Laura M. Calkins. China and the First Vietnam War, 1947-54. Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia Series. New York: Routledge, 2013. 200 pp. $155.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-415-63233-1. Reviewed by Mao Lin Published on H-Diplo (November, 2013) Commissioned by Seth Offenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York) The literature on the Indochina wars is large Calkins particularly explores “the cooperation and growing larger. Until recently, however, the and the tensions which arose as the two regimes literature showed an overwhelming tendency to simultaneously pursued the not always comple‐ focus on the decision making in Washington. mentary goals of security and revolution” (p. 1). Moreover, most scholars in the feld specialize in Indeed, this detailed monograph follows the re‐ the Second Indochina War. When they discuss the search path charted by previous scholars who fo‐ First Indochina War, the agenda is usually to trace cused on non-U.S. players during the two Indochi‐ the origins of the later U.S. involvement in the na wars.[1] Calkins also pays attention to what the Second Indochina War. As a result, the “other historian Priscilla Roberts once called the new re‐ side” of the war is rendered invisible and many of search orientation of studying intra-alliance rela‐ the war’s origins remain obscure. But the picture tions among the Communist powers during the is changing, and fast. More and more scholars Indochina wars.[2] To this, Calkins’s book is a wel‐ have begun to internationalize the study of the In‐ comed contribution. dochina wars by modifying the previous U.S.-cen‐ Calkins locates the origins of Sino-Viet Minh tric approach, often with the benefit of using non- military cooperation in 1947-49, showing how the U.S. archival sources. Laura M. Calkins’s book Chi‐ changing strategic situations in China and Viet‐ na and the First Vietnam War, 1947-54 is the lat‐ nam were closely interlocked. For the Chinese est contribution to the study of the international‐ Communist leaders, a major strategic concern at ization of the First Indochina War. that time was how to win the civil war by defeat‐ The book’s goal is to examine “the political ing the remaining Chinese Nationalist forces in and military relationship between the Chinese China’s southwest areas bordering Indochina. As and Vietnamese Communist regimes, particularly their army advanced toward the Sino-Vietnamese in relation to the Franco-Viet Minh conflict.” border, Mao Zedong and his lieutenants quickly H-Net Reviews realized the importance of cooperating with Ho Vietnam but also throughout Indochina. Calkins Chi Minh’s Viet Minh forces to deal with the Na‐ thus reminds us that although “the tension be‐ tionalist forces that retreated into Indochina. For tween the Chinese and Vietnamese views had yet Ho and his colleagues, the prospect of a Commu‐ to emerge publicly ... it is useful to bear in mind nist victory in China would greatly enhance the that bilateral differences on this issue were al‐ possibility of winning their own war against the ready apparent by March 1949” (p. 18). French. Calkins shows how the two Communist The cooperation and tensions that character‐ forces developed military cooperation in 1947-49, ized early Sino-Vietnamese relations, Calkins ar‐ including the transaction of weapons and occa‐ gues, continued after the exchange of diplomatic sional coordination of localized battles against the recognition between the Democratic Republic of Chinese Nationalist troops. Vietnam (DRV) and the People’s Republic of China As Calkins shows, the Vietnamese Commu‐ (PRC). According to her, a Sino-Vietnamese strate‐ nists clearly anticipated significant support from gic consensus emerged in the frst quarter of the Chinese Communists once it became clear that 1950. This consensus gave priority to the estab‐ the latter was going to control China. This expec‐ lishment of DRV control in North Vietnam, which tation pushed the Viet Minh leaders to articulate a would both secure PRC’s southern border and new strategy of waging war against the French. clear the way for the DRV to receive Chinese aid They now argued that the Communist victory in directly across the border. At the same time, rec‐ China created favorable conditions for the Viet ognizing the weak Communist presence in South Minh force to launch the “second phase” of the Vietnam, Mao and Ho agreed upon the need to anti-French war. While guerrilla warfare was the first build up Communist strength there before es‐ norm during the initial phase of the war, in the calating the war against the French. Calkins docu‐ “second phase” the Communists “would adopt ments how Beijing provided aid to the DRV in line more sophisticated military tactics, including ‘mo‐ with this strategic consensus, and while she ac‐ bile warfare’ involving larger concentrations of knowledges that the Chinese help was crucial to troops” (p. 16). More important, this “second the DRV, she emphasizes the tensions between the phase” was supposed to quickly pave the way for two caused by the Chinese highhandedness in the fnal stage of the war, a “general counteroffen‐ dealing with their weaker neighbor. Nonetheless, sive” that would drive the French out of Indochi‐ the DRV leaders were so encouraged by their new na. relationship with China that they decided to While Calkins also discusses the ideological shorten the “second phase” of the war and move fraternity between the Chinese and Vietnamese to the fnal “general counteroffensive” stage. On Communists, she makes it clear that strategic con‐ October 7, 1950, the People’s Army of Vietnam cerns played a major role in shaping the early (PAVN) launched the Le Hong Phong II offensive Sino-Vietnamese alliance. Indeed, she also ex‐ as the opening move of the “general counteroffen‐ plores the differences between the two Commu‐ sive” against the French. nist parties regarding the overall strategy for the Only eight days later, however, Ho cancelled war in Indochina. On the one hand, the primary the offensive and the DRV leadership sharply re‐ concern of the Chinese, Calkins argues, was to se‐ versed its policy by arguing that it was still pre‐ cure the Sino-Vietnamese border in their struggle mature to launch a “general counteroffensive” against the Nationalist forces. The Vietnamese, on against the militarily superior French. Calkins ar‐ the other hand, wanted a larger commitment gues that this change was a result of the new in‐ from the Chinese to defeat the French not just in ternational situation created by the Chinese inter‐ 2 H-Net Reviews vention in the Korean War. As Korea now became war. Those difficulties were highlighted by the Beijing’s primary concern, Calkins claims, China 1954 Geneva Agreements, which, in the eyes of not only reduced its aid to Vietnam in order to southern Communist leaders, at least implied the first supply Chinese troops in Korea, but also abandonment of South Vietnam into the hands of wanted to slow down the process toward the cli‐ their enemies. The book’s epilogue further exam‐ max of DRV’s anti-French struggle. China feared ines the post-Geneva strategic debate within the that an escalated Franco-Vietnamese conflict Vietnamese leadership. It concludes that once the would only give the United States a pretext to in‐ southern Vietnamese leaders were forced to swal‐ tervene in Indochina, thus bringing a larger war low the new strategy, the Chinese were pleased to China’s southern fank. Because China could and a new era of Sino-Vietnamese alliance start‐ not afford another war when it was engaged in ed, with China now providing massive aid to build the Korean War, Beijing withdrew its earlier sup‐ socialism in the DRV. port for a DRV “general counteroffensive” against While this book provides some fresh details the French. As a result, the DRV leadership was of Sino-Vietnamese relations during the First In‐ forced to reevaluate its strategy. Calkins thus con‐ dochina War, it also raises several questions. First, cludes that “the context of military developments Calkins’s decision to give the 1954 Geneva Confer‐ in Korea was a key factor in the Vietnamese lead‐ ence only a brief and rather conventional cover‐ ership’s decision to change its policy direction” age in the book’s epilogue is somehow surprising. (p. 67). Most scholars agree that the Geneva Conference Between late 1950 and mid-1951, the DRV crystallized the complicated intra-alliance rela‐ leadership developed a new strategy that differen‐ tions among the DRV, the PRC, and the Soviet tiated the war in North and South Vietnam. In Union. While a major consensus still seems to North Vietnam, the DRV would continue to use hold that in the broader scheme of things, Mos‐ “main-force” or “mobile group tactics” in waging cow and Beijing sacrificed the interests of Hanoi the war. This prolonged “second phase” of the to promote their own strategic interests at Gene‐ war would consolidate DRV’s control of the Tokin va, a powerful “revisionism” has already area, which would buy DRV more time preparing emerged.[3] Since Calkins’s major agenda is to ex‐ for the fnal “general counteroffensive” stage, and amine the simultaneous existence of cooperation perhaps, more important according to Calkins, se‐ and tensions between China and Vietnam, a de‐ cure China’s southern perimeter. In the South, the tailed discussion of the 1954 Geneva Conference DRV leadership resolved that the Communist that engages the current scholarship on this topic forces must again rely on guerrilla warfare as the would have been useful. What makes the book’s primary strategy, both buying time to build up organization even more unbalanced is the fact Communist strength there and precluding a possi‐ that the book’s fve chapters only cover the time ble U.S.