Ibid, p. 357. 62 Ibid, p. 365. 63 Ibid, see also Eden, op. cit., p. 144. 64 Joyaux, op. cit., p. 380. However Eden commented the American reaction only as 'unexpected'. See Eden, op. cit., p. 145. 35 they did their best, the British and French Foreign Ministers could not persuade Dulles to go to Geneva.65 A trade-off was made as Mendes-France signed a 'position paper', similar to the American-British Seven Points, and Dulles agreed to send his Deputy to Geneva. As France and Great Britain wanted to try a peaceful solution first, before deciding to take a military option in the form of united action, the Americans understood that they could not block the conference. Therefore, they tried to set up a harsh list of conditions that any agreement in Geneva should meet. During Churchill and Eden's visit to Washington in late June, the Americans and British signed the famous Seven Points. The document gave the French to understand that the United States and Great Britain would accept a settlement on Indochina, should it preserve the integrity of Laos and Cambodia, at least the southern half of Vietnam and, if possible, an enclave in the Red River Delta. The agreement should not restrict the possibility of maintaining non-communist regimes in Indochina and it should provide for effective international supervision.66 The Seven Points indicated for the first time that the United States gave up its determination that Communists gain nothing. It was a more realistic stand than the US previous policy. Though the Seven Points shows some US flexibility, Washington still took a tough stand in relation to the Geneva talks. A joint communique was also signed and publicised during this visit, which in part warned that 'the French government is confronted with demands, which prevent an acceptable agreement regarding Indochina, the international situation will be seriously aggravated' .67 The message was clear. The Communists were threatened by western united action if they dared to prevent a solution in Geneva. This communique was the first joint signal froin the West and, therefore, important in itself. The Chinese and Vietnamese concessions made during the last phase of the conference seemed to be partly a result of this communique's pressure. Even when an agreement meeting all the American demands was reached at Geneva, however, the Americans refused to sign. This refusal could have torpedoed the conference if at the very last minute Eden and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov had not salvaged the situation, deciding that there would be no signatories to
65 See more details in Eden, op. cit., p. 156-57. 66 See full list of conditions in Eden, op. cit., p. 149; Gravel, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 124. 67 See more details in The Times 29 June 1954, cited in Cable, op. cit., p. 111. 36 the declaration and it should have a heading in which all the participating countries would be listed. 68 Parallel to efforts to block a peaceful solution, the Eisenhower Administration tried to push the united action plan forward a second time. Both the United States and France were interested in American intervention, but in different ways. The French saw the threat of American intervention working for their position at the negotiating table, as their 'trump card' at the talks. They wanted to try a negotiated settlement first, however. The Americans, on the other hand, saw united military action as the only solution for Indochina.69 They believed that the war could be fought in their way. The then US Assistant Secretary of State for Far East Asia affairs, Walter Robertson, stated that the purpose of American intervention would be to hold a bridgehead in Vietnam long enough- say two years- for the Americans to train the 300,000 Vietnamese who were supposed to be longing to fight the communists. 70 The Americans were so enthusiastic about the military option that as early as 1 May, when the memory of the April failure to agree on united action was still fresh in everyone's minds, Dulles and his advisors discussed another plan for united action with Eden. The Americans, however, failed again to obtain Eden's endorsement. They decided to bypass the British and discuss the idea bilaterally with the French.71 The Pentagon Papers disclose that though the French preferred to postpone the intervention until after the Geneva Conference, the Americans went ahead with their contingency plan. By 21 May, the State Department's Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs took the lead by producing a hypothetical timetable and got it ready by 24 May.72 Through May, the Americans continued their efforts to reach agreement with the French on the conditions
68 Though their roles are not in focus of the present thesis, Molotov and the Soviet delegation played important role at the Geneva Conference. Molotov allegedly was the author of the two last minute concessions- two-year deadline for national elections and the seventeenth parallel demarcation line, which made the conference successful. See for instance Eden, op. cit., p. 159; Joyaux, op. cit., p. 472. At that time, in the context of the Cold War, the Soviets tried to avoid a hot war with the capitalist world, and championed a policy of'peaceful coexistence', which received Chinese and Viet Minh support. The influence of the Soviet position was seen in Ho Chi Minh's then speeches, where he called for a 'peaceful 1 strategy'. See for instance Ho Chi Minh's speech at the 6 h plenum of the VWP, in mid-July 1954 and his appeal to the Vietnamese, following the closing of the Geneva Conference in Bo Cong an, Ban nghien cuu tong ket, 1967, Van kien dang, 1946-1954 (The Party Documents 1946-1954), Vol. 2, pp. 382-93, 411-413. 69 On the American and French objectives in Indochina consult Randle, op. cit., pp.l91-193. 70 See more details also in Eden, op. cit., p. 126. 71 See more details in Eden, op. cit., p. 133-35. 72 Gravel, op. cit., Vol. l, p. 126. 37 for intervention in Indochina. 73 By 31 May, the United States had reportedly practically reached agreement with France on the conditions for intervention, should the conference fail. 74 So, the French rejected united action at least before the end of the conference. In early June, Dulles admitted that 'united action' had attracted insufficient support to justify an approach to Congress. Eisenhower said on 10 June that he did not intend to seek congressional authority for intervention in Indochina. 75 American efforts to intervene in Indochina did not stop at these statements. The third campaign began not long after that. On 16 June, Eisenhower wrote to President Rene Coty that the United States was ready to prepare for new discussions about the united defence of Indochina?6 Under the new plan, the French were written off. 77 The Policy Planning Staff had proposed that the United States should join forces with Cambodia, Laos and the State of Vietnam to break up the Geneva Conference and should then give them armed assistance.78 So not only were the British written off, but also the French. Whereas NSC 5405 spoke only in hypothetical terms of the intention for America to replace the French in Indochina, this decision became the first step in its realisation. Later, the Americans went further, refusing to sign the Geneva Agreements, and supporting the Ngo Dinh Diem government in the South to sabotage them.
Increasing Chinese aid to the DRV
Mao Zedong and other leaders in Beijing were reportedly shocked by the quick and unyielding American response in the Korean War. They viewed it not as an isolated event, but as the reflection of an overall American plot of aggression in the Far East, including China, Korea, Vietnam and the Philippines.79 Two days after the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De and other top CCP leaders received Chinese military advisers who were preparing to work in Vietnam.
73 The American conditions were: a request for American intervention from France and the Associated States, participation of ANZUS states, a UN peace-observation commission, complete independence for the Associated States, further stay of French troops in Indochina, United States air and sea support, endorsement by not only the French government but also the French National Assembly. 74 See more details in Eden, p. 133. 75 Cable, op. cit., p. 95, Quoted in Bator, 1967, Vietnam, a Diplomatic Tragedy: Origins of US Involvement, p. 92. 76 FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XIII, part2, p. 1720. 77 Cable, op. cit., p. 96. 78 FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XIII, part2, pp. 1713-19. See also Cable, op. cit., p. 108. At the time, the American planners had in mind only a political replacement, providing the Associated States with arms and giving them advice. It by no means was a call for sending troops into Indochina. 79 PRC Information Bureau's instruction 29 June 1950, quoted in Chen Jian, 1993, 'China and the First Indochina War, 1950-54', China Quarterly No. 133, p. 91. 38 Stressing that supporting Vietnamese Communists was the 'glorious internationalist duty' of Chinese revolutionaries, Mao assigned the advisers two major tasks: to help the Vietnamese organise and establish a formal army, and to assist them in planning and conducting major campaigns. In late July, the 79-person CMAG (Chinese military advisors group), headed by General Wei Guoqing, was formally established at Nanning. In August, the CMAG at last arrived in Vietnam and after that worked closely with the Vietnamese Army General Staff and the CCP Central Committee's Central Military Commission (CCCMC) to organise different campaigns in Vietnam. It was reported that Chinese advisors were even given direct command of campaigns, for instance the North-West campaign in 1952.80 However, Vietnamese sources dispute the size of the CMAG's role according to Chinese sources, especially during the Dien Bien Phu campaign, though they do not completely reject its role. 81 From April to September 1950, the Chinese delivered more than 14,000 small arms, 1, 700 machine guns, about 150 pieces of different types of artillery (including mortars), 2,800 tons of grain, and large amounts of ammunition, medicine, uniforms and communication equipment. 82 Later, an observer mentioned that throughout the summer at least 20,000 Viet Minh troops were trained and equipped by the Chinese in Yunnan and Guangxi.83 In mid-October the Chinese also began the construction of a railway extension from Liaozhou to Chennanguan via Nanning.84 The impact of the Chinese aid was seen immediately through the Bien gioi (border) campaign in the autumn-winter 1950. The Viet Minh, for the first time in five years of resistance war, conducted a successful campaign to liberate the Sino-Vietnamese border, the significance of which was confirmed in Ho Chi Minh's speeches and party's documents.85 Since then, as asserted in these documents, the Vietnamese revolution went out of isolation and became connected to the 'great democratic rear'. Summing up the war of anti-French
80 See more details in Guwen Tuan de Lishi (History of the Chinese Military Advisory Group), hereafter the CMAG. 81 See for instance Nguyen Huy Toan, 1998, Su That ve Nhung Lan Xuat Quan cua Trung Quae (Truth about the sendings Chinese troops abroad). 82 The CMAG, pp., 44-6; Quoted in Chen Jian, 1993, op. cit., p. 93. Chen King, however, claimed that from January to September 1950 the Viet Minh received from China about 40,000 rifles, 125 machineguns, 75 mortars, 3,000 boxes of ammunition, and 870 tons of other military equipment. See King Chen, 1969, Vietnam and China, 1938-1954, p. 262-3. 83 King Chen, 1969, op. cit., p. 262. 84 . Ibid., p. 263. 85 See for instance Ban chi dao tong ket chien tranh true thuoc bo chinh tri, 1996b, Tong ket cuoc khang chien chong thuc dan Phap, thang loi va bai hoc (Summing up anti-French Resistance, Victories and Lessons), p. 168. 39 resistance, Vo Nguyen Giap admitted that the year 1950 divided the war into two phases: the guerrilla war and counter-offensive. 86 Chinese influence was also seen in the political field. Hoang Van Chi claimed that Ho Chi Minh was criticised by the Chinese for being a 'rightist'. Hoang Van Chi argued that Ho Chi Minh was devoting too much attention to the patriotic war against the French and not enough to the establishment of communism. 87 He offered good evidence for his claim, mentioning that the Viet Minh had changed its slogans from anti-imperialist to anti-feudal.88 Whereas the former united all classes in Vietnam to fight against French colonialism, the latter was understood to advocate the total liquidation of all 'reactionary elements'. Vo Nguyen Giap's account agrees with Hoang Van Chi, though his explanation for the phenomenon is different. He maintains that in the first years of resistance, opposition to feudalism was neglected and the question of the peasantry was not given its rightful place, but after 1949-50 this question was put more clearly.89 Further indirect evidence for Hoang Van Chi's claim was the opening of the Second Congress of the Indochinese Communist Party in February 1951. Though no documents are yet available to highlight the influence of Chinese Communists in the event; at the Congress the party decided to incorporate Mao Zedong' s thoughts in its Program. Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh's portraits were hung behind the rostrum indicating the increasing Chinese influence in the party. Chinese Communist influence was also seen in the translation and publication of Chinese leaders' writings, and the use of this material in study courses.90 Though Mao thoughts were always listed in the end of the list of Marxist thoughts, which also included ones of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, the Chinese influence was the biggest.91 Vietnamese copying of the Chinese model was in high gear. 92 In June 1951, the Chinese contingent of advisers, technicians
86 Yo Nguyen Giap, 1974, Ve Chien tranh Giai phong va Chien tranh Giu nuoc (On Liberation War and National Protection War), p. 52. 87 Hoang Van Chi, 1964, From Colonialism to Communism, p. 71. 88 See more details in Hoang Van Chi, p. 71-72. 89 Yo Nguyen Giap, 1974, op. cit., p. 45. See more details on the Chinese influence on Viet Minh in King Chen, 1969, op. cit. 90 See more details in King Chen, 1969, op. cit., p. 240. 91 At the Second Congress of the 1CP, Truong Chinh, then its General Secretary said that 'Marx, Engel and Lenin's theory, and Stalin and Mao's roles were important factors of the maturing of our army'. See Bo Cong An, 1967, op. cit., p. 373. 92 See more details in King Chen, 1969, op. cit., chapter 5, pp. 212-78. 40 and medical servicemen was estimated at 4,000 to 6,000 and in 1952 at 7,000 to 8,000, which indirectly demonstrated the Chinese influence in Vietnam.93 The Chinese were determined to help the Viet Minh resist the French, but they never risked sending their troops into the Indochina conflict. In July 1952, the CMAG sent a telegram to the CMCC asking the CCP to send Chinese troops from Yunnan province to take part in the attack on Lai Chau. However, the CCP Central Committee rejected the proposa1.94 Khrushchev also confirmed China's unwillingness to send troops into Vietnam. Zhou Enlai told Khrushchev in Moscow before the Geneva Conference that China could not meet Ho Chi Minh's demands to send Chinese troops to Vietnam, though he did not make clear when the Vietnamese leader made the request. 95 The following years witnessed the Chinese and Viet Minh following the chosen policy. The delivery of Chinese aid to Vietnam was facilitated by the development of a transport system near the border. The railway from North China to Chennanguan was opened in the summer of 1953. In late 1953 and early 1954, a road was built from Mengze (Yunnan) via Lai Chau to Dien Bien Phu.96 In late 1953, the PRC was seen accelerating its military deliveries and other support to the DRV. Four Vietnamese anti-aircraft battalions which had been receiving training in China were sent back home. During the Dien Bien Phu campaign, more than 200 trucks, over 10,000 barrels of oil, over 100 cannons, 3,000 guns of various kinds, 2,400,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, over 60,000 artillery shells and about 1,700 tons of grain were rushed to the DRY's troops. 97 The reason for the increase in Chinese supplies was their understanding that a victory at Dien Bien Phu would enhance their position at the forthcoming international conference in Geneva. At the time the Viet Minh had not yet been invited to the conference. In a letter to Peng Dehuai, then Vice Chairman of the CMCC in charge of its daily affairs, and formerly Commander-in-Chief of Chinese forces in Korea, Mao stated
93 King Chen, 1969, op. cit., p. 273. A report from Le Monde said Chinese officers in the Viet Minh army were estimated at 3,000 to 4,000, including three or four generals (see Le Monde, 10 November 1952, cited in King Chen, 1969, op. cit., p. 273.) This number probably was exaggerated. 94 The CMAG in Vietnam, pp. 57-58. Quoted in Chen Jian, 1993, op. cit., p. 97. 95 Khrushchev Nikita, 1970, Khrushchev Remembers, p. 482. 96 For more details, see King Chen, 1969, op. cit., p. 274-75. 97 The CMAG, p. 114. Quoted in Chen Jian, 1993, op. cit., p. 102. One can do an interesting calculation here. Barrels of oil mentioned here probably were 50-gallon drums, so a total of 500,000 gallons. Trucks needed no less than 10 miles/gallon, so 50,000 miles travelled, divided by approximately 200-mile round trip, equals only 250 trips to and from Dien Bien Phu. That was too small support for a big campaign. 41 that the Vietnamese needed to form four additional artillery regiments and two new engineering regiments, which should complete their training in six months. If the Chinese did not have enough cannons in their warehouses to equip these Vietnamese units, Mao suggested they transfer equipment from their own units. The Chinese should also supply the Vietnamese with instructors and advisers selected from the Chinese troops that had fought in Korea, including some division and army level officers.98 To facilitate the last assault on Dien Bien Phu, the Chinese transferred large amounts of military equipment and ammunition to the Vietnamese. Two Chinese-trained Vietnamese battalions, equipped with 75mm recoilless guns and six-barrel rocket launchers, arrived at Dien Bien Phu on the eve of the final attack.99 Compared with the American aid to Indochina, which was over $2.3 billion for the five years to 1954, Chinese aid was smaller but nonetheless kept increasing during those years. This was because of the Chinese capacity that had been released by the end of the Korean War, and Beijing's increasing fears of American intervention in Indochina. In particular, 1954 witnessed their determination to help the DRV obtain a military victory before negotiations in Geneva started. Like the Americans, who increasingly shaped their Vietnam policy according to their perception of Chinese expansion, the Chinese increased their involvement in Vietnam because of their worry about American intervention. They saw China and not Korea as the objective ofthe American intervention in Korea. They certainly could not allow another American intervention in Vietnam to succeed, and therefore they increased their aid to the DRV. If, prior to the Korean War, the Chinese recognised the Viet Minh based on their shared ideology, now their increasing aid to Vietnam was explained by their increasing worry about American intervention. Had there been no American threat, the PRC would have continued to help the Viet Minh, but at a more modest level. The impact of the US factor in China's policy towards Vietnam was obvious in Beijing's attitude at the Geneva Conference on Indochina. The US calls for western countries' united action to help the French in Indochina made Chinese leaders greatly concerned about American intervention in Vietnam. This concern was highlighted in
98 Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai 3 April1954, the Manuscripts, Vol. 4, pp. 474-75. Quoted in Chen Jian, 1993, op. cit. , pp. 102-03. 99 Chen Jian, 1993, op. cit., p. 104. 42 Zhou Enlai's talk with Indian Ambassador to China on 19 April 1954. 100 Qian Jiadong, a member of the Chinese delegation to the Geneva Conference, later recalled that China's major concern in 1954 was that after the DRV drove the French out, the United States would come in'. He admitted that the Chinese wanted 'to stop the war [in Vietnam] for the moment and rest for a few years before completing unification [of Vietnam]' .101 This Chinese worry was seen most clearly when a comparison between the two phases of Geneva Conference is made: before and after the failure of the Geneva negotiations on Korea. Up to 16 June, China seemed to be less active in taking initiatives to tackle problems, though there were some signs of Chinese flexibility. Joyaux, for instance, observes that the Chinese probably influenced the DRY's position in the question of evacuating the French Union's wounded soldiers from Dien Bien Phu. 102 On 12 May, in his opening speech, Zhou Enlai avoided denouncing the France-SVN agreement of28 April, whereas Pham Van Dong, Head ofthe Viet Minh delegation, denounced the State of Vietnam as an American product. Pham Van Dong also demanded the participation of the Pathet Lao and the Khmer Isarak in the conference, but he received no support from either China or the Soviet Union. At the first restricted session on 17 May, Zhou Enlai said: 'all the barriers, no matter where they are from, should be denounced' .103 This statement clearly implied that the DRV was also being blamed for the situation. Especially, at the first unofficial Sino-French meeting, on 18 May, the Chinese delegation's general secretary, Wang Bingnan, told Colonel Jacques Guillermaz, an expert in the French delegation, that the Chinese came to Geneva not to support the Viet Minh's position, but to do their best to establish peace. 104 Later he told Paul Boncour, French Ambassador and the Conference's General Secretary, that China did not necessarily encourage the Viet Minh to advance to the Red River Delta. 105 This news was very important for the French, as they were organising the defence of Hanoi and Haiphong at that time.
100 See more details in The Diplomatic History Research Office of the PRC Foreign Ministry, 1993, Zhou Enlaiwaijiao huodongdashiji, 1949-1975 (A chronicle ofZhou Enlai's Diplomatic Activities, 1949-1975),pp.58-59. 101 Cited in Qiang Zhai, 2000, op. cit., p. 54. 102 See more d eta1"I s m. 1oyaux, op. elf.,. p. 218-23. 103 Ibid, p. 302. Emphasis added. 104 Ibid, op. cit., p. 324. 105 Ibid., p. 324. 43 The Chinese rushed to make concessions only after the failure of the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference on 15 June. 106 The day after the failure, Zhou Enlai paid a visit to Eden, telling that he could persuade the Viet Minh to withdraw from Laos and Cambodia. He promised that China would recognise these two countries' royal governments, provided that there were no American bases on their territory. 107 This proposal showed how important the absence of an American threat next to its border was to the Chinese. China was ready to make the initial concessions in order to obtain security on its southern border. Eden later wrote that he received a 'strong impression that he [Zhou] wanted a settlement' .108 On the same day, at the plenary session, Zhou Enlai offered a six-point proposal, the main points of which were conveyed to Eden in the morning. 109 The proposal was seen as a breakthrough in the negotiations. Even the US Under-Secretary of State, Bedell Smith, found 'acceptable points' in Zhou Enlai's speechY0 This was the highest praise the Americans could offer at that time. Joyaux later commented that if the Chinese preferred goal of preventing American intervention in Indochina was met, they were ready to take back the precondition of official recognition of the Prince Souphanouvong and Son Ngoc Minh governments for a solution in Indochina. 111 The SRV Foreign Ministry's White Book also called these concessions 'very fundamental and disadvantageous to the Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian peoples', though it was not precise with the timing of the Chinese offer of concessions.112 So, 16 June represented a watershed in China's policy towards the Geneva Conference. After Zhou Enlai, Pham Van Dong made a speech on Cambodia and Laos. He did not alter his government's support for the Pathet Lao and Khmer Isarak, which indicates that the DRV delegation's head had not been advised beforehand of the Chinese concessions. Chinese sources also confirm that at a meeting between Molotov,
106 Due to the US veto, no agreement, even an agreement that the talks would take place some time in the future, was reached on Korea. 107 Eden, op. cit., p. 145. Eden did not describe the meeting at long. See more details about this meeting in Gravel, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 138. 108 Eden, op. cit., p. 145. 109 See more details about the Six Points in Joyaux, op. cit., pp. 373-74; Gravel, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 138-39. 110 Quoted in Joyaux, op. cit., pp. 376-77. Ill Ibid., p. 372. 112 The SRV Foreign Ministry, 1979, Su that ve quan he Viet-Trung trong 30 nam qua (Truth about Sino-Vietnamese relations during the last 30 years) hereafter the White Book, p. 30. It is not precise claiming that the Chinese concessions made at meeting between Zhou Enlai and Mendes France on 23 June. The White Book was prepared at height ofthe Sino-Vietnamese confrontation, and therefore was politically biased. 44 Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong on 15 June, the Chinese Premier tried to persuade the DRY's representative to admit the presence of the DRV troops in Laos and Cambodia. They did not discuss the concessions Zhou made the next day to Eden. 113 The question that concerns readers is why Zhou Enlai did not take Pham Van Dong into his confidence before making the 16 June concessions as a standard ally relationship required? The failure of the Korean phase seemed to put the Chinese under enormous pressure. For them, American intervention in Indochina was very near and quick measures had to be taken to rescue the conference. On 17 June, Bidault met Zhou to discuss the latter's 'new offer'. He was quoted as believing that the Communists were greatly concerned over the break-up of the conference. 114 Zhou Enlai explained to Bidault that the Chinese wanted 'to see these two countries [Laos and Cambodia] democratic and peaceful like the new republics of Southeast Asia such as Indonesia, Burma and India. They can participate in the French Union if they wish and live in peace with other countries ... Yet we [the Chinese] don't want Laos and Cambodia to be American military bases. This would be a threat to Chinese security' .115 On 20 and 21 June, Zhou Enlai met separately with Tephan, head of the Cambodian delegation, and Sananikone, head of the Laotian delegation, to clarify Chinese policy. 116 In addition, China tried to gather representatives of the different forces in Indochina and help them talk to each other. On 21 June, Zhou Enlai invited representatives of Laos, Cambodia and the DRV to a dinner. From that moment China's preference for an Indochina with different colours, should there be no American presence, became clear. After all, in order to obtain a compromise at talks, Zhou Enlai was selling out Pathet Lao and Khmer Isarak, and delivering a harsh blow to the DRV. On 23 June, at Berne, Zhou Enlai also met with the new French Premier Pierre Mendes-France. The Chinese Foreign Minister confirmed again that China had only one
113 See for instance The CCP Central Documentary Research Department (ed.), 1997, Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 1949-1976 (A Chronicle ofZhou Enlai's Life, 1949-1976), Vol. 1, 383-84; Qu Xing, 'Shilun 1954 nian Rineiwa huiyi shang de Zhou En1ai waijiao' (Tentative Analysis of Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy at 1954 Geneva Conference), In The Diplomatic History Research Office of the PRC Foreign Ministry (ed.), Yanjiu Zhou Enlai: Waijiao sixiang yu shijian (Studies on Zhou Enlai: Diplomatic Thought and Practice), p. 257, Li Lianqing, 1.994, Da waijiaojia Zhou Enlai (Master Diplomat Zhou Enlai), Vol. 2, p. 276, cited in Qiang Zhai, 2000, op. cit., pp. 56-57. 114 Gravel, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 138. 115 Joyaux, op. cit., pp. 378-79. 116 See more details in Ibid, pp. 384-88 45 aim at Geneva, to establish peace in Indochina. 117 China made clear that it was ready to make concessions in order to remove the American threat. The White Book claimed that this meeting was the turning point in China's policy towards Vietnam at the Geneva Conference. 118 However, as mentioned above, the change was actually made a little earlier, on 16 June. The difference between the two dates is not in the timing, but in the motivations of the Chinese concessions. The American threat loomed behind the Chinese concessions at the talks in Geneva. During the interval between the two ministerial level phases of talks, Zhou Enlai met with Ho Chi Minh at Liaozhou from 3-5 July. After the meeting, Ho Chi Minh sent an instruction to Pham Van Dong, in which he emphasised that the Viet Minh's objectives at the conference should be: 1 On military affairs, simultaneous cease-fire in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; the 16 h parallel as the demarcation line; ban of post-ceasefire sending troops and military servicemen [into Indochina], ban of military bases and coalitions [in Indochina]. On political affairs, agreement on time for national elections in Vietnam, Vietnam's post-unification participation in the French Union; discussing French economic interests. On the ISC, the membership of India, Poland and Canada.119
Ho Chi Minh and Zhou Enlai reached agreement on some important questions. They agreed totally on questions concerning Laos and Cambodia. There were no special demands for the Pathet Lao or the Khmer Issarak. The question of the International Supervision Commission's (ISC) membership also was resolved. Yet Ho Chi Minh still insisted on the sixteenth parallel as the demarcation line, and the question of the period of time before national elections were held was put on hold. Ho Chi Minh's instructions contained no 'bottom line' for the DRY's demands. A Vietnamese source said that at the end of the meeting there was no clear agreement between Ho Chi Minh and Zhou Enlai on these two important questions. But Zhou asked Ho Chi Minh for the right 'to be flexible at Geneva as it is far away and it is impossible to ask for instruction'. 120 The gap between the Geneva Agreement and Ho Chi Minh's instructions indirectly supports the validity of the above source.
117 Ibid, pp. 396-97. 118 The White Book, p. 3 I. 119 Quoted in the DRY's Defence Ministry, Lich Su Khang chien chong thuc dan Phap, 1945-1954 (History of the anti-French Colonialism Resistance, 1945-54), Vol. 2, p. 473-74. 120 Based on my interviews with Vietnamese former diplomats. 46 Pham Van Dong believed that a demarcation at the seventeenth parallel was the result of a Chinese plot. China had even agreed with the Indians on the concession before talking with the Vietnamese. In talks with Pham Van Dong during the interval between the two sessions, that is some time in early July, Krisna Menon, Nehru's envoy, pointed to the Ben Hai river on the map, asking whether this could be the demarcation line. Pham Van Dong, however, did not explain why he believed that the initiative to move the line up to the seventeenth parallel came from China. 121 The Chinese seemed to be ready to pay a higher price than the Viet Minh for peace in Indochina. The White Book disclosed that Zhou Enlai's 30 May cable to the Vietnamese Workers Party' Central Committee urged the Vietnamese to sacrifice even Hanoi, Haiphong and highway no. 5 in order to achieve a deal. 122 Joyaux finds interesting evidence for Chinese pressure on the DRV to make concessions. Having studied three documents signed after Zhou Enlai came back to Beijing from the Liaozhou meeting, Joyaux concludes that these documents had been prepared long before and were signed only when there was a political agreement between Ho Chi Minh and Zhou Enlai. 123 This is indirect evidence of Chinese pressure on the DRV to make concessions at the Geneva Conference. When they came back to Geneva, the Chinese were in great haste to realise their plan of neutral ising Indochina. The White Book also confirms that after 10 July, China pushed Vietnam further in making concessions. 124 Zhou Enlai' s timetable after his return to Geneva was full of diplomatic meetings. Besides meetings that did not relate directly to the conference, each day, Zhou Enlai and his close assistants had four or five important meetings to discuss various concessions. Joyaux offers the best account of how the Chinese made concessions relating to questions of ISC membership, the timing of national elections in Vietnam and a temporary demarcation line between North and South Vietnam. 125 What was the meaning of the Chinese concessions? Their principal aim was to prevent armed American intervention in Indochina. There was no other condition for the Chinese concessions except the guarantee that there would not be American bases in
121 Based on my interview with Pham Van Dong, Hanoi, March 1997. 122 The White Book, p. 32. However, in the end, this was not the price the Viet Minh had to pay at Geneva. · 123 Joyaux, op. cit., p. 437. 124 The White Book, p. 32. 125 See more details in Joyaux, op. cit., pp. 461-472. 47 Indochina. This was the case when China offered fundamental concessions for the first time on 16 June. In all these meetings, Chinese representatives repeated its point whether they were speaking with British, French, Laotian and Cambodian delegates. China even went public on the matter .126 At the last moment and under the pressure of the negotiations' breakdown, China withdrew its condition on the neutralisation of Indochina. Cambodia and Laos were to be allowed to associate with foreign forces to protect their security if they deemed that necessary. Yet China found another way to realise its plan of neutralisation of Indochina. Zhou Enlai invited representatives of the royal governments of Laos and Cambodia, and both parts of Vietnam to a dinner on 22 July. Joyaux was right when he commented that 'the Chinese delegation invited representatives of four countries in Indochina to show for the last time its perception of peaceful co-existence'. 127 At the dinner, Zhou Enlai even proposed to Ngo Dinh Luyen in front of Pham Van Dong and Ta Quang Buu, who at the Geneva Conference was representing the DRV at the military commission, that the Bao Dai government could set up a representative office in China. It is believed that Pham Van Dong was not informed about this beforehand. 128 The Viet Minh therefore felt betrayed at the talks. With the victory at Dien Bien Phu, the Viet Minh had hoped for more, but being dependent on Chinese aid it had to go along with the Chinese concessions. Pham Van Dong was believed to have gone straight to Ho Chi Minh's office in a Viet Bac forest to apologise for not having fulfilled the task, but Ho Chi Minh calmed him down. 129 He understood that this was not Pham Van Dong's fault, but a result of the struggle between forces out of the Viet Minh's control.
Conclusion
After the Korean War started and especially after American troops approached the Sino-Korean border in October 1950, bringing about Chinese entry into the war, Sino-American relations deteriorated rapidly. Although both sides tried hard to avoid it, they became direct enemies. This change in their relationship had an immediate impact
126 On July 18, Huang Hua met with American press correspondents and told them that the main problem now was 'whether western countries agreed or not on the neutralisation oflndochina', and that 'the success or failure of the conference depended on American position on this question'. See Joyaux, op. cit., p. 476. 127 Ibid., p. 489. 128 Ibid., p. 490. 129 Based on my talks with a Vietnamese researcher who heard Pharo Van Dong's talk on the Geneva Conference. 48 on their relations with Vietnam. Both saw Vi~tnam as playing a more important role in their security plans. The Americans tried to help the French to fight the Viet Minh in order to prevent the 'loss' of Vietnam to the Communists, which would have been a blow to the 'free world'. In the same time, the Chinese tried to help the Viet Minh to fight against the French colonialists and American interventionists in order to safeguard their southern flank. Chinese and American aid to Indochina increased sharply from 1952 onwards, when their military power was released, first by the stalemate and then by the armistice in Korea. It seems that it was not only the China factor that played a role in American increased aid to Indochina. The United States also wanted to buy French support for its plans in Europe, and therefore increased its aid to the French in Indochina. Domestic politics governed by anti-Communist sentiment also made the Americans more determined to fight the communists in Indochina. But all these factors played a minor role in shaping their Vietnam policy compared with their concern about the Chinese. The Geneva Conference demonstrated clearly how Sino-American relations affected their respective Vietnam policies. Having in mind the American threat in the form of armed intervention in neighbouring countries, the Chinese Communists did all they could to prevent an American presence in the peninsula, though they had to sacrifice their Indo-Chinese comrades' interests. The Vietnamese Communists were persuaded by the Chinese and the Soviets to make concessions to avoid American intervention, which would have been a worse scenario for them. This 'benefit' of the concessions, however, did not exclude the fact that the Chinese made concessions based on their security interests, namely their perception of the American threat. One can doubt the importance of the US factor in the Chinese June 16 decision to make concessions, as Eisenhower said, a week earlier, that he did not intend to seek congressional authority for intervention. There seemed to be no reason from the American side for the Chinese to be anxious to make concessions. However, the Eisenhower statement was confidentially made, which the Chinese hardly could learn of. Moreover, the US Administration did not drop completely its plan to intervene in Indochina. Lastly, Dulles' behaviour at the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference made the Chinese greatly concerned about American intentions towards China. This situation forced Chinese leaders to make concession in the question of Indochina to remove the American threat from their southern border.
49 The turning point in Chinese policy towards Indochina was probably the Geneva Conference. If before the conference they had wanted to see their revolutionary model transplanted to Indochina, after the conference they were prepared to settle for the prospect of 'new republics of the Indonesia, India type' in Indochina. They now preferred to have different regimes in Indochina, and even in one part of Vietnam. Probably from that point onwards, China preferred to see Indochina become 'Balkanized'. The Americans became increasingly worried about Chinese expansion in the region and became determined to fight the communists in Indochina. Thanks to their superior economic and military capacity, the Americans were enthusiastic about the military option for Indochina. US policy seemed to be rigid, conflicting even with its allies- France and Great Britain- who preferred to try a peaceful settlement. The rigidity of American policy augured to a great extent the fate of Indochina. Their hard line at the talks and their threat to intervene in Indochina forced the Chinese to yield. The evolution of Chinese and American involvement in Vietnam during these five years from 1950 to 1954 also showed that the more each saw the other as an opponent, the more they became determined to prevent each other's influence in Vietnam from growing.
50 Chapter 3 The Quasi War between China and America, and the Vietnam War, 1954-1968
The previous chapter showed that Sino-American confrontation played a key role in bringing about partition of Vietnam. How did Sino-American relations further affect these two countries' policies towards Vietnam in the fifteen years after the Geneva conference? This chapter will show that, during the period between 1954 and 1968, the United States and China entered into a quasi war, to borrow the words of US Under-Secretary Christian Herter.' Although their policies were extremely hostile, the two countries stopped short of outright war. This state of affairs forced both of them to follow a Vietnam policy aiming at maintaining the 'status quo', which meant continued partition of Vietnam. Washington tried to build a strong South Vietnamese government to confront the Ho Chi Minh government in the North, whereas Beijing tried to persuade the Vietnamese Communists to reconcile with partition of the country. As partition was imposed on the Vietnamese by the big powers, and ran counter to their wishes, it was a logical development for most of the Vietnamese to try to reunite their country. Without interference from the great powers, these efforts would have resulted in one outcome or another, and this would have been a strictly Vietnamese affair. However, the Sino-American quasi war did not allow the Vietnamese to determine their fate? Being hostile and suspicious about each other's intentions in Vietnam, China and the United States supported different governments in Vietnam, and found partition more convenient than any other kind of compromise.
1 Cited in Dulles F. R., 1972, American Foreign Policy towards Communist China: 1949-1969, p. 186. 2 This dissertation does not rule out the role of the Soviet Union in its attempts to maintain a divided Vietnam. For present purposes, I focus on the impacts of the Sino-American relationship on policies towards Vietnam and discuss the Soviet factor only when it is relevant. I do not exclude the 'civil war' dimension in the Vietnam events during those years, but I will argue that this dimension was only secondary to the role of great powers in partition of Vietnam. The term of 'Vietnamese' is used here in a loose definition, meaning both Vietnamese Communists and non Communists who fought for reunification.
51 American support for the Diem government following the Geneva Conference was aimed at developing a strong government in South Vietnam, in order to uphold the partition of Vietnam. Due to its weakness, in the early 1960s, the Saigon government seemed incapable of blocking reunification. Thus the status quo was threatened. With their military and economic power, the Americans were willing to solve the Vietnam issue by force, to defeat the Communists militarily. For this reason they can be regarded as the authors of the Vietnam War. The main argument of this chapter is that the Vietnam War was imposed on the Vietnamese. The point may raise some objection as in 1959 the Vietnamese Communists initiated an armed struggle to reunite the country. As will be shown, the communist resort to armed struggle was a response to, but not a cause for, American intervention. In contrast, given their relative economic and military weakness, the Chinese took a more restrained attitude, advising the Vietnamese Communists not to resort to armed struggle. Their aim was to maintain the status quo in Vietnam, and not to provoke the Americans. But when, contrary to Chinese advice, the Vietnamese Communists took up armed struggle, which increased US involvement in Vietnam, the Chinese helped the Vietnamese to resist the Americans, to prevent any alteration of the status quo to their disadvantage. In both cases, the Chinese aim in Vietnam did not change - to maintain the status quo. The Sino-American relationship has been one of the main themes in academic literature, as well as statesmen's memoirs.3 Unlike the majority of these western works, I argue that the United States was more belligerent and the PRC was more defensive in their relations, due to differences in their military and economic power. A huge number of American and Vietnamese documents, statesmen's memoirs and monographs has been written on the Vietnam War. 4 To the best of my knowledge, however, none of these works focuses on analysing the
3 See for instance memoirs by president D. Eisenhower, B. Johnson, and other US policy makes like G. Ball, R. Hilsman, D. Rusk. There are many authoritative works on the subject, including F.R. Dulles F. R.; R. Garson, etc. Their works will be cited later in the chapter. 4 Consult 'Selected Bibliography of the Vietnam War' in Olson James (ed.), 1983, The Dictionary ofthe Vietnam War, pp. 525-46.
52 impacts of the Sino-American relationship on these two countries' Vietnam policy, or argues the Vietnam War was primarily a result of the hostility between these two powers. This chapter also introduces some new Vietnamese and Chinese sources on the Vietnam War subject. 5
The Sino-American Quasi War
During the fifteen years between 1954 and 1968, China and the United States engaged in a quasi war against each other. On the one hand, they were suspicious of each other, considered each other as enemies, and adopted a hostile policy towards each other. On the other hand, they did their best to avoid direct military conflict. The Korean War with all its costs and ramifications, had been a big lesson for the two countries. By no means did they want to repeat that mistake. In this quasi war, as we shall see, contrary to established belief in the West, the United States was more bellicose. This US aggression was seen in its intervention in Chinese affairs when it tried to block Chinese unification. America also was more belligerent and rigid than its European allies. It not only opposed PRC accession to the United Nations, but also rejected any exchange with the PRC. US bellicosity was explained by its power. As the most powerful nation after World War II, the United States saw no need to go 'soft' on communism, or to look for compromise with the PRC. It had to show how tough it was to assert its role as leader of the 'free world'. The Chinese were more restrained towards the United States during the quasi war. It should be noted that the Chinese restraint was aimed at the United States, but not the Nationalists in Taiwan. The Chinese Communists considered national unification a sacred cause. That they were ready to use force to achieve that aim attests to their 'bellicosity' rather than their restraint as this chapter
5 One ofthe most interesting sources among them isLe Duan's 1979 talk on China, which should be highly classified, but ironically was found in a public library- the Army Library- by Christopher Goscha. Some might doubt its authenticity, but I am inclined to believe in its genuineness. Other Vietnamese sources are works prepared under the supervision of the CPV Politburo and Defence Ministry and there are also individual works by former ranking diplomats such as Luu Van Loi, Mai Van Bo. The Chinese recently have written intensively on Sino-American and Sino-Vietnamese relations. Their works will be cited later in the chapter. The newly published 77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders, compiled and edited by a Cold War International History Project is also of great interest.
53 claims. But this was bellicosity in relation to Taiwan, not the United States. Chinese restraint towards the United States was seen in its efforts to avoid direct conflict with it, and to promote relations between the two countries. Unlike the strong United States, weak China needed to offer compromises in order to strengthen its position. Interestingly, in this quasi war, while the Americans changed from bellicosity towards restraint, the Chinese moved from restraint towards bellicosity. While McCarthyism was responsible for the tough US stance in the late 1950s, the Chinese Cultural Revolution was responsible for the toughening of the Chinese position in the late 1960s. This does not contradict with my earlier claim that the US and Chinese military and economic power determines their behaviour in international relations. While power is the most important factor, other dimensions like ideology, domestic politics etc. also play their role in determining foreign policy.
US bellicosity towards China
The clearest sign of US bellicosity was its determination to intervene in the civil war in China, to prevent the Communists from taking Taiwan and reuniting the country. In mid-August 1954, President Eisenhower told a press conference that any 'invasion' of Formosa (Taiwan) would have to run over the Seventh Fleet.6 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles also announced that the United States would use its navy and air force to protect Taiwan and the Pescadores.7 American determination to defend Taiwan prevented the Chinese Communists from reuniting their country. While American determination was understandable, 8 their action was outright intervention. Communist shelling of the offshore islands may have worried the Americans, but they could hardly claim that it represented a threat to their security, or that the Chinese Communists had taken an anti American action. Both the Nationalists and the Communists agreed that Taiwan
6 Cited in Duiies F.R., op. cit., p. 148. 7 Cited in Han Nianlong, op. cit., p. 94. 8 Emerging from World War II as the most powerful nation on earth, the Americans thought that they had the right/obligation to lead the struggle for preservation of 'free world' against 'evil communism'.
54 was a part of China. Although it was an unwelcome action, the shelling was an internal Chinese affair. The battle for Taiwan was a continuation of the civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists. Anti-PRC sentiment in the American Administration was so high that, during the Taiwan crisis of October 1954, some of Eisenhower's advisors recommended not only defending the offshore islands9 but also supporting the Nationalists in attacking the mainland. The use of atomic weapons against the PRC was also discussed. 10 American China policy was so rigid that Secretary of State, J. F. Dulles, recommended supporting the Nationalists' stand against the Communists even though he thought that the Nationalists were not strongly committed to the anti-Communist cause. 11 This means that the United States, or at least its Secretary of State, was more determined to fight against Communist China than the Nationalists in Taiwan. US rigidity was evident in comparison with their allies' policy. Both Great Britain and Canada- two major US allies- suggested neutralising the island and getting rid of Chiang Kai-shek. 12 One columnist wrote in those days, 'all our Allies, except Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek regard this as the wrong war, at the wrong time, and at the wrong place'. 13 Though they understood that they were alone in their policy, 14 American leaders were determined to protect the offshore islands. Moreover, in December 1954, Washington signed a mutual defence treaty with Taipei that unequivocally spelt out American willingness to protect Taiwan. In addition, in January 1955, the US Congress adopted the Taiwan Resolution, which gave unlimited authority to the US president to act in the Taiwan Strait. The United States supported their words with their deeds. After the Taiwan
9 They are islands controlled by the Nationalists, which are situated close to the mainland. Of them, the main islands are Quemoy and Matsu. 10 See more details in Eisenhower, 1963, op. cit., p. 476. 11 Eisenhower wrote that Dulles doubted about the Nationalists' loyalty if they were attacked, which meant that the Chinese Nationalists were not so determined to fight the Communists. See more in detail in Eisenhower, 1963, op. cit., p. 476. 12 Eisenhower, 19'63, op. cit., p. 464. 13 Ibid., p. 478. 14 See J.F. Dulles' confession to his secretary Berding in the latter's memoirs, op. cit., p. 60.
55 resolution was adopted 5 aircraft earners, 5 cruisers, 50 escort ships and submarines were reportedly sent to the Taiwan Straits. 15 After the first Taiwan crisis was resolved the United States did not change its attitude towards the PRC. In 1956 the US State Department opposed visits by American newsmen to the mainland. Later, they vetoed the PRC's proposal for an exchange of journalists between the two countries. The most obvious evidence of US hostility towards the People's Republic was Secretary of State Dulles's San Francisco speech in June 1957, in which he stated that the US government regarded the Chinese Communist regime as 'a passing and not a perpetual phase' .16 Dulles even urged 'Chinese overseas and on the mainland to look to the Nationalists on Taiwan as the government of all China' .17 In addition, despite the increase in Western countries' trade with China, the United States continued its unilateral embargo on all trade with Communist China. It also opposed eve.ry attempt to admit China to the United Nations. The Americans were united in their opposition. William Knowland and Lyndon Johnson, Republican and Democrat Senate leaders, respectively, stated that if the United Nations accepted the Beijing government, the United States would withdraw its support from the world organisation. Moreover, the United States deployed Matador missiles- surface to-surface missiles with a range of about 600 miles and capable of carrying either nuclear or conventional warheads - and constructed an airport with runways for B-52 bombers, on Taiwan. On the diplomatic front, the Americans tried to downgrade the level of the Warsaw talks between the two countries. 18 Although the United States did not provoke the second Taiwan Strait crisis, in August 195 8, 19 its reaction once again proved its hostility and bellicosity. Eisenhower not only sent the Seventh Fleet to the Straits, but also considered
15 Arbatov G. A., 1984, Sovremennaia Vneshniaia Politika SshA (The US Contemporary Foreign Policy), Vol. 2, p. There is no American source to confirm this Soviet information. 16 Quoted from Hilsman R., 1967, To Move the Nation, p. 301. 17 Loc. cit. 18 See more details in Han Nianlong, op. cit., p. 130. Arbatov, op. cit., p. 315; and Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 302. 19 The Chinese claimed that the US behaviour in the Middle East was one of the reasons for the Chinese shelling across the Taiwan Strait. See for instance Han Nianlong, op. cit., p. 131. But this explanation is not very convincing as such a distant event could not provoke this serious decision on the Chinese part.
56 using atomic bombs. 20 Dulles stated that the United States would not hesitate to employ armed force to protect Taiwan. A Soviet source revealed that the United States sent nearly 130 military ships, including 7 of the total 13 American aircraft carriers, 3 cruisers and 40 escorting ships to the Taiwan Straits.21 Like previous conflict, there was no support for American policy from its allies in Europe and America. In fact, because of its blind support for Chiang Kai-shek, one Senator asserted, the United States was being dragged into war 'through the back door, by a dictator, a Chinese warlord who was driven off the mainland of China' .22 US hostility towards the PRC also could be seen in its leaders' speeches. While visiting Taiwan in 1960, President Eisenhower reaffirmed that the United States rejected 'the claim of the warlike and tyrannical Communist regime in Beijing to speak for the Chinese people'. 23 In his first State of the Union Message, in early 1961, President John Kennedy accused the Chinese Communists of menacing the security of the entire area - from the borders of India and South Vietnam to the jungles of Laos.24 He told the Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, that 'China was an expansionist nation. If recognition were extended, and other ties were opened, they would serve to legitimise that aggression'. 25 It should be mentioned that the Kennedy Administration faced a dilemma in its China policy. Though it was eager to do so, the Administration could not make a change. Rusk explained this irony as the political weakness of the Administration due to Kennedy's thin victory against Nixon and the strong anti China sentiments in American domestic politics. 26 Another reason for the cautious China policy was probably that the Democrats had been accused of 'losing China' in 1949, which restrained Democrat Presidents from initiating a change in China policy, and explains why world had to wait for Nixon to normalise relations with China. Rusk could not initiate any new studies on China policy, for fear that this
20 Eisenhower, 1966. The White House Years, Vol. 2, p. 295. 21 Kapitsa, op. cit., p. 211. 22 Eisenhower, 1966, p. 302. 23 Dulles F. R., op. cit., p. 187. 24 Ibid., p. 191. A short border war between China and India occurred in October-November 1962. See more details on the Sino--Indian conflict in Whiting Allen, 1975, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, pp. 1:..-169, Gurtov and Hwang, 1952, China Under Threat, pp. 99-152. 25 Quoted in Garson R., The United States and China Since 1949, A Troubled Affair, p. 81. 26 See more details in Rusk D., 1990, As I saw it, p. 283.
57 might be leaked to the press?7 Whatever the reason, American attitudes towards China were locked into anti-Communist sentiments. The Johnson Administration followed the same policy, rejecting all possible contact with China. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, stated in 1965, 'we think that anything in terms of trade expansion, or recognition or admission to the United Nations that tends to encourage them that their policy is paying dividends is not in the interests of getting peace established in the Pacific'. 28 Though they were hostile to the PRC, as shown above, the United States did try its best to avoid a direct military clash with the People's Republic. In the heat of the first Taiwan crisis in 1954, contrary to some hard-line counsel, Eisenhower chose restraint. He rejected hard-line advice in relation to China on three occasions.29 Moreover, when the US-Taiwan treaty was signed, in December 1954, Dulles and Taiwan's Foreign Minister Yeh exchanged confidential notes, which in effect banned the Nationalists from resorting to force in relation to the PRC. This was seen as a measure to reduce the chance of PRC-ROC explosion that could draw the United States into direct conflict with the PRC. The above-mentioned US belligerence was a sign of 'active defence', aimed at eliminating the PRC's capability to attack Taiwan, rather then fighting for the mainland. During the second Taiwan crisis in 1958, President Eisenhower also chose restraint. 30 One of the clearest American attempts to avoid military conflict with China was their willingness to keep the Geneva talks going.31 Secretary of State Dulle.s - the major architect of anti-China policy - allegedly instructed U. Alexis Johnson, head of the American delegation, to ensure that the talks kept going, and to avoid provoking a Chinese walkout.32 Another example was the
27 Ibid. See more on Kennedy administration's dilemma in Dulles F. R., op. cit., pp 194-95. 28 Quoted from Dulles F. R., op. cit., p. 219. 29 See more details in Eisenhower, 1963, op. cit., pp. 459-83. 30 See more details in Eisenhower, 1966, op. cit., pp. 292-304. 31 The Sino-American talks started in Geneva in August 1955, than changed its venue to Warsaw in 1959. Up to 1968 they held l34 sessions, a record number. 32 See more details in Berding, op. cit., p. 58.
58 Kennedy Administration's opposition, when, in June 1962, Chiang Kai-shek called for retaking the mainland by force. 33 US attempts to avoid a hot war with China shows that when it saw no chance for a change in the status quo favourable to it, the United States preferred to maintain two Chinas- an undeclared 'two-Chinas' policy. This claim appears to contradict American refusal to recognise the PRC. Diplomatically and legally speaking, there was no such policy, but in practical terms, there was. The United States gradually changed its China policy. As early as March 1963, Averell Harriman advised Roger Hilsman, his successor as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, 'to think about laying the groundwork for what the President might do about China policy in his second administration' .34 At his last press conference, on 11 November 1963, President Kennedy emphasised, 'if the Red Chinese indicate a desire to live at peace with the United States, with other countries surrounding it, then quite obviously the United States would reappraise its policies. We are not wedded to a policy of hostility to Red China' .35 The clearest example of the American accommodation of the PRC was Hilsman' s San Francisco speech of December 1963. Unlike Dulles' 1957 speech, Hilsman stated that 'we have no reason to believe that there is likelihood that the Communist regime will be overthrown'.36 In contrast to Dulles, who refused to acknowledge the existence of the PRC, Hilsman recognised this reality, which signalled the US two Chinas policy. In September 1966, Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, went as far as to say that a current goal of American policy was to exchange visitors between China and the United States to help break through 'the walls of isolation that Beijing has built around itself' .37 By the end of the Johnson
33 As a result of the failure of the Great Leap Forwards Movement, in 1961-62 food shortage and unrest were acute in many parts of the mainland. The ROC obviously saw an apportunity to 'recover' the mainland. In the early months of 1962 several high American officials, including Averell harriman and Allen Dulles, visited Taiwan. Their purpose was to discourage the Nationalist eagerness for an invasion of the mainland. See more details in Chiu Hungdah, 1979, 'China and the Taiwan issue' in Chiu H. ( ed.), 1979, The Question of Taiwan in Sino-American Relations, pp. 173-74. American Ambassador to Poland John Cabot reportedly informed PRC Ambassador Wang Bingnan that the United States would not support the Nationalists' attempt to invade the mainland. See ibid, p. 173. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists, p. 250. 34 Hilsman, op. cit., pp. 346--47. See also Dulles F. R., op. cit., p. 208. 35 Dulles F. R., op. cit., p. 209. 36 Hilsman, p. 351. 37 Dulles F. R., op. cit., p. 231.
59 Administration, political and social groups also placed high pressure on the government for change in America's China policy.38 All this foretold a change that would occur in American policy towards China in the near future. A 'two Chinas' policy was being formed before a compromise was found later, during the Nixon Administration.
P RC restraint towards the United States
It was conventional wisdom in the West that the Chinese Communists were aggressive. Had they not twice provoked crises over Taiwan? As argued above, the crises were an internal Chinese affair. If anything connected with the shelling was related to the United States, it was the intention of showing the Americans the Chinese Communists' determination to reunite China. It was to probe how far the United States might be prepared to go in defending the nationalist regime. It was also aimed at displaying Chinese military strength to the United States, and to demonstrate that it was not easy to defeat China. 39 The second shelling in September 1958 was to express the PRC's resentment against the growing level of American support for the Nationalists.40 Another reason was to prepare the ground for coming talks with the United States. A Soviet work on Chinese foreign policy asserts that the second crisis brought about the renewal of the Sino-American talks.41 However, these reasons were secondary to the PRC's desire to show its disapproval and not to allow the Taiwan issue to be 'frozen'. So, no matter how 'belligerent' the PRC was, in the eyes of the West, it was clear that the People's Republic stirred up the Taiwan crises in a defensive rather than an offensive manner. The PRC's restraint was seen m its efforts to avoid direct military confrontation with the United States. During the first Taiwan crisis, Zhou Enlai told the Swedish Ambassador the PRC did not reject diplomatic negotiations with
38 See more details in Dulles F. R., op. cit., pp. 218-31. 39 At that time the US was preparing for establishment of SEATO, which clearly aimed against China. 40 See above part' on US China policy. 41 Arbatov, op. cit., p. 316. The Sino-American talks started in Geneva, but were then suspended because the Americans did not assign a diplomat with Ambassadorial rank to the talks.
60 the United States for addressing the question of tension.42 In April 1955, at the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung (Indonesia) the PRC Prime Minister announced his government's willingness to enter into negotiations with the United States. Moreover, on the advice of conference participants, the Chinese agreed not to raise the question of the 'American aggression in Taiwan' at the conference.43 Even when the Americans demanded that the Chinese meet their preconditions before the talks could start, which in effect closed the door to negotiations, Zhou Enlai was believed to have kept it 'open a crack' .44 Moreover, in May, he told the British Charge d'Affairs, Trevelyan, 'we would strive for the liberation of Taiwan through peaceful means so long as it was possible'.45 He was ready to hold talks with the Kuomintang to solve the crisis. On the eve of the Sino-American talks in Geneva, in August 1954, Beijing also released some imprisoned airmen as a measure to improve the atmosphere for possible discussions. During the second Taiwan crisis in 1958 the PRC was also seen as trying to avoid war with the United States. Although the Chinese Government formally announced that the breadth of China's territorial sea was 12 nautical miles, they did not shell American ships escorting KMT re-supply vessels, which stood only 3 miles from the Chinese coast.46 They limited their opposition to a statement by Foreign Ministry spokesman, on 7 December.47 In addition, on 8 September 1958 Mao reaffirmed China's desire to settle disputes with the United States through peaceful negotiation.48 Once again, the Chinese initiated the idea of holding talks to ease the tension. Another reconciliatory move by the PRC was the 6 October statement by its Defence
42 Han Nianlong, op. cit., p. 97. China, however, refused to discuss the Taiwan question in the UN, considering it an intervention in Chinese internal affairs. 43 See more details on Zhou Enlai's activities at Bandung conference in Han Nianlong, op. cit., p. 99-100. 44 This is what the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Mohammed Ali, reported from the conference, cited in Dulles F. R., op. cit., p. 161. 45 Han Nianlong, op. cit., p. 124. Camilleri claimed that only in January 1956 did Zhou Enlai make this offer. See more details in Camilleri, 1980, Chinese Foreign Policy, p. 33. 46 Eisenhower, 1966, op. cit., p. 302. 47 Han Nianlong, op. cit., p. 132.
48 Ibid, p. 132-33. The point in fact was made two days earlier in a Zhou Enlai statement. See more details in Kapitsa, op. cit., p. 211.
61 Minister, Peng Dehuai, which announced a one-week cease-fire if United States destroyers would cease escorting KMT ships.49 The Chinese then extended the cease-fire other two weeks, and subsequently announced that they would fire on odd days of the month. 50 Eisenhower described the situation as a 'Gilbert and Sullivan war' .51 It was in effect 'political confrontation', a show of the Chinese Communists' determination on the Taiwan question, but not a sign of their willingness to fight a real war with the United States for Taiwan. During the second crisis, Dulles proposed to exchange a cease-fire for the withdrawal of the Americans advising the Nationalists from Quemoy and Matsu -two KMT islands close to the mainland. The PRC's rejection of this offer indicated that their aim was not to take the islands themselves, but to show their opposition to the US Taiwan policy. The PRC probably preferred to solve the Taiwan question as a whole, not to deal with the offshore islands question separately. The Chinese attitude towards the United States was made clear in a conversation between Mao Zedong and the Soviet Charge d' Affairs to China, S. F. Antonov, on 14 October 1959. Mao told the Soviet diplomat that China had no intention of starting a war with the United States over Taiwan. According to Mao, the Chinese could wait 10-20 years, even 30-40 years, to solve the Taiwan question.52 In an interview given to Anna Louise Strong, on 13 March 1959, Mao jokingly said that Dulles was the Chinese Communists' 'teacher' as he had 'taught' them to stop at the brink ofwar.53 Mao made it quite clear that the PRC was unlikely to engage in war with the United States. As late as September 1963, the Chinese leadership still championed a peace program. The PRC's Foreign Minister Chen Yi told Australian filmmaker, John Dixon,' If there is another war I can tell you now, that somebody else can do the fighting. I've seen enough. The United States has got to realise that we all live on the same globe'. 54
49 Han Nianlong, op. cit., p. 135. 50 Ibid, p. 304. 51 Eisenhower, 1966, op. cit., p. 304. 52 From the journal ofS. F. Antonov (21 October 1959): Summary of a Conversation with the Chairman ofthe CC CPC Mao Zedong on 14 October 1959, reproduced in CWIHP, Bulletin, Issue No. 13, Fall1993', pp. 56-58. 53 Ang Chengguan, op. cit., p. 109. 54 Cited in Lawson, op. cit., p. 43.
62 However, while the United States tried, in the early 1960s, to improve Sino-American relations, the PRC did not. Zhou Enlai told Edgar Snow that unless the United States acknowledged that the status of Taiwan was an internal Chinese affair and withdrew the Seventh Fleet, it was inconceivable that friendly relations could be established between the two countries. 55 This Chinese refusal to improve relations with the United States seems to indicate the depth of Chinese bitterness about US Taiwan policy. Moreover, when the Sino-Soviet rift intensified in the 1960s, the Chinese Communists believed that a Russo-American alliance aimed at China had been established. Under influence of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the PRC hardened its policy towards the United States by the mid-1960s. 56 Even in these difficult times for China, however, Zhou Enlai reaffirmed 7 his country's resolve not to provoke a war with the United States. 5 On 16 October 1964 Chinese Communists successfully detonated an atomic bomb. Zhou Enlai proposed that the United States and China should conclude a formal agreement that neither power would be the first to use atomic bombs against the other, which the United States rejected. The PRC was clearly unsatisfied with US Taiwan policy, but was forced to accept the situation, in order to avoid direct military confrontation with the United States.
The US war against the DRV
We have seen in the previous section that the United States engaged in a quasi war against China. Although hostile to the PRC, it stopped short of dragging the United States into a hot war with China. This US China policy found expression in its Vietnam policy. The US objective was to maintain the status quo in Vietnam, which meant that the United States could confront the perceived Chinese expansion without fighting directly with Red China. As will be shown, Washington tried to build a strong anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam, blocking implementation of the Geneva Agreement. To the Americans, the
55 Snow E., I 97 I, The Long Revolution, p. 232. 56 see more details in Dulles F. R., op. cit., pp. 232-234. 57 Camilleri, op. cit., p. 43.
63 seventeenth parallel was not a temporary military demarcation line as articulated by the Geneva Agreement, but a permanent state border between North and South Vietnam. They helped Ngo Dinh Diem to consolidate his power in the South to compete with Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic ofVietnam. Then, when the Saigon government was weakened by people's uprisings in the South in 1960, and the status quo came under threat, the United States intervened with its 'anti guerrilla war' or 'special war'. In the end, when America could not win the special war, instead of accepting neutralisation of South Vietnam, it escalated the war by deploying its ground forces in the South and bombing the North, which was widely known as 'Americanisation' of the war. All these war escalation efforts were aimed at maintaining the status quo by force. Did all these happen because of Vietnam itself? I do not exclude the role of the Vietnamese Communists and anti-Communists in the evolution of events in Vietnam. The Soviet factor also played an important role, as the American perception of world Communist expansion meant first of all Soviet expansion. US Vietnam policy was not solely influenced by the China factor. However, for present purposes, the focus is on how the Sino-American quasi war influenced US Vietnam policy. Vietnamese and Soviet factors will be discussed when necessary to highlight the limits of the impact of the Sino-American relationship on events in Vietnam. It is argued here that the real reason behind America's determination was its hostility towards China. Had there been no American fear of Chinese expansion, there would not have been such massive American involvement in Vietnam. In 1954, President Eisenhower believed that if elections were to be held in Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh would have won 80 per cent, and therefore not only the North but also the whole of Vietnam would be 'lost'.58 Some may argue that what Eisenhower had in mind was a comparison between Ho Chi Minh and Bao Dai' s popularity, not between Ho Chi Minh and Ngo Dinh Diem. Whatever the comparison, the Eisenhower statement was recognition of Ho Chi Minh's high reputation in Vietnam.
58 Eisenhower, 1963, op. cit., p. 372.
64 However, the Eisenhower Administration was determined to build up a strong anti-Communist government in South Vietnam to compete with Ho Chi Minh's government, or in Senator John F. Kennedy's words, to offer Vietnam a 'non-communist revolution'. 59 One of the first measures taken by the Americans after the Geneva Conference was to help evacuate nearly one million northerners to the South. A conventional claim in the West is that the evacuation of this huge number of the Northerners to the South was evidence of people's rejection of the Communist regime. However, this argument does not explain why the majority of the migrants were Catholic. I hold that churches' propaganda and transportation, which were provided with active assistance from the Americans, helped to produce this massive migration.60 The migration evidences American involvement more than rejection of communism. In the months following the Geneva Conference, American Ambassador Donald Heath, Military Mission Head, Colonel Lansdale, and others in Saigon tried to persuade the French and the sect leaders of the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao and Binh Xuyen, to support Diem.61 A watershed in American involvement in Vietnam was Eisenhower's letter of 22 October 1954 to Diem, in which the American president for the first time promised direct American aid to South Vietnam, not through the French as before. The same day, an NSC meeting adopted a training program for the South Vietnamese army. In 1955, the United States launched a large and ambitious program to strengthen the South Vietnamese government, which consisted of both covert and overt plans.62 Money was poured into South Vietnam. From 1955 to 1961, the United States spent between $1.5 and $2 billion in Vietnam. This sum did not
59 Senator John F. Kennedy promoted this idea in his famous speech at a symposium, organised in early June 1956. See more details in the US Gov. and the VN War, pt. 1, pp. 303-305. 60 There were also regroupees from the South to the North, but due to their lack of transportation, their size is not comparable to the migration from the North to the South. Moreover, the Communists believed that tap ket (regrouping) was temporary, as the Geneva agreement articulated that national election should be held within two years. See more details on regrouping from the South to the North in Thayer C., 1989, War by Other Means, pp. 17-19. 61 See more details in FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XIII, pp. 2048-2052, 2000-2001; The US Gov. and the VN War, pt. 1, p.282; Lansdale, 1972, in the Midst of Wars, p. 244---60. 62 As far as the covert and clandestine CIA program in Vietnam is concerned, see the US Gov. and the VN War, pt. 1, pp. 308-311. For the overt plans' account, see ibid., pp. 311-316.
65 include CIA funding or the cost of maintaining the military advisory group, which was paid from Defence Department funds. The US government also increased its personnel in Vietnam from 500 in 1955 to 1,500 in 1961.63 American efforts to build a strong government in the South might have seemed innocent if they had not indirectly encouraged the Diem regime to sabotage implementation of the Geneva Agreements. Though there are no sources to demonstrate direct American involvement in Diem's decision, it can be inferred that US support was the main reason of Diem's refusal to comply with the agreements. Some argue that the Vietnam events in 1954-1975 were first of all a civil war, and outside powers only played secondary role in these events. I hold that if there was a civil war, it was transplanted from outside. There were two reasons for this claim. First, the Bao Dai government was invented by the French in the latter's fight against Vietnamese independence, whereas the DRV government was formed by the national assembly, which was elected by a national election in 1946. As a successor of the Bao Dai government, the Diem government had no more legal basis of an independent institution though a 'referendum' was organised in 1955. Even Lansdale, Diem's 'king maker', had to admit that 98 percent of vote for Diem was a fraud. 64 Second, without American support, Diem and his successors could not wage that 'civil war' to block reunification of the country. Thus, the Vietnam events were first of all a result of the outside powers' interference, though there were Vietnamese elements that endorsed and supported that interference. Another important feature of American policy towards Vietnam in this period was gradual replacement of the French by the Americans in running the war in Vietnam. In the beginning, US personnel, in co-operation with the French, trained Vietnamese military forces. From 1956, they assumed the job alone. When Diem asked the French forces to withdraw, the Americans completely replaced them in Vietnam.
63 Ibid., p. 314. See also Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 259-{)2. 64 See for instance Fall, The Two Vietnams, pp. 257-58. See also the US Gov. and the VN War, pt. 1., p. 300.
66 However, there was limit to the cause of US anti-Communism in Vietnam. Though SEATO (Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation) was set up in September 1954 to show American determination to oppose communism in Southeast Asia, there was no attempt to include Vietnam in this military organisation. The inclusion of South Vietnam would have been an outright breach of the Geneva Agreement, and Washington did not want to provoke the Communists by such an act. American allies, such as Great Britain and France also did not support such a move by America. Moreover, there were dissenting voices in the American Administration regarding American policy towards the Diem government. Defence Secretary Charles Wilson reportedly strongly opposed not only the Diem regime, but the whole idea of US involvement in Vietnam. In a meeting of the NSC on 24 September 1954, he stated that the United States should 'get completely out of the area' .65 He continued to protest after Eisenhower's letter was sent to Diem. On the other hand, Secretary of State Dulles was among Diem's strongest backers. Dulles also successfully mobilised substantial support from influential Senator Mike Mansfield in the fight to maintain Diem.66 Ambassador Heath and his successor, General Lawton Collins, changed their position towards Diem several times. 67 Among bureaucrats, whose voice in shaping US Vietnam policy cannot be overlooked, there were some strong supporters of Diem. The CIA's Colonel Lansdale was a clear example.68 Though there were differences within the Eisenhower Administration, all but Defence Secretary Wilson more or less agreed that the most important target was a strong anti-Communist government in South Vietnam headed by Diem or someone else. Different American officials may have favoured different options, but this was the unchanged objective of the United States in South Vietnam. The above discussion shows that the Diem government was first of all an American product. Without American aid, his government could not have survived, much less consolidated its power. US Senator Ernest Gruening
65 FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XIII, pp. 2059, 2142; see also the US Gov. and the VN War, pt. 1, p. 284. 66 Gravel, op. cit.; Vol. 1, pp. 222-23; The US Gov. and the VN War, pt. l, pp. 283-84. 67 ' Ibid. 68 See more details on Lansdale's activities in Vietnam in his memoir, op. cit., chapters 9-18.
67 reasonably asserted that 'South Vietnam is sustained only by US arms and funds. Its ephemeral regimes are self-imposed and respond to no popular desire' .69 These US efforts were conditioned by its perception of communist expansion. At the time, the Americans considered the communist bloc as monolithic. The 'communist threat' in Vietnam was seen as coming from both China and the Soviet Union. Here, we see both the impacts of the Sino-American relationship on US Vietnam policy, as well as its limits. Had there been no quasi war between China and the United States, the United States would not have been so enthusiastic about supporting Diem's anti-Communist government. In terms of limits, not only the US-China quasi war, but the whole idea of the Cold War with the Soviet bloc made the Americans determined to stop communist influence in Vietnam. The events that followed unfolded with the same logic. After the Vietnamese Communists decided, in spring 1959, to resume armed struggle to support their political struggle for national reunification, the Diem regime's position weakened. By the end of 1959, the Communists had reportedly gained control over large areas ofthe South Vietnamese countryside, perhaps as much as two-thirds, or half by day and all by night as the saying went. 70 An authoritative Vietnamese source claims that by the end of 1960 the NLF forces administered, at different levels, 685 of the total of 1,193 communes in Nam Bo (the southern part of Vietnam). The figure for Khu 5 (the central part of Vietnam) was 3,200 of a total of 5721 villages. 71 In these changed circumstances, the Americans rushed to the aid of the Diem government. Counter-insurgency or anti-guerrilla strategies became an emphasis of American activities in South Vietnam. US Army Special Forces personnel were sent to Vietnam to run counter-guerrilla training for the South
69 The Senator Gruening meant the regimes replaced each other in the first half of the 1960s. See Gruening E., 1968, Vietnam Folly, p. 18. 70 The US Gov. and the VN War, pt. I, p. 334. 71 Bo Quoc Phong, Vien Lich su Quan su VietNam, 1996, Lich su cuoc khang chien chong My cuu nuoc, 1954-1975 (History ofthe anti-American national salvation resistance), p. 328. Dong khoi Ben Tre (Uprisings in Ben Tre province) is one of the clearest examples of uprisings in the South. See also Nguyen Thi Dinh, 1969, Khong con duong nao khac (No other way), pp. 74-102; and Bo Quoc phong, 1996, op. cit., pp. 266-331.
68 Vietnamese army. In 1960, the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) doubled its size, increasing from 342 to 685. 72 In addition, the Americans increased their aid to build the Dan Ve (Civil Guards), one of the main forces fighting the anti-guerrilla war. In early 1961, a plan was prepared to spend about $42 million to build civil guards forces. This amount added to approximately $225 million a year already being paid by the United States to maintain the South Vietnamese forces. 73 Another measure was to help Diem to build 'fortified villages' under a 'ap chien luoc' (strategic hamlet) program, which was aimed at dividing the NLF forces from the population. President Kennedy even approved the National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 52 directing an increase of covert operations against North Vietnam to lessen the pressure on the South Vietnamese regime.74 The Vietnamese Communists called these American efforts a 'special war' against Vietnam, as not American troops, but American dollars, arms and instructors were poured into South Vietnam to wage war against the Vietnamese Communists. The United States could claim that they were aiding a legitimate government to fight against 'rebels'. But the Vietnamese Communists reasonably claimed that the Americans were inflicting war on them by erecting a pro American government and then helping it fight. From the very beginning, the war was started by the Americans and imposed by them on the Vietnamese. The special war was to rescue the Saigon government and maintain the status quo. The Americans were more enthusiastic about the war than the Saigon government. One of the first signs of this enthusiasm was President Kennedy's letter to Diem, conveyed by Vice President Johnson during his visit to Vietnam (9-15 May 1961). The US President voluntarily offered the commitment that 'we
72 In fact, from 1956 a group of350 American military personnel under the Temporary Equipment Recovery Misson (TERM) mission was introduced into South Vietnam. When the mission completed its work in 1959, these personnel were absorbed into MAAG. (See more details in Gruening, op. cit., pp. 193-94 and Thayer C., 1989, op. cit., pp. 126-27. Another source claims that the official figure ofMAAG personnel placed the number at 342, but in fact it was well over a thousand officers and men. (Bernard Fall, 'Will South Vietnam Be Next?', The Nation 31 May 1958, cited in Thayer, op. cit., p. 127. 73 The US Gov. and the VN War, pt. 2, pp. 14-15. 74 See more details in Moise, 1996, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation ofthe Vietnam War, Chapel Hill: The University ofNorth Carolina Press, pp. 3-4.
69 are ready to join you in an intensified endeavour to win the struggle against Communism' .75 Although it was not clear at that moment what form American participation would take, very soon it would become clear that not only American dollars and arms, but American combat supporting units would be sent to Vietnam. Johnson was also instructed to raise with Diem the question of whether US combat troops should be sent to Vietnam or whether there should be a US-Vietnam mutual defence treaty. This was another American 'initiative'. Interestingly, Diem was not in favour of either proposal. He believed that the American presence would only jeopardise his government's reputation, especially compared to his rival, the DRV, since there was no armed Chinese or Soviet presence. So, the Americans were more anxious than the Diem government to promote an escalation of the American presence in Vietnam. In a meeting in summer 1961, three ranking officials- Rostow, Taylor and Alexis Johnson- discussed the possibility of 'using evidence of North Vietnam aggression as a foundation for more aggressive if still limited military action against North Vietnam'. 76 Thus, three years before the Tonkin Incidents, the Americans had planned to expand the war to the North under some kind of pretext. We know that at that time, there was no big troop infiltration of the 77 South. So, discussion of expanding the war showed only the Kennedy Administration's willingness to defeat the Vietnamese Communists' will to unite the country. October 1961 saw two important decisions concerning Vietnam: sending US Army and US Marine Corps helicopter units to South Vietnam, and sending Taylor and Rostow for a study visit to Vietnam. The helicopter units were told to have been sent to Vietnam for training purposes, but only two months later, they were authorised to participate in combat operations. Though the events in Vietnam developed on their own, the Berlin crisis probably pushed the Kennedy Administration for more decisive actions in Vietnam to confront the 'communist threat'.
75 Q d. uote In the US Gov. and the VN War, pt. 2, p. 42. 76 See more details in the US Gov. and the VN War, pt. 2, pp. 53-66. 77 A publication of the SRV's Defence Ministry discloses that in May 1961, the first group of 500 personnel was sent to the South, which arrived at destination in July. See Bo Quae phong, Vien Lich su Quan su VietNam, 1997, Lich su cuoc khang chien chong My cuu nuoc, 1954-1975 (History of Anti-American Resistance for National Salvation, 1954-1975), Vol. 3, pp. 37-38.
70 The most important decision of the year was made on 15 November, when an NSC meeting discussed and approved the Taylor-Rostow report, which called for the introduction of American troops into Vietnam, though in disguise of flood relief. Ambassador Nolting in Saigon was directed to discuss the subject with Diem. The same month, the powerful US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was set up. These November decisions were important as they laid the groundwork for far greater US involvement and for further 'Americanisation' of the war. 78 Once again, it was the United States, and not the Diem government that initiated the plan to expand the war. Initially the Kennedy Administration demanded that Diem reform his government to secure enhanced US support. Diem opposed the 'administrative partnership', explaining that it would give the Vietnamese Communists a 'monopoly on nationalism'.79 Despite Diem's failure to provide any quid pro quo, in December 1961, the first contingent of the augmented US military support arrived in Saigon. This was another example of US enthusiasm in pouring aid into South Vietnam to confront the perceived communist threat. The Americans were so enthusiastic about running the war and winning it, which meant to prolong partition of Vietnam, that they even started to consider a change in the leadership of South Vietnam. As early as autumn 1961 there was speculation that if the 'performance' of Diem continued to be unsatisfactory, and the situation in Vietnam did not improve, the United States would have to play an active role in installing a new leadership. 80 While, at that time, the removal of Diem was only a hypothesis, the Americans did push for removal ofNhu, Diem's brother who served as Special Advisor to the government, and Tran Kim Tuyen, the head of the secret police. Finally, in August 1963, the United States decided to remove the Ngos. In November, they were killed by ARVN coup officers.
78 Interestingly, earlier in the year, the Central Committee also decided to set up Trung uong cue mien Nam (Laodong's Central Office in South Vietnam- COSVN); The quan giai phong mien Nam (The liberation army of South Vietnam) was also established by a decision of Tong quan uy (the Central Military Commission). Thus both sides prepared for the military option. See Bo quae phong, 1997, op. cit., pp. 32-35. 79 Cited in Kahin· George MeT., 1986, Intervention, How America Became Involved in Vietnam, p. 138. 80 See more details in the US Gov. and the VN War, pt. 2, p. 100.
71 American policy makers explained their approval of Diem's removal by saying that the United States could not be identified with a regime that behaved with such brutality and crass disregard for world sensitivities. 81 We know that in 1963 the Diem government was in conflict with Buddhists in the South, brutally oppressing their protests. But leaving aside the 'moral' content of their explanations, the main reason behind the decision to remove Diem was the American fear of losing the war in Vietnam. Ambassador Lodge, one of the strongest supporters of the coup, lateradmitted this, stating that 'dissatisfaction with the Diem regime might explode in violence, bringing in a pro-Communist or at best a neutralist set of politicians. America's investment in Vietnam entitled the United States to intervene'.82 Whatever the reasons, Diem's removal shows how far the Americans went to build a 'strong' anti-Communist government in the South. In the early 1960s, although the Kennedy Administration decided to increase its involvement in Vietnam, it decided to accept a negotiated settlement for Laos. The neutrality of Laos raised the question whether South Vietnam could follow the Laos model. After the Geneva Conference on Laos, in July 1962, Ambassador Averell Harriman reportedly thought that neutrality could be possible for South Vietnam, but Secretary of State Dean Rusk did not agree. President Kennedy supported him in this. Kennedy was determined to continue the course _ taken by his predecessors, which was to build a strong anti-Communist government in South Vietnam. 83 This was the main reason why South Vietnam could not have become neutral at that time. Why could the United States accept neutrality in Laos but not in South Vietnam? It may have been that, unlike South Vietnam, Laos borders China and the United States ran the risk of provoking a direct confrontation with China if it insisted on building an anti-Communist bastion in Laos. At the time, the Vietnamese Communists had already arrived at this conclusion.84 There were
81 Ball, G.W., 1982, The Past Has Another Pattern. p. 370. 82 Quoted in Karnow, S., op. cit., p. 290. 83 see more details in Dulles F. R., op. cit., p. 200. 84 See more details in Le Duan, 1993, Ve chien tranh nhan dan VietNam (On Vietnamese People's War), p. 158.
72 other reasons for the neutrality of Laos. Le Duan claimed that both the Soviets and Chinese supported the Pathet Lao, and therefore the United States had to sign the Geneva Agreement on Laos, while there was Sino-Soviet rift during the Vietnam War, which enabled the Americans to escalate the war in Vietnam.85 Le Duan's claim was not very precise as both of them also supported the DRY, though there was a rift between them. However, there were differences in the cases of Laos and Vietnam. While the Chen Yi stated that his country took the same position on Laos as the Soviets at the Geneva Conference, 86 China opposed a united action with the Soviet Union during the Vietnam War. Another reason was the lack of roads in Laos, which prevented both sides from mounting major attacks. One can argue that these geographical conditions prevented a modern army like the US one from operating effectively, and therefore the United States accepted Laotian neutrality. However, this argument does not take into account the American intervention in Laos by other means to support Laotian rightist forces. Kong Lae claimed that the main reason for his 1960 coup was that to stop a civil war that the Americans brought into Laos. So the lack of road was only a secondary reason for the American acceptance of Laotian neutrality. I believe that the main reason was that Laos borders China, and the United States did not want to repeat the Korean mistake of bringing US troops close to the Chinese border. The comparison between the situation in Laos and South Vietnam showed how China cast its shadow over US policy towards Vietnam. The accepted Western view was that neutrality was only the first step towards a communist take-over of South Vietnam. Supposing that this assumption is correct, it shows that the Americans did not want to accept circumstances in Vietnam that were unfavourable to them. Whether South Vietnam was communist or non-communist should have been seen to be a Vietnamese affair, but the United States insisted on its being non-communist. The fear of a change to the status quo, of losing more ground to the Communists was the main motive of America's Vietnam policy.
85 Le Duan, 1979, Le Duan 'stalk on China. 86 See more details in Han, op. cit., p. 204.
73 The United States was so keen on opposing neutrality for South Vietnam that it reportedly gave the green light to the anti-Diem coup in November 1963, partly for fear that the Ngos would to open dialogue with Hanoi and could reach a compromise to neutralise South Vietnam.87 The DRY's former Prime Minister, Pham Van Dong, indirectly confirmed this story, saying that Nhu did send word via Poland's Ambassador, but it was only a game played by Nhu to test the American reaction, and that Nhu did not really want to open a dialogue with Hanoi. 88 While there are no sources confirming the claim that American fear of neutrality in South Vietnam was the reason for their support of the anti-Diem coup, it was clear that this fear had always haunted them. President Johnson sent a warning to the Duong Van Minh junta that 'neutralisation of South Vietnam is unacceptable [and] would only be another name for a Communist take-over'. 89 McNamara admitted that Johnson Administration officials were mortified by the possibility that Diem's successors might be looking for a neutral solution.90 McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow both delivered scathing attacks in early January on a proposal from Mike Mansfield that suggested, in essence, taking seriously the idea of a neutral solution in Saigon. 91 Opposition to neutralisation of South Vietnam was even the main theme, by which Nguyen Khanh bought American support for his coup against the Minhjunta.92 McNamara conceded that throughout 1964 and 1965, coup followed coup, each successive government in Saigon was deemed more or less acceptable in Washington, solely on the basis of US estimation of its compatibility with US strategy for prosecuting the war. Rejection of neutrality became one of the prerequisites for the job.93 The US
87 See more details in Nguyen Van Chau, Do Mau, VietNam- Mau lua que huang (Vietnam my homeland in blood and fire), p. 675, Bui Tin, Following Ho Chi Minh, p. 60. 88 Base on my interview with Pham Van Dong in March 1998. 89 Quoted from McNamara, 1999, Argument Without End, op. cit., p. 113. 90 Ibid. 91 See more details in the US Gov. and the VN War, pt. 2, pp. 215-218. See also Kahin G. MeT., op. cit., pp. 190-193. 92 Minh was suspected of being pro-French and receptive to De Gaulle's neutralisation plan for Vietnam. See more details in Kahin, op. cit., pp. 196-98. 93 McNamara, 1999, op. cit., p. 115. See more in Kahin, 1986, op. cit., pp. 208, 294-195.
74 leadership's anti-neutrality sentiment showed, one more time, how the Americans imposed their will on the RVN. On the other hand, in 1963, Kennedy began to seek answers to the question of how the United States could get out of Vietnam. Robert Kennedy later recalled that according to his brother, the solution must involve 'some form of coalition government with people who would ask us to leave' .94 So, it was probable that Kennedy saw that the Americans should withdraw from Vietnam, but given the amount of US prestige and resources that had already been sunk into an anti-Communist crusade in South Vietnam, getting out would not be easy. The above analysis of Sino-American relations under the Kennedy Administration also shows that Kennedy intended to modify his China policy if he won a second term. Once again, the close relationship between Sino-American relations and US policy towards Vietnam is evident. When the Americans planned to change their China policy, they planned to change Vietnam policy as well. Though there are no documents, statements by American statesmen to support, facts show that US Vietnam policy was, in a sense, an aspect of its China policy. Later, as will be seen, when the Nixon Administration began its rapprochement with China, its Vietnam policy would change too. After the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963, the political situation in South Vietnam became increasingly chaotic, and the NLF had effectively exploited the political and military weakness of the Saigon government. In December 1963, Defence Secretary McNamara reported to Johnson, 'the current trends, unless reversed in the next two or three months, will lead to neutralisation at best or more likely to a Communist-controlled state'.95 In March 1964, according to McNamara, about 40 per cent of the countryside was now under Vietcong control or predominant influence.96 Johnson, however, ruled out American withdrawal, nor did he contemplate a compromise with the Communists. Believing in their financial and military strength, the Johnson Administration decided to escalate the war to rescue the Saigon government. By
94 Quoted in McNamara, 1999, op. cit., p. 99. 95 Quoted from Karnow, op. cit., p. 325. See also in the US Gov. and the VN War, pt. 2, p. 211-12. 96 See more details in Gravel, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 311-12.
75 the end of 1963, the MACV and the CIA together had worked out an anti-DRV covert program using the code name OPLAN 34A. Johnson was quoted as saying that the plan was designed to make clear to the North Vietnamese that the United States would not accept a Communist victory in South Vietnam and that the United States would escalate the conflict to whatever level was required.97 The American Administration saw expanding the war to the North as a main measure to stop the aggravation of situation in the South. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy allegedly stated that air raids against the North would compel Hanoi to stop or at least sharply cut down its assistance to the NLF, and equally important, would stiffen the Khanh government.98 Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and General Curtis LeMay, Commander of US air forces supported this approach. Others opposed it. Hilsman and Harriman favoured a more political approach to Vietnam. Ball believed that escalation of the war could not solve the problem in the South, but would provoke the North into a tit-for-tat escalation.99 The Johnson Administration was so enthusiastic to expand war to the North that in early June 1964, it drafted a resolution to ask for congressional approval to expand the war. Pentagon planners also pinpointed 94 bombing targets in North Vietnam. In early August 1964, the Administration took advantage of the distorted, if not fabricated, information on the so-called second attack on the destroyer Maddox to justify the bombing of the North Vietnamese patrol bases and a major oil storage depot. 100 Though Johnson's spokesmen described the reprisals as 'limited in scale', American aircraft flew 64 sorties against these targets. As in the past, the American Administration was more enthusiastic than the Saigon government about winning the war. When a rift between Ambassador Maxwell Taylor and Khanh broke out in 1964, the latter even threatened to expel Taylor, which would have meant the end of American involvement in Vietnam. Explaining this move to Karnow, a Saigon government official asserted that 'our
97 Cited in Moise, op. cit., p. 5. 98 Quoted in Karnow, op. cit., p. 344. 99 See more details in Ball G., 1982, The Past Has Another Pattern, pp. 391-403; The US Gov. and the VN War, pt. 2, pp. 359-363. 100 See more details in Moise, op. cit., chapters 4-6.
76 big advantage over the Americans is that they want to win the war more than we do' .101 Another example of American enthusiasm for winning the war was Johnson's decision to send American troops to Vietnam in March 1965, without prior discussion with his South Vietnamese counterpart. On the morning of 8 March, when the marines had just arrived at Danang, the South Vietnamese Prime Minister's Assistant, Bui Diem, was called to his boss and given the task of drafting a communique with his American counterpart. It is also believed that Dr. Phan Huy Quat, the then Prime Minister, was not informed, much less asked for approval.102 By deploying combat troops in great number in Vietnam, Washington 'americanised' the war in order to avoid a defeat. One of the main reasons behind this action was the American fear of a Chinese 'expansion'. Nixon admitted that in 1965 in the capacity of a private citizen he made a series of speeches to justify the war.103 At the time, Nixon spoke of the China factor in unambiguous terms, emphasising that the Vietnam War was not a war between the Vietnamese, nor the war between the United States and Vietnam, but the war between the United States and China. 104 Parallel with the escalation of the war, Johnson initiated a series of peace proposals or peace offensives. 105 He claimed that from 1965 until January 1969 'hardly a month passed throughout that period in which we did not make some effort to open the gateway to peace' .106 In reality, American peace proposals
101 Karnow, op. cit., p. 383. 102 Ibid., p. 416. See also Bui Diem and David Chanoff, 1987, In the Jaws ofHistory, p. 134. 103 In January, for instance, he mentioned that the American involvement in Vietnam risked involving Red China, but to him 'if Vietnam is lost, Southeast Asia is lost and the Pacific becomes a Red Sea'. See more details in Nixon R., 1978, TheMemoirs of Richard Nixon, pp. 270-71. 104 Quoted in Dulles F.R, op. cit., p. 213. Dulles claimed that Nixon made this statement in March 1965, but he gave no sources for his quotation. Though there is no direct confirmation in Nixon's memoir, the same idea was clearly given there. See Nixon, 1978, ibid 105 Quite a few American and Vietnamese, as well as citizens of third countries, have written memoirs and monographs on diplomacy during these years. Of them the most detailed accounts is Mai Van Bo, 1985, Tan Cong Ngoai giao Tiep xuc Bi Mat (Diplomatic Offensive and Secret Contacts); Mai Van Bo, 1993, Hoi ky Ngoai giao (Memoirs of a Diplomat); Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu, 1990, op. cit.; Johnson, 1971, op. cit.; Herring, George C, (ed.), 1983, The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: the Negotiating Volumes ofthe Pentagon Papers; Goodman A. E., 1986, The Search for a Negotiated Settlement ofthe Vietnam War, pp. 9-36. McNamara, 1999, op. cit., pp. 219-312; Cooper, 1970, The Lost Crusade, The full story of US involvement in Vietnam from Roosevelt to Nixon, pp. 325-369; Janos Radvanyi, 1978, Delusion and Reality: Gambits, Hoaxes, and Diplomatic One-Upmanship in Vietnam. 106 Johnson B., 1971, The Vantage Point, p. 233.
77 played, in large part, a supporting role in the American war escalation. Before and after the Gulf of Tonkin Incidents in August 1964, the United States did not want a peaceful solution to the war in Vietnam. Instead, they believed that their bombing of the DRV would force the latter to acquiesce to the American plan. Between 1965 and 1967 American confidence in this strategy was eroding, but they still demanded reciprocal moves by the DRV in exchange for their bombing halt. It was only after the Tet offensive of spring 1968, when the United States became frustrated and decided to start their disengagement with Vietnam, that they agreed unconditionally to halt the bombing North of the twentieth parallel, opening the way for talks between the Americans and the Vietnamese Communists. In June 1964, Blair Seaborn - the Canadian representative at the International Control Commission - was asked to assure the Vietnamese Communists that the United States was determined to maintain an independent, non-communist South Vietnam. 107 It should be recalled that at that time a bombing plan for North Vietnam had been prepared by the Administration. Judging by the content of the American message and the situation at that time, the Seaborn mission could not be seen as an attempt at peace, but as an ultimatum before air attacks were carried out against the DRV. The Pentagon Papers concede that 'the most important result of the Seaborn mission was probably to afford an additional reason, if one were needed, for subsequent American escalation of the war' .108 Thus the Administration also dismissed out of hand the UN Secretary General U Thant's proposals for peace talks. 109 Moreover, the Seaborn mission also served intelligence purposes. The Canadian diplomat was instructed to see whether there were signs of a rift within the DRY's leadership and the strength of their will to fight. 110
107 Johnson, op. cit., p. 67. See also in Luu Van Loi, 1990, Tiep Xuc Bi Mat VietNam- Hoa Ky Truoc Hoi Nghi Pari (Pre-Paris Conference Vietnam-US diplomatic contacts), Hanoi: Vien quan he quoc te, pp. 20-25. 108 Herring, 1983, op. cit., p. 5. 109 See more details in Cooper, op. cit., pp. 327-328; The US Gov. and the VN War, pt. 2, p. 344. 110 Ambassador Cabot Lodge proposed to send an emissary to North Vietnam to 'explore North Vietnamese attitudes towards the conflict in the South'. Cited in Herring, 1983, op. cit., p. 4; Cooper, op. cit., p. 326.
78 The second Seaborn mission to Hanoi in August 1964, just after the first American bombing of the North, did not offer any thing new. The Americans in fact sent a message though him to Hanoi, which blamed the DRV for aggravating of the situation. 111 It is obvious that by the time, the Americans believed strongly in the power of their bombing. Between 1965 and 1967 Washington made different initiatives to sound out a negotiated settlement of the war, of which the most important were the Mayflower, XYZ, Pinta, Marigold and Sunflower operations. The central point of all these attempts was to achieve de-escalation of DRV activities in the South, or an end to DRV troop infiltration into the South, in exchange for a halt to US bombing. This demand was unacceptable to the DRV. The two sides were too distant from each other, The Vietnamese Communists claimed that reunification was a Vietnamese affair, while the United States asserted that the North was invading the South. 112 As a result, Hanoi demanded unilateral US concessions while Washington insisted on reciprocity. At some points, the Johnson Administration showed some flexibility, giving a commitment to halt the bombing first, conditional on the DRY's de escalation of its activities in the South (The Marigold operation). But shortly afterwards, it took back that offer and reversed the order- the DRV was first to de-escalate its activities, followed by an American bombing halt (the Sunflower operation). The main reason for the failure of all these peace plans was the Johnson Administration's belief that it could rely on force to defeat the DRV. Peace plans were used only as political means to hide its aggression towards North Vietnam.
111 See more details in Herring, 1983, op. cit., p. 8; Luu Van Loi, op. cit., pp. 26-28. 112 I argue that the American claim sounded ridiculous not only to the Vietnamese Communists, though the South Vietnamese leaders called the DRY's action 'xam luoc' (invasion). The reason is simply that the leaders in the South also called for Bac Tien (March to the North). What prevented them from doing so was not lack of will, but lack of capability. If the 'Nationalists' had marched to the North, they could not have called it 'invasion' of the North. For both Communists and 'Nationalists', reunification of the country was their cause. In the South Vietnamese leaders called themselves 'Nationalists', but I do not agree with this claim as relying on the outsiders they rejected the national elections in 1956, blocking peaceful re-unification of the country. They also supported the Americans in the latter's rejection of neutralise South Vietnam, by staging coups against leaders who were in favour of this option. By no means these leaders were nationalists in its ordinary meaning.
79 The United States, however, gradually changed its stance on peace. If in the beginning the United States believed strongly in bombing the DRV until they accepted peace, thereby stopping the DRV 'invasion' of the South, they gradually came to understand that bombing could not 'break the Vietcong's back and destroy its will'. In the face of pressure from international and domestic protest, the Johnson Administration began to modify its stand. Eventually, the Tet offensive (spring 1968) showed that the Americans could not defeat by military means the Vietnamese Communists' will to fight for reunification, and forced them to change radically their position. Johnson's statement of 31 March 1968 did not ask for 'reciprocal' moves by the DRV in response to his decision to stop bombing North of the twentieth parallel. The entire history of the American attitude towards the peaceful solution of the conflict seems to be connected with Sino-American relations. US rejection of the peace settlement was an element of its overall Vietnam policy, which was conditioned by its China policy. If the US China policy did not change, how could its Vietnam policy change? During these years, the American Administration tried to settle the Vietnam question by military force. It tried to maintain the status quo by force. Only after Tet did the Americans turn to look for peaceful means to maintain the status quo, as will be shown in the next chapter.
China's avoidance of a confrontation with the US over Vietnam
The background section on Sino-American relations above showed that in the fifteen years after the Geneva Conference, China did not want to tackle the United States head on. It pursued the same objective in Vietnam. Facing different challenges during this period, the People's Republic responded differently, but the main content of the Chinese Vietnam policy did not alter- to maintain the status quo, and to keep Vietnam as a buffer zone against the US threat. In the early years, Chinese leaders called for implementation of the Geneva Agreements and for an enlarged conference, to discuss implementation. It also pressed the Vietnamese to reject resorting to arms to unite the country and to refrain from helping the revolutionary forces in Laos and Cambodia. Chinese leaders were afraid that these measures could provoke increased American intervention. Faced
80 with the American 'special war' in Vietnam, they changed their policy, and went to the aid of the Vietnamese. However, they tried to keep the fighting at a low level, which would tie down the Americans in South Vietnam, but would not, they calculated, provoke them to expand the war to the North. When the Americans brought the air war to North Vietnam and intensified the ground war in the South, the Chinese adopted a policy of YuanYue KangMei (aid Vietnam- resist the US), but they clearly tried to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States by refusing to commit their combat troops in Vietnam. Between 1954 and 1959 there was little military activity in Indochina. The Americans helped Ngo Dinh Diem consolidate his government in the South, but there was no direct threat to the status quo in Vietnam that would have worried the Chinese. In these circumstances, 'peaceful coexistence' in the peninsula was the best choice for the Chinese. To pursue this goal, on the one hand, the Chinese emphasised that the Geneva Agreements should be followed. Did they really believe that the agreements would be implemented and elections held? Probably, not. No one believed that was possible. Both the Chinese and the Vietnamese Communists had understood that since the time of the Geneva Conference, the Americans and their 'puppets' would not implement the accords. The Chinese calls did not have any affect on the Ngo Dinh Diem government, but they had a restraining effect on the Vietnamese Communists. This was an indirect way of telling the Vietnamese Communists not to take up arms to unite the country. The Chinese did not limit themselves to indirect calls. They urged the Vietnamese leaders directly but secretly not to take up arms in the cause of national unification. Mao reportedly gave this advice twice to the Vietnamese leaders, in November 1956 and July 1957. 113 He even suggested that the partition of Vietnam could last for a hundred years, which in the Chinese colloquium means 'forever'. Parallel to their calls, the Chinese threatened the Vietnamese Communists that the use of military forces for the purpose of reunification could result in the loss ofNorth Vietnam. 114 The Chinese were so worried that guerrilla war in the South could provoke American military intervention that they
113 See more details in the White Book, p. 39. 114 Ibid
81 countermanded their own Vice Foreign Minister, member of the CPP Central Committee, Zhang Wentian, when he said that the Vietnamese could wage a guerrilla war in South Vietnam. 115 When it was clear that the Diem government did not intend to comply with the Geneva agreements, the Chinese called for an enlarged Geneva conference to include the ISCC members so as to ensure the implementation of the agreements. On 25 January 1956 Zhou Enlai made this suggestion in his letter to the co chairmen of the Geneva conference, and repeated it in his political report to the Chinese People Political Consultative Conference, on 30 January 1956."6 But when the co-chairmen addressed a message to both North and South Vietnam, in May 1956, urging them to make every effort to implement the Geneva Agreements, the Chinese stopped calling for a conference, although they had been the ones to propose it. Ang Cheng Guan later commented that 'the Vietnamese Communists were again let down by their mentors, who once more failed to back them to the end' .117 Why did China stop calling for an enlarged conference, abandoning its own initiative? Presumably, the Chinese calls either for implementation of the Geneva agreements or for an enlarged conference were diplomatic manoeuvres. They did not believe it would come about, and therefore easily dropped their 'initiative', seeing it could not serve any more as a diplomatic 'offensive'. Some other PRC statements served the same objective. 118 A development that deserves more attention was the Chinese refusal to support the Soviet proposal to admit both Vietnams to the United Nations. In November 1956, when he was in Hanoi, Zhou Enlai assured Ho Chi Minh that China would not agree to the Soviet proposal, describing it as 'selling out' .119 If the Chinese aim was a stable and balkanised Indochina, why did they not agree with the Soviet proposal? This was not because of the Sino-Soviet rift, as their relations in 1956 were still reasonably good. My explanation is that due to their
115 The White Book, p. 40. See also Le Duan, 1979, op. cit. The talk highlights Le Duan's suspicions about Chinese leaders' intentions in Vietnam, which I think he exaggerated. 116 Ang Chengguan, op. cit., p. 14. 117 Ibid, p. 27. 118 Ibid, pp. 44, 77. 119 Han Suyin, Eldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the Making ofModern China, 1898-1976, p. 260. See also Ang, op. cit., p. 50.
82 experience with the United Nations during the Korean War, the Chinese were suspicious about the organisation. For them, the United Nations was nothing more than a tool in the Americans' hands. For this reason, they rejected two parts of Vietnam becoming part ofthat American-dominated body. Chinese reluctance to support an armed Communist struggle in South Vietnam was one of the main reasons the Vietnamese Communists were slow to take the decision, as indicated in a high profile publication prepared under the supervision of the Communist Party of Vietnam's (CPV) Politburo. 120 Only four and a half years after the Geneva Conference, in January 1959, the VWP (Vietnamese Workers' Party) decided to adopt armed struggle to support the political struggle in the South.121 The Chinese response to the Vietnamese Communists' decision was rather complicated, and changed several times. In the beginning they seemed to support the decision. Pham Van Dong confirmed in March 1997 that the decision was kept secret from the Chinese or the Soviets, but it somehow found its way to the ears ofVietnam's 'elder brothers'. 122 In August 1959, when Ho Chi Minh informed Zhou Enlai ofVietnam's decision to form the NLF and to use military means to achieve reunification, the Chinese Prime Minister reportedly promised to give, by the end of the year, weaponry, equipment and funds worth approximately $500 million to support the liberation struggle. 123 China failed to fulfil this pledge, however. Clearly, the Chinese reconsidered the decision and were afraid that the aid would encourage the Vietnamese Communists to promote armed struggle in the South, which could bring about increasing American involvement in Vietnam, and therefore would threaten China's security. There seemed to be a difference of opinion among the Chinese leadership. According to Le Duan, Zhou Enlai and Zhang Wentian were inclined to support the armed struggle, but Mao Zedong opposed it. 124
120 See more details in Ban chi dao, 1996a, op. cit., p. 116. 121 Ibid, p. 44. Thayer C., 1989, op. cit., pp. 183-85. 122 Based on my interview with Pham Van Dong in March, 1997. 123 Han Suyin, 1992, 'Zhou Enlaiyu ta de Da Shiji: 1898-1998' (Zhou Enlai and Chronology of His Activities: 1898-1998), p. 363. See also Ang, op. cit., p. 139. 124 See more details in Le Duan, 1979, ibid Zhang Wentian used to be CCP's General Secretary, but than dropped to lower rank. At the time of his statement, he was Vice Foreign Minister.
83 Moreover, in early 1960, China chose to downplay the importance of the armed struggle in the South Vietnam, failing to mention it in important speeches. 125 At high-level talks in May 1960, Zhou Enlai was dissatisfied with the Vietnamese armed struggle in the South, and tried to persuade the Vietnamese of its futility. He told his Vietnamese counterpart that 'even if Diem is overthrown there cannot be immediate reunification of Vietnam as the Americans cannot accept that outcome'. 126 The Chinese leader pointed out that the North could support the South only by political means, helping the South to work out policies, and the emphasis should be on nurturing the Southerners' spirit of self-reliance. Their fear of American intervention was exposed in their advice that only when the prospect of success was certain should the North help the South militarily. 127 Even in the event of such a 'safe' situation the Chinese were cautious, urging the Vietnamese to provide arms 'secretly, letting no one know [about the help]'. In short, the Chinese advised the Vietnamese Communists to take an almost 'no help' attitude in relation to the revolutionary movement in the South. 128 The reason behind that advice was Chinese fear of provoking the United States by armed struggle in the South. Moreover, when the Vietnamese rejected Chinese advice and began the armed struggle in the South, Chinese leaders insisted that it be run at a platoon level. 129 Guo Ming contended that in mid-May 1960 the North Vietnamese and Chinese leaders met twice in Hanoi and Beijing, where Zhou Enlai was quoted as having told Pham Van Dong that the South must be liberated, and there must be a combination of political and military struggle. Pham Van Dong was reported as having agreed with Zhou Enlai. 130 The Chinese author seems to have downplayed
125 Ang, op. cit., pp. 140-43. 126 Cited in the White Book, p. 42. The Chinese leader, referred to here, was probably Zhou Enlai, who visited Vietnam at that time. See also Bo quoc phong, Vien lich su quan su VietNam, 1991, Cuoc Khang Chien Chong My Cuu Nuoc 1954-1975: Nhung Su Kien Quan Su (The Anti-US Resistance War for National Salvation, 1954-1975: Military Events), pp. 44-45. 127 The White Book, ibid 128 Ibid 129 Le Duan, 1979, ibid 130 Guo Ming (ed.), 1992, Zhongyue Guanxi Yanbian Sishi Nian (Forty years of Sino-Vietnamese relations), p. 67.
84 the second point that Zhou Enlai made in May 1960 that there could not be reunification as the Americans could not accept it. Other evidence of Chinese disapproval of the DRY's decision was the sharp reduction in Chinese economic aid in 1961. 131 However, the Chinese did not reject the NLF. China's policy was much more complicated. Instead, it was the first country to recognise the NLF and reportedly supported the organisation's line of independence and non-alignment more than Hanoi was comfortable with. 132 A joint communique issued in September 1962 after the first visit to China by an NLF delegation mentioned not reunification but establishing South Vietnam as a neutral zone together with Cambodia and Laos. 133 It seemed that the Chinese did not agree with the Vietnamese line, but they chose not to oppose it overtly. On the contrary, the Chinese engaged with the newly founded front and influenced it from within. Another confounding element in the behaviour of the Chinese is their practice of giving verbal support to the Vietnamese Communists' cause. 134 Sometimes verbal support misled the audience. Chinese policy can more accurately be judged by its deeds, not its words. Other elements of the Chinese Vietnam policy were efforts aimed at neutralising Laos and Cambodia. The Chinese leaders were reported to have pressed Hanoi to affirm publicly at Bandung (April 1955) that Hanoi would not interfere in the internal affairs of Laos. 135 In February 1956, Zhou Enlai also assured Sihanouk that China would restrain North Vietnam from interfering in Cambodia's domestic affairs. 136 On 13 May 1957, Zhou Enlai told the North Vietnamese ambassador to China, Nguyen Khang, that Laos must be neutral and that there should not be a revolution in Laos at that point in time. 137 Moreover, in
81 L awson, op. ell.,. p. 59 . 132 Ibid, p. 58. 133 Ibid, p. 60. The Vietnamese Communists also agreed with neutralisation of the South. The NLF's Program set out its objective as to fight for and independent and neutral South Vietnam. However, there seemed to be no concrete idea and plan for neutralisation of the South. See the American-Vietnamese discussion on neutrality in McNamara, 1999, op. cit., pp. 99-150. 134 See more details in Han, op. cit., pp. 196-98. 135 L awson, op. ell.,. p. 57 . 136 Ang, op. cit., p. 17. See also Milton Osborne, 1994, Sihanouk: Prince ofLight, Prince of Darkness,, p. 114; and Sihanouk and Burchett, 1973, My War with the CIA: Cambodia's Fight for Survival, p. 203. 137 Zhou Enlai waijao huodong da shiji, p. 204; also in Ang, op. cit., p. 55.
85 August 1961, when the fighting in Laos between the Neo Laos Hak Xat (NLHX or the Lao Patriotic Front) and the pro-American forces was tense, the Chinese advised the Vietnamese that the greatest care must be taken to avoid direct involvement in the war in Laos. At talks in Geneva, Beijing advocated partitioning Laos horizontally into two zones: a north zone situated along China's southern border that would be controlled by the revolutionary forces; and a south zone controlled by the Phoumi Nosavan faction. 138 The Chinese leaders understood that the situation in Laos and Cambodia directly affected Vietnam. 139 Neutralisation of these two countries was clearly unfavourable to the Vietnamese revolution. The sole purpose of these Chinese efforts was to avoid provoking the United States. Once again, avoiding direct military confrontation with America was the main thrust of the Chinese attitude towards Indochina. When the United States started the 'special war' in South Vietnam in 1961, China changed its policy accordingly. This time the threat to the status quo was a challenge to the Chinese leaders. If the Americans won the special war, the situation in Vietnam would have been unfavourable to China's security. China would face a greater American threat on its southern border. Thus, the Chinese leaders changed their stance, supporting the Vietnamese Communists' armed struggle in the South not only with words, but also with arms. In summer 1962, the Chinese decided upon the immediate supply gratis by China of enough firearms to equip 230 Vietnamese infantry battalions. 140 The year 1962, therefore, marked the start of Chinese assistance to the Vietnamese Communists' struggle in South Vietnam. Vietnamese sources do not disagree on this point, but they add that that the Chinese refused to help the Vietnamese to build up a regular army and agreed to provide the Vietnamese only with light arms and logistics. 141 They were also believed to have urged the Vietnamese to limit activities in the South to
138 The White Book, p. 44. Le Duan, 1979, ibid. 139 To the Vietnamese leaders the revolutions of three countries are 'inter-related', and Indochina is the single unified battlefield. 140 Han, op. cit., p. 196. See also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo dui Wai Guanxi Gaishu (Shanghai Waiyu Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1989, Huang Guoan et al., 1986, ZhongYue guanxi yanbian (Evolution of Sino-Vietnamese Relations), p. 209. Guo Ming ( ed.) 1992, Zhong Yue guanxi yianbian sis hi nian (Forty years of Sino-American relations), p. 69; Wang Xiangen, 1992, 'YuanYue kang Mei shilu' (Stories of aiding Vietnam in the anti-American struggle), p. 18; Ang, op. cit., p. 229. 141 The White Book, p. 42.
86 guerrilla war with small-scale attacks and using only up to company-size units. 142 An independent source confirmed this claim, saying that Chinese semi-automatic weapons were not found in South Vietnam until July 1963. 143 So, the Chinese agreed to promote armed struggle in South Vietnam to meet bigger challenges from the United States, but they still feared that intensive fighting could provoke an increase in American military intervention. To them, guerrilla warfare was good enough to tie down the Americans without risking expanded war with the Americans. As late as December 1964, the Chinese still advocated that policy. 144 At the same time, Chinese leaders continued to give verbal support for the Vietnamese Communists' struggle. 145 The verbal support was seen most clearly in the years when the Americans mounted air raids against the DRV. During these years (1964-68) the Chinese repeatedly talked about their support for the DRV in its struggle against the United States, but they gave clear signals that they would not intervene in the war unless it expanded into Chinese territory. These signals ranged from an omission of a reference to Chinese interference when republishing a Vietnamese article, to the Chinese leaders' failure in mentioning measures taken to support the Vietnamese allies. 146 The clearest statement of the Chinese policy was given by Mao Zedong in an interview given to Edgar Snow, that only if the United States attacked China would the Chinese fight. 147 There seems to have been one exception, a Renmin Ribao statement of March 1964, which asserted that 'China is ready to send our men, whenever the South Vietnamese people want them, to fight together with the South Vietnamese people to annihilate the American aggressors' .148 In his response to the Foreign Minister of the DRV, Foreign Minister Chen Yi, confirmed this stand. 149 This
142 Ibid 143 Lawson, op. cit., p. 61. 144 See more details in ibid, pp. 28-29. 145 See more details in Han, 196-97. 146 See more details in Directorate ofintelligence, 1967, 'The Sino-Vietnamese Effort to Limit American Actions in the Vietnam War', stored in Texas Tech University, Vietnam Archives. Hereafter the CIA document. See also Lawson, op. cit. Chapters 2-4. 147 Cited in the White Book, p. 46. The CIA Document. 148 Quoted in the CIA document, p. 27. 149 77 Conversations, p. 78.
87 pledge was made in response to the NLF's 22 March appeal with an eye to recouping setbacks in Beijing's prestige, competing with Moscow on the matter of willingness to send volunteers. But China changed its mind very quickly. As MOFA's White Book later disclosed, they even broke the promise to send pilots to protect the DRY's air space, which should have be done in June 1965, according to a secret agreement between the two countries. 150 There is no independent source to support MOF A's claim, but the minutes of an April 1965 meeting between Liu Shaoqi and Le Duan mention that Liu conditionally endorsed the idea of sending pilots to Vietnam. During the meeting, in reply to Le Duan's request for Chinese pilots, Liu confirmed that the Chinese would offer whatever the Vietnamese were in need of and they were in position to offer. He even went on to confirm that the Chinese would send troops to Vietnam, if the Vietnamese requested it. 151 The Chinese contend that, in April 1965, China signed at Vietnamese request agreements on the dispatch of assistance troops to Vietnam. Under the agreements, China sent a total of over 320,000 troops in such fields of expertise as surface-to-air missiles, anti -aircraft artillery, engineering, rail ways, mine sweeping and logistics, with the number reaching over 170,000 in the peak year. 152 Anti-aircraft artillery forces were sent to Vietnam to cover the Chinese road-building forces. 153 It is thought that they were not used to protect Vietnamese targets. This is quite different from what would normally be understood by
150 The White Book, pp. 47-48. 151 77 Conversations, p. 83. Le Duan requested Chinese pilots to help 'to restrict American bombing to areas south of the 20th or 19th parallels, to defend the safety of Hanoi, and to defend several main transportation lines, and to raise the morale of the Vietnamese people'. 152 Han, op. cit., p. 198. No concrete time was given. Mao Zedong gave a much smaller number over I 00 thousands. Cited in 77 Conversations, p. 174. Ho Chi Minh allegedly requested Chinese help building the roads in order to release Vietnamese forces reserved to go to the South. 77 Conversations, pp. 84-85. There is also a discrepancy between the sources on the time of the signing of the agreement. According to 77 Conversations, Ho Chi Minh made the request in May, but the above-mentioned Han encyclopaedia claims that the two countries signed the agreement in April. 15 Le Duan claims that he requested only nguoi (personnel) without vu khi (armaments), but the Chinese troops had armaments with them when they arrived in Vietnam. In 1979, Le Duan was highly suspicious of Chinese intentions in Vietnam. His claim is probably a revision of events. Le Duan even repeatedly rejected a Chinese suggestion that they build a road from Nghe An to South of the Central Highland. See Le Duan 1979, op. cit., p. 2. However, there is no independent source to confirm Le Duan's claim.
88 'sending volunteers'. The Chinese later confirmed this difference between their logistical troops in Vietnam and volunteers. 154 Interestingly, sending these logistical troops to Vietnam was a cause of wartime tension between Vietnam and China. Mao was quoted as criticising Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping for their 'enthusiasm' on the question of Vietnam. To Mao, the incautious introduction of troops into Vietnam aroused Vietnamese suspicions that the Chinese wanted to take over Vietnam. 155 Though at the time Le Duan rejected this Chinese point, later he went further, claiming that at that time the Chinese already 'planned to invade' Vietnam. 156 Leaving aside Le Duan's exaggeration, his claim confirms that the introduction of Chinese logistical troops to Vietnam did raise tensions between the Vietnamese and Chinese. The Chinese position on the Americanisation of the war was most clearly expressed in Zhou Enlai's oral message to President Johnson. On 2 April 1965, the Chinese premier asked Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan to convey a four-point message to the American president: 1. China will not take the initiative to provoke a war with the United States. 2. The Chinese mean what they say. In other words, if any country in Asia, Africa or elsewhere meets with aggression by the imperialists headed by the United States, the Chinese Government and people definitely will give it support and help. Should such just action bring on US aggression against China, we will unhesitatingly rise in resistance and fight to the end. 3. China is prepared. Should the United States impose a war on China, it can be said with certainty that, once in China, the United States will not be able to pull out, however many men it may send over and whatever weapons it may use, nuclear weapons included. 4. When a war breaks out, it will have no boundaries. 157
This Chinese statement was fuel for Vietnamese suspiciOns about the Chinese leadership's intentions in Vietnam. The Vietnamese interpreted it as a 'green light' for American war escalation in Vietnam. 158 However, I argue that the statement only showed that the Chinese were primarily concerned about a possible American attack on China. They indicated that they preferred not to initiate a
154 See more details in 77 Conversations, pp. 96--97. 155 See more details in 77 Conversations, pp. 92-96, Le Duan, 1979, ibid 156 See Le Duan, 1979, ibid 157 Ibid See also 77 Conversations, pp. 80-82, 86. 158 See more details in The White Book, and Le Duan, 1979, ibid
89 Sino-American clash, and hoped that the Americans would also exercise restraint. The Chinese Premier also warned the American President of the cost of aggression against China. But Zhou Enlai downplayed American aggression against North Vietnam by avoiding mentioning it by name. Indeed, the term 'any country in Asia, Africa or elsewhere' put the American bombing of North Vietnam on a par with much less volatile situations in other parts of the world.
Figure 3.1 China's Aid to the DRV, 1964-1968
r=:l Guns r=:l Bullets (thousands) --+--Artillery pieces _._Artillery shells (thousands)
250,000 .------~~... 8,000 7,000 200,000 6,000 150,000 5,000 4,000 100,000 3,000 50,000 2,000 1,000 o.J--=:::..:z..__...-+_~.-...... _...~--+-...~-__.____.~1...... !---~L....-...____._-I---~....__._..I..-..il-o 25,240 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
Source: LiKe and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de renminjiefangjun, p. 418.
However, the American bombing did produce a new element in Chinese policy. Contrary to their advice in previous years, the Chinese were now urging large-scale PAVN entry into the fighting. Hongqi (Red Flag) of 27 February 1965 commented that 'the American imperialists have extended the war to the DRY. The DRY, therefore, is fully entitled to use every possible means to deal telling blows to them and their lackeys' .159 This article was allegedly broadcast only in Vietnamese, to Vietnam six times on 2 March, strongly suggesting the Chinese leaders' intention to impel Hanoi to make significantly greater military commitment and to accelerate the effort in the South. 160
159 The CIA document. 160 Ibid.
90 Along with their calls for intensifying the war, the Chinese increased sharply their military aid to Vietnam- threefold in guns, fourfold in bullets and artillery pieces, and more then fivefold in artillery shells. This increased Chinese aid was also a Chinese response to the increase of Soviet aid to Vietnam, which occurred after the fall of Khrushchev, and especially after Kosygin's February 1965 visit to Hanoi. 161 During the Vietnam War the Chinese also provided the Vietnamese with US$1 00 million to buy food in the South, which the Soviets did not.162 Why did the Chinese want to attract more American troops to the South? Zhou Enlai told the Egyptian president through the latter's envoy that the Chinese would be glad if the Americans sent more troops to Vietnam.163 Normal logic suggests that the Chinese should have favoured a withdrawal of all American troops from Vietnam, and certainly not sending more troops in. It is probable that the Chinese believed in the eventual victory of people's war, no matter how long it took, or how costly it would be. Zhou Enlai himself explained that 'we know that we can take their blood' .164 He believed that 'the US distraction in Vietnam is beneficial to the people in the world' .165 I would add that Zhou Enlai's unspoken motivation was that US distraction was beneficial to China. To some Chinese leaders, an impasse in the Vietnam War was beneficial. They would have the kudos of helping the Vietnamese, the Vietnamese would be dependent on them for aid, and the Americans would be tied down in Vietnam and would not present a threat to the PRC's security. This also served the PRC's objective of maintaining the status quo in Vietnam. After all, the Vietnam War was not being fought on Chinese soil. Hence, a protracted war that tied down the United States and sapped its strength for a long period was quite acceptable to the Chinese. What they
161 See more details on Soviet aid to Vietnam in Thakur Ramesh and Carlyle Thayer, 1993, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam, 1945-1992, pp. 116-18. 162 Based on my interview with Pham Van Dong, Hanoi, March 1997. Le Duan also confirmed that Chinese money delivery. See Le Duan, 1979, ibid. 163 The White Book, p. 47. There is no Chinese source to confirm this claim. But Zhou Enlai did tell the Tanzanian President Nyerere on 4 June 1965 that the more US forces were tied down in Vietnam, the more beneficial it would be for national independence movements. See Zhou Enlai waijiao dashiji, p: 460. 164 The White Book, ibid. 165 Zhou Enlai waijiao dashiji, p. 460.
91 feared most was a direct confrontation with the United States that might lead to a nuclear attack on China. 166 Another element of Chinese policy towards Vietnam during this period was their constant refusal to consider Vietnamese-American negotiations as a means of gaining a suspension of air attacks. Renmin Ribao of 1 March 1965 wrote, 'we shall never succumb to the American imperialists' blackmail. No socialist country should' .167 The subject of negotiating with the United States was repeatedly discussed in meetings between Vietnamese and Chinese leaders. The Chinese line was that they did not object to negotiations in priciple, but that it should wait for the 'appropriate time' and Vietnam should negotiate from a 'position of strength'. To them, holding talks with the United States following only a bombing halt in the North was a betrayal of the Southerners. 168 At that time, CIA experts observed that Hanoi was more equivocal on the matter of negotiations, and deleted the phrase 'Vietnam will not agree with the idea of negotiation' from the Vietnam News Agency account of Beijing's statement. 169 Chinese opposition to negotiations was understandable, as it would go against their plan of tying down the Americans in Vietnam. Their objection was a result also of their ar~ti-Soviet policy. The Soviet Union favoured a negotiated end to the war. The Chinese leaders suspected that the endorsement of negotiations indicated the increased influence ofthe Soviet Union, which China was certain to oppose. The anti-Soviet orientation of Chinese foreign policy also resulted in other measures taken by the Chinese in relation to Vietnam. The White Book discloses that during 1965-66 the Chinese rejected various plaris for united action on five occasions, including both joint protest and a united front vis-a-vis American aggression against the DRV. 170 The Chinese also allegedly blocked the delivery of
166 See for instance Lawson, op. cit., pp. 133-147. 167 Renmin Ribao, 1 March 1965. Cited in the CIA document. 168 See more details in 77 Conversations, pp. 74, 82, 85, 89-91 and 121. 169 Cited in the CIA document. 170 See more details in the White Book, pp. 48-49. On the united fi"ont see Le Duan, 1979, ibid; 77 Conversations, pp. 75, 91; Lawson, op. cit., pp. 166-169.
92 Soviet aid to Vietnam. 171 At the time the Cultural Revolution started in China, which intensified the anti-Soviet orientation of Chinese foreign policy. Being unsatisfied with Vietnamese willingness to hold talks with the Americans, in 1966-67 the Chinese reduced their military aid to Vietnam, except for bullets, which doubled in these two years (see Figure 3.1). On the other hand, Chinese leaders promised to give Vietnam several billions dollars per year if Vietnam declined Soviet aid. 172 Le Duan believed that it was due to this lack of socialist solidarity that the Americans were able to escalate the Vietnam W ar. 173 In fact, there was a struggle within the CCP over Chinese policy towards the Americans and the Vietnam War, which was highlighted in Luo Ruiqing's February and Lin Biao' s September 1965 articles. 174 The PLA' s Chief of Staff, reportedly supported by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, argued for co-operation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the struggle against the American aggression in Vietnam, but the Defence Minister rejected this co operation. Lin got Mao's support and Luo was purged by the end of November 1965. Even someone as anti-China as Le Duan confirmed this difference among Chinese leaders in 1979. 175
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the Sino-American relationship during the fifteen years after the Geneva Conference entered a state of quasi war. On the one hand, the two co\}ntries were hostile to and suspicious about each other. On the other hand, they tried to avoid engaging in direct military conflict with each other. In this process, America seemed to be more belligerent, while the PRC seemed to be
/ 171 White Book, ibid. Though there is no independent source to support this claim, but Zhou Enlai allegedly rejected the Soviet proposal to establish an airlift using 45 planes for weapons transportation for Vietnam. See 77 Conversations, p. 76. 172 Le Duan, 1979, ibid. Pham Van Dong also confirmed to me that he was asked by Chinese leaders why he went to the Soviet Union when he already received what he needed from the Chinese. Based on my interview with Pham Van Dong in Hanoi, in March 1997. 173 Le Duan, 19'79, ibid. Le Duan argued Chinese and Soviet support for Pathet Lao in the early 1960s forced the Americans to sign the Geneva Agreement on Laos. 174 See more detai'ls in Zagoria, 1967, 'Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi, New York: Pegasus, pp. 70-83. 175 See more details in Le Duan, 1979, ibid.
93 more restrained and defensive. Both were in favour of maintaining a divided Vietnam- maintaining the status quo in Vietnam. Due to their hostility to communism, in response to Communist China, the United States was determined to stop 'communist expansion' in South Vietnam. The Americans saw the Vietnamese Communists as the Chinese Communists' 'soldiers'. Their commitment in Vietnam was not to oppose the Vietnamese Communists, but the influence of the Chinese Communists. This is where McNamara later admitted 'we were terribly wrong'. However, between 1954 and 1968, US determination, strengthened by its economic and military power, involved it deeper and deeper in Vietnam. From helping Diem to consolidate his government, the United States waged a special war against the Vietnamese Communists and their sympathisers. From supplying advisors, arms and money, they progressed to sending soldiers to fight directly against the NLF's forces, and to bomb the DRV in a 'local war'. The war had by then become 'Americanised'. During this entire period, it was shown that the United States was more enthusiastic than their Vietnamese allies in the South to engage in war, and to win. In this sense the Americans imposed the Vietnam War on the Vietnamese. Being the more aggressive partners in the Sino-American relationship, the United States was the author of the Vietnam War. It was not the PRC that sowed the seeds of war by helping the DRV to 'conquer' the South, as perceived in the West, but the United States that initiated it. As mentioned above, like China, the United States preferred to maintain the status quo in Vietnam- a divided Vietnam -but both the political and military communist struggle endangered this situation, forcing the United States to commit itself further to Vietnam just to maintain the status quo. This, however, does not mean that the Vietnamese Communists initiated the war. Ultimately, national reunification was a Vietnamese affair. US efforts to block reunification, as opposed to the Vietnamese communists' realisation of their rights, was the primary cause of the war. On the other hand, being the weak partner in Sino-American competition, it was in China's interests to keep the peace on their Southern border. The PRC, therefore, championed the cause of peace in Vietnam. The Chinese leaders tried to
94 restrain the Vietnamese Communists from taking up armed struggle in the South and from helping the revolutionaries in Laos and Cambodia. They pressed them to limit the fighting in the South to a low level and they refrained from sending fighting units to Vietnam. They were most concerned about the possibility of the American war expanding to their own territory. The PRC repeatedly warned the United States not to expand the war to China. Common sense from the Vietnamese perspective tells us that the Chinese warning was in effect a 'green light' for the Americans to escalate the war in North Vietnam. This interpretation of Chinese behaviour does not explain why the Chinese wanted their enemy to approach their border. This chapter argues that though it was unfavourable for the DRV, the Chinese warning spoke only of Chinese unwillingness to fight directly with the United States in Vietnam. While it was not within its power to block American war escalation, the PRC could only warn that the escalation should not expand further to the Chinese territory. The entire history of Chinese policy towards Vietnam in this period shows that it was dictated by Chinese perceptions of the American threat to their security. They shifted from restraining the Vietnamese Communists to supporting them in the 'special war', and then in the Americanised war (chien tranh cue bo, local war in Vietnamese). The reason for those changes was nothing but the American escalation ofthe Vietnam War. So, we see that both the Chinese and American Vietnam policies grew out of their policies towards each other. This chapter also shows how Vietnam, as a small state, was influenced by an inter-power competition between the United States and China. The clearest evidence is that war was imposed on Vietnam as a result of the Sino-American confrontation. As shown above, had there been no Sino-American quasi war, there would have been no Vietnam War. In this case, Vietnam was a victim of the Sino-American conflict. There are numerous cases that show how the United States and the PRC imposed their views on their Vietnamese allies. As far as the United States is concerned, from the very beginning it used aid to consolidate the Diem government, against the wishes of some South Vietnamese political groups. After the anti-Diem coup, the Americans in effect controlled internal political life in
95 Saigon, deciding who would become leaders of the regime. The clearest examples of the American imposition of their will on their Vietnamese allies were cases when they extended the war without prior South Vietnamese endorsement. As far as China is concerned, they used their aid to influence the Vietnamese Communists. The Chinese pressured the Vietnamese Communists not to carry out armed struggle, not to aid the Laotian and Cambodian revolutionaries, to limit the fighting in the South to a minimum, and not to enter into talks with the United States. One can argue that as a small state, Vietnam benefited from the Sino-American quasi war. The United States poured money and arms to South Vietnam, which would have not occurred if there were not Sino-American conflict. The same logic could be applied in the PRC-DRV relations. However, the money and arms that America and China poured into Vietnam did not benefit the Vietnamese, but devastated this country. The point is not whether Vietnam was a victim or a beneficiary, but that the situation in Vietnam was influenced by the Sino-American relationship. If Vietnam was a 'beneficiary', it was because of the Sino-American quasi war in the first place, and this 'happy' state would end when Sino-American relations changed in the early 1970s. There were also cases when the Saigon leaders showed their resentment of the American bosses, proof of the 'power' of the small against the big. The reason these exceptional cases arose was simply because the Americans wanted to win the war more than their allies, which made them 'weak' in relation to the latter. We saw how 'strong' the South Vietnamese leaders were in these cases. However, they acquiesced very quickly to their bosses, understanding that the powerless cannot make waves for long. The Ngos paid dearly for their stubbornness. This dissertation in no way argues that the attitudes of the United States and the PRC towards Vietnam were dictated only by their relationship with each other. There were cases when factors other than Sino-American relations affected American and Chinese policies towards Vietnam. Chinese policy towards Vietnam, for instance, was also dictated by their relationship with the Soviets. The American decision that fateful autumn of 1961 was also significantly influenced by the Berlin crisis. These cases, however, were secondary to the main conflict
96 between China and the United States. Here, the Soviet factor in Chinese policy towards Vietnam can also be seen. The Sino-Soviet rift made the struggle of the Vietnamese Communists more difficult. United action of the socialist countries, in whatever form, would have been much more helpful to the Vietnamese fighters. This makes the picture of China's Vietnam policy more complicated and harder to comprehend, but it does not exclude the main factor- the United States- in China's Vietnam policy. The Sino-American quasi war induced Chinese leaders to favour a policy aimed at maintaining the status quo. They prevented the Vietnamese Communists from altering the status quo, and helped them to maintain it when the Americans tried to challenge it. In the corning chapters, we will see how the Chinese tried to press the Vietnamese to reach an agreement with the United States in the early 1970s in order to maintain this status quo. This chapter rejects the claim that there was a civil war in Vietnam and the outside powers played only a role of supporting sides in that war. Though the Vietnamese failed to solve their political differences between themselves, there were no indications that their differences would lead to a civil war. The massive migration to the South in 1954 rather showed the level of American intervention in Vietnam than the rejection of communism, which was believed to be a reason for a civil war in Vietnam. Without American transportation means, propaganda and settlement aid, the migration would have been more modest. Moreover, the balance of forces in both political and military terms, was favourable to the Ho Chi Minh government. Eisenhower's notion of Ho Chi Minh's popularity evidenced the DRV political strength. The Viet Minh's nationalism was also attractive to the population. In the military plan, while the Vietrninh forces matured through anti-French struggle, the 'nationalist' forces were invented by the French, part of the French expeditionary forces. In these circumstances, if there were a civil war the 'nationalists', the nationalists would have been defeated quickly. Thus, the civil war if there really was one was possible and prolonged only due to American intervention.
97 Chapter 4 Sino-American Rapprochement and Peace for Vietnam, 1969-1973
By the end of the 1960s the United States and the People's Republic of China had independently arrived at the decision to improve their relations. The rapprochement was formalised by Nixon's historic February 1972 visit to China. How did the new Sino-American relationship affect American and Chinese policies towards Vietnam? This chapter argues that the improvement in Sino-American relations was one of the reasons for the end of the Vietnam War. 1 Ifthe Sino-American quasi-war brought about the Vietnam War, the Sino-American rapprochement helped to end it. The aim of keeping Vietnam divided did not alter, but the means changed following rapprochement. China and the United States arrived at a tacit understanding that they did not need to wage war in Vietnam against each other. If in the previous years, the two countries had tried to maintain the status quo - a divided Vietnam- by war, now they tried to maintain it with peace. Therefore they both made efforts in different ways for peace in Vietnam. Rapprochement allowed the United States to withdraw its troops from Vietnam, as there was no longer any need to confront the perceived Chinese communist expansion. Even worse for the DRV, it enabled America to escalate the war in order to obtain a better settlement for the end of the war, so-called 'peace with honour'. Rapprochement also changed China's Vietnam policy, from one of supporting prolonging the war to ending the war in conditions unfavourable to its ally. It was now in the PRC's interest to press for 'peace at any price' (my coined word). No matter how high the price that the Vietnamese communists had to pay for peace, the PRC wanted an end to the war. As in previous chapters, this chapter first introduces the main features of the Sino-American rapprochement, and then turns to an analysis of US and Chinese policies towards Vietnam to highlight the relationship between rapprochement and their Vietnam policies. Though the Sino-American rapprochement has been well
1 There were other reasons for the end of the Vietnam War. From the point of view of international relations, the Soviet factor played important role in this ending, perhaps even a bigger role than the Sino-American rapprochement. But for the purposes of this thesis, my focus is on the impact of Sino-American relations on the conclusion of the Vietnam War. 98 researched,2 this chapter introduces some new Chinese sources,3 which show how active the PRC's leaders were in preparing for rapprochement. Because of the paucity of sources, this phenomenon has been neglected in the Western literature. Moreover, it will be shown that the two countries adopted different approaches to rapprochement. While the United States was fairly constant in its progress towards this goal, the PRC followed a more circuitous route, but in the end also arrived at rapprochement. The ways they approached rapprochement did not affect their policies towards Vietnam as much as the rapprochement itself. It is introduced here to highlight a phenomenon that seems to have been ignored in the literature. The chapter focuses on the impact of rapprochement on US and Chinese policies towards Vietnam. The topic of the relationship between these factors is not new,4 but it has not been argued in the form presented here. To the best of my knowledge, no other research has taken the topic as its central point. In the past, the implications have been mentioned merely as a by-product when analysing other topics. This chapter also uses some new sources, to which previous research has lacked access.5
2 See, for instance, the memoirs of Nixon, Kissinger, Holdridge and Haig; John Garver's monograph, China's Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1968-1971; Gregor A. J., The China Connection; Ross R., 1995, Negotiating Co-operation: the United States and China, 1969-1989; Garson R., 1986, The United States and China Since 1949, A Troubled Affair. 3 One of the most interesting sources is Xiong Xianghui's memoir, 'Dakai ZhongMei guanxi de qianzou' (Overture of the opening of the Sino-American relations) in Liu Shan (ed.), 1998, Zhongguo waijiao xinlun (New Dimensions of China's Diplomacy). Xiong was secretary of a small high-level study team, headed by Chen Yi, whose purpose was to study the international situation and to suggest new policy approaches for the PRC's leaders. He therefore was an authoritative source on the matter. See also Chen Dengde, I 988, Mao Zedong he Nikeson zai 1972 (Mao Zedong and Nixon in 1972; Xueci Mao Zedong de waijiao sixiang (Study Mao Zedong's Diplomatic Thoughts, and Han Nianlong (ed.), 1990, Diplomacy of Contemporary China. 4 One can distil fragments of information about this relationship from numerous memoirs and monographs on the Sino-American rapprochement and on this period ofthe war. Nixon's and Kissinger's memoirs should be mentioned in the first place as they offer detailed accounts of Sino-American rapprochement and US policy towards Vietnam. In some places, they also discuss the PRC's attitude towards Vietnam. The SRV's White Book also gives a Vietnamese perspective on the PRC's policy towards Vietnam. Eugene Lawson's book The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict and Anne Gilks's monograph The Breakdown ofthe Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 1970-1979 add some information on PRC policy. 5 The CWIHP's 77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in indochina, 1964-1977 is one ofthe most interesting sources. These are notes of meetings between Chinese and mostly Vietnamese leaders. Though the sources are not given, and it is therefore difficult to place complete confidence in these materials, they offer some insights into the deliberations of the PRC leadership. The newly declassified 'The Winston Lordfiles' also add to the existing memoirs of Kissinger and Nixon. There are also some new Vietnamese sources, of which the most interesting is Luu Van Loi's monograph, Dam phcm Paris giua Le Due Tho va Kissinger (The Le Due Tho-Kissinger Paris Talks). Being one of the principal experts at the Paris talks, his account is one of the most authoritative Vietnamese sources. Nguyen Thanh Le's book, Hoi nghi Paris (The Paris Conference) is another new Vietnamese source. Le was the DRY delegation's spokesperson. 99 Sino-American rapprochement
In the years between 1969 and 1973 Sino-American relations gradually improved. It was the result of efforts on both sides, but the Nixon Administration was particularly active in this process. Except for a brief period in early 1969, when the new administration was unsure as to how to initiate its new China policy, it pursued this aim consistently once it was shaped. The Administration proposed that the Warsaw talks be resumed, then suggested that they be upgraded. When the Warsaw channel was disrupted in early 1970, the Nixon Administration tried to keep the lines of communication with the Beijing government open. By the end of 1970, Nixon and Kissinger embarked on a secret campaign to establish direct high-level contact between the two countries. The American efforts bore fruit in July 1971, when Kissinger paid a secret visit to Beijing. Sino-American rapprochement was formalised with Nixon's trip to China in 1972 and the Shanghai communique. In this process, as we shall see, China seemed to be more passive, responding to American initiatives without making its own, though in some cases Beijing also showed active signs, offering some initiatives. The little-known efforts of Chen Yi's study team, and Zhou Enlai's 'ping-pong diplomacy', were signs of the PRC's active preparation. However, the Chinese leaders followed a more zigzag or circuitous path towards rapprochement. In late 1968 and late 1969, Beijing tried twice to sound out the possibility of detente with the United States. But both times it quickly changed its mind, cancelling the planned Sino-American talks. It was only after the Lushan CPP Central Committee Plenum, in August 1970, when the Chinese leaders had more or less solved their internal struggle, that they decided to respond to the American overtures. In mid- 1971, the Chinese leaders came to a definite decision to improve their relations with the United States. They invited a US table tennis team to visit China, and agreed to Presidential Envoy Henry Kissinger's secret trip to China. China and the United States arrived at rapprochement in their relations during the Nixon visit to China in February 1972.
The constant US search for rapprochement
At first the US was not very enthusiastic about improving relations with the PRC. Though it proposed in September 1968 to renew the Warsaw ambassadorial talks and
100 obtained Chinese agreement,6 the Johnson Administration did not proceed further in its initiative. It was election time, and important decisions had to await the election results. In November, when the PRC proposed renewing the Warsaw talks in February 1969, the US gave its agreement in three days. This was more a sign of diplomatic reciprocity than of US interest in the talks. In September, it took only two days for the PRC to answer the American proposal. It was unlikely that the Johnson Administration would be interested in improving Sino-American relations just as it was about to hand over to the new administration. In the first months of its term, the new administration took no new initiatives in relation to China, though both President Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Kissinger, were convinced of the need for a change in US policy towards China. 7 Yet, five days after the Inauguration, President Nixon complained that the American Ambassador in a European country had failed to prevent that country from announcing its recognition of Beijing. During a press conference on 27 January 1969, he also emphasised that the United States would continue to oppose the admission of the PRC to the United Nations. He reaffirmed that the US would change its China policy only when 'some changes occur on their side'.8 Some authors argue that Nixon's public statements were at odds with his private views, noting that privately Nixon had ordered preparations for rapprochement with the PRC. However, Kissinger admitted that the new administration did not have a precise idea of how to initiate a new China policy, and by March 1969, Sino-American relations seemed essentially frozen in the same hostility of mutual incomprehension and distrust that had characterised them for twenty years. 9 The basis of these contradictory assessments was Nixon's memorandum of 1 February 1969 to Kissinger. Nixon claimed that he had instructed that the possibility of rapprochement with the Chinese be explored. 10 Kissinger, however, contended that Nixon's instruction was just 'to create the impression that we were exploring a move towards China' .11 It is probable that
6 1nterestingly, to the best of my knowledge, only Holdridge mentions the Sino-American exchange in September 1968 (see Holdridge, p. 25). Other sources started their account from the Chinese proposal in November 1968. 7 Both argued for a new attitude towards China prior to coming to power. For more details, see Kissinger, 1979, The White House Years, pp. 164--{)5; Nixon, 1978, op. cit., p. 545. 8 Cited in Kissinger, ) 979, op. cit., p. 168. 9 Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., p. 171. 10 Nixon, 1978, op. cit., p. 545. 11 Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., p. 169. 101 Nixon did not think that rapprochement was possible at that time, but he may have thought that a study needed to be made to suggest new recommendations for the Administration's China policy. Kissinger also disclosed that he gave a directive, on 5 February, to produce an inter-agency paper on China. Holdridge's memoirs agree with this account. 12 On balance, it is likely that in the first half of 1969, the Nixon Administration was unprepared for a new China policy. US policy towards China changed only after National Security Study Memorandum 14 (NSSM 14) was prepared in July 1969. The memorandum recommended several unilateral steps the United States should take to begin improving US-PRC relations, and these were put into effect between July and December 1969. In August, during his trip around the world, Nixon told the presidents of Pakistan and Romania that the United States would not be a party to any arrangements to isolate China. He asked his hosts to convey this American view to the Chinese leaders. In the same month, Secretary of State William Rogers made a major speech in Canberra declaring America's desire to improve relations with China. In early September, Ambassador Stoessel was instructed to approach his Chinese counterpart to propose a renewal of the Warsaw talks, which he fulfilled in early December 1969. In November, US destroyers were given orders to stop patrolling in the Taiwan Strait. By late 1969, the US administration had started to look for ways to improve its relations with the PRC and succeeded in getting Chinese agreement on renewing the Warsaw ambassadorial talks. Being serious about improving Sino-American relations, the Nixon Administration wanted to have substantial talks this time. At the first meeting after the Warsaw talks resumed in January 1970, Ambassador Walter Stoessel expressed Nixon's desire to send a personal emissary to Beijing. Moreover, in his message to Congress, made prior to the first post-resumption round of talks, Nixon stated that it was in the interests of the United States to take whatever steps were possible to improve 'practical relations' with Beijing.13 At the second meeting in the following month, Stoessel told PRC Charge d'A.ffairs, Lei Yang, that the United States had firm intentions to reduce US military facilities in the Taiwan area as tensions in the area had diminished. 14
12 Holdridge, op. cit., p. 30. 13 Nixon, 1978, op. cit., p. 545. 14 Cited in Holdridge, op. cit., p. 37. 102 There was no consensus as yet within the Nixon Administration on rapprochement. After the second meeting, a great debate erupted between the White House and the State Department over the merits of actually accepting the Chinese offer to receive a US emissary and when to hold the next meeting. 15 The disagreement within the Nixon Administration was the reason for the postponement of the ·third Sino-American Warsaw meeting. The Warsaw channel ended in May 1970, following the American invasion of Cambodia in April. However, the Nixon Administration tried to keep open confidential communication channels between Washington and Beijing, via the US military attache in Paris. 16 Furthermore, the United States continued to make some goodwill gestures towards the PRC. In March 1970, the State Department announced the virtual lifting of the ban on travel by American citizens to the PRC. In April, export to China of some American-made goods was authorised. October 1970 became a turning point in the US campaign for rapprochement with China when Nixon and Kissinger began their secret diplomacy to open contact with the Chinese leaders via the Pakistani and Romanian channels. 17 In the same month, Nixon also gave an interview to Time magazine, saying that he wished to visit China. 18 The American efforts bore fruit in November, when Zhou Enlai sent word, via the Pakistani channel, that the Chinese leaders were willing to accept a high-level American emissary in Beijing. Being committed to improving Sino-American relations, Nixon was concerned that operation Lamson 719 could spoil his plan. 19 At his press conference ofFe bruary 17, the US president assured the Chinese leaders that the operation was not directed against the PRC.20 The US president was even ready to offer unilateral concessions to China. In his address to Congress in February 1971, Nixon stated that he was examining further steps to create broader opportunities for contacts between the Chinese and American peoples, and that his administration's efforts 'will not be deterred by a lack of
/
15 See in Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., pp. 690-93 for further details on the differences between the State Department and the White House. See also Holdridge, op. cit., p. 37. 16 See more details in Vernon C. Walters, 1978, Silent Missions, chapter 25. 17 See more details in Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., pp. 698-708, 714-732; see also Nixon, 1978, op. cit., pp.546-552. 18 Nixon, 1978, p. 546. 19 This late February l971 operation was the first conducted by the South Vietnamese Army without US personnel accompanying. It was planned to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail in South Laos. The campaign was to test the validity of the Vietnamisation policy. 2° Cited in Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., p. 706. 103 reciprocity'. 21 In addition, during the early. months of 1971, the US administration prepared a list of measures easing trade with the PRC. After the US table tennis team visited China, the White House announced the first major breach in the decades-old trade embargo against China. The Nixon Administration also sent a letter to Jean Sainteny, who had a close relationship with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, Huang Zhen, to set up an additional channel with the Chinese.22 In late April, Zhou Enlai's positive answer came through the Pakistani channel, and in July 1971, Kissinger made a secret visit to Beijing to open a direct and high-level contact between the two countries. This resulted in the well known February 1972 events. Sino-American rapprochement met some obstacles within the administration, however. Besides differences on the speed of rapprochement, as mentioned above, some voices spoke against it. Vice-President Agnew was vocal in his disagreement.23 From the very beginning, the Taiwan question was an obstacle to rapprochement. While trying to open contact with Beijing, the Nixon Administration did not want to abandon Taiwan, effectively attempting to carry out a two-China policy.24 This showed that rapprochement was not to be a one-way process and that it was far from free of conflict. Having said that, it is important to acknowledge that from July 1969 the Nixon Administration was consistent in its search for rapprochement with the PRC. Measures were taken, and ways were sought to set up contact with the PRC leadership. Even when there was no consensus on the speed of rapprochement in the early 1970s, the Administration still took measures to improve its relations with Beijing.
The circuitous Chinese route towards rapprochement
Unlike the United States, the PRC seemed to have followed a more circuitous route towards rapprochement. Facing an increasing Soviet threat,25 the People's Republic started to change its policy towards the United States. In September 1968, it took only
21 Nixon, 1978, op. cit., p. 548. 22 See more details in Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., p. 713. 23 Ibid., see also Nixon, 1978, op. cit., p. 549. 24 On 2 August 1971, U.S. Secretary of State, William Rogers, stated that from now on the United States would support Beijing's admission to the UN and its claim to the Security Council seat, but it would oppose any effort to deprive Taiwan of its UN membership. Quoted in Kalb Marvin and Bernard Kalb, I 974, Kissinger, p. 253. See also Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., pp. 773-74. 25 The sending of 'fraternal' troops to Czechoslovakia, in August 1968, and especially the Brezhnev doctrine of 'limited spvereignty' were sources of increasing concern to the Chinese. Lin Biao criticised this doctrine on the grounds that it allowed the Soviet Union to intervene in the domestic affairs of other socialist countries. After the Sino-Soviet armed conflict in Zhenbao Island (March 1969), China was
104 two days for the Chinese leaders to reply positively to the American proposal to renew the Warsaw ambassadorial talks?6 Moreover, according to Holdridge, the PRC affirmed that its policy towards the United States was based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. 27 This was astonishing, as the PRC rejected the application of those principles in its relations with the Soviet Union. In November 1968, after Nixon had won the presidential election, the PRC proposed convening the Warsaw talks in February 1969. The Chinese decision, as Camilleri later commented, represented an initial step undertaken by the section of the Chinese leadership that had become interested in exploring the possibility of detente with the United States.Z8 It is likely that this section of the Chinese leadership had not yet won the internal debate over policy towards the United States. Later, Mao told Nixon that Lin Biao's faction was opposed to rapprochement.29 Thus, Chinese commitment to the improvement of Sino-American relations was quickly withdrawn. The meeting, planned for early February 1969, was cancelled just two days before it was due to take place. The reason given was that the United States had offered political asylum to a Chinese diplomat, but it was speculated that the Cultural Revolution faction or si ren bang (gang of four) for had pressed for a hard-line policy towards the United States. Moreover, though it paid more attention to condemnation of the Soviet Union, the Lin Biao report to the CCP Ninth Congress in April 1969 still identified American imperialism as 'the most dangerous enemy ofthe world's people'.30 By early 1969, the struggle within the CCP leadership had not yet come down in favour of improving Sino-American relations. 31 Nevertheless, the year 1969 could be. seen as a turning point in Chinese policy towards the United States. After the First Plenum of the Ninth Congress, Mao Zedong instructed four Chinese Marshals, Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Su Xiangqian and Nie Rongzhen, under the leadership of Chen Yi, to study the international situation and propose measures to be taken. The appointment of Chen Yi to head tllis study team
even more keenly aware of the direct Soviet threat to its security. Moreover, in August-September 1969, there were rumours that the Soviets would carry out a pre-emptive attack on Chinese nuclear facilities. 26 Holdridge, 1997, Crossing the Divide, p. 25. 27 Ibid. 28 Camilleri, op. cit., p. 119. 29 Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., p. 1061. 30 Quoted in Xiong Xianghui, op. cit., p. 8. 31 At the time it is believed that there were three factions within the CCP leadership, headed by Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai and Jiang Qing. They argued respectively for detente with the Soviet Union and opposition to
105 spoke of a change in Chinese domestic politics, favourable for the improvement of Sino-American relations as, unlike the Cultural Revolution leaders, Chen Yi followed a more balanced policy. He even proposed, as early as 1965, 'to stabilise with the West and ally with other countries to resist Soviet Russia' .32 The four marshals gradually came around to opening relations with the US to balance the Soviet threat. In July 1969, when the first report was completed, the marshals assessed the Soviet threat to Chinese security as more dangerous than the American threat, though they maintained the previous party line of opposing both Soviet revisionism and American imperialism. In August 1969, the four marshals proposed to exploit American-Soviet contradictions by holding talks with them both. In September, they concluded that 'if the Kosygin-Zhou Enlai meeting at Beijing airport had shaken the world, a Sino-American summit meeting, if organised, would shake the world more'. 33 Chen Yi even proposed orally to Zhou Enlai that 'when the Sino-American talks resumed China should take the initiative to propose a ministerial or summit meeting ... and not to demand any pre-conditions for the meeting' .34 To him, the summit itself would be a success for the PRC. The marshals' recommendations seemed to be accepted by the PRC leaders when the CCP Central Committee (time?) decided to resume the Warsaw talks to impose pressure on both the Soviet Union and the United States.35 In December 1969, a meeting between the two envoys took place in Warsaw. This was the first ever invitation offered to an American ambassador to the PRC embassy. It led to the resumption, on 20 January 1970, ofthe 135th Sino-American ambassadorial talks. Chen Yi's suggestion ofupgrading the negotiators' level was taken up, when Lei Yang, the Chinese Charge d'Affairs in Warsaw, proposed that to the American counterpart at their first post-resumption meeting.36 Moreover, in practice, the PRC government also showed its restraint in solving problems raised in its relations with the United States. In July 1969, when a boat,
the United States; detente with the United States and opposition to the Soviet Union; and opposition to both the United States and the Soviet Union.
32 Chiao Guanhua, 'Chiao Kuanhua's Address', Issues and Studies, September 1975, p. 101. 33 Xiong Xianghui, op. cit., pp. 18-25. 34 Ibid., p. 27. 35 'Xueci Mao Zedong de dakai ZhongMei guanxi de zhanlue quece' (Study Mao Zedong's Strategic Decision to open relations with the United States), in Xueci Mao Zedong de Waijiao Sixiang (Study Mao Zedong's Diplomatic Thoughts), hereafter the Study, p. 185. This source, however, seems to be imprecise as the PRC's Charge d'A.flairs in Warsaw was rather lukewarm when approached by his US counterpart at a reception in December 1969. 36 Holdridge, op. cit., p. 36. 106 operated by two American citizens, penetrated Chinese territorial waters near Hong Kong, the Chinese broke with tradition and decided to avoid publicity, and refrain from open denunciation ofthe Americans as 'CIA agents'.37 These were clear signs that by 1969 the PRC also wanted to improve its relations with the United States. But like previous attempts, the thaw in Sino-American relations was short-lived. Two days before the planned 137th Sino-American ambassadorial meeting was to be convened, the Chinese cancelled the meeting. It was said that the reason for the cancellation was American aggression against Cambodia in April 1970.38 However, it took 18 days, from the start of the US/RVN campaign, for the Chinese to take this step. This made observers doubt the validity of the explanation. Qn 20 May, Mao also issued a strongly-worded anti-American statement. The cancellation of the meeting and Mao's statement showed that the PRC leadership was not yet ready for rapprochement. It seemed that no one faction had prevailed as the Chinese did not totally reject the meeting.39 Mao later confirmed the existence of this internal struggle and its influence on Sino-American relations.40 The failure to solve the inner struggle was why the PRC, as sinologist Gregor claimed, could not settle on a specific foreign policy strategy throughout 1970.41 The internal political struggle within the CCP leadership seemed to have been resolved at a CCP Central Committee conference, held in Lushan in August 1970,42 at which the Lin Biao faction was all but defeated. Shortly after that plenum, Zhou Enlai sent a message to Nixon via Pakistan's president saying that Nixon's special envoy would be welcome in Beijing to discuss outstanding issues. Moreover, on 1 October 1970 Chairman Mao Zedong invited American writer, Edgar Snow, and his wife to stand next to him on top of Tiananmen to review the National Day parade. This was a
37 See Chen Dengde, op. cit., pp. 16-20 for more details. 38 On 18 March 1970 Lon Nol carried out a coup against Sihanouk. In the latter's absence, the Cambodian parliament voted 99-{) to depose him. Like the Vietnamese, the Chinese blamed the Unit~d States for organising the coup, though Kissinger flatly denied this. In late April, the US/RVN forces passed across the Vietnamese-Cambodian border to incur in Cambodia. They tried to destroy the NLF forces' bases in Cambodia. Vietnam and China called this action an invasion of Cambodia. 39 Kissinger recalled that 'the cancellation was accomplished in the most restrained matter conceivable. Only the timing, not the fact, of a meeting was deemed "unsuitable". China made clear its willingness to continue conversations and even suggested a procedure for accomplishing it'. (Kissinger, 1979, The White House Years, p. 692) 40 See Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., p. 1061 for more details. 41 Gregor, China Co11nection, p. 77. 42 Garver, 1993, Foreign Relations ofthe People's Republic of China, p. 79. Kissinger observed, some time around July 1970 the Chinese apparently had reconciled their inner policy conflicts. On I 0 July
107 symbolic recognition of Mao's endorsement of improving Sino-American relations. In December 1970, Mao gave Edgar Snow a five-hour interview during which he stated that he was willing to have talks with Nixon. 43 Another signal of Chinese willingness to leave open the prospect of improvement in Sino-American relations was their reaction to the Lam Son 719. Not only was the Renmin Ribao condemnation of the operation mild, but Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua, on the day of the Renmin Ribao rebuke, expressed his desire to meet with Kissinger.44 It was only in mid-1971 that the Chinese leaders came to an unequivocal decision about improving their relations with the United States. In April 1971, a US table tennis team was invited to China in a move described by Zhou Enlai as 'xiao qiu tui dong da qiu' (a small ball [table tennis ball] moving a big ball [the world]).45 Holdridge, who was in charge of East Asian affairs in the State Department at the time, admitted that they gave Zhou the greatest credit for his perspicacity in jumping ahead of the Americans in the matter of improving US-China contacts.46 However, it should be noted that Mao did not come to this decision easily. In the beginning he opposed inviting the US team to China, but later changed his mind.47 Moreover, just a month earlier, Zhou had told Le Duan and Pham Van Dong that the people's revolutionary struggle could not be sacrificed for the sake of relations between governments. Only traitors do that.48 The PRC gradually arrived at the decision to improve relations with the United States, but it was not an easy process, and it seems that a momentous decision was made in April 1971. What caused Mao to make that fateful decision is still an open question, but no matter how difficult the decision, after the advent of 'ping pong' diplomacy, the Chinese leaders consistently supported the policy of improving Sino-American relations. In late May 1971, a working group under the direction ofYe Jianying was established to prepare for Kissinger's secret visit.49 In July and October
Beijing announced the release of Catholic Bishop James Walsh, who had been sentenced in I958 to twenty years' imprisonment as a spy. See Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., p. 697. 43 See more details in Mao Zedong, I 995, Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Mao Zedong's Selected Texts on Foreign Policy). 44 See more details in Kissinger, I 979, op. cit., p. 706. 45 Quoted in Su Ge, 'Zhongguo duiMei zhengce de yuanqi yu fazhan' (Origins and development of Chinese policy towards the United States) in Liu Shan, Liu Shan, Zhongguo Waijiao Xinlun, p. 260-61. 46 Holdridge, op. cit., p. 48. 47 See more details in 'Gong Li, 1992, op. cit., pp. 77-8 I. 48 See 77 Conversations, p. I 79. See also Texas Tech University's Vietnam Archives, Box 2192. (From here on The TTU Vietnam Archives) 49 Chen Dengde, op. cit., p. 154. 108 1971, the Chinese welcomed Kissinger twice. In February 1972, Nixon made his historic trip to China to seal the rapprochement between the two countries.
The US presses for 'peace with honour'
How did Sino-American rapprochement affect US policy towards Vietnam? This chapter argues that though the impact of Sino-American rapprochement was limited compared with the Soviet-American relationship, it enabled the United States to increase pressure on the DRV in order to win a better peace settlement in Vietnam. This pressure was seen, in its clearest form, in Nixon's war escalation in 1972 following the rapprochement. More importantly, it allowed the United States to end the US war against the DRV. The war no longer had the meaning of hindering the Chinese expansion. Rapprochement made direct American involvement in resisting 'communist expansion' unnecessary, and therefore the United States could withdraw its troops from Vietnam. This is not to say that the Nixon Administration was ready to abandon South Vietnam. In fact, the Administration was eager to support the Saigon government. It preferred to see two states exist in parallel in Vietnam. But this was only indirect involvement, far removed from its previous direct involvement. The war continued, but between the Vietnamese without direct American participation. The impact of Sino-American rapprochement on the American attitude towards Vietnam is seen in the contrast between the events that occurred before and after rapprochement in February 1972. Prior to rapprochement, the United States escalated the war, but partly in secret. It also tried to be restrained in order to avoid negative effects on Sino-American rapprochement. After rapprochement, the Nixon Administration took unprecedented measures to escalate the war, pressing the DRV to accept a compromise settlement more favourable to the United States. There were various expressions of pre-rapprochement war escalation. At a
White House meeting, in early 1969, Nixon was quoted as say~ng that North Vietnamese leaders misjudged two things, that he had three years and nine months to run the war, and he did not want to be the first president to lose a war. 5° Nixon revealed his 'madman theory' to Haldeman, saying that he wanted the North Vietnamese to believe he might do anything to win the war, including possibly using nuclear
50 Quoted in Genovese, The Nixon Presidency: Power and Politics in Turbulent Times, p. 117. 109 weapons. 51 While the administration started to withdraw its troops from Vietnam in June 1969,52 Nixon intensified the bombing of North Vietnamese supply routes and 3 bases. 5 The secret bombing was only the start of the Nixon War. Nixon also widened the war to Cambodia and Laos. 54 Along with the escalation of the war, the peace negotiations in Paris dragged on for two years. Nixon's May 1969 proposal was unacceptable to the DRV as it asked for a mutual withdrawal of US and DRV troops. In October 1970, the US administration 5 agreed to allow DRV forces to remain in the South. 5 Two years later the DRV accepted this proposal, but in late 1970 there were not many DRV forces present in the South,56 and therefore the DRV demanded to remove Thieu, Ky, Khiem- the three main political figures in the South -which the United States could not accept. Thus, the two sides could not achieve peace at the time. Nixon understood that escalation was a means to achieve a victory within his five-point strategy.57 What Nixon termed 'victory' was in reality peace with honour, as he knew that the United States could not win the war. Goodman commented that in its search for peace, the only trump card the United States had left was its preponderant military power. 58 This comment may have been overstated as the Nixon Administration also had potential rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the PRC to pressure Hanoi
51 Ibid., p. 119. 52 Since June 1969 the Nixon administration had run a staged troop withdrawal program. By I January 1972 it had withdrawn over 400,000 troops from Vietnam. The withdrawal was due to pressure from Congress to end the war. Moreover, after the Tet offensive of the Spring 1968, the DRV/NLF military position in South Vietnam had been weakened. The years 1969-70 were considered the 'darkest' time of the war for the communist side. This enabled the US to withdraw its troops from Vietnam. 53 For more on Nixon's secret bombing, see Operation Breakfast, the Menu operations in Nixon, 1985, op. cit., pp. 109-111; Nixon, 1978, 381-82; Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., pp. 246-54. 54 Not long after the March 1970 coup in Cambodia, Nixon ordered US/RVN forces to attack Eastern Cambodia. The two-and-a-half month incursion was to eliminate the DRV/NLF's bases in Cambodia. In early 1971, Nixon went a step further in expanding the war. A 5,000-man ARVN force crossed the border into Laos, and started the Lam Son 719 campaign, which was to cut the DRV' s supply routes. The campaign was to test the US Vietnamisation plan. For more details on the Cambodian incwsion and Lam Son 719, see Nixon, 1978, op. cit., pp. 498-99. Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., pp. 987-1002. · 55 In his famous 7 October speech, Nixon proposed a 'standstiii cease-fire including a halt to American bombing throughout Indochina'. See more details in Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., p. 58. See also Luu Van Loi, 1996, op. cit., p. 143. 56 Nguyen Thanh Le, 1998, Cuoc Dam Phan Paris ve VietNam, 1968-1973 (The Paris Talks on Vietnam, 1968-1973), p. 58. Luu Van Loi, 1996, op. cit., p. 143. After the human loss ofMau Than and spring and summer 1969 attacks, the NLF forces had not been recovered. See more details in Bo Quoc Phong, 1996, pp. 13-42; Ban Chi Dao, 1996a, pp. 83, 327. The years 1969-70 were considered as 'the most difficult years for the revolution in the South'. The DRV/NLF losses stood approximately at the same level as during the anti-French resistance war and most of their regular forces had withdrawn to the North. 57 This plan involved Vietnamisation, pacification, diplomatic isolation, peace negotiations and gradual troop withdrawal. See Nixon, 1985, op. cit., pp. 105-06. 58 Goodman A, 1986, The Search for a Negotiated Settlement ofthe Vietnam War, p. 47. 110 for a negotiated settlement. However, it shows the significance of military power in the Nixon plan to end the war. On coming to office, Nixon faced a tough task in ending the war in Vietnam. Perceiving a growing Soviet threat, it was in the interest of the US to end the war. Moreover, Nixon understood that the US could not win the war. The longer the US was bogged down in Vietnam, the worse was its position in its rivalry with the Soviet Union. It was also in Nixon's interests, as an individual, to end the war in order to be re-elected. Having won a narrow victory against Humphrey in the presidential election, his political base was not strong. Moreover, the American constituency was strongly opposed to the war. Nixon's military efforts served the purpose of ending the war on terms favourable to the United States. Their temporary success also was due to the DRV/NLF's strategic mistakes. 59 By early 1971, the United States had still not achieved rapprochement with the PRC. The Nixon administration's willingness to improve Sino-American relations meant that it exercised some restraint in its war efforts. As the 1970 US/RVN incursion into Cambodia was given as the reason for the Chinese cancellation of the Sino-American talks, Nixon was concerned that the February 1971 Lam Son 719 operation60 could spoil his efforts to improve Sino-American relations. He was quick to assure the Chinese leaders that the operation was not aimed against the PRC.61 So, even before rapprochement, it seems that the Sino-American relationship somehow restrained the United States in its war plan against the DRV. But this China factor had a very limited strength. Its limit was seen in the fact that the US tried to enlist not Chinese, but Soviet support for its dealings with the DRV. In mid-1969, Cyrus Vance, then Under-Secretary of State, was sent to Moscow to discuss the linkage between the opening of Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) talks and the Vietnam question.62 One can argue that Nixon had a two-track strategy, and was ready to move on either front. There were two options open for Washington to pressure Vietnam, either Moscow or Beijing, but the fact that Nixon ~dministration chose to deal with Moscow at that time shows the limit of the China factor. Probably the
59 In 1969, the DRV/NLF forces mistakenly focused on attacks on the cities, where they were not effective due to the lack ofthe element of surprise, leaving their position in the countryside vulnerable. See Ban chi dao, 1996a, op. cit., p. 91-92. See also Bo Quoc Phong, 1991, op. cit., pp. 14, 26-31. 60 Lam Son 719 was the first test of the Vietnamisation program, where the US only provided air cover and air transportation 'while the ARVN forces fought on ground. The failure of the attack marked a turning point in the Vietnam War, the start ofVietnamisation's failure. 61 See more details in Nixon, 1978, op. cit., p. 547-48. 62 See more details in Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., pp. 265-69. 111 Americans understood that it was the Soviet Union, not China, that provided Vietnam with advanced weapons. Another reason was that they were seeking rapprochement with China and tried to avoid pressuring their new partner, while in their relations with Moscow the Americans had something to bargain - the SALT talks, over which the Soviet Union was eager to make a deal with the United States. During the period between the ping-pong diplomacy and the Nixon visit to China, the impact of Sino-American rapprochement on US Vietnam policy became clearer, but it was still limited. It was during this period that the United States opened a diplomatic offensive against the DRV. In May 1971, the Americans took a new
initiative, a seven-point program to settle the Vietnam War. Kissinger .~alled this program a 'turning point' in US Vietnam policy, whereas Nixon indicated that this would be the 'final' US offer.63 The main concession in the US Seven Points was its acceptance of the presence of the DRY's troops in the South. The United States proposed the South Vietnamese discuss this question separately. In effect, this concession was made in Nixon's statement of October 1970, as mentioned above. The DRY's leaders probably agreed with Kissinger's assessment, and therefore decided to send Special Advisor Le Due Tho to Paris again, after 14 months' absence.64 The US concession, however, did not advance the talks any further, as the DRV still demanded a political settlement in the South, namely the overthrow of the Thieu government. During July-October, the US modified its stance at the Paris talks several times. Kissinger started to probe what the DRV understood by political settlement for the South.65 Xuan Thuy saw the change in the US attitude, reporting home that 'the U.S. is likely to make concessions and has expressed its willingness to negotiate a settlement of the question [ofthe Vietnam War]. It is noteworthy that the U.S. wants to bargain on not only the military questions, but also the political questions' .66 In August, the United States offered a new eight-point proposal, which made another concession, confirming the neutral US position in relation to the future of the Saigon governmep.t. In October, the United States refined its eight-point program, shortening the schedule for
63 Kissinger, 1979, p. 1018. 64 See more details in Luu Van Loi, 1996, op. cit., p. 15 8. Luu Van Loi claimed that for the first time, the US dropped its demand for a mutual withdrawal ofDRV troops from the South. This appears strange as the October 1970 US proposal did not ask for DRV troops withdrawal. I argue that after their victory in defeating the Saigon government's Lam Son 719, DRY leaders felt that situation was more favourable than in the late 1970 to discuss the American offer. 65 See more details in Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., pp. 1028-31. 66 As quoted in Luu Van Loi, 1996, op. cit., p. 175. 112 withdrawal of its troops from Vietnam and slightly modifying its position on the political settlement for the South after US withdrawal.67 The US initiatives were unsuccessful as the DRV still demanded Thieu's removal. The main reason for the failure of talks in the second half of 1971 was that the DRV found its position on the battlefield not sufficiently advantageous and was preparing for a new offensive in the coming spring.68 This assessment does not conflict with my earlier claim that the DRV jumped at the US July 1971 peace program because it felt that its position was bettered after the Duong 9 Nam Lao campaign (No.9 Road and South Laos) -the DRV's terminological equivalent of Saigon's Lam Son 719. The DRV's situation improved but in its calculation it was not good enough to accept the American proposal. The contrast between this rejection and the acceptance a year later, as shall be shown, is evidence of Chinese and the Soviet pressure on the DRV to accept peace. It can be seen that the above-mentioned US 'concessions' were governed primarily by the situation on the battlefield and had little to do with the international situation, least of all with the Sino-American relationship. Theoretically, North Vietnamese forces would wither away if they could not be reinforced' .69 Another reason for American flexibility in May-October 1971 was that it faced increasing pressure at home, especially when, on 22 June, the US Senate passed a resolution asking the President to withdraw American troops from Vietnam within nine months if the DRV agreed to release American POWs.70 In offering Hanoi a concession, the Nixon Administration hoped that Hanoi would change its mind.71 Lastly, by then, the international situation had become favourable to the United States. The Americans had already established contact with the Chinese. During these months Kissinger made two visits to China and Nixon was preparing to go to China. They had also secured agreement with the Soviets to hold a summit. The Americans seemed to have gained leverage to press Hanoi for a solution to the Vietnam War. The US peace proposals were seen as diplomatic attacks against Hanoi. Thus,,.US diplomatic
67 Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., pp. 1027-40. See also Luu Van Loi, 1996, op. cit., pp. 176-95. 68 See more details in Luu Van Loi, 1996, op. cit., p. 194. 69 Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., p. 1018. On the loss ofTet offensive see Vo Van Kiet, 1998, 'Mau Than trong Hoi uc cua Thu Tuong Vo Van Kiet' (Tet offensive in Premier Vo Van Kiet's memory), Dai Doan Ket (Vietnam), New year 1998 issue. Vo Van Kiet claimed that the losses of the 2"d and 3rd phases of the post Tel offensive were due to the lack of surprise. 70 See more details in' Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., p. 1018. 71 Kissinger disclosed that he and Nixon differed on the question of the necessity oftalks with the DRV. Unlike Nixon, Kissinger hoped that Le Due Tho would drop the political demands. See Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., p. 1030. 113 flexibility in later half of 1971 was a result of both the situation on the battlefield and the state of Sino-American and Soviet-American relations. Before the Nixon visit to China, the Sino-American relationship played only a minor role in US decisions. The impact of rapprochement on US policy was not only limited, but also rife with contradictory signals. On the one hand, Nixon instructed Kissinger to be tough with Hanoi following Kissinger's successful trip to Beijing in July. 72 But on the other hand the rapprochement somehow restrained the United States in its relations with the DRY. In January 1972, General Abrams warned of an imminent DRV offensive, and requested authority to disrupt the offensive's preparations by air attacks north of the DMZ. Kissinger and Laird did not agree to the bombing. One of the reasons for Kissinger's rejection was his concern that bombing would spoil the atmosphere of the coming Nixon visit to China. 73 The impact of the Sino-American rapprochement was clear only after the Nixon visit, as the United States became tougher in its relations with the DRV. The DRV claimed that the United States constantly carried out bombing of North Vietnam between 1 and 5 March 1972.74 This March bombing could not be compared with Nixon's earlier war expansion. But it was done without any pretext/5 which showed that the United States felt less constrained about escalating the war. Moreover, in April, the Nixon Administration used B-52s for the first time to bomb the North, and five aircraft carriers were sent to Vietnam to support air attacks against the North. In early May, Nixon also ordered the mining of DRV ports and bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. In the space of eleven days in May 1972, nearly three thousand sorties were sent to drop some forty thousand tons of bombs on Hanoi and Haiphong and adjacent areas. One historian later wrote that Nixon's 'madman theory' was no abstraction. 76 Hanoi assessed the May US decisions as 'strategic measures that affected the battlefield
72 With Kissinger's trip to Beijing in July 1971, the United States and China agreed to start their rapprochement. Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., p. 1026. 73 Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., p. 1100. 74 Luu Van Loi, 1996, op. cit., p. 203. Kissinger claimed that the accusation was groundless. See Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., p. I 106. To him the United States did not bomb the DRY at that time. See ibid, pp. 1001-02. 75 US intelligence had long known about the DRY's preparation for the spring 1972 offensive, but the United States did not take military measures to intervene. In early March, the offensive had not yet taken place. Thus, there was no reason for this March bombing. 76 Kamow, op. cit., p. 669.
114 in the South, but not simply supporting measures taken in the Johnson time' .77 April and May 1972 witnessed an unprecedented US escalation of the war. Though these measures were taken after the DRV!NLF Xuan 1972 (Spring or Easter to use the American term) offensive, which seems to imply that the offensive was the whole reason for the US escalation, I believe that this escalation was possible only because of the realisation of Sino-American rapprochement. One clear evidence is Holdridge's memoir, which discloses that the question of mining Haiphong harbour had been debated at length in the White House and plans had been drawn up for use as a contingency but had not been employed.78 It is probable that Nixon was not in a position to take this decision before the Sino-American rapprochement had been reached. If in February 1971 he was so concerned about the impact of a campaign in South Laos on US-PRC relations, as mentioned earlier, how could he later take the decision to escalate a war next door to China without having improved relations first? This bold measure, taken after the rapprochement, speaks of its impact on US policy towards Vietnam. On the other hand, Sino-American rapprochement played only a limited role in the US decision. There were many more US calls on the Soviets to exert pressure on the DRV. In April, Kissinger was sent secretly to Moscow, and was instructed to discuss only the Vietnam question. Nixon threatened to cancel the US-Soviet summit, which was planned for May. 79 During the Moscow summit, in June 1972, Nixon and Brezhnev also discussed the Vietnam question. The Soviets made a major concession to the Americans as the Soviet-US communique did not mention US mining and bombing of Vietnam. 80 After the summit, Soviet President Nikolai Podgomy went to Vietnam to inform the DRV leadership of the results of the summit. Subsequently, the Lao Dong Politburo convened an extraordinary meeting, which decided to adopt a 'peaceful strategy' .81 Though it is not yet clear what pressure the Soviets and Chinese exerted on the Vietnamese Communists, the sequence of events indirectly proves the presence of such pressure. Moreover, Le Due Tho later admitted that 'the then international
77 Luu Van Loi, I996, op. cit., p. 2I5. 78 Holdridge, op. cit., p. I03. 79 See more details in Kissinger, I 979, op. cit., pp. 11 08-64; Nixon, 1978, op. cit., pp. 587-94; and Luu Van Loi, I990, op. cit., pp. 204-8. 80 The Soviet conces~ion is seen clearer if compared to the Sino-American Shanghai Communique months earlier, where the Chinese insisted on stating their conflicting views. 81 Le Due Tho, at that time attending the Bulgarian Communists' Congress, was recalled to participate in this meeting. Xuan Thuy also was called back from Paris. See more details in Luu Van Loi, I 996, op. cit., p. 219. 115 situation and balance of forces did not allow us to achieve both goals at the same time'. 82 Two goals that the DRV leaders sought during the talks were US troop withdrawal and the removal of Thieu. Le Due Tho meant that the DRV had to be satisfied with only achieving the first goal. It seemed that the Soviet pressure on the Vietnamese was more effective than the Chinese one. The Lao Dong did not change its strategy after Nixon's visit to Beijing, but changed it after American-Soviet summit. So, contrary to the conventional understanding in Vietnam,83 the influence of Sino-American rapprochement on the US April and May 1972 bombing and mining was not as strong as some have believed. Another example of the influence of Sino-American rapprochement on the US attitude towards Vietnam was Nixon's tough stance in the months prior to the signing of the Paris Agreement. Thanks to the DRV' s concessions, following the Lao Dong Politburo's adoption of a peaceful strategy, the talks moved fast between July and October 1972.84 At the end ofthis period, the two sides agreed on a timetable, according to which they would sign the agreement on 30 October 1972. Nixon also agreed that the draft was complete and the United States was ready to sign. However, using the Thieu government's rejection as a pretext, the United States changed its mind, asking for further talks.85 It was clear that Nixon's plan was to string the talks along, overcome the hurdle of the presidential election and then again hammer out an agreement with the aim of getting further concessions from the Vietnamese. Nixon succeeded in this plan.86 After his landslide election victory, he was no longer under time pressure and became tougher in the talks with the DRV. Kissinger more frequently threatened his counterparts that a breakdown of the talks would have dire consequences. His threat was realised when the United States carried out the Linebacker-2 bombing operation in
2 & Le Due Tho, 1988, 'Le Due Tho's talk with Vietnam War History Group', Cited in Luu Van Loi, 1996, op. cit., p. 224. &J See more details in the White Book, p. Pham Van Dong also confirmed with me that one of the PRC's 'betrayals' was its receiving Nixon in February 1972. Based on my interview with Pham Van Dong in March 1997. 84 On the DRY concessions, Luu Van Loi wrote, 'what Kissinger proposed four years earlier was now accepted by Le Due Tho'. (Luu Van Loi, 1996, op. cit., p. 288.) See more details on the talks during that period in Luu Van Loi, 1996, op. cit., chapters VII-VIII, pp. 225-323; and Kissinger, 197,9, op. cit., chapter XXXI, pp. 1301-59. " 85 See the exchange of notes between the US and the DRY in late October 1972 in Luu Van Loi, 1996, op. cit., pp. 306-7, Goodman, op. cit., pp. 83-84. Consult also Kissinger and Nixon's memoirs. 86 The DRY did not demand that two or three of the four parties be signatories, without the Saigon government. Such a proposal would have cornered the United States. I asked Pham Van Dong and Luu Van Loi why the DRY did not make such a demand to see the American reaction, and was flatly told that
116 December 1972. Before the bombing there was only one remaining unsolved question between the two sides - the DMZ question. The state of the talks could not justify Nixon's decision. 87 On the contrary, it showed how tough was Nixon's stance in relation to Vietnam by the end of 1972. After the Christmas bombing the two sides resumed their talks and, in late January 1973, signed the Paris agreements. 88 One of the reasons for Nixon's toughness was his success in improving Sino-American relations. The US President did not need to worry about the PRC's reaction to his actions. He was correct, as the PRC's protest over the December bombings was mild. Kissinger observed that although Beijing condemned the bombing as a 'barbarous new crime', it told Hanoi to settle the war. He even claimed that the PRC leaders understood the motivations for the Christmas bombing better than the America's allies.89 The history of American policy towards Vietnam in the years 1968-73 shows that rapprochement helped the Nixon Administration to be tougher with Vietnam and therefore negotiate a better deal over the ending of the war. But in all likelihood, Sino-American relations did not only serve as a secondary factor to facilitate the settlement of the Vietnam War to American advantage. The improvement in relations between the two countries took away the raison d'etre for American involvement in Vietnam in general. As mentioned above, one element ofNixon's plan to end the war was to isolate North Vietnam diplomatically by improving US relations with both the PRC and the Soviet Union. In tum, improved relations made the war unnecessary for the United States. As mentioned above, as a private citizen, Nixon talked of the Vietnam War as the war between China and the United States.90 Therefore, as president Nixon understood better than any other person that once the United States improved its relations with the PRC there was no need for it to continue the war. Another sign of US unwillingness to continue the war was that it even pressed Thieu to go along with the American plan.91 This is not to say that the United States was unwilling to support the Saigon government. On contrary, the United States pumped billions of qollars worth of
it was not possible (interviews with Pham Van Dong and Luu Van Loi, March 1998 and July 1999, respectively). 87 Kissinger claimed that from the US point of view, the changes made to the agreement draft were not worth the anguish and bitterness of the last months of the war, and blamed both Thieu and Hanoi for it. Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., pp. 1467-68. 88 There was not much difference between the October draft and the final agreement. See Luu Van Loi, 1996, op. cit., pp. 411-15. Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., pp. 1466-67 for more details. 89 Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., p. 1454. 9° Cited in Dulles F. R., op. cit., p. 213. 91 See more details in Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., pp. 1468-70. Nixon, 1978, op. cit., p. 749-51. 117 arms into South Vietnam under the Enhance and Enhance Plus programs.92 Only the American participation in the war was seen as unnecessary. As we will see in the next chapter, Washington wanted to partition Vietnam, and preferred to see two states exist in Vietnam. All the presented arguments point to the conclusion that rapprochement was in US interests, helping the United States to exert pressure on the DRV. Anne Gilks, however, argues that Sino-American rapprochement operated to the benefit of the North Vietnamese. She states that by demonstrating the trend towards moderation in chinese foreign policy, rapprochement reduced Washington's fear of the possible consequences of a Communist victory in Indochina and made the Nixon Administration more willing to consider a compromise settlement of the war. 93 This chapter argues that the rapprochement removed the raison d'etre of the Vietnam War, but the fact remains that rapprochement allowed the United States to intimidate Hanoi, but did not encourage Washington to make concessions in a 'compromise settlement'. No significant concessions were made during the months after rapprochement. The major US concession allowing the DRV troops stay in the South was made in May 1971, if not October 1970, prior to Sino-American rapprochement. The breakthrough was made thanks to the DRV' s concession - its removal of its demand for the overthrow of the Thieu government.
China presses for 1peace at any price'
In the previous chapter we saw that the PRC' s leaders opposed the opening of the US-DRV talks and called for protracted resistance against US aggression. How did Sino-American rapprochement affect Chinese policy towards Vietnam? This section will show that prior to rapprochement in 1971, the PRC continued to call for intensifying the fighting and opposed the DRV-US negotiations, though it found different forms to express its opposition. The PRC's leaders, however?' changed their attitude after the Sino-American rapprochement. They advised the Vietnamese Communists to compromise with the United States, even to accept the Thieu government in the South in order to settle the Vietnam War. In fact, Kissinger's July visit to Beijing marked a watershed in the PRC's policy towards Vietnam.
92 See more details in Nixon, 1985, op. cit., pp. 170-171. 93 Gilks, op. cit., p. 58. 118 Prior to July 1971, the PRC continued opposing the Paris talks, but changed its way of opposing it. Unlike in the months between May and October 1968, when they categorically opposed negotiations, the Chinese leaders now endorsed the talks, but downplayed their importance. At his meeting with Pham Van Dong and other DRV leaders, on 17 November 1968, Mao Zedong told the Vietnamese guests that 'it is imperative to fight and to talk at the same time. It will be difficult if you rely on negotiations to request their departure' .94 He reminded the DRY's Prime Minister that the Americans could deceive the Vietnamese Communists, the same warning that had been given to the Vietnamese earlier. Moreover, at this meeting Mao repeated his advice to fight large-scale battles.95 So, while endorsing the talks, Mao emphasised combat, even large-scale combat. This showed that the change in PRC policy was not significant. It was a tactical change rather than a strategic one. It was not in the Chinese leadership's interest to keep opposing DRV policy while, despite its opposition, talks were going on. Moreover, there was no reason for them to criticise the Vietnamese Communists, as the talks did not progress after they started in May 1968. It took six months for the two sides to agree on the participants at the negotiating table. Mao explained to Pham Van Dong that some Chinese comrades were worried that the Americans would deceive the Vietnamese Communists, but he was not.96 This statement sounds quite objective when it is recalled how tense the October 1968 meeting between Chen Yi and Le Due Tho was.97 However, it was not credible for Mao's subordinates to disobey him, opposing the US-DRV talks. Mao himself had also disapproved of the talks. Mao's discussion with Pham Van Dong showed that he had changed his mind. Since then, Chinese leaders have repeatedly praised the DRY's policy of 'fighting while talking' as correct.98
94 77 Conversations, 141. 95 Later, Mao told Le Duan that Lin Biao knew only guerrilla warfare with a view to keeping the US bogged down in Vietnam, but he wished to see the Vietnamese fighting mobile warfare and destroy the US forces (cited in 77 Conversations, p. 185). This somehow highlights the differences in the Chinese leaders' opinions, but Mao's view was always the PRC's official line. 96 77 Conversations, p. 143. The DRY source agrees with this account, saying that the Chinese leaders said that they agreed with the DRY's strategy of 'fighting while talking', but advised the Vietnamese to fight on as negotiations would not bring results. See more details in MOF A China Department file. 97 See the previous chapter. 98 See more details in 77 Conversations, p. 180. My interview with former Ambassador Ha Van Lau, who was then Deputy Head ofthe Vietnamese delegation, also confirms this change of Chinese attitude towards the peace talks. Lau said that contrary to his previous meetings with Ambassador Huang Zhen, when the latter showed his coolness to Lau's remarks on the US-DVR talks progress, Huang changed his attitude, praising the Vietnamese for successful conduct of talks with the Americans. Lau did not confirm the precise time of the change, but one can guess it took place sometime in late 1968. 119 The years 1969-70 witnessed further Chinese emphasis on the importance of fighting and downplaying of the talks' importance. This can be seen in Zhou Enlai's April 1969 talks with Truong Chinh, then the second number in the Lao Dong's Politburo. The PRC Premier said that the difference between the two opposing stances could be resolved only on the battlefield.99 In the same month, he told a COSVN delegation that the NLF's peace plan, known as the Ten Points, could not trap the United States, but would make the people less vigilant and lose sight of the principles. 100 By saying that Zhou Enlai clearly indicated his objection to a peaceful strategy, or at least to the emphasising of a peaceful strategy, to settle the conflict in Vietnam. This objection to an emphasis of peaceful means was also seen in Zhou Enlai's talk with NLF Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho. In October 1969, the PRC Premier told his guest that he agreed with two out of the ten points, i.e. the demand for American withdrawal and the right of the South Vietnamese to manage their own affairs. 101 This was only a slight change, as the PRC had not yet given its support to the whole peace plan. The SRV Foreign Ministry claimed that only in December 1970, did the Chinese publicly support the NLF' s Ten Points and its modified Eight-Point plan. 102
Figure 4.1 China's Military Aid to the DRV, 1968-1973
Guns (thousands) Bullets (thousands) ---+----Artillery shells (thousands --111-- Artillery pieces 250,000 ...... 247";921-·-······---· ········-·-······--·-··-······-··-··-··-·--····-···-·····-····-············--·-······-····::.:;:::::=111·--··---·· 10,000 219. 89! ______.-lll--g;2:3£ 200,000 8,000 ~' 150,000 '"-., 6,000 100,000 ~~~J:AC}k~------+-:!;2tt-~ 4,000 50,000 2,000 0 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
/ Source: LiKe and Hao Shengzhang: Wenhua dageming zhang de renminjiefangjun, p. 416.
99 MOFA China Department file. Li Xiannian, the then PRC Vice Prime Minister, told Le Due Tho the same idea. Cited in 77 Conversations, p. 157. 100 77 Conversations, p. 157. A Vietnamese source agrees on this point, revealing that in June 1969, Zhou Enlai sent a telegram to Huynh Tan Phat, Head of the newly established Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, saying that the US would not withdraw completely and unconditionally all their and allies' troops from the South, and would not accept the establishment of a coalition government. Quoted in MOF A China Department's file. 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid. 120 The Chinese rejection ofthe importance of the DRV-US talks was also seen in Zhou Enlai' s advice that the Vietnamese Communists should spend less foreign currency and less of its officials' time on the negotiations in Paris. 103 Moreover, Zhou and Kang Sheng, then a member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, suggested that the DRV recall home all Vietnamese students in China and Eastern Europe to intensify the fighting. Moreover, the PRC Prime Minister suggested sending Chinese experts to the front to see the needs of the Vietnamese so that their aid could be more effective. 104 This seemed to confirm the PRC' s willingness to intensify the fighting in Vietnam. The PRC's line was seen most clearly in Mao's words, when he told Le Duan and Pham Van Dong, in May 1970 that he was not saying that the Vietnamese Communists should not negotiate, but that their main energy should be devoted to fighting. 105 Opposing the negotiations, the Chinese leadership went as far as to reduce Chinese aid to the DRV. In August 1969, Zhou asked the DRY's Vice Premier Le Thanh N ghi whether the Vietnamese planned to fight or to talk, so that the Chinese knew how to provide aid for Vietnam. 106 This clearly indicated Chinese dissatisfaction with the Vietnamese over the question of conducting talks with the United States. In fact, the PRC reduced its aid to Vietnam. According to the White Book, in 1969 aid was reduced by 20 per cent and in 1970 by 50 per cent against the 1968 level. 107 This charge is supported by Chinese sources as highlighted in the Figure 4.1. All the main military items - guns, artillery pieces, bullets and artillery shells - dropped sharply in those years. Bullets decreased nine times from around 248 million to 29 millions, while guns, artillery pieces and artillery shells decreased 2, 3 and 5 times, respectively. A record of the meeting between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong in September 1970, however, shows that the Chinese leader was offering the DRV weapons more advanced than those it had requested. 108 At first glance, it seems that this offer
103 This advice was given to Pham Van Dong and COSVN leaders in April1969. Cited in 77 Conversations, p. 157. 104 Ibid., p. I 73. 105 77 Conversations, p. I65. 106 MOFA China Department file. See also the White Book, p. 53, in which the names Zhou Enlai and Le Thanh Nghi were deleted. 107 The White Book, p. 53. It was not clear whether or not the PRC aid for I970 included the amount provided for by a supplementary aid agreement, signed on 25 May I970, as observed by Robert O'Neil. The agreement was believed to cover the expenses of the extended war in Cambodia (cited in O'Neil, p. II). 108 Cited in 77 Conversations, p. I 73. 121 contradicted the Chinese reduction of aid for the DRV. It was probable that aid was reduced to demonstrate Chinese displeasure with the talks, but the Chinese were also indicating their willingness to encourage the fighting by offering better weapons. Other seemingly conflicting evidence was Mao's confirmation to Pham Van Dong, on 23 September 1970 that 'we have made the provinces of Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan and Guangzhou responsible for helping you as well as the rest of the Southeast Asian region. The entire production by these provinces is for you' .109 This statement does not necessarily contradict the reduction of aid to Vietnam, either. What the PRC was ready to provide and what it did provide could be different matters. Furthermore, any difference would show the level of the PRC's displeasure with the DRY's negotiation line. Another sign of PRC opposition to the talks was its cold reaction to the establishment of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (the PRG), in June 1969. Though the PRC publicly recognised the PRG, privately recognition was not mentioned when receiving its Ambassador Nguyen Van Quang.U 0 The PRC was only the eleventh of the twelve socialist countries to recognise the PRG, and the seventeenth country to recognise it. It was likely that the PRC considered the establishment of the PRG was to serve the talks' purpose and therefore did not give it full support. At the same time as calling for intensifying the fighting, the Chinese continued to give oral support to the Vietnamese Communists' struggle. The Chinese issued two statements between April and May 1970, when the Indochinese Peoples' Summit was convened, and when the United States bombed North Vietnam. The famous Mao Zedong statement of 20 May, where Mao denounced the American aggression against Vietnam, was also issued at this time. 111 Initially, China did not want to break relations with the Lon Nol government following his coup d'etat in March 1970. But it changed its mind in late April, after the US-ARVN incursion into Cambodia. 112 It should be noted, however, that though the PRC's leaders emphasised the importance of intensifying the fighting in Vietnam, it was a constant policy of the PRC that it did not want to fight with the United States. 113 Moreover, as Kissinger observed,
109 77 Conversation, p. 178 110 MOFA China Department's file. 111 See more details in MOFA China Department's file and Han, op. cit., p. 211. 112 See more details in Qiang Zhai, 2000, op. cit., pp. 188-90.
122 these Chinese statements did not offer any concrete commitments to help the DRV. 114 Does this contradict the PRC's willingness to intensify the fighting in Vietnam? Probably, not. On the one hand, the PRC's leaders did not want the Vietnamese Communists to make a deal with the United States without reference to them, but on the other hand, they did not want to provoke the United States with a strong commitment. There are conflicting opinions over the PRC's position on the question of a reconvened Geneva conference. Gough Whitlam, the then Australian opposition leader,
stated in July 1971 that Zhou Enlai told him that he supported such a conference. II5 But Renmin Ribao of 2 September 1971 accused US imperialism of spreading talk about the convening of a Geneva conference in an effort to obstruct a peaceful settlement.116 A MOFA file of the meeting between Zhou Enlai and DRV leaders in July 1971 also confirmed that the Chinese leaders were not in favour of an international conference. 117 It is likely that the PRC did not support the reconvening of the Geneva conference at that time as it went against the PRC's calls for intensifying the fighting. Even if Zhou Enlai discussed that possibility with Whitlam, he later changed his mind. We know that by the end of 1970, the Chinese leaders had not changed their policy towards the United States. As shown earlier, they were not yet committed to improving Sino-American relations. In this situation, there was no reason for them to change their policy towards Vietnam. They continued to encourage the Vietnamese Communists to focus on fighting, but not on negotiating with the United States. Negotiations were seen just as decoration for the fighting. The PRC's leaders changed their attitude towards the Vietnam War immediately after Kissinger's July 1971 visit to Beijing. Informing the Vietnamese of the content of the meeting, Zhou Enlai said that for the Chinese, the primary question was American withdrawal from Vietnam, and the Taiwan question was only secondary.ll8 We know that before Kissinger went to China, the PRC leaders emphasised that the purpose of the
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m Kissinger, for instance, observed that despite its belligerent tone, Lin Biao's speech at the Ninth party Congress, in March 1969, held 'tantalising innuendoes' as it emphasised that China would not attack unless attacked first. Kissinger affirmed that this statement eased the US fear of Chinese intervention in Indochina (Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., p. 176.). 114 Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., p. 509. 115 The TTU's Vietnam Archive, Box 7, Folder 4. 116 Cited in ibid. 117 MOFA China Department's file. 118 The White Book, p. 57. 123 visit was to discuss the Taiwan question. 119 So, it is clear at least that the Chinese leaders had changed their priority, focusing on solving the Vietnam question first. What were the signs of change in the PRC's policy towards the war? The White Book claims that from July 1971, the Chinese started to separate military and political questions, suggesting that the Vietnamese make concessions in order to get American troops out of Vietnam and to solve the political question of the South later. 120 By then the DRV had made these questions indivisible, demanding that they be solved simultaneously. In July 1971, China informed the DRV of the four US points. The White Book does not elaborate on the content of this meeting between the Chinese and the Vietnamese, but implies that China advised, if not pressured, the DRV to accept the US proposal. 121 Chinese sources, however, claim that Zhou Enlai urged the Americans to withdraw completely from Vietnam. 122 I am of the view that Vietnamese and Chinese sources do not contradict each other. They just emphasise different aspects of the Chinese position in July 1971. The Chinese wanted the United States to withdraw from Vietnam- what the Chinese now emphasise. But this does not mean that China wanted the Americans to abandon the Thieu government. In fact, Beijing advised Hanoi to make a concession to the United States- to drop the condition of removing Thieu. This is what the Vietnamese now emphasise, and accuse the Chinese for. While we can only speculate about a change in Chinese stance over the war settlement in July 1971, we can be sure that the Chinese changed their policy in November. At a meeting with DRV leaders, Chinese leaders put it unequivocally that 'Vietnam had better take time to settle firstly the withdrawal of the American forces, to solve the question of releasing POWs'. They underlined that 'overthrowing the Saigon puppet (regime) is a long-term question' .123 If previously the PRC emphasised fighting and believed that the United States would not agree to the withdrawal of their forces, now they reversed the order, saying that the objective was to ask for total withdrawal and if the United States did not comply the Vietnamese would fight hardY4
119 See Zhou Enlai's June 1971 invitation letter to Nixon in Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., pp. 726-27. 120 MOFA China Department's file. 121 The White Book, p. 58. 122 The Diplomatic History Research Office of the PRC Foreign Ministry, 1991, Xin Zhongguo Waijiao Fengyun (Diplomatic Turbulence ofNew China), Vol. 2, pp. 221-22; Zhang Guang, 1991, 'Dakai ZhongMei guanxi dam en de Iishi beijing yu jingguo' (The Historical Background and Process of the Opening of Sino-American Relations) Waijiaoxueyuanxuebao, No.2, 1991, p. 59. 123 The White Book, p. 58. 124 77 Conversations, p. 178. 124 It should be noted that there were some seemingly conflicting Chinese signals. China, for instance, objected to the inclusion of Ambassador Bruce- former Head of the US negotiation team at the Paris talks - in Kissinger's October 1971 visit to Beijing. 125 China also allegedly refused to hold a parallel Kissinger-Le Due Tho meeting in Beijing during Nixon's February 1972 visit to China. 126 This reluctance to give any pretext to interpret Chinese intervention in US-DRV negotiations does not contradict to Chinese willingness to end the war. It seems that by the end of 1971, if not since July, the Chinese wanted to see an end to the war in Vietnam. In November 1968, Mao mentioned that Nixon had to resolve the Vietnam War within two years. 127 He also agreed to start negotiations, as mentioned above. But for nearly three years, the PRC had opposed diplomatic settlement. In fact, they preferred fighting to negotiating. So why did the PRC leadership change its position in 1971? Was this because the situation in the battlefield had changed or because Sino-American relations had changed? We know that the situation had not changed significantly in 1971. The Saigon government lost the Lam Son 719/28 but there was no meaningful change in the balance of forces in the South. As noted above, the DRV/NLF forces had not recovered from their losses of 1969-70. The DRY's Foreign Ministry's claiming that in order to solve the Taiwan question the Chinese tried to press the Vietnamese to settle the Vietnam War appears quite reasonable. 129 The Chinese seemed to be satisfied with a solution allowing the Americans to withdraw their forces from South Vietnam and leaving the political settlement open for a while. One of the most obvious signs of change in the PRC's attitude was that it tried to avoid talking about the fighting in Vietnam. This totally differed with the practice of earlier years when they constantly called for fighting. At a DRV Embassy reception, on 2 September 1971, the PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yongsheng allegedly gave a speech which 'made no mention of the Nixon Administration, or of a Vietnam ,settlement'. He
125 See also Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., p. 769. 126 Ross R., 1995, op. cit., p. 49. Walters Vernon, 1978, Silent Mission, p. 545--46. 127 77 Conversations, p. 144. 128 It can be argued that the Saigon government's Lam Son 719 defeat marked a turning point in the Vietnam War. But the maximum we can infer from the defeat is that with Vietnamisation program, the United States and Saigon government could not win the war, but it did not indicate that they would lose it. 129 The White Book, p. 57. The Westerners may face difficulties in understanding the 'contradiction' between this White Book claim and Zhou Enlai's above statement of the secondary priority of the Taiwan question to the settlement of the Vietnam War in Sino-American relations. The Vietnamese were
125 simply took the occasion 'to express concern over recent floods in North Vietnam and to offer pro forma support for the Vietnamese in their war of resistance' .13°Kissinger also observed that Beijing did not reply to a US December 1971 note which warned the DRV that its offensive would evoke the most serious retaliation from the United States. Kissinger wrote that the PRC's silence was in itself a 'significant sign of dissociation by what had been considered until then as the capital of world revolution'. 131 A Vietnamese source also said that the PRC press was late in publishing news on the DRV/NLF's Easter 1972 offensive. Moreover, the amount of coverage was insignificant. 132 Further, the PRC seemed to be slow in expressing its support for the DRV, in face of the US escalation of the war against North Vietnam. In April 1972, the PRC did not even issue a statement in support of the DRY's statement, which had become standard practice. The Chinese reaction was limited to a reception by Zhou Enlai of the DRY's Charge d'Affairs, Nguyen Tien. 133 Only on 11 May did the PRC government issue a statement, following a DRV statement of 10 May, condemning Nixon's decision to mine Vietnamese ports. But the PRC government statement did not demand an end to the mining and did not express its intention of helping the DRV in opposing the mining. 134 Kissinger observed that a Renmin Ribao commentator of 11 May 'neither denounced Nixon, nor indicated any Chinese response to the interdiction campaign'. Moreover, Renmin Ribao reprinted Nixon's speech, which Kissinger assessed as signifying that 'whatever the motive, it was the first time the Chinese "masses" had seen an account of Hanoi's intransigence and of our peace program. The North Vietnamese politburo could only interpret it as cool dissociation by their two major allies'. 135 The DRY's Foreign Ministry also claimed that the Chinese used their aid carrot to encourage the DRV to toe the Chinese line of compromising with the Americans. The White Book reveals that in 1971-72 Chinese aid exceeded the level of all previous
suspicious of the Chinese. They believed that the Taiwan question was the first Beijing's priority, though Zhou Enlai officially stated that it was given secondary priority. · 130 The TTU's Vietnam Archive, Box 7, Folder 4. 131 Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., p. 1043. 132 MOFA China Department's file. 133 MOFA China Department's file. See also The Diplomatic History Research Office ofthe PRC Foreign Ministry, ed, 1993, Zhou Enlai Waijiao Huodong Dashiji (1949-1975), (A chronology ofZhou Enlai's Diplomatic Activities, 1949-1975), p. 627. 134 Cited in ibid. It was not clear what the DR V Foreign Ministry meant by 'opposing the mining'. Anyway, a Chinese source showed that Zhou Enlai received unenthusiastically the DRY's request for • help in de-mining the DR V' s ports, though he later agreed to help. See more details in Lei Hua Jian, Xin Zhongguo haizhan neimu (Behind New China's Sea Battles), pp. 170-171. 135 Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., p. 1195.
126 years. 136 Figure 4.1 supports this Vietnamese claim. All four main items of Chinese military aid increased sharply in 1971. In that year, aid in guns, artillery pieces, bullets and artillery shells increased 1.5, 3, 2 and 4 times, respectively. The following years 1972-73 also witnessed an increase of three of the four aid items (excepting bullets). Delivery of guns continued to increase rapidly. One could argue that the increased aid was aimed at intensifying the war rather than decreasing the fighting. This would be correct in a normal situation, but in the case of Sino-Vietnamese relations, the PRC was worried that the Vietnamese Communists were suspicious of the motivations behind the Sino-American rapprochement. 137 A decrease in aid, which would be logical to the PRC's plan to forge a compromise with the United States, would have provoked strong suspicion from the DRV. 138 Thus, the PRC thought it better to increase its aid to Vietnam to dispel DRV suspicions over the new developments in Sino-American relations. A MOF A file also confirms that the PRC leaders gave a 'high-level welcome' to the Pham Van Dong visit to Beijing in November 1971, which was offered whenever the Chinese leaders wanted to win the DRV leaders' heart. 139 The PRC's leaders also changed their stance over the fate of the Saigon government. By July 1972, the DRV had demanded the removal of the Thieu government, what the DRV termed a 'political question' ofthe settlement of the war. 140 At a meeting with Le Due Tho in July 1972, Zhou Enlai spent much time persuading his guest that the DRV should 'surprise' the Americans by accepting Thieu. To add more weight to his argument, Zhou compared this situation in Vietnam with the CCP's
136 The White Book, p. 59. 137 This concern was not unfounded as, on 13 July 1971, right after the Kissinger visit to Beijing, Le Duan told Zhou Enlai who came to Hanoi to inform the DRY's leaders of the Kissinger visit that the latter was designed to forestall surprises the US faced one after another during the war (cited in 77 Conversations, p. 177). This statement sounds like a puzzle. It is usual in Vietnamese and Chinese culture l}Ot to speak directly on matters they are concerned about, but to do so indirectly. Being Chinese, Zhou Enlai should have understood Le Duan's suspicion over the Sino-American summit. As mentioned above, Pham Van Dong considered the visit as one of the PRC's betrayals of the DRY. See also Quan Doi Nhan Dan and Nhan Dan editorials in TTU Vietnam Archive, box 7 folder 4. 138 The Chinese use of aid carrot in relation to the Vietnamese was rather complicated, sounded confusing to some observers. Previously, when the Chinese were dissatisfactory with the Vietnamese conducting talks with the United States, they responded by reducing aid to the DRY, though they were in favour of intensifying fight in South Vietnam. In 1972-73, they increased aid not because they wanted the Vietnamese Communists to fight, but because they wanted to eliminate the Vietnamese suspicions of their rafprochement with 'washington. 13 MOFA China Department's file. 140 The above-mentioned extraordinary meeting of the Lao Dong's Politburo decided to change the DRY's stance at the Paris talks. 127 position towards Chiang Kai-shek. The intention was clear: if the CCP could accept the Chiang Kai-shek government in Taiwan, why could Lao Dong not accept the Thieu government in South Vietnam? He even affirmed that CCP Politburo had discussed this question, 141 which meant that if the Vietnamese Communists did not heed his advice, the PRC could alter its support for the war. Ironically, the PRC and the DRV had changed roles in the debate about 'fighting or negotiating'. Before the Sino-American rapprochement, the PRC leaders were afraid that the DRV would make a deal with the United States, altering its position on fighting with them. Now they changed their position, trying to persuade the DRY's leaders to stop fighting and even to accept Thieu for a period of time. Mao even told Nguyen Thi Binh that the 'so-called Cqmmunists' were calling for further fighting and rejecting negotiations. 142 What he criticised them for was exactly what he had called for prior to the Sino-American rapprochement. At that moment, no one knew how 'short' would be the life of a coalition government with Thieu's participation. The PRC's compromise showed that it was eager to settle the Vietnam War with conditions unfavourable to its ally . . The PRC leadership understood that the year 1972 was very important in American politics, as it was an election year. Zhou Enlai told Xuan Thuy in July that year that the remaining four months prior to the November election in the US were very important. 143 The time pressure also made the Chinese more overt in their pressure on the Vietnamese to accept a compromise with the United States. The question of the North Vietnamese troops' remaining in the South after the American troops' withdrawal was the major question that the Vietnamese and Americans bargained over at talks. But in November 1972 the Chinese asked the Vietnamese leaders, through the DRY's Vice Minister of Trade, to drop that demand in order to sign the agreement in that year. 144 In December the Chinese even played into the hands of the Americans when their
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141 See more details on this meeting in 77 Conversations, pp. 179-82. The Chinese and Vietnamese understood the importance of an election year to American presidential candidates, but they were too late in changing their position to exploit that opportunity. They had much less than 4 months, by their reckoning, to press the American Administration for a peace deal. The chance for success was very small. 142 77 Conversations, p. 182. 143 Zhou Enlai's Diplomatic Activities Chronology, p. 635. 144 The White Book, p. 59. This sounds contradicting with earlier statement that the United States dropped its demand for the PA VN troops' withdrawal. The simple reason is that the negotiators always bargained and re-bargained their 'gives' and 'takes'. The question of the P A VN troops withdrawal was not exception. But it can be also another imprecise account of the White Book. 128 Ambassador Huang Zhen passed Kissinger's threat of renewing bombing to his Vietnamese counterpart. 145 Later, in 1979, the DRY White Book accused the PRC of betrayal, of colluding with the Americans. 146 While the PRC did want a peace settlement in Vietnam, there was no evidence of collusion. The White Book cites one US source in support of its charge. Kissinger was believed to have told a group of journalists on 1 March 1972 that after the Nixon visit to Beijing, the US administration needed only to keep an eye on Moscow and knock out Vietnam. 147 This statement sounds as if the United States had already gained PRC endorsement for defeating the DRY. But this was only what Kissinger wanted, rather than a fact. Newly released declassified US materials showed that the PRC insisted on complete US withdrawal. From the start, at the July 1971 meeting, Zhou Enlai told Kissinger that the United States should not leave its 'tail' behind in Vietnam, which meant not to leave its advisors in the South. 148 Twice in January and February, 1972, the PRC accused the United States of seeking to enmesh China, which Kissinger admitted was 'not unjust' .149 It is interesting that Winston Lord's papers show that Kissinger was constantly looking for a tacit Sino-American understanding or 'collusion' over the Vietnam question, but each time the PRC's representatives rejected or did not respond to Kissinger's suggestions. 150 On the contrary, the PRC's representatives were unequivocal in their demand for complete US withdrawal from Vietnam. It was in the PRC's interest that the United States end the Vietnam War and focus on the Soviet threat. So, it pressed not only the DRY, but also the United States for a peaceful settlement. This finding does not accord with conventional wisdom of the DRY's official line, which maintains that the PRC colluded with the United States and betrayed the DRY. It is clear that the rapprochement had a great impact on PRC policy towards Vietnam. The PRC leadership changed from opposing the talks and calling for fighting to pressing Hanoi to accept a partial solution to the Vietnam War. They npt only advised the Vietnamese Communists to accept the Thieu government, but also to withdraw their troops from the South. These were the most important questions at the DRY-US talks.
145 The White Book, p. 60. 146 Ibid. 147 Kalb Marvin, Kissinger, p. 283. 148 NASA, The Winston Lord papers. 149 Kissinger, 1979, op. cit., p. 1045, 1104. See also Winston Lord's papers. 150 See more details in NASA, Winston Lord papers. 129 The Vietnamese Communists could be satisfied with achieving one goal, but not with none goal achieved. The PRC's advice showed that they wanted the DRV to sign the peace agreement at any cost. However, this analysis also shows that Chinese pressure seemed to be weaker than Soviet pressure. As mentioned above, Haig was sent to Moscow to exert pressure on the Soviets, but no-one was sent to Beijing to seek Chinese pressure for change in the DRY's policy. The change of the DRY's strategy also was made immediately after Podgomy's 1972 visit to Vietnam.
Conclusion
During the years between 1969 and 1973 the United States and the PRC toqk different routes in improving their relations. One took a more or less a straight path, and the other took a more circuitous route, but they both arrived at the same destination. Once the state of their relations changed, their policies towards Vietnam changed accordingly. Though the escalation of the war had begun years before reaching rapprochement with the PRC, the United States now felt less constrained in escalating the war so as to press North Vietnam for concessions at the talks. It bombed North Vietnam without any pretext in early March 1972, which had not been the usual American practice in waging the war. Moreover, April and May saw an unprecedented escalation when Nixon bombed populated areas and mined all the DRY's ports. The peak of the US escalation was its use of B-52s in bombing Hanoi and Haiphong. Without rapprochement with the PRC, the United States would not have escalated the war to that degree. The United States was no longer worried about the PRC's reaction. The second impact of the rapprochement on the US policy towards Vietnam was that it now felt safe in withdrawing from Vietnam. It no longer had to worry about Chinese expansion. Nixon even pressed Thieu to accept the deal with the DRV and the PRG. After Sino-American rapprochement, Vietnam lost its position in the US strategic plan. The US troop withdrawal shows the beginning of the US disengagement from Vi~nam, at least compared with the its previous involvement. The next chapters will show further US disengagement from Vietnam. In the previous chapter, it was argued that the United States escalated the war due to its confrontation with the PRC, but here it is argued that thanks to Sino-American r.approchement, the Nixon Administration was able to escalate the war as well. Is there a contradiction between these arguments? A further look at the events answers this question. If in the 1950s and 1960s the United States started the war in 130 order to stop 'Communist expansion', it escalated the war this time just to press for a better bargain for American withdrawal. As far as the PRC is concerned, rapprochement brought an obvious change in its policy towards Vietnam. Before rapprochement, the PRC leadership consistently called for intensifying the fighting in the South. Though agreeing reluctantly to the Paris talks, they emphasised the importance of fighting to the extent that the talks lost all meaning. In calling for fighting, the PRC leadership resorted even to threatening that aid would be cut off. This is not at all surprising. The PRC was not satisfied with the level of fighting, but understood that the DRV still wanted to fight. Cutting aid would put the DRV in an even more difficult military position. The watershed in PRC policy towarqs Vietnam occurred precisely after the Kissinger visit to Beijing. The PRC now turned to advise the DRV to settle the war. The more the rapprochement matured, the more the PRC pressed for a peaceful solution to the war. Beijing not only agreed with the US demand to settle the military question first and the political question later, that is acceptance of the Saigon government, but also advised the North to withdraw its troops from the South, a demand the United States itself had long since dropped. The change in the PRC's policy towards Vietnam brought about a significant change in the DRY's strategy. The Lao Dong Politburo decided to adopt a peaceful strategy, meeting US demands that it had rejected for years. As mentioned above, if Sino-American confrontation brought about the Vietnam War, their rapprochement helped to end it. Sino-American rapprochement was one of the reasons for the ending of the war in 1973. This is not to say that rapprochement alone brought about the end of the war. The Vietnam War had its own momentum, and after the Tet offensive of 1968, US policy makers came to realise that they could not win the war. But Sino-American rapprochement facilitated the way in which peace in Vietnam was established. Moreover, not only did Sino-American rapprochement lead to calls for a quicker solution, but also the start of ~inc-American detente. As we have seen, the Soviet Union had an even bigger influence on the development of the situation in Vietnam. This chapter also shows that big power relations set the scene for small states. On this occasion, Sino-American rapprochement forced Vietnam to accept the deal they preferred. Against the Vietnamese Communists' wishes, they were forced to accept half measures. Had there been no Sino-American rapprochement, the Nixon Administration, under domestic pressure, would have made more concessions to the DRV/NLF. 131 There were cases when the DRV and the Saigon governments rejected the pressure of their great power backers. Hanoi did not acquiesce to the PRC demand to withdraw its troops from the South, and rejected a proposal to conduct talks between Le Due Tho and Kissinger in Beijing while Zhou Enlai had talks with Nixon. The Saigon government refused to sign the agreement in October and even asked the United States to press for more concessions from the DRV when the United States was ready to sign. Do these episodes argue that small states have power over big states? Yes and no. A small state can exploit its position to its advantage, but there are limits to this capacity. The chapter shows that both Hanoi and Saigon had to accept what they did not want under pressure from the PRC and the United States.
132 Chapter 5 Sino-American Hesitancy to Normalise and Reunification of Vietnam, 1973-1977
Nixon's visit to China raised high hopes for the normalisation of Sino-American relations. But against expectations, relations were not normalised until five years after his visit. Relations between the two countries were stalled for a time. Neither country wished to return to confrontation, yet neither was ready to normalise. The United States demanded concessions over the Taiwan question, but the People's Republic of China was not prepared to yield. This stalemate did not reverse the trend towards , rapprochement in their relations, but it slowed the process of normalisation. Hostilities had ended, but the two countries were reluctant to make the final decision to fully normalise relations. Various authors have focused on the Sino-American relationship during this period. 1 But unlike some, who claim that Sino-American relations went through a phase ofuncertainty,2 this chapter argues that both the Americans and Chinese had confidence in their policies, but were not yet ready to normalise their relations. Many studies have been written on American policy towards Vietnam in these years, with two main differing views. Some argue that the United States continued to be committed to Vietnam3 while others argue that the United States disengaged from Vietnam.4 They agree on one point: that the Watergate scandal turned the tide in Vietnam. This author is of the view that the commitment to Saigon shown by the Nixon and, to some extent, the Ford Administration was tactical and short-term. The main issue was always disengagement from Vietnam. Watergate merely hastened the process. The central argument of this chapter is that, as in previous periods, Sino-American relations in these years shaped American and Chinese policy towards Vietnam. The two countries / tacitly agreed to maintain the status quo- a divided Vietnam- by peace.
1 See for instance Harding Harry, 1992, A Fragile Relationship, the United States and China since 1972, Ross Robert, Negotiating Co-operation: the United States and China 1969-1989; Oksenberg M. (ed.), Dragon and Eagle, United States-China Relations: Past and Future, Han Nienlong, Diplomacy of Contemporary China. 2 See for instance Oxnam R. B., 1978, 'Sino-American relations in Historical perspective', in Oksenberg, op. cit., p. 24. 3 See for instance, Gareth Porter's A Peace Denied, Kissinger's The Upheaval Years and Nixon's No More Vietnam. The last two memoirs try to lay the blame for defeat in Vietnam on the US Congress. 4 The clearest example of this view was Nguyen Tien Hung's The Palace File. 133 Like the initial rapprochement with China that helped the United States withdraw its troops from Vietnam - a partial disengagement - continued rapprochement enabled the Americans to disengage further from Vietnam.5 The United States cut its aid to the Saigon government. It was also ready to establish some form of diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. More importantly, the United States refused to intervene to rescue the Saigon government when North Vietnam mounted its general offensive. This disengagement policy allowed the Vietnamese to reunite the country quickly and inexpensively. China was unwilling to see the fighting in Vietnam continue. This would put the United States in difficult position, which in tum would be unfavourable to the Chinese who needed American support in their anti-Soviet struggle. Fighting was also likely to / increase Soviet influence in Vietnam, something the Chinese wished to prevent. For present purposes, this factor is not the focus of the analysis. Chinese pressure for a peace agreement, evident in earlier years, would also release the United States from the burden of war. Sino-Vietnamese relations, however, worsened markedly after the end of the Vietnam War. Sino-Soviet rivalry appeared to dominate Chinese thinking about its Vietnam policy. This factor represents a challenge to this dissertation's main theme -the impact of Sino-American relations on their respective Vietnam policies. It could be that Sino-American relations were not the main factor in shaping Chinese policy towards Vietnam. Another challenge to this dissertation's theme is the question of whether Vietnam itself, not the big powers, played the main role in defining Chinese policy towards Vietnam. It can be argued that the deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations was due not to changes in Sino-American relations but to Vietnamese inclination towards the Soviet Union. This chapter, therefore, tries to answer these challenges by showing how Sino-American relations still played a principal role in shaping these countries' policies towards Vietnam. It also shows the limited extent to which Sino-American relations affected Chinese policy towards _Y'ietnam. The following section will first describe the period of hesitancy in Sino-American relations, then analyse American disengagement and China's frosty attitude towards Vietnam's
5 The term 'continued rapprochement' used here seems to contradict with my earlier claim of the stalling character of Sino-American relations during the years between 1973 and 1977. I hold that the two countries were reluctant to normalise their relations, staying where they were in 1973. This state of relationship is of stalling or stagnation character. The two countries, however, did not step backward to confrontation. In this sense, they continued the rapprochement process that they started in the early 1970s. 134 unification to highlight the impact of the Sino-American relationship on their Vietnam policies.
Sino-American hesitancy over normalisation
Sino-American relations during the years 1973-77 were characterised by hesitancy over normalisation. On the American side, this hesitancy was expressed in unwillingness to take the final steps in fully normalising Sino-American relations. The United States considered that the Chinese needed normalisation more than did the Americans. For this reason, they held out for Chinese concessions. While they remained unsatisfied with Chinese concessions, they refused to take the ultimate move of normalisation. This American reluctance in no way represented a desire to return to confrontation. On the Chinese side, reluctance was marked by a shift from enthusiasm to frustration. In the beginning, the Chinese needed normalisation and offered America concessions, but when they realised that they could not achieve normalisation without making substantial concessions over Taiwan, their attitude changed. They then demanded the United States meet their conditions for normalisation. But like the Americans, the Chinese did not want a return to confrontation. They kept unchanged their 'Yi Tiao Xian ' (one line) policy. Like in the previous period, aligning with the United States and opposing the Soviet Union remained the main thrust of Chinese foreign policy. The reluctance we shall see in this period was only a sign of temporary rejection to make a further step, but not a sign of willingness to go backwards. So, during these years, the tendency towards rapprochement did not halt completely, but merely slowed.
American reluctance to normalise Sino-American relations
After initial euphoria over the thaw in Sino-American relations, US reluctance to complete the normalisation of relations was expressed in its unwillingness to make concessions to the Chinese. Some argue that the United States was uncertain about its / China policy, and changed its policy towards China some time in 1974 because of the Watergate scandal and the weakening position of presidents Nixon and Ford.6 I argue that although Watergate weakened the Nixon presidency and hindered normalisation, American reluctance was evident even before the scandal destroyed Nixon's power. It was clear in the character of American attempts to seek Chinese concessions on Taiwan.
6 See Ross, 1995, op. cit., pp. 71-91; Garson, op. cit., pp. 151-53. 135 As a long-time supporter of Taiwan, Washington would lose international standing if it dropped Taiwan without winning any concessions from the PRC. As there was no reason for the United States to compromise, it consistently demanded concessions from the Chinese. As we will see, the Americans changed their stand only in the late 1970s when there were incentives for them to compromise. Harding cites three factors for stagnation in the Sino-Ameri~an relationship: differences in US and PRC strategies towards the Soviet Union, their failure to find a mutually acceptable solution to the Taiwan issue, and their mounting domestic political difficulties. According to Harding, the United States wanted an alignment with China in order to promote Soviet-American detente, whereas China wanted an alignment with the United States for confrontation against Moscow. Washington was concerned that it would be drawn by China into a Sino-Soviet confrontation.7 I agree with Harding that these three reasons were behind the American reluctance to normalise. But in slight contrast to Harding, I think that the first and last factors were more important, while the second factor was a result of the other two. Because of their differences over the Soviet Union and the pressures of domestic politics, the US and PRC governments could not find ground for compromise over the Taiwan issue. If the Soviet factor had been partly a momentum for Sino-American rapprochement, it now hindered further Sino-American normalisation as the United States was concerned that the Soviet Union would consider the normalisation of US-China relations as an anti-Soviet act. US domestic politics, as argued earlier, also hindered normalisation. The costs of normalisation for the US seemed to outweigh the benefits. US reluctance to make concessions to clear the way for normalisation was not apparent in 1973 as, thanks to Chinese concessions, the Sino-American relationship had improved during that year. According to Kissinger, when he proposed in February, to set up a permanent 'point of contact' to facilitate discussion between the two countries on strategic questions, Zhou Enlai offered him a good deal, proposi~g to exchange liaison offices.8 Chinese sources do not agree with Kissinger's memoir, claiming that it was Kissinger who proposed the exchange of liaison offices.9 However, the Kissinger version of February Sino-American exchange, which is supported by Holdridge who
7 See more details in Harding, op. cit., p. 48. 8 Kissinger claimed that he offered three options- to set up trade offices, consulates, and liaison offices. But the Chinese immediately ruled out the first two. For more detail, see Kissinger, 1982, Years of Upheaval, p. 61. 9 See for instance Han, op. cit., p. 277. 136 was then China expert at National Security Council, 10 seems more accurate from the point of view of logic. Up to that time, the PRC had refused to set up representative offices in capitals where Taiwan had embassies. It would have been difficult for the Americans to propose setting up the first ever office of this type in Washington. It would have been more likely for Kissinger to put forward several options from which the Chinese could chose. Leaving aside the question of who proposed the exchange of liaison offices, an exchange in itself was a PRC concession. Without PRC leaders' good will, it is unlikely that liaison offices would have been set up at that time. One fact seems to contradict the claim of US reluctance to normalise US-PRC relations. During Kissinger's February 1973 visit to Beijing, the US National Security Advisor offered the Chinese a timetable for normalisation of relations. According to this timetable, the US would 'prepare to move after the 197 4 [congressional] elections toward something like the Japanese solution with regards to diplomatic relations', and be prepared to establish full diplomatic relations before mid-1976. 11 It can be argued that Kissinger's offer showed US enthusiasm on the normalisation question, not reluctance as I claim, because acceptance of the Japanese solution - establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing and limiting relations with Taibei to a non governmental basis- represented an American concession. However, Kissinger also made it clear that the United States intended to retain 'some form of representation' in Taiwan. Zhou Enlai allegedly agreed that the two sides would seek a compromise on this question. 12 It seems that the Chinese sources emphasised the US promise, but were silent about their concessions. The timetable was more likely a US promise aimed at encouraging the Chinese to make concessions, not evidence of American enthusiasm. Another episode that may be used to challenge the point of US reluctance to normalise relations is Kissinger's statement during his November 1973 visit to Beijing in which he allegedly said that the United States was 'determined to do much more to complete the process of normalisation' .13 However, the US took ,no action to substantiate that statement. On the contrary, the PRC leaders seemed to offer more
10 For more details, see Holdridge, op. cit., p. 112. 11 Kissinger's report or2 March 1973, 'My China trip', in US National Security Archive, Winston Lord's Files. See Han, op. cit., p. 277. 12 Ibid. 13 Quoted in H. Harding, op. cit., p. 46. 137 concessions on this occasion. 14 So, like the 'normalisation plan' of February, this Kissinger statement of November was probably to encourage Chinese concessions. One can argue that far from demonstrating US reluctance to normalise relations with China, setting up the liaison office showed US readiness to normalise. The United States appeared to be ready to sacrifice diplomatic relations with Taiwan for normalisation of its relations with China. The above analysis, however, merely shows that though the exchange of liaison offices in itself was a step towards normalisation of Sino-American relations, it by no means amounted to a US concession, much less US abandonment of Taiwan. From the very beginning, Kissinger was seeking Chinese concessions on Taiwan in exchange for the normalisation of Sino-American relations. If, in 1973, US reluctance to make concessions contrasted with the PRC's unilateral concessions, the reluctance became clearer in 1974, when the Chinese changed their mind, refusing to yield to American demands. 15 A clear example is Kissinger's November 197 4 visit to Beijing. During that visit, the two sides failed to achieve agreement on normalisation. The reason for that failure was not a change in US policy, as Kissinger did not increase US demands in exchange for termination of defence relations with Taiwan. Kissinger was believed to have asked Deng Xiaoping to make a pledge that China would pursue reunification with Taiwan solely through peaceful means if the United States were to terminate defence relations with Taiwan. 16 This proposal did not come out of the blue. In February 1973, Kissinger and Zhou Enlai had agreed that they would look for a compromise solution to the Taiwan question. The Chinese insisted in 197 4 that the United States meet three conditions before relations could be normalised. 17 This Chinese insistence made normalisation impossible. President Ford's December 1975 visit also failed to solve the normalisation question. The visit was reduced from seven to four days and Ford added Indonesia and the Philippines to his tour to make the failure of the China trip less visible. The two sides were not able to sign a joint communique. The Chinese refusal to agree to a joint communique was made on the grounds that no concrete progress towards normalisation
14 The Chinese concessions will be discussed later in this chapter. 15 See more details on Chinese concessions later in this chapter. 16 Cited in Xue and Pd, Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao, p. 226. See also Harding, op. cit., p. 51, Lawson, 1978, 'Taiwan: We Forgot Who Held the Trump Cards', in Washington Post, 29 December 1978. 17 These conditions include abrogation of US Mutual Defence Treaty with Taiwan, end of official relations with Taiwan, and withdrawal of all its remaining forces from Taiwan. 138 had been made. Thus, the Sino-American stagnation of 1974-1977 was mostly due to the Chinese refusal to compromise. The United States was also partly responsible for the stagnation. According to Kissinger's November 1973 promise, the United States would make moves towards normalisation after November 1974. But the intervening Watergate scandal, which destroyed the Nixon Administration's position, prevented it from taking initiatives in its China policy. That the Ford Administration repeatedly told the Chinese that they would . move to normalise Sino-American relations after the 1976 presidential election confirms the fact that US domestic politics hindered normalisation with Beijing. 18 The Chinese, therefore, had some justification for blaming the United States for breaking its promise. Washington had been reluctant to normalise before Watergate destroyed the Nixon presidency. Events in US domestic politics did not change American attitudes towards China, but simply increased the existing trend of reluctance to normalise US-China relations without gaining concessions on the Taiwan issue. The limit of US willingness to normalise Sino-American relations was seen clearly in President Carter's China policy. Relieved from domestic pressure, the new US president had a mandate to normalise Sino-American relations. But his administration assigned it a low priority. China policy was not one of the subjects addressed by the first wave of presidential review memorandums. Indeed, the subject of China was not even discussed at the informal meeting of the coming NSC on 4 January 1977. 19 Only in mid- 1977, after the completion of PRM-24, did the US president establish minimal American conditions for normalisation. These included the continued sale of defensive weapons to Taipei, the maintenance of extensive unofficial relations with Taiwan, and a US statement of continued concern for the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan dispute. These 'minimal' conditions showed that the Carter Administration, at least in its early stages, was not enthusiastic about normalising US-China relations.
The clearest example of US limited readiness to normalise ~inc-American relations was the Vance trip to China in August 1977. In the beginning, its purpose was
18 During his visit to China, in December 1975, Ford hinted that he would try to normalise their relations in his second term. President Ford was under pressure from the rightist faction of the Republican Party and could not take any initiative in his China policy. He was afraid that any hint that the Ford administration was about to 'abandon' Taiwan would give Reagan enormous advantage in his challenge to the president, especially when a huge majority of the American public opposed expanding diplomatic relations with Beijing if that required breaking ties with Taipei. 19 Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 51-52. See also Harding, op. cit., p. 70 139 to discuss conditions for normalising relations with Beijing, but Carter had second thoughts, limiting it to probing the limits of the Chinese position to see what concessions China might make. Carter was concerned that the achievement of normalisation might cost the president some of the support he would need in the Senate to secure the ratification of the treaty on the future of the Panama Canal.20 Instead of discussing conditions for normalisation, Vance was instructed to present to the Chinese the US 'maximum' position, that the United States intended to assign government personnel to the unofficial organisation that would represent American interests in Taiwan. After the Vance visit the United States decided to give lower priority to its China policy. Holdridge confirmed that Vance's trip to China was a setback, if not a disaster.21 Though American policy-makers considered that the time was not yet ripe for normalisation, they did not want to abandon the objective. Some in the Carter Administration argued for developing strategic relations with Beijing. The Ford Administration was believed to have sold to China more advanced technology and encouraged its allies to do the same, but was still not prepared to endorse arms sales to China.22 Strategic relations were seen as a means to restore the momentum of US-China relations. They were also viewed as a means of strengthening America's strategic position against the Soviet Union and increasing the chances that moderate leaders would dominate the forthcoming political succession in Beijing.
Hardening of Chinese attitude towards Sino-American normalisation
Between 1973 and 1977 the PRC gradually hardened its US policy. Initially, Chinese leaders may have thought that concessions on their part would be effective in promoting normalisation of Sino-American relations. But later they came to feel that there had been no progress, and became unbending in their policy towards the United States. They refused to yield to the US demands on the Taiwan question necessary for .r Sino-American normalisation. Nevertheless, like the United States, the People's Republic of China did not want to return to confrontation. China made some concessions in 1973. In February, PRC leaders agreed to establish a liaison office in Washington where Taiwan still maintained its embassy. This
20 Vance C., 1983, Hard Choice, p. 79. 21 Holdridge, op. cit., p. 173. 22 Harding H., op. cit., p. 54. 140 was the clearest concession as it was the first example of the PRC and the ROC flying flags in the same city. Zhou Enlai's concession was not a surprise if put in the context of Chinese willingness to align with the United States to oppose the Soviet Union. In that same February, Mao told Kissinger that it was necessary to establish a line including the United States, Japan, China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Europe to oppose the Soviet Union. 23 This was the main content of Mao's 'Yi Tiao Xian' policy. Later a Chinese author, Zhang Xiaoming, commented that Mao Zedong's main idea was to unite the world in a front, the main force of which was the United States, to oppose the Soviet Union. To Zhang, in that 'Tongyi Zhanxian' (united front), America was the most important member.24 During Kissinger's November 1973 visit to Beijing, Zhou Enlai allegedly made a second concession. Zhou told his guest that normalisation could be achieved simply on the basis of confirming the principle of one China and was not contingent on the termination of either the mutual defence treaty or American diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Kissinger concluded that China was 'indirectly inviting a proposal that combined the principle of a unified China with some practical accommodation to the status quo' .25 Kissinger made this statement to reporters immediately after leaving China. 26 The Chinese did not dispute Kissinger's claim. This silence could be interpreted as confirmation of Kissinger's assessment. Moreover, Chinese accounts do not discuss this important visit, which indirectly confirms that the Chinese had made initiatives they would later retract. Zhou was later believed to have been charged by Mao with 'capitulationism' ,27 which once again indirectly confirms the Chinese 1973 concessions. Moreover, Chinese leaders wanted to push forward normalisation by inviting Nixon to visit China a second time. After Nixon expressed to Huang Zhen, the head of the PRC's liaison office in Washington, his willingness to make a second visit to China,
23 Mu Jun, 'Zhongda de lis hi juece deng- tan Mao Zedong dakai ZhongMei guanxi de zhanlue juece yu zhanlue sixiang' (Important Historical Decision- On Mao Zedong's Strategic Decision and Thought of opening Sino-American relations) in Mao Zedong waijiao sixiang yanjiu, pp. 172-180. 2 Zhang Xiaoming, 1998, 'Lengzhan shiqi xin Zhongguo de si ci duiwai zhanluejueze' (Four Cold War Chinese Foreign Policy Decisions), in Liu Shan, op. cit., p. 12. 25 Kissinger, 1982, op. cit., p. 692. 26 See New York Times, 17-18 November 1973. Cited in Harding H., op. cit., p. 47. 27 Ross R., 1995, op. cit., pp. 65-66; Ross R., 1989, 'From Lin Biao to Deng Xiaoping: Elite Instability and China's US policy', The China Quarterly, No. 118, p. 276; Oksenberg M., 1982, 'A Decade ofthe Sino-American relations', Foreign Policy, Vol. 61, No. I, pp. 182-83. 141 Mao invited him to visit China 'at an appropriate time' .28 Zhou Enlai probably believed. that exchange of liaison offices would consolidate Sino-US relations and prepare for full normalisation.29 The Soviet factor impelled the Chinese to go ahead with normalising their relations with the United States. Chinese leaders were worried about the US-Soviet June 1973 summit and the conclusion of their Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. 30 China's policy towards the United States changed in 1974. 31 Though the Chinese independently arrived at their decision to hasten their relations with Washington, Nixon's resignation in August that year also made the Sino-American normalisation more difficult. In mid-1974, acting Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua,responded unenthusiastically to Kissinger's suggestion that he visit Beijing in October. Kissinger had to accept Beijing's postponement of the visit until November. More importantly, Deng Xiaoping, who was in charge of PRC foreign policy at that time, rejected Kissinger's November 1974 suggestion that the United States maintain a liaison office in Taiwan after the establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing . This would have been in exchange for Beijing's pledge to pursue reunification with Taiwan solely through peaceful means. Deng charged the United States with applying a 'reversed liaison office' formula to realise a 'one China, one Taiwan' policy.32 He also insisted that the US meet three conditions for Sino-American normalisation, as mentioned above. This insistence showed a hardening in China's position on the United States. The Chinese leadership was no longer prepared to endorse the compromise on Taiwan that Zhou seemed to have suggested to Kissinger in 1973. Discussion of blocked claims and frozen assets dating from the Korean War, resolution of which was essential for normalisation of Sino-American relations, also stalled that year, though the two sides were allegedly close to achieving an agreement in the November 1973 and April 1974 discussions.33 Moreover, the Chinese became
/ 28 Ross R., 1995, op. cit., pp. 72-73. See also Solomon R., US-PRC Political Negotiations, p. 33. 29 Ross R., 1995, op. cit., pp. 51-52. 30 See more details in Ross, 1995, op. cit., pp. 73-74. 31 Ross claimed that China's reassessment of US-China relations began in second half of 1973, when Mao started to criticise Zhou Enlai and the Foreign Ministry (See Ross R., 1995, op. cit., pp. 65-66). But we see that in November 1973, Zhou still offered Kissinger a good deal on normalisation. By the end of 1973 there probably was no consensus yet within the Chinese leadership over its US policy though there were voices spoken against Zhou Enlai's line. It was a coincident that Nixon resigned in August 1974, which could not but gave a blow against improvement of Sino-American relations. 32 Han, op. cit., p. 278.
142 suspicious about real intentions of the United States over Taiwan. One Chinese diplomat complained, in autumn 1974, 'we don't know whether your Secretary of State is really sincere about getting out of Taiwan' .34 In addition, as Ross claims, Beijing refused to engage in any activities that suggested acquiescence to a 'two-China' policy. It turned down Kissinger's frequent suggestions that Zhou Enlai or any other Chinese leader visit Washington.35 PRC inflexibility in its policy towards the United States was seen most clearly during President Ford's visit to China in December 1975. Other evidence of the PRC's hard line foreign policy was its criticism of the Helsinki accords of 1975. The Chinese described the accords as the Munich agreement of the 1970s, implying that the agreement would simply give the Soviet Union greater opportunities to build up military strength and expand its influence in other parts ofthe world. 36 Geng Biao told graduates of the Institute of Diplomacy in August 1976 that promoting detente with the Soviet Union would not work, and it was a 'capitulatory and retrogressive' way to solve world problems. 37 The downturn of Sino-American relations was maintained in 1977, the first year of the new Carter Administration. The Chinese considered unacceptable the American 'maximum' plan, offered by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance during his August visit to China. The Chinese were even angered by American press reports that they were prepared to discuss the Taiwan question. 38 One reason for the hardening of PRC policy towards the United States was internal struggles within the CCP, which as mentioned above started from mid 1973. Zhou Enlai came under sustained criticism by a radical faction in the Chinese leadership. The 'pi-Lin, pi-Kong' campaign (criticise Lin Biao, criticise Confucius) of these years was directed against Zhou. We do not know the exact cause-and-effect relationship between the failure of Sino-American normalisation and the fall of Zhou Enlai. It is likely that he argued for concessions to win normalisation, and that he was
33 See more details on November 1973 discussion in Kissinger, 1982, op. cit., pp. 683-99; and on April 1974 discussion in Ross R., 1995, op. cit., p. 77; Han, op. cit., p, 277; and Burr W. (ed.), The Kissinger Transcripts, pp. 270-88. 34 Quoted in Harding, op. cit., p. 50. 35 Ross R., 1995, op. cit., p. 52. 36 Xinhua, 29 September 1977, Jen Ku-ping, 'The Munich ragedy and Contemporary Appeasement', Renmin Ribao, 26 November 1977. Cited in Ross R., 1995, op. cit., p. 100. See also Garson R., The United States and Chiiw Since 1949, A Troubled Affair, p. 148; 37 Geng Biao, 1977, 'Geng Biao's Talks on A Turning Point in the China-US Diplomatic Relations', Issues and Studies, Vol. XIII, No. I, p.131. 38 Carter J., 1982, Keeping Faith, p. 192. 143 blamed when normalisation did not eventuate. In turn, criticism of Zhou hindered normalisation. With Zhou in failing health and under attack, his ability to move Chinese foreign policy in new directions declined steadily. Deng Xiaoping, who replaced Zhou in managing foreign policy, was even more vulnerable to charges of capitulation to the United States than was Zhou.39 In 1976, Hua Guofeng became nominal successor to Mao, but he did not have a strong political base that allowed him to take the initiative in improving Sino-American relations. In 1977, when Deng had not yet fully consolidated his power, he could not afford any suggestion that his approach to the Taiwan question was not firm and principled. Another reason was the Chinese fear that it would be abandoned by ,the United States once US-Soviet detente succeeded. The Chinese leaders bitterly described the US strategy as standing on Chinese shoulders to reach agreements with Moscow. 40 The fear was exaggerated by the feeling that the US position was weakening. Beijing, therefore, not only wanted to probe Soviet policy towards China and engage in what one analyst called a 'hundred-day thaw' in its relations with the Soviet Union,41 but also wanted to redistribute the costs of anti-Soviet co-operation by eliciting US compromises necessary for normalisation. The Chinese, however, did not want to worsen their relations with the United States. The Ford visit showed that the Chinese, like the Americans, were eager to maintain the trend towards rapprochement. Though they knew that the visit would not bring about any significant results, they went on to receive the US President to keep high-level contact alive at least. After Ford's visit to Beijing, Chinese leaders also promptly extended an invitation for Nixon to visit China the following February, in the hope that he could increase pressure on the Ford Administration to break the deadlock.
US disengagement from Vietnam
How did Sino-American hesitancy regarding normalisation affect US policy towards Vietnam? As mentioned above, hesitancy about normalisation amounted to
39 That Deng's position was weak was confirmed by Holdridge, who wrote that during the meeting with Kissinger Deng seemed to be looking to his colleagures seated to his left and right for assurances that he was following the correct party line. See Holdridge, op. cit., p. 157. 4°Kissinger, 'my China trip', in US National Security Archive, the Winston Lordfiles. Harding H., op. cit., p. 49. · 41 See more details in Gottlieb, 1979, 'The Hundred-Day Thaw in China's Soviet Policy', Contemporary China, Vol. 3, pp. 3-14.
144 rapprochement without the act of normalisation. In the previous chapter we saw that Sino-American rapprochement eliminated the raison d'etre of the Vietnam War. It enabled the United States to withdraw its troops - a major step towards US disengagement from Vietnam. Likewise, the Sino-American continued rapprochement, albeit taking the form of normalisation hesitancy, killed any incentive for the United States to re-involve itself in Vietnam, another step towards disengagement. Whether there was American disengagement is a controversial matter, and many observers take issue with it,42 but there is evidence in support of this assessment. Firstly, aid to the Saigon government was being cut. The cuts were made by Congress and the Administration had no choice but to carry them out. Wherever the initiative originated, the end result was the same. The Administration's willingness to maintain the status quo - a divided Vietnam - for a period of time was also a form of disengagement compared with previous levels ,of US engagement. Furthermore, when the Administration's efforts to support the Thieu government could not prevent its fall, the United States refrained from re-involvement. This restraint was the culmination of US disengagement. All this could have been partly due to continued Sino-American rapprochement, without which it was difficult for Congress as well as the Administration to accept that outcome in Vietnam. After Sino-American rapprochement, South Vietnam lost its importance in Washington's strategic calculations, and the latter gradually accepted its loss. The main argument for this interpretation is that, as a result of further rapprochement, US disengagement enabled the Vietnamese to reunite the country rapidly and at low cost, which otherwise would have taken a longer time and been more costly. Postponement of Sino-American normalisation also encouraged the United States to establish diplomatic relations with Hanoi if the latter dropped its conditions. This attitude differed from the American position in the next period, which once again highlights the impact of the Sino-American relationship on US policy towards Vietnam. US willingness to maintain the status quo in Vietnam was seen in its various efforts to strengthen the Saigon government and its threats to renew bombing against the DRV in order to restrain the latter from taking military measures, which could have
42 For instance, Porter in his 'A Peace Denied', argues that the Nixon administration did all it could to block the implementation of the Paris Agreement and encouraged the Thieu government to sabotage the accords, which showed continued American involvement in Vietnam. In addition, the memoirs of Nixon and Kissinger showed that the Nixon administration was planning to bomb Vietnam 'to retaliate the North Vietnamese violations of the Agreement'. Their points will be considered later in this chapter. 145 changed the balance of power in Vietnam. The first sign of the post-Paris Agreement American attitude towards Vietnam was its pledge to support the Saigon government. On 23 January 1973 Nixon indicated clearly that the agreement would not change the US relationship with the Saigon government. He announced that the United States would 'continue to recognise the government of the Republic of Vietnam as the sole legitimate government of South Vietnam' .43 This declaration already violated the spirit of the agreement as the United States had pledged that it would withdraw from Vietnam not only militarily but politically as well, and not 'impose any political tendency .or personality on the South Vietnamese people' .44 Another indication of the Nixon Administration's unwillingness to .implement the agreement was its decision to bring in a large 'civilian' force to run the absurdly large, expensive and highly technological war machine that the United States had turned over to the Saigon government under 'Vietnamisation'. Later Gareth Porter observed that American pilots just 'retired' and were 'hired' as civilians to fly C-130 planes.45 Likewise, the Defence Attache Office was also set up to provide a thin cloak for the presence of an American military command-headquarters in Saigon.46 The United States found a way to avoid dismantling its bases in Vietnam. General Woodard, US Representative in the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, announced that the United States had no bases to dismantle or equipment to withdraw, because they had all been turned over to Saigon already.47 A DRV official remarked bitterly that 'we come out of our quarters here at Tansonnhat every day and we see
nothing but Americans at 7th Air Force headquarters and it's a cynical argumentto say it's a Vietnamese base'.48 The United States also provoked opposition not only from the DRV but also from the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) with its failure to provide sufficient information to either the JMC or the ICCS to permit control ofthe withdrawal of its troops or equipment. Porter commented that the United
States, which had always sought strong international enforcement and in~ection as part
43 Cited in Porter, op. cit., p. 186. In his letter to Thieu before the signing Nixon already gave this promise. See more details in Hung, op. cit., pp. 149-50. 44 See Article 9c ofthe Paris Agreement. Cited in Luu Van Loi, 1996, op. cit., p. 454. 45 Porter, op. cit., p. 186. 46 See more details on how DAO broke the Paris Agreements in Joseph Amter, 1982, Vietnam Verdict, A Citizen's History, New York: Continuum, p. 301. 47 Porter, op. cit., p. 232. 48 Cited in Porter, op. cit., p. 233. 146 of the agreement, refused to allow inspection by either control body of its own withdrawal. 49 As a clear sign of support to the Saigon government, Nixon offered a secret commitment to Thieu that the United States would intervene again immediately if the cease-fire was violated by the Communists. While the United States had every right to enforce the agreement, one-way enforcement was far from neutral or justified. Besides the American violations of the agreement mentioned above, Kissinger admitted that the Saigon government was not 'virginally pure' in implementing the agreement.50 Observers more or less agree that the North Vietnamese were defensive while the South Vietnamese were offensive in their post-Paris Agreement behaviour.51 But there was no US attempt to enforce the agreement against violations by the Saigon government. 52 In
49 Porter, op. cit., p. 233. 5°Kissinger, 1982, op. cit., p. 303. 51 See for instance William Turley, op. cit., p. 159; Gareth Porter, op. cit., pp. 193-96; Herring, 1986, America's Longest War, p. 258; and Karnow, op. cit., pp. 657-58. Some observers argue that in October 1973 when they adopted resolution No. 21, the Vietnamese Communists changed their policy towards settlement of the Vietnam conflict, taking the military option. In fact, the resolution did not go that far. It was just a readjustment to the loss of territory and people to the Saigon government following the Paris Agreement. The PA VN was instructed to resolutely protect territory and people against the Saigon government's offensive. This indicated the defensive character of the PA VN activities. Speaking of this resolution, in November 1973 after its adoption, Le Duan emphasised that the situation in the South would develop in two possible ways- peace and war. He did not say which possibility was more likely. (Le Duan, 1993, op. cit., pp. 468-69) In the same month, he gave the Tay Nguyen Regional Party Organisation six tasks, ofwhich none was warlike in character (Le Duan, 1993, op. cit., pp. 470-71). A Defence Ministry source also confirms that resolution No. 21 emphasised on 'flexibility in defence in order to protect and develop our force' (Bo Quoc Phong, 1991, op. cit., p. 157). See also Ban Chi dao, 1996a, op. cit., pp. 95-97. I think that the Lao Dong Party did not take the offensive line until July 1974, when Le Duan instructed the General Staff to build a strategic plan, which the latter completed in October 1974. Though the logistics preparation was started in late 1973, it was not for offensive purposes. As mentioned above, no strategic decision on this matter was made. The preparation was aimed at facing the second possibility- war- rather than for an all out offensive. Even the two-year plan prepared by the General Staff in October 1974 did not unequivocally spell out an offensive (Bo Quoc Phong, 1991, op. cit., p. 180). This assessment is challenged by other sources. For instance, Van Tien Dung claims that the spirit of the 21st resolution was to set out 'to conduct revolutionary warfare, destroy the enemy, and liberate the South' (Van Tien Dung, op. cit., p. II). I argue that such a statement is not different from other resolutions and therefore does not mean that the Lao Dong Party decided to take offj::nsive option for settlement of the Vietnam conflict. It is noteworthy that there is discrepancy in Vietmimese sources on the timing of the crucial2l51 Central Committee plenum. Van Tien Dung wrote that it took place in October 1973 (Van Tien Dung, op. cit., p. II.), whereas the Politburo's Summary, and a SRV Defence Ministry authoritative work gives the date of July 1973 (see Ban Chi Dao, 1996a, op. cit., p. 95; Bo Quoc Phong, 1991, op. cit., p. 157). There are two possibilities. First, there were two phases of that meeting, which was a normal CPV practice, and sources mention different phases. Second, Van Tien Dung may have confused readers by his writing style. In October 1973, a Central Military Committee meeting (Hoi Nghi Quan uy Trung uong) took place, which had the task of realising the 21st VWPCC resolution, not the CC plenum itself. But the Politburo's Summary confirms that the CMC meeting took place in March 1974, not in October 1973 (Ban chi dao, 1996a, op. cit., p. 97). 52 There is only a slight mention known about US unhappiness to see the Saigon government breaking the agreement. In June 1973, Zhou Enlai let Le Duan know that the Chinese learnt from the Americans that Nixon was in trouble and the US administration did not want Saigon make the situation more complicated 147 fact, one-way enforcement encouraged the Thieu government to sabotage the agreement. Porter commented that the Nixon Administration believed that the Saigon government could expand its territorial control without much risk of a North Vietnamese main force response, provided that the North Vietnamese feared renewal of American bombing. 53 The Nixon Administration's determination to maintain the status quo was seen most clearly in its threat and plans to renew the bombing against the DRY's supply routes and the De-militarised Zone (DMZ). US determination was expressed in Kissinger's assertion at a March meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG): 'we have no intention, under any circumstances, of letting the enemy mount a big offensive this year' .54 The US National Security Advisor calculated that 'the best military option appears to be a resumption of bombing the trails in Laos as soon as possible after the third tranche ofPOWs is released, possibly followed later by bombing of the DMZ and the area between the DMZ and the South Vietnamese lines, if necessary'.55 On March 15, 1973, Nixon threatened, for the first time, to take unilateral action if necessary to force the DRV to stop its use of the trail network and the DMZ to move military equipment into the South. In fact, ten days earlier, he had ordered a bombing strike of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which he cancelled the next day. Kissinger claimed that Nixon was a 'distracted man', while the US President explained that he did not order the bombing because he was afraid that it would block the release of 6 American prisoners of war. 5 Kissinger, who at this point was not well apprised of the detail of the Watergate scandal and its implications for Nixon's presidency, was more eager to renew the bombing. Nixon did not accept Kissinger's recommendation, and limited himself to making another tough reminder to the North Vietnamese leaders.57 Whatever the reasons for cancelling the bombing, threats and plans to bomb the DRY's supply routes and the DMZ showed that the Nixon Administration was far from disengaging from Vietnam. On the contrary, a certain faction witJlin the Nixon
by increasing the fighting and breaking the agreement (see 77 Conversations, p. I 86.) There is no American source to confirm this claim by Zhou.
53 Porter G., op. cit., p. I 87. 54 Kissinger, I 982, op. cit., p. 3 I 8. 55 Kissinger, I 982, op. cit., p. 3 I 8. 56 Nixon, I985, op. cit., p. I77. 57 See more details in Kissinger, I982, op. cit., p. 319-22. 148 Administration was in favour of renewing bombing of the DRV, to maintain US involvement in Vietnam. The Administration sharpened its threat to resume bombing against the DRV when it announced that it had begun carrying out military reconnaissance flights over the North. Admitting this was a violation of Article 2 ofthe agreement, the US officials said that the purpose of the move was to warn Hanoi that the United States was taking preparatory steps for renewed bombing.58 In addition, in February 1973, the United States suspended troop withdrawal and its mine-clearing operations of coastal waters off North Vietnam. Kissinger claimed that Hanoi's failure to produce a list of the POWs who were due to be released was the reason for these American measures. 5 ~ This was only a pretext for a US breach of the agreement as Kissinger knew that the DRV release of American POWs depended on Saigon's release of its political detainees, which had already been delayed. If bombing was a threat in Vietnam, it was a reality in Laos and especially in Cambodia. American B-52 bombers and fighters planes struck targets in Laos on 16 and 17 April in retaliation for the Pathet Lao's seizure of Tha Vieng, south of the Plain of Jars. In Cambodia, US bombing resumed in February and ended only in August as the result of a congressional ban. Bombing was the only means to prevent the FUNK from taking over Phnompenh. The bombing in Laos and Cambodia had its effects on Vietnam. It was a threat to North Vietnamese leaders that the United States might bomb Vietnam again, which naturally restrained them from taking measures to increase their military presence and fighting in the South. Later, a SRV Defence Ministry work admitted that the loss of territory and people to the enemy was due to certain Vietnamese leaders' 'fear of tension and willingness to reconcile with the enemy' .60 This 'fear' was partly a result of American bombing in Laos and Cambodia.61 Thus, we have seen that the Nixon Administration in the first months following the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement was willing to involve it~lf further in Vietnam to keep Vietnam divided. However, there was a limit to American involvement. Washington preferred to maintain the status quo for a period of time,
58 Quoted in Porter, op. cit., p. 204. 59 See more details in Kissinger, 1982, op. cit., p. 317. 60 Bo Quoc Phong, 1991, op. cit., pp. 155-56. 61 See more details on different opinions within the Lao Dong's leadership on possibility of renewed war with the United States in R. Brigham, 1998, Guerrilla Diplomacy, The NLF's Foreign Relations and the Vietnam War, pp. 118-19. 149 which was referred to by Kissinger as a 'decent interval'. After such an interval Washington probably would not care much about the fate of South Vietnam. Kissinger put this idea clearly in his memoir: 'what our reactions should have been after a few years might be debated; but failure to react after a few weeks was certain to make a mockery of American credibility'.62 Effectively, this was saying that in the US President's National Security Adviser's view, the United States could accept a Communist take-over years later, but not right after the Agreement was signed. He was concerned about the timing, but not the substance of political change in Vietnam. Kissinger's private view was much clearer. He thought that the South Vietnamese needed a 'decent interval' of about two years after the Paris agreement so that the United States would not be blamed if Saigon fell to the Communists. On 24 January 1973, the day after the initialling ofthe Paris Accords, John Ehrlichman, then Counsel to the President, asked Kissinger how long South Vietnam could survive under the terms of the agreement. 'I think', said Kissinger, 'that if they are lucky, they can hold out for a year and a half. 63 The US Congress was ahead of the Administration in disengaging from Vietnam. The clearest sign was Congress's anti-war mood. Beginning in May 1973, anti-war measures in Congress that had been blocked in the House of Representatives began to pass. On 10 May, the House of Representatives voted 219 to 188 to cut off funds for the bombing of Cambodia. On 31 May, the Senate followed suit by a margin of 63 to 19. In addition, Congress began to pass bills to disengage America totally from Indochina. In June, the Senate approved a bill to block funds for any US military activities in Indochina, and the House endorsed the legislation. In October, Congress passed the War Powers Act, which stipulated that the President must consult with Congress before intervening with American forces in an armed conflict. Nixon vetoed the act, but Congress overrode his veto. The result of Congress's anti-war mood was that it cut the lev,€! of every aid package for South Vietnam proposed by the Administration and reduced aid from $2,270 million in fiscal year 1973 to $1,010 million in fiscal 1974, and $700 million in fiscal 1975.64 In April 1975, President Ford asked for $722 million in emergency military aid and $250 million in economic and humanitarian aid. When Ford met with
62 Kissinger, 1982, op. cit., pp. 315-16. 63 Ehrlichman, Witness to Power, p. 208. 64 Cited in Nixon, 1985, 1986, op. cit., pp. 185-86. 150 leaders of Congress, he ran into strong opposition to helping Saigon. One senator said 'I will give you large sums for evacuation, but not one nickel for military aid'. Another said, 'I will vote for any amount for getting Americans out. I don't want it mixed with getting Vietnamese out' .65 The anti-war mood was seen clearly in the tension around the February 1973 bipartisan congressional mission to Saigon. The working session between Thieu and US congressmen 'turned into a hostile interrogation of Thieu'. Thieu was so angered by the delegation that he said, 'the gift is important, but the manner in which it is given is even more important'. 66 Congress's lack of interest in Vietnam was understandable as American boys were out of Vietnam and it appeared that America had more important problems than Vietnam. Among them was the 1973-74 oil crisis, which shook the world economy including America, and the Middle East War. Without downplaying the importance of these factors, it should be emphasised that by then most Americans had come to understand that the Vietnam War was wrong and unnecessary. Given rapprochement with both the Soviet Union and China, there was no necessity for the United States to be engaged in this conflict. In the previous chapter, we saw that rapprochement eliminated the raison d'etre ofthe war. In the following years, this trend towards rapprochement in Sino-American relations continued. It eliminated American interests in continuing involvement in Vietnam. Therefore, not only Congress, but also the Administration wanted disengagement from Vietnam, albeit to a lesser degree. The first sign of the Administration's willingness to disengage was its pressure on the Saigon government to accede to the June 1973 Paris Communique. Nixon wrote to Thieu several times to this effect between May and June. In the end Thieu yielded to the US President's ultimatum. He ordered the RVN delegation to join in the signing ceremony. But Thieu wrote a bitter note to himself in the margin ofNixon's letter: 'This is outrageous! This is what you say; not what I say or the people of South Vietnam or the American people say' .67 Hung wrote that the most difficult aspect ,for Thieu was
65 Nixon, 1985, op. cit., pp. 199-200. Ambassador Martin and others were to assert that the cuts in US assistance had prevented the South Vietnamese from resisting the Communists effectively, but a Pentagon study later noted that only two fifths of the $700 million allocated actually reached Vietnam, the rest was committed to equipment that awaited shipment or had not yet been spent (See Kamow, op. cit., p. 661). Kissinger claimed that while the US aid to the Saigon government was being cut, the arms poured into the South Vietnamese Communists' hands. This is unconvincing as during the years 1972-73 the aid to the North hardly could be compared to the one to the South. See more details in William Turley, The Second Indochina War, p. 164. 66 see more details in Hung, op. cit., pp. 256-61. 67 See more details in Hung, op. cit., pp. 192-204. 151 Kissinger's concession to Le Due Tho on the right of military movement across the DMZ.68 Though there are no independent sources to confirm Hung's claim about the Nixon Administration's June 1973 pressure on Thieu,69 there is evidence on American concessions on the status of the DMZ. According to Luu Van Loi, one ofthe two last minute obstacles to the Paris Agreement was the question of the passage through the DMZ. Ultimately, Hanoi agreed to the Kissinger version that the parties would discuss the question of 'civilian passage' through the DMZ.70 The June 1973 communique allowed that 'military equipment may transit the DMZ only if introduced into South Vietnam as replacement'.71 This concession became clearer if put in the context that the Paris Agreement already limited six 'entry points' for each party in South Vietnam to run their replacement of armament, which should be defined fifteen days after the cease fire.72 Probably under American pressure, the feeling of isolation allegedly grew in Saigon after the June 1973 Paris Communique was signed.73 As mentioned above, the Administration preferred to maintain 'two Vietnams'. To realise this program, the Nixon Administration was ready to set up some form of diplomatic relations with the DRV. Kissinger claimed that during his February 1973 visit to Hanoi, he proposed a number of approaches to diplomatic relations, including the establishment of liaison offices, but the Vietnamese rejected them all. Kissinger even hoped that 'Hanoi's nationalism might cause it to seek better relations with Washington to gain some margin of manoeuvre between its Communist patrons, Beijing and Moscow'.74 An agreement was also reached on US economic aid to the DRV, which if carried out, would have helped to promote US-DRV relations. There were difficult talks in February 1973 between Kissinger and DRV counterparts. But it was finally agreed that the Joint Economic Commission would be set up to consider how to develop DRV-US economic relations and to work out an aid program that the Americans would
68 Hung, op. cit., p. 193. 69 Interestingly Nixon's No More Vietnam does not touch on the question of the May-June negotiation, and Kissinger's The Upheaval Years is silent about the Nixon letters, though does cover the negotiation. 70 See more details in Luu Van Loi, op. cit., p. 394. 71 Porter G (ed.), 1979, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions', Vol. 2, New York: Earl M. Coleman Enterprises Inc. Publishers, p. 635. 72 Luu Van Loi, op. cit., p. 470. 73 Hung, op. cit., p. 205. 74 Kissinger, 1982, op. cit., p. 42. 152 submit to the Congress. The United States promised to provide $3.25 billion for the DRV, part of a $7.5 billion dollar five-year reconstruction program for Vietnam. 75 It is noteworthy that at the same time Nixon's Administration showed a marked coolness to the Thieu visit to the United States in April. Vice-President Agnew complained that only one cabinet member was willing to join him for Thieu's arrival ceremony. 76 This is not to say that the Nixon Administration was seeking to improve its relations with Hanoi at the expense of relations with Saigon. In fact, Nixon allegedly promised Thieu $1 billion military aid and $700 million economic aid. 77 The cabinet members' coldness towards Thieu visitjust showed how much the Americans had lost interest in associating with South Vietnam. This could not be termed abandonment, but it was in marked contrast to their previous relationship.
Figure 5.1 Value of arms shipments to North and South Vietnam, 1972-1975 (millions of current dollars)
3000 I -+-North
-•··· South 2500 t -Linear (South)
I -unear(North)
-~ "---··--·----··-----·---·-
1974 1975
Sources: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Militmy Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1968-1977, cited in Turley, 1986, op. cit., p. 164
Another expression of US willingness to disengage gradually from Indochina was its attempt to persuade Lon Nol to declare a unilateral cessation of offensive military operations. Kissinger claimed that the Americans were prepared to settle for a genuine coalition government for Cambodia with Sihanouk as the balance wheel.78 He ' told Huang Hua, then the PRC's Ambassador to the UN, that the United States was prepared to work for a coalition structure in Cambodia and the Americans were not
75 Luu Van Loi, 1996, op. cit., p. 506. Kissinger, 1982, op. cit., pp. 38-39. 76 See more details on the failure ofThieu's April1973 visit in Kissinger, 1982, op. cit., pp. 309-15. 77 Thieu did not disclose the quantity of aid that Nixon offered him during their meeting in San Clement, but according to Hung he was satisfied with Nixon's aid promises. See more details in Hung, op. cit., p. 164. 78 Kissinger, 1982, op. cit., p. 36. 153 committed to any particular person. 79 Compared with full support to Lon Nol, which the United States had provided previously, a coalition with Sihanouk's as head of state was a step towards US disengagement from Cambodia. We have seen that following the Paris Agreement, Congress was eager to disengage from Indochina, while the Administration preferred to maintain the status quo, to 'neutralise' Indochina with a neutral Laos and Cambodia and two Vietnams. The same process continued in 1974. The Nixon Administration fought with Congress for more aid for the Saigon government.80 The Watergate scandal seemed not to have affected much the Administration's commitment to Thieu. Only four days before he resigned, Nixon signed a $1 billion bill for military aid to the Saigon government. The new President, Gerald Ford, also was quick to offer his Administration's commitment to the Thieu government. The day after his swearing in, the new President reiterated that America's existing commitments to Vietnam 'are still valid and will be fully honoured in my Administration' .81 On 24 October, Ford wrote secretly to Thieu, again insisting that there would be no change in American policy towards Vietnam under his administration. In late 1974, after Congress appropriated just $700 million of the $1 billion authorised ceiling for Indochina that had been signed by Nixon, Ford moved to reassure Thieu by dispatching a presidential delegation to Saigon, headed by Deputy Secretary of Defence William Clements. According to Hung, the delegation discussed in front of its Vietnamese counterparts the question of timing - requesting new military aid funds and 'juggling' Congress for an immediate $300 million military aid supplement. 82 The US military aid to Saigon following the Paris Peace agreement far over-passed the Soviet and Chinese aid to Hanoi. Figure 5.1 clearly documents the distance between aid received by the North and South Vietnam from their allies, though the methods of calculation were different. The plan was realised when, in January 1975, President Ford requested a $300 million supplementary appropriation for military aid for Vietnam. In March 1975, following his fact-finding trip to Vietnam, US Army Chief Fredrick Weyand also asked urgently for $722 million in military aid to Saigon. Weyand's proposal was refined and presented to Congress by the Pentagon. According to one calculation,
79 Ibid., p. 350. 80 See more details in Amter, op. cit., p. 304; Snepp, op. cit., pp. 107-113. 81 Cited in Hung, op. cit., p. 240. See also Snepp, op. cit., p. 113. 82 See more details in Hung, op. cit., p. 243. 154 the re-supply efforts would provide 744 artillery pieces, 446 tanks and armoured personnel carriers, more than 100,000 rifles, over 5,000 machineguns and 11,000 grenade launchers, about 120,000 tons of ground and air munitions, and about 12,000 trucks - an effort on a scale rivalling that of the pre-cease fire Enhance and Enhance Plus programs. With these supplies the South Vietnamese were to equip 8 infantry and ranger divisions and another 27 independent regiments formed from existing militia units: a force that would roughly match the Communist army descending on Saigon.83
General Van Tien Dung claimed that the United States set up an air-lift to carry arms from Bangkok to Saigon and used huge C-5 Galaxy transport aircraft to move hundreds of pieces of artillery and enormous quantities of weapons and ammunition from the United States to Tan Son Nhat. Four LST Transport ships along with the aircraft carrier Hancock, fifteen large helicopters, and 300 marines sat bobbing in the East Sea. 84 His claims about US arms delivery were supported by Snepp, who wrote that the baby-lift operation used huge C-5 Galaxy after arms were unloaded from the carrier. 85 But Dung's second implicit charge that the United States was preparing to bring troops back into Vietnam was not convincing as President Ford confirmed that the US naval transports and charter vessels were sent to the water off South Vietnam for 'strictly humanitarian purposes' .86 The same month, Ambassador Graham Martin- 'the next best thing to a B-52' -went to Washington to lobby for aid to Saigon. US support for the Thieu government was seen as a diplomatic manoeuvre to save it. Martin advised Thieu to appoint Duong Van Minh as Prime Minister as he hoped that the North Vietnamese would negotiate with Minh. 87 But Washington was believed to have disapproved Saigon's efforts to contact the NLF representative in Paris to make a separate deal. 88 It probably did not want to allow the situation develop beyond its control. The United States tried to boost
83 Arnold R. Issaacs 1983, Without Honour: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia, Baltimore: The John Hopkin University Press, p. 406. 84 Van Tien Dung, op. cit., p. 125. 85 See Snepp, op. cit., p. 304. 86 Snepp, op. cit., p. 256. 87 Tran Van Don claimed that Martin just asked to have Nguyen Van (Big) Minh be appointed Premier with full power to negotiate with Hanoi. Martin told Thieu that unless Big Minh was appointed, American aid would cease. See more details in Don, op. cit., p. 146. However, Hung disclosed that Martin asked him when 'your President' would resign. The question implied Martin's willingness to see Thieu resign. See more details in Hung, op. cit., p. 321. 88 See more details in Hung, op. cit., p. 314-15. However, there is no other source to confirm Hung's account. Even Tran Van Don, whom Hung interviewed for this purpose, did not recount, in his memoir, what he told Hung. 155 the ARVN's morale by delivering to Saigon, in the last days of the war, sixteen 105mm howitzers. 89 Washington also tried to play the Soviet card to slow the DRV offensive. 90 There was no consensus within the Administration on Vietnam policy. To Frank Snepp, then the CIA's Saigon-based Vietnam strategist, Kissinger supported Weyand's proposal of $722 million aid to the Saigon government, but Schlesinger opposed it.91 While the National Intelligence Estimate on Vietnam prepared in late March, whose author was believed to be Ambassador Martin, argued that the Thieu forces were strong enough to hold the new defence line north of Saigon, the Defence Secretary considered this to be 'crap' .92 Despite that difference in opinion, ultimately Kissinger's view prevailed. The Administration requested more aid for the Saigon government. It even hoped that Congress would agree to the introduction of combat forces for protection and evacuation. 93 The above-mentioned events show that the Administration tried its best to rescue the Thieu government by providing aid. For the United States, maintaining the status quo was still the best option. It avoided re-involving itself in Vietnam, however. When the Saigon government's Foreign Minister, Vuong Van Bac, visited Washington in October 1974, Ford declared that he supported 'partnership' with South Vietnam, but he avoided making any specific commitments. He also diplomatically declined Thieu's request for a meeting. Moreover, on Capital Hill, Bac encountered 'hostility and many reservations'. Congressmen urged him to reach accommodation with the National Liberation Front. Congress was still in favour of disengaging from Vietnam, as displayed by the partial appropriation of the $1 billion bill for Indochina signed by Nixon. The clearest example of US efforts to avoid direct involvement was its refusal to react to the P A VN campaigns by military means. The Chief of the US Army Staff asked for $722 million in emergency military aid, and B-52 bombers. Kissinger objected to any bombing, telling Ford 'if you do that, the American people will take to the streets again'. Ford later disclosed in an interview given to Nguyen Tien Hung that Kissinger
89 Hung, op. cit., p. 297. 90 See more details in Snepp, op. cit., pp. 236--37. Dobrynin Anatoly, 1995, In Confidence, Mowsow 's Ambassador to America's six Cold War Presidents, 1962-1986, pp. 343-44. 91 Snepp, op. cit., p. 306-08. 92 Ibid, p. 226-27. 93 Ibid, p. 331. The War Power Act as ambiguous and President still had right to use force to protect American citizens. 156 had commented privately 'why don't those people [RVN leaders] die fast? The worst thing that could happen would be for them to linger on'.94 The Ford Administration also refused to make any secret promises to the Saigon government. On 8 April, asked about secret letters to Thieu, Kissinger said that the United States had no 'legal commitment' to come to Vietnam's aid, but it did have a 'moral commitment' .95 This neither-negative-nor-affirmative answer removed any US responsibility to intervene to rescue the Saigon government. CIA Director William Colby flatly rejected the suggestion by Thomas Polgar, CIA chief in Saigon, of an anti Thieu coup. 96 A CIA report of early April from Saigon emphasised that only 'decisive US action' could delay Saigon's military defeat, but CIA Station Chief added 'not necessarily military' for he did not want anyone to think he was advocating the reintroduction of combat forces. 97 US disengagement was described bitterly by Thieu in his resignation speech of21 April, in which he characterised US policy as 'an inhumane act by an inhumane ally'. 98 In March-April 1975 the Saigon government's situation was so desperate that the United States resolved not to carry the burden any longer. This marked the end of the gradual process of disengagement, which started with US troop withdrawal in 1973 while maintaining a divided Vietnam by providing aid to the Saigon government and finished with the acceptance of the loss of the Saigon government. The peak of disengagement was Ford's speech of 23 April at Tulane University in New Orleans, 'Today, Americans can regain the sense of pride that existed before Vietnam. But it cannot be achieved by re-fighting a war that is finished ... These events, tragic as they are, portend neither the end ofthe world nor of America's leadership in the world'.99 In January 1973, when the Paris Agreement was signed, the Nixon Administration did not plan to disengage totally from Vietnam. It tried to reduce its involvement by withdrawing its troops. But continued rapprochement with China meant that there was no longer a motive for re-involvement. This was the main reason why Congress did not want to provide aid to South Vietnam and forced the Administration to follow its lead. The Watergate scandal and its aftermath - a weakened presidency - made re-
94 Hung, op. cit., p. 304. 95 Ibid, p. 307. 96 See more details in Colby W., 1989, Lost Victory, p. 352; and Snepp, op. cit., pp. 290-91. 97 Snepp, op. cit., p. 276. 98 Karnow, op. cit., p. 668. 99 Cited in Kamow, op. cit., p. 667. 157 involvement more difficult, if not impossible, 100 but it was not the main reason for the disengagement process. As a result of Sino-American rapprochement, Vietnam mattered less in US strategic calculations and the United States gradually disengaged from Vietnam. In this process, Congress and Administration drove at different speeds, but arrived at the same destination. Thanks to US disengagement, the Vietnamese were able to unite their country rapidly and at a low price. The resistance would have been much stronger if the Americans continued their involve in whatever form. After the fall of Saigon, the Ford Administration continued a policy of hostility towards Vietnam. There was a slight prospect of normalisation when Hanoi and Washington exchanged messages through the Soviet Union expressing their willingness normalise their relationship,101 but the United States imposed an embargo on all of Vietnam and demanded a full account of all personnel missing in action (MIA) before normalisation of US-Vietnam relations. When the new Carter administration came to power in Washington, hopes for early normalisation were rekindled. Normalisation of relations with Vietnam and setting aside the past were Carter campaign pledges, though they received little prominence in speeches and debates. President Carter seemed to view opening up to Vietnam less as part of a new, comprehensive Asian strategy for the United States than as symbolically writing 'finis' to an unhappy chapter in history. 102 In an October 1976 memorandum setting out specific goals and priorities for a Carter foreign policy, Cyrus Vance placed heavy emphasis upon normalising relations with Vietnam as 'an opportunity for a new initiative .... The Vietnamese are trying to find a balance between over-dependence on either the Chinese or Soviet Union. It is also to the interest of the United States that Vietnam not be so dependent'. 103 In March 1977, President Carter sent Leonard Woodcock to Vietnam to test Hanoi's attitudes on normalisation and determine specifically what the Vietnamese were prepared to do to meet US requirements regarding MIAs. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and his assistant for East Asia, Richard Holbrooke, recognised that this was necessary to blunt domestic opposition to normalisation. The Vietnamese, however, held fast to their demand for
10°Kissinger regretted much that the Watergate tied the Administration's hands to react to the PA VN's offensive. See for instance Dobrynin, op. cit., pp. 344-345. 101 Former Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin claims that news about this exchange of oral messages done with his direct participation was never published before. See Dobrynin, op. cit., p. 344. · 102 See Nayan Chanda, 1986, Brother Enemy: The War After the War, p. 146. 103 Vance, op. cit., p. 450.
158 economic assistance under the terms of the February 1973 Nixon letter to Pham Van Dong, which pledged 'best efforts to contribute to the post-war reconstruction in North Vietnam without any political conditions' .104 Though the Vietnamese demand hindered normalisation, 105 Carter's statement encouraged the Vietnamese to think that there was a link between 'humanitarian aid' and 'full accounting'. He stated that 'if in normalisation of relations, there evolves trade, normal aid processes, then I would respond well'. 106 As Brown commented later, Carter left open at what poiJ!t aid might come - as part of a normalisation deal or after normalisation had taken place. Neither did the United States make it clear what Vietnam should do to resolve the MIA problem. 107 This said, it remains true that in early 1977 the Carter Administration opened the door to US-Vietnam normalisation. Another sign of the reduction of US-Vietnam hostility was the US pledge to support Vietnam's membership of the United Nations, which opened the way for Vietnam to become a UN member in September 1977. Moreover, during the first meeting in May 1977, Holbrooke made an unconditional proposal for the establishment of diplomatic relations, after which the US trade embargo would be lifted. Phan Hien, however, again demanded economic assistance as a precondition to normalisation, linking it to co-operation on the missing in action issue. In December 1977, Holbrooke offered to exchange liaison offices, but his counterpart, Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien, did not agree. This December 1977 round oftalks also showed the limits ofUS flexibility in its Vietnam policy. At that moment, Vietnam according to Chanda 'had become reconciled to the idea that no money could be expected before normalisation' .108 But the United States rejected lifting the embargo and making a tacit agreement that it would keep its promise of assistance after normalisation. 109 The US Congress seemed to be more rigid than the Administration on the Vietnam question. After the failure of the May negotiations, the House of Representatives passe.d a bill prohibiting the use of any funds 'for the purpose of negotiating reparations, aid or any other form of payment' .110 Later,
104 Cited in Brown F., 1989, Second Chance, The United States and Indochina in the 1990s, p. 23. 105 I argue that the United States owed Vietnam economic assistance at least morally. 106 President Carter's press conference, 24 March 1977. Cited in Brown, op. cit., p. 24. 107 Brown, op. cit., p. 24. Nayan Chanda seems to agree with Brown (See Chanda, op. cit., p. 148.) 108 Chanda, op. cit., p. . 156. 109 See more details in Chanda, op. cit., p. 156. 110 Brown, op. cit., p. 24 and Chanda, op. cit., p. 155.
159 the Senate followed suit with an amendment requiring US opposition to loans to Vietnam by international financial institutions. Hanoi's publication of Nixon's letter may have aroused conservative criticism of the normalisation gambit, and congressional actions narrowed still further Holbrooke's room for manoeuvre- the possibility of even humanitarian aid after normalisation became remote. Vietnam Ambassador Dinh Ba Thi's involvement in Truong Dinh Hung Humphrey's amateur espionage also slowed the normalisation process. In January 1978, the former was declared pesona non grata, which dashed any hope for the fourth round oftalks in February or March. Nevertheless, the 1977 US-Vietnam contacts showed that the Carter Administration kept the door to normalisation open. Nayan Chanda, reasonably commented that Vance believed that normalisation of relations with Hanoi would help to reduce its dependence on Moscow and Beijing, while Holbrooke felt that establishment of US ties with Vietnam was essential to bring about a constructive relationship between Vietnam and ASEAN. 111
Chinese cold attitude towards Vietnam's reunification
In the previous chapter we saw that Sino-American rapprochement made China pressure Vietnam for a peace deal with the United States with conditions unfavourable to the DRV. The logic was to help the United States to withdraw from Vietnam and focus on meeting the Soviet threat. Sino-American hesitancy about normalisation in the years 1973-77 pushed China further in this direction. China did not want to see the Vietnamese Communists intensify the fighting, which would have 'distracted' the United States from the main focus- the Soviet Union. To this effect, as we shall see, Chinese leaders not only advised Vietnamese leaders to stop fighting, but also reduced military aid to their southern neighbour. Like the Americans, the Chinese wanted to neutralise Indochina. They supported an independent South Vietnam and a neutral government in Cambodia. When, contrary to their plan, the Vietnamese Communists started their offensive to reunite the country, the Chinese tried to hinder this process. In short, China took a cold attitude towards Vietnam's reunification. After reunification, the Chinese tried to support the Khmer Rouge to create a counterbalance against Hanoi. With America out of the region, there was a power vacuum, which a weak China could not fill and which. it feared the Soviet Union would.
111 Nayan Ghanda, op. cit., p. 145. 160 The clearest feature of Chinese policy towards Vietnam in the post-Paris Accords period was its withdrawal of support to the Communists' fighting in South Vietnam. The SRV White Book states that 'during the [June] 1973 talks with General Secretary Le Duan and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, Chairman Mao Zedong said that it was necessary to stop fighting in South Vietnam for a period of time' .112 However, Hoang Van Hoan- a former senior member of the Lao Dong Politburo and forriler Vietnamese Ambassador to China- claimed that the White Book reference was incomplete. He wrote that Mao had added, 'the problem of these troops [Thieu's troops] can only be solved by war' .113 According to Hoang, Zhou Enlai was of the same view. 114 This claim is supported by Zhou Enlai's internal report, in which the PRC Premier affirmed that the Vietnamese people could subjugate Nguyen Van Thieu politically and militarily, given time.ns The White Book and Hoang's claims are not necessarily contradictory. While the former emphasised Mao's insistence on stopping fighting, the latter focused on its temporary character. Newly released documents, compiled in '77 Conversations between Chinese and foreign leaders', confirm that Chinese leaders advised their Vietnamese counterparts to stop fighting for a while. Mao told Le Due Tho in February 1973 that 'after the Paris Agreements have been signed the Vietnamese needed at least six months to stabilise the situation in South Vietnam and to strengthen their forces'. In June 1973, Zhou Enlai told Le Duan that the Indo-Chinese countries should take time to relax and build their forces'. 116 If the sources do not conflict with each other, what was the point Mao was making in 1973? I would argue that Mao was unwilling to see the continuation of fighting in South Vietnam at any time. But outright rejection was not diplomatic, so Mao chose to express this rejection in a milder fashion. Though he did not say that the halt in fighting would last forever, and he,even mentioned that it might last for one or two years, Mao's advice could be interpreted as a fairly lengthy cessation. This advice in 1973 was reminiscent ofthe advice of Chinese leaders in 1954, when.they urged the Vietnamese not to renew fighting in the South. Once the American threat was reduced, the Chinese no longer supported fighting in Vietnam. This is a clear example of how the
112 White Book, p. 66 113 Renmin Ribao November 27, 1979, cited in Lawson, op. cit., p. 235. 114 Ibid. cited in Lawson, op. cit., p. 236. 115 Zhou Enlai, 1977, 'Zhou Enlai's Reports on the International Situation', Issues and Studies, Vol XIII, No. I, January 1977, p. 124. 116 77 Conversations, p. 184, I 96. 161 Sino-American relationship affected China's policy towards Vietnam. Continued fighting not only would have increased the burden on America and made it more difficult for it to confront the Soviet threat, but also increased Soviet influence in Vietnam, which China wanted to avoid. Chinese leaders also advised the NLF to stop fighting. In October 1973, when the NLF's Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho visited China, one Hong Kong-based US journalist observed that Beijing seemed to oppose a large-scale renewal of the Vietnam War. 117 Later, Lawson commented that 'Chinese speeches were moderate in tone and advised a cautious approach to the revolution in South Vietnam. And these attitudes remained largely unchanged throughout 197 4'. 1!8 The Chinese advice not to fight went against the Vietnamese Communists' interest if put in contrast to the Saigon government's activities. After the agreement was signed, the Thieu government intensified its campaign to expand the territory under its control. 119 It is noteworthy that Vietnamese leaders agreed with Chinese leaders on this important question of halting the fighting. Pham Van Dong's address to a special session ofthe National Assembly in February 1973 shows that the Lao Dong leadership regarded national reunification as a distant prospect and took a peaceful course to reunification. 120 In June 1973, during his visit to China, Le Duan told the host that a democratic and nationalist government, which would emerge in Saigon could 'exist for ten or 15 years', and the Vietnamese Communists 'were not in a hurry to turn South Vietnam into a socialist entity' .121 He seemed to agree with the Chinese on a peaceful solution of the Vietnam question. In the same meeting, Pham Van Dong allegedly confirmed that 'we are not in a hurry with the goal of national unification' .122 In February 1973, Kissinger got the impression from his working sessions with DRV counterparts that 'Hanoi's rulers were considering the option of building their own society rather than conquering their neighbours' .123 This indirectly confirms that the DRY's leadership was in favour of a peaceful course, at least at the beginning of 1973. Various Vietnamese sources confirm this peaceful line held at the time by Vietnamese
117 New York Times 24 November 1973, cited in Lawson, op. cit., p. 238. 118 Lawson, op. cit., p. 238. 119 See more details in Ban Chi Dao, 1996a, op. cit., p. 329. 120 Pham Van Dong, 1977, Pham Van Dong's Selected Writings, Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, pp. 303-27. · 121 77 Conversations, p. 186. 122 Ibid. 123 Kissinger, 1982 op. cit., p. 42. 162 leaders. 124 Moreover, the Vietnamese Communists admitted their loss of land and people to the Saigon government in the months following the Paris Agreement. 125 Following a peaceful course, the DRV barely increased its troops in the South. PA VN troop levels in the South remained fairly constant from the cease-fire agreement until the end of 1974: 145,000 troops were introduced after the cease-fire, but 115,000 returned to the DRV. 126
Figure 5.2 China's Military Aid to the DRV, 1973-1975
c::::J Guns c::::J Bullets (thousands) --Artillery pieces -•-Artillery shells (thousands)
250,000 -:- -:- 10,000 + 9,000 I ' I 200,000 + t 8,000 l ! t 7,000 I 150,000 t 6,000 i 4,880 T 5,ooo 100,000 + t 4,000 I 3,000 2,210 t i I 50,000 t T2,ooo t 1,000 i 0 ' 0 1973 1974 1975
Source: Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang: Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun, p. 416.
The Vietnam situation, right after the Paris Agreement, more or less resembles the post-Geneva Accords situation, when political struggle was emphasised over armed struggle. The Vietnamese leaders' endorsement of a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict immediately after the Paris agreement indirectly confirms Chinese unwillingness to support the armed struggle in the South. Vietnamese leaders' peaceful plan was likely a result of Chinese and also Soviet influence.
124 In February 1973, Le Duan unequivocally emphasised that in the South there were two administrations and the Vietnamese Communists could win through political struggle (Le Duan, 1993, Ve Chien Tranh Nhan Dan (On the People's War), p. 458.). The VWP Politburo's resolution of January 1973 also said that the party was resolved to take the peaceful strategy and not to initiate military conflict and civil war. (Bo Quoc Phong, 1991, op. cit., p. 142). 125 See more details on this loss in Ban chi dao, 1996a, op. cit., p. 95,329. See also Bo Quoc Phong, 1991, op. cit., p. 143. 126 Porter, 'Paris Agreement', pp. 68, 77. Cited in Gilks, op. cit., p. 99. 163 One logical development of Chinese unwillingness to see the continuation of fighting in the South was reduction of military aid to Vietnam, though they promised, in 1973, to continue for five years to give Vietnam an annual amount of aid equivalent to that of 1973. 127 Figure 5.2 shows that all four major items of China's military aid to Vietnam reduced sharply in those years. The reduction in Chinese military aid was confirmed by other sources and demonstrated China's hopes for a military respite. Thailand's Minister of Defence, Marshal Thawi was quoted as saying that Chinese arms and ammunition to Hanoi have come to a halt. 128 A Renmin Ribao article of July 1978 also confirmed, 'it is true that China reduced her aid to Vietnam after the Vietnamese people's [the Paris Agreement of 1973] victory in their war of resistance to US imperialism and for national salvation' .129 Other Chinese sources say that China granted Vietnam thousands millions ofyuan in aid even though the scale of the war was reduced after the signing of the Paris Agreement. 130 These sources are silent about the breakdown, mixing economic with military aid. This silence indirectly confirms the post-Paris Agreement Chinese reduction of military aid to Vietnam. Nixon also indirectly confirms the reduction of Chinese aid to the DRV. He wrote, after the Paris Agreement was signed that the Soviets and Chinese were not eager to give more aid 'because we made clear to them that doing so would damage their new relationship with the United States'. 131 Figure 4.1 clearly shows that the total of Soviet and Chinese aid to Vietnam reduced sharply after the Paris Agreement. It also was not comparable to American aid to the Saigon government. Moreover, not all arms coming from China were Chinese aid. The Chinese were believed to have delivered some Soviet arms to the DRV after the Paris Agreement in order to exacerbate US-Soviet tension. 132 Unwilling to see the reunification of Vietnam, the Chinese were believed to have hindered the delivery of arms to Vietnam. In late 1974, according to an American source, China began to fall behind in its aid shipments to Hanoi- Beijing was 33 shipments behind
127 The White Book, p. 66-7. The recent work, Victory and Lessons, which is free of political bias ofthe late 1970s, also confirmed this aid cut. See Ban chi dao, 1996a, op. cit., p. 98. 128 FBIS 20/12/1973. Cited in Lawson, op. cit., p. 237. 129 Renmin Ribao 22 July 1978, cited in Lawson, op. cit., p. 237. 130 See for instance 'Sino-Vietnamese Relations During Vietnam's Anti-French, anti-American Struggle', in 'The Vietnamese Foreign Minister's White Book concerning Vietnam-China Relations', Beijing, p. 26. 131 Nixon, 1985, op. cit., p. 191. 132 According to Kissinger, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin told him that the Soviet war materiel showing up in North Vietnam now was being introduced by the Chinese in their eternal effort to undermine a relaxation oftensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. See Kissinger, 1982, op. cit., p. 318. 164 schedule in weapons and economic aid deliveries to Hanoi. 133 This amount was not significant, but it occurred just when Hanoi was about to launch its spring offensive. The reluctance to support further fighting went hand in hand with another feature of Chinese Vietnam policy - willingness to maintain a non-communist South Vietnam. In June 1973, Zhou told Le Duan that during the next five to ten years South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia should build peace, independence and neutrality. 134 Zhou's welcoming speech during Le Duan's visit did not even mention Vietnamese reunification. 135 In October, he told DRV Deputy Prime Minister, Le Thanh Nghi, that the internal affairs of South Vietnam should be solved by the people of South Vietnam themselves, and the Vietnamese Communists should not impose the communist system in South Vietnam. 136 It is relevant to mention here that some charges made in the SRV's White Book against China are not convincing. For instance, the White Book claims that the Chinese colluded with the Americans in hindering the struggle of the South Vi~tnamese revolutionary forces. The 'evidence' is a sentence from the November 1973 Sino-American Joint Communique, in which China and the United States agreed to maintain constant contact to exchange views on questions of mutual concern.137 But there is no information on the content of any exchange that ran counter to the interests of the Vietnamese. The memoranda of contacts between ranking American and Chinese officials, kept in the Winston Lord files, show that after the Paris Agreement, Sino-American talks did not include the Vietnam question. Another charge of the White Book was that the Chinese tried to convince Duong Van Minh to resist 'the general offensive of the South Vietnam's armed forces and people' .138 No independent source is given to confirm this serious criticism. On the contrary, Nguyen Tien Hung discloses that it was Thieu who tried to make a deal with the Chinese Communists. In the autumn of 1974 Vuong Van Bac- Thieu's Foreign Minister- approached Thieu suggesting that South Vietnam make a secret approach to the PRC to urge the Chinese to moderate their support for the North Vietnamese and the PRG. But Qiao Guanhua told a British
133 Lawson, op. cit., p. 238. 134 77 Conversations, p. 185. 135 Xinhua June 4, 19'73, FBJS, Daily Report, China, June 5, 1973, A4-7. cited in Gilks, op. cit., p. 104. 136 77 Conversations, p. 190. 137 White Book, p. 67. 138 Ibid 165 MP- Thieu's messenger- that the Chinese were totally committed to the PRG. 139 It seems that the SRV's charges are not very convincing. The Chinese probably championed the course of a more independent South Vietnam as a means to restrain the North, but there were limits to this. They were not in favour of an outright alliance with Hanoi's enemy, which would have gone against their own interests. To promote an 'independent' South Vietnam, the Chinese encouraged the PRG to develop into a separate entity. The Joint Communique, issued at the end ofNguyen Huu Tho's visit to Beijing, pointedly referred to the PRO's rising international prestige, pledged to strengthen good Chinese relations with the NLF and the PRG. On 19 July 1973, they signed an initial aid agreement. However, China was believed to have provided economic, but not military, aid to the PRG. 140 The Chinese seemed to have a different attitude towards the DRY and the PRG. Some time after the Paris Agreement, Truong Nhu Tang - an NLF Ambassador at large -took part in ceremonies marking Albanian independence, where Yao Wenyuan of the CCP also was present. It appeared to Tang that Yuan became warmer to him when he realised that Tang was representing the PRG, not the DRV. 141 Another case was an April1975 dinner, at which Li Qing, the PRC's Minister of Commerce, announced that the PRC was going to send a large freighter loaded with food, medicine and other necessities to Danang or Saigon as soon as it was liberated. Tang commented that the implicit meaning of this announcement was not lost to any of those present, from North or South. He also asserted that 'throughout our stay the Chinese had treated us with a good deal more cordiality than they had the DRY delegation ... They were signalling to the PRG that they were open to independent contacts'. 142 Gilks reasonably comments that China endorsed the PRG in the hope of achieving a political settlement with the Thieu regime, which would bring an end to the fighting, while deferring reunification. 143 Chinese leaders also wanted a peaceful solution to the Cambodian conflict. 144 There are conflicting opinions and sources on Chinese policy towards Cambodia in the
139 Nguyen Tien Hung, op. cit., p. 313. 140 Xinhua, July 19, 1973, in FBIS, Daily Reprot- China, July 20, 1973, A2. Cited in Gilks, op. cit., p. 105. 141 Tang, op. cit., p. 249. 142 Ibid, p. 256. 143 Gilks, op. cit., p. 105. 144 In the early months of 1973 the FUNK forces opened an offensive against the Lon No! government, which threatened the latter's existence and brought about the American bombing to rescue Lon No!. Under pressure from Congress, in mid-August, the Nixon administration stopped the bombing.
166 early months of 1973. According to Nixon and Kissinger, China acted as an intermediary in the conflict. Nixon went as far as to claim that, in mid-June, with the help of the Chinese, the Cambodian protagonists were on the verge of sealing a deal. 145 Kissinger not only agreed with his boss on the role the Chinese played in this affair, but even asserted that 'Zhou needed our military actions in Cambodia for the effectiveness of his policy almost as much as we did. Our bombing was a bargaining chip for two parties even though one of them condemned it'. 146 It is absurd to think that Chinese leaders needed American bombing for their plan to succeed. This is purely Kissinger's speculation, and one that served his purpose of blaming Congress for the defeat in Cambodia. 147 The newly released Winston Lord Files show that at meetings between Kissinger and Chinese representatives, whether in New York, Washington or Beijing, the Chinese repeated their demand that the Americans stop bombing, stop supporting Lon Nol and let the Cambodians solve their own affairs. 148 In June 1973, Zhou Enlai shared this view with Le Duan. 149 Kissinger's conclusion is not convincing, but his accounts of meetings with the Chinese shed some light on the Chinese eagerness for compromise in Cambodia. In February 1973, Zhou Enlai told Kissinger that a completely 'red' government would compound everybody's problems. 150 In April, at a state banquet for Sihanouk,' Zhou condemned the United States for continuing its 'wanton bombing' in Cambodia and its support for the 'traitorous Lon Nol clique'. But when the Americans protested to the Chinese over Zhou Enlai's statement, Huang Hua told Kissinger that the Chinese demand to end support for Lon Nol was aimed at the individual and not the government as a whole. To Kissinger, Huang's explanation 'left open the prospect discussed in Beijing in February of including other elements of the Phnompenh government in a coalition without their present chief'. 151 The Chinese desire for a coalition government in Cambodia was also expressed in a October 1973 meeting between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong. Zhou told his guest that 'the United States wishes to withdraw from Cambodia. If we can win the sympathy of some people in Lon N ol' s faction, we will be
145 Nixon, 1985, op. cit., p. 177. 146 Kissinger, 1982, op. cit., p. 353. 147 See more details in Kissinger, 1982, op. cit., pp. 335-55. Nixon's over-optimism as being mentioned above also aimed at blaming Congress for the ramifications in Cambodia. 148 See more details in the Winston Lord Papers. 149 See more details in 77 Conversations, p. 186. 15°Kissinger, 1982, op. cit., p. 352. 151 See more details in Kissinger, 1982, op. cit., pp. 349-50. 167 in an advantageous position. It is therefore unwise if these chances are not exploited' .152 This was clear support for a coalition to be set up in Phnompenh. What concerns us in this whole Cambodian story, is the impact of Chinese Cambodia policy on Vietnam. Though there are no sources to confirm or reject the proposition, it could be speculated that a successful solution to the Cambodian conflict by peaceful means would have affected the situation in Vietnam. It would have been a model for solving an internal conflict. This was what Chinese leaders preferred to see happen in Vietnam. China's attitude towards Cambodia, therefore, indirectly supports the main argument of this chapter that after rapprochement, the Chinese did not want to see an intensification of fighting in Vietnam. It seems that the Chinese wanted the Vietnamese Communists to withdraw their forces from Cambodia. Anne Gilks observes that China's concern over Hanoi's long term aspirations in Indochina was implicit in Zhou Enlai's statement that 'no interference in Indochina under whatever pretext in whatever form will be tolerated'. 153 Other sources confirm this point. Zhou was believed to have told Sihanouk, in January 1973, that the problems of the three Indochinese countries should be solved by the three countries themselves. 154 In May 1973, he allegedly told David Bruce, the first head of the US liaison office in Beijing, that 'the only way to find a solution was for the parties concerned to implement fully all the subsidiary clauses of Article 20' .155 On 4 June, Huang Hua handed a message to Kissinger. It stressed that all parties concerned - by implication including Hanoi - needed to respect the sovereignty of Cambodia. These statements indirectly asked for the withdrawal of PA VN/NLF forces from Cambodian territory. The withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia would have been a blow to the Vietnamese Communists and weakened their position in South Vietnam. Clearly, the Chinese preferred to see Indochina neutralised. Moreover, it seemed that China had started to compete with Vietnam in Cambodia. Conversations between Zhou Enlai and Vietnamese leaders show that, at that time, the Chinese did not have direct influence over the Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk, and had to ask the Vietnamese to intercede for them with the Cambodians. But they began to build their own relations with the Cambodians. The military aid
152 77 Conversations; p. I 89. 153 Gilks, op. cit., p. 109. 154 77 Conversations, p. I 83. 155 Kissinger, I 982, op. cit., p. 351. 168 agreement, signed between China and the Kampuchean United Nationalist Royal Government (GRNUK), was also believed to enhance its influence over Cambodia vis a-vis Hanoi. 156 Ironically, this Chinese rivalry with Vietnam made China's policy towards Cambodia contradictory as China's support contributed to the KPLNAF's offensive and thus to the American bombing campaign, which effectively destroyed the chance of the cease-fire the Chinese were hoping to secure. Whatever the 'by-products' of this anti-Vietnamese policy, the Chinese seem to have been unwilling to see Vietnamese influence in Indochina increase. Nixon confirmed this logic, stating that Zhou Enlai wanted to prevent a North Vietnamese victory in Indochina. He wrote that
China wanted closer relations with the United States to counter increasing ho~tility from the Soviet Union. Therefore, it was directly contrary to Beijing's interests for Hanoi either to achieve hegemony in Indochina or to humiliate the United States. 157 China's cold attitude towards Vietnamese reunification was clear in its reaction to the PA VN offensive. In March 1975, Beijing 'politely advised' Hanoi that its intended offensive was unwise. 158 This claim is supported by MOFA's archives, which disclose that in March the Chinese deliberately raised the question of the Paris Agreement to imply that the DRV should implement it, and stop the offensive. A Sinologist observes that almost up to the last moment, Beijing was urging the Vietnamese to delay renewal of the fighting. Only in mid-April, as Vietnamese victory became universally apparent, did China harden the tone of its propaganda in an effort to show belated support for the winning side. 159 Around the time of Vietnam unification, Sino-Vietnamese relations started to deteriorate. Bilateral conflict, which had been overshadowed by the American threat, now re-emerged. The first sign was intensifying territorial disputes between the two countries. According to a Hanoi source, the Chinese committed more serious violations than in the previous period. Between 1949 and 1973, the Chinese had annexed more than 90 points along the Vietnam-China border, but beginning in 19741he number of incursions steadily increased: 197 in 197 4, 294 in 197 5, 812 in 197 6, 873 in 1977 and
156 Gilks, op. cit., p. 107. 157 Nixon, 1985, op. cit., p. 176. 158 Lawson, op. cit., p'. 239. 159 Ibid, p. 240. Interestingly the MOFA 's White Book does not use this evidence to support its charge against China. However, MOF A archives confinned that only on 18 April 1975, while receiving Kim long II, Deng Xiaoping and Ye Jianying for the first time spoke publicly of the DRY's victory. 169 2,175 in 1978. 160 In particular, in January 1974 the Chinese drove out the Saigon Navy from Vietnam's Hoang Sa islands (Paracels in English and Xisha in Chinese). The Vietnamese disclosed that in a 1975 meeting with Vietnamese leaders, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping admitted that the two countries had disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands and the two sides should meet and discuss these disputes. 161 The White Book claims that the Chinese took the Paracels before Vietnam became unified, in an attempt to provide afait accompli. The Chinese calculated that it was better to take the islands from the Saigon government than from the hands of Hanoi after the reunification of Vietnam. Tension between Vietnam and China was also highlighted in the September 1975 meeting between Deng Xiaoping and Le Duan. Deng blamed the Vietnamese for anti-Chinese propaganda in a play with anti-Chinese content. 162 The White Book charges that the Chinese declined to provide new aid to Vietnam and were lagging with delivery of old aid. 163 The Chinese explained that they needed a respite after so many years of supporting the Vietnamese anti-American struggle. It was their right to decide whether or not to provide aid to Vietnam. But the excuse of allowing breathing space to the Chinese sounds unconvincing when compared with the US$1 billion of Chinese aid over five years to Cambodia, 164 aid that was later used by the Khmer Rouge to run a border war against Vietnam. The clearest sign of post-1975 Chinese anti-Vietnamese policy was its support for the Khmer Rouge in the latter's conflict with Vietnam. As early as June 1975, Pol Pot secretly visited China and began negotiations about Chinese military aid. In August and October 1975 teams of experts from China's Defence Ministry conducted an extensive survey in Cambodia to assess defence needs. In February 1976, Deputy Chief ofPLA Staff, Wang Shangrong, visited Cambodia and signed a military aid agreement with his counterpart, Son Sen. According to the agreement, China was to deliver artillery pieces, patrol boats and air-defence equipment on a priority basis. A total of 500 Chinese advisers were to train soldiers to use the equipment. Wang-also listed the
160 Hoang Nguyen, 1979, 'Chinese Aggression: Origins, Results and Prospects', in Chinese Aggression against Vietnam', p. 25. 161 The White Book, p. 69. 162 See more details in 77 Conversations, p. 192. 163 The White Book, p. 83. 164 Chanda, op. cit., p. 17. 170 weapons systems to be delivered in 1977 and 1978. 165 It was reported that Chinese advisors were taken prisoners during an attack on Vietnam. 166 The SRV's official line was that the border war between the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) and Vietnam was essentially a war run by 'Chinese reactionary forces' against Vietnam, and that Vietnam faced invasion threats from two directions China and Cambodia. 167 A further analysis of the events of 197 6-1977 shows that the Chinese probably preferred to support the Khmer Rouge to create a counterbalance force to prevent Vietnam from aligning with the Soviets. But China did not support the DK's provocation against Vietnam, least to say to carry on a proxy war through the Khmer Rouge, as the Vietnamese claimed. The above-mentioned Febr,uary 1976 agreement was aimed at building up the DK army, which fell far short of the standard of the PA VN. Moreover, as Huang Hua disclosed in 1977, China put forward a four-point proposal. One point stipulated that China would not side with either party (Vietnam or Cambodia) to increase tension between them or provide either party with military aid or any form of assistance that might lead to tension. 168 During Pol Pot's triumphant visit to Beijing in September 1977, China offered a venue for Vietnamese-Cambodian talks on their conflict, though the talks failed to solve any problems. The Chinese inclined towards the Khmer Rouge in the Vietnam-DK conflict. In September 1977, during his meeting with Pol Pot, when the latter criticised strongly the Vietnamese, Hua Guofeng praised his guest, stating that 'your strategy regarding the neighbouring countries is correct' .169 The Chinese made a decisive turn to totally support the Khmer Rouge in December 1977. Geng Biao confirmed that in December 1977, a month after Le Duan's visit to China, the CCPCC 'decided to give energetic support to Cambodia'. He also disclosed that at the time there were proposals to send the East Sea Fleet to Cambodia to help the Khmer Rouge, and to attack Vietnam from Guangxi province. 170 Though it was not clear whether these proposals were made in December 1977 or later in 1978, a shift
165 Ibid., p. 18. 166 Ibid., p. 32. 167 Truong chinh, 1982, Kien quyet danh bai chu nghia banh truong va chi nghia ba quyen TQ (Determined to defeat Chinese expansionism and hegemonism), pp. 15, 19. 168 See Huang Hua, 1977, Huang Hua's Report on the World Situation, Issues and Studies, Vol. 13, No.7, p. 77. 169 77 Conversations,' p. 194. 170 Geng Biao, 1981, 'Geng Biao's Report on the Situation of the Indochinese Peninsula', Issues and Studies, Vol. 17, No. I, pp. 85-86.
171 in the Chinese attitude towards the conflict occurred, probably influenced by the Vietnamese October 1977 counterattack against the DK, which ran tens kilometres into Cambodian territory. The Chinese seemed to understand the weakness of the Khmer Rouge compared with Vietnam, however, and advised the DK's leaders towards restraint. The same month, Vice Premier Chen Yonggui paid a visit to Cambodia, where he was reported to have refrained from any direct reference to Cambodia's territorial conflict with Vietnam, and announced China's support for Cambodia in more general termsY' The following month, Deng Yingchao, Zhou Enlai's widow, visited Cambodia. Deng urged the Khmer Rouge leaders to settle their problems with Vietnam through negotiations. But her suggestion was rejected. 172 The former ambassador to Cambodia and then to Vietnam, Zhang Qing, confirmed with me in Beijing in February 1998 that the Chinese did not agree with the Khmer Rouge policy towards Vietnam at that time. 173 What he meant was that the Chinese advice was to broaden the political base of the DK and to bringing Sihanouk back to political life. By mid-1978 the Chinese seemed to favour negotiations to escalation. At the time, the Chinese were increasingly worried about Soviet influence over the Vietnamese. At a time, Mao was quoted as saying that 'to oppose imperialism without opposing revisionism will eventually lead to a second revolution' .174 Chinese dissatisfaction with the Vietnamese was seen in Mao's comment that 'Vietnam is a temple occupied by four chief monks who became master of anyone who gives them food and clothing' .175 So, factors other than Sino-American relations appeared to influence Chinese policy towards Vietnam.
Conclusion
The United States and China were reluctant to make any concessions over the Taiwan issue in pursuit of nofil1alisation. The United States did not need the People's Republic of China as much as they had in previous years. It was satisfied with the level of
171 New York Times, 23 December 1977. Cited in Chanda, op. cit., p. 203. 172 Chanda, op. cit., p. 210. See also in Reder S. 'The Kampuchean-Vietnamese Conflict' in Elliott, op. cit., pp. 45-46. Far eastern Economic Review, March 17,1978, p. 19. 173 Based on my interview with Zhang Qing, Beijing, February 1998. 174 Jiang Qing, 1975, 'Jiang Qing's Address to Diplomatic Cadres', Issues and Studies, Vol. XI, No.7, July 1975, p. 94. 175 Ibid.
172 improvement of their relations and did not want to proceed to normalisation. Concessions over Taiwan were therefore not necessary. After failing to reach normalisation through a series of concessions, the People's Republic also hardened its US policy, demanding that it share the cost of normalisation. Namely, it insisted that the US Administration meet its demands before normalisation could proceed. Though they failed to normalise, the two countries continued the rapprochement process. This shows that rapprochement was limited, but not that they rejected it. In this situation- continued rapprochement without full normalisation- there was no reason for the United States to take part in the war in Vietnam. Congress was in favour of total and immediate disengagement, while the Administration opted for a gradual approach. It preferred to maintain the status quo in Vietnam but with a reduced level of engagement. When its efforts to secure the Saigon government failed, the Administration accepted its loss without intervention. Clearly, the United States would not have behaved that way if Sino-American rapprochement had not continued. History shows how great power relations shaped US policy towards a small state - Vietnam. Nixon claims that Watergate changed US policy towards Vietnam, and that when he resigned, the will to fight in Vietnam went with him. If this were the case, it would contradict the main hypothesis of this dissertation. It suggests that it was not Sino-American relations that shaped American policy towards Vietnam, but individuals and US domestic politics. Although I do not reject the role of individuals and domestic politics in shaping American Vietnam policy, I argue that the Nixon Administration had started to disengage from Vietnam before Watergate. The pressure Nixon imposed on the Saigon government in May-June 1973 was a clear demonstration ofthis. Moreover, although Nixon could have been tougher with Vietnam if his power had not weakened and although he resigned because of Watergate, he could not have prolonged American intervention. He could have resumed the bombing, but how long could the bombing have lasted in such a situation? Under the pressure of domestic politics, which saw no benefit for the United States in further engagement in Vietnam following rapprochement with the People Republic of China, Nixon could not have prolonged that commitment even if he had wanted to and his power had not been eroded. There were no incentives for him, as an individual, to commit to that policy. The Watergate scandal hastened US dise~gagement, but did not create it. On the other hand, Sino-American hesitancy over normalisation also encouraged the United States to establish relations with a unified Vietnam to prevent the 173 latter's dependence on China or the Soviet Union. This situation was different from the next period when Sino-American normalisation killed American interest in doing so. As far as the PRC is concerned, we have seen how Sino-American reluctance to normalise relations affected Chinese policy towards Vietnam. As a form of continued rapprochement, it encouraged the Chinese to please the Americans in their Vietnam policy. In their eagerness to release the United States from the burden of war, the Chinese did not want to see the fighting in Vietnam continue, and advised the Vietnamese Communists to stop fighting for a period of time. They promoted a negotiated settlement for Cambodia, which could have served as a model for solving the South Vietnam question. They also tried to encourage an independent tendency within the PRG, which also would have promoted a coalition government in South Vietnam. These components of Chinese policy towards Vietnam were the direct result of developments in Sino-American relations. America was no longer a threat to China, and the Chinese did not need to aid the Vietnamese Communists to complete reunification. Moreover, continued fighting in Vietnam would complicate the American position by increasing its burden of aid to the Saigon government, something the Chinese did not want. It also would have distracted the United States from the main enemy- the Soviet Union. The rapprochement started in 1972 and continued to affect China's behaviour towards Vietnam. This period also witnessed a new element in Sino-Vietnamese relations - rivalry and the start of hostile relations. This was an indirect result of the Sino-American relationship. With the departure of a common enemy, conflicts between the two Communist neighbours re-emerged. Historical suspicions of each other now resurfaced. The above analysis shows how imprecise were some of the DRY's charges against China, evidence of Vietnamese suspicion of China. In addition, it also shows that Chinese suspicions about Hanoi's alliance with the Soviets encouraged them to initiate an anti-Vietnamese policy. Here one can see also the role that individuals, like Le Duan, played. Factors such as suspicion and the role of individuals are not the focus of this dissertation. What concerns us is the impact of Sino-American relations on Chinese policy. As discussed, the disappearance of the American threat gave rise to new factors in Sino-Vietnamese relations. If such a link could only be posited between Sino-American relations and China's Vietnam policy, the emphasis in this dissertation on the importance of the Sino-American relationship in shaping Chinese Vietnam policy would be excessive. But the impact of the new state of Sino-American relations 174 on Chinese calculations went further than this. American withdrawal from the region created a vacuum that the Chinese were not in a position to fill. This provided the Soviets and the Vietnamese with the chance to fill it. This 'expansion' of Soviet and Vietnamese influence, in tum, raised concerns on the part of the Chinese. In this sense, we can see the link between Sino-American relations and Chinese attitudes towards Vietnam. That said, it is important to emphasise that this situation also shows the limits of the influence of Sino-American relations on Chinese policy towards Vietnam. Not everything that happened in Vietnam was the direct result of Sino-American relations, though some links are apparent. Another challenge to this dissertation's main hypothesis is the assertion that because the Americans were defeated in Vietnam, they lost their bargaining chip with the Chinese over Taiwan. If accurate, this suggests that it was not Sino-American relations that affected the two countries' policies towards Vietnam, but the reverse. If it were the case, it would mean a small state was not subject to the nature of relations between big powers, but somehow changed big power relations. I believe that though there were reversed influence of the state of American-Vietnamese relations on American policy towards China, but this influence was insignificant. The United States and the People's Republic of China failed to normalise their relations mainly because of other factors. As discussed, the United States did not need Sino-American normalisation so much that it was ready to make concessions to the PRC. It was different from the situation from 1978, when American-Soviet rivalry forced the United States to normalise relations with China. This will be discussed in the next chapter. American unwillingness or reluctance was the main reason for the failure to normalise Sino-American relations in the years between 1973 and 1977, not their defeat in Vietnam.
175 Chapter 6 Sino-American Limited Strategic Co-operation and Isolation of Vietnam, 1978-1988
The analysis in this chapter begins in the crucial year 1978, which marked changes in the foreign policy of all three countries - China, the United States and Vietnam. In the face of a perceived Soviet threat, China and the United States overcame the reluctance of the previous period to establish full diplomatic relations. Their relations developed in the form of limited strategic co-operation. On the one hand, they co-operated with each other to confront the Soviet Union. One the other hand, the two countries' different interests and security perspectives limited their co-operation, which in fact ended in 1989 with the end of the Cold War. Vietnam also changed its foreign policy. After its failure to gain Chinese support in dealing with the Khmer Rouge's border provocations and to establish diplomatic relations with the United States, Vietnam threw its hand in with the Soviet Union to safeguard its security. Sino-American relations during this period have been the topic of memoirs by statesmen and of works by numerous scholars. 1 I use these works to construct a perspective on Sino-American relations - limited strategic co-operation. This chapter tries to bring these perspectives together to paint a fuller picture of Sino-American relations as well as of American and Chinese policies regarding Vietnam. For instance, Carter ignored Chinese reservation over American arms sales to Taiwan, made prior to normalisation. Without knowledge of China's reservations, one could mistakenly perceive that Sino-American normalisation was a one-way concession process. Though the Sino-American relationship is not the focus of this work, I attempt to contribute to the debate. Two major works on the subject by Harry Harding and Robert Ross argue more or less along the lines I take in this study, but divide the period under discussion into shorter phases and define them differently.2 Such an approach· is limited in
1 In the first category, one can consult the memoirs of presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Regan, secretaries of state Cyprus Vance, Alexander Haig and George Shulz, secretary of defence Caspar Weinsberger, national security advisor Brzezinski, assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific John Holdridge. For the second category, there are first-class analyses by Robert Garson, John Garver, Harry Harding, Liu Ta Jen, Robert Ross and Michael Yahuda. Their works will be cited later in this chapter. 2 Harry Harding, for instance, divides this period into three phases termed normalisation, estrangement and reconciliation. See Harding H., op. cit., pp. 67-172. Robert Ross calls his three phases 'Normalisation: the Necessity for Compromise', 'Renegotiating Co-operation: Renewed Cold War 176 explaining the contradictory measures taken by the United States in a same phase.3 I look at this period as a whole and point out to the contradictions in their attitudes towards each other, which explains why their co-operation was limited during the whole period. Robert Garson and Liu Ta Jen also analyse Sino-American relations of this period, but their approaches are different from the one taken in this dissertation. Garson's 'nervous open door' 4 describes more the Chinese attitude towards the United States, while Liu's 'a decade of pragmatism' 5 focuses on American attitudes towards China and Taiwan. Neither discusses the substance of Sino-American relationship. American, and especially Chinese, policy towards Vietnam has been the topic of voluminous works.6 But those authors focus on describing Sino-Vietnamese relations and/or the Indochina conflict/ while this dissertation argues that Sino-American limited strategic co-operation brought about changes in both American and Chinese policies towards Vietnam. In the previous chapter we saw that the United States sought to persuade the DRV to drop its conditions in order to establish relations, but later changed its mind, rejecting normalisation of relations with Vietnam when the latter dropped its conditions for normalisation. Then, during the whole period, the United States demanded Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Cambodia before relations could be normalised. The United States tried to isolate Vietnam until it yielded, whereas China changed its attitude towards Vietnam from neutrality to full support for the Khmer Rouge in its war with Vietnam. Like the Americans, during the whole period, the Chinese followed their announced policy of 'bleeding Vietnam white' in order to press the Vietnamese to yield on the Cambodian question. The main argument of this chapter is that in the context of Sino-American limited strategic co-operation, in relation to both the United States and China, Vietnam stood on the other side of the battle lines, and therefore was subject to their shared but independently held hostile policies.
Tension and US Anns Sales to Taiwan' and 'Consolidation of Co-operation: US Strategic Confidence and Chinese Policy Adjustment'. See Ross Robert, 1995, op. cit., pp. 120-245. · 3 For instance, in the same 'nonnalisation' phase, the United States not only nonnalised relations with China, but also passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which the Chinese considered as encroaching on the political basis of the normalisation of Sino-American relations (see Han, op. cit., p. 289). 4 See Garson, op. cit., pp. 170-196. 5 See more details in Ross R., 1995, op. cit., pp. 120-245. Liu Ta Jen covers American policy towards both China and Taiwan and his title 'a decade of pragmatism' referred to American policy rather than to Sino-American relations. See more details in Liu Ta Jen, op. cit., pp. 343-364. 6 To name just a few: Frederick Brown, Nayan Chanda, Pao-min Chang, King C. Chen, Anne Gilks, Steven Hood, Eugene Lawson, Stephen Morris and Ross Robert. Their works will be cited later in this chapter. 7 The conflict is mostly between China and the Khmer Rouge on the one hand and Vietnam and Phnompenh government on the other hand. 177 As in previous chapters, this chapter will first analyse the Sino-American relationship. Then it will describe American and Chinese policies towards Vietnam in order to highlight the logic between these relationships.
Sino-American Limited Strategic Co-operation
This part of the chapter argues that during the eleven years between 1978 and 1988 the United States and China achieved a kind of limited strategic co-operation. On the American side, this was seen in America's contradictory attitude towards China. The United States wanted to develop strategic co-operation with the People's Republic of China in order to confront the Soviet Union in the second round of the Cold War.8 But But their conflicting interests and perspectives limited this co-operation. This was obvious in the case of the Taiwan question. On the Chinese side, however, this feature of the Sino-American relationship was seen by China's changing attitude towards the United States. The Chinese changed from a policy of 'united front' against the Soviet Union to an 'independent policy', which downplayed the alignment with the West and opened the way to improvement of relations with the Soviet Union.
America 's Contradictory China Policy In the previous chapter, we saw that during the years 1973-77 the United States was reluctant to make concessions to normalise Sino-American relations. During the next ten years, as we shall see, US policy towards China was characterised by this contradiction. To gain strategic benefits, the United States normalised its relations with China, though it pressed for Chinese concessions. After normalisation, the United States took measures to develop a multi-faceted co-operation with China. The latter became a 'friendly nation', which meant that it was not an ally but a country that shared many interests with the United States. But in parallel with this, the United States not only passed the Taiwan Relations Act, but also sold sophisticated weapons to Taiwan, which angered Beijing. The first sign of the new China policy was the Carter Administration's move to normalise relations with China in spring 1978. There were both domestic and international incentives for the move. From the perspective of domestic politics, the
8 The Cold War started after the end of the World War II, but the detente of the 1970s improved relations between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation's member countries. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, they engaged in the second round of Cold War. 178 Carter Administration was in a better position to initiate a new China policy. By that time, with the passage of the Panama Canal Treaty, Carter felt strong enough to make another attempt. 9 From the point of view of strategic relations, normalisation of US-China relations would enhance America's position in dealing with the Soviet Union. Brzezinski wrote, 'we were convinced that a genuinely co-operative relationship between Washington and Beijing would greatly enhance the stability of the Far East and that, more generally, it would be to the US advantage in the global competition with the Soviet Union' .10 Not all Carter's Administration agreed with this calculation. Secretary Cyrus Vance, for example, preferred to follow a more balanced stand in US relations with the Soviet Union and China. 11 The president, however, agreed with Brzezinski's assessment of the strategic significance of Sino-American normalisation. 12 One of the best symbols of the US-China strategic relations was a photograph of Brzezinski taken during his May 1978 visit to China, on top ofthe Great Wall, allegedly pointing an AK- 47 towards what he termed the Soviet 'Polar Bear'. 13 Considering that time was ripe for normalising relations, in the spring of 1978 the Carter Administration shifted its policy towards China. On 26 April, the White House announced that Brzezinski would visit China the following month. The publicly declared purpose of the trip was to 'consult' with the Chinese leadership on a broad range of issues. Brzezinski claimed that the President instructed him to inform the Chinese that the United States 'has made up its mind' on normalisation, and that he wanted to 'move rapidly' .14 He also was empowered to tell the Chinese that the United States was willing to accept all three Chinese conditions for normalisation - termination of US-Taiwan relations, withdrawal of US military personnel and installations from Taiwan, and abrogation of the US-Taiwan Security Treaty. 15 This acceptance of Chinese conditions was the most important change in US policy as previously it had rejected these conditions. Holdridge claimed that 'the scope of the Brzezinski mission was very broad and seemed designed to anticipate Chinese
9 In the previous chapter we saw that one of the reasons for the Carter Administration's reluctance to normalise Sino-American relations was the Congressional hearing on the Panama Canal Treaty. 10 Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 196. 11 Consult Vance, op. cit.; Brzezinski, op. cit. 12 See more details in' Carter, op. cit., p. 195. 13 Holdridge, op. cit., p. 174. 14 Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 196, 207. 15 Han, op. cit., p. 280. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 208. 179 agreement on normalisation' .16 Though Holdridge may have been over-optimistic in his comments, it indirectly shows the significance the Carter Administration gave to this trip. 17 Besides its decision to send Brzezinski to Beijing to let the Chinese know about US determination to normalise Sino-American relations, the Carter Administration allegedly dropped its objection to sales of non-threatening or defensive arms to China by its NATO allies. 18 In June 1978, Carter, Vance and Brzezinski met to review their China policy. The meeting set a target date for US-China normalisation - mid December 1978. 19 In parallel with acceptance of the Chinese conditions, however, the Carter Administration set its own conditions for normalisation. It demanded that jhe United States be permitted to maintain a full defence agreement with Taiwan for another year. China would not contradict the US statement that the Taiwan issue should be solved peacefully and with patience, and the United States would continue some military sales to the Taiwanese after the defence agreement expired. It took nearly six months for the two countries to negotiate the terms of normalisation. In July, talks between the Head of the US liaison office in Beijing, Leonard Woodcock and the PRC's Foreign Minister Huang Hua started in Beijing. But late in November 1978, Carter still insisted on these three US conditions. Only in early December, thanks to both Chinese concessions and Carter's 'fresh carrot and new stick', did the two countries eventually agree on the communique.20As a carrot, Carter invited either Hua Guofeng or Deng Xiaoping to visit the United States immediately after diplomatic relations were established. As a stick, he informed Beijing that the SALT treaty was almost complete, and a Soviet-US summit
16 Holdridge, op. cit., p. 174. 17 For more details on the Brzezinski trip, see Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 207-19. 18 Liu Ta Jen, US-China Relations 1974-1992, Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., p. 329. In January 1978, Carter had already given the green light to the French to sell arms to China. For more details, see Vance, op. cit., p. 114. 19 See more details in Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 224. There seems to be controversy over the date of 15 December. Brzezinski claimed that the date was agreed upon at the June meeting and his critics were not correct in blaming him for accelerating the process and killing the SALT efforts. Vance wrote that while in the Middle East, he was surprised to hear that Sino-American normalisation would be announced on I 5 December 1978. Carter also indirectly supports this Vance claim when he wrote that he decided to surprise Deng by proposing that the US reveal its agreement in only two days, as soon as Secretary Vance could return to Washington from the Middle East. This author is of the view that while the June meeting set a target date of mid-December, the slow progress of the Sino-American talks suggested that the date could not be met. But the fast progress in early December surprised Vance. This was done undoubtedly with Brzezinski's efforts. 20 Harding Harry, A Fragile Relationship, p. 80. See also Carter, op. cit., p. 198. 180 was therefore imminent.21 Carter, however, seems to have downplayed Chinese reservations over the important question of arms sales to Taiwan. Brzezinski's memoirs show that the Americans were ambivalent on this question, which made the Chinese assume that the Americans would also make concessions over this question. 22 On 15 December 1978 (Washington time), the two sides simultaneously issued statements in Washington and Beijing that they would establish diplomatic relations on 1 January 1979. The above story of Sino-American normalisation, especially the American ambivalence over the question of arms sales to Taiwan, shows both American willingness to normalise US-China relations, and its limits. The United States wanted to normalise relations with China but it also insisted on winning concessions from the Chinese. The contradictions in US policy towards China were clearly seen in the congressional passage of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which took place only three months after the establishment of Sino-American diplomatic relations. Initially, while drafting the Act, the Carter Administration tried to maintain the status quo between the United States and Taiwan as much as possible. But Congress modified the draft, expressing strong US support for Taiwan. According to the TRA, defence articles and services were to be made available to Taiwan, and the United States might intervene in the Taiwan Strait area if a threat against Taiwan were posed by some hostile force, which could only be China. The TRA also restated the validity of international treaties binding the United States and Taiwan. Though the Administration did not agree with congressional modification to the bill, it had no choice but to follow congressional will. In April, President Carter signed the Taiwan Relations Act into law. The TRA as it stood was arguably not the Administration's preferred option, and therefore was not an expression of a contradiction in US China policy. I am of the view that, whatever the reason, the TRA was a setback to the improvement ofUS-China relations and, as such, itshould be seen as a sign of contradiction in US China policy. Moreover, President Carter did not use his veto power, which, at the least, shows the limits to the Administration's willingness to protect Sino-American relations from Congressional attacks.
21 See more details in' Carter, op. cit., pp. 197-98. The Chinese account seems to downplay the Chinese concessions, overlooking American insistence on their right to seii arms to Taiwan. See for instance Han, op. cit., pp. 282-84. 22 See more details in Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 231. 181 This contradictory pattern in United States' China policy did not change in the · last two years of the Carter Administration. The Administration rapidly broadened US-China contacts on diplomatic, military, economic, cultural and other fronts; but it continued and even expanded arms sales to Taiwan. Brzezinski reasonably claims that in its dealings with China and the Soviet Union, the United States changed from an 'even-handed' through a 'balanced' to a 'tilt-towards-China' stance?3 Moreover, the United States also allegedly made different concessions to China. Liu Ta Jen, a leading Taiwanese observer, charges that the United States seemed to have been co-opted into playing Beijing's game, which was to reduce the status of Taiwan to that of a mere province of China?4 Though possibly overstated, the charge shows that the United States was ready to make concessions in order to maintain strategic relations with China. But continuing US arms sales to Taiwan, which started after the moratorium and very much angered the Chinese, also reached an all-time high of over $550 million in President Carter's last year in office. 25 This point is more or less supported by another Sinologist. Harding writes, 'the strategic relationship between Beijing and Washington was largely kept in a holding pattern through most of 1979' .26 The Reagan Administration's China policy did not differ greatly from that pursued by his predecessor. It took measures to please the Chinese Communists. When Secretary of State Alexander Haig visited China in mid-June 1981, he told his hosts that President Reagan intended to treat the PRC as a friendly nation. The Administration had also decided to sell Beijing lethal arms. Moreover, in his letters to Chinese leaders in April-May 1982, Reagan stated US support for Beijing's 'nine-point proposal' to reunite the country, which Taiwan rejected. One can also see American concessions to the Chinese in the difficult Sino-American communique on arms sales to Taiwan signed in August 1982. The United States undertook not to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan and affirmed the ultimate objective of ending them. It also pledged that the sales would be gradually reduced. The Taiwanese reasonably charged that the
23 Ibid, pp. 413-25. 24 Liu, op. cit., p. 339. 25 Holdridge, op. cit., p. 196. This claim by Holdridge highly contrasted with Harding's figure of $267 million worth of American arms sales to Taiwan in 1980 (Harding, op. cit., p. 112). Another source agrees with Harding, ·claiming that in January 1980, the State Department announced that the United States would sell Taiwan only $280 million worth of arms. Moreover, it had carefully selected only defensive weapons for that purpose (See more details in Liu, op. cit., p. 340). 26 H ar d'mg, op. cit.,. p. 91 . I 182 communique was in direct contravention to the TRA.27 We have seen earlier that the TRA was a blow to improvement in Sino-American relations, but now the arms sales communique, in turn, reduced US commitments to Taiwan, as articulated .in the TRA. This changing attitude was a result of conflicting directions in American domestic politics. Congress had not shifted its stance on Taiwan, but the Administration saw it as necessary to achieve a compromise with China over the arms sale question. In 1983, the Reagan Administration liberalised its guidelines on exports to China, particularly exports of the seven so-called 'dual-use' items. In the main, the Americans did not export these items to the Soviet Union or its Communist allies. In June 1984, the United States and China signed minutes on three specific programs: to produce antitank guided missiles; large calibre artillery ammunition; and to develop an avionics kit for China's older F-8 interceptor plane. Furthermore, in 1987, the Administration recommended that the Chinese be given so-called fire-finder artillery locating radar. Later, US Defence Secretary, Caspar Weinberger, commented that the equipment was a very considerable assistance to the Chinese in defending their long borders with the Soviet army, which was well equipped with artillery and tanks. 28 At the same time, the Reagan Administration seemed to be firmer in dealing with China over the Taiwan question. President Reagan was an old friend ofTaiwan.29 During a meeting in Cancun (Mexico) he told Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang in no uncertain terms that the United States would maintain its obligations to Taiwan.30 Also contrary to Huang Hua's threat to downgrade Sino-American relations, Washington approved further arms sales to Taiwan. In March 1982, the President even threatened 'we were going to sell spare parts to Taiwan whether the Chinese liked it or not; if they wanted to talk, then we would accommodate them, and if they did not, then there was nothing to talk about' .31 Moreover, two days after the release of the arms-sale communique, the Reagan Administration announced its intention to allow Taiwan to continue co-producing F-5E fighters.
27 Liu, op. cit., p. 349. 28 Weinberger, op. cit., p. 286. 29 During his presidential campaign, Reagan remarked that Taiwan was really a country, and should be treated as such. (See 1-Ioldridge, op. cit., p. 198). 30 Haig, op. cit., p. 209.ln March 1981, Reagan told Chai Zemin, new PRC Ambassador to Washington, that the United States would not forget 'old friends', that is Taiwan (Holdridge, op. cit., p. 202). 31 Haig, op. cit., p. 213. 183 The Chinese shift from united front to an independent policy
On the Chinese side, limited co-operation, during the years between 1978-198 8, was seen not as a contradiction, but only a change in attitude towards their partner. Before 1982 the Chinese continued to follow Mao'syi tiao xian (one front) policy, which was described in the previous chapter as allying with the United States, and opposing the Soviet Union. In the years following that watershed they called the policy 'duli zizhu' (independent). 32 In the earlier phase, as will be shown, what the Chinese perceived as the Soviet threat pushed them into a kind of alignment with the United States. However, in the later phase, unresolved and emerging problems in their relations with the United States encouraged them to take a more independent stance. Beginning in 1978, the Chinese also changed their policy towards the United States. There were both domestic and international conditions favourable to the change in China's stance. The 11th CCP congress, which took place in August 1977, signalled Deng's return to power. The pragmatists within the CCP started to consolidate their position. Eventually, the Third Plenum of the CCP's Eleventh Central Committee (December 1978) confirmed the victory of the Deng faction. 33 Deng Xiaoping, long called a 'capitalist roader', believed that only Western capital and technology could help China realise its four modernisations program, which was reconfirmed by the Third Plenum. This domestic change contributed much to the alteration in Sino-American relations that followed. Moreover, increasing Soviet influence in Vietnam was a nightmare for Chinese leaders as they were afraid that they were being encircled by hostile pro-Soviet forces. 34 The signing of Soviet-Vietnamese friendship treaty (3 November 1978) and the subsequent overthrow ofthe Pol Pot regime by the SRV/PRK forces worried the Chinese. This explained why, in early December 1978, they shifted their stance in the Sino-American talks, making normalisation possible. In fact, this change in China's attitude towards the United States was a development of the PRC's unchanged yi tiao xian strategy. On the day of Sino-American diplomatic establishment, 1 January 1979, Deng Xiaoping said, 'the main policy that we follow on the international front is the policy that Mao Zedong and
32 See more details in Zhang Xiaoming, 1997, op. cit., pp. 14-15. 33 All the CCP's official documents take the Third Plenum ofNovember 1978 as a watershed in its history. . 34 See more details on international and domestic influences on Chinese decision to normalise Sino-American relations in Gong Li, 1992,Gua yue hong gou: 1969-1979 nian Tzongmei guanxi de yanbian (Overcoming the gap: 1969-1979, evolution of Sino-American relations), pp. 315-317. 184 Zhou Enlai decided upon, but did not live to see. We have realised part of their cause. The signing of the Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty, and Sino-American normalisation promotes peace and stability in the world' .35 In the late 1970s, Chinese leaders took a step beyond yi tiao xian, calling for a tongyi zhanxian (united front) to oppose the Soviet Union. In mid-January 1979, Geng Biao, then CCPCC Politburo member and General Secretary of the CCPCC Military Commission, allegedly wrote for internal use that 'in view of the current situation, nothing can be regarded as more important than the rapid establishment of an international united front with the opposition to Soviet social-imperialism as the centre' .36 He also pointed out that this 'united front' was with China's 'secondary enemy'- the United States.37 As we saw in the previous chapter, in the years between 1973 and 1977, though they followed the same one-front policy, the Chinese were reluctant to normalise their relations with the Americans. But in the late 1970s, this strategy encouraged them to make concessions in order to normalise relations with America. The difference was due to the level of the Soviet threat to China, and as well as to the American attitude towards China. In the late 1970s, the Chinese were more concerned about the Soviet threat than they had been in the mid-1970s. The main reason for this was the increase in Soviet influence in Vietnam. Deng Xiaoping told ranking Chinese cadres that there were three tasks facing them in the 1980s: to oppose hegemony, to reunite Taiwan and to develop China. 38 In Deng's mind, therefore, facing the Soviet threat was the most important task for China. Geng Biao also emphasised that the Cambodian 'incident' was only the Soviet Union's first step of in its expansion into Southeast Asia, a part of the global strategy of Soviet social-imperialism.39 Coincidentally, as mentioned above, the Americans were ready to make concessions in accepting the Chinese conditions, though they also promoted their own. This new situation facilitated the success of the Chinese old one-line strategy in normalising Sino-American relations. It has been the general understanding that the United States initiated normalisation with the decision to send Brzezinski to Beijing. In fact, it was the Chinese
35 Deng Xiaoping, 'Deng Xiaopingwenxuan' (Deng Xiaoping's Selected Writings), Vol. 2, p. 155. 36 Geng Biao, 1981, 'Keng Piao's [Geng Biao] Report on the Situation ofthe Indochinese Peninsula', Issues and Studies, Vol. XVII, No.1, January 1981, p. 92. 37 Geng Biao, 1981, op. cit., p. 93. 38 Yu Long (ed.), 1992, 'Mao Zedong he Deng Xiaoping yu Zhongguo guoqing (Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping on the PRC's situation), p. 575. 39 Geng Biao, 1981, op. cit., p. 94. 185 initiative to encourage the Americans that started the process. The Chinese sensed that Brzezinski would adopt amore anti-Soviet line, and tried to make a breakthrough in their relations with America by promoting contact with him. In November 1977, outgoing Ambassador Huang Zhen invited Brzezinski to visit China.40 When Brzezinski came in May 1978, he received a much more cordial reception than that accorded to Vance. However, the Chinese were not ready to yield to American preconditions. As mentioned, it took half a year to iron out their differences on the Taiwan question. By late 1978, when the Soviet threat became clearer with the signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese friendship treaty, and coincidentally the position of the reformers was consolidated by the Third Plenum of the Eleventh CCPCC, Chinese leaders decided to drop their objections to the American conditions. In early December, only days after the plenum closed and a month after the signing of Soviet-Vietnamese treaty, Deng Xiaoping agreed to accept continued US arms sales to Taiwan after the US-Taiwan Treaty expired.41 As mentioned above, however, Chinese leaders may have assumed that the United States would terminate arms sales after a limited period. American ambiguities may have contributed to this Chinese assumption. But this assumption cannot totally take away the fact that the Chinese made concessions in December 1978 in order to normalise their relations with the United States. Immediately before the communique of diplomatic establishment was announced, Deng Xiaoping told Leonard Woodcock, US Liaison office's Head: China hopes that after the normalisation of Sino-US relations the United States will prudently handle its relations with Taiwan so that they would not affect China's efforts to peacefully settle the Taiwan question in the most reasonable way. If the United States continues its arms sales to Taiwan, this will, in the long run obstruct China's efforts to bring about Taiwan's return to the motherland by peaceful means. 42
While the above statement called for American restraint in dealing with Taiwan, it did not condemn arms sales, a major American concern relating to normalisation. This was a remarkable turnaround, as during the previous six months, the Chinese had consistently rejected this American demand.
40 Holdridge J., op. cit., p. 173. 41 See more details in Overcoming the gap, pp. 315-317. 42 Han, op. cit., p. 283.
186 Deng Xiaoping played an important role in making the decision. It is no coincidence that normalisation happened after his rise to power. His determination to normalise Sino-American relations was revealed in a disclosure to a Japanese visitor. He was quoted as saying, in October 1978, that he would die happy after paying a visit to America.43 If true, the implication was that Deng gave highest priority to a visit to America, which was contingent on normalisation of relations between the two countries. One month after normalisation, in late January 1979, Deng Xiaoping visited the United States, during which time the Chinese leader tried to build strategic relations with the United States. In his interview with the Times (London) before his departure for the United States, Deng Xiaoping emphasised that in the face of the increasing Soviet threat it was necessary to strengthen Sino-American relations, to establish an anti-Soviet united front. 44 He made it quite clear that Sino-American co-operation was a vital tool against Soviet influence in the Middle East and Southern Asia, but he was in favour of an informal, rather than a formal alliance.45 The Chinese need for a better relationship with the United States was seen also in its reaction to the congressional passage of the TRA. Only three months after the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States, Congress passed the act, which very much angered the Chinese Communists. In March 1979, the Chinese constantly let the Americans know that they were concerned about the discussion of the act in Congress.46 When President Carter signed the act into law, Deng charged that it threatened the political basis of Sino-American normalisation.47 Later, Deng told the editor of the Christian Science Monitor that the TRA was a big obstacle to the development of Sino-American relations.48 The Chinese, however, did not take measures to downgrade their relations with the United States. 'Strategic reasons' must have again played an important part in China's acquiescence. Later, PRC Vice Foreign Minister, Zhang Wenjin, told Holdridge that Deng Xiaoping tolerated continued arms
43 Gong Li, 1992, op. cit., p. 315. There is no American source to confirm whether there was a link between Deng Xiaoping's expression of his willingness to visit America and Carter's decision to offer a carrot- the invitation to visit the United States in Deng's address. 44 Gong Li, 1992, op. cit., p. 327. 45 See more details in Gong Li, 1992, op. cit., pp. 327-336; Carter, op. cit., pp. 202-211; Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 405--414. Interestingly, Southeast Asia was not considered as the place where Chinese and American interests in opposing Soviet threat were of the same order. Obviously China was more worried about the Soviet threat in Indochina than the United States. 46 see more details in'Han, op. cit., pp. 285-88. 47 Han, op. cit., p. 289. 48 Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Deng Xiaoping's Selected Writings), Vol. 3, p. 184.
187 sales to Taiwan for 'strategic reasons' .49 A representative of the Chinese Foreign Ministry also told Haig, 'Taiwan is important to us, but strategic co-operation is important to us, too'. 50 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan of December 1979 drew China and the United States closer together. In January 1980, the Chinese received US Defence Secretary, Harold Brown, and in May Defence Minister Geng Biao went to the United States. US officials described their discussions with the Chinese on military matters as 'almost like talking to an ally' .51 The Chinese allowed the Americans to build facilities near the Sino-Soviet border to monitor Soviet missile tests. Beijing and Washington also developed what amounted to a co-ordinated strategy on Indochina. Each supported Pakistan and aided the Afghan Mujahedin. Michael Yahuda called this relationship 'strategic parallelism' .52 Sino-American relations developed fast. In 1980 alone, over one thousand Chinese delegations visited the United States, and over four thousand students went to the United States to study. Bilateral trade, helped by the granting of MFN status in January 1980, was worth nearly $5 billion in 1980.53 At the same time, the Chinese started to show their reluctance to yield further to the United States. Their assumption that the United States would cease selling arms to Taiwan did not materialise, and again made them angry. Moreover, they seemed to consider playing their own 'Soviet card' in their relations with the United States, reconsidering their role in Soviet-American rivalry. In June 1980, they rejected an American proposal for the visit of US warships to Chinese ports. The TRA was as the stated reason for the refusal. This tendency became consolidated in the years that followed. China protested strongly about a statement by presidential candidate Ronald Reagan on Taiwan. Further, in sharp contrast with their negotiating position in 1978, China's leaders brought great pressure to bear on the Reagan Administration on the 4 question of arms sales to Taiwan. 5 When Secretary of State Haig visited China in June 1981, Foreign Minister Huang Hua warned him that 'a rupture' in Sino-American
49 Holdridge, op. cit., p. 185. 50 Haig, op. cit., p. 215. 51 Cited in Yahuda M., 1993, 'The Significance ofTripolarity in China's Policy Towards the United States Since 1972', in Ross R. (ed.),1993, China, the United States and the Soviet Union, Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War, p. 24. 52 Yahuda, op. cit., p. 24. 53 Garver, op. cit., pp, 163--64. 54 On 23 August 1980, president candidate Reagan told a press conference that Taiwan was really a country and should be treated as such, and the United States should restore diplomatic relations with
188 relations might ensue unless Washington acceded to Chinese demands on arms sales. Deng Xiaoping told Haig that relations might go backwards if the United States went too far. 55 The Chinese were also unhappy with what they believed to be a US breach of its promise to offer $2 billion in loans, given by Vice President Walter Mondale during his visit to China in 1979. As summer came, Chinese pressure on the Taiwan question increased. In early July, the Chinese delivered a demarche to the American ambassador in Beijing, stating if the United States continued to sell arms to Taiwan, this would force China into a very strong reaction with grave consequences for the strategic situation. Late in August, the Chinese cancelled Chief-of-Staff Liu Huaqing's visit to the United States. The Chinese also used high-level Sino-American meetings to exert pressure on the Americans. In late October 1981, at his meeting with Reagan during an East-West summit in Mexico, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang tried to obtain Reagan's support for improving Sino-American relations. He cited the threat of the 'Polar Bear' to consolidate his argument, but the American president was unwilling to acquiesce. Later, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua even presented to his American counterpart, Alexander Haig, what the latter considered an ultimatum. The Chinese Foreign Minister stated that the United States must undertake that sales in any given year would not exceed the level of the Carter years, and indicate that sales would decline annually and then cease.56 Secretary Haig was considered as a Beijing proponent. His anger upon receiving the ultimatum, as reported in his memoirs, shows how tense the China-US 7 relationship was at that time. 5 Around the time of this incident, Chinese disappointment about Sino-American relations reached its peak, but China still did not want to break off relations with the Americans. Huang Hua suggested high-level talks on the subject of arms sales to Taiwan. In December 1981, the talks started in Beijing between US Ambassador Arthur Hummel and PRC Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wenju. Ultimately, both sides compromised and signed the 17 August 1982 communique, known as the second Shanghai Communique. China secured US commitment that the quality of the arms
Taiwan, and Taiwan should be provided with whatever arms it believed it needed to defend itself. (see Holdridge, op. cit., p. 198). 55 See more details in"Haig, op. cit., p. 207. Han, op. cit., p. 290. 56 See more details in Zhuang Qubing, 'The US 'Taiwan Relations Act", Beijing Review, 7 September 1981. Han, op. cit., p. 291. 57 See more details in Haig, op. cit., p. 210. 189 Washington sold to Taiwan would not exceed the quality of the arms it had sold in previous years, and that the quantity of the arms would decrease over time. For their part, the Chinese agreed to US linkage of its arms sales policy to China maintaining its policy of peaceful unification. Though a compromise was reached, thanks to concessions on both sides, the Chinese attitude is interesting. China is believed to have agreed to the communique only once it was clear that the US deal with Taiwan on the F- 5E aircraft was about to go ahead regardless. Secretary of State George Shultz, who replaced Haig that month, claimed that the Chinese concession was made when they understood that the Americans were firm in their Taiwan policy.58 Haig also agreed that the US proposal of a communique on arms sales was 'less than the Chinese had wanted', though he tried to make light of the Administration's tough stance, one that he 9 opposed. 5 In 1982, Beijing moved away from a united front with the United States and championed a more independent foreign policy. In September, at the Twelfth Party Congress, Deng Xiaoping stated that 'the three major tasks for the Chinese people in the 1980s are to make intensified efforts in the socialist modernisation drive; strive to bring about reunification of the motherland, of which Taiwan is an integral part, and oppose hegemony'.6° Compared with the three tasks Deng set out in 1979, a clear change in Chinese foreign policy is evident. The Soviet Union was no longer a serious threat, and opposing hegemony was the least important of the three tasks. Moreover, at the congress, the CCP's General Secretary Hu Yaobang declared that both superpowers were equally hegemonic.61 Garver observes that 'talk of a united front against Soviet hegemony disappeared and the notion of military alliance or strategic co-operation with the United States were explicitly rejected'.62 There were both domestic and international conditions favourable for the change m Chinese foreign policy. Carol Hamrin observes that there was a coalition of politicians dissatisfied with what they alleged was China's excessive alignment with the
58 See more details in Shultz G., 1993, Turmoil and Triumph, p.384. 59 Haig, op. cit., p. 215. Though Haig hinted that the failure of American attempts to release American hostages in Iran, which Haig did not take part in, was the reason for his resignation, one can speculate that differences between Haig and President Reagan over China policy also was part of that decision. 6° Cited in Han, op. cit., p. 411. 61 See more details on' the change in the PRC foreign policy in Han, op. cit., pp. 411-416. See also Deng Xiaoping's talk to an enlarged Military Commission's meeting in 1985 in Deng Xiaoping, 1995, Dang Tieu Binh Van Tuyen (Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works), pp. 138-39. 62 Garver J., 1993, Foreign Relations ofthe People Republic of China, p. 98. 190 United States and unnecessary animosity towards the Soviet Union.63 Sino-Soviet relations also improved following Brezhnev's 1982 Tashkent statement, and especially from 1985 when Gorbachev carried out his perestroika in the Soviet Union. In 1983, when Weinberger visited China, Zhao Ziyang told him four or five times that Taiwan was an obstacle to future better relations. Weinberger admitted that he became so tired of listening to Zhao's references about Taiwan that he pretended to be asleep. 64 Moreover, Weinberger observed that the Chinese were not interested in American views on the threat from the north, but interested only in exchanges of military technology. 65 This is a clear example of China's changing attitude. The Soviet Union was no longer a threat to China, which had forced it to align with the United States. China also pressed the United States very hard on a series of bilateral issues, such as the asylum granted to the tennis star Hu Na, the US court ruling on China's liability for the Qing Dynasty's railway bonds, the Senate's pro-Taiwan position on membership in the Asian Development Bank, and the question of US airlines being able to fly to Taiwan as well as to the mainland.66 The Chinese were so angered that an article in Beijing Review stated that 'the fact that there still remains a "Taiwan issue" in the relations between China and the United States is the consequence of imperialistic expansionist policy on the part of the United States'.67 The Chinese also used high-level meetings with Americans to raise their opposition to American foreign policy. For instance, at his meeting with Reagan in 1984, Deng criticised the United States, in Reagan's words, 'for a whole range of supposed sins' .68 On the other hand, China still wanted to promote military contacts and strategic co-operation with the United States. 69 In 1983, Chinese Defence Minister Zhang Aiping invited US Defence Secretary Weinberger to visit China. In 1984 he paid a return visit to the United States. As mentioned above, the two sides signed three minutes to promote
63 Hamrin C., 'China reassess the superpowers', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 56, No.2, summer 1983. See also Dorothy Solinger, 'The Fifth National People's Conress and the process of policy making: reform, readjustment, and the opposition,' Asian Survey, Vol. XXII, No. 12, December 1982. 64 Weinberger, op. cit., p. 271. 65 Weinberger, op. cit., p. 269. 66 See more details in Ross R., 1991, 'China Learns to Compromise: Change in US-China Relations, 1982-84', China Quarterly, No. 128 (December 1991), pp. 742-73. 67 Li Zhongyun, 'US Policy towards Taiwan: 1948-50' Part II, Beijing Review, Vol. 25, no. 28 (July 12, 1982), p. 25. 68 See more details in Reagan, op. cit., p. 370. 69 Garver observes that military contacts were not suspended, but were handled in a more low-key fashion. (Garver, op. cit., p. 98.) This comment probably was not precise. 191 Sino-American co-operation in military affairs. The PRC's Defence Minister Zhang showed Weinberger such personal attention that the latter wrote, 'his cordiality and thoughtfulness towards me were not exceeded anywhere else in the world that I visited' .70 Moreover, though Vice President Bush went to Beijing with nothing new to offer, Deng Xiaoping received him warmly, calling the United States a friend. Haig commented that it was 'a significant choice of terms that had been avoided by other Chinese leaders' .71 Another example was Weinberger's second visit to China in 1986. Deng raised with him the possibility of United States loans to China, similar to the loans for military and economic assistance that America extended to other countries. Though nothing came of this request, it surprised the US Defence Secretary. Later he wrote, 'it seemed so much at variance with China's normal pattern of not wanting to ask us for anything. I took it as another sign of how far our friendship had progressed! The approach showed that the Chinese felt far closer to us than we had ever estimated'. 72 There were reasons for the Chinese to adopt an independent foreign policy. From the point of view of domestic politics, the growing engagement of Chinese society, economy and policy with the largely Western-dominated international society and economy had already raised the old cry of the danger of Westernisation. The General Secretary ofthe CCP, Hu Yaobang, became a victim when, in January 1987, he was cast aside. From a strategic point of view, China also wanted to improve relations with the Soviet Union to play the Soviet card for possible gains in Sino-American relations. Deng was so eager to normalise Sino-Soviet relations that he told Weinberger, 'if I felt a trip to the Soviet Union could bring about the fulfilment of our three conditions for better relations, I would go tomorrow'. 73
The US crusade to isolate Vietnam
In the previous section, we saw that the United States was in favour of limited strategic co-operation with China, which resulted in a contradictory approach to the People's Republic. No matter how tense their relationship was at times, the United States considered China as a partner, moreover a strategic one. Rapprochement had been
70 Weinberger, op. cii., p. 266. 71 Haig, op. cit., p. 213. 72 Weinberger, op. cit., p. 285. 73 Ibid. 192 progressing, with ups and downs, since Kissinger's secret visit to Beijing in July 1971. Compared with the years between 1973 and 1977, the United States had forged better relations with China. This American attitude towards China once again casts a shadow over their policy towards Vietnam. With the need to improve relations with China, the Americans sacrificed their intention to improve relations with Vietnam. During the whole decade, from 1978 to 1990, the United States indirectly supported China in an anti-Vietnam course, isolating Vietnam in the world arena. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the United States tried to persuade Vietnam to drop its economic aid precondition in order to normalise their relations. But when Vietnam signalled its acceptance of the American demand in the second half of 1978, the Americans had changed their mind, refusing to normalise. The American change of heart in late 1978 was seen most clearly in US reaction to the official Vietnamese dropping of preconditions for normalisation. In September, at a meeting with Richard Holbrooke and Michael Oksenberg in New York, Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach agreed to normalise without condition. He asked that a joint memorandum on the question be issued, but Holbrooke refused.74 On October 11, President Carter accepted the Brzezinski-Woodcock recommendation and decided to defer ~ormalisation with Vietnam until after Sino-American normalisation.75 This decision reversed Carter's own September intention to normalise simultaneously with China and Vietnam.76 Carlyle Thayer claims that Carter asked his advisors to respond to three options: to recognise China first, to recognise Vietnam first, and to recognise them simultaneously. In the end he decided to take the first option.77 Why did the United States change its mind? To Brzezinski, American-Vietnamese normalisation would spoil efforts to normalise Sino-American relations. Carter himself admits the Chinese factor in his administration's refusal to normalise relations with Vietnam. He wrote, 'there would be a firestorm whenever we had to face the China-Taiwan issue, and this in itself would be a full agenda. The China
74 See more details in Brown, op. cit., pp. 28-30. At that time, Fredrick Brown was the State Department's country director for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. But in his memoirs, Brzezinski claimed that at that meeting Nguyen Co Thach and Holbrooke agreed in principle to normalise American-Vietnamese relations. (Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 228.) Probably there was a tacit understanding that the normalisation could proceed soon. 75 Carter, op. cit., pp.'194-95; Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 228; Brown, op. cit., p. 30. 76 Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 228. 77 Thayer Carlyle, 1985, 'United States Policy Towards Revolutionary Regimes: Vietnam (1975-1983)', in Dick Clark, ed., US Foreign Policy: Adjusting to Change in the third World, pp. 121-28. 193 move was of paramount importance, so after a few weeks of assessment I decided to postpone the Vietnam effort until after we had concluded our agreement in Beijing'.78 Interestingly, China did not demand US non-recognition of Vietnam as condition for US-China normalisation.79 Carter disclosed that in early 1978 the Chinese sent word to the US president that they would welcome closer US relations with Vietnam. 80 Even as late as September 1978, the Chinese told Holbrooke that they would not oppose American recognition of Vietnam. 81 Nevertheless, the prevailing opinion in the Administration, whose representative was Brzezinski, was to defer US-Vietnam normalisation in order to avoid any perceived Chinese dissatisfaction. This fact alone shows that Sino-American relations shaped US policy towards Vietnam. Interestingly, in 1985, after visiting a Khmer refugee camp on the Thai-Cambodian border, former President Carter had told the press, 'the United States should, as a matter of principle, have relations with Vietnam, since, even when countries have differences, it is better to maintain contacts' .82 Unfortunately, when he was in power Carter did not do what later, as a private citizen, he thought that the United States should have done. This once again highlighted the way Sino-American relations overshadowed US policy towards Vietnam. At the time, ASEAN did not object yet the improvement of US-Vietnam relations, which once more highlighted the China factor in US policy towards Vietnam. The American rejection was more meaningful. They neglected relations with Vietnam for the sake of those with China when they understood that the Vietnamese needed an improvement in American-Vietnamese relations to face the Chinese threat. Following his visit to Vietnam in the summer of 1978, Congressman Montgomery was quoted as saying that the Vietnamese were anxious to resume negotiations because they were afraid of the Chinese. 83 Another source claims that Premier Pham Van Dong even spoke to visiting Americans of 'the need for a US presence to help secure the peace and stability of Southeast Asia' .84 The Americans even started to support Beijing in its anti Vietnam crusade. In his speech in Beijing, Brzezinski was believed to have condemned
78 Carter, op. cit., p. 194-95. 79 See Chanda's interview with Woodcock and Holbrooke in Chanda, op. cit., p. 289. 8°Carter, op. cit., p. 194. 81 Cited in Chanda, op. cit., p. 289. 82 See Philadelphia Jn'quirer, June 5, 1985. Cited in Chanda, op. cit., p. 38. 83 Cited in Chanda, op. cit., p. 271. 84 Daniel Southerland, 'US Wary over Vietnam's Overtures,' Christian Science Monitor, August 29, 1978. Cited in Chanda, op. cit., p. 272. 194 'regional hegemony'- a code term used by China for Vietnam. 85 Brzezinski indirectly admitted 'I had already labelled Vietnam publicly as "a Soviet proxy" in keeping with what we had said to the Chinese. Though this view was strongly contested by State' .86 Though the China factor was obvious in this American decision, there are some conflicting claims. Interestingly, Holbrooke, who pushed vigorously but unsuccessfully for normalisation with Vietnam, claims that the decision to shelve normalisation had nothing to do with China. To him there were three factors - boat people, the impending Vietnamese 'invasion' of Cambodia, and impending congressional elections -that blocked normalisation.87 Nayan Chanda argues convincingly that the election would at best have postponed normalisation for a short time, but not indefinitely, as occurred. The other two reasons were also unconvincing, as they were known to US officials when they undertook full-scale preparations to set up an embassy in Vietnam.88 Holbrooke's claim was probably an attempt to shift the responsibilities for the failure of US-Vietnam normalisation to the Vietnamese. Some observers argue that the impression Hanoi was still playing fast and loose on preconditions severely handicapped the State Department in its battle with NSC staff over the compatibility of twin-track normalisation efforts with Beijing and Hanoi.89 This explanation more properly applies to the situation before, but not after September, when the Vietnamese made an unequivocal concession to the Americans. This argument runs parallel with another, which says that the failure of American-Vietnamese normalisation was a result of internal conflict within the Carter Administration.9° Contrary to Carter's thinking, his Secretary of State, Cyprus Vance, believed that normal diplomatic relations with Hanoi were supported by Asian allies, and could increase American influence with Vietnam and offer it alternatives to
85 Xinhua, May 20, 1978. Cited in Sutter, 1981, 'China's Strategy towards Vietnam and its Implications for the United States', in Elliott D. (ed.), The Third Indochina Conflict, p. 177. 86 Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 228. 87 Cited in Chanda, op. cit., p. 292. As for the term 'invasion', while the purpose of this dissertation is not to debate over that term, it should be noted that the Vietnamese cannot accept it. This corresponds to the Americans refusal to accept that they invaded Vietnam in 1964-I 973. 88 Chanda, op. cit., p. 292. During September-October 1978 the State Department run a project to establish a US Embassy in Hanoi. 89 Brown observes that on the one hand, Phan Hien told press in Tokyo that Vietnam would not seek aid as a precondition for normalisation, but a congressional delegations visiting Hanoi could not pry a convincing renunciation of the aid demand from the top leadership (See Brown, op. cit., p. 29). 90 There was a fight between the Vietnamese and Chinese desks within the State Department, and also a fight between Brzezinski-Woodcock and Vance-Hoi brooke over normalisation with China and Vietnam. See more details in Chanda, op. cit., pp. 282-84, 286-89. Vance, op. cit., p. 122, Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 228-229. 195 excessive political, economic, and military dependence on the Soviet Union or China. 91 This line, however, was not accepted. I am of the view that although policy is always decided by individuals, the fact that President Carter listened to Brzezinski's advice but not Vance's recommendation showed that global calculations decided US policy towards small states. In this case US policy towards China predetermined its policy towards Vietnam. Some argue that the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty blocked normalisation. But this explanation does not take into account the Vietnamese fight for American recognition before taking on military co-operation with the Soviet Union. While Vietnamese efforts to normalise relations with America were at their height in September-October,92 the move towards the Soviet Union was made in November. Duiker argues that Hanoi was committed to its treaty with Moscow regardless of the state of US-Vietnamese negotiations over the restoration of diplomatic relations.93 We know that the signing of the treaty between Vietnam and the Soviet Union was done in hurry, though preparations were discussed earlier. 94 This haste suggests that it was probable that the signing was awaiting the result of Vietnamese-American negotiations. It seems that the American-Vietnamese relationship was not affected by the Soviet-Vietnam treaty, but the reverse applied. The China factor also was clearly seen in the American attitude towards Vietnam in later events. In December 1978, Washington did not respond to the Vietnamese proposal to renew talks on normalisation. Later that month, they condemned the Vietnamese for what they perceived as a Vietnamese 'invasion' of Cambodia. This condemnation contrasted sharply with their previous understanding of Vietnamese self-defence in the latter's reaction to the Khmer Rouge's encroachments. Raphael Iungerich, chief Indochina analyst of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, later told Chanda that 'Holbrooke and all of us were sort of taking the Vietnamese side on this issue up through December 1978. It was Vietnamese
91 Interestingly, the Vance-Holbrooke line was supported by the policy of Australian Malcom Fraser-Andrew Peacock. See Thayer Carlyle, 1980, 'Australia and Vietnam, 1950-1980' Part II, From Conciliation to Condemnation, 1972-1980,' Dyason House Papers [Australian Institute oflntemational Affairs], Vol. 6, No.3, pp. 5-12. See also Chanda, op. cit., p. 286. 92 See more details in Chanda, op. cit., pp. 282-84. 93 Duiker W., 1986, China and Vietnam: The Roots ofConflict, p. 80. 94 In 1981, a well-placed official told Nayan Chanda in an interview that though the draft of Vietnamese-Soviet treaty was ready in early 1978, it had not been signed as the Vietnamese 'did not want to cloud the prospect of normalisation with the United States'. See Chanda, op. cit., pp. 257-58. 196 who were being ambushed within Vietnamese territory'. 95 The condemnation would have been understandable if it had taken place later, when the Vietnamese stay in Cambodia became protracted.96 A momentous condemnation, however, shows that it was made under the influence of global calculations, rather than the event itself. This indirectly highlights how the Sino-American relationship influenced America's attitude towards Vietnam, though one can reasonably claim that the condemnation could also have signalled American concern over the increase in Soviet influence in the area. The American reaction to the Chinese invasion of Vietnam was another indication of the pro-China position taken by the United States in relation to the Sino-Vietnam conflict. As soon as the Sino-Vietnamese war broke out, the US State Department called on 17 February for an 'immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and Chinese troops from Vietnam' .97 This seemingly neutral position could not hide a pro-China stance. Marilyn Young pointed out that the China attack against Vietnam in February 1979 was only possible with the blessing of the United States.98 Duiker commented that 'Washington had unwillingly become an accomplice of Chinese foreign policy objectives in Southeast Asia' .99 Moreover, Brzezinski admitted the American supporting role in the Chinese attack when he wrote, 'I also felt that a steadfast US position would convince the Chinese that we were not a "paper tiger" and that the relationship with us had certain long-range and reciprocal security benefits' .100 The US National Security Advisor seemed to be claiming that the teeth of the US 'tiger' were protecting China against a possible Soviet military response to the Chinese war against Vietnam. According to Brzezinski, the United States warned the Soviet Union of the consequences of a Soviet intervention on Vietnam's behalf, which partly prevented the Soviet Union from taking military measures against China. 101
95 Chanda, op. cit., p. 286. 96 A high-ranking Vietnamese diplomat disclosed, in his unpublished memoirs, that the Vietnamese never discussed, at least to his best knowledge, the aims of the Cambodia affair. It sounds like the Vietnamese leadership did not have a clear-cut plan in Cambodia. The talks on the 'Indochina Federation' was simply a fantasy made by some ill-intention propagandists and consumed by some light-hearted observers. Vietnamese leaders simply thought, no matter how naive they were, that they could help the Cambodian to build a new life, which also served their security interests. 97 New York Times February 18, 1979. Cited in King Chen, 1986, China's War with Vietnam, 1979, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, p. 107. 98 Young M., 1991, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990, p. 311. 99 DUI'k er, 198 6, op. cit., . p. 85. 100 B rzezms . k'1, op. c1t.,. p. 414 . 101 Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 414. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin's account did not go into detail about the messages channelled through the hot line between Brezhnev and Carter, except to confirm that both sides 197 During the entire decade between 1979 and 1988, following the overthrow ofthe Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, the Americans were consistent in demanding that Vietnam withdraw from Cambodia before normalisation of relations between the two countries could proceed. In May 1979, Vance recommended to the president that communications with Vietnam be re-opened through its UN delegation in New York. Talks began in July between Robert Oakley, Holbrooke's deputy, and Ambassador Ha Van Lau, the Vietnamese permanent representative to the UN. Lau told the Americans that Vietnam still wanted to establish normal relations with the United States, but the Americans saw it as impossible due to the 'invasion' of Cambodia. Vance insisted that 'the chance for normalisation was dead for the time' .102 To him, the aim of the meeting was just 'to warn Hanoi to act with restraint in Southeast Asia, especially regarding Thailand, and to caution them about the long-term implications of the growing Soviet military presence in Vietnam' .103 Sihanouk disclosed that American officials, including Christopher, Woodcock, Holbrooke and Oakley, all told him that they favoured a 'Sihanouk solution' for Cambodia. 104 To the Americans, Pol Pot's unpopular government and Heng Samrin's 'un-Cambodian' government should be abolished, and an international conference should be convened. However, the United States did not take that independent course. Instead, it followed the Chinese line in the Cambodia question. In September 1979, Washington voted for retaining the UN seat for the Khmer Rouge. Moreover, it joined China in opposing the ASEAN proposal, made at the International Conference on Kampuchea in 1981, to disarm the Khmer Rouge and the Phnompenh government. As for the first act, the United States was by the time well aware ofthe brutality of the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, and faced a moral charge for supporting it. But strategic considerations forced them to ally with those well-known murderers. 105 They would not even abstain from voting. Explaining the vote, Cyrus Vance states, 'unpleasant as it was to contemplate voting, even implicitly, for the Khmer Rouge, we could not afford the far-reaching consequences of a vote that would isolate us from
suspected the other's strategy towards China. See more details in Anatoly Dobrynin, 1995, In Confidence, p. 418. 102 Vance, op. cit., p. 123. 103 Ibid. 104 Sihanouk, 1980, War and Hope, the Case for Cambodia, pp. 113-15. 105 Western observers claim that prior to 1978 Hanoi also did not condemn the Khmer Rouge. Some Vietnamese diplomats today consider this was a mistake made by Vietnamese leaders at the time (Based on my interviews in Hanoi). However, this is not the focus of the present essay. 198 ASEAN, Japan, China, our ANZUS treaty partners, and most of our European allies'. 106 A senior US official said that the choice was between moral principles and international law. The scales weighed in favour of law because it also served US security interests. 107 Vance's reference to law was simply a rationalisation for siding with the Khmer Rouge as there is no international law that forbids the overthrow of a genocidal regime. 108 More recent American championing of human rights in its foreign policy, especially US and international intervention under the flag of protection of human rights in the former Yugoslavia and some African countries, suggests that international law today has changed, departing from the boundaries of 'state sovereignty', and encompassing 'moral responsibilities'. Abstention would not have been a vote for a new government in Cambodia. It would have fulfilled US national interests, as well as helping the United States avoid the charge of siding with the Khmer Rouge. It would have showed more US independence in its policy towards Cambodia. The US failure to abstain was an example of how US geo-political calculations affected its attitude towards Vietnam. This was an act calculated to side with China and to oppose the perceived increase of Soviet influence in the area. In the autumn of 1980 the new US Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie, was keen to abstain in the UN vote on Pol Pot's credentials. But eventually, under tremendous pressure from China and from American ambassadors in ASEAN capitals, Muskie agreed to a US vote in favour of Democratic Kampuchea (DK). 109 The de facto US siding with the Khmer Rouge highlighted US policy towards Indochina. National Security Advisor Brzezinski was convinced that Cambodia was a 'proxy' war between the Soviet Union and China, and this alone justified supporting the anti-Vietnamese forces, regardless of their character. 110 Brzezinski was also believed to have persuaded Thailand to co-operate with China to rebuild the Khmer Rouge on the
106 Vance, op. cit., p. 126. 107 Cited in Chanda, op. cit., p. 377. That fateful vote linked US support to a murderous group with whom US officials were forbidden to shake hands. 108 There is nothing in international law to uphold that overthrow. But in order to blame Vietnam for breaking international law one has to cite which international law that it broke. On legal aspect of the Cambodian question consult Klintworth Gary, 1989, Vietnam's Invasion in Cambodia in International Law. 109 Chanda, op. cit., p. 382. 110 B rown, op. elf.,. p. 42 . 199 occasion of his visit to Thailand in the spring of 1979. 111 The United States also backed the creation of the Khmer resistance using the remnants of Pol Pot's forces as the nucleus. These decisions were viewed by the Carter Administration as vital to supporting ASEAN's rejection of what the Vietnamese claimed as the irreversibility of the Cambodian situation. American pressure on ASEAN to drop its demand for disarming the Khmer Rouge and the Phnompenh government in order to hold free elections in Cambodia was a clear case of the US pro-China position on the Cambodian question. At the July 1981 International Conference on Kampuchea, US Assistant to Secretary of State, John Holdridge, even threatened the Singaporean Ambassador that he would jnform his Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, about his insistence on the proposal to disarm. The ambassador found this crude interference in Singapore's internal affairs unforgivable. 112 Under American pressure, ASEAN was obliged to drop its initiative. This story is not intended to highlight Holdridge's personal character, but to show how far US officials were prepared to go in pressing a pro-China position. As mentioned above, a 'Sihanouk resolution' would have been more independent than siding with the Khmer Rouge. Faced with the American attitude on Cambodia question, Vietnamese leaders came to the conclusion that the United States was trying to 'come back' to Indochina. Truong Chinh, then number two in the VCP, wrote, 'taking advantage of the Chinese renegade, the United States is seeking a come-back to Indochina to fight against revolution in this peninsula' .113 Though the statement shows how the Vietnamese misunderstood American motivations in supporting the Khmer Rouge, it illustrates what ramifications a US pro-China policy had on the state of American-Vietnamese relations. Undoubtedly, it worsened the situation, an indirect influence of US China policy on its relations with Vietnam. In the 1980s, the United States remained hostile to Vietnam. First, it supported ASEAN in its anti-Vietnam crusade. This period saw the increase of ASEAN's importance in US foreign policy. Successive US administrations dealt with Indochinese
111 See more details in Elizabeth Becker, 1986, When the War Was Over: The Vietnamese Voices of Cambodia's Revolution and Its People, New York: Simon and Schuster, p. 440. Though in his memoirs, Brzezinski was silent about this effort, he wrote that one of his objectives of his May 1978 visit to China was to persuade China to facilitate the emergence of an independent Cambodian government that enjoys the support of its people' (see Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 207 op. cit.,. 112 See more details in Chanda, op. cit., p. 388-89. 113 Truong Chinh, 1982, op. cit., p. 65. 200 affairs (except MIAs) through the filter of relations with ASEAN. In 1982, the United States began a program of covert assistance worth $15 million a year, channelled through ASEAN countries to the non-communist factions of the Cambodian coalition. 114 In 198 5, Congress authorised up to $5 million in overt aid for education, training, and logistical support for resistance groups operating out of Thailand. 115 Commenting on this US policy, Marilyn Young wrote, 'indifferent to the suffering its policies cause, the United States has helped to keep Cambodia at war for over a decade, deliberately impoverishing both Vietnam and Cambodia in the process. It has been an inexpensive way to punish Vietnam and pursue a 'strategic alliance' with China at the same time'. 116 Second, the United States maintained its embargo on trade and investment against Vietnam. Japan, the European Community, and other potential aid donors or investors were reluctant to break ranks as long as the United States held fast. The denial of American maritime oil technology to Vietnam through third countries and prevention of major development loans from international financial institutions were damaging to Vietnam's economy. The Reagan Administration was so hostile to Vietnam that it was ready to slow down the discussion over MIAs. Steve Hood observes that talks on American MIAs suffered a serious breakdown in 1983, despite Vietnam's attempts to rekindle talk of normalisation and the return of some American MIA remains. 117 Another example was Shultz's speech of April 1985, on the tenth anniversary of the fall of Saigon, which condemned Vietnam for victimising the 24 million people of South Vietnam. The statement went against the advice of some Vietnam specialists within the administration, who were afraid that such a statement would disrupt progress on the POW/MIA issue. 118
114 Chanda, op. cit., p. 402. Brown wrote that since 1984 covert assistance on the order of$10 to $15 million annually has reportedly been provided to non-communist factions ofthe CGDK. (Brown, op. cit., p. 44.) 115 Brown, op. cit., p. 45. 116 Young, op. cit., p. 312. 117 Cited in Hood Steven J., 1992, Dragon Entangled, Indochina and the China-Vietnam War, New York: M.E.Sharpe Inc., p. 72. In February 1982, Deputy Assistant Secretary ofDefence, Richard Armitage, visited Hanoi to probe possibilities of renewing Vietnamese POW/MIA co-operation. The next two years saw only expansion of technical level meetings. 118 See more details in Shultz G., op. cit., p. 552-53. 201 Moreover, the Americans added three issues to the American-Vietnamese dialogue: emigration of Vietnamese children of American fathers, the Orderly Departure Program permitting emigration of Vietnamese with connections to the United States, and the US attempt to gain the exit from Vietnam of former inmates of Vietnamese re-education camps. Marilyn Young commented, 'like the king in a nightmare fairy tale, the United States has set Vietnam task after task as the price of normalisation and aid. As each one is fulfilled, a new one is proffered' .119 The anti-Vietnam mood was also evident within the Reagan Administration. Reagan rewrote Vietnam's history when he told reporters that it had always been two countries that France had liberated after World War II, and whose possible reunification was disrupted by Ho Chi Minh's refusal to participate in elections. 120 US Secretary of State Alexander Haig even seemed to have been unsatisfied with giving a tacit blessing to the Chinese attack on Vietnam in 1979. He hinted that the United States at that time should not have made a public call for withdrawal of Chinese troops from Vietnam. 121 Haig was especially happy with his statement in Manila during his East Asia tour in 1981, denouncing the Vietnamese 'invasion' of Cambodia. He believed that the statement would not have had the same effect if made at a Washington press conference. 122 Another sign of the Reagan Administration's hostility towards Vietnam was its refusal to respond to Vietnamese signals of willingness to improve relations. Chanda observes that in January 1985, the Indochinese Foreign Minister issued an appeal to the United States to return to the region to play a constructive role. Hanoi also attempted to seduce the Americans by dangling the possibility of reduced Soviet use of Cam Ranh Bay. Hanoi also made some unilateral concessions. In 1985, it permitted excavation of a B-52 crash site near Hanoi by US teams. About one hundred MIA remains were repatriated. It also announced that it would make a unilateral effort to resolve the MIA issue within two years. Early in 1986, when Richard Armitage, then Assistant Secretary of Defence and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz went to Hanoi 'to test the waters', they received more assurances of unconditional co-operation on POW/MIA and some indications of greater flexibility on
119 Young, op. cit., p. . 313. 120 Gettleman et al., (ed.), 1995, Vietnam and America, p. xv. 121 See more details in Haig, op. cit., pp. 202-03. 122 Haig, op. cit., p. 216. 202 other issues. These initiatives got no response from the United States. Though the United States understood that Vietnam was not a Soviet puppet, it was not ready to respond to the Indochinese appeal. 123 Instead, while welcoming Vietnamese humanitarian co-operation as a positive move that would clear the deck for eventual normalisation, the United States repeatedly said that it would not establish relations with Hanoi until its withdrawal from Cambodia. 124 The appointment in mid-1987 of retired General John W. Vessey Jr., former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as special Presidential Emissary for Humanitarian Affairs marked the beginning of a new phase in solving the MIA issue. General Vessey visited the SRV in August 1987 and obtained Hanoi's commitment to accelerate efforts to help find MIA remains and provide information. In return, and for the first time, the United States agreed to look into certain humanitarian concerns ofthe Vietnamese as a result ofthe war. In late 1987, the first of three US prosthetics teams visited Vietnam to survey problems of the disabled. It was a result of Hanoi's efforts rather than a show of American good will. In an unprecedented display of co-operation, Hanoi accepted the US offer to conduct joint searches in Vietnam. The first search took place in September 1988.
China's 1Bieeding Vietnam White'
China's limited strategic co-operation with the United States shows that despite the problems China encountered with the United States, it continued to see it as a partner. In Indochina, the two countries' interests were parallel. Moreover, as demonstrated, the Americans offered China concessions by supporting China's policy in this comer of the world. Under such circumstances, the Chinese had more reason to be tough with the Vietnamese during the whole decade of the 1980s. As we will see in this section, the Chinese tried to 'bleed Vietnam white' by supporting a guerrilla war in Cambodia, by exerting military pressure on the border with Vietnam, and by pursuing a diplomatic campaign to isolate Vietnam. China even manoeuvred with the Soviet Union to pressure Vietnam. Earlier in this chapter we learnt that in May 1978, Brzezinski visited China and informed the Chinese that President Carter had made up his mind on normalisation. This
123 Assistant Secretary of Defence, Richard Armitage, told Chanda that the Soviet-Vietnamese marriage is not made in heaven. See Chanda, op. cit., p. 402. 124 Chanda, op. cit., p. 403. 203 fundamentally changed Sino-American relations. After that Sino-Vietnamese relations quickly deteriorated. Three major factors precipitated this deterioration: open Chinese support for Democratic Kampuchea in its conflict with Vietnam, the severing of Chinese economic aid to Vietnam, and the crisis over the overseas Chinese. First, the Chinese changed from a slight inclination towards Cambodia to total support for the DK in the latter's conflict with Vietnam. If in January 1978, Deng Yingchao advised the Khmer Rouge leaders to seek a negotiated settlement with the Vietnamese, in June, Deng Xiaoping told the DK's Foreign Minister, Ieng Sary, that 'China would adopt tougher measures if Hanoi persisted in its anti-China policy' .125 In July, the Chinese promised to increase military aid to the Khmer Rouge. 1 ~ 6 Pao-Min Chang observes that by late July China had sizeably stepped up its supply of military hardware and ammunition to Kampuchea. 127 A report by Geng Biao also indicated that by December 1978, China would have provided the DK with enough equipment for three divisions, and food, medicine, and ammunition for 100,000 troops. 128 There were an estimated 6,000 Chinese military advisers in Cambodia, and a somewhat larger number of technicians. 129 A Vietnamese source claims that the figure '800' was inscribed on weapons sent to Pol Pot!Ieng Sary to remind Khmer Rouge soldiers of the colossal weight of the 800 million Chinese against 50 million Vietnamese. 130 Second, in bilateral relations, the Chinese also toughened their stance and exerted direct pressure on Vietnam. In May 1978, China twice cancelled turn-key aid projects to Vietnam, reaching a total of seventy-two projects. This was followed by the termination of all aid to Vietnam and withdrawal of all Chinese technicians by July. In July, Beijing also announced the closure of its land border with Vietnam. In August, the first bloody skirmish occurred along the Sino-Vietnamese border. In September, the border incidents increased. 131
125 Xinhua, 5 June 1978. Cited in Pao-min Chang, 1985, Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam, Singapore: Singapore University Press, p. 62. 126 The Chinese Rulers' Crimes against Kampuchea (PRK: Foreign Ministry, April 1984, p. 99. Cited in Duiker, 1986, op. cit., p. 78. See also Ross, op. cit., p. 193. See also The Vietnam-Kampuchea Conflict (A Historical Record), p. 31. 127 See more details in Pao-min Chang, op. cit., pp. 70-71. 128 Geng Biao, 1981, 'Geng Biao's Report on the Situation ofthe Indochinese Peninsula', Issues and Studies, Vol. 17, No 1/1981, p. 90. 129 Duiker, 1986, op. cit., p. A FEER article of July 14, 1978 also agreed with this amount. Geng Biao did not give a precise number of Chinese 'working' in Cambodia. He just asserted that it was more than I ,500. Geng Biao, 1981, op. cit., p. 88. 130 The Vietnam-Kampuchea Conflict (A Historical Record), p. 28. 131 See more details in Pao-min Chang, op. cit., pp. 51-72; Nayan Chanda, op. cit., pp. 231-62; Duiker, 1986, op. cit., pp. 63-94; The White Book, pp. 84-89; 204 Finally, il) spring 1978, the crisis over the Chinese living in Vietnam- the Hoa Kieu - also erupted. The Vietnamese charged the Chinese with organising the disorder made by the Hoa in Vietnam. 132 Against this, the Chinese blamed the Vietnamese for their persecution and exodus. David Marr reasonably assessed that 'while there may have been sound economic reasons of these moves [the SRV's economic reform measures in the South], the diplomatic timing could hardly have been worse' .133 Vietnamese leaders' mistake may have been fuelled the conflict, but could not be seen as a primary reason for Chinese hostility. In June, China declared that it would dispatch ships to Vietnam to evacuate 'victimised' Chinese residents. It also closed down all three Vietnamese consulates in China. 134 There seems to be no direct link between changes in Sino-American relations and in China's Vietnam policy. Some observers argue that the Chinese concessions over Taiwan were due to the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations. 135 If true, this would mean that Sino-Vietnamese relations partly shaped China's policy towards the United States, but not the other way around, as this dissertation tries to demonstrate. I maintain that the Chinese were not so concerned about a 'Vietnamese threat', as the Soviet one. They feared that the Soviets would use Vietnam as a base against China. The above-mentioned Geng Biao statement that Cambodia was only the first step in Soviet expansion in Southeast Asia was a clear example of that Chinese fear. The change in Sino-American relations was a result of Chinese calculations about a strategic relationship between China, the United States and the Soviet Union, expressions of which were the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations and the parallel improvement of Soviet-Vietnamese relations. In part, it was also a result of growing mutual suspicion. The Chinese suspected that the Vietnamese would join the Soviet Union in its anti-China policy, whereas the Vietnamese suspected the Chinese would support the Khmer Rouge to weaken Vietnam,
132 See more details in the White Book, pp. 81-82. 133 Marr David, 1981, 'Sino-Vietnamese Relations', The Australian Journal ofChinese Affairs, Canberra, No.6, 1981, p. 58. 134 See more details on the Hoa crisis in Pao-min Chang, 1982, Beijing, Hanoi, and the Overseas Chinese, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies. 135 Holdridge, for instance, claimed that in September 1978, when he was assigned to be national intelligence officer for China, he became aware of the tremendous influence that Vietnam and Cambodia exercised on US-China relations. It was at this time that the American intelligence community noted Vietnam's military build-up against Cambodia, which occurred contemporaneously with the growing Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. See Holdridge, op. cit., p. 179. 205 and they did not want to see a strong southern neighbour. 136 If the Vietnamese had been more circumspect, they would have avoided Chinese misunderstanding of their intentions, and would therefore have avoided the tragedy they suffered in the 1980s. This, however, is another topic. 137 This is not to argue that the failure to secure Sino-Vietnamese relations brought about changes in Sino-American relations. As mentioned above, the Chinese were concerned about the Soviet threat. The improved relationship between the Soviet Union and Vietnam was only one expression of this. The Vietnamese leaders' mistakes aggravated, but did not generate, the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations. It is common in such situations for escalation to occur in both directions, for each to feed on the other - Sino-American normalisation affected US and Chinese policies towards Vietnam, and the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations affected the Chinese position on the relations between China and the United States. I believe that as a small state, Vietnam was not the main subject, but a component, of Chinese as well as American foreign policy concerns. This. said, changes in the Sino-American relationship did affect their attitudes to Vietnam. While there was no direct link between Sino-American relations and Chinese policy towards Vietnam, one can see an indirect link. We can ask whether the Chinese could have been tough towards the Vietnamese without improving relations with the Americans? Probably, not. Without normalisation of relations with the United States, the Chinese would have been forced to work harder for a negotiated settlement of their differences with the Vietnamese. America's role as a 'non-paper tiger' made the Chinese more confident in their relations with Vietnam. Another expression of the impact of Sino-American relations on Chinese policy towards Vietnam was the Chinese refusal to send troops to Cambodia to help the Khmer
136 See more details on the Chinese suspicion in Geng Biao, ibid. Jiang Qing, ibid.; and Huang Hua, ibid. See more details on the Vietnamese suspicions in Truong Chinh, 1982, ibid, and The White Book 137 The Vietnamese official line says that the Chinese were behind the Khmer Rouge's attacks on Vietnam. It overlooked the Chinese failed efforts to restrain the Khmer Rouge, especially in late 1977 early 1978. Deng Xiaoping's July 1977 speech at the third plenary meeting of the Tenth CCPCC also shows that the Chinese were willing to settle the differences with Vietnam by negotiations (see Deng Xiaoping, 'Deng Xiaoping's talks at the Third Plenary Session of the Tenth CCPCC', in Issues and Studies, No.7, Vol. 14, July 1978, pp. 104-05). Even ifthis was only one ofthe opinions within the CCP policy debate, there were no Vietnamese efforts seen to exploit this tendency. Since the day Nixon visited China, the Vietnamese leaders had always suspected Chinese motivations in Vietnam. Moreover, this fire was fuelled by the thousand-year history of Chinese expansion against Vietnam. Stephen Morris' work broadly analyses how the Vietnamese, Chinese and Cambodians misperceived each other's behaviour. See more details in Morris, 1999, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia. 206 Rouge in response to a perceived attack from Vietnam. In October 1978, when preparations for a Vietnamese attack against the DK were in high gear, Deng Xiaoping told Thai reporters of this decision. In December 1978, when Wang Dongxing, a powerful politburo member, visited Cambodia, he rejected Cambodia's request for Chinese troops. Instead he asked his hosts to wage a protracted war. 138 Later Geng Biao discussed four reasons for the rejection, of which the two most important were the Chinese fear of being bogged down in the conflict once they had made the commitment and their reluctance to be considered as interventionists in Cambodia. 139 Had Sino-American relations been normalised by that time, the Chinese would have been more likely to take the step. They would have been unrestrained by the fear that the action would hinder normalisation with the United States. Thus, a tougher Chinese stance was more·obvious once Sino-American relations were normalised. One and a half months after normalisation, and only a fortnight after Deng Xiaoping's visit to America, China waged war against Vietnam. 140 The purpose of the war was declared to be 'to teach Vietnam a lesson'. Why did China not apply this lesson immediately after the Vietnamese 'invasion' of Cambodia? One probable reason for the delay, as William Duiker observes, was to take advantage of the trip by Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping to the United States, scheduled for late January. 141 Defence Minister Geng Biao also admitted that one of the reasons was to prepare public opinion for war. 142 Probably, by 'public opinion' Geng Biao meant international support for the Chinese action, of which American support was the most important. Thus, the impact of Sino-American normalisation on the Chinese decision to attack Vietnam was clear.
138 Ross, op. cit., p. 211. See also Geng Biao, op. cit., p. 86. 139 See more details in Geng Biao, op. cit., pp. 86-88. 140 A Vietnamese source claims that, on February 17, 1979, China sent 600,000 troops to attack Vietnam. The troop number exceeded the number of the American troops present in Vietnam at the height of the Vietnam war. See more details in Truong Chinh, ibid. The Vietnamese source was probably exaggerated. Harlan Jencks, who worked for US intelligence, was more objective in his description of the war. See more details in Jencks H. 'China's 'punitive' War on Vietnam: A military assessment' Asian Survey, No. 8 August 1979. See also Chen King, 1987, China's War with Vietnam, 1979, pp. 96-117. 141 Duiker, 1986, op. cit., p. 84. During his tete-a-tete with Carter, Deng Xiaoping won tacit approval for his plan to attack Vietnam. See more details in Carter, op. cit., pp. 206-09; Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 406; Gong Li, 1992, op. cit., pp. 327-36; Xie Yixian (ed.), 1988, Zhongguo waijiao shi, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shiqi, 1949-79 (A Diplomatic History ofChina, 1949-79), pp. 575-75. Though Chinese sources do not give account on Deng's mention about the Chinese intention to give a 'punitive' attack on Vietnam during the Deng--Carter meeting, they document that Deng was satisfactory with the talks' result, which indicate that if Carter did not tacitly endorsed the Chinese plan, he did not oppose it strongly enough. 142 See Gengbiao, Report, op. cit. See also Duiker, 1986, op. cit., p. 84. 207 One also can see the American factor in the Chinese decision to call off the war. Even the tacit American support for the Chinese attack was limited. The Americans did not want to see the war prolonged and extended. Under such circumstances, the Chinese could not prolong the war. This explained the shortness of the campaign, though Chinese military defeat was also a contributing factor in its withdrawal. 143 Assuming that the Chinese had open American support, the situation would have been different. The Chinese would have stayed longer in Vietnam, and tried to achieve more 'victories' before it withdrew. This once again shows the impact of Sino-American relations on Chinese policy. Limited American support forced the Chinese to be restrained in their attitude. This 'restraining' effect does not conflict with the earlier claim that Sino-American normalisation had an 'encouraging' effect on the Chinese decision to attack Vietnam. Instead, this story shows both sides of the coin, supporting the main argument of this chapter -that Sino-American strategic co-operation was limited. As described earlier in this chapter, the Chinese attitude towards the United States changed in 1982 when the PRC developed an independent policy, a more balanced stance in relation to the United States and the Soviet Union. But the Sino-American relationship had only an indirect impact on Chinese policy towards Vietnam, the Chinese tum towards a balanced attitude in their relations in 1982 did not greatly affect their Vietnam policy. For the whole period, the Chinese had maintained the policy of 'bleeding Vietnam white', the main purpose of which was to isolate Vietnam, and keep it bogged down in Cambodia. This policy was probably announced sometime in late 1979 early 1980. 144 In an October 1984 talk with Sihanouk Deng Xiaoping told his guest that it was time to give Vietnam another lesson without waging war, which indicated that he followed a policy of 'bleeding white Vietnam' .145 An Indochina observer comments that China 'has played the leading role in promoting a strategy of attrition designed to revise the status quo within Cambodia by placing increasing strain on the government and society of Vietnam' .146
143 The Chinese declared to withdraw after the capture of Lang Son, which was considered as a 'victory', though Chinese losses indicated a clear defeat. Later, Chinese officials conceded privately that the results had been disastrous. See New York Times, March 5, 1979. Cited in Duiker, 1986, op. cit., p. 87. 144 Brown observed that in March 1980, Indonesian President Suharto and Malaysian Prime Minister tun Hussein dissociated their countries from China's announced policy of 'bleeding Vietnam white'. See Brown, 1989, p. 40-4'1. 145 MOF A archive. 146 Leifer Michael, 1983, 'The Third Indochina Conflict', Asian Affairs, Vol. 70, Part II, June 1983, pp. 125-131. 208 To bleed Vietnam white, the Chinese tried to keep the war going in Cambodia. They understood that a military solution to the Cambodian conflict was the most important thing. Immediately after the fall of Phnompenh, Chinese leaders reiterated that China would continue to support the Pol Pot regime and did not consider the fall of Phnompenh as the end ofthe struggle. 147 Pao-min Chang observes that 'by late January 1979, Beijing was already busily supplying the Khmer Rouge through Thai territory and using Chinese ships'. 148 The Chinese supplied arms not only to the Khmer Rouge, but also to non-communist troops. In late 1981, China delivered a major arms shipment to Son Sann's forces, which included mortars and rockets, and was enough to equip 3,000 men. This was followed by Beijing's announcement in early May that China was ready to arm another 3,000 of Sihanouk's men. 149 To ensure that the Khmer Rouge could withstand the Vietnamese onslaught, China throughout 1979 kept alive its threat to use force against Vietnam again. In announcing the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Vietnam in early March, Beijing declared that China would counterattack again if Vietnam renewed armed provocation. Deng Xiaoping and Li Xiannian repeated this threat while receiving foreign guests. 150 China stationed over twelve divisions close to the Sino-Vietnamese border, with five army corps behind them, and also carried out a series of manoeuvres designed to tie down a substantial number of Vietnamese units along the border. This was intended to deter Vietnam from any further large-scale and sustained offensives against the Khmer Rouge forces. 151 Leifer observes that Chinese military pressure forced Hanoi to deploy a force of approximately 50,000 near its border. 152 In late November 1979, Hanoi charged that China had committed over 1,000 cases of armed provocation in violation of Vietnamese territory during the six-month period following the end of the border war. On the political front, Chinese leaders made a significant effort to unite all anti Phnompenh Cambodian forces. Deng Xiaoping reportedly lectured Ieng Sary when he came to Beijing immediately after the fall of Phnompenh. He suggested that Prince Sihanouk be appointed Chief of State. This strategy was a calculated one since
147 See more details in Chang, 1985, op. cit., pp. 108-09. 148 Straits Times, February 1, 8 and 11, 1979. Cited in Chang, 1985, op. cit., p. 109. 149 Beijing Review, May 1, 3 and 11, 1981. Cited in Chang, 1985, op. cit., p. 122. 150 Xinhua, March 5, 1979. Cited in Chang, 1985, op. cit., p. 110. 151 See more details on Chinese military activities near the Sino-Vietnamese border in Chang, 1985, op. cit., pp. 110-11. 152 Leifer, op. cit., p. 128.
209 Sihanouk was evacuated from Phnompenh a day before the city fell to SRV/PRK forces. Beijing also persuaded Sihanouk, who at first had wanted to deal with the Vietnamese, to lend his support to the search for a coalition. 153 Deng also advised the Khmer Rouge leader on the need to promulgate a new program based on such widely popular issues as democracy and patriotism. During 1981, the anti-Phnompenh coalition gradually began to take shape. It was formally created in June 1982. 154 On the diplomatic front, the Chinese also tried to win international support for the Khmer Rouge. The DK successfully retained its UN seat, despite its record of genocide. The number ofvotes in its support even increased between 1979 and 1984. In 1979, there were 79 affirmative votes, but in 1984 the number jumped to over 90. The Chinese were also successful in achieving a UN resolution calling for withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. 155 For China, ASEAN played the most important role in its anti-Vietnamese campaign. To alleviate ASEAN fears of China's intentions in the region, Beijing promised not to support revolution in Southeast Asian countries. Furthermore, China reconfirmed its willingness to see Kampuchea become a neutral, non-aligned country. 156 Crucially, Chinese diplomats succeeded in persuading ASEAN to drop its resolution for the International Conference for Kampuchea in 1981, which called for disarmament of both the resistance forces and the Phnompenh government forces. The most critical ASEAN state was Thailand. In early 1979, Beijing approached Thai leaders to request permission for the Khmer Rouge to use Thailand as a headquarters and to allow the shipment of war material to guerrilla forces operating inside Cambodia. As an inducement to Bangkok, China promised that the pro-Beijing Thai Communist Party would no longer seek the violent overthrow ofthe Thai government. 157 In the early 1980s, Chinese leaders understood that the road to Phnompenh might pass through Moscow. At the time, there were indications that Soviet leaders
153 In September 1979, Sihanouk called for a Sihanouk solution to the Cambodian problem, which rejects both the DK and the PRK, and called for a free election in Cambodia (see Patrick Raszelenberg eta/. (ed.), 1995, The Cambodia Conflict: Search for a Settlement, 1979-1991, pp. 28-29). Later that year, he sent three letters to Pham Van Dong to call for a meeting between them, but the letters were returned without opening. (see Sihanouk, 1980, op. cit., p. 151). 154 See more details in Jacques Bekaert, 'Kampuchea's 'loose Coalition': A shotgun Wedding,' Indochina Issues, no. 22 (December 1981). Pao-min Chang, op. cit., pp. 119-24. Duiker, 1986, op. cit., pp. 98. 155 See more details in Amer Ramses, 1994b, The United Nations and Foreign Military Intervention. A Comparative Study of the Application of the Charter, Second Edition, Report No. 33. 156 See more details in Chang, op. cit., p. 125. 157 Geng Biao's Report, pp. 11-12, 1985, Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam, p. 109. 210 hoped to improve relations with China in order to prevent the formation of a solid Sino-American alliance in Asia. In 1982, at talks with the Soviets, the Chinese raised three conditions for normalisation of relations between China and the Soviet Union, of which the most important element was Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. 158 China then proposed a five-point plan leading to the gradual withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and the creation of a neutral and independent Cambodia free from external interference. 159 As long as the Cambodian question was unresolved Sino-Vietnamese relations could not be improved. In April 1979 the two sides started bilateral negotiations. But their positions were far apart. As the apparent victim of Chinese invasion and still under the threat of renewed attack, Vietnam considered the problem of Chinese aggression as the only substantive issue to be discussed. Vietnam insisted that negotiations be strictly confined to matters directly related to the restoration of peace and stability in the border region. China apparently did not want to discuss those questions. It preferred to discuss the question of hegemony in the region. In countering Hanoi's three-point proposal, Beijing put an ambitious eight-point proposal covering Cambodia as well as the ethnic Chinese and territorial disputes at the second meeting. As no agreement could be reached even on procedures for conducting negotiations, the peace talks soon became a forum for trading charge and counter-charge. In September 1981, the Chinese cancelled the talks. Recall that with the coming of the Reagan Administration to power in 1981, Sino-American relations became more difficult. Moreover, a PRK/P AVN successful 1984-85 dry season campaign along the Thai-Cambodian border brought more problems for the Chinese. Though Chinese Foreign Minister, Wu Xueqian, threatened to administer a second lesson if the Vietnamese continued their offensive, the Chinese did little to back up Wu's words. There were no reports of a significant movement of Chinese troops and military material into the border area; and Chinese military operations along the frontier were apparently more limited than in previous years. 160 Moreover, as mentioned above, 'bleeding Vietnam white' suited China.
158 Han, op. cit., p. 426. See also Gromyko Andrei, 1989, Memoirs ofAndrei Gromyko, p. 253. 159 At the time Vietnamese leaders naively believed in their capability to build a strong and 'friendly' government in Cambodia, which would force the A SEAN and China to recognise the Phnompenh government. The Vietnamese paid dearly for that naivety. 160 Duiker, 1986, op. cit., p. 110. The MOFA China Department's files also support this observation. 211 In 1985, the PLA's Deputy Chief of Staff, Su Xin, allegedly gave three reasons for Chinese failure to administer the second lesson: that the force used for a new campaign should be twice as great as the one used in 1979; that China was trying to improve relations with the Soviet Union; and that possible side-effects would be to tarnish China's peaceful image. 161 Ifthis information was correct, the Soviet factor was clearly more important in restraining China from taking provocative decisions in relations to Vietnam. I would add that one reason for Beijing's failure to administer its 'second lesson', however small, was the change in Sino-American relations. Unlike in early 1979, under the Reagan Administration Sino-American relations became more difficult, and the Chinese probably could not win even the tacit support that they had gained in 1979 for another military operation against Vietnam. It would have been more difficult for Washington to maintain its silence if China had launched another attack against Vietnam. In order to consolidate an anti-Vietnam CGDK, the Chinese came to rescue the coalition whenever it showed signs of disunity. In September 1985, Sihanouk changed his mind, and again tried to make a deal with the Vietnamese and the Heng Samrin government. He suggested a peace conference that would lead to an eventual coalition between the CGDK and the Phnompenh regime. The Chinese, however, opposed the idea. In the end, Sihanouk had to reconcile with the Chinese position. 162 Also, in late 1987, Sihanouk agreed to meet with Hun Sen, but when the latter flew to Pyongyang to meet him, he changed his mind, probably because of Chinese pressure. Though in the second half of the 1980s there were some signs of improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, 163 in relations with Vietnam, China maintained its tough stance. On several occasions Vietnamese leaders signalled their desire for an improvement in relations with China. After a successful campaign along the Thai-Cambodian border, in December 1984, the Vietnamese offered negotiations with the Chinese to normalise relations. The August 1985 meeting of the Indochinese Foreign Ministers announced that Vietnamese troops would complete their withdrawal from the PRK by 1990, and their willingness to open talks with various opposition groups or individuals. In November, the SRV formally agreed to hold direct talks with Khmer Rouge without the
161 MOFA's archives. 162 See more details in Osborne Milton, 1994, Sihanouk, Prince ofLight, Prince ofDarkness, pp. 252-53. 163 See more details in Duiker, 1986, op. cit., p. 111. 212 participation of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. China rejected these initiatives, reiterating its determination to continue providing support for the CGDK. At the same time, Beijing reportedly stepped up its pressure on the Sino-Vietnamese frontier and rejected a Vietnamese proposal for negotiations to settle the border disputes. 164 Carlyle Thayer observes that increased Chinese military activities along the border were linked to Vietnamese offensives in Cambodia. Up to August 1987, six major flare-ups were registered along the border. 165 Beginning in early 1988 tension also began to mount around the Spratly archipelago in the South China Sea. The increased tension led to clashes in March 1988 and resulted in China seizing some of the islands from Vietnam. 166 Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, the Chinese made some diplomatic manoeuvres to test the water. On the diplomatic front, a slight warming of Sino-Vietnamese relations could be detected as early as late 1985, when China's president and his Vietnamese counterpart exchanged messages of congratulation. The two sides also resumed low-level contacts. In March 1986, the Chinese government sponsored a further meeting in Beijing of the three factions making up the CGDK, at which an eight-point plan to resolve the Cambodian problem was unveiled. The most important element of the plan was an acceptance that any settlement would have to take account of the existing regime in Phnompenh. Without tacit support from the Chinese, such a program would have been difficult to achieve. Moreover, China indicated to the Soviets that they no longer objected to the Soviet presence at Cam Ranh Bay, which encouraged the Soviets to pressure the Vietnamese for more flexibility on the Cambodian question. 167 Neither did they object when Sihanouk met Hun Sen at the end of 1987 and in early 1988. As Ramses Amer observes, during the second half of 1988 tension along the Sino-Vietnamese land border steadily decreased and by the end of the year, border trade resumed. 168 This change appeared at the same time as Mikhail Gorbachev tried to normalise Sino-Soviet relations. The effect of Sino-Soviet relations
164 New York Times, January 5, 1986; FEER, October 26, 1985. Vietnam Courier June 1985 pp. 13-14. 165 Thayer, C., 1987, 'Security Issues in Southeast Asia: The Third Indochina War' (paper presented at the Conference on Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific arranged at the Australian National University, 12-14 August 1987, pp. 5-20. 166 See more details in Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 March 1988, pp. 23-24; and 5 May 1988, pp. 23-24. . 167 See more details in Duiker, 1986, op. cit., p. 111. 168 Amer Ramses, 1994, 'Sino--Vietnamese Normalisation in the Light ofthe Crisis ofthe Late 1970s', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 67, No.3, fall, pp. 357-383. 213 on Chinese policy towards Vietnam is clear here. 169 The change was also the result of the strengthening position of the Phnompenh government, and of international conditions unfavourable to Beijing at a time when co-operation between China and the United States was weakening. All these Chinese manoeuvres encouraged the Vietnamese to alter their policy in Cambodia, but there were no signs of China easing its attitude towards Vietnam. During the years 1988-89, while Vietnam tried to solve the international aspect of the Cambodian question, China insisted on linking international and internal aspects. Chinese Premier Li Peng told Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi that Vietnam should not only genuinely withdraw its troops from Cambodia, but should also be responsible for settling Cambodia's internal affairs. 170
Conclusion
This chapter shows that during the years between 1978 and 1988 China and the United States maintained a kind of limited strategic co-operation, which was characterised by both co-operation and tension. The two countries continued to operate as partners and even achieved a higher level of development in their relations - they overcame the reluctance of the years 1973-77 and successfully normalised their relations. The state of the Sino-American relationship conditioned their policies towards Vietnam. One of the clearest impacts of Sino-American normalisation and limited strategic co-operation was the American refusal to normalise relations with Vietnam. The rejection reversed the previous US stance over American-Vietnamese normalisation. The prevailing opinion within the Carter Administration was concern over the possible impact of American-Vietnamese normalisation on Sino-American normalisation. When the United States needed a better relationship with China in order to compete with the Soviet Union, it sacrificed normalisation with Vietnam, which after 1975 did not play a significant role in US foreign policy. The reversal in the US attitude to Vietnam in 1978 was a clear attempt not to provoke the Chinese. US appeasement of China, shown in its refusal to normalise relations with Vietnam, is even more obvious given that the Chinese did not oppose American recognition, but the Carter Administration was so cautious that it decided not to normalise with Vietnam.
169 See more details iri Nguyen-vo Thu Huang, 1992, Khmer-Viet Relations and the Third Indochina Conflict, p. 152. 170 Renmin Ribao, II February 1989. Cited in Klintworth Gary, 1989, 'China's Indochina Policy', Journal ofNortheast Asian Studies, fall1989, pp. 25-44. 214 This US caution points to two conclusions: the insignificant role Vietnam played in American foreign policy, and US readiness to sacrifice normalisation with Vietnam for the sake of relations with China. The latter point directly supports the main argument of this dissertation: that the Sino-American relationship shaped American policy towards Vietnam. The former point also indirectly supports that argument. Vietnam's insignificant position in US foreign policy was a continuation of the US policy of disengagement that followed the Sino-American rapprochement in 1972. In chapter IV we saw that the Paris peace agreement was the first step in US disengagement from Vietnam, in marked contrast to its earlier involvement in Vietnam. In the previous chapter US disengagement was evident with the US acceptance of the 'loss' of South Vietnam. The main thrust of all this development was the devalued position of Vietnam in US strategic calculations following the disappearance of 'Chinese communist expansionism'. In the late 1970s and during the 1980s Vietnam not only continued to be removed from the US foreign policy focus, but even worse, became a pawn that the United States could use to please the Chinese. Another sign was the US vote to retain Democratic Kampuchea's seat in the United Nations. An abstention would have shown more independence of the part of the United States, and could not have been taken as a sign of endorsement of the Phnompenh government. But the Carter Administration voted in favour of retaining the DK's seat in the United Nations. The vote was another sign of the impact of Sino-American limited strategic co-operation on the US attitude towards Vietnam, though there could also have been a Soviet factor in this American decision. The United States could see the installation of a new government in Phnompenh as an increase of Soviet influence in the region. Thus the vote shows not only the impact of Sino-American relations on US behaviour as well as its limits, as the state of the Sino-American relationship not only shaped the American stance towards Vietnam but also pointed to other factors including the Soviet one. In the 1980s, China and the United States saw more conflict in their relations than in the late 1970s. China started to follow a more independent foreign policy. This cooling down of their relations could also be seen in US policy towards Vietnam. The outright support for the Chinese stance that was seen in 1978-81 was no longer apparent. The United States did not initiate moves on the Cambodian question. It simply demanded Vietnamese withdrawal. Vietnam became a backwater in the US strategic picture. The United States left it to others to take the initiative. This US indifference 215 towards Vietnam was a direct result of the Sino-American relationship. Unlike the period between 1950 and 1972, in the context of Sino-American limited strategic co operation in the 1980s, Washington did not need a Vietnam card in its policy towards Vietnam. Its indifference was a logical development of this state of Sino-American relations. As for the Chinese, the Sino-American limited strategic co-operation helped them to take a tough stand with the Vietnamese. As the Chinese and the Americans moved towards normalisation, the Chinese became tougher with the Vietnamese. They started to side with the DK in its conflict with Vietnam, and provide it with military aid. In parallel, China cut its economic aid to Vietnam and encouraged the Hoa crisis in Vietnam, though the Vietnamese also held some responsibility. Moreover, Sino-American normalisation played into the hands of the Chinese in their decision to invade Vietnam in February 1979, though the limits to Sino-American co-operation also shortened the Chinese campaign against Vietnam. This deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations to the point of war could have been avoided if the United States had not offered the Chinese its tacit approval. In the 1980s, the Chinese policy of bleeding Vietnam white was not a direct result of the state of Sino-American relations, but indirectly, it was. American efforts to isolate Vietnam in those years unless Vietnam yielded to its demand of withdrawal from Cambodia made the Chinese policy more effective. We have seen that the United States had only an indirect impact on Chinese policy towards Vietnam. This was totally different from the situation prior to 1971, when the American threat was a direct reason for Chinese aid to Vietnam. The reason for this was that after American withdrawal from Vietnam, it was the Soviet Union and not the United States that was China's competitor in Indochina. Chinese hostility towards Vietnam was a direct result of the increase of Soviet influence. Here, we see the limitation of the Sino-American impact on Chinese policy towards Vietnam. But these limits do not mean that Sino-American relations did not have an indirect impact on Chinese policy.
216 Chapter 7 Sino-American Normality and Normalisation with Vietnam, 1989-1995
This chapter's analysis starts with the crucial year of 1989, which more or less marks the end of the Cold War. In that year, not only its prime symbol, the Berlin Wall, but a series of Communist governments in Eastern Europe, fell. This landmark event could not but affect all the countries in the world, including the three countries under study - China, the United States and Vietnam. Moreover, the year 1989 also witnessed the Tiananmen Incident, which shocked the Americans and widened the gap between China and the United States. The analysis ends with the year 1995, when Washington normalised its relations with Hanoi, completing the process of Sino-Vietnamese and American-Vietnamese normalisation. In the post-Cold War world, both China and the United States lost their incentive to maintain their limited strategic co-operation of the previous years. The Soviet Union was no longer the common enemy. In fact, it had ceased to be the enemy since from the mid-1980s when Mikhail Gorbachev started perestroika in the birthplace of communism. But the end of the Cold War eventually eliminated the raison d'etre of the loose Sino-American alliance. The two countries still needed each other, but for different reasons, largely of economic and regional-level importance. This prompted them to develop a kind of normality in their relationship, which meant that though they had different perspectives, values and conflicts, the two countries considered each other business partners. This relationship was a long way both from alliance and hostility. Post-Cold War Sino-American relations have been discussed by some authors, mostly in journal articles, and in chapters of books by Harry Harding and Robert Garson. 1 Though both works offer a full picture of Sino-American relations between 1989 and 1993, I do not agree with their conclusions. Harding argues that China-US relations arrived at a deadlock in the years following the Tiananmen Event, whereas Garson merely describes the relationship in the light of 'old problems in a new world order'. While Garson does not give any particular name to the relationship, Harding's 'deadlock' suggests a rather negative assessment of the relationship. In my view,
1 See chapter 8, 'deadlock' in Harding, op. cit., pp. 247-96; and chapter 8, 'Old Problems in a New World Order', in Garson R., op. cit., pp. 197-221. 217 normality, which is characterised by both co-operation and conflict, reflects the current Sino-American relations more fully. As distinct from the previous period where the two countries evolved a limited strategic relationship, now there were no incentives for them to develop that kind of relationship. But neither were there reasons for them to go back to the confrontation of the pre-rapprochement era. There is not much written on American and Chinese Vietnam policy during this period. I rely mostly on news reports, especially Reuters. The main point of this chapter is that in the post-Cold War world, both the United States and China have altered their anti-Vietnam policies, and gradually normalised their relations with Vietnam. But normalisation was extremely difficult for Vietnam, as it does not play a significant role in either American or Chinese foreign policy. Normalising relations did not mean a more important role for Vietnam in their strategic picture. Without hostility between China and the United States, they did not need Vietnam as a supporter in their rivalry.
Sino-American Normality
The end of the Cold War triggered a big debate over Sino-American relations. Some observers argue that with the end of the Soviet Union as a common enemy, the geopolitical logic for the US-China strategic alliance was removed and underlying tensions and conflicts of interests, which had been dormant during much of the 1970s and 1980s, began to emerge. Others argue that China's strategic value is inaccurately perceived as having greatly diminished following the collapse of the Soviet Union.2 I think that both arguments are valid, and not mutually exclusive. They complement each other, giving a fuller picture of the Sino-American relationship. On the one hand, China lost its previous strategic role in the American strategic picture, and its old conflicts with the United States re-emerged. Conflicting economic interests and ideological differences have increasingly fuelled tension in the relations between the two countries. On the other hand, both the United States and China still need each other. In the new
2 For the first type of arguments see in Oksenberg Michel, 1991, 'The China Problem', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No.3; Zhang Yunling, 1997, 'Changing Sino--US-Japanese relations', The Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No.4; Authors like Kenneth Lieberthal, Kishore Mahbubani, James Richardson, and Morton Abramowitz, however, speak for the second argument. See Lieberthal, 1995, 'A New China Strategy', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No.6; Kishore, 1995, 'The Pacific Impulse', Survival, Vol. 37, No. I; Richardson, 1994, 'East Asian Stability' The National Interest, No. 38; Abramowitz, I 993, 'Pacific Century: Myth or Reality', Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 15, No.3.
218 post-Cold War world, the United States faces challenges different from those of the past, such as regional crises, international terrorism and nuclear proliferation. It is not easy for America to solve these problems alone. Needless to say, American business circles want access to the Chinese labour as well as consumption markets, whereas China hope for American capital, technology and market for Chinese goods. Thus, it is imperative for both to maintain the relationship of partners, despite occasional tensions. This state of relationship is normal in international relations. In the post-Cold War world China and the United States have arrived at normality in their relations. Such a relationship is far removed from the limited strategic relationship of 1978-8 8, but neither is it the confrontation of 1949-72. Both sides made great efforts to secure their relations, though different perspectives and values often hindered their relationship. US efforts were seen in the Bush and Clinton Administrations' comprehensive engagement with China, while Chinese efforts were seen in their conciliatory approach to the United States.
American comprehensive engagement with China
The main feature of American policy towards China in the post-Cold War context was comprehensive engagement.3 The term alone shows the positive side of the relationship, but it indirectly indicates that there were forces in the United States, that called for the opposite policy. There were reasons for a hostile policy towards China. Ideologically, the anti-Communists in the United States did not want to see one of the communist regimes left over from the end of the Cold War continue to exist. Economically, in the post-Cold War era when economics has become the main thrust of contemporary world competition, the Americans could no longer sacrifice their economic interests for the sake of strategic/political benefits, as previously was the case. These ideological differences and economic conflicts were not new, but in the past they were hidden by strategic calculations. Now, with the end of the Cold War, China lost its role as US supporter in American-Soviet rivalry. That is why problems in these two fields often generated tension in relations between China and the United States.
3 Interestingly, Director ofNorth American Studies, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Chu Shulong, argues that the post-Cold War US attitude towards China has changed over the years and is divided into four phases, which does not correspond with my claim. See more details in Chu Shulong, 1996, 'SinO.:...US Relations: The Necessity for Change and a New Strategy', Contemporary International Relations (China), Vol. 6, No. 11, November 1986. I find that this periodisation cannot explain the Bush Administration's efforts to engage with China in very early days following the Tiananmen Incident. 219 US willingness to engage with China was seen in its reaction to the Tiananrnen Incident, the biggest event that exposed the two countries' differences and brought about some rifts in their relations. Although immediately after the incident, President Bush banned high-level American visits to China, reduced technology transfers and restricted aid programs, he did not impose an embargo against China, a tough measure often taken to show a hostile American attitude. On the contrary, the United States tried to ensure that the relationship did not break down. Under this context, in July -just a month after the crackdown- the US president secretly sent his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, and Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, as special envoys to Beijing. Despite the US Administration's claim that the envoys expressed their abhorrence in relation to the crackdown, the visit itself showed the American desire to maintain a state-to-state dialogue with the Chinese. Furthermore, soon afterward, officials of the American Embassy in Beijing and Consulates in Shanghai and other cities returned to China, and US Ambassador James R. Lilley attended ceremonies on different occasions in August 1989 in Tianjin and Shanghai.4 In that same month, US Secretary of State James Baker, while delivering an address to the Asia Society in New York, stressed that human rights could not be the only factor in US foreign policy decision-making. The message was clear: the Tiananmen Incident would not alter mainstream Sino-American relations. The American Secretary of State pointed out that 'the hasty dismantling of a constructive US-Chinese relationship built up so carefully over two decades would serve neither our interests nor those of the Chinese people' .5 Why did the Bush Administration want to preserve its relationship with China? The answer can be found in then Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Solomon's speech at the University of California at San Diego on 30 October 1990. He stated that the need for strategic engagement with Beijing would endure as China's international role had evolved to encompass a broad range of global and regional issues: from missile and nuclear non-proliferation to co-operation on the Gulf crisis, to resolution of regional conflicts in Cambodia, and on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, he claimed that, in the long term, a modernising China at peace with itself and its neighbours is essential to
4 Ding Xinghao, 1990, 'The Sino-American Relationship: A Chinese Perspective', in After Tiananmen Square: Challenges for the Chinese-American Relationship, p. 101 5 Cited in Ding, 1990, op. cit., p. 101. 220 stability and prosperity in Asia. 6 The price of hostility towards China in the 1950s and 1960s was so high that the US Administration now chose to engage with China in order to change it. The logic is that if the United States is engaged with China, it could help China to modernise, and modernisation in tum would transform China. December 1989 witnessed further signs of improvement in Sino-American relations. The US Export-Import Bank resumed the extension of credits to Beijing, and allowed the export of three satellites, worth $300 million, to China. In the same month, Bush sent Brent Scowcroft and Lawrence Eagleburger to Beijing for a second time. Though it was described as an effort intended to keep the Chinese informed of the results of the Bush-Gorbachev summit at Malta, the significance of the visit, as stated by Deng Xiaoping, was that Sino-US relations had to be improved in spite of the disputes and differences between the two countries. 7 By January 1990, the United States had further loosened its restrictions on loans to the PRC. The United States also chose not to oppose World Bank loans for 'human needs'. The decisive move, however, was made in June 1990 when President Bush decided to extend China's MFN status. In 1991, with the Gulf crisis escalating, the United States dropped the last restriction against China- the ban on meetings between high-ranking officials from the two countries. In December 1991, after the UN vote on Iraq, China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen travelled to Washington to meet with President Bush. On the other hand, there were occasions when the Americans displeased the Chinese. President Bush met the Dalai Lama in April 1991, which could not but upset the Chinese. In 1992, while campaigning for re-election in Texas, President Bush announced that he would sell F-16 planes, produced in Texas, to Taiwan, a move that the Chinese criticised as a breach of three communiques signed between the two countries. The sale was not aimed mainly at increasing Taiwan's defence capabilities, as had been the case in the past. Economic motivation- to sell Texan products- was an important factor in the decision, which also had some strategic justifications. Here one can see how economic problems and domestic politics, a presidential election in this case, could affect US-China relations. This was different from the past tension of a more political and strategic origin between the two countries.
6 US Department of State, Dispatch (hereafter the Dispatch), 5 November 1990 Vol. 1, No 10, p. 247. 7 South China Morning Post, 11 December 1989, PI, quoted from Reuters Electronic News.
221 While announcing the F-16 sale, however, the Americans tried to let the Chinese understand that they maintained a one-China policy. Despite occasional signs of an 'unfriendly' relationship, the Bush Administration's policy towards China, on the whole, was strongly characterised by 'comprehensive engagement'. Addressing the Asia Society in New York City on 11 December1991 President Bush emphasised that 'China is vitally important. It is our policy to remain engaged. We believe this is the way to effect positive change in the world's most populous nation' .8 The Clinton Administration, which replaced the Bush Administration in early 1993, continued the engagement policy towards China, although as a presidential candidate Clinton had strongly criticised Bush's China policy. Moreover, with Democrats in power in both the Administration and Congress, for the first two years of the Cliton Administration there was no conflict between executive or legislative branches over US policy towards China, . On 28 May 1993, Clinton announced that from that day 'the US will speak with one voice on China policy'. 9 In the same speech, Clinton followed Bush to extend most favoured nation (MFN) status to China, though he threatened that the MFN extension the following year would depend upon whether China made progress in improving its human rights record. He also said that his administration 'would act' if the examination of reports proved that China had shipped M -11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan. Different speeches made by members of the Clinton Administration show no difference in the policies run by Clinton and those of his predecessor. 1°Furthermore, in May, 1994, Clinton did what the Republican China admirers had not had the timeor the will to do, that is to de-link the issues of MFN and human rights in China. So, the Clinton Administration in fact continued the Bush Administration's engagement policy towards China. Sino-American relations under the first Clinton Administration were also marked by some conflicts. In August 1993, the Americans imposed sanctions on China for its shipments of M-11 missile components to Pakistan. In 1994, the Clinton Administration decided to undertake a 'Taiwan policy review' to enhance unofficial
8 The Dispatch Vol.2, No. 46, p. 840. 9 See more details in Clinton's statement in The Dispatch, Vol.4, No. 24, p. 425. 10 See for instance Wif1ston Lord's statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in The Dispatch, Vol4, No. 14; Warren Christopher's address at University of Washington in Seattle, Washington in ibid., Vol.4, No. 48; Perry's Address at the National Defence University, Beijing ibid. Vol.S, No. 44. 222 relations with Taiwan; and in 1995, it permitted Taiwanese President Li Denghui's US visit. US-China state-to-state relations were also kept at a low level. The US President and Vice President chose not to visit Beijing, and President Jiang was not invited to Washington for a high-level visit. Even when sanctions against China were imposed in August 1993 US Secretary of State Christopher stressed that the Americans were 'willing to negotiate the necessary conditions for a waiver of those sanctions' .11 When the American Administration reviewed its Taiwan policy, Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord did not fail to comment that it would be a serious mistake to introduce what China would undoubtedly perceive as an official basis to American relations with Taiwan. He also reiterated that the Administration opposed attempts to legislate a visit by Taiwan's top leaders. 12
China's conciliatory attitude towards the United States
If, in the American case, Sino-American normality was seen in efforts to carry out a policy of comprehensive engagement with China, in China's case it was confirmed by the latter's conciliatory attitude towards its partner. In the new world order, as mentioned above, due to the disappearance of the strategic triangle, China had lost the strategic significance it had enjoyed since 1972. In addition, Sino-American tension had continually escalated over human rights and trade disputes. The Tiananrnen Incident of June 1989 exacerbated the conflicts between the two countries. Chinese conservatives, as Yachun Chang observes, focused on the negative side of the close relationship with the United States, blaming it for 'bourgeois liberalism', the shake-up of mainland society and the creation of a domestic atmosphere that led to the 1989 'counterrevolutionary disturbances'. 13 But China understood that it needed American support for economic development. Even the conservatives could not ignore the fact that China relied on the United States for its economic development, whereas the reformers maintained that peaceful evolution was a long-term ideological and diplomatic strategy that did not pose an immediate threat to China. In this situation, the main content of China's US policy was a conciliatory approach to its partner. In Zhang
11 The Dispatch, p. 821. 12 According to the agreement reached between the two countries when they normalised their relations in 1979, the United States undertook that it would maintain only unofficial relations with Taiwan, which meant that the visit to 'America by Taiwanese officials could be interpreted as official, and would be in breach of that agreement. 13 Chang Yachun, 1993, 'The Contradiction Between the Basic Principles and Pragmatic Approach of Beijing's US policy', Issues and Studies, August 1993, p, 74. 223 Yunling's words, to have a peaceful environment in the long term, China had to develop good ties with the United States, and to try its utmost to 'reduce troubles and avoid antagonism' with them. 14 Therefore, it had to maintain stable ties with the United States. On the other hand, China was unwilling to accept US demands and pressure. The conciliatory Chinese approach to the United States was expressed in its reaction to the measures taken by the United States following the Tiananmen Incident. As a Chinese author observed, Chinese newspaper editorials and articles strongly criticised and protested about foreign interference in China's internal affairs, but China's formal official reaction 'was more moderate'. Ding observed that the Chinese government had not taken any major retaliatory measures against the United States. 15 According to him, statements by Chinese leaders after the Tiananrnen Incident showed that China's reform and open policy were unchanged and expressed China's willingness to strengthen Sino-American relations. 16 Harry Harding agrees that Beijing's overall policy towards the United States in 1989 was 'to wait out the crisis in Sino-American relations' .17 In early 1990, China allowed Fulbright and Peace Corps programs and other academic exchanges between China and the United States to resume. It also lifted martial law in Beijing and released some 500 Tiananmen Incident detainees. 18 The conciliatory Chinese attitude was not at the expense of principles. They took a tough stance and offered compromise only at the last moment. Meeting with former President Nixon in November 1990, Deng told his guest that he and his colleagues had to 'respect China', which meant that they had to respect their principles. 19 A Taiwanese China watcher also observes that Beijing adopted a strategy of 'strong words and hard line stance', and did not release a single political dissident during James Baker's October 1991 visit to Beijing. But China did consent to retry dissidents who had shown no criminal behaviour. Eventually, Wang Dan, a leading dissident, and a few others were released. 20
14 Zhang Yunling, 1997, 'Changing Sino-US-Japanese Relations', The Pacific Review, Vol.lO, No.4, 1997, p. 454. 15 Ding, 1990, op. cit., p. I 00. Beijing did impose a few sanctions on the United States, particularly in cultural and academic spheres. See more details in Harding, op. cit., pp. 238-39. 16 Ibid. 17 Harding H., op. cit., p. 239. 18 Ding Xinghao, 1991, 'Managing Sino-American relations in a changing world', Asian Survey, Vol XXXI, No. 12, December 1991, pp. 1159-1160. 19 Cited in ibid, p. 1159. 20 See more details in Chang Yachun, op. cit., pp. 78-79. 224 Another conciliatory sign in Chinese US policy was Chinese behaviour concerning the Gulf crisis. The Chinese voted for eleven UN resolutions calling on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Its abstention on the twelfth vote, which sanctioned the use of force against Iraq, also made the use of force by American and allied forces possible. The Chinese abstention was so critical as being one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. A Chinese veto would have put the Americans in a more difficult position to move agaisnt Iraq. On the other hand, the abstention vote, as the Chinese claimed, showed a consistent Chinese policy of peaceful solution of conflict, and served the Chinese aim of claiming Third World leadership.21 In short, though the Chinese vote could be interpreted in different way, it was seen by observers as a sign of the Chinese desire to improve relations with the United States. A leading sinologist commented that 'Beijing's adherence to UN positions [on Iraq] evidenced strands of realism in Chinese foreign policy'. 22 Moreover, US Secretary of State, James Baker disclosed that the Chinese made some concessions during talks in November 1991. They stated that they intended to observe the missile technology control regime (MTCR) guidelines and parameters. This means that they would apply them to any exports of missiles and related technology. The government of China would propose that the National People's Congress complete the ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Chinese also for the first time responded to the American request for information about 800 names of reported political prisoners, which was given in June 1990.23 Although the Chinese interpreted the American F-16 sale as a violation of the three communiques between the United States and the People's Republic, their response was muted because Bush made it clear that he would not alter the one-China policy.24 Chang Yachun also observes that the only concrete step that Beijing took in protest over ' the American F-16 sale was to stop attending the five-power arms control conference. The conciliatory Chinese approach towards the United States was in clear contrast to their reaction to a similar sale of 60 French Mirage 2000-5 jets to Taiwan. There, Beijing ordered the closure of the French consulate in Guangzhou.
21 See more details in Huo Hwei-ling, 'Patterns of behaviour in China's foreign policy, the Gulf Crisis and Beyond', Asian Survey, Voi.XXXII, No.3, March 1992, pp. 263-76. 22 Oksenberg M., 199f, 'The China Problem', Foreign Affairs, Vol.70 No.5, p. 1. 23 Baker at the news conference in Beijing, 17111191. Dispatch Vol.2. No. 46 24 Quoted in Vogel, Ezra, F. 1997, Living with China: US-China relations in the twenty-first Century, p. 24. 225 Thus, the Chinese also had tried their best to secure Sino-American relations. From the Chinese perspective, relations with the United States are important, mostly for economic reasons. A leading Chinese International Relations expert, Qimao Chen, observes that China specialists agree that threats to China's security in the post-Cold War world does not come from the Soviet Union, nor from the United States in the near future, but from 'multi-level economic and scientific challenges' .25 In this context, even the Tiananmen Incident did not affect Chinese determination to modernise, which relies on American technology, investment and its market. The United States ranks as the second largest foreign investor in the PRC. The volume of mainland China's direct exports to the United States had grown to US$14.1 billion in 1991 from US$.1 billion in 1978, and the PRC was ranked as the third largest supplier of goods to the United States. 26 The frail Deng Xiaoping' s famous visit to southern China in 1992 pushed this cause further. In this economic field, there are also Chinese concessions to the United States. The increase in the Chinese trade surplus with the United States27 worried the Americans, resulting in increased pressure to apply super 301 in retaliation against the perceived unfair trade between China and the United States. According to an observer, on the eve of the expiry of a 30 October 1991 ultimatum laid down by George Bush, Beijing struck a deal with Washington in the 301 trade talks by agreeing, within two to five years, to substantially dismantle its complex system of import controls, including licensing, secret trade rules and other restrictive barriers. In addition, it promised to improve its trade system.28 The conciliatory Chinese attitude in itself speaks of US pressure, which must have raised their suspicions and concerns about the real US motives. Oksenberg observes that the Chinese believe the United States has sought to restrain other leading industrialised nations from restoring relations with China to the levels that existed prior to the events in Tiananmen Square in June 1989. Washington is also accused of discouraging a rapid and full restoration of lending to China by international financial institutions. He stressed that behind these charges are more deep-seated fears - of
25 Chen Qimao, 1993, 'New Approaches in China's Foreign Policy', Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIII, Nor. 3, p. 240. 26 Cited in Chang Ya~chun, op. cit., p. 75. 27 According to one calculation, it jumped from $6 billion in 1989 to $10.4 billion in 1990, creating the largest US deficit with any trading partner except Japan and Taiwan. (See Ding, 1991, op. cit., p. 1162). 28 Chang, op. cit., p. 81. 226 another era of American global hegemony and an American design to undermine China's communist regime.29 A Chinese strategist allegedly circulated among Chinese Politburo members, a document warning that after the Gulf War, the United States planned to shift its forces eastward to dominate Japan and China and establish an Asia-Pacific empire. Moreover, his analysis is believed to have been endorsed and promoted by Chinese leaders in June-July 1991, though subsequently discredited.30 Editor of the China Quarterly, David Shambaugh, also agreed that to many Chinese leaders, the United States is pursuing a hostile policy to consign Communist China to the proverbial dustbin ofhistory.31 In China's view several actions by the United States have upset, the two countries' relationship. China saw US demands that it grant more freedoms to and provide more information about its dissidents as interference in its domestic affairs. In 1993 the United States stopped a Chinese ship, the Yinhe, in international waters and searched it for forbidden chemicals that President Jiang had denied were on board. Furthermore, American politicians campaigned to block the Chinese from hosting the Olympics in 2000. In 1995, despite a warning from China, Clinton allowed Taiwan's President Lee Tenghui to visit the United States, breaking an informal understanding that the United States would not welcome top Taiwan leaders.
A difficult American normalisation with Vietnam
We have seen earlier in this chapter that in the post-Cold War era, Sino-American relations returned to normality, which was characterised by both co-operation and conflict. But post-Cold War Sino-American co-operation was also different from the limited strategic co-operation of 1978-88, which encouraged the United States to sacrifice its relations with Vietnam. Strategic factors no longer hindered American-Vietnamese normalisation. On the other hand, unlike past Sino-American conflicts, today's contradictions are of economic and ideological origin, problems that Vietnam cannot help the United States solve, as was earlier the case. Thus, Vietnam's
29 Oksenberg Michel, 1991, 'The China Problem', Foreign Affairs, Vol.70 No.5, p. 1. 3°Cited in Bonnie S. Glaser, 'China's Security Perceptions, Interests and Ambitions', Asian Survey, Vol XXXIII, No. 3, March 1993, pp. 259-60. 31 Shambaugh David, 1995, 'The United States and China: a New Cold War?', Current Hist01y, September 1995, p. 224. Quoted in Frank Frost, 1996, The United States and China: Containment or Enlargement?, Current Issues BriefNo. 5 1996-97. Canberra: Department of the Parliamentary Library, p. 9. 227 role in American foreign policy calculations has not changed much. This explains, as we shall see, why .the United States was slow to normalise its relations with Vietnam. Normality in post-Cold War Sino-American relations removed one of the main obstacles to US-Vietnam normalisation,32 but it did not offer any incentive for the United States to speed up the process. Normalisation therefore presented many difficulties for the Vietnamese. This was seen in American insistence on Vietnam meeting its condition for normalisation, solving the Cambodian issue, which did not depend only on Vietnamese efforts. Moreover, after October 1991, when this obstacle was removed, the MIA issue took its place, preventing the two countries from normalising their relations. Both the Bush and Clinton Administrations practised pressuring Vietnam for concessions before making a move to ease the trade embargo against Vietnam or to normalise relations. Sometimes the United States even moved more slowly than its plan for normalisation the road map. Contrary to hopes the Bush Administration raised in relation to the US-Vietnam normalisation in its first days in 1989,33 the new Bush administration followed an old Indochina policy. It demanded that the Vietnamese resolve the Cambodian issue before normalisation could be realised. Designate Deputy Assistant on Asian and Pacific Affairs, David Lambertson, stated that Vietnam could not limit its participation in a solution to the Cambodian conflict to its own troop withdrawal. He asked the Vietnamese to talk directly with Sihanouk: and to pressure the Phnompenh leaders to adopt 'reasonable positions' in negotiations among Cambodian groups. 34 It was clear that the United States was not satisfied with the Vietnamese troop withdrawal it had demanded, increasing the price of normalisation. Ironically the Khmer Rouge, which was responsible for the genocide in Cambodia during 1975-78, enjoyed a better position in American policy than Vietnam.
32 I do not argue that American 'appeasement' in relations with China, in the late I 970s, was the only obstacle for US-Vietnam normalisation. There were different reasons -the Vietnam syndrome, the MIA/POW problem and even the miscalculations of Vietnamese leaders. But for the purpose of this analysis, I limit the discussion by studying how Sino-American relations affected US policy towards Vietnam. As we have seen in previous chapters, appeasement was one of the reasons why the United States refused to normalise relations with Vietnam. 33 Bush declared in his inaugural speech that there were Americans missing and unaccounted for in the world, but 'goodwill begets goodwill'. In addition, he stated that 'the final lesson of Vietnam is that no great nation can long afford to be sundered by a memory. See US State Department Bulletin (hereafter the Bulletin), Vol.89, No. 2I45, April I989, p. 2. 33 Keith Richburg I 99I, 'Back to Vietnam', Foreign Affairs, fall I 99I, Vol.70, No 4, p. I20. 34 The Bulletin, Vol 89, No. 2I46, May I 989, p. 38. 228 No pressure was applied for the Khmer rouge, but applied for the Vietnamese. The Bush Administration was in favour of giving the Khmer· Rouge a place in the new government in Phnompenh. The reason, in Lambertson's words, was that the Khmer Rouge retained significant military strength in comparison with the other Cambodian factions. 35 Secretary of State, James Baker, even declared that the Khmer Rouge was a 'fact oflife' .36 Another sign of the old Cambodia policy was the American position at the Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC), which was organised in July-August 1989. The Americans demanded a role for the Khmer Rouge in the new Phnompenh government. The Bush Administration blamed the Vietnamese for the PICC's failure, as they refused to make concessions on the question of the Khmer Rouge role in a new government.37 Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Solomon, even criticised the Vietnamese for forcing on the international community 'a time-constrained choice between the Hun Sen regime and the Khmer Rouge' because the Vietnamese accelerated their timetable for withdrawal of their forces. 38 The Americans had demanded Vietnamese withdrawal for more than ten years, but then found themselves 'time-constrained' in looking for a solution to the Cambodian issue. Carol Giacomo of
Reuters rightly concluded that 'for years, the United States pursue~ one objective getting Vietnam to withdraw its troops [and] never thought through the complexities of Cambodian peacemaking that are finally being faced now'. 39 Instead of looking for political means to solve the Cambodian issue, the Bush Administration provided aid in the form of lethal weapons to the non-co111munist resistance ~orces. It believed that by supplying arms it could bolster these forces. 40 In addition, the United States increased aid to the non-communist factions in Cambodia. If / in 1989, American aid was $5.5 million, the new administration requested $2 million
35 Ibid. 36 Quoted in Richburg, op. cit., p. I21. 37 See in Solomon's address to an International Symposium in Los Angeles, September 8, I 989. The Bulletin, Vol.89, No. 2152, November I989, p. 50. 38 Ibid. 39 Reuters News Service, September I 8, I 989. 40 Quoted from Richburg, op. cit., pp. 12I-22. The provision of arms was confirmed by the KPNLF's leaders. See Bangkok Post, October 13, I 989, p. 7. In summer I 989, the US Senate also voted 59 to 39 in favour of military aid to the Cambodian non-communist factions. See the Reuters News Service, October 2, I989. 229 more for the 1990 FY. 41 The measure reportedly was criticised even by ASEAN countries on the grounds that it would further inflame the situation.42 It was only towards the end of the year that the Bush Administration started to change its Cambodia policy. David Lambertson, then already confirmed as US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, spoke out in favour of Congressman Solarz's idea of deploying a UN body in Cambodia.43 In mid-January 1990 the United States joined with other Permanent Members of the UN Security Council in discussing a role for the United Nations in resolving the Cambodian question. This initiative provided a way to break the impasse in the Cambodian settlement as the PRK would not accept a quadripartite government including the Khmer Rouge. At the same time, the Khmer Rouge would not accept a tripartite government that would exclude it. Later, a high-ranking Vietnamese diplomat confirmed the value of this initiative. Hun Sen told the Vietnamese Ambassador that he preferred a UN body to the Supreme National Council (SNC) with Khmer Rouge's participation in supervising the elections.44 Solarz's initiative afterward became the main content of the UN Framework for Cambodia. Eventually, on 18 July 1990, American Cambodia policy took a turn when Secretary of State James Baker stated that the United States would withdraw its support for the Coalition Government ofDemocratic Kampuchea's seat at the UN because of its inclusion of the Khmer Rouge, and would hold talks with Vietnam. At last, America ceased its indirect support for the Khmer Rouge. A Vietnamese diplomat was quoted as commenting that 'the Americans have always been right behind China. Now maybe things will change'. 45 The American decision was a clear sign of a new Cambodia policy, one that was no longer a hostage to its China policy. In the new world order, free from the need to follow China's Cambodia policy, the United States had a wider range of options and became more active in solving the Cambodian issue. Some might disagree with this argument, claiming that there was no link between Sino-American relations and the change of heart on the American-Cambodian issue. It could be argued that the change was simply America's response to the changed situation following the Vietnamese troop withdrawal. This was exactly the point made
41 Ibid. 42 Richburg, op. cit., p~ 122. 43 Reuters News Service, 9 December 1989. 44 An unpublished memoir. 45 Reuters News Service, 19 July 1990. 230 by US Under-Secretary of State, Robert Kimmitt. 46 I agree that the Vietnamese withdrawal met American demands and encouraged the Americans to alter their stance. But suppose the United States had still needed Chinese strategic co-operation, would it have dropped its support for the CGDK when the PRC still supported it? Probably not. This highlights the impact of changes in Sino-American relations on US Vietnam policy, and supports my point that the disappearance of Sino-American limited strategic co-operation untied American hands in their Vietnam policy. This impact was twofold. The new Sino-American relationship did not augment Vietnam's position in US strategic calculations, which explains why the Americans were slow in reacting to the Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Cambodia. It took nearly a year for the Americans to formulate a new policy following the Vietnamese withdrawal. During that time, as mentioned above, Washington demanded Vietnamese participation in resolving the Cambodian issue, a demand additional to its previous stance. Both the US Administration's acceptance of Solarz's formula and its July volte face were the result of domestic and international pressure.47 After this policy reorientation, the Americans seemed to become active m participating in the Cambodian settlement process. On 6 August 1990 US deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs, Kenneth Quinn, met the Vietnamese Ambassador at the UN, Trinh Xuan Lang, for a three-and-a-half-hour talk. The two sides were believed to have discussed the Cambodia question and changes in American policy.48 On 28 August, after an affirmative US vote, the UN Security Council adopted the Perm-Five framework for a solution to the Cambodian conflict.49 Under-Secretary of State Kimmitt claimed that the change in American policy in July had contributed to this success, though there are no independent sources to confirm this. 50 September witnessed more changes in American policy. Besides the two discussions between American and Vietnamese diplomats at the UN, on 29 September, Baker held discussions in New York with Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, the
46 He explained the reasons for the change in US Cambodian policy as situation had changed after 'the bulk of Vietnam's combat units withdrew last year'. See The Dispatch, Vol.1, No.3, September 17, 1990. 47 See more details in Richburg, op. cit., p. 123; and Reuters News Service, June 15, 1990, July 19, 1990. 48 Reuters News Service, 8 August 1990. 49 This document demanded the creation of a Supreme National Council of individuals as the 'embodiment of independence, sovereignty, and unity of Cambodia'; a UN-supervised cease-fire; and the creation of a UN Tran"sitional Authority in Cambodia with responsibilities of supervising the cease-fire, verifYing the withdrawal of all foreign military forces and advisers and the end of all arms supplies, to the four factions. The Dispatch, Vol.2. No. 16, April1991. 50 The Dispatch, Vol.l, No.3, 17 September 1990. 231 highest level US-Vietnam contact since 1973. After the meeting, the Vietnamese Foreign Minister went to Washington DC to meet with Congress leaders and General Vessey. Another decisive change in American policy made that month was Baker's instruction to the American Charge d'Affairs in Vientiane to meet with Phnompenh's 1 diplomats. 5 The American Ambassador to Jarkarta also met Hun Sen in Jakarta, though on an 'exceptional basis', in order to encourage Hun Sen's personal participation in efforts to form an SNC. 52 The change in American policy towards Cambodia had immediate and positive results. Sihanouk reportedly changed his mind about a Jakarta meeting with Hun Sen just hours after Washington announced its own change of heart.53 China was also believed to have suddenly taken 'a very active role in the peace process' .54 The Chinese prompt change following the American decision was an attempt not to be left behind by the events. The PRC did not want to loose initiative to other players. The American decision to open direct talks with the Phnompenh government undoubtedly contributed to the success of the Jakarta meeting, which ended with a statement signed by all four factions' representatives to accept the Perm-Five plan and to set up a twelve-member SNC. 55 The positive results of the changes in US Cambodia policy shows that the United States had the capacity to play an active role in resolving the Cambodian conflict, a role which in the past, partly for strategic reasons, it had declined to play. Though there was some progress on the Cambodian issue, the Bush Administration seemed to be unwilling to move ahead on normalisation with Vietnam. In September 1990, Baker acknowledged Vietnam's efforts in relation to the Cambodian settlement, but declared that the pace and scope of normalisation with Vietnam depended on further progress on the MIA issue. 56 In the same month, the United States moved to renew the trade embargo. Apple Computers was even prevented from donating computers to a Vietnamese school. 57 There was a small prospect for early normalisation when Richard Solomon declared that 'with the signing of an agreement on Cambodia in Paris, we would begin
51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. MOFA China department's file. 53 See more details in Reuters News Service, 6 September I990 54 Ibid. 55 Reuters News Service, September II. Bangkok Post, II September I990, p. I. 56 Cited in Frost, Frank. I993, 'Vietnam's Foreign Relations: Dynamic of Change', p. 42 57 Ibid. The impact of American ban was not limited to the United States. It was believed that Apple Computers in Australia was also not allowed to provide its computers for Vietnam. 232 discussion in the way of normalisation [of relations with Vietnam]' .58 He even elaborated the content of the coming discussions, which would focus on US financial claims against the Vietnamese and vice versa, the mechanics of setting up an embassy, and other aspects of a normal relationship. The hope, however, was dashed when, on 9 April 1991, the same US Assistant for Asia-Pacific affairs, Richard Solomon, outlined a four-phase proposal- the so-called 'road map'- to normalise American-Vietnamese relations. While Washington has not released an official copy of the 'road map', it was known to link US-Vietnam normalisation to the signing and implementation of the Paris agreements on Cambodia as well as resolution of the MIA issue and release of re education camp detainees in Vietnam.59 The map obviously expanded American conditions for normalisation. Previously, the Americans demanded that the Vietnamese withdraw all troops from Cambodia, then they insisted that, in addition, Vietnam talk to Sihanouk to press the Phpompenh government for a solution. Finally, when a solution was close the American 'road map' tied normalisation to implementation of the Paris agreement. Moreover, the Americans made normalisation dependent on progress in resolving MIA issues and, among other matters, the Orderly Departure Program (ODP) question. Deputy Foreign Minister Le Mai reasonably described the American behaviour as 'moving the goal posts' in American-Vietnamese relations.60 This is one of the clearest examples of the difficulties in the US-Vietnam normalisation. Deliberately or not, the 'road map' slowed US-Vietnam normalisation in several ways. Firstly, the implementation of the Paris accords depended on many factors that were out of Vietnam's control. Richburg rightly argued that even with the June agreement for a Cambodian cease-fire and the pledge by the four warring factions to stop receiving military aid, it still appeared unlikely that the remaining obstacles to a fully-fledged peace could be resolved soon.61 This view was shared by other observers. 62 Moreover, as Richburg noted, the 'road map' appeared to rest on the old assumption about Vietnam's residual influence over Phnompenh. He claimed that the
58 TheDispatch, Vol. 1, No. 16, 17 December 1990, p. 334. 59 Le Mai, 1992, 'Normalisation of US-Vietnam Relations: The Best Way', speech at The American-Vietnamese Dialogue, Organised by The Aspen Institute, February 11-14, 1992 in Nadi, Fiji. Republished in Clark D., 1992, (ed.) The American-Vietnamese Dialogue, Queenstown: The Aspen Institute, p. 13. A fuller account was given in Frost, F., 1993, 'Vietnam's Foreign Relations: Dynamic of Change', p. 43. · 60 Le Mai, op. cit., p. 12. 61 Richburg, op. cit., p. 112. 62 See for instance Clark D., op. cit .. 233 PRK was unlikely to take any position it saw as against its own interests.63 This assessment was fully supported by a high-ranking Vietnamese diplomat in his memoir, who claims that on the two most important questions - the role of the Khmer Rouge and the UN transitional authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) - Hun Sen disagreed with the Vietnamese and followed his own policy. Rejecting Vietnamese advice, he chose not to compromise with the Khmer Rouge, and fully supported UNTAC.64 Secondly, normalisation was linked to the progress in solving the POW/MIA issue. The events that followed showed that this sensitive question had prevented the two countries from normalising their relations earlier. Compared with 78,750 US MIAs from World War II, and 8,200 US MIAs from the Korean War, the 1,700 MIA cases from the Vietnam War was a much smaller number. Thus it was reasonable for the Vietnamese to ask why the MIA issue was a national priority question for the United States. 65 Though the application of this condition for normalisation was due to the active and effective Vietnam MIA lobby, it showed that the United States did not have a strong interest in normalising relations with Vietnam. If the will had been there, the Administration would have overcome the opposition of the MIA lobby. The linkage between normalisation and the progress of the Orderly Departure Program was a third example of American unwillingness as this was solely a domestic Vietnamese question. Some observers argued that the 'road map' was needed to make it clear what was expected of Vietnam and what it would get from meeting American demands, and that both sides would win in the end.66 That is true. But the fact is that the United States, in Brown's words, 'held the whip handle'; while it was imperative for Hanoi, normalisation was a low priority in the array of Washington's global foreign policy objectives.67
The 'road map' was a symbol of difficult US-V~etnam normalisation, but its realisation highlights the difficulties that the Vietnamese had to overcome to normalise relations. In the beginning, there were some hopeful signs. In April 1991, Presidential Envoy John Vessey announced that an MIA office would be opened in Hanoi. The United States also provided, for the first time since 1975, direct aid of $1 million to
63 Richburg, foe it. 64 An unpublished memoir. 65 Le Mai, op. cit., p. 12. 66 See for instance Coibert E., 1992, 'Problems ofNormalisation US-Vietnam Relations Since 1975', in Clark D., op. cit., p. 8.
234 Vietnam to provide prosthetics for amputees. On the Cambodian issue, the Americans seemed to apply more pressure for the implementation of the UN plan. They threatened the non-communist resistance forces with suspending aid to them unless they continued military co-operation with the Khmer Rouge.68 However, following the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia, on 31 October 23 1991, which removed the first obstacle to US-Vietnam normalisation, there was no sign of quick normalisation between the two countries. Though Baker announced that the United States was
prepared to begin discussion~ with Vietnam concerning the issues and modalities that would be involved in normalising relations with Vietnam, only a small step was taken in practice: the US 25-mile travel restriction on Vietnamese diplomats in New. York was lifted, and US-organised travel to Vietnam was permitted. President Bush reiterated that normalisation was 'a step-by-step process'. At the same time, President Bush announced that the Americans would upgrade their relations with Laos to Embassy level. This contrast only highlighted American uneasiness towards the Vietnamese. The events of 1992-95 showed how difficult the normalisation process was. Each measure of embargo relaxation was made after clear Vietnamese effort on the MIA issue, and the steps were very small. In March 1992, a $3 million assistance package of humanitarian aid was announced. In April the restoration of telecommunication links was permitted, commercial sales to meet basic humanitarian needs was allowed, and restrictions on projects by non-government organisations and non-profit organisations in Vietnam were lifted. Moreover, by this time, other Western businesses were getting involved in Vietnam, causing some American executives to lobby Washington for normalisation. This lobby was gaining power, and ultimately overcame the MIA lobby. A month before normalisation, in June 1995, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher admitted, 'there are very strong business and commercial interests for our normalising relationship with Vietnam as soon as we can have confidence they are being very forthcoming with respect to the MIA/POW issue' .69
67 Brown F.Z. 1997, 'US-Vietnam Normalisation- Past, Present and Future' in Morley J. W. and M. Nishihara (ed.) Vietnam joins the World, London: M.E. Sharpe, p. 203-204. 68 Reuters News Service, April I 0, 1991. The threat was probably aimed more at urging the non communist forces to go along with US policy, but not a real intention as the administration was also afraid that a cut-off of American aid would weaken any American influence on the process. Moreover, the Bush Administration was asking Congress for $25 million, over three times more than the amount for the FY 1990, in the next fiscal year for the resistance 69 Nguyen Tri Dung, 'Vietnam: End in Sight for US Trade Embargo', Vietnam Investment Review March 29, 1993. 235 But when that lobby was not strong enough, the Americans still refused to normalise with Vietnam. Even by the end of 1992, when General Vessey reported favourably on Vietnam's efforts on MIA issues, Bush limited his response by only allowing American companies to set up offices in Vietnam and negotiate contracts pending the lifting of a trade embargo. 70 Though this Bush decision was recognised as a positive step, and at the time there was speculation that Bush might end the embargo before he turned the White House over to President-elect Bill Clintcin,71 he left office without making any change in US-Vietnam relations. Bush's refusal to normalise shows extreme American reluctance when it is remembered that Vietnam had given the United States access to thousands of documents and photographs of captured Americans to clear the way for restoring diplomatic ties. 72 Moreover, the Americans seemed to lag behind on their own 'road map'. A year had passed since the Paris agreement was signed and UNTAC had already begun its work in Cambodia. According to the 'road map', it was already time for the Americans to lift the embargo or, at least, to lift their block against the international institutions' lending to Vietnam. None of these moves was made. The new administration of Bill Clinton was just as slow as that of his predecessor in normalising relations with Vietnam. It demanded the fullest possible accounting of MIAs before normalisation could proceed.73 It also rejected French President Fran9ois Mitterrand's request to lift the embargo.74 Moreover, the United States tried to block other Western countries from promoting business with Vietnam, understanding that it would be unfavourable for American business. In April 1993, under American pressure, France had to shelve its plan to raise the issue of renewing loans to Vietnam at a semi-annual meeting of the IMF and World Bank.75 It was only in July 1993 that President Clinton decided to end American opposition to the multilateral lending to Vietnam. The making of this decision once again highlights how difficult normalisation was. The decision was made only after the
70 Reuters News Service, 15 December 1992. 71 Some diplomats suggested that President Bush might announce US plans to exchange government liaison offices with Hanoi. He would then be able to say that the Americans had put the war behind them. See Reuters News Service, 15 December 1992. 72 Reuters News Service, 15 December 1992. Laurence McQuillan 'USA: Bush signals ties with Vietnam may be near'. T, The Dispatch Vol.14, No. 14,4 May 1993, p. 219. 74 Reuters News Service, 'USA: US won't heed Mitterrand plea to rush Vietnam trade'.
236 president received broad support from political figures and pressure groups. In June, the US National Security Council staff recommended that President Clinton end US opposition to multilateral lending to Vietnam. 76 On the same day, a bipartisan group headed by former US Secretary of State Edmund Muskie came out in favour of ending the embargo.77 Moreover, parallel with the decision, Clinton announced that he would send a high-level delegation to Vietnam to press for further help in resolving the fate of those still listed as missing in action from the Vietnam War. He stressed that 'any further steps in US-Vietnam relations will strictly depend on further progress by the Vietnamese on the POW/MIA issue'.78 The model of taking small steps towards normalisation after receiving broad support for the move was practised in all other cases when the Americans eased their embargo against Vietnam. In September the· Clinton Administration permitted American companies to participate in development projects in Vietnam funded by international financial institutions.79 The decision was made only after Senator Charles Robb, Chairman of the East Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, visited Vietnam in August and also spoke in favour of normalisation.80 In addition, the move seemed to be more modest than originally planned or proposed by advisors. Winston Lord was quoted as having revealed privately to Nguyen Xuan Oanh, who had been Vice-Premier of the former Saigon government, that President Clinton would lift the US trade embargo against Vietnam in all but name. 81 The Clinton decision was clearly very different from Lord's understanding. Moreover, normalisation was again refused, even after Vietnam was highly praised by Christopher and John Kerry for its efforts on the MIA issue. 82 The American arrogance amused one Thai newspaper. An editorial in the Bangkok Post commented, 'twice in 1993 opportunities for a foreign policy success were dropped in Clinton's political lap.
75 France. with Japanese backing, was known to be leading an effort to assemble a $140 million package to enable Hanoi to pay off its arrears to the IMF, which would make it eligible for new loans from the Fund and other international institutions. 76 Reuters News Service, 'USA: Aids urge Clinton to Allow Vietnam loans', June 18, 1993. Reuters News Service, 'USA: Christopher- Decision soon on Loans for Vietnam' June 21, 1993. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Reuters News Service, 14 September 1993. 80 Reuters News Service, 'Vietnam: US Senator Robbin Vietnam expresses wish to End Embargo', 24 August 1993. 81 Reuters News Service, 7 September 1993 'Vietnam: US Embargo on Last Legs'. 82 See for instance interview with Ngyen Manh Cam in Tuoi tre, Reuters News Service, 9 August 1993. Reuters News Service, 'Vietnam: US Senator John Kerry confirms progress on POW/MIA Issue' May 24, 1993. Vietnam Invetsment Review, 24 May 1993. 237 Twice he lacked the minimal courage to exploit the moment'. 83 This Thai paper even advised the Vietnamese 'forget it [the lifting of the American embargo and normalisation], and have relations with whoever pays respect Vietnam' .84 The lifting ofthe American embargo in February 1994 was also undertaken after a non-binding resolution of the Senate signalling broad bipartisan support for the move was approved. By the end of January the US Senate voted 62-38 in favour of a resolution calling for lifting of the economic embargo.85 If fact, Vietnam eased Clinton's decision by offering a concession. In January, it agreed with the United States on opening a dialogue on human rights. It took another year and a half for the Clinton Administration to make the final decision to normalise relations with Vietnam. This, like other decisions, was achieved only after Clinton obtained broad support. On 15 May, Vietnam gave a US presidential delegation a batch of documents on missing Americans, later hailed by the Pentagon as the most detailed and informative of their kind. Another nudge towards normalisation was a favourable statement by Senator John McCain.86 In addition, in June 1995, as subsequently disclosed, Secretary of State Warren Christopher urged Clinton to establish full diplomatic relations with Vietnam. Even so, the Clinton announcement showed arrogance in two ways: It was made unilaterally, suggesting that the Americans were in doing the Vietnamese a favour. 87 Furthermore, Clinton announced that normalisation would serve American interests in 'working for a free and peaceful Vietnam'. 88 The statement was aimed at buying support from conservative American circles, 89 but it also shows the US intention of interfering in domestic Vietnamese affairs. Though there was no information to confirm this, the statement could not but have raised Vietnamese leaders' concern over US intentions in its relations with Vietnam.
83 Bangkok Post, 20 January 1994, p. 4. 84 Ibid. 85 Reuters News Service, 'Vietnam: Vietnam welcomes US Senate Vote on Ending Sanctions', January 29, 1994. 86 See more details in Reuters News Service, 25 May 1995. 87 It is not known whether the Vietnamese asked for talks on normalisation and were rejected or they accepted small state fate of receiving privileges given by great power. 88 TheDispatch, Vo1.6, No.28, July 10, 1995, p. 551. 89 US presidents always are concerned about being labelled as 'soft on communism'. 238 Difficulties in Chinese normalisation with Vietnam
Like US-Vietnam normalisation, Sino-Vietnamese normalisation was an extremely difficult process. Initially, China demanded resolution of the Cambodian question as a condition for normalisation, and insisted on unilateral Vietnamese concessions on this question. The Chinese went as far as unofficially demanding the removal of Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach as a precondition for normalisation of Sino-Vietnamese relations. They changed their policy only after the Chengdu summit of September 1990, where Vietnamese leaders allegedly accepted the Chinese version of power sharing for the Cambodian Supreme National Council. Though this concession removed the biggest obstacle for normalisation- the Cambodian issue, China did not agree to normalise its relations with Vietnam immediately, dragging out normalisation until after the Paris peace agreement for Cambodia was signed. The first clear sign of difficulties in the normalisation process was the lack of reciprocity in Sino-Vietnamese relations. After three Beijing visits within seventeen months between January 1989 and May 1990 by Vietnam's First Deputy Foreign Minister, Dinh Nho Liem, the Chinese sent their Assistant Foreign Minister, Xu Dunxin, to Hanoi. 90 The lack of reciprocity was seen not only in the number of visits, but also in the visitors' ranks. While Liem was first Vice Foreign Minister, Xu was only Assistant. Another sign of difficulty was Chinese insistence on unilateral Vietnamese concessions. Though the Chinese had made some encouraging gestures, 91 they insisted on Vietnamese participation in resolution of the domestic aspect of the Cambodian question, in other words, the political solution. The Vietnamese position was that political settlement should be left for the Cambodians to negotiate. Thus the first two rounds of talks in Beijing between Dinh Nho Liem and his Chinese counterparts brought no results. China insisted on resolution of the Cambodian issue before normalisation could proceed. 92
90 Dinh Nho Liem visited China in January, May 1989 and May 1990. In June 1990, Xu Dunxin came to Hanoi. 91 They publicly praised the Vietnamese willingness to withdraw their troops from Cambodia, and reduced military pressure at the border. See more details in Jiefangjun Baa, 11 January 1989, quoted in FBIS 25 January 1989. The lack offull information ofFBIS sources used in this dissertation is due to the fact that they are photocopies from FBIS publications stored in the Indochina Centre at University of California at Berkley, and used as they are classified there. 92 See more details in FBIS, 9 May 1989. 239 One of the main aspects of the Cambodian solution was the question of the Khmer Rouge's possible return to power. In April 1989, Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach proposed six measures to prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge. 93 But the Chinese rejected these proposals, describing them as 'aimed at attaining the goal it has failed to attain on the battlefields' .94 The Chinese clearly insisted on the unilateral Vietnamese withdrawal of troops, without internationally guaranteed denial of power to the Khmer Rouge, which was the main problem for Vietnam's security. This Chinese line also contrasted with their own proposal of 1983 that China would normalise relations with Vietnam when it withdrew its forces from Cambodia.95 Moreover, at the Paris International Conference on Cambodia of July-August 1989, the Chinese insisted on establishment of a four-faction coalition government, which accorded the same position to the Khmer Rouge as the Phnompenh government, something Hanoi and Phnompenh could not accept. The conference failed to produce any results. When Vietnam withdrew its all troops from Cambodia in September 1989, China refused to acknowledge it. The stated reason for their reluctance was the lack of international supervision of the withdrawal.96 It was one thing for lack of international supervision to cause the Chinese to doubt the completeness of Vietnamese withdrawal, but the Chinese description of Vietnamese actions as 'tricks' and 'lies' showed a rigidity in their attitude towards Vietnam. 97 This amounted to a total rejection of Vietnamese good will and was not conducive to promoting a political settlement of the conflict. The Chinese exerted additional pressure on the sea and land borders between China and Vietnam. Chinese warships were reported to have been cruising in the South China Sea in late September and early October.98 In addition, the official Chinese media
93 They included: terminate aid to the Khmer Rouge, ban it from maintaining armed forces, punish its top leaders, confiscate its hidden arms arsenals, end its control in the refugee camps, deny it a role in a future government in Cambodia. 94 Jiefangjun Baa 2 May, cited in FBIS 2 May 1989. 95 On I March 1983, Chinese Foreign Minister stated 'ifthe Vietnamese government decided to pull out all its troops from Cambodia, the Chinese side will, right after the first withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, and be ready to resume negotiations with Vietnam to discuss the normalisation of relations between the two countries'. See Nhan Dan, 12 May 1989. 96 Xinhua, 29 September 1989. Reuters News Service, 30 September 1989. See also FBIS, 6 October 1989, and 29 October 1989. 97 See more details in Xinhua, 29 September 1989, 7 October 1989 and Reuters News Service, 26 October 1989. 98 South China Morning Post, 5 October 1989. 240 accused Vietnamese troops of provoking border clashes by smashing and moving markers and firing at Chinese citizens, the first such claim levelled by Beijing for several months.99 Observers commented that the Chinese report marked a break with Beijing's recent practice of focusing on the positive aspects of border relations with Vietnam, showing an attempt by Beijing to keep up pressure on Vietnam until it yielded politically on the question of Cambodia. 100 It was only in early 1990 that the Chinese started to change their policy. According to Vietnam's Vice Foreign Minister, Vu Khoan, China not only decided to hold celebrations marking the birth centenary of Vietnam's founding father Ho Chi Minh in May, but also decreased tensions on the border. Contacts between :Vietnam's Foreign Ministry and the Chinese embassy in Hanoi were stepped up and plans were
1 discussed to celebrate the 40 h anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two nations. 101 Furthermore, Li Peng was quoted as telling the outgoing Vietnamese Ambassador and the newly accredited Ambassador that he hoped the normalisation of Vietnamese-Chinese relations would be realised at an early date. 102 The South China Morning Post explained the reason for the seemingly improved relationship between the two countries by Deng's call for protecting socialism in three Asian countries- China, North Korea and Vietnam. 103 Deng was believed to have outlined a three-pronged plan to defuse 'direct contradictions', then 'indirect contradictions' and lastly to boost bilateral relations. 104 Direct contradictions referred to confrontation~, including armed clashes, whereas indirect contradictions referred to the Cambodian problem and other regional issues. A leading Vietnam watcher, Carlyle Thayer, also observed that the PRC's Vice Premier Wu Xueqian told Michio Watanabe, the elder Japanese statesman, that China favoured the restoration of Sino-Vietnamese ties based on a formula once used by Ho Chi Minh, that of 'comrade plus brother' .105 This development proves the correctness of David Marr' s prediction ten years before. In 1981, Marr commented that 'Communists in both Vietnam and China continue to think of themselves as authentic Maxist-Leninist. In the short-term this undoubtably makes rapprochement all the more
99 FBIS, 8 November 1989. 100 Ibid. 101 Cited in FBIS, 7 January 1990 102 MOF A China Department's file. 103 South Chinese Morning Post, 25 January I 990. 104 Ibid. 105 Kyodo News Service, 3 May 1990. Cited in Thayer C., 1992, 'Comrade Plus Brother: The New Sino-Vietnamese Relations', The Pacific Review, Vol.5, No.4, p. 402. 241 difficult. In the long run, however, it offers one means by which new generations of Vietnamese Communists may begin to forge' .106 However, if this was the case, the tendency was short lived. It later became clear that China was not in favour of a red solution, power sharing between the Khmer Rouge and the Phnompenh government without the participation of non-communist forces, and it favoured 'dong chi, khong phai dong minh' (comrades but not allies) 107 relations with Vietnam. This policy line went against attempts to protect socialism, as the South China Morning Post claimed. While there are no sufficient sources to support or reject the claim, the fact is that the above-mentioned changes in China's policy towards Vietnam were not significant. They could have just been aimed at encouraging the Vietnamese to make concessions to China on the Cambodian question. This explanation seems more convincing, as the Chinese seemed to prefer keeping their policy changes low key. Renmin Ribao and Xinhua did not publish the congratulatory messages exchanged between Nguyen Co Thach and Qian Qichen on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of diplomatic establishment between the two countries. 108 Moreover, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Jin Guihua kept insisting that the main obstacle to the normalisation of Sino-Vietnamese relations was the Cambodian issue. 109 So, even when there were 'ideological incentives' for China to go more softly with Vietnam, it kept insisting on Vietnamese concessions on the Cambodian issue. This is a clear-cut example of the difficulties in Sino-Vietnamese normalisation. Chinese inflexibility on the Cambodian question was seen in their diplomatic rejection of the Sihanouk proposal of March 1990 to convene a meeting between the Chinese, Vietnamese, Thai and other ASEAN representatives to resolve the Cambodian issue. In a 'soft' rejection, Qian told Thai counterpart Siddhi that a trilateral meeting could be convened when conditions were 'ripe' and the timing was 'appropriate'. l!O Instead, Li Peng reconfirmed with Siddhi two Chinese principles for 'reasonable and
106 Marr, David, 1981, 'Sino-American relations', The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, (Canberra) No.6, 1981, pp. 45--64. 107 In 1950-72 when Sino-American relations were described as 'vua Ia dong chi vua Ia anh em' (comrades plus brothers) comrade relations were rated above realpolitik's alliances. But in the post-Cold War context 'comrades but not allies' means that the relations between the two countries were not at alliance level as in the past. 108 MOFA China Department's files 109 FBIS, 17 January 1990. 110 Bangkok Post, 29 March 1990, p. 6; Reuters News Service, 29 March 1990.
242 comprehensive' political settlement of the Cambodian issue: Vietnamese withdrawal and the participation of the four parties in the settlement. Furthermore, during Li Peng's visit to Moscow in April 1990, the Chinese successfully pressured the Soviets over their plan for Cambodia. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed that national reconciliation should be achieved, that the four sides in Cambodia should unite and that Vietnam should withdraw all its troops. 111 The Chinese hard line on the Cambodian issue was seen clearly in the May and June 1990 talks between the two countries. In early May, Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Dinh Nho Liem went to Beijing for the third round of talks in seventeen months. There was no sign of Chinese concessions, but Vietnamese concessions were clear. Thach said both China and Vietnam endorsed UN involvement in the settlement. Though Vietnamese understanding of a UN role was limited, 112 this acceptance showed a change only in the Vietnamese position. By then, Vietnam had not accepted a UN role in Cambodia as Vietnamese memories of anti-Vietnamese resolutions on the Cambodian question by the UN were still fresh. Another concession was that the Vietnamese allegedly changed its opinion on the SNC. While Sihanouk and Hun Sen agreed in their Bangkok joint communique that such a council should be set to symbolise Cambodian sovereignty, 113 the Vietnamese agreed with the Chinese that the SNC should be more than a symbolic body during the transitional period before elections. The last important concession made by the Vietnamese side was Liem's agreement not to refer any more to the question of the Khmer Rouge's genocide. Liem promised that another form of words would be formulated to replace the term. 114 The Chinese did not disclose the details of the meeting until after the failure of the fourth round of talks in Hanoi. They claimed that the two sides had reached some common understanding during Liem' s visit to Beijing, 115 although the Vietnamese denied this. In the absence of appropriate sources, I assume that concessions were couched in
111 Xinhua, 26 April 1990. The Vietnamese claimed that their troops had been withdrawn from Cambodia. 112 Vietnam preferred the UN to verify the withdrawal but demanded that the UN should respect the sovereignty of Cambodia. 113 Bangkok, IS May 1990, p. 7. 4 ll Based on my interview with a former high-ranking diplomat in Hanoi July 1999. 115 Xinhua disclosed that during the May talks the Vietnamese side expressed its willingness to study the Chinese views concerning the transitional authority and the disposition of the troops of the four factions in Cambodia upon returning to Vietnam and to keep the latter informed of the result. See Xinhua June 28, 1989, quoted in Reuters News Service, June 29, 1989.
243 ambiguous language, and when the Chinese did not reciprocate, the Vietnamese denied the concessions. While there is no direct evidence, indirect sources confirm that assumption. The Chinese announced that Liem's meetings with Chinese Foreign Ministry's officials had been 'beneficial' and 'helped promote mutual understanding between the two countries' .116 This was code for Chinese satisfaction with the changes they detected in Vietnam's position. Moreover, only a month after Liem's visit, the Chinese sent their Assistant Foreign Minister Xu Dunxin to Vietnam for talks on Cambodia. A Vietnamese diplomat in Beijing told me that the haste was due to the 'good impression' imparted to the Chinese by Liem's visit. 117 Contrary to all hopes, 118 Xu Dunxin' s trip -the first visit by a Chin~se ranking official to Vietnam in ten years - was a failure. A former high-ranking diplomat in Hanoi told me that Xu Dunxin was hypocritical, asking Vietnam's Deputy Foreign Minister, Tran Quang Co, to implement 'five points' (nam y kien) endorsed by the Vietnamese leaders, which Co denied was the case. The Chinese negotiator also blamed Co for going back on understandings (thoa thuan) 119 reached during Liem's visit, which Co also denied. The talks between Nguyen Co Thach and Xu Dunxin were a disaster as Thach allegedly lost his temper, accusing China of being hostile to Vietnam and inflexible on Cambodia. 120 As mentioned above, the Chinese insisted on unilateral Vietnamese concessions. The Vietnamese may have thought that their initial concessions would inspire Chinese reciprocity. But when Xu Dunxin went to Hanoi empty handed, the talks failed. This showed how tough China was in its relations with Vietnam. The Chinese did not concede anything to reach a breakthrough m Sino-Vietnamese relations while the Vietnamese made a range of concessions. Chinese inflexibility is obvious in the context of the then fresh agreement between Sihanouk and Hun Sen. On the eve ofXu's trip to Hanoi, the two Cambodian leaders agreed, in Tokyo, to set up an SNC of six members from each ofthe two sides - the Phnompenh government and the coalition. Xu demanded it be made up of the
116 FBIS, 8/5/1990. Reuters News Service, 10 May 1990. 117 Based on my interview with a Vietnamese diplomat in Beijing February 1998. 118 Diplomats did not foresee an immediate resumption of full ties between Vietnam and China, but they expected agreement on measures to reduce tension along the frontier and extend cross-border trade. See for instance International Herald Tribune, 9 June 1990. 119 The best translation of 'thoa thuan' into English is agreement, but there was no agreement reached during the May talks. ·so 'understanding' was used instead of'agreement'. 120 Based on my interview with a ranking diplomat in Hanoi, July 1999. See also Thayer C., 1992, op. cit., p. 404. Carlyle Thayer, however, claims that 'the talk on Cambodia went comparatively well', which does not conform with the information I obtained from this interview in Hanoi. 244 four rival Cambodian factions but he did not recogmse the Sihanouk-Hun Sen agreement, citing the absence of the Khmer Rouge and Son Sann. 121 This was an unconvincing reason for Chinese rejection as Sihanouk was Chairman of the CGDK. Moreover, Son Sann later agreed with the declaration and appointed two members from his faction to take part in the SNC. Another sign of Chinese rigidity was its insistence on Vietnamese participation in resolving the domestic aspects of the conflict. Xu proposed, in Hanoi, a five-stage approach to the peace settlement of Cambodia, with Chinese and Vietnamse participation at every stage. 122 Later Tran Quang Co explained to me that Vietnam could 123 not accept this Chinese proposal as 'it is disadvantageous to Vietnam' . , A former high-ranking Vietnamese diplomat also confirms that the Vietnamese influence over the Hun Sen government in the settlement of Cambodian conflict was limited, and the Cambodians were highly suspicious of possible Sino,-Vietnamese deals agreed without their participation. 124 After the failure of Xu's trip to Hanoi it was no surprise that the Chinese declared that they would continue to back the Khmer resistance. The Chinese also declined to take part in a Vietnam-Thailand-China dialogue proposed by Thai Prime Minister Chattichai. 125 The Chinese also rejected high-level Chinese-Vietnamese talks. 126 China was believed to have pressured Vietnamese leaders to settle the Cambodian issue before holding a summit. Moreover, the Chinese did not respond to Thai Prime Minister Chatchai's urging China to stop its arms supply to the Khmer Rouge forthwith. 127 China changed its Vietnam policy only after Baker's volte face, discussed in the previous session. At the end of August, Li Peng stated that China hoped to normalise relations with Vietnam and would discuss with the latter such problems as the dispute over the Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelago. 128 On 28 August he made the same point to
121 See more details in Straits Times, 16 June 1990. 122 See more details in The Nation 28 July 1990, and FBIS 8 August 1990. 123 Based on my interview with Tran Quang Co in Hanoi, July 1999. The consistent Vietnamese position was that Vietnam should respect Cambodia's sovereignty and the internal aspect of the conflict had to be left for the Cambodians to solve. 124 See unpublished memoirs. 125 Strait Times, 16 June 1990. 126 Nguyen Van Linh was quoted as telling a Japanese delegation that he had requested a meeting with Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, but was rejected. See Bangkok Post, 5 August 1990. 127 FBIS, 15 August 1990. 128 Ibid. 245 the Standing Committee- of the Chinese Parliament. 129 Vietnamese diplomats claimed that the American change of position in July in relation to the Cambodian issue brought about Chinese policy changes. 130 A high-ranking Vietnamese diplomat was quoted as saying that until July 1990 China had repeatedly turned down Vietnam's requests for a high-level meeting, but after the talks between Vietnam and the United States started in August, the Chinese changed their mind, inviting the Vietnamese leaders to Chengdu. 131 Difficulties in the normalisation process were also seen in the lack of reciprocity m the Chengdu meeting, where Vietnamese leaders reportedly made substantial concessions. The invitation was so sudden that the Vietnamese had to leave Hanoi the day after National Day, 2 September. Hanoi jumped at the Chinese offer, but the Chinese merely interpreted this as a sign of Vietnamese weakness. Another sign of broken reciprocity was Deng Xiaoping's absence from the meeting, despite Pham Van Dong having come from Hanoi. A high-ranking Vietnamese diplomat told me that Pham Van Dong regretted making the journey when Deng failed to appear, and the normalisation question was not discussed. 132 Moreover, the venue for the meeting also was not the Chinese capital but the provincial town of Chengdu. This choice was clearly to downgrade the importance of the talks. Although Nguyen Van Linh was was reported to have asked to go to Beijing to meet Deng Xiaoping, the request was turned down. 133 This lack of reciprocity was not as difficult as Chinese pressure over the formula for SNC membership (6+2+2+2+ 1). This proposal was different from the Hun Sen-Sihanouk Declaration with one extra 'neutral' member who would act as the chairman. It was aimed not only at eliminating the Tokyo Declaration, but also represented an effort to describe the Cambodian problem as a four-party rather than a two-sided conflict. After the Chengdu meeting Sino-Vietnamese relations improved noticeably. Carlyle Thayer observed that the Chinese abandoned their 'bleed Vietnam white' policy. 134 Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach said, 'there is no more shelling across the
129 Asian Bulletin Nov 1990 p. 86 130 See more details in Thayer, op. cit., p. 516. 131 Former First Vice Foreign Minister, Dinh Nho Liem, spoke at a meeting of an ad hoc 'Fifty years of Vietnam's diplomacy'. Quoted in unpublished 'Fifty years of Vietnam's diplomacy', which is of primary importance due to the high level of its participants. See also Thayer C., 1992, op. cit., p. 404. 132 Based on my interview in Hanoi, July 1999. 133 Chongkitavom K.,''Road still Rocky for Vietnam-China Ties', The Nation. FBIS, 5 July 1991. To the best of my knowledge, there is no Vietnamese source to confirm this claim. 134 Thayer, 1994a, 'Sino-Vietnamese Relations, the Interplay of ideology and National Interest', Asian Survey, Voi.XXIV, No.6, p. 517. 246 border and now more rice, coal, bicycles, sewing machines, apples are crossing the border. There will be exchange of visits of high-ranking officials' .135 China also was said to have withdrawn forces from positions it had occupied in northern Vietnam since the Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979. 136 In September 1990, Deputy Prime Minister Vo Nguyen Giap paid a visit to Beijing at the invitation of the Chinese Olympic Committee. Though Giap did not have substantive authority, the visit- the highest level visit since 1977 - was a sign of improvement in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. In January 1991, Vu Oanh, an alternate member of the CPV politburo, secretly headed a delegation to China to study Chinese economic reform. 137 The clearest sign of warmth was Jiang's congratulatory massage to Do Muoi, in June 1991, which marked the first communication between the two parties since 1978. The Chinese also invited a CPV envoy to Beijing to brief the Chinese leaders on the outcomes ofthe CPV Seventh Congress. In late July, Le Due Anh, the number two in Vietnam's party, paid a secret visit to China. The Chinese leaders allegedly told Anh that China 'agrees completely' with the results of Hanoi's congress. 138 Around this time, there was also substantial progress in solving the Cambodian question. In June, Hun Sen accepted Sihanouk as SNC Chairman, ending his nine-month objection. Though, as my interviews in Hanoi confirm, the decision was made independently from the Vietnamese, 139 it resulted in an agreement on the SNC's power-sharing to tackle the last problem of the conflict. All these positive changes in Vietnam as well as in Cambodia did not help to speed up Sino-Vietnamese normalisation, however. During the August 1990 visit to China by Deputy Foreign Minister, Nguyen Dy Nien, the Chinese continued to demand a solution to the Cambodian conflict before Sino-Vietnamese relations could be normalised. The Chinese also confirmed this line to Foreign Minister, Nguyen Manh Cam, when he visited China the following month. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated that the visit was only an 'important step in the normalisation of relations', whereas his Vietnamese counterpart claimed that his visit was 'a symbol of
135 FBIS-EAS, 22 October 1990. 136 FBIS, 23 October 1990. 137 Kawi Chongkitthawon, ibid. 138 Murray Hiebert and Tai Ming Cheung, lac. cit.; see also Thayer 1994a, op. cit., p. 520. After the failure of Xu Dunxin's trip to Hanoi, the Chinese unofficially demanded removal ofNguyen Co Thach as condition for normalisation. They were reasonably satisfied as the Seventh CPV Congress removed Thach. 139 Based on my interviews in Hanoi in July 1999 with Vietnamese diplomats. 247 the complete normalisation of relations between Vietnam and China'. 140 Only a week after the Paris Peace agreement on Cambodia was signed, in early November 1991, the Chinese invited Vietnamese leaders, General Secretary Do Muoi and Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet to China, marking the normalisation of relations between the two countries. The Chinese exploitation of Hanoi's weak position in normalisation process was evident in the one-way exchange of visits. Following the Chengdu meeting, no Chinese visitor arrived in Hanoi, while two VCP politburo members, one Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and his Deputy went to China. The Chinese made no response to the invitation to send a delegation to Hanoi to study Vietnam's economic situation, which reportedly was offered by Oanh during his January 1991 visit. 141 Moreover, Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam went to China via highway No. 1. According to the rumours going around Hanoi at the time, it was like the trips to China made by Vietnamese ambassadors in former times when Vietnam was a tributary state of its big Northern neighbour. The above history shows that Sino-Vietnamese normalisation was an extremely difficult process for the Vietnamese. The post-normalisation relationship also shows Vietnam's difficult position in its relations with China. Normalisation opened a new era in Sino-Vietnamese relations, one free from confrontation, but it was still full of conflict. The most difficult question was the South China Sea disputes. In February 1992, less than four months after normalisation, China passed a law claiming the Spratly and the Paracel islands, and reserved the right to use military force to defend its claims. The law served as the legal basis for Chinese expansion in the South China Sea. In the same month Chinese troops physically took possession of Da Ba Dau (Three Headed Rock) in the South China Sea. According to Vietnamese sources, during the first half of 1992, the Chinese military seized 8,400 hectares of land located at fifteen disputed locations along their border. 142 Moreover, in early May China signed an agreement with a little-known US company, Crestone Energy Corp., to explore for oil on Vietnam's continental shelf. The contract showed not only Chinese encroachment of Vietnamese territory, but it was also a means of humiliating the Vietnamese. It was allegedly signed in Beijing's Great Hall of the People just hours before the VCP Central Committee's Adviser, Nguyen Van
140 The Nikkei Weekly, 21 September 1991. Cited in Reuters News Service, the same date. 141 Kawi Chongkitthawon, ibid. 142 Thayer 1994b, op. cit., p. 257. 248 Linh, held discussions there with General Secretary Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng. 143 Furthermore, in signing this contract the Chinese expanded the range of disputes with Vietnam as Tu Chinh (the concession area China awarded to the Crestone Corporation) was neither a disputed area nor an outstanding historical problem, but a one arising after the normalisation of relations. 144 Beijing even warned that it was willing to use force in this dispute. 145 In July, the Chinese stationed their troops on Da lac reef, only 10 km Southwest ofNam Yet Island, where Vietnam had stationed troops for years. In September they set up an oil drilling platform in the Bac Bo (Tonkin) Gulf and sent a seismic survey ship. 146 In parallel with incidents in the South China Sea, the land-border tension also increased. A railway signal box was built 500 metres inside Vietnamese territory. 147 The boundary marker at Friendship Pass was moved 400 metres into Vietnamese territory. Chinese border guards from Guangxi province evicted Vietnamese farmers from disputed territory and burned their huts. Diplomats in Hanoi said China seemed to be making a deliberate push in the South China Sea. 148 Between June and September, Chinese authorities had detained at least 22 Vietnamese freighters plying between Haiphong and Hong Kong. 149 The Chinese were also believed to have pressured the Vietnamese not to develop relations with Taiwan. 150 It seems that in the changed circumstances, the Chinese applied a new tactic in their relations with the Vietnamese. China had often urged Vietnam to preserve 'daju' (the overall relationship) which meant not to harm the new-found Sino-Vietnamese friendship, as a means of preventing Vietnam from strongly protesting against their encroachment. 151 In addition, whenever a high-level Chinese delegation went to Vietnam, the Chinese made conciliatory gestures. For instance, on the eve of Li Peng' s visit to Hanoi, the Chinese withdrew their drilling platform and released a Vietnamese freighter. The moves seemed to be aimed at downplaying the disputes between the two
143 Ibid., p. 356. See also Beijing Review, July 20. 144 Cited in Thayer, 1994b, op. cit., p. 360. 145 Ibid. 146 Reuters News Service, 6 September I 992. 147 FBIS, June 12, 1992. 148 Reuters News Service, I 0 July I 992. 149 See more details in South China Morning Post, I 3 November 1992; in Reuters News Service, November 13, 1992. 150 Reuters News Service, 14 February 1992, November 4, 1991. 151 See more details in Nguyen Hong Thach, 1992, 'Vietnam-China: New but Not Easy Year', Trend (Distributed with Singaporean Business Times) 31 December 1992.
249 countries. The Chinese also played 'visit diplomacy' with Vietnam. In 1992, there were three high-ranking visits to Vietnam by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (in February), Major-General Fu Jiaping, Head of the PLA's Foreign Affairs Bureau (in May), and Prime Minister Li Peng (in November). They also invited numerous visitors from Vietnam, including CPV Central Committee's Senior Adviser Nguyen Van Linh, Defence Minister Doan K.hue, and Major-General Vu Xuan Vinh, Head of the VPA's External Relations Department. Though there were twelve agreements signed during those visits, they failed to solve any major disputes between the two countries. Like the year 1992, the years 1993-95 saw two concurrent tendencies in Chinese policy towards Vietnam: one of exchanging visits between the two countries, and another of encroaching on Vietnamese interests. 152 There were cases of Chinese ships drilling, conducting seismic tests about 300 km southeast of Vung Tau, fishing in Vietnamese territorial water, and of Chinese warships stopping supplies reaching Petro Vietnam's oil-drilling operations. 153 However, troubles seemed to occur less often than in 1992. The main reason was that in 1992 Vietnam did not react as much to Chinese moves. They seemed to adopt a milder attitude towards the South China Sea disputes. The two sides also reached some progress in the settlement of border disputes. In February 1993, the two countries. started discussing the 'fundamental principles' to be applied in solving disputes along the land border and in the territorial waters between them. A breakthrough was recorded in the August meeting in Beijing, 154 and in October an agreement on basic principles was signed in Hanoi. This achievement was so limited that Vietnamese principal negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Vu Khoan, coldly commented after the signing ceremony, 'it's better than nothing', whereas his Chinese counterpart Tang Jiaxuan called it 'a very important document' .155 Moreover, the two sides decided to establish joint working groups, one on the land border and the other on Bac Bo Gulf. 156 The third round of talks, conducted in July 1995 in Beijing, set up a third joint working group on territorial water issues, which means that only four years after normalisation, the Chinese recognised that there were territorial disputes in the South China Sea. They refused, however, to discuss the Paracel Islands dispute. In
152 See more details in Thayer 1994b, op. cit., pp. 363-4. 153 Reuters News Service, May 17, 1993. October 25, 1994, South China Morning Post, July 26, 1994; August 19, 1994; in Reuters News Service, 26 July 1994 and 19 August 1994. 154 Kyodo News Agency, August 31, 1993; in Reuters News Service, 2 September 1993. 155 Reuters News Service, 19 October 1994. 156 Ibid, 21 October 1993. 250 addition, at the July 1994 meeting between the Foreign Ministers of the two countries, during the ARF meeting in Bangkok, it was agreed that two sides would exercise restraint and do nothing to worsen the situation. 157 The end of 1994 and early 1995 also saw increasing Chinese concern about Vietnamese normalisation with the United States and joining ASEAN. On 17 November 1994 the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Sherr Guofang said that Chinese welcomed the improvement in relations between the United States and Vietnam but opposed any US military presence there. 158 The statement was caused by a speech made by Pacific Admiral Richard Macke, the top US military officer in Asia, following his visit to Hanoi in which he mentioned that he was interested in the Cam Ranh.Bay base. Though Macke's statement did not mean that the United States really wanted the base, the Chinese reaction shows how deep were China's concerns about possible military relations between Vietnam and the United States. China also worried about Vietnamese membership of ASEAN. Sherr Guofeng told a press conference in Beijing in July 1995 that China hoped and believed that Vietnam, after joining ASEAN, would devote itself to regional peace and stability, as the other ASEAN countries were doing. 159 Privately the Chinese conveyed more directly their concerns, reminding the Vietnamese of the costs of the recent anti-Chinese policy. 160 These Chinese worries forced Nguyen Manh Cam to go public to assure China that closer ties with its Southeast Asian neighbours and the United States would not affect development of relations between the two countries. 161
Conclusion
The post-Cold War years were marked by both American and Chinese normalisation of their relations with Vietnam. Clearly, the new international situation made isolation of Vietnam unnecessary. However, as the analysis has shown, normalisation moved extremely slowly in both cases. The United States, as well as China, did their best to pressure Vietnam and to win concession after concession from the Vietnamese side, before normalisation was agreed.
157 Ibid., 22 July 1994. 158 Ibid., 17 November 1994. See also Nikkei Weekly, 8 May 1995; in Reuters News Service, 8 May 1995. 159 lbid.,21 July 1995. · 160 Based on my interviews with Vietnamese diplomats in Hanoi and Beijing. 161 Reuters News Service, 31 July 1995 and South China Morning Post, 1 August 1995; in Reuters News Service, 1 August 1995. 251 At first glance, there seemed to be no link between Sino-American relations and US Vietnam policy. But deeper analysis shows a connection. The slow process of normalisation, in the American case, was due to American domestic politics and opposition from POW/MIA pressure groups. Bush and Clinton both had to show that they were not betraying American soldiers who had fought and died in Vietnam. However, that was only the tip of the iceberg. The real reason for the slow American normalisation was that Vietnam, in the new world order, was not as important to the United States. The United States did not need Vietnam as it had in the past. America had to co-operate with China, and in many cases even had to please the Chinese. Under these circumstances, Vietnam lost its geopolitical significance in the American strategic plan. In today's world where gee-economics has the upper hand, Vietnam is no longer important to the United States. Had Vietnam occupied a better position in the American strategic plan, normalisation should have been achieved earlier, despite pressures from anti-normalisation forces in the United States. On the other hand, as Sino-American relations in the 1990s were also characterised by confrontation, there was little incentive for the United States to develop its relations with Vietnam. When the Americans became increasingly worried about Chinese ambitions in the region, voices favouring better relations with Vietnam could be heard. Macke's remark, mentioned above, was an example. The chief of American forces in the Asia-Pacific was looking for a 'good port', but the relevant question was why did the Americans need one? There is no doubt that this was a response to the Chinese threat, as perceived by America. This could not help but improve American-Vietnamese relations. This example demonstrates a further impact of Sino-American relationship on US policy towards Vietnam, however small. The same logic was seen in the slow and difficult Sino-Vietnamese normalisation. Because there was no longer an American threat to Chinese security, the Chinese were in no hurry to improve their relations with Vietnam. This lack of Chinese interest in developing relations with Vietnam is the reason for all the difficulties in the normalisation process and in the relationship after normalisation. Moreover, in order to please the Americans and the international community, the Chinese showed their toughness with Vietnam in a number of cases. When the Vietnamese tried to build the new relationship ~n the basis of their shared ideology, or to form an alliance against 'peaceful evolution', the Chinese always rejected their overtures, stressing that Sino-Vietnamese relations could not return to the 1950s and 1960s. 252 If these were 'negative' effects of the American factor on China's Vietnam policy, there also were some 'positive' effects. The normalisation process was accelerated whenever the Chinese saw the signs of American-Vietnamese rapprochement. Baker's volte face pushed the Chinese to the decision to invite Vietnamese leaders to Chengdu, a move they had refused to make for years. The Chinese also seemed to be worried when the Vietnamese finally normalised relations with the United States and joined ASEAN, and this forced them to alter their tough stance in the South China Sea disputes. While not reversing its policy in the South China Sea, China did adopt a milder position.
253 Conclusion
Analysis of the relationship between the state of Sino-American relations and these two countries' Vietnam policies over the entire period from 1950 to 1995 shows that the relationship between these two powers largely shaped their attitudes towards Vietnam. In the beginning, their relationship did not seem to affect strongly their decisions to recognise different governments in Vietnam. Both continued their pre-1950 policies. Recognition was more ideologically motivated than based on security calculations, though the estrangement that followed the establishment of the PRC encouraged each side to make its respective move. The Chinese Communists tried to export their model of revolution to their southern neighbour, while the Americans tried to nurture non communist forces in Vietnam when they arrived at the firm conviction that the Viet Minh were 'Communists in disguise'. At the time, the Soviet factor played a more significant role than the China factor in American recognition of the State of Vietnam, as every communist movement in the world was thought to be directed from Moscow. For the Chinese part, the People's Republic was not yet concerned greatly about the American threat to its security when it recognised the DRV. The reason for the neglect of the security dimension in their attitudes towards Vietnam in early 1950 was that the two countries did not yet consider each other immediate enemies, though they were highly suspicious about each other. Vietnam had not yet become a battlefield for influence between China and the United States. However, it became the case as soon as the two powers became locked in confrontation following the outbreak ofthe Korean War in June 1950, and especially after US troops approached the Yalu River in October. The increase in their support for the opposing sides in the First Vietnam War was a direct result of their newly established hostility. They both started to be concerned about the threat the other posed. While Beijing helped the Viet Minh to fight the French colonialists and American interventionists in order to deflect the American threat from China's southern border, Washington was determined to help the French and the Vietnamese 'nationalist' forces to stop the comm.unist 'expansion'. The American determination was clearest when Dien Bien Phu was under siege and was about to fall. Thanks to its superior economic and military capacity, Washington was enthusiastic about a military option for 254 Indochina. Its policy seemed to be rigid, conflicting even with its allies - Paris and London - who preferred to try for a peaceful settlement. On the other hand, the Sino-American military confrontation in Korea did not produce any outright victor. Both countries suffered enormously during the war. They understood that they had to avoid further direct military conflict with each other, and at the same time try to prevent each other from exercising a dominant influence in the region. Both China and the United States provided aid to Vietnam, but refused to commit troops in the conflict. Even when Washington was eager to take military measures to prevent the Vietnamese communist forces from achieving victory against the desperate French, it preferred to offer only air and navy support besides the military aid provided for the French expeditionary forces in Vietnam. Moreover, Washington insisted on the participation of its allies in a united action against the Viet Minh, which would ease its losses in case of a direct conflict with China over Vietnam. Washington did consider taking military measures without French or British participation, but this was only one of the scenarios considered, albeit one that showed American determination to fight the communist forces in Vietnam. Washington was by no means prepared to fight alone in Indochina at that time. Chinese and American determination to hinder each other's influence without direct fighting was the main reason for the partition of Vietnam, which ran counter to the interests of the Vietnamese, both Communists and anti-Communists. It should be noted that, due to different economic and military capabilities, the two countries arrived at endorsement of partition differently. Along with the Soviet Union, France and Great Britain, China was one of the authors of the idea, whereas the United States in the beginning opposed it, only adopting it when it was clear there was no other choice. The Geneva Conference showed clearly the way Sino-American hostility affected China's attitude towards Vietnam. Facing the threat of American intervention in Indochina, which the Chinese Communists perceived as a direct threat to their security, they did their utmost to deflect this threat, even if it meant sacrificing the interests of their Vietnamese comrades. The Chinese pressured the Viet Minh to make concessions on two important questions - the temporary demarcation line, the timing of national elections - in order to secure a peace agreement in Vietnam. The Chinese urged the Vietnail_lese to make more concessions than necessary, as later events were to prove. They advised the Vietnamese to agree on a regime of common management of
255 Highway No. 5, the main communication line between the two biggest cities in the North. Moreover, the Geneva Conference witnessed a turning point in China's policy towards Vietnam. If prior to the conference the Chinese Communists had wanted to export revolution to Vietnam, to impose their revolutionary model on their southern neighbour, at Geneva they changed this attitude, limiting themselves to a 'half victory'. China was satisfied with the northern half of Vietnam being communist. The Chinese Communists also preferred to 'balkanise' Indochina, which constituted of a Laos and a Cambodia, modelled after Indonesia and India, and two Vietnams. The American intention to partition Vietnam was not clear in Geneva as they were eager to fight for a united anti-Communist Vietnam. But the limits of their capability (as they could not send their own troops to fight in Vietnam) and the refusal of their allies to support them prevented them from achieving this aim, which foreshadowed partition of Vietnam. After 1954, maintaining the status quo in Vietnam or prolonging a divided Vietnam became the main thrust of both Chinese and American Vietnam policies. Such an approach served the two countries' needs in fighting a quasi war with each other, as no-one would be the loser in that situation. Sharing the same objective in Vietnam, China and the United States differed in the means to achieve it, due to the different strengths of their local partners - the Ho Chi Minh and Bao Dai governments. After the Geneva Conference, the United States tried its utmost to build a strong anti Communist government in South Vietnam to counter-balance the Ho Chi Minh government in the North. US support was a primary reason why Ngo Dinh Diem rejected national elections to reunite the country in 1956. In the meantime, Beijing also advised Hanoi to refrain from resorting to arms to reunite Vietnam. When the status quo came under threat in the early 1960s due to the uprisings in the South, the Buddhist protests, and the ineffectiveness of the Saigon government, both the United States and China took measures to maintain the status quo. While Washington poured money, arms and advisors into South Vietnam to rescue the Saigon government, the Chinese considered these American efforts as a threat, and began to support the Vietnamese Communists' armed struggle by providing the DRV with arms. As preservation of the status quo was their overall objective in Vietnam, the Chinese tried to keep the fighting to a restrained level and advised Hanoi to fight a prolonged war. 256 American efforts in the special war did not stop the guerrilla war in the South, despite Washington's belief that widening the war to the North would help solve the guerrilla war in the South. The controversial Tonkin Gulf incidents in 1964 served as a pretext to realise what Washington had already planned -the widening of the war to the North and then to Laos and Cambodia. It should be noted that by the late 1950s and early 1960s, fighting had already broken out in Laos, but the warring sides and their supporters soon arrived at a compromise. The escalation of the Vietnam War in the mid- 1960s was an attempt to Americanise the war with the hope of winning it. The main US objective probably was not to conquer the North, as that would have been unacceptable to China and, like the Korean War, it might well have produced a direct military confrontation between China and the United States, something the latter likely did not want to risk. The US war escalation forced the Chinese to increase their military aid to the DRV in order to maintain the status quo. In the end, American efforts did not produce the desired results. The Tet offensive of 1968 showed that the United States could not win that war. Under domestic pressure, the US Administration began to look for a way out. For different reasons, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, China and the United States arrived at the decision to improve their bilateral relations. The most important reason for Beijing was its desire to play Washington against Moscow, whereas Washington wanted to exploit the China factor to end the war in Vietnam. Some in Washington also wanted to play Beijing against Moscow. This rapprochement soon altered the course of Chinese and American policies in Vietnam. Both countries pressured for peace in Vietnam in their own way. Thanks to an 'understanding' with China, the United States undertook unprecedented military pressure against the DRV in order to force it yield to US demands. The Chinese understood that Nixon's war escalation did not pose a threat to China as in the past. Beijing not only did not take counter-measures, but it advised Hanoi to accept peace. This contradicted China's earlier advice to reject negotiating with the United States. The pressure worked, and the Paris Peace Agreement was signed in January 1973. After the Paris Agreement, both China and the United States continued to favour maintaining the status quo, this time by peaceful means. While the Americans hoped for a 'decent interv~l' before the South fell, and continued to provide the Saigon government with aid to stand against the North, Beijing urged Hanoi not to resume fighting for a period of time. It looked like a repeat of the 1954 situation following the 257 Geneva Agreement. However, there was a big change in American policy towards Vietnam. As a result of Sino-American rapprochement, Vietnam no longer occupied a high priority in the US strategic plan. That is why when Hanoi started a general offensive in early 1975, Washington did not intervene. Unlike the situation in the early 1960s, when the Americans jumped in to prop up the Saigon government, this time Washington reconciled itself to the loss of Saigon. The loss of 55,000 Americans in the Vietnam War may have kept US policy makers from risking further involvement, but this cannot negate the fact that there was no longer any need for the United States to intervene in Vietnam. I see this as the main reason for the American refusal to become involved again. In the event that Washington still faced a threat of 'Chinese expansion' in Vietnam, I do not think that over 50,000 American dead would have hindered intervention to protect perceived American national interests in Vietnam. Sino-American rapprochement allowed the United States to drop the Vietnam card in its strategic game. As for China, it was unmoved by the Vietnamese Communists' victory. The Chinese saw no American threat from Vietnam, and therefore no benefit in outright DRV victory. It would have been different if the victory had eliminated an American threat to China's security. On the contrary, the new situation raised Chinese concerns about the increasing influence of the Soviet Union, their established enemy for quite some time. The American withdrawal from Vietnam might seem to end the equation between the state of Sino-American relations and their policies towards Vietnam. However, if in previous years the causal relationship was direct, it now became indirect. The power 'vacuum' in Indochina produced by the American pull-out worried the Chinese, and this, at times, made them unwise when assessing Vietnamese attitudes, and aggravated the situation. Vietnamese leaders' mistakes, which are not the focus of this dissertation, also exacerbated the situation. While fighting against a common enemy, the Chinese and Vietnamese could set aside their mutual suspicions and conflicts, but they failed to do so when the enemy disappeared. The power vacuum also gave rise to the Soviet factor. Though the Soviet factor had been present since 1950, the Soviet Union became increasingly involved in Vietnam only from the mid-1960s. Moreover, the US factor's disappearance set up a totally new game in Vietnam. Now it was not competition between China and the United States, but between China and the Soviet Union that directly shaped China's Vietnam policy. Chinese support for Democratic Kampuchea, which was aimed at building a counter-balancing force in Indochina, 258 indirectly encouraged the Khmer Rouge's anti-Vietnam policy, though China did not totally support such a course. Sino-American limited strategic co-operation had an immediate impact on American and Chinese policies towards Vietnam. In 1978, US indifference towards Vietnam and its desire to normalise relations with China resulted in its decision not to normalise relations with Vietnam, whereas the US tacit understanding made the Chinese feel more confident in being tough with Vietnam, and in 'teaching Vietnam a lesson' in 1979. In fact, that new relationship made Washington and Beijing tacit allies in their policies towards Vietnam during the whole decade of the 1980s. US indifference towards Vietnam, and its perception of Vietnam as a Soviet puppet, were the main reasons for its efforts to isolate Vietnam in the 1980s, though its strategic relationship with China partly encouraged Washington to do so as well. At the same time, just as had been the case when they 'taught a lesson' to the Vietnamese, the state of Sino-American relations helped the Chinese to be more confident in 'bleeding Vietnam white'. With the end of the Cold War, the Sino-American relationship entered a new phase. There was no need for the United States to buy Chinese support, which had restrained it from normalising relations with Vietnam. But its indifference towards Vietnam did not change. After Sino-American rapprochement, Vietnam never again gained a high priority in America's strategic plan. Moreover, one barrier against American-Vietnamese normalisation might have been removed but others remained. Of them, MIA issues were the most important. That is why the normalisation process was so protracted. As far as China was concerned, there was no longer tacit American endorsement of its tough policy towards Vietnam. Moreover, China became relatively isolated following the Tiananmen Incident. Vietnam also made numerous concessions to China. All these new factors encouraged China to alter its old policy towards Vietnam. However, just as with the case ofUS-Vietnam normalisation, China-Vietnam normalisation was difficult. The reason is that Vietnam does not play a significant role in Chinese foreign policy. We have seen that the Vietnam policies of the United States and China were derived from their attitudes towards each other. Being a small state, Vietnam never was, and never will be, the primary subject of US and Chinese foreign policies. It can be only a secondary subject. This is valid not only for Vietnam, but also for other small states
259 caught in confrontations between big powers. Korea is another example, one worthy of further research on its role in the Sino-American relationship. This dissertation shows that whenever the substance of the Sino-American relationship changed, Chinese and American attitudes towards Vietnam altered accordingly. There were four watersheds in Sino-American relations. The Korea war placed the two countries in direct confrontation with each other. Rapprochement in 1971-72 changed dramatically their relationship; they ceased to be enemies. The establishment of diplomatic relations signalled the start of their limited strategic relationship. The end of the Cold War brought the two countries back to normality in their relations. Each of these radical changes in Sino-American relations brought about changes in their policies towards Vietnam. Their hostility increased their involvement in Vietnam. Their rapprochement encouraged the Chinese to press the Vietnamese to end the war on American terms, while it enabled the Americans to end its direct
participation in the Vietnam War. From that time, the Ameri~ans lost interest in Vietnam, and this small state no longer occupied a central position in American foreign policy planning. Sino-American limited strategic co-operation prevented the Americans from normalising relations with Vietnam, a thing they had tried to do years before that, whereas it enabled the Chinese to wage a 'punitive attack' on Vietnam, which hitherto they had not dared to administer. The end of the Cold War also witnessed new attitudes on both their parts towards Vietnam. They both agreed to normalise relations with Vietnam, though the process was extremely difficult for the Vietnamese. Not only big watersheds, but also smaller changes in Sino-American relations altered Chinese and American policies towards Vietnam. The failure of the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference, for instance, forced the Chinese make radical concessions to the French. The above analysis of the impacts of Sino-American relations on Chinese and American policies towards Vietnam shows clearly that relations between these two powers affected Vietnam's fate. In the mid-1950s, Sino-American hostility prevented the Vietnamese from uniting their country through national elections. Fighting a quasi war with Beijing, between 1954 and 1972, Washington could not accept the 'loss' of South Vietnam to the Communists, though that 'loss' was a purely domestic Vietnamese affair. Washington took such a loss as a sign of Chinese expansion. Until 1964, the Soviet Union under Khruschev was in favour of peaceful coexistence. Though the new Soviet leadership under Brezhnev was more committed to the Vietnamese communists' anti-American resistance, in American eyes it was less bellicose than the 260 Chinese leadership. The special war and then the American war were US efforts to fight a quasi war with China on Vietnamese soil. Vietnam was a victim of the battle between these two powers. There were several cases when the Americans intervened to stymie South Vietnamese attempts to neutralise South Vietnam. These interventions were also examples of the way the Americans imposed their will on the Vietnamese. Interestingly, maintaining the status quo of a divided Vietnam was a central point in both US and Chinese policies towards Vietnam during the entire period between 1954 and 1975. Both powers supported this idea, and tried to maintain it either through force or peaceful means (before and after 1973), as this was the best solution to their competition. However the 'status quo' did not reflect the real balance of power in Vietnam. This highlights how the powers tried to impose their will on Vietnam. Partition lasted 20 years, and only because of their interference. Had there been no American intervention, Vietnam would have been reunited in 1956 or sometime soon afterwards. It was reunited in 1975, only two years after the American withdrawal from South Vietnam, giving up its 20-year fight against 'communist expansion' in Vietnam. This quick re-unification following the American pull-out was clear evidence that partition had been artificial, and that it had been imposed on the Vietnamese. The big powers' imposition of their will ran counter to the balance of power in Vietnam and the Vietnamese will to reunite the country. That is why the status quo came under threat several times and, in the end, broke down. This does not mean that big powers cannot impose their will on small states. In fact, in Vietnam they gave up fighting with each other and found a compromise. Moreover, in this case, one of the powers found that its interest in maintaining South Vietnam was diminishing. These were favourable conditions for the local forces to decide to fight it out. This contrasted with the situation in Korea and Germany (before 1989), where during the Cold War no big power was prepared to give up the fight for the status quo, and therefore the latter was maintained. The main difference between the Vietnam case and the Germany and Korea cases is that in the last two situations there was more or less a local power equilibrium, which was not present in the case of Vietnam. That is why when the big powers stopped playing their game, the situation in Vietnam changed fast according to the local power balance. The end of the Cold War witnessed the Soviet abandonment of the GDR (German Democratic Republic) card, and the latter fell because of its economic weakness compared to the FRG (Federation Republic of Germany). This was another 261 expression of 'balance of power', which was measured not by arms but by living standards. The balance of power was in favour of the FRG, and the latter won the game. This contrasted with the Korea case, where a local 'power equilibrium' continues. The economic power of South Korea is not sufficient to defeat the military power of North Korea. This dissertation puts the focus on the China and US factors in events in Vietnam. Ultimately, it tries to analyse the impact of Sino-American relations on these two countries' policies towards Vietnam. However, the analysis also shows the role of the Soviet factor in events in Vietnam. The Soviets played an important role in the 1954 Geneva talks and in the signing of the Geneva agreements. A Soviet-American summit of 1972 and the Soviet interests in promoting detente with the United States in the early 1970s also were important factors in the 1972 change of strategy by the Vietnamese Communists. Needless to say, Soviet support for Vietnam in the 1980s showed their crucial role in events in Indochina. A comparison between Soviet and Chinese roles in Vietnam could be a topic for further research. As stated, this dissertation does not pretend to be a theoretical work, but the above empirical analysis suggests that small states are never primary, but only ever secondary subjects of big powers' foreign policies. Big powers are major players to each other. Small states play only a supporting role in intra-powers games. Whenever a big power needs the support of a small state, it values the role of small state, but that card is dropped immediately when it no longer serves the interests of the big power. That is not new, but it contradicts the claim that small states can benefit from competition between big powers. If there are such 'benefits' they are short-lived and these benefits disappear as soon as the competition fades away. Small states more often are victims of intra-power struggles as they are not allowed to decide their own fate. Big powers usually impose their will on the small, disregarding the domestic situation of small states. Approaching the end of the research I arrive at four observations. First, the US failure to impose its will on Vietnam shows that great powers often overestimate their strength and neglect the local situation. The Americans were, to borrow McNamara's words, terribly wrong in Vietnam. They will be wrong again elsewhere if they overestimate their military power. Here, Kosovo comes to mind as a topic for further analysis. The question is whether it was another example where US and NATO overestimated their military power, whether NATO air attacks against Yugoslavia were 262 more likely a military showdown to threaten Milosevik, than a measure to solve the complicated ethnic conflict there. Another observation could be made while answering the question of whether, in the context of Sino-American hostility, the Vietnam War was inevitable. The war broke out due not only to Sino-American confrontation, but also to the lack of Vietnamese capability to work with each other, and to find compromises. Ho Chi Minh had to rely on China to fight the French colonialists. Such a course received wide support, but relying on American support to fight the Communists was the biggest mistake of the Vietnamese 'nationalists'. In the end, this outside aid did not help the 'nationalists' win, but it devastated the country. The third observation was clear from US indifference to Vietnam following the Sino-American rapprochement. This indifference is in stark contrast with the massive American aid and involvement of previous years. This demonstrates quite clearly that Vietnam played a significant role in big power strategic plans only when it acted in the capacity of their 'soldier'. The same can be seen in China's aid to Vietnam whenever the US threat increased: this happened in the last years of the first Indochina conflict, during the special war and the localised war. This hypothesis is proved to be right not only in the previous hot wars, but might be so also in today's economic 'war', though the methods and the rules used in these wars are different. This opens up another topic for discussion. Lastly, the deterioration of Vietnam-China relations following Sino-American rapprochement demonstrates that the Vietnamese leaders did not fully understand their role in big power strategic calculations. Moreover, the Vietnamese Communists blamed the Chinese for what they perceived as Chinese 'betrayal'. The blame might have been reasonable if there were evidence of betrayal. But the blame was made without strong evidence, based mostly on suspicions, and showed that the Vietnamese Communists did not recognise the Chinese right to advise the Vietnamese to make concessions at Geneva in a way that served Chinese interests. Neither did the Vietnamese respect the right of the Chinese to realise rapprochement in order to serve their own interests. The same culture was seen in the practice of Saigon-Washington relations. When Washington, in the light of its own interests, could not bring itself to rescue Nguyen Van Thieu, the latter accused Washington of being 'inhumane'. The lack of respect paid to their supporters' right to act in any way contrary to Vietnamese wishes was one of the problems that prevented the Vietnamese from being understood and respected by 263 partners. This may be an example of Vietnamese culture, in which people are accustomed to seeing themselves as the centre of attention. If evicted from the centre, this is clearly someone else's fault. This cultural view, too, could serve as a topic for further research.
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Interviews
Former Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, Hanoi, March 1997 and March 1998. ' Former Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, Hanoi, March 1997.
Former Vice Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co, Hanoi, July 1999.
Former Foreign Minister's Assistant, Luu Van Loi, Hanoi, August 1999.
Former Ambassador to France, UN, et. Ha Van Lau, Hanoi, August 1999.
Former Ambassador to China Dang Nghiem Hoanh, Hanoi, August 1999.
Former PRC Ambassador to Cambodia and Vietnam, Zhang Qing, Beijing, February 1998.
Some high-ranking Vietnamese diplomats who wish to be unidentified.
Memoirs
A memoir, whose author wants to keep unidentified.
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