China's Exercise of Realpolitik and 'Containment'
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
A 1954 North Vietnamese stamp featuring Mao China’s Exercise of Realpolitik and ‘Containment’ during the First and Second Indochina Wars, 1954-1973 By Kyuhyun Jo, University of Chicago history—the Vietnam War.2 Beijing would experience a radical Introduction: Why Understanding Chinese “Containment” transformation in its role, from a political adviser to a nation during the First and Second Indochina Wars Matters struggling to free itself from colonial rule to a major participant in a bitter diplomatic tug-of-war with Washington, Moscow, On a clear July afternoon in 1954, the North Viet- and Hanoi as it tried to maintain its ideological integrity as a namese delegation walked out proudly from a conference room leader of the Communist world and protect southern China in a small hotel in Geneva. That morning had been very tense, against a constant American military threat throughout the two with the Vietnamese and the French constantly exchanging Indochina wars. How did China’s commitment to ideological uncomfortable glances. The Chinese delegation walked along solidarity and anti-imperialism adapt to a major international with the Vietnamese, congratulating them on their victory war in Vietnam in which China had to confront the United over the imperialists. The Chinese believed that they had much States diplomatically and be wary of the Soviet Union, previ- to celebrate, as they had succeeded in promoting their posi- ously its closest ally during the early years of the Cold War? tion as the leader of Asian Communism by employing intense Much has been written about the impact of French anti-imperialist rhetoric. Most importantly, Beijing believed it colonialism in Vietnam and the United States’ exercise of “con- had secured a firm alliance with Hanoi to counter the possible spread of American and Soviet influence in Southeast Asia.1 Yet, little did the Chinese know that they had just ex- perienced the prelude of the longest “hot” war in Cold War 2 The Vietnam War was also one of the most serious refugee crises in the 20th century, producing over a million refugees 1 “Agreement of the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam,” July by the end of the war in 1975. See Peter Gatrell, The Making 20, 1954 (https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/genevacc. of the Modern Refugee (Oxford: Oxford University Press, htm). 2013), p. 207. 46 tainment” in the Second Indochina War.3 Understanding the Beijing’s relations with its Cold War rivals. Qiang argues that war as an American affair is highly plausible, for the United during the 1950s and 1960s, Beijing had close ties with Hanoi States was primarily involved in fighting the North Vietnamese because Mao Zedong thought that Ho Chi Minh as a firm on the ground. However, the Vietnam War was also a diplo- Communist could serve as a bulwark against further Ameri- matic war that used words as bullets. China actively participat- can advancement into the Chinese mainland. However, by the ed in the war through a diplomatic exercise of its own version 1970s, Moscow posed a bigger threat than Washington as it of “containment,” blending anti-imperialism and realpolitik in tried to break down the Sino-Vietnamese alliance by urging framing its political rhetoric aimed at curbing both American Hanoi to negotiate peace instead of continuing the anti-Amer- and Soviet influence in Vietnam. ican struggle. A discussion of China’s involvement in the First and Chen Jian’s Mao’s China and the Cold War examines Second Indochina Wars is important for three main reasons. the Chinese leadership’s strategies of international diplomacy First, what is commonly known as the “Vietnam War” was towards the United States and the Soviet Union during major only the second of the two Indochina Wars. To understand the crises such as the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Chen argues that origins of the Second Indochina War, it is imperative that we the Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-U.S. rapprochement were understand what happened during the First Indochina War. the monumental events that ultimately led to the dissolution of China, which negotiating peace for the sake of North Vietnam the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The two works and for itself during both wars, will provide an explanation of are notable because they are the first serious inquiries into about the importance of linking the two wars together. Therefore, we China’s relationships with the first two Indochina Wars and, to must begin in 1954, when the decisive battle at Dien Bien Phu a larger extent, the political environment of an international affirmed Vietnamese independence from France and began the Cold War. Despite their originality, there are two important Sino-Vietnamese alliance through China’s ardent diplomatic limitations with Zhai and Chen’s works. First, the geographical support of Vietnam. range of their primary sources is very limited. Most of Zhai and In addition, understanding China’s role in the two Chen’s sources are Chinese military and diplomatic records. wars will contextualize the wars within the framework of a gen- Second, there are newly available primary sources to expand eral Cold War history and help us appreciate their importance the two authors’ scope of research.4 Most recently, the Wood- as international historical events. They were not only bilateral row Wilson Center’s archives on the First Indochina War, the conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union, but Geneva Conference, and the Second Indochina War provide also trilateral geopolitical and ideological conflicts between more detailed information about Chinese diplomacy during China, the United States, and the Soviet Union. the two wars through previously inaccessible Chinese, Russian, Finally, the topic of China’s involvement in the two and Vietnamese primary sources, all recently translated into Indochina Wars has much potential for further research with English.5 Furthermore, since the primary sources dealing with the release of new sources. Qiang Zhai’s China and the Vietnam China during the Indochina Wars illuminate both local and in- Wars, 1950-1975 argues that China adjusted its diplomatic ternational political contexts in which the Chinese leadership strategies throughout the two Indochina Wars according to chose its diplomatic strategies, scholars will be able to gain a balanced appreciation of the complexities facing Chinese poli- cymakers during the first two Indochina Wars. I will supplement Zhai and Chen’s main arguments by 3 See Nicola Cooper, France in Indochina (Bloomsbury showing how China pragmatically employed anti-imperialist Academic, 2001), Mark Philip Bradley, Vietnam at War and anti-American rhetoric as important cornerstones of its (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), and Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and unique international diplomatic strategy: balancing ideological the Making of America’s Vietnam (New York: Random commitment with geopolitical security throughout the course House Trade Paperbacks, 2012) for discussions of French of the first two Indochina Wars. I will demonstrate how China colonialism in Vietnam. For discussions of American survived through the First and Second Indochina Wars by ma- involvement in the Vietnam War, see Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 4 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel and London: The University of California Press, 1999), Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical 2001), pp. 267-293 and Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold Appraisal of American National Security Policy during War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, the Cold War (Oxford University Press, 2005) , George C. 2001), pp. 327-334 and pp. 351-360. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and 5 See “Indochinese War,” (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ Vietnam, 1950-1975 (McGraw Hill Publishing, 2013). For collection/152/indochinese-war) “Geneva Conference of a general discussion of American historiography on the 1954,” (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/7/ Vietnam War, see Phillip E. Catton, “Refighting the Vietnam geneva-conference-of-1954) and “The Vietnam War” (http:// War in the History Books: The Historiography of the War,” digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/87/vietnam-war) OAH Magazine of History, Vol. 18, No. 5, Vietnam (October, archives of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s International Cold 2004), pp. 7-11. War History Project. 47 nipulating the Sino-Vietnamese alliance to contain U.S. and struggles.10 China’s commitment to Vietnam’s cause was such Soviet influence, all the while being very wary of the unpredict- that Liu Shaoqi told Luo Guibo, China’s political adviser to able dynamics of Cold War politics from 1954 to 1973. Vietnam, to inform Hanoi that the Chinese Communist Party would “do its best to satisfy Vietnamese requests” and send ef- China and the Geneva Conference (1950-1954) fective military advisors to direct Vietnamese forces against the French.11 The first diplomatic encounter between the People’s The Chinese leadership’s perception of supporting Republic of China and Vietnam occurred in 1950, when Viet- Vietnam’s struggle against France as its “international obliga- nam entered into the fifth year of its bitter nine-year anti-co- tion” was a complex product of realpolitik that reflected Com- lonial struggle against France. The success of the 1949 Com- munism, historical anti-imperialism, and geopolitics. China munist revolution was a major turning point, for, as Chen Jian believed that it was essential that the Vietnamese struggle argues, Vietnam had a “golden opportunity” to gain Chinese against France, as an Asian revolution, closely followed the support.6 Furthermore, by 1950, the course of the First In- “Chinese model”—a Communist and anti-imperialist revolu- dochina War had become increasingly favorable for Vietnam; tion aimed at realizing national liberation in Asia and through- even with American support, France could no longer be con- out the rest of the world.