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Home , 1954 Geneva Conference, Bamboo Curtain, First Indochina War, Pressure (play), Viet Minh

Laura M. Calkins. and the First War, 1947-54. Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Series. New York: Routledge, 2013. 200 pp. $155.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-415-63233-1.

Reviewed by Mao Lin

Published on H-Diplo (November, 2013)

Commissioned by Seth Ofenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York)

The literature on the Indochina wars is large Calkins particularly explores “the cooperation and growing larger. Until recently, however, the and the tensions which arose as the two regimes literature showed an overwhelming tendency to simultaneously pursued the not always comple‐ focus on the decision making in Washington. mentary goals of security and revolution” (p. 1). Moreover, most scholars in the feld specialize in Indeed, this detailed monograph follows the re‐ the Second Indochina War. When they discuss the search path charted by previous scholars who fo‐ , the agenda is usually to trace cused on non-U.S. players during the two Indochi‐ the origins of the later U.S. involvement in the na wars.[1] Calkins also pays attention to what the Second Indochina War. As a result, the “other historian Priscilla Roberts once called the new re‐ side” of the war is rendered invisible and many of search orientation of studying intra-alliance rela‐ the war’s origins remain obscure. But the picture tions among the Communist powers during the is changing, and fast. More and more scholars Indochina wars.[2] To this, Calkins’s book is a wel‐ have begun to internationalize the study of the In‐ comed contribution. dochina wars by modifying the previous U.S.-cen‐ Calkins locates the origins of Sino- tric approach, often with the beneft of using non- military cooperation in 1947-49, showing how the U.S. archival sources. Laura M. Calkins’s book Chi‐ changing strategic situations in China and Viet‐ na and the First , 1947-54 is the lat‐ nam were closely interlocked. For the Chinese est contribution to the study of the international‐ Communist leaders, a major strategic concern at ization of the First Indochina War. that time was how to win the civil war by defeat‐ The book’s goal is to examine “the political ing the remaining Chinese Nationalist forces in and military relationship between the Chinese China’s southwest areas bordering Indochina. As and Vietnamese Communist regimes, particularly their army advanced toward the Sino-Vietnamese in relation to the Franco-Viet Minh confict.” border, and his lieutenants quickly H-Net Reviews realized the importance of cooperating with Ho Vietnam but also throughout Indochina. Calkins Chi Minh’s Viet Minh forces to deal with the Na‐ thus reminds us that although “the tension be‐ tionalist forces that retreated into Indochina. For tween the Chinese and Vietnamese views had yet Ho and his colleagues, the prospect of a Commu‐ to emerge publicly ... it is useful to bear in mind nist victory in China would greatly enhance the that bilateral diferences on this issue were al‐ possibility of winning their own war against the ready apparent by March 1949” (p. 18). French. Calkins shows how the two Communist The cooperation and tensions that character‐ forces developed military cooperation in 1947-49, ized early Sino-Vietnamese relations, Calkins ar‐ including the transaction of weapons and occa‐ gues, continued after the exchange of diplomatic sional coordination of localized battles against the recognition between the Democratic Republic of Chinese Nationalist troops. Vietnam (DRV) and the People’s Republic of China As Calkins shows, the Vietnamese Commu‐ (PRC). According to her, a Sino-Vietnamese strate‐ nists clearly anticipated signifcant support from gic consensus emerged in the frst quarter of the Chinese Communists once it became clear that 1950. This consensus gave priority to the estab‐ the latter was going to control China. This expec‐ lishment of DRV control in , which tation pushed the Viet Minh leaders to articulate a would both secure PRC’s southern border and new strategy of waging war against the French. clear the way for the DRV to receive Chinese aid They now argued that the Communist victory in directly across the border. At the same time, rec‐ China created favorable conditions for the Viet ognizing the weak Communist presence in South Minh force to launch the “second phase” of the Vietnam, Mao and Ho agreed upon the need to anti-French war. While was the frst build up Communist strength there before es‐ norm during the initial phase of the war, in the calating the war against the French. Calkins docu‐ “second phase” the Communists “would adopt ments how Beijing provided aid to the DRV in line more sophisticated military tactics, including ‘mo‐ with this strategic consensus, and while she ac‐ bile warfare’ involving larger concentrations of knowledges that the Chinese help was crucial to troops” (p. 16). More important, this “second the DRV, she emphasizes the tensions between the phase” was supposed to quickly pave the way for two caused by the Chinese highhandedness in the fnal stage of the war, a “general counterofen‐ dealing with their weaker neighbor. Nonetheless, sive” that would drive the French out of Indochi‐ the DRV leaders were so encouraged by their new na. relationship with China that they decided to While Calkins also discusses the ideological shorten the “second phase” of the war and move fraternity between the Chinese and Vietnamese to the fnal “general counterofensive” stage. On Communists, she makes it clear that strategic con‐ October 7, 1950, the People’s Army of Vietnam cerns played a major role in shaping the early (PAVN) launched the Le Hong Phong II ofensive Sino-Vietnamese alliance. Indeed, she also ex‐ as the opening move of the “general counterofen‐ plores the diferences between the two Commu‐ sive” against the French. nist parties regarding the overall strategy for the Only eight days later, however, Ho cancelled war in Indochina. On the one hand, the primary the ofensive and the DRV leadership sharply re‐ concern of the Chinese, Calkins argues, was to se‐ versed its policy by arguing that it was still pre‐ cure the Sino-Vietnamese border in their struggle mature to launch a “general counterofensive” against the Nationalist forces. The Vietnamese, on against the militarily superior French. Calkins ar‐ the other hand, wanted a larger commitment gues that this change was a result of the new in‐ from the Chinese to defeat the French not just in ternational situation created by the Chinese inter‐

2 H-Net Reviews vention in the . As now became war. Those difculties were highlighted by the Beijing’s primary concern, Calkins claims, China 1954 Agreements, which, in the eyes of not only reduced its aid to Vietnam in order to southern Communist leaders, at least implied the frst supply Chinese troops in Korea, but also abandonment of into the hands of wanted to slow down the process toward the cli‐ their enemies. The book’s epilogue further exam‐ max of DRV’s anti-French struggle. China feared ines the post-Geneva strategic debate within the that an escalated Franco-Vietnamese confict Vietnamese leadership. It concludes that once the would only give the a pretext to in‐ southern Vietnamese leaders were forced to swal‐ tervene in Indochina, thus bringing a larger war low the new strategy, the Chinese were pleased to China’s southern fank. Because China could and a new era of Sino-Vietnamese alliance start‐ not aford another war when it was engaged in ed, with China now providing massive aid to build the Korean War, Beijing withdrew its earlier sup‐ in the DRV. port for a DRV “general counterofensive” against While this book provides some fresh details the French. As a result, the DRV leadership was of Sino-Vietnamese relations during the First In‐ forced to reevaluate its strategy. Calkins thus con‐ dochina War, it also raises several questions. First, cludes that “the context of military developments Calkins’s decision to give the 1954 Geneva Confer‐ in Korea was a key factor in the Vietnamese lead‐ ence only a brief and rather conventional cover‐ ership’s decision to change its policy direction” age in the book’s epilogue is somehow surprising. (p. 67). Most scholars agree that the Geneva Conference Between late 1950 and mid-1951, the DRV crystallized the complicated intra-alliance rela‐ leadership developed a new strategy that diferen‐ tions among the DRV, the PRC, and the Soviet tiated the war in North and South Vietnam. In Union. While a major consensus still seems to North Vietnam, the DRV would continue to use hold that in the broader scheme of things, Mos‐ “main-force” or “mobile group tactics” in waging cow and Beijing sacrifced the interests of the war. This prolonged “second phase” of the to promote their own strategic interests at Gene‐ war would consolidate DRV’s control of the Tokin va, a powerful “revisionism” has already area, which would buy DRV more time preparing emerged.[3] Since Calkins’s major agenda is to ex‐ for the fnal “general counterofensive” stage, and amine the simultaneous existence of cooperation perhaps, more important according to Calkins, se‐ and tensions between China and Vietnam, a de‐ cure China’s southern perimeter. In the South, the tailed discussion of the DRV leadership resolved that the Communist that engages the current scholarship on this topic forces must again rely on guerrilla warfare as the would have been useful. What makes the book’s primary strategy, both buying time to build up organization even more unbalanced is the fact Communist strength there and precluding a possi‐ that the book’s fve chapters only cover the time ble U.S. intervention in the war. This diferentiat‐ period from 1947 to mid-1951, leaving the thir‐ ed strategy, however, created a considerable split teen-page-long epilogue to cover the years from among the Vietnamese leadership. The fnal chap‐ 1952 to 1955. ters of the book thus examine the difculties A second problem is that, perhaps too eager faced by northern DRV leaders when they were to show that tensions existed between China and selling this strategy to their southern counter‐ Vietnam even during the initial stage of their al‐ parts. Calkins argues that those difculties liance, Calkins occasionally overdraws her conclu‐ emerged because the southern Communist lead‐ sions. For example, she claims that when China ers resented the new strategy that did not allow established diplomatic relations with the DRV, them to be more aggressive in the pursuit of the

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“Beijing intended something less than acknowl‐ open to further debate. Calkins emphasizes that edgment of the DRV’s full sovereignty over all of the key factor behind DRV’s decision to slow down Vietnam” (p. 39). Her evidence is that on the day its anti-French struggle was China’s determina‐ after the PRC had recognized the DRV, the Chinese tion not to trigger a U.S. intervention in Indochina premier declared that China would in the middle of the Korean War. At the same communicate directly with the French regarding time, she spends a considerable portion of her alleged French mistreatments of ethnic Chinese in book discussing how the weaknesses of the Viet‐ . Zhou’s message, Calkins argues, “con‐ namese force sobered the DRV leaders’ eagerness veyed China’s acceptance of the French authority to launch a premature “general counterofensive” in Indochina” (p. 40). However, this evidence does against the French. While her analysis of DRV’s in‐ not necessarily support her conclusion, especially ternal weaknesses can be complemented by other since Calkins does not provide materials showing scholars’ work, Calkins does not fully establish the whether or not the Chinese and Vietnamese lead‐ primacy of Beijing’s strategic calculation in the ers perceived any connection between Zhou’s DRV’s change of strategy. This is the case partially message and its supposed limiting efect on DRV’s because Calkins relies on two categories of prima‐ sovereignty. Calkins then immediately proceeds to ry sources. One is the information contained in discuss Ho’s secret visit to the in ear‐ monitored radio broadcasts by Communist radio ly 1950. Ho did not get a “treaty of friendship” stations, collected by the British and U.S. govern‐ from , like the one Stalin signed with ments. Another is the records of the two govern‐ Mao. Ho’s presence in Moscow was also not pub‐ ments, especially the central fles of the U.S. State licly noted. Calkins thus concludes that Ho’s visit Department. Of course, it is perfectly legitimate demonstrated “the limited signifcance of China’s for historians to use those two categories of pri‐ decision” (p. 40). However, mary sources. However, the thesis that China in‐ there was no necessary connection between Chi‐ tentionally tried to rein in the DRV’s war efort na’s allegedly limited diplomatic recognition of against the French cannot be substantiated with‐ the DRV and Ho’s failure to get Stalin’s full com‐ out archival sources, such as meeting records, mitment to his cause. On the contrary, a number memorandums of conversation, policy position of scholars have pointed out that China’s recogni‐ papers, and other materials that originated direct‐ tion of the DRV actually paved the way for the So‐ ly from the Communist governments. viet recognition of Ho’s regime and greatly in‐ In fact, Calkins herself occasionally acknowl‐ creased the importance of Ho’s revolution in Stal‐ edges this problem. For example, she discusses a in’s eyes. They have also proved that the limited joint Sino-Soviet military mission that visited Soviet commitment to Vietnam at that time was Tonkin in early 1951 to investigate the DRV’s capa‐ determined by the Soviet and Chinese bilities of waging a widened war. “This mission’s “division of labor,” and had nothing to do with the fndings were not disclosed,” Calkins admits, “but DRV’s sovereignty and legitimacy.[4] While it seems likely that one of the principal issues be‐ Calkins’s decision to emphasize the potential loss, ing communicated to the Vietnamese ... was that not the potential gains, of the DRV during Ho’s vis‐ the Franco-Viet Minh war would not attract the it to Moscow should be respected, she should have full measure of material support from the major had a more balanced analysis in light of other Communist powers” (p. 85). The only evidence scholars’ work. supporting this speculation is a statement made Calkins’s analysis on the relations between by Ho. However, Ho’s statement, as quoted by the Korean War and the DRV’s subsequent change Calkins in the text, only admitted that the DRV of strategy in its own anti-French struggle is also was not ready yet to launch the “general coun‐

4 H-Net Reviews terofensive.” Nowhere does Calkins show (Paris: Armand Colin, 2011); and Pierre Asselin, whether Ho reached this conclusion under Chi‐ Hanoi’s Road to the Vietnam War, 1954-1965 nese and Soviet or on his own. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). Calkins seems to be aware of the gap between [2]. Roberts, ed., Behind the , her thesis and her evidence. And she suggests that 32-43. her evidence can only show that the shift in Viet‐ [3]. Pierre Asselin, “The Democratic Republic namese strategy took place at the same time when of Vietnam and the 1954 Geneva Conference: A the Chinese were trying to prevent the Korean Revisionist Critique,” Cold War History 11, no. 2 War from further escalation. Thus her conclusion (May 2011): 155-195. about the impact of the Korean War on the First [4]. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 13-17; Indochina War, which is the book’s main thesis, Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 120-123; and should be best treated as a hypothesis. Nonethe‐ Olsen, Soviet-Vietnam Relations and the Role of less, a good hypothesis is a necessary frst step to‐ China, 16-21. ward solid scholarship. Overall, Calkins provides a concise description of Sino-Vietnamese relations - during the frst Vietnam War, which is useful for students in this feld. 19 Notes C [1]. For a few prominent examples, see Qiang W Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 19 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War ly (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, T 2001); Ilya V. Gaiduk, Confronting Vietnam: Soviet , Policy toward the Indochina Confict, 1954-1963 [ (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Mari Olsen, Soviet-Vietnam Relations and the Role of ] China, 1949-64 (New York: Routledge, 2006); ly Priscilla Roberts, ed., Behind the Bamboo Curtain: 13 China, Vietnam, and the World beyond Asia (Stan‐ ford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Mark At‐ Calkins wood Lawrence and Fredrik Logevall, eds., The Chi Minh First Vietnam War: Colonial Confict and Cold Zedong War Crisis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, s 2007); Mark Philip Bradley and Marilyn B. Young, eds., Making Sense of the Vietnam War: Local, Na‐ s tional, and Transnational Perspectives (New York: Calkins Oxford University Press, 2008); Christopher E. Chi Minh Goscha and Christian F. Ostermann, eds., Connect‐ the  ing Histories: and the Cold War in , 1945-1962 (Stanford: Stanford , University Press, 2009); Christopher E. Goscha, l Vietnam: Un État né de la Guerre,1945-1954

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Citation: Mao Lin. Review of Calkins, Laura M. China and the First Vietnam War, 1947-54. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. November, 2013.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=39623

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