View, the Completion of This Project Demonstrates a Commitment to Higher Learning That Was Instilled Many Years Ago by My Parents
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REGIME TYPE AND THE PERSISTENCE OF COSTLY SMALL WARS DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Bradley N. Nelson, M.A. * * * * * The Ohio State University 2008 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Randall Schweller, Advisor Professor Richard Herrmann ________________________ Professor Alexander Thompson Advisor Graduate Program in Political Science ABSTRACT This dissertation attempts to answer the following questions: Why do powerful democracies repeatedly fail to cut their losses in costly small wars? And why have democracies exhibited such behavior more often than nondemocracies? Thus, this dissertation links regime type with the tendency of powerful states to persist in costly small wars. I argue that a two-step model, linking the incentives of political coalitions, existing institutional constraints, and war policy, explains the variation in behavior between democracies and nondemocracies in small wars. Within the model, there are five variables–three types of coalition incentives (the type and probability of domestic punishment, elite time horizons, and the role of war propaganda) and two domestic institutional constraints (the number of veto players and the pace of policy change). I hypothesize that the first three variables can push democratic political coalitions toward a dominant incentive to continue their investment in costly small wars. And the two institutional constraints at times act as safety locks on the foreign policy process, making it doubly difficult for democracies to cut their losses. ii The empirical section of this dissertation consists of four case studies: French- Indochina War, Iraqi Revolt of 1920, Soviet-Afghan War, and Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. Two cases examine a powerful state persisting in a costly, protracted small war, and two cases investigate powerful states cutting their losses in asymmetrical conflicts. The cases are used to determine whether my model of domestic politics accounts for the variation in state behavior in small wars. As such, I process trace the events and processes that contributed to various outcomes in each case. The four case analyses provide considerable support for the two-step model. I consider the model as “strongly passing” empirical tests in three of the cases (Indochina War, Soviet-Afghan War, and Sino- Vietnamese War), and “weakly passing” the remaining case (Iraqi Revolt of 1920). My research offers sixteen timely, pertinent implications for academic scholarship and real world foreign policymaking. These implications directly target the two-step model, the three alternative explanations of this study, as well as several ancillary yet important insights into international relations. iii Dedicated to My Mother, Father, and Linda iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The document that is now in your hands has been a work in progress for almost the last seven years. My initial research and writing on many of the ideas contained herein occurred as a result of an independent study with Randall Schweller in the summer of 2001. Since that time, there have been a number of people who have provided invaluable support, assistance, and counsel to me and this dissertation. To the best of my recollection, I would like to acknowledge all of these people below. First, from the spring of 2002 to the winter of 2003, I participated in a three- quarter seminar (Political Science 846) that was expressly designed to stimulate research projects by the department’s international relations graduate students. Importantly, this seminar allowed me to flesh out much of my work on democratic foreign policymaking from the summer of 2001. Ted Hopf and Donald Sylvan, the two faculty leaders of Political Science 846, happily read all of my drafts and provided ample comments and suggestions. I am also grateful for the recommendations that many of my seminar colleagues made during the three quarters. Finally, many thanks to Alexander Thompson, who served as a discussant during a presentation of my 846 paper and elucidated a host of interesting critiques. Most notably, after the presentation, he gladly set time aside to discuss his critiques in person. v Second, I extend my appreciation to two faculty members who helped shape this project in various consequential yet subtle ways. John Mueller doggedly questioned the term “quagmire,” and forced me to rethink the dependent variable of this project. My revised dependent variable–costly, protracted small wars–is analytically clearer and more precise than the one I employed in the nascent stages of this dissertation. Among other things, Donald Sylvan emphasized the importance of a logical and transparent research design to good scholarship. His insights were crucial to much of the structure and content in chapter three. Third, this project has certainly benefitted from the input of my dissertation committee. I am extremely thankful for all of their help. Alexander Thompson, a late addition to my committee, has quickly and graciously read two drafts and offered trenchant advice, especially on chapters one and two. His thoughts on liberal theorizing and political institutions sharpened the logic of my two-step model. Both Richard Herrmann and Randall Schweller have been more than generous with their time and considerable wisdom. And this is just as true today as it was when I began my prospectus in the summer of 2003. My dissertation, from top to bottom, is a far, far better project because of their contributions. And it must be noted that Schweller, my committee advisor, has served as a model mentor over the years. I cannot even begin to estimate how vi much I have learned about international relations from him. Like so many other former Ohio State graduate students, I am intellectually indebted to Randall Schweller. Lastly, I would like to acknowledge the four most important people in my life. Weylin Sternglanz, a dear friend, has been a vital wellspring of support, laughter, and even athletic competition during the dissertation process. My mother and father, Alice and Larry Nelson, have assisted and supported me throughout the years in countless ways. In particular, although neither have college degrees, my mother and father have been staunch advocates of my education. They have always encouraged and cheered my academic progress. In my view, the completion of this project demonstrates a commitment to higher learning that was instilled many years ago by my parents. Linda LaCloche, my wife, is my unsung hero. She has uprooted her life twice for me without complaint. After moving to town, she has tirelessly worked her way up from a low-level public relations assistant with the City of Columbus to a coveted policy advisor to Mayor Michael B. Coleman. With respect to my dissertation, she has proofread and edited several chapters and helped repeatedly with the copying efforts. And Linda–herself an excellent political science student as an undergraduate–has also acted at times as a sounding board for ideas. I cannot express in words how proud I am of her and how grateful I am for everything that she has done for me. My love for her is unshakable and everlasting. vii VITA February 5, 1974........................................Born – Evergreen Park, Illinois 1996............................................................B.A. Political Science, Saint Xavier University 1997-1998..................................................Graduate Research Associate, University of Virginia 1998............................................................M.A. Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia 2000-2001...................................................University Fellowship, The Ohio State University 2001-2003...................................................Graduate Teaching and Research Associate, The Ohio State University 2003-2008...................................................Instructor, The Ohio State University FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Political Science Minor Field: International Relations viii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract . ii Dedication . iv Acknowledgments . v Vita.................................................................viii List of Tables . xv List of Figures . xvi Chapters: 1. Introduction . 1 1.1 Research Question . 1 1.2 The Argument . 5 1.3 Why the Research Question is Important . 9 1.3.1 Democracies and Conflict and Peace . 10 1.3.2 Liberal International Relations Theory . 16 1.3.3 War Termination . 17 1.3.4 Small Wars . 19 1.4 Empirical Data . 21 1.4.1 Research Methods . 21 1.4.2 Findings and Implications . 26 1.5 Conceptual Definitions. 27 1.5.1 Democracy . 27 1.5.2 Small Wars . 29 1.6 Structure of Dissertation . 32 ix 2. Democratic and Nondemocratic Logics of Costly, Protracted Small Wars . 34 2.1 What About Non-Domestic Politics Variables? . 35 2.2 Democracies and Small Wars . 36 2.2.1 Democratic Political Coalitions . 36 2.2.2 Democratic Political Coalition Incentives . 42 2.2.2.1 Democratic Incentives to Continue Costly Small Wars . 44 2.2.2.1.1 Probable, Mild Punishment . 44 2.2.2.1.2 Short-Term Time Horizons . 49 2.2.2.1.3 Leaders Trapped By Their Rhetoric . 53 2.2.2.2 Democratic Incentives to Cut Losses . 59 2.2.3 Democratic Institutional Constraints . 62 2.2.3.1 Democratic Institutions Prevent Deviations From the Status Quo . 63 2.2.3.1.1 Multiple Veto Players . 63 2.2.3.1.2 Slow Pace of Policy Change . 66 2.2.3.2 When Can Democratic Institutions Facilitate Policy Change? . 68 2.3 Nondemocracies and Small Wars . 70 2.3.1 Nondemocratic Political Coalitions . 70 2.3.2 Nondemocratic Political Coalition Incentives . 72 2.3.2.1 Nondemocratic Incentives to Withdraw From Costly Small Wars . 73 2.3.2.1.1 Severe, Possible Punishment . 73 2.3.2.1.2 Longer Time Horizon . 76 2.3.2.1.3 The Absence of Trapped Leaders . 77 2.3.2.2 Nondemocratic Incentives to Continue Costly Small Wars . 80 2.3.3 Nondemocratic Institutional Constraints . 81 2.3.3.1 Nondemocratic Institutions Can Facilitate Policy Change . 81 2.3.3.1.1 Fewer Veto Players . 81 2.3.3.1.2 Faster Policy Change . 84 x 2.3.3.2 When Is It More Difficult to Achieve Policy Change? .