sign in sign up
<<
Home , Elbridge Durbrow, Ellen Hammer, First Indochina War, Frederick Nolting, Jean Sainteny, Joseph Buttinger

ENABLERS OF A WAR: THE AMERICAN PRESS AND ,

1954-1960

______

A Thesis

Presented

to the Faculty of

California State University, Chico

______

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

in

History

______

by

Kevin Allen Luty

Spring 2015

PUBLICATION RIGHTS

No portion of this thesis may be reprinted or reproduced in any manner unacceptable to the usual copyright restrictions without the written permission of the author.

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Publication Rights ...... iii

Abstract ...... v

CHAPTER

I. Introduction ...... 1

II. Collaborators in , 1954-1955 ...... 7

III. Encouragers of Optimism, 1955-1956 ...... 31

IV. Purveyors of Pessimism, 1957-1960...... 49

V. Conclusion ...... 70

Bibliography ...... 75

iv ABSTRACT

ENABLERS OF A WAR: THE AMERICAN PRESS AND VIETNAM,

1954-1960

by

Kevin Allen Luty

Master of Arts in History

California State University, Chico

Spring 2015

Previous historical studies of the have examined thoroughly the

American news media’s opposition to the conflict. This thesis, however, will reveal how at first the American press acted as a promoter of U.S. intervention in Vietnam from 1954 to 1960. Operating under the “can-do spirit” of the era, journalists believed that the

United States could succeed in creating an anticommunist state in Vietnam where the

French had failed. Convinced of ’s centrality in the global struggle to contain , the press applauded when American negotiators successfully placed the nation under the umbrella protection of the Southeast Treaty

Organization (SEATO) in September 1954 and raised no protests when the U.S. Military

Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) began training and equipping the South Vietnamese

Army. Despite evidence that South Vietnamese Premier lacked

v widespread support, the American press backed him and cited his fraudulent presidential victory in October 1955 as proof of his popularity. Unwilling to promote any course of action that might threaten Diem, the U.S. media joined him in rejecting the 1956 unification elections called for by the 1954 Geneva Accords. In May 1957, Diem’s supporters in the welcomed him when he visited Washington with a highly orchestrated public relations campaign falsely depicting the president as a successful democratic leader—a “Miracle Man of Asia.” In response to Diem’s few critics,

American commentators simply rationalized his police-state tactics as necessary reaction to the Communist threat. Following a near-fatal coup attempt in 1960, the press finally began to criticize Diem, but remained convinced about the ultimate necessity for

American involvement.

vi CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

For the American press no less than the U.S. government, the pitted communism against the “Free World” in an existential battle for the future of civilization.

In the pages of popular newspapers, news magazines, and journals the basic assumptions that underlay Washington’s Cold War consensus went unchallenged. Thus when the

United States intervened in foreign lands to prevent the spread of communism, as the

Eisenhower administration did in Vietnam from 1954-1960, the American press naturally paid close attention. This thesis will analyze how the American press treated major policy decisions that the U.S. government made in Vietnam during these formative years of its engagement. It will examine in close detail press coverage of the Franco-American negotiations over Vietnam, the U.S. government’s rejection of the all-Vietnam elections stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Accords and the Eisenhower administration’s commitment to South Vietnam’s President Ngo Dinh Diem. American press coverage of these issues and events, as the following pages will demonstrate, provided an important pretext for an expanding American intervention and ultimately the resort to war because it depicted the

Republic of Vietnam as a vital security interest of the United States justifying providing significant quantities of military and economic aid to ensure its survival.

In general, scholarship on the American press and Vietnam has focused on determining whether an adversarial relationship existed between journalists and the U.S.

1 2 government during the Vietnam War. ’s groundbreaking two-volume study Big Story published in 1977 answers this question in the affirmative, claiming that the American press reported the 1968 as a psychological and military victory for and the Viet Cong while officials correctly claimed the opposite.1 Right revisionist historians adopted the adversarial press thesis to argue that the media bears responsibility for the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. According to these writers, who ironically challenged the initial orthodox position on the left that accepted news coverage of Tet as accurate, correspondents intentionally misled the American public about Tet to sour domestic attitudes toward the war and the U.S. military and civilian officials carrying it out.2 Other leftist critics of American foreign policy such as Noam

Chomsky and Edward Herman, on the other hand, reject the adversarial label altogether.

They argue that the American press continued to defend U.S. involvement in Vietnam as a noble, if misguided, venture despite disagreeing with U.S. government tactics during the war.3

Prior scholars, by focusing on real or imagined conflict between the American press and U.S. government, have paid only cursory attention to Vietnam news coverage from the years 1954 to 1960. The studies that do exist mention this period if only to note the glaring lack of disparity between the opinions that American journalists and the U.S. officials charged with the task of nation-building in Vietnam expressed. According to

1 Peter Braestrup, Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington, 1 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977), 156. 2 Charles Mohr, “Once Again-Did the Press Lose Vietnam?” Columbia Journalism Review 22, no. 4 (November/December 1983): 53. 3 Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (: Pantheon Books, 1988), 299. 3 most writers, the press lacked both the manpower and expertise to report accurately about

Vietnam in the and early 1960s, and thus relied on U.S. government sources who exaggerated the successes of Ngo Dinh Diem and his American supporters. Philip

Knightley, in The First Casualty: The as Hero and Myth Maker from the Crimea to Iraq, states the case succinctly: “There were few experts on the area, and most articles, in the period from 1954-1960, concentrated on the Communist menace and the need for greater American involvement.”4

According to Susan Welch, the American press uncritically accepted President

Dwight D. Eisenhower’s policies in Vietnam largely due to the absence of access to any contradictory information outside the U.S. government.5 Daniel Hallin, in The

Uncensored War, claims that articles journalists who went to Vietnam in the early 1960s wrote tended to “reflect . . . the perspectives of American officialdom generally.”6 While certainly largely dependent on official sources during this period, journalists also granted legitimacy to U.S. nation-building techniques in Vietnam and the regime of Ngo Dinh

Diem because they genuinely feared Communist expansion in Southeast Asia and accepted the “” as fact.

Like the American press, many observers accuse the academic community of misrepresenting or underreporting Vietnam in the scholarly journals during the 1950s and early 1960s. In his study of intellectuals and the Vietnam War, Robert Tomes

4 Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from Crimea to Iraq (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 409. 5 Susan Welch, “The American Press in Indochina, 1950-1956,” in Communication in International Politics, Richard L. Merritt, ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972), 221. 6 Daniel Hallin, The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 9. 4 characterizes coverage as suffering from “a basic state of confusion over the objective facts.”7 Similarly, Robert Scheer, in his 1965 study entitled How the United States Got

Involved in Vietnam, claims that the social scientists who researched Vietnam during the

1950s created “propaganda for the cause” that glorified Ngo Dinh Diem’s anti- communism and the American commitment to create a democratic South Vietnam.8

Reinforcing this viewpoint, other studies claim that the American Friends of Vietnam

(AFV), an influential lobby group with government ties, exerted an inordinate influence on early Vietnam press coverage, specifically regarding coverage of Ngo Dinh Diem. In

America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam: Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast

Asia, Seth Jacobs argues that “Diem was treated with unconditional positive regard by . . . the American media” thanks to the AFV until 1960.9 Historian Frederik Logevall claims that the AFV successfully promoted Diem, “while drastically limiting the number of articles even remotely critical of the Saigon government.”10

Historians contend that Diem received largely sympathetic press coverage until full-time correspondents arrived in 1962 to reveal the ugly truth about his regime and break with the U.S. government’s official line for the first time. , in

Once Upon a Distant War, writes that the newly arrived newsmen relied on “provocative,

7 Robert Tomes, Apocalypse Then: American Intellectuals and the Vietnam War (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 66. 8 Robert Scheer, How the United States Got Involved in Vietnam: A Report to the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions (Santa Monica CA: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1965), 33. 9 Seth Jacobs, America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 218. 10 Frederick Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam (New York: Random House, 2012), 664. 5 new, adversarial standards that broke from the old and would be used to chronicle

America’s disaster in Vietnam.”11 According to James Aronson, it took the arrival of such full-time correspondents as , , and

“to get the American public—and the government—to realize and acknowledge that the miracle of Diem was a costly myth.”12

Nevertheless, some historians acknowledge that scattered doubts about Diem arose prior to 1962. However, they insist that the U.S. government still guided the

Vietnam narrative. William Hammond, in Reporting Vietnam: Media and Military at

War, asserts that the press had ignored Diem’s “despotic tendencies” until an abortive coup attempt nearly toppled his regime in 1960. Despite their shift in tone, American correspondents remained largely dependent on official sources until early 1963.13 In

Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War, Clarence Wyatt claims that the 1960 coup attempt accounted for a “swing in press opinion about Diem.”14 Even so, the press “failed to present the whole story . . . in Vietnam” until full-time correspondents arrived on the scene to seek out independent sources of information on a regular basis.15

This thesis will add an important new dimension to the literature on the

Vietnam War, explaining how the American press acted as a facilitator and promoter of

U.S. intervention in Vietnam during the 1950s. Unlike other studies on the topic,

11 William Prochnau, Once Upon a Distant War: David Halberstam, Neil Sheehan, — Young War Correspondents and Their Early Vietnam Battles (New York: Random House, 1995), 31. 12 James Aronson, The Press and the Cold War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), 191. 13 William M. Hammond, Reporting Vietnam: Media and Military at War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 8. 14 Clarence Wyatt, Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995), 67. 15 Ibid., 69. 6 however, it will not compare and contrast American press coverage from different eras to identify the roots of a potentially adversarial relationship between correspondents and officials. Rather, this fresh examination will demonstrate how the tone of American press coverage about Vietnam from 1954 to 1960, while certainly in part a reflection of the influence of the U.S. government and AFV, sprang mostly from the “can-do spirit” of the age and widespread popular beliefs, that journalists shared, about American exceptionalism and the evils of communism. Due to their stringent belief in the efficacy of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, American journalists were able to rationalize their support for the draconian behavior of the Diem regime, while also rejecting all-Vietnam elections and lobbying for ’s withdrawal. As a result, the American press, by embracing greater U.S. responsibility for Vietnam in the 1950s and early 1960s, lent legitimacy to policies that made military intervention in the mid-1960s inevitable. CHAPTER II

COLLABORATORS IN COLONIALISM,

1954-1955

The American press accepted and in many cases outright endorsed the U.S. government’s assumption of responsibility from France to prevent the triumph of communism in Vietnam. Driven by fears of an international Communist conspiracy, both

American officials and the press believed that one could trace Communist activities in

Vietnam to the People’s Republic of (PRC) and ultimately the . Fear of Communist expansion in Southeast Asia led reporters to support U.S. action for collective defense such as taking the lead in creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty

Organization (SEATO) and generated enthusiasm for the anti-Communist South

Vietnamese regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. It also allowed American journalists to criticize

French policies in Vietnam, especially when they involved reconciliation with the Viet

Minh. By arguing that Franco-American objectives were basically incompatible, journalists allowed the U.S. government to act unilaterally in Vietnam. Both American intervention and the press’s support of it make sense only in the larger Cold War context.

The long American involvement in Vietnam began during the , when the U.S. government funded the French war effort to defeat the Communist .

In the early 1950s, American policy-makers felt themselves justified in fearing an expansive Communist conspiracy in Asia directed from . After

7 8

Chinese Communist forces defeated the Nationalist army of Jiang Jieshi in 1949, Soviet

Premier Josef Stalin spoke of a “second front” in Asia. In December of that year, PRC leader travelled to Moscow to sign a Sino-Soviet mutual defense pact designed to meet potential foreign aggression.16 American fears heightened when Stalin approved Communist North ’s plan to unify the country by military means in June

1950. After American troops intervened to defend , China sent troops to meet the American forces below the Yalu River in November 1950. For three years, both sides fought a bloody war that ended in stalemate. The and the triumph of

Mao Zedong in China convinced American officials that communism threatened all of

Asia.17 Thereafter, the war in Indochina between the Communist Viet Minh and the

French colonial regime took on international dimensions.

The French, who had ruled Indochina since late in the nineteenth century, briefly lost control of Vietnam when occupied the nation during World War II.

After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, France returned to Vietnam and confronted an upstart independence movement led by , a committed nationalist and

Communist. With widespread popular support, Ho’s Viet Minh forces fought successfully against the army and appeared poised to rule all of Vietnam.

The U.S. government, which had expressed opposition to French colonialism when

Franklin D. Roosevelt was president, faced a dilemma in Indochina where the distinction between communism and anti-colonialism was blurred. Inspired by hysterical notions of

16 , The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 2005), 39. 17 George Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 22. 9 an international Communist conspiracy, policy-makers ultimately identified Ho Chi Minh as a Soviet provocateur, despite having no evidence that he actually received orders from

Moscow.18 In 1950, American fears seemed to be justified when Ho Chi Minh established diplomatic ties with the PRC and the Chinese sent troops to the Vietnamese border. On July 26, 1950, Harry S. Truman signed military aid legislation into law and the U.S. began funding the French war effort in Vietnam to prevent Ho and his Viet Minh from establishing Communist control of the nation.19

French troops greatly outnumbered the Viet Minh forces under the command of Vo Nguyen Giap. However, the Viet Minh received weapons and advisors from the

PRC and by 1950 boasted a modern army. In the spring of 1951, Giap ordered attacks on key areas such as the Red River Valley and the port of . The French, under the command of General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, resisted the attacks, but neither the

French nor the Viet Minh could properly claim the initiative. In an attempt to gain greater support from the Vietnamese masses, the French granted more control over the war effort to Vietnamese units in 1952. By suggesting that the Vietnamese were virtually independent, the French procured increased American support for their efforts in June

1952.20 Viet Minh successes in early 1953, however, dampened enthusiasm for France’s prospects among American officials. In April, the U.S. government demanded that increases in American aid be met with a coherent French military plan to win the war.21

18 , Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin, 1983), 190. 19 Ibid., 192. 20 R.E.M. Irving, The First Indochina War (London: Croom Helm, 1975), 103. 21 Ibid., 104. 10

In response, the French intensified their war effort, implementing the Navarre Plan at the end of 1953.

Bolstered by millions of dollars in aid and thousands of tons of American equipment, General decided to challenge the Viet Minh guerrillas for supremacy by luring them into conventional battles. Navarre attacked the Viet Minh throughout the Delta and along the Laotian border, while reinforcing French strongholds. For Navarre, defending the French position at Dien Bien Phu, long considered a hotbed of Viet Minh activity located in northwest Vietnam near the Laotian border, assumed critical importance in the spring of 1954.22

After French Colonel Christian de Castries placed large artillery pieces around the fortress at Dien Bien Phu in March, Giap attacked, quickly capturing the French cannons and surrounding the base. In response, French Chief of Staff General Paul Ely called for direct U.S. military assistance. Ultimately, American officials, including

President Dwight D. Eisenhower himself, considered direct military intervention misguided and too costly. Unwilling to incur more casualties, and unable to secure greater U.S. support, the French met with representatives of the Viet Minh in May at

Geneva, Switzerland to negotiate a cease-fire. After Geneva, Western powers including

France and the United States, met at Manila with representatives from , the

Philippines, Pakistan, , and Australia to discuss the creation of a regional security organization—SEATO—designed, in part, to provide justification for U.S. protection of the new regime in South Vietnam.

22 Ellen Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina (Stanford, CA: Press, 1954), 314. 11

During the Dien Bien Phu crisis, Secretary of State had promoted the creation of a collective Southeast Asian security pact designed to deter

Communist aggression in the region and establish a legal basis for American intervention in Vietnam.23 While Dulles envisioned a military response to Communist expansion in

Asia, other Western powers, notably Britain and France, desired a political solution based on the Geneva Accords.24 Ultimately, SEATO allowed the signatories, including the

United States, to claim that an armed attack against southern Vietnam constituted a threat to regional peace. The American press overwhelmingly supported the creation of

SEATO.25 However, some columnists did not believe that SEATO provided adequate safeguards against the Communists realizing their designs in Southeast Asia and blamed

France for the weakness of the treaty. In a series of articles and letters to the editor published by , SEATO’s critics laid to the agreement.

Two weeks prior to the formal consultations at Manila, correspondent

Chalmers Roberts outlined potential problems with the security pact under consideration.

In particular, he noted that France and Britain intended to honor the Geneva agreement by refusing to sign a defense treaty that included South Vietnam. Roberts concluded that

“such a treaty will be only the merest beginning in the colossal problem of how to reverse the growing communist strength in Asia.”26 Joseph and Stewart Alsop, who considered the Geneva Agreement comparable to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s

23 Herring, America’s Longest War, 55. 24 Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little Brown, 1973), 243. 25 Susan Welch, “The American Press in Indochina, 1950-1956,” in Communication in International Politics, Richard L. Merritt, ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972), 219. 26 Chalmers Roberts, “Southeast Asia Pact: Three Main Problems Involved,” Washington Post, August 21, 1954. 12 resort to appeasement at Munich in capitulating to Nazi ’s Adolf Hitler in

September 1939, depicted SEATO as essentially a paper tiger. The Alsop brothers believed that South Vietnam’s situation called for more drastic measures than SEATO, in part because the French presence inflamed “the already violent nationalist feeling of the

Vietnamese population.”27 In a letter to the editor published after SEATO’s creation, Dr.

Phan Quang Dan criticized the French for failing to consult the Vietnamese during the

Manila Conference. Dan, an outspoken Vietnamese nationalist, argued that Vietnam had every right to belong to SEATO, while France did not. He claimed that only an independent Vietnam free from French influence could defeat communism.28

While the Geneva cease-fire and the creation of SEATO terminated French military domination over Indochina, the rise of Ngo Dinh Diem signaled the end of

French political supremacy. During the First Indochina War, as Vietnamese grew, so too did frustration with the French and Bao Dai, their puppet in Saigon. While

Bao Dai attempted to gain independence from France through negotiation, others such as

Ngo Dinh Diem called for a more vigorous approach. Diem had gained a small but influential group of followers in the United States due to his unique blend of anti- communism, Catholicism, and . A relatively obscure figure in

Vietnamese political circles, Diem bolstered his nationalist credentials in September 1953 when he organized and attended a Unity Congress that criticized Bao Dai’s gradualist

27 Joseph and Stewart Alsop, “Rest of Vietnam Next Red Goal,” Washington Post, August 29, 1954. 28 Phan Quang Dan, “Vietnam and SEATO,” Letters to the Editor, Washington Post, September 18, 1954. 13 approach with the French.29 After the Congress, Bao Dai met with Diem on multiple occasions to assuage nationalist doubts. One such meeting occurred in , as Dien

Bien Phu hung in the balance. At the meeting, Bao Dai appointed Diem premier of the

State of Vietnam. The U.S. supported Diem while the French considered his appointment an invitation to civil war.30

Despite very serious objections to France’s attitude towards Diem, officials within the Eisenhower administration believed that without the continued presence of the

French Expeditionary Corps, Vietnam’s security would be precarious at best. France desired to cooperate with the United States in the interest of protecting her investments in

Vietnam and to avoid accusations of losing Vietnam to the Communists. Thus, in

September 1954, France and the United States agreed to pursue a cooperative effort in preserving a free South Vietnam with Ngo Dinh Diem as premier.31 While agreeing to nominally support Diem, France continued to search for alternatives. Some American officials also had doubts about the premier, but the U.S. government chose to stay the course with Diem primarily because of the political influence his supporters wielded.

Mike Mansfield, one of Diem’s boosters, had met Diem during the First Indochina War at the request of Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. Diem found a kindred spirit in

Mansfield, who shared his distaste for the French and their colonial past.32

29 Edward Miller, “Vision, Power and Agency: The Ascent of Ngo Dinh Diem, 1945-54,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 35, no. 3 (October 2004): 453. 30 Kathryn Statler, “The Diem Experiment: Franco-American Conflict Over South Vietnam, July 1954-May 1955,” Journal of American-East Asian Relations 6, no. 2/3 (Summer-Fall 1997): 147. 31 Kathryn Statler, Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 125. 32 Robert Scheer and Warren Hinckle, “The Vietnam Lobby,” Ramparts 4, no. 3 (July 1965): 18. 14

In , Senator Mansfield visited Vietnam as a member of the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee prior to returning home from the Manila conference. While in Vietnam, he met with prominent supporters of Ngo Dinh Diem, including Wesley

Fishel, a Michigan State political science professor, and , a Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative. In issuing his second Indochina report to the

Eisenhower administration, Mansfield drew heavily on his conversations with Fishel and

Lansdale to argue that Diem’s regime needed unqualified American support.33 In Senate speeches, Mansfield defended Diem against his critics and threatened to withdraw all assistance to Indochina unless Diem remained in power. Mansfield’s endorsement lent credibility to the premier in the press and in Washington. While non-committal on Diem long-term, the press relied on Mansfield as a major source of information in reporting positively about his regime in the fall of 1954.

Upon Mansfield’s return to the United States, the Washington Post claimed that “Senator Mike Mansfield has been consistently the best-informed man on Capitol

Hill respecting the problems in Indochina.” Regarding Diem, the editorial repeated the senator’s assertion that “the Diem government is the only force capable of inspiring confidence and resisting the subversion of the Viet Minh.”34 Influenced by Mansfield’s energetic defense of Diem, Eisenhower formally endorsed the premier with a letter pledging direct American assistance to his regime on October 23. Eisenhower’s written endorsement arrived amid great uncertainty about Diem’s ability to win support from the

33 Gregory A. Olson, Mansfield and Vietnam: A Study in Rhetorical Adaptation (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1995), 40. 34 “Lessons of Indochina,” Washington Post, October 15, 1954, editorial. 15

Vietnamese National Army (VNA). General Nguyen Van Hinh, VNA Chief of Staff, and a veteran of the First Indochina War had threatened to unseat Diem in September only to have American officials in Saigon thwart his efforts. Despite avoiding a coup, grave doubts remained about Diem’s control of the VNA. When the French floated Hinh’s name as a possible replacement for Diem in October, Senator Mansfield persuaded the

Eisenhower administration to maintain support for Diem.35

In the press, Mansfield’s continued support for Diem during the Hinh crisis deflected attention from the undeniable defects of the regime in Saigon. After noting that

Diem faced the possibility of a Hinh-led coup, pointed out that

“Senator Mansfield expressed doubt over the advisability of aid being given if Ngo Dinh

Diem was overthrown.” The Christian Science Monitor specifically cited Mansfield when arguing that “outspoken American support has kept Mr. Diem at the helm in the face of growing opposition” from Hinh and other army officers.36 Hinh never organized a coup against Diem, despite his popularity among influential South Vietnamese, because the United States did not endorse his plans.37 In return for their support, the Eisenhower administration urged Diem to make military and political reforms to shore up popular support for his regime in the fall of 1954. Although his regime received enthusiastic

American support, both nationalist and communist opponents continued to besiege Diem.

His inability to provide strong leadership amid these threats caused Washington to consider intervening directly in South Vietnamese political affairs.

35 Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution: The U.S. in Vietnam, 1946-1966 (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 118. 36 “President Ties Aid to Vietnam Results,” Christian Science Monitor, October 25, 1954, 7. 37 Robert Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), 18. 16

In late October 1954, the Eisenhower administration received word from

Donald Heath, its ambassador in Saigon, that the Diem regime was struggling to gain popular support from the general population. American officials, particularly Secretary of

State Dulles, continued to believe that Diem represented South Vietnam’s best hope for leadership. Indeed, Heath’s pessimistic appraisal only furthered speculation about his impending replacement as ambassador.38 Eisenhower sealed Heath’s fate in November when he named General J. Lawton Collins as his special representative in Vietnam.

Eisenhower gave Collins broad powers to help Diem’s regime achieve political stability.

Collins brought plans to reduce South Vietnam’s conventional army to a 100,000 man force capable of protecting his regime from both the Communists and the political- religious sects. His arrival in Saigon convinced both the French and Vietnamese that the

U.S. planned to assume a greater role in determining affairs in South Vietnam.39 To the consternation of both American and French officials, the American press argued that the

Collins Mission portended an American takeover in Vietnam.

Both the Washington Post and the New York Times praised Eisenhower’s decision to dispatch Collins to Vietnam. While a New York Times editorial downplayed any friction between the U.S. and French camps, it acknowledged that the two powers needed to coordinate their activities in a more efficient manner. The Collins Mission, according to the paper, indicated that the United States finally “appreciated the gravity of the situation” in Vietnam. Accordingly, the New York Times called for “concerted action”

38 David L. Anderson, Trapped By Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953- 1961 (New York: Press, 1991), 84. 39 Bernard Fall, “Indochina Since Geneva,” Pacific Affairs, 28, no. 1 (March 1955): 23. 17 between the French, Vietnamese, and the Americans to reverse the Communist tide.40

The Washington Post took a far more cynical view of the French. A November 8 editorial celebrated Collins’ appointment but claimed that “[h]arassments and obstructions seem to have been thrown in the way of independent-minded Premier Diem by French interests on the spot.” The editorial called for greater cooperation between the two powers and insisted that foreign intervention remained essential to creating a stable South Vietnam.41

Prior to Collins’ arrival in Saigon, ambassador Donald Heath cabled the

Department of State to warn officials against providing too much information to the press about his visit. Heath had spoken with French Chief of Staff General Paul Ely, who expressed grave concerns about the implications of Collins mission. Ely suspected that if certain aspects of Collins proposals became public, the Viet Minh could argue successfully that France had violated the Geneva Accords.42 Ely had reason for concern.

The terms of the cease-fire forbade the “introduction into Vietnam of foreign troops and military personnel.”43 After negotiating with Collins in December, Ely agreed in principle to let the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) train and organize the VNA in place of the French.44 The agreement soon was made public and, as Ely feared, the

40 “Mission to Vietnam,” editorial, New York Times, November 5, 1954, 20. 41 “Collins to Indochina,” editorials, Washington Post, November 8, 1954, 12. 42 The Ambassador in Vietnam Donald Heath to the Department of State, 3 November 1954, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS with appropriate year), 1952-1954: Indochina, part 2 (Washington, DC, 1982), 13: 2204. 43James Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), 146. 44 Anderson, Trapped By Success, 94. 18

Viet Minh then charged France and the United States with seeking to undermine the

Geneva Accords.45

The American press considered the Ely-Collins proposal a calculated risk that placed the United States in the unenviable position of acting alone to save South

Vietnam. While some voices in the press raised concerns about American involvement, they also emphasized the importance of Vietnam in the context of the larger Cold War. In an article titled “U.S. Inherits Another Headache: France Turns Over Indo-China Job to

America,” the U.S. News and World Report described Washington’s assumption of responsibility in Vietnam as “one of its biggest gambles in Asia since the Korean War.”46

A Washington Post editorial repeated the same theme, admitting that the United States was taking a “calculated risk” in Vietnam. Still, the article depicted American intervention as a positive alternative to French occupation.47 Columnist C.L. Sulzberger, in the New York Times, speculated that U.S. “naval and air detachments in the Western

Pacific” would henceforth be responsible for the security of South Vietnam. While

American air strikes represented an imperfect deterrent to Communist aggression,

Sulzberger considered them an improvement over the traditional land forces employed by the French.48

Reports that indicated a new role for the United States in Vietnam or detailed sensitive information regarding military operations worried American officials in Saigon

45 “Vietminh Charges U.S. Breaks Truce, New York Times, December 9, 1954. 46 “U.S. Inherits Another Headache: France Turns Over Indo-China Job to America,” U.S. News and World Report, December 10, 1954, 26. 47 “Gamble in Vietnam,” editorials, Washington Post, December 11, 1954, 10. 48 C.L. Sulzberger, “Indirect Aggression and ,” New York Times, December 20, 1954. 19 and Washington. Randolph Kidder, the Charge d’Affairs in Saigon, told the State

Department that such stories could lead the Viet Minh to file a complaint with the

International Control Commission, a multinational organization charged with enforcing the Geneva Accords.49 Kenneth Young, a State Department official in the Office of

Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, informed Collins on December 15 that the

French were responsible for leaking information about his proposals with Ely. He reassured the embassy that Washington would continue to keep “security questions under close wraps.”50 Despite Young’s assurances, the press continued to reveal delicate information about French and American activities in Vietnam as the U.S. government attempted to sustain an uneasy relationship with .

In mid-December 1954, Secretary of State Dulles travelled to Paris and met with French Prime Minister Pierre Mendes-France and British Prime Minister Anthony

Eden to discuss and Indochina. During one meeting, Dulles assured

Eden that, despite U.S. plans to send additional “training personnel” to Vietnam, the

United States intended to continue working with the French.51 Following the Paris talks, the press continued to emphasize the expansive American role in Vietnam and its harmful impact on Franco-American cooperation. In the Christian Science Monitor, correspondent Ronald Stead claimed that the U.S. plan to “undertake accelerated and intensified training of South Vietnam’s army” ensured that “suspicion of motives” soon

49 The Charge in Vietnam Randolph Kidder to the Department of State, December 14, 1954, FRUS, 13, part 2, 2369. 50 Kenneth Young, Kenneth Young, Acting Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs to J. Lawton Collins, Special Representative in Vietnam, 15 December 1954, [correspondence]. U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1955-1957. 1: Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985. 51 The Secretary of State to the Department of State, December 17, 1954, FRUS, 13, part 2, 2386. 20 would develop between France, the United States, and the South Vietnamese government.52 Marquis Childs, in the Washington Post, opined that Franco-American efforts to train South Vietnamese troops jointly remained “extremely difficult to implement at the working level in view of the fierce conflicts and rivalries in the suspicion-laden atmosphere of Saigon.”53

Although officials in the Eisenhower administration shared the press’s concerns about working with the French, they did not want the United States to assume full responsibility for Indochina in the early months of 1955. Dulles had argued repeatedly against unilateral action in Vietnam and warned Eisenhower about alienating the French, whose presence remained a vital security buffer against communist encroachment. Dulles did not want the United States to bear full responsibility for the shaky regime in Saigon and he understood that American officials had few contacts in

Vietnam besides Frenchmen.54 With these considerations in mind, the United States continued funding the French Expeditionary Corps in Vietnam, while also seeking French advice on policy decisions. Despite reaching tentative agreements on military decisions,

France and the United States continued to disagree about the viability of the Diem regime during late 1954.55 The American press seized on the Diem issue to argue that French and

American objectives in Vietnam were incompatible.

52 Ronald Stead, “Vietnam: A House Divided,” Christian Science Monitor, December 27, 1954, 9. 53 Marquis Childs, “Eden, Dulles Try to Aid Mendes-France,” Washington Post, December 31, 1954. 54Daniel P. O’C. Greene, “John Foster Dulles and the End of the Franco-American Entente in Indochina,” Diplomatic History 16, no. 4 (October 1992): 555. 55 Statler, Replacing France, 132. 21

In January 1955, some American observers considered Diem inept, while others held that he was Indochina’s last best hope. All agreed, however, that Diem’s nationalism made him unacceptable to the French. In a January 1955 edition of The

Reporter, Joseph Buttinger defended Diem against French charges that he took orders from the United States and claimed that South Vietnam had achieved remarkable success under the premier. Buttinger defended Diem’s Francophobia and called for the U.S. government to help South Vietnam “in freeing itself from the remnants of a decaying colonialism.”56 In a far more pessimistic article, published in Commentary, Peter Schmid claimed that the Viet Minh enjoyed immense popular support, particularly in the

Vietnamese countryside. According to Schmid, Diem faced more than Communist subversion, as political-religious sects with armies and followers of their own threatened to unseat him as premier. Against these odds, Diem, who Schmid called a “rabid enemy of the French,” stayed in power chiefly due to U.S. influence.57 French and American divisions over Diem occupied much of the mainstream press’s attention as well.

Conventional publications provided a more measured analysis of South

Vietnam’s prospects for survival, but maintained that France presented a major impediment to the nation’s battle against communism. In the New York Times, C.L.

Sulzberger called American and French policies “tangential,” noting for example that

Pierre Mendes-France had appointed , who had negotiated successfully with Ho Chi Minh in 1946, as Paris’ in , while the United States did not

56 Buttinger, “An Eyewitness Report on Vietnam,” 20. 57 Peter Schmid, “Free Indochina Fights Against Time: Vietnam’s Winding, Rocky Road,” Commentary (January 1955), 28. 22 recognize the northern regime. Sulzberger insisted that France had accepted a Communist takeover as inevitable.58 Shortly after his article appeared, the New York Times published a letter to the editor from Joseph Buttinger that endorsed Sulzberger’s view and went a step further. Buttinger charged the French with actively undermining the Diem regime, while maintaining a friendly relationship with Ho Chi Minh. For him, a successful U.S. foreign policy did not include consultations with the French.59 In a similar vein,

Newsweek contended that Diem’s odds for saving South Vietnam from Communist subversion could improve only after French withdrawal, openly celebrating Diem’s effort to rid South Vietnam of the last “vestiges of French colonial control.”60 Unfortunately for

Diem and his American backers in the press, French withdrawal also had allowed the premier’s non-Communist opponents to coalesce into an anti-government force.

Three prominent nationalist groups in South Vietnam had opposed Diem’s rise to power. The Cao Dai sect, named after its founder who preached an amalgamation of Buddhism, Christianity, and Taoism, had fought reluctantly alongside the French against the Viet Minh in the First Indochina War to maintain their large land-holdings in the Vietnamese countryside.61 The Hoa-Hao sect, founded by Hyunh Phu So, claimed nearly two million adherents to its brand of Buddhist Protestantism. During World War

II, Hoa Hao forces clashed with the Viet Minh and under banner of truce, the Viet Minh assassinated So in cold blood, driving the Hoa Hao closer to the French. The Binh-Xuyen

58 C.L. Sulzberger, “Teaching the Sultan’s Horse to Speak,” New York Times, January 17, 1955. 59 Joseph Buttinger, “Our Policy Toward Vietnam,” Letters to the Editor, New York Times, January 30, 1955. 60 “Indo-China: A Fateful Thumb,” Newsweek, January 31, 1955. 61 Bernard Fall, “Religion in Politics,” in Viet-Nam Witness: 1953-66, Bernard Fall, ed. (New York: Praeger, 1966), 146. 23 sect claimed no religion, but operated Cholon’s Grand Monde Hotel and ran Saigon’s police. The Binh Xuyen and its leader Le Van Vien also had supported the French in the

First Indochina War. For years, these three sects had relied on French subsidies to maintain their armies, fiefdoms, and business operations until, in January 1955, the

French cut off all financial and military assistance to them.62 Despite holding seats in

Diem’s cabinet, sect leaders viewed the French withdrawal as leaving them endangered and considered the new premier a threat to their survival.

In March 1955, the Hoa-Hao, Cao Dai, and Binh Xuyen coalesced, forming the United Front of National Forces, and demanded that Diem broaden his government.

Diem refused to negotiate with the sects and in late March, South Vietnam descended into civil war, as the Binh Xuyen clashed with government forces.63 The sect crisis seriously threatened Franco-American cooperation in Vietnam. During the early days of fighting, the French aided the Binh Xuyen and withheld supplies from the VNA.

Americans in Saigon, including the CIA’s Edward Lansdale, provided intelligence to loyalist troops. Washington supported Diem’s retaliatory actions against the Binh Xuyen, while Paris blamed Diem for provoking the hostilities.64 The American press, fascinated by armed conflict in Communist-contested third world nations, followed the sect crisis closely.65 While expressing pessimism about Diem’s chances for victory, the press

62 Bernard Fall, “The Political-Religious Sects of Viet-Nam,” Pacific Affairs 28, no. 3 (September 1955), 251. 63 Edward Geary Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 252. 64 Fall, “The Political-Religious Sects of Viet-Nam,” 253. 65 Clarence Wyatt, Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Press, 1995), 63. 24 continued to depict France as a hindrance to his efforts, driving a wedge between Paris and Washington.

On April 3, in a front-page New York Times story, Robert Alden detailed

Diem’s plan to charge France with obstructing his fight against the Binh Xuyen.

According to Alden, the United States sympathized with Diem’s military solution to the crisis, while the French supported a political compromise between the sects and the government.66 On the following day, Secretary of State Dulles cabled the embassy in

Saigon his dismay over articles indicating a divergence in French and American policies in South Vietnam. Dulles told the embassy to inform General Ely that the United States did not endorse such stories.67 As the fighting wore on in into mid-April, the press remained convinced that the sect crisis had revealed major rifts between Paris and

Washington, specifically regarding Diem. Joan Thiriet of the Christian Science Monitor claimed that the French had given up on the premier, while the Americans continued to bankroll his fight against the sects.68 Although the French had been Diem’s most vocal critics, American officials had their own doubts. On April 25, after weeks of internal debates, Collins successfully persuaded the Eisenhower administration to support a change in government. Before the orders reached the embassy, however, Diem defeated the Binh Xuyen in a critical Saigon battle and Dulles renewed U.S. support for the premier.69

66 Robert Alden, “Vietnam Blames French in Crisis,” New York Times, April 3, 1955, 1. 67 Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 4 April 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, 1, 199. 68 Joan Thiriet, “Paris Weighs U.S. Policy in Vietnam,” Christian Science Monitor, April 20, 1955, 14. 69 Anderson, Trapped by Success, 110. 25

Dulles’ decision to support Diem despite the objections of Collins brought

Franco-American conflict in Vietnam to a boiling point. Dulles argued that Diem’s victory had ruled out any alternative to his regime, while French Prime Minister Edgar

Faure claimed that Diem’s actions created a vacuum for the Viet Minh to fill. Predictably, the press supported Dulles’ view, with the New York Times leading the charge.70 The press also began to repeat charges made in earlier months about French ties to Hanoi. On

May 4, Gordon Walker, chief foreign correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, alleged that much of the “circumstantial evidence” pointed to French cooperation with the Viet Minh. According to Walker, France secretly had been cutting deals with the PRC and North Vietnam since the Geneva Conference to maintain economic privileges in

Vietnam in the event of a communist takeover.71 Accusations such as those Gordon

Walker made did not escape the notice of French officials. On May 11, Edgar Faure told

Douglas Dillon, the American ambassador in Paris, that he would endorse Diem to disprove allegations made in the press about France’s “double game” in Vietnam.72

Faure’s endorsement did not reduce suspicion in the American press and doubts persisted about France’s commitment to Diem after his victory against the sects.

By mid-May 1955, Diem’s loyalist forces had defeated the Binh Xuyen and driven its leaders out of Saigon. According to Newsweek, the French remained opposed to

Diem and secretly had attempted to send arms to the Binh Xuyen in the wake of its May

70 Greene, “John Foster Dulles and the End of the Franco-American Entente in Indochina,” 557. 71 Gordon Walker, “France, Reds in Secret Pact?” Christian Science Monitor, May 4, 1955, 1. 72 Dillon to the Department of State, FRUS, 1955-1957, 1, 395. 26 defeat.73 On May 23, Newsweek charged the French with planting “rumors of impending violence” in the South Vietnamese capital to undermine confidence in Diem.74 While

Newsweek’s charges against French remain debatable, the news magazine was correct to point out that Diem’s victory had increased greatly animosity between French and

American officials. On the heels of Diem’s triumph, Secretary of State Dulles began prodding the French government to recall any of their representatives who had opposed the premier. Washington also relieved Ambassador Collins, who consistently had defended the French, and replaced him with G. Frederick Reinhardt.75 These developments, coupled with the mass withdrawal of French troops, signaled the end of direct French military influence in South Vietnam. With the end of the sect crisis and the

French withdrawal ensured, American press coverage of Vietnam diminished significantly.76 Although their interest did wane, journalists remained wary of French intentions. Some worried that the Franco-American animosities arising from disagreements regarding Vietnam might have lasting negative diplomatic consequences for postwar Europe.

After World War II, the United States acted jointly with France to maintain its dominance in Indochina largely due to the overriding need for French cooperation in

Europe. From 1950 to 1955, the United States and Britain attempted to convince France that an armed West Germany was necessary to prevent Soviet expansion into Western

Europe. At trilateral talks between the three powers in May 1955, France finally accepted

73 “Indo-China: Dangerous Vacuum,” Newsweek, May 16, 1955, 16. 74 “Indo-China: Clash and Compromise,” Newsweek, May 23, 1955, 45. 75 Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Political History (New York: Praeger, 1972), 412. 76 Wyatt, 64. 27 rearmed West Germany’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), giving the United States a free hand in Vietnam.77 Germany’s rearmament and the U.S. assumption of responsibility in Vietnam did not sit well with columnist C.L.

Sulzberger, who predicted “Trouble Ahead with Paris” in the June 15, 1955 edition of the

New York Times. There he claimed that French attitudes toward the United States had soured as a result of German rearmament and would get worse with the French withdrawal from Vietnam. According to Sulzberger, thousands of anti-American French armed forces would “soon be disseminating their prejudices at home,” endangering

Franco-American cooperation in Europe.78 Other journalists argued that postponing the

French withdrawal endangered the success of the Diem regime.

Although the French High Command had given full autonomy to officers in the VNA and French troops largely had evacuated Saigon, France retained a military presence in Vietnam until April 28, 1956.79 France’s gradual withdrawal raised some concerns among American journalists. In The Nation, roving Southeast Asian correspondent Sam A. Jaffe noted that France, whose interests were “purely economic,” continued to “occupy” Vietnam with 80,000 troops. Jaffe expressed skepticism about

Diem’s claims to leadership noting, for instance, that France “still controls the purse strings” in Saigon.80 When Takashi Oka, staff writer for the Christian Science Monitor, visited South Vietnam in the fall of 1955, he found that many of Diem’s critics believed

77 Greene, “John Foster Dulles and the End of the Franco-American Entente in Indochina,” 570. 78 C.L. Sulzberger, “Trouble Ahead With Paris: The Background,” New York Times, June 15, 1955. 79 Buttinger, Vietnam, 412. 80 Sam A. Jaffe, “Dilemma in Saigon: Which Way Democracy?” The Nation, June 25, 1955, 581. 28 that the president needed to take a firmer stand against the French. Oka spoke with

“revolutionaries . . . who berated Mr. Diem for not throwing the French out fast enough.”81 Most journalists expressed relief at the French withdrawal no matter its pace, applauding any developments that distanced South Vietnam from its colonial past.

The death blow to French aspirations in Vietnam occurred when Diem ousted

South Vietnamese Chief of State and former Emperor Bao Dai in an October 1955 referendum. Diem targeted Bao Dai in a massive propaganda campaign and ordered police to intimidate voters on his way to a huge electoral victory.82 The undemocratic nature of the vote prompted the French to cut diplomatic ties with Saigon. French officials understood the pitfalls of propping up a nationalist leader with questionable public support and dissuaded their American counterparts from going down the same path.83 The American press interpreted the referendum as both an important democratic exercise and an embarrassment for the French and their candidate Bao Dai.84 Although the press celebrated the results of the election, journalists did acknowledge that Diem’s victory meant that the 1956 all-Vietnam elections stipulated in arguably the most important provision of the Geneva Accords would not take place.

On October 24, the termed the election a “vote of confidence in Diem” and a “total repudiation of Bao Dai.” Diem’s overwhelming triumph at the polls, the report concluded, guaranteed his rejection of the July 1956 unification

81 Takashi Oka, “Vietnam Measures Diem,” Christian Science Monitor, November 2, 1955. 82 Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990 (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 53. 83 Statler, Replacing France, 145. 84 Jessica Chapman, “Staging Democracy: South Vietnam’s 1955 Referendum to Depose Bao Dai,” Diplomatic History, 30, no. 4 (September 2006): 698. 29 elections called for in the Geneva Accords.85 Henry R. Lieberman of the New York Times reached the same verdict. From Saigon, he reported that “Premier Ngo Dinh Diem tonight interpreted his victory over Bao Dai as a popular mandate not to proceed with unification elections in Vietnam.”86 At a press conference, Diem told reporters that he would not allow the elections until North Vietnam established true democratic conditions for its citizens. Although the United States backed his position on the elections, Diem’s supporters understood that even a truly democratic vote would make Ho Chi Minh the leader of a unified Vietnam. Thus, officials in Washington and Saigon did not

Diem to hold the elections, but requested that he publicly remain open to the holding of them as a possibility.87 The election issue posed the final challenge to Franco-American relations in Vietnam.88

Although neither South Vietnam nor the United States had signed the Geneva

Accords in 1954, both governments verbally had vowed not to undermine its terms. Thus, when Diem refused to honor the elections in July 1956, North Vietnam protested his actions to the international community. Hanoi’s protests did not result in any recriminations from foreign governments, however, while the United States explicitly endorseed Diem’s right to abrogate the accords. Like the U.S. government, the American press believed that only signatories to the cease-fire had any obligation to insist on holding the elections. Convinced that the balloting could not truly be free, the press endorsed Diem’s position. In promoting and celebrating France’s withdrawal, the press already had encouraged greater American

85 “South Viet-Nam Voters Repudiate Ex-Emperor,” Los Angeles Times, October 24, 1955, 7. 86 Henry R. Lieberman, “Diem Sees Delay on Unity Upheld,” New York Times, October 26, 1955. 87 Herring, America’s Longest War, 67. 88 Statler, Replacing France, 155. 30 intervention in Vietnam. Now American journalists acted as enablers of the U.S. government in continuing to prop up Diem as a consequence of their failure to demand the holding of the elections to reunite the nation. Ultimately, Diem’s refusal to allow the vote to occur allowed him to create a dictatorship in South Vietnam with tacit support from the American press and the U.S. government.

CHAPTER III

ENCOURAGERS OF OPTIMISM,

1955-1956

After the , the Eisenhower administration chose to create a separate South Vietnam rather than endorse all-Vietnam elections and risk a Ho

Chi Minh victory. Initially, the United States acted without the support of France and

Britain, signatories to the Geneva Accords. By 1956, however, international opinion had proved favorable to Washington’s opposition to the elections. Washington acted confidently in postponing and obfuscating the election issue for a variety of reasons.

First, France’s power to enforce the agreement was negligible. Second, both the Soviet

Union and Britain opted to maintain a fragile détente between the Eastern and Western

Blocs rather than push for a unified Vietnam. Finally, the United States did not wish to cross Premier Ngo Dinh Diem, a steadfast opponent of the elections.

Historians generally have forgotten another key reason for Washington’s confidence in opposing Vietnamese elections in 1956 was the supportive role the

American press provided for its decision. With very few exceptions, the American press’s stance towards the elections mirrored the U.S. government’s. Due to the influence of the

Vietnam Lobby, the press often rejected the elections outright, arguing that the North

Vietnamese lacked the ability to oversee a truly democratic plebiscite. In some cases, individuals who took part in Operation Passage to Freedom drew on their experiences to

31 32 contend that North Vietnam’s violations of the Geneva during the free migration period made the elections ineffectual. Other commentators argued that Diem’s government was simply not bound by the Geneva Accords. Whatever the reason, the press allowed the election deadline to pass without comment or protest. While the press consciously undermined the elections stipulation, it did so largely because that provision rested on shaky foundations.

During July 1954 at the Geneva Conference, delegates from France and the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) signed a cease-fire that ended the First

Indochina War and temporarily divided Vietnam at the 17th parallel. Tran Van Do, representative of the South Vietnamese delegation, protested the , calling for a unified Vietnam under control.89 The North Vietnamese, on the other hand, called for immediate nationwide elections to unify Vietnam under one government.

At the insistence of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, both delegations settled for a temporary partition.90 After weeks of negotiations, the Geneva powers agreed that all-Vietnam elections, supervised by the International Control Commission, would take place in July 1956. The delegates placed the elections provision in the cease- fire’s Final Declaration, which the participants did not sign and thus lacked clear legal authority.91 Moreover, because only the French and Viet Minh signed the cease-fire at all, the South Vietnamese could argue that the Geneva Accords did not apply below the 17th parallel. Washington believed that the elections would result in a victory for Ho Chi

89 Bernard Fall, “The Cease-Fire-An Appraisal,” in Viet-Nam Witness: 1953-66, Bernard Fall (ed.) (New York: Praeger, 1966), 61. 90 Bernard Fall, “Settlement at Geneva-Then and Now,” in Ibid., p. 71. 91 Ibid., 75. 33

Minh and used the ambiguity and vagueness of the elections provision to argue against its implementation.92 Then South Vietnamese Premier Ngo Dinh Diem also feared a

Communist victory and became an increasingly vocal opponent of unification elections with Washington’s support.

In the tendentious months after Geneva, Washington focused primarily on bolstering the Diem regime against domestic and foreign rivals who threatened to unseat him. Elections remained a background issue until January 1955, when the Eisenhower administration began investigating the issue at the request of Ambassador J. Lawton

Collins.93 In April, the Defense Department recommended that the United States “Make every effort to abolish or postpone indefinitely the elections proposed for Vietnam under the Geneva Accords.”94 President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John

Foster Dulles elected to delay while urging Diem to consult with Hanoi on the elections to appease international opinion. Despite Washington’s requests, Diem rejected consultations with the North.95 He not only cited the fact that South Vietnam did not sign the cease-fire, but also argued that the conditions in North Vietnam made a free vote impossible. U.S. officials worried that Diem’s opposition to elections would reflect poorly on the United States. Still, fears of a Ho Chi Minh victory overrode concerns

92 David Anderson, Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-61 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 123. 93 Kathryn Statler, Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2009), 157. 94 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs H. Struve Hensel to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson, 22 April 1955, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS with appropriate year), 1955-1957, Vietnam (Washington, DC, 1985), 1: 280. 95 Statler, Replacing France, 177. 34 about domestic and international censure and the U.S. ultimately backed Diem’s stance on the elections. The U.S. government found support from the press, which relied largely on the opinions of the Vietnam Lobby for its expectations about the nationwide elections.

The Vietnam Lobby, a Washington interest group concerned mainly with supporting and maintaining a non-Communist South Vietnam, began as an informal network of Diem supporters. Wesley Fishel, the lobby’s founder, met Diem in in

1950 and introduced the young politician to influential journalists, academics, and U.S. government officials. In the fall and winter of 1954, individuals within the Vietnam

Lobby became concerned about Diem’s coverage in the American press.96 Joseph

Buttinger and Leo Cherne, who had helped Diem resettle refugees during the months after Geneva, believed that the press was misrepresenting Diem. In response, they hired

Harold Oram, a public relations expert, to sway press opinion in Diem’s favor. In January

1955, at Oram’s insistence, Buttinger met with editors and publishers from a wide variety of newspapers and news magazines and successfully reversed the tide.97 Buttinger and his colleagues in the Vietnam Lobby were concerned with portraying Diem as a viable leader whose heroic resistance to Communism made him a valuable U.S. ally.

Like many Americans, members of the Vietnam Lobby believed that the unification elections imperiled Diem and jeopardized South Vietnam’s status as a “Free

World” nation. In the press, they called attention to North Vietnam’s violations of the

Geneva Accords to show that the necessary conditions for free elections did not exist

96 Joseph Morgan, The Vietnam Lobby: the American Friends of Vietnam, 1955-1975 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 20. 97 Seth Jacobs, America’s Miracle Man: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia, 1950-1957 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 233. 35 north of the 17th parallel. Some members of the Vietnam Lobby recounted their experiences in Operation Passage to Freedom, where thousands of Vietnamese refugees fled the North. The 1954 Geneva cease-fire explicitly gave Vietnamese civilians the freedom to move across either side of the 17th parallel after the agreement went into effect. This provision allowed nearly 900,000 refugees to cross the border southward in the months after Geneva, providing South Vietnam with what historian Robert Scigliano has called a “great human and propaganda victory.”98 Although many Vietnamese left

North Vietnam voluntarily, the U.S. Navy aided them in their journey. During Operation

Passage to Freedom U.S. Navy vessels transported refugees from North Vietnam and resettled them in South Vietnam, providing them with shelter at the end of the journey.

Though extolled as a great accomplishment for the “Free World,” the mass exodus involved the Catholic Church and U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) committing acts of coercion. For example, Catholic priests invoked slogans such as

“Christ has gone to the South” and the “Virgin Mary has departed from the North” to spur their congregations to emigrate.99 Additionally, CIA agents informed Catholics that they would be a targeted minority under a Communist regime. In a more sinister act, the

CIA told Vietnamese civilians that the United States was considering dropping nuclear weapons on North Vietnam.100 The members of the Vietnam Lobby chose not to include

98 Robert Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), 133. 99 Chester C. Cooper, The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam (New York: Dodd & Mead, 1970), 130. 100 George McTurnan Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 77. 36 these details in documenting their experiences in the American press. Instead, they highlighted the dire circumstances in North Vietnam that prompted the refugees’ exodus.

Before arriving in Vietnam to assist with Operation Passage to Freedom, Leo

Cherne headed the International Rescue Committee, an organization dedicated to relocating civilians in areas that totalitarian regimes were threatening. In Vietnam,

Cherne helped Diem resettle refugees in the fall of 1954, finding the premier an able leader.101 Cherne judged Diem’s earliest press coverage reprehensible and in December

1954, he penned a letter to the editor of the New York Times, castigating correspondent

Peggy Durdin for her pessimistic portrayal of the South Vietnamese regime. In his letter,

Cherne challenged Durdin’s conclusion that Diem lacked popular support. Diem, he claimed, stood at the forefront of a “democratic force” capable of defeating

Communism.102 In January 1955, Cherne wrote an article for Look magazine in which he described the recently arrived refugees as “too weary to resist the Reds without us.”

Cherne’s article revealed nothing about the overwhelmingly Catholic composition of the refugees or the CIA’s disinformation campaign. However, it did promote greater

American involvement and stepped up technical assistance. According to Cherne, greater aid remained vital to building resistance to the Viet Minh and preventing a Communist victory in the 1956 elections.103

Joseph Buttinger, co-founder of the IRC and close associate of Leo Cherne, shared both Cherne’s enthusiasm for American involvement in Vietnam and his distaste

101 Aaron Levenstein, Escape to Freedom: The Story of the International Rescue Committee (New York: Freedom House, 1983), 104. 102 Leo Cherne, “The Saigon Picture,” The New York Times, December 12, 1954. 103 Leo Cherne, “To Win Indochina We Must Win These People,” Look, January 25, 1955. 37 for the press’s coverage of Diem. In a June 1955 edition of the New Leader, Buttinger criticized columnists Joseph Alsop and Peter Schmid for using French propaganda to smear the nationalist Diem. According to Buttinger, the French insisted on nationwide elections because they sought coexistence with North Vietnam. Accordingly, he urged that “America’s position on the election issue be entirely different from that of the

French.” Buttinger called for the United States to support the elections in principle, while acknowledging that a truly free election was impossible in North Vietnam. He claimed that the South Vietnamese, if left to their own devices, would choose freedom.104

Buttinger’s views coincided very closely with those of the U.S. State

Department. Washington did not wish for the elections to take place, but it also did not want to reject the elections outright and upset U.S. allies France and Britain. To bide time, Secretary of State Dulles suggested that Diem publicly express his support for the elections, while also demanding that they meet standards of freedom he knew would be unacceptable to Communist authorities.105 In July 1955, in violation of the Geneva

Accords, Diem failed to consult with the North Vietnamese about the elections. As the deadline passed without a resumption of hostilities, the French became much less concerned about enforcing the elections provision.106 The American press also ascribed little importance to the lack of consultations and lent credence to Diem’s objections.

In a radio broadcast aired in South Vietnam on 17 July 1955 that the foreign press promptly picked up, Diem announced his refusal to hold pre-election consultations

104 Joseph Buttinger, “Are We Saving South Vietnam,” New Leader 38 (27 June 1955): 511. 105 Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, May 27, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, 1, 421. 106 Statler, Replacing France, 164. 38 with North Vietnam. In defending his stance, Diem noted that the Republic of Vietnam did not sign the Geneva Accords and cited Communist restrictions on freedom of movement to South Vietnam.107 Diem’s supporters at Time and Newsweek joined him in highlighting alleged Communist violations of the Geneva Accords to justify their stance in opposition to the election. Time editor Henry Luce supported direct American intervention in Asia and had used his publication to champion the U.S.-backed Diem since Geneva.108 In a 1 August 1955 article, Time defended Diem, noting that he did not

“feel bound by a pledge his government did not sign.” It also charged North Vietnam with providing the Communist Pathet Lao with supplies across the Laotian border in violation of the Geneva Accords.109 Newsweek, whose publisher Malcolm Muir would later join Luce as a member of the American Friends of Vietnam (AFV), took the same editorial position on the consultations. In a 1 August report, it cited the large population disparity between North and South as a compelling argument against implementing the elections provision.110

Diem’s opposition to the 1956 plebiscite gained more legitimacy following the formal creation of the AFV. The AFV, which included members of the informal

Vietnam Lobby along with a diverse group of journalists, politicians, judges, and humanitarians argued for greater U.S. involvement in Vietnam. According to the AFV’s statement of purpose, which it released in December 1955, the group aimed to educate

107 Tillman Durdin, “Diem Stand Held Bar to Elections,” New York Times, July 17, 1955, 7. 108 Robert Herzstein, Henry R. Luce, Time, and the American Crusade in Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 194. 109 “South Viet Nam: The Wreck of the Majestic,” Time, 1 August 1955, 22. 110 “Out on a limb,” Newsweek, August 1, 1955, 33. 39 the American people on the North Vietnamese government and its repeated violation of the Geneva Accords.111 Additionally, the AFV sought to promote support for the Diem government and warn the public about the consequences of a Communist takeover in

South Vietnam. To this end, the AFV focused much of its early work on dissuading the

Eisenhower administration from supporting the 1956 elections.112

Senator Mike Mansfield’s name appeared on the group’s letterhead, although he was not an officer in the AFV. In July 1955, Mansfield came out against the unification elections, citing Viet Minh restrictions on freedom of movement and its support of the Pathet Lao.113 In a January 1956 edition of Harper’s magazine, Mansfield seconded Diem’s contention that the 1956 elections could not truly be free. In his article, he claimed that “the iron-clad Communist dictatorship in north Viet Nam” needed to be

“modified” before free elections could take place. He defended Diem’s decision to avoid consultations with North Vietnam, claiming that the Geneva Agreement was not “binding on his government.”114 Due to his lobbying in the press and Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, historian Greg Olson claims that Mansfield “played a role in the denial of the

1956 elections.”115 He did not act alone however. Other AFV members, including the wildly popular Dr. Thomas Dooley, dramatized the plight of the northern refugees to argue in 1956 that South Vietnam could not afford to fall to Communism.

111 Morgan, The Vietnam Lobby, 32. 112 Ibid., 31. 113 Gregory Olson, Mansfield and Vietnam: A Study in Rhetorical Adaptation (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1995), 62. 114 Mike Mansfield, “Reprieve in Viet Nam,” Harper’s, January 1956, 46. 115 Olson, Mansfield and Vietnam, 73. 40

Dr. Thomas Dooley, a Navy medical physician, arrived in Vietnam in August

1954 to assist in Operation Passage to Freedom. He earned wide recognition for his medical work and his “situation reports” which were widely read among his fellow navy officers. While in Vietnam, Dooley met William Lederer, co-author of the famous book

The Ugly American. At Lederer’s insistence, Dooley began documenting his experiences in preparation for a book he would write about the American-led efforts to help northern refugees flee south.116 The resulting book, Deliver Us From Evil, released in January

1956, provided a sensational account of Operation Passage to Freedom and embellished stories describing Viet Minh atrocities. The book succeeded in bringing Vietnam to the consciousness of the average American, who largely had been unaware of the tiny

Southeast Asian nation. Accompanying the release of Dooley’s book was unanimous praise from the press. Various publications showered Dooley with accolades and uncritically repeated his claims about Communist war crimes.117 In April 1956, Reader’s

Digest reprinted a portion of Deliver Us From Evil. Dooley’s emotionally charged account placed the Vietnam conflict in a larger battle across the globe between good and evil, appealing to a religiously sensitive public.

The Reader’s Digest excerpt of Dooley’s work skillfully combined autobiography with propaganda to portray the refugee exodus from North Vietnam as a flight from a godless regime bent on eliminating Catholicism. Dooley wrote of his time building refugee camps in the port city of Haiphong where he cared for Vietnamese that

116 Diana Shaw, “The Temptation of Tom Dooley,” Los Angeles Times, December 15, 1991. 117 James T. Fisher, Dr. America: The Lives of Thomas A. Dooley (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1997), 90. 41 the Viet Minh had “horribly maimed.” Dooley recounted his experience treating disease in the congested camps and also wrote in vivid detail about torture techniques that the

Communists used specifically against Catholics. The U.S. Navy doctor also weighed in on the Geneva Accords. In the beginning of his account, Dooley calls them “shameful.”

Later, he documents the Viet Minh’s violations of the armistice, citing for instance, the

Communist efforts to prevent residents from fleeing the village of Cua Lo. Dooley also criticized the ineffectiveness of the International Control Commission, which was charged with ensuring freedom of movement for North Vietnamese villagers.118 Later investigations proved that many of Dooley’s allegations of Communist terror either were greatly exaggerated or flatly false.119 In April 1956, however, they impressed upon the

American public the serious nature of the struggle in South Vietnam and the need for continued U.S. intervention.

The publication of Dooley’s account in Reader’s Digest appeared as the AFV was intensifying its effort to turn the press against the 1956 elections.120 Dooley’s depiction of North Vietnam undoubtedly heartened his fellow lobbyists, but the thorny issue of the Geneva Accords remained on the table. In March 1956, following a popular election where citizens chose from a field of pro-government candidates, a South

Vietnamese National Assembly met for the first time. In one of its opening acts, the new legislative body publicly denounced the 1954 Geneva Accords and rejected the all-

118 Thomas A. Dooley, “Deliver us From Evil,” Reader’s Digest, April 1956, 167. 119 David Patrick Johnson, “Selling ‘Operation Passage to Freedom’: Dr. Thomas Dooley and the Religious Overtones of Early American Involvement in Vietnam,” Unpublished Master’s Thesis, University of New Orleans, 2009, 32. 120 Morgan, The Vietnam Lobby, 37. 42

Vietnam elections provision.121 The National Assembly’s decision to stand with Diem against the elections convinced the Viet Minh to abandon its political strategy for unifying Vietnam.122 The American press again deemed Diem’s actions legitimate and raised no concerns about his actions sparking a larger conflict. In the 13 March 1956 issue of the Christian Science Monitor, an editorial about the National Assembly elections claimed that the South Vietnamese “would be on stronger logical and moral ground if they declared themselves willing to vote,” but acknowledged that since France negotiated the Geneva agreement, South Vietnam had no obligation to honor it.123 A

Time magazine article claimed that the March elections “indicated Diem’s basic popularity,” adding that “South Vietnam rightly argues that no free election could possibly be allowed in the more populous north.”124

Not all American commentators, however, blindly supported the narrative emanating from Saigon and Washington in the spring of 1956. Hans J. Morgenthau, a foreign policy expert and one-time Department of State official advanced a realist critique of U.S. policy during the Cold War. Morgenthau objected to its moralistic approach to foreign affairs, arguing against viewing the world through the lens of

American exceptionalism. Instead, he argued that the United States had to judge each situation independently with respect for the realities on the ground. With respect to

121 Robert Alden, “Saigon Casts Off ’54 Geneva Pact,” New York Times, March 9, 1956, 5. 122 Scigliano, 137. 123 “Vietnam Won’t Vote,” Christian Science Monitor, , 1956, 18. 124 “South Viet Nam: Victory for Diem,” Time, March 19, 1956, 40. 43

Vietnam, Morgenthau distanced himself from other experts in the 1950s when he claimed that Vietnamese Communism was fundamentally different than the European variety.125

In March and April 1956, Morgenthau’s criticism of U.S. policies in Vietnam appeared in the New Republic. On 12 March, he challenged two widely held assumptions about Vietnam. First, he called the Viet Minh victory a triumph for anti-colonialism, in which Communism played only a complementary role. Second, he claimed that most of the refugees left North Vietnam not of their own volition, but at the insistence of their priests.126 In April, Morgenthau argued that, by “doing too much” in Vietnam, the United

States would earn the label of colonizer, rather than liberator.127 In June of that year,

Morgenthau expressed his support for implementing the 1956 elections provision of the

Geneva Accords, claiming at an AFV gathering that he would “defend the legal validity of that agreement to the last drop of my blood.”128 Morgenthau notwithstanding, most of the voices in the American press supported U.S. policies in Vietnam during the spring and summer of 1956. When the election deadline came and went neither the American press nor the Western governments who signed the Geneva cease-fire raised protests.

In November 1955, representatives from Britain and the Soviet Union, co- chairs of the 1954 Geneva Conference, began meeting to discuss the elections issue. In an

April discussion, British Minister to Saigon Sir Hubert Graves noted that Diem’s

125 Jennifer See, “A Prophet Without Honor: Hans Morgenthau and the War in Vietnam, 1955- 1965,” Pacific Historical Review, 70, no. 3 (August 2001): 422. 126 Hans Morgenthau, “The Immaturity of Our Asian Policy-1: Ideological Windmills,” New Republic 134 (12 March 1956): 22. 127 Hans Morgenthau, “The Immaturity of Our Asian Policy-2: The Danger of Doing Too Much,” New Republic 134 (16 April 1956): 15. 128 Morgan, The Vietnam Lobby, 41. 44 resistance to elections had grown stronger as the AFV’s public opposition grew more vocal.129 The Soviet Union, which at the time valued “” with the

West more than the 1956 plebiscite, decided to placate Diem and his allies in the United

States.130 Washington thus had no reason to change its position opposing the elections. In a February 1956 paper that the Office of Intelligence Research prepared, the State

Department confidently declared the “absence of any real prospect that the nation-wide election. . . will be held.”131 By July 1956, the U.S. policy of stalling on the elections had proved successful. The Saigon regime had gained in strength and foreign pressure had completely subsided. When the 20 July deadline passed without a vote, U.S. officials voiced approval.132 Some American newspapers speculated about the consequences of

Vietnam’s partition, while other publications praised Diem for resisting French and

British pressure to uphold the elections provision.

The Geneva Accords received their particular composition largely due to the influence of the British. While the Americans refused to recognize the Viet Minh and the

French were primarily interested in withdrawing from the region with dignity, the British believed that all parties stood to benefit from the peace a diplomatic agreement would engender. Having endorsed the Geneva Accords, the British stood by the elections stipulation even as the United States attempted to undermine it. By 1956, broader Anglo-

American considerations forced London to concede that the elections would not take

129 Statler, Replacing France, 168. 130 George Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 67. 131 Intelligence Brief Prepared in the Office of Intelligence Research, February 7, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, 1, 637. 132 Anderson, Trapped by Success, 126. 45 place. Unwilling to admit openly the death of the agreement, the British continued to promote the accords publicly, suggesting that South Vietnam remained open to future consultations on the elections.133

London’s insistence that the armistice remained intact reassured the New York

Times. The Times cited the British Foreign Office when claiming that “North and South have agreed to continue respecting the armistice between them despite a breakdown of the political provision.”134 Unlike the Times, the Christian Science Monitor struck a pessimistic tone. “It is the case of Korea all over again,” the paper avowed, “but more dangerous.”135 Time magazine, on the other hand, cheerfully reported that the passing deadline did not result in rioting or Communist violence. Time called the elections provision a “moral low for the British and French,” and celebrated Diem’s consolidation of power as a victory for democracy.136

The resolution of the election issue allowed Diem to take steps toward improving the popularity of his regime, while also giving it greater legal standing. To accomplish this, Diem ratified a South Vietnamese Constitution in October 1956. The document provided for three branches of government-legislature, executive and judiciary.

However, it also granted the executive broad powers to suspend laws and resolve disputes

133 Arthur Combs, “The Path Not Taken: The British Alternative to U.S. Policy in Vietnam, 1954- 1956,” Diplomatic History 19, no. 1 (January 1995): 53. 134 “Vietnam Armistice Remains in Effect,” New York Times, July 15, 1956, 15. 135 Ronald Stead, “South Vietnam: Two Years of Geneva,” Christian Science Monitor, July 20, 1956, 4. 136 “Viet Nam: All Quiet on the 17th Parallel,” Time, July 30, 1955, 24. 46 between the separate branches. Additionally, the Constitution allowed the executive to revoke individuals’ civil liberties in the name of national defense.137

The mainstream press greeted the Constitution as a progressive, if imperfect, document. The Washington Post provided the most critical analysis of it, noting that the executive branch enjoyed the right to suspend nearly every liberal provision contained in the document. However, the article also explained that the Constitution guaranteed freedom of expression “along with life, liberty, security and the integrity of the human person.”138 In a more positive article, Egon Kaskeline of the Christian Science Monitor wrote that the Constitution contained provisions “vital to a functioning democracy.” He alleged that Diem planned on “ending his present one-man regime as soon as possible.”139 “A new democracy has joined the international family,”140 the New York

Times declared in a celebratory editorial. It even defended the authoritarian nature of the

Diem regime, citing the continuous threat of Communist subversion in South Vietnam.

The academic journals followed suit. While some observers criticized Diem, others argued that his ends justified his means.

Like the American press, academic journals in the United States promoted a vigorous effort to stem the expansion of international Communism in the 1950s.

American intellectuals believed in the strategy that the U.S. government articulated, sharing official concerns about the consequences of a Communist victory in

137 Ellen Hammer, “Progress Report on Southern Vietnam,” Pacific Affairs 30, no. 3 (September 1957): 226. 138 “Constitution Proclaimed by Diem in So. Vietnam,” Washington Post, October 27, 1956. 139 Egon Kaskeline, “South Vietnam Set to Proclaim New Constitution,” Christian Science Monitor, October 18, 1956, 11. 140 “Vietnam Constitution,” New York Times, October 26, 1956. 47

South Vietnam. For example, Foreign Affairs, the main publication of the Council on

Foreign Relations, provided a prominent platform for concerned Cold Warriors.141

Typically, in an October 1956 edition of Foreign Affairs, French intellectual and former politician Jacques Soustelle argued that Diem’s rise to power had hampered

Franco-American efforts to curb Communism in East Asia. He criticized the French government’s attitude toward the Geneva Accords, suggesting that Pierre Mendes-France had delegitimized the settlement because he had allowed Diem to assume power. Diem’s

“dictatorship,” according to Soustelle, had carried out “hostile acts” against France in addition to irreparably damaging relations between the Western powers in Vietnam.142 In a January 1957 edition of Foreign Affairs, William Henderson took a more sanguine view of Franco-Vietnamese relations, but nevertheless acknowledged that Diem “ruled virtually as a dictator.” Henderson, an AFV officer, argued that Diem needed the extensive powers the new Vietnamese Constitution allotted to him due to the “present- day political and economic realities in South Vietnam.”143 Henderson’s rationale would become increasingly common as criticism mounted against Diem from 1957-1960.

By early 1957, Diem had created successfully a one-man government heavily dependent on intimidation and coercion to maintain power and lacking in widespread support.144 Diem’s heavy-handed tactics, often aimed at his non-Communist rivals, raised

141 Robert Tomes, Apocalypse Then: American Intellectuals and the Vietnam War, 1954-1975 (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 43. 142 Jacques Soustelle, “France Looks at Her Alliances,” Foreign Affairs 35, no. 1 (October 1956): 118. 143 William Henderson, “South Vietnam Finds Itself,” Foreign Affairs 35, no. 2 (January 1957): 292. 144 Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam (New York: Random House, 2012), 680. 48 increasing concerns about the authoritarian nature of his regime. From 1957 to 1960, members of the AFV and the Michigan State University Group nevertheless defended

Diem, arguing that harsh measures remained necessary to defeat Communism in South

Vietnam. Other observers, however, warned that Diem’s repression emboldened the

Communists and deprived his regime of the popularity necessary to achieve victory.

American press coverage of events in South Vietnam remained almost exclusively dependent on sources who endorsed the theory of containment in foreign affairs during the years immediately after the Geneva Conference. Thus, while journalists often raised serious concerns about Diem, their articles never questioned the wisdom of

American support for his regime.145 Moreover, the American press rarely blamed Diem for persistent and mounting instability in South Vietnam, preferring to shift the blame to

Hanoi. By suggesting that Diem shouldered little responsibility for deteriorating economic and political conditions in South Vietnam, the American press failed to press

Washington to seek alternatives. While news reports on the 1954 Geneva Accords encouraged the United States and Diem to bypass international law, press coverage of

Vietnam from 1957 to 1960 allowed the United States to keep an unpopular dictator in power, ultimately paving the way for direct U.S. intervention.

145 James Aronson, The Press and the Cold War (New York: Monthly Review Press), 190.

CHAPTER IV

PURVEYORS OF PESSIMISM,

1957-1960

Ngo Dinh Diem’s assertion of power earned him the adoration of many

American journalists who considered his leadership as necessary for maintaining a free

South Vietnam. In the early months of 1957, the American press showered Diem with praise and gloated about his accomplishments after Geneva. As time passed, however, questions arose about Diem’s governing style, which borrowed heavily from the practices of the Communist government he swore to oppose. Most writers in the American press and academic journals rationalized his , stressing patience, while reminding readers that South Vietnam did not have a history of democracy. Although

Diem’s harsh policies largely evaded media criticism, they created massive popular resentment in South Vietnam. As villages increasingly embraced Communist insurgents, the U.S. government and press investigated its aid program and found it unable to win popular support.

By 1960, the optimism that pervaded press coverage about Vietnam in the prior decade had vanished as internal pressure mounted against Diem. Instead of heeding foreign calls to reform, Diem redoubled his oppressive tactics, losing much of the support of the American press. Diem’s relationship with journalists worsened as more correspondents arrived to cover the intensifying war in South Vietnam in the early 1960s.

49 50

While American newsmen eventually lost faith in Diem, they failed to question the efficacy of American involvement. The Cold War consensus, which initially had created the justification for Diem’s brutal policies, later provided the rationale for direct

American military intervention after his ouster late in 1963.

In 1957, many onlookers credited Diem with finally bringing stability to

South Vietnam. Beneath the façade of security, however, the nation remained embroiled in political disputes that often erupted into violence. In February 1957, an assassin’s bullet narrowly missed Diem during his ceremonial visit to a village north of Saigon.146

Three months later, Diem left Vietnam for a heavily publicized visit to the United States.

During his stay, the American press heaped compliments on South Vietnam’s president, while ignoring the growing instability in Vietnam. Publications such as the Boston Globe,

Washington Evening Star, and the Saturday Evening Post celebrated Diem’s resiliency and depicted him as a valiant cold warrior and “miracle man” of Asia.147 The New York

Times declared that Diem “injected hope where formerly there was despair” in

Vietnam.148 Chalmers Roberts of the Washington Post, who would later emerge as a vocal antiwar journalist, described Diem as the “Symbol of Vietnamese democracy.”149

Ensuring the glowing reception the American press gave Diem were the diligent efforts of the American Friends of Vietnam (AFV) which urged publishers to provide positive editorial comment about his visit. Thankful for the tone of his press coverage, Diem

146 Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution: The U.S. in Vietnam, 1946-1966 (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 141. 147 Frederik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam (New York: Random House, 2012), 676. 148 “Visitor from Saigon,” New York Times, May 12, 1957, E2. 149 Chalmers Roberts, “Diem-Symbol of Free New Asia,” Washington Post, 8 May 1957, A1. 51 personally thanked media mogul Henry Luce among others during a banquet at New

York’s Ambassador Hotel prior to departing back to Vietnam.150 While Diem’s popularity soared in the United States, it remained low in South Vietnam, where a growing insurgency thrived off popular suffering and the people’s animosity toward the central government for creating it. To maintain power and create the anti-Communist state the American press and the U.S. government so desired, Diem relied upon dictatorial techniques that alienated the population and drove them towards supporting the Communist insurgency. Because he lacked a broad political following, Diem orchestrated propaganda campaigns that resembled those the Communists used to glorify

Ho Chi Minh.151 As part of the propaganda drive, Diem arrested suspected Communists and forced them to renounce their ties to the Communist Party in front of large audiences.

All told from 1955 to 1958, Diem jailed 40,000 political prisoners and had 12,000 individuals killed for their alleged subversive activity.152

While the mainstream American press remained largely silent about the suppression campaign, other media sources raised the alarm about Diem’s repressive methods. For example, even Henry Luce’s Life magazine reported how Diem relied on a

“machinery of security” including concentration camps and re-education centers to root out political opposition. But Life also praised the “Miracle Man” Diem for saving his

150 Seth Jacobs, America’s Miracle Man: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 260. 151 Robert Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation under Stress (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), 91. 152 , Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience (New York: Pantheon, 1985), 89. 52 people from the consequences of a Communist victory in the July 1956 elections.153

Writers who published articles in American academic journals showed a greater willingness to question Diem’s commitment to democracy. However, they generally argued that his policies were only temporary measures to counter the Communist threat.

Although Diem spoke generally about his commitment to democracy, he did not believe in representative government based on the Western model. In fact, Diem subscribed to the political philosophy of Minh Mang, an early 19th Century Vietnamese emperor who claimed to rule by divine right and made decisions after consulting a small group of elite advisors.154 For advice, Diem relied almost exclusively on his brother Ngo

Dinh Nhu, who served as his political counselor and ran the Can Lao, the most influential political party in South Vietnam.155

Nhu’s influence became the source of increasing concern in American academic journals. In March 1957, political scientist Roy Jumper in Pacific Affairs claimed that the breakdown of French rule in Vietnam had given rise to a new class of

Mandarin rulers whose selection derived from personal loyalty and family ties to Diem.

According to Jumper, under Diem, “nepotism . . . has now become rampant at all levels of the public service.”156 In a September edition of Pacific Affairs, Ellen Hammer conceded that under Diem, South Vietnam had come under “over-centralized and

153 John Osborne, “The Tough Miracle Man of Vietnam,” Life, May 13, 1957, 164. 154 Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam (New York: Vintage, 1972), 109. 155 P.J. Honey, “Progress in the Republic of Vietnam,” The World Today 15, no. 2 (February 1959): 70. 156 Roy Jumper, “Mandarin Bureaucracy and Politics in South Viet Nam,” Pacific Affairs 30, no. 1 (March 1957): 51. 53 authoritarian rule.” While Hammer expressed reservations about Diem’s family oligarchy, she maintained that over time a liberal regime would develop “as the leadership of the Republic of Viet Nam acquires greater self-confidence.”157 Although his tactics resembled those the Communists used, Diem’s nationalism was unquestioned.

This made foreigners, especially the Chinese, living in South Vietnam targets of government repression.

Chinese in South Vietnam, who comprised nearly one-tenth of the population, were traditionally passive and concerned mainly with running businesses and trading goods. In August 1956, Diem demanded that Chinese residents Vietnamize their names and surrender their property to the state. His actions frustrated the normally apolitical

Chinese and led them to freeze rice exports and stop lending to farmers, sabotaging the

Vietnamese economy.158 Writers in American academic journals, concerned chiefly about the looming threat of Communist China, criticized Diem’s measures. In the December

1957 issue of Far Eastern Survey, Roy Jumper noted that the Chinese responded to

Diem’s policies with protests and refusals to accept Vietnamese citizenship. “Politically,”

Jumper concluded, “the measures may well make the Chinese community more vulnerable to Communist penetration.”159 In a rare scathing critique of the Diem regime appearing in American Opinion in February 1958, World War II veteran and historian

Hilaire du Berrier argued that Diem’s restrictions on the Chinese had produced

157 Ellen J. Hammer, “Progress Report on Southern Viet Nam,” Pacific Affairs 30, no. 3 (September 1957): 227. 158 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 89. 159 Roy Jumper, “Problems of Public Administration in South Viet Nam,” Far Eastern Survey 26, no. 12 (December 1957): 190. 54 widespread unemployment, trade deficits, and bankruptcy. Du Berrier believed that the measures inflamed tensions between the West and the People’s Republic of China

(PRC).160 Historian and Southeast Asian expert Bernard Fall agreed. In Fall’s view,

Diem’s Chinese crackdown had fractured relations between Saigon and China’s

Nationalist government in Taiwan. Forced assimilation, according to Fall, disrespected the Chinese community and brought ethnic tensions to a “boiling point.”161

The Chinese population was not the only group to suffer under Diem’s repression. Diem and his ruling clique proved equally intolerant of opposition journalists.

Although Diem abolished formal censorship of the press in 1956, he only tolerated articles that reflected well on his government. His Presidential Decree no. 13 allowed the government to fine or jail publishers suspected of supporting communism. Acting on this edict, in March 1958, he shut down the opposition newspaper Thoi Luan for printing a critique of the South Vietnamese constitution.162

While writers scrutinized Diem’s hostile treatment of the press in the academic journals, they also argued that a truly free press was a luxury South Vietnam could not afford. In the American Political Science Review, J.A.C. Grant suggested that press censorship and government intimidation prevented the rise of opposition parties in

South Vietnam. However, he then proceeded to defend Diem, claiming that “democracy in South East Asia cannot be expected in a period of three years.”163 Francis J. Corley

160 Hilaire du Berrier, “About South Vietnam,” American Opinion 1 (February 1958): 11. 161 Bernard Fall, “Viet-Nam’s Chinese Problem,” Far Eastern Survey 27, no. 5 (May 1958): 67. 162Scigliano, South Vietnam, 83. 163 J.A.C. Grant, “The Viet Nam Constitution of 1956,” The American Political Science Review 42, no. 2 (June 1958): 462. 55 justified Diem’s actions on similar grounds in Thought magazine. Corley acknowledged that the South Vietnamese government controlled the press and stifled opposing viewpoints. But he also warned that it would be a “grave risk to jeopardize what stability has been secured thus far for the sake of a democratization that for the present seems unattainable.”164 Diem’s authoritarian rule, whether temporary or not, agitated both

Vietnamese intellectuals and villagers and provided new recruits for the Vietnamese

Communists.

Diem’s popularity in the countryside, which had never been widespread, took a severe blow when he decided to abolish village elections. According to , an Asian expert in the U.S. State Department, the decision to replace popularly elected provincial chiefs with hand-picked government officials “did more than anything else to convince the Vietnamese that Diem was ‘antidemocratic’.”165 Government bureaucrats proved incapable of responding to the needs of villagers and they often resorted to arbitrary arrests to impose order.

Despite growing unrest in the villages, Hanoi remained committed to using peaceful means to achieve reunification largely because party leaders feared American intervention. In defiance of their superiors, local cadre often attacked government outposts and assassinated provincial chiefs on their own. In 1957, Communists and their supporters killed 452 village chiefs, sparking great concerns in Washington about Diem’s

164 Francis J. Corley, “Viet-Nam Since Geneva,” Thought 33, no. 4 (Winter 1958-1959): 561. 165 Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 418. 56 popularity.166 In 1958, Le Duan, a veteran of the First Indochina War and dedicated Viet

Minh officer, secretly inspected South Vietnam. He found that Diem’s campaign against communism had decimated party ranks in the villages. After consulting with southern cadre, he decided that armed struggle was necessary to offset Diem’s Communist purge.167 In January 1959, at the Fifteenth Plenum of the Central Committee, Hanoi authorized its southern operatives to use violent methods in combination with political subversion to overthrow the Saigon regime.168 The growing upheaval in the South

Vietnamese countryside and the renewed Communist offensive raised questions about the effectiveness of U.S. aid in the American press.

As early as February 1958, George V.H. Moseley, in the New Leader called for “reassessment of the American aid program in the three Indo-Chinese states.”

Moseley, who visited Indochina on a two-year tour of duty with the U.S. Army, focused particular attention to Vietnam, where American aid, he argued, supported a government that “adopted virtual totalitarian tactics in the name of fighting Communism.” Moseley claimed that South Vietnam’s ruling classes used U.S. assistance to repress the people, driving some into the communist camp.169 At that time in Washington, Congress was debating the merits of the American aid program. During Congressional hearings,

Senator Mike Mansfield, previously a vocal defender of Diem, argued that the United

States should consider curtailing military and economic assistance to the Republic of

Vietnam.

166 Logevall, Embers of War, 684. 167 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 103. 168 Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990 (New York: Harper-Collins, 1991), 66. 169 George V.H. Moseley, “U.S. Aid to Indo-China,” The New Leader, February 24, 1958, 14. 57

Congressional deliberations on the subject of aid to South Vietnam led Albert

M. Colegrove of the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain to investigate the aid program himself.170 His findings reflected poorly on both the U.S. and South Vietnam governments, revealing exorbitant waste, inefficiency, and corruption within the aid program. Although the U.S. embassy quickly rebutted these charges, Colegrove’s claims represented the greatest threat to the official Vietnam narrative the U.S. government promoted in the 1950s.171 Press scrutiny remained a bothersome issue for the American mission as Diem tightened controls on both his Communist and non-communist foes in

1959.

In response to the renewed Communist offensive of 1959, Diem secured legislation to subdue his political opponents. The 10/59 law that the National Assembly passed in May 1959, allowed the government to arrest and put to death suspected

Communists without appeal. Not only did the law contravene the right of habeas corpus, its use also violated the Geneva Accords, which outlawed retribution against individuals whose only offense was fighting against the French in the First Indochina War.172 In addition to subjecting his enemies to arbitrary arrests, Diem prevented his opponents from participating in the democratic process. To ensure government control of the

National Assembly during August 1959 elections, Diem and his inner circle distributed propaganda through the controlled press, manipulated ballots, and relentlessly smeared

170 David L. Anderson, Trapped By Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953- 61 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 180. 171 Clarence Wyatt, Paper Tigers: The American Press and the Vietnam War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 65. 172 Young, The Vietnam Wars, 62. 58 opponents. Only two opposition candidates won, who then quickly surrendered their seats in response to fabricated charges of campaign fraud.173 American Ambassador to

Vietnam worried that damning revelations about Diem’s draconian policies would reduce the president’s international standing. In anticipation of the elections, Ambassador Durbrow cabled the State Department his concerns that stories about Diem’s undemocratic practices would “feed Hanoi propaganda” if written by western correspondents.174

The Ambassador had no need to worry. The press largely ignored the August elections and Diem’s most vocal proponents rationalized his blatant civil rights abuses.

Preoccupied by the Congressional investigation into Albert Colegrove’s allegations and the ongoing civil war raging in , neither the Washington Post nor Newsweek offered any assessment of the 1959 elections. Time printed a brief summary, noting that the elections benefitted primarily pro-government candidates.175 In less mainstream publications, Diem’s supporters came to his defense. Wesley Fishel, in the New Leader, depicted Diem as a conscientious reformer, driven by Confucian idealism and concern for the common good.176 In another contribution to the New Leader, Fishel suggested that the controversial 10/59 law that Diem persuaded the legislature to pass was necessary to provide villagers with “confidence in the Government’s ability and determination to

173 Scigliano, South Vietnam, 95. 174 Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow to State Department, 28 August 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS, with appropriate year), 1958-1960, Vietnam (Washington, DC, 1986), 1: 228. 175 “South Viet Nam: The Mixture as Before,” Time, September 14, 1959, 31. 176 Wesley R. Fishel, “Vietnam’s Democratic One-Man Rule,” The New Leader, 2 November 1959, 13. 59 protect them.”177 In a December 1959 issue of the Reporter, Wolf Ladejinsky questioned whether South Vietnam could “be expected to fashion truly democratic arrangements overnight?” A land reform expert under contract with the U.S. government, he claimed that in Vietnam “free competition for power must develop gradually . . . in the midst of a life-and-death struggle against the Communist conspiracy.”178 Ladejinsky’s and Fishel’s efforts to distract attention from the unsavory aspects of Diem’s policies would become increasingly difficult as concern grew in Vietnam and the United States, elevating pressure on Diem and his principal American advisors.

Both Wesley Fishel and Wolf Ladejinsky worked as part of the Michigan

State University Group (MSUG), a technical assistance project started in May 1955 to help the Diem regime create a modern constitution, police force, and system of administration. The MSUG employed fifty-four professors who specialized primarily in police administration and political science.179 Among other accomplishments, they turned

South Vietnam’s Civil Guard into a security force capable of policing the countryside and helped create the Vietnamese Bureau of Investigation. In addition to their field work,

MSUG members became trusted sources of information about Vietnam for both the academic journals and the mainstream press.180 Although partially successful in bringing

Western administrative techniques to Vietnam, bureaucratic disputes with other U.S. agencies and language and cultural barriers hampered the MSUG’s efforts. In 1959, the

177 Wesley R. Fishel, “Vietnam’s ,” The New Leader, December 7, 1959, 20. 178 Wolf Ladejinsky, “Vietnam: The First Five Years,” The Reporter, December 24, 1959, 21. 179 Robert Scheer, How the United States Got Involved in Vietnam (Santa Monica CA: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1965), 34. 180 Ibid., 38. 60

MSUG came under critical examination in the mainstream media when Jack Steele, a writer for the Scripps-Howard chain, alleged corruption in MSUG’s communications program.181 The so-called Rundlett affair discredited the MSUG and caused many within the organization to reassess the program. In the early 1960s, controversy continued to haunt the MSUG and support for Diem became a subject of debate within the group.182

Even Diem’s most ardent supporters, including Fishel and Ladejinsky, urged the president to consider reforms as South Vietnam’s villages fell increasingly under

Communist control.

In the waning months of 1959, Communist Party cadre and their sympathizers assumed greater control of South Vietnam’s villages, as rising discontent pushed peasants into Communist ranks. South Vietnam’s rural population particularly resented the government’s agroville program, which forced villagers to abandon their ancestral homes and live in heavily fortified communities with strangers. Sensing a prime opportunity,

Communist organizers promised villagers free land in return for their cooperation.183 In

Ben Tre province, where peasant dissatisfaction with local landlords was high,

Communist cadre armed civilians and launched an uprising in January 1960. During the

Ben Tre uprising, cadre redistributed property to landless tenants, attacked government posts, and executed government supporters. In its effort to suppress the rebellion, the

Saigon government often relied on extreme brutality, increasing tensions between

181 John Ernst, Forging a Fateful Alliance: Michigan State University and the Vietnam War (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1998), 75. 182 Ibid., 115. 183 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 103. 61 villagers and officials in the process.184 The deteriorating situation in South Vietnam’s countryside alarmed Diem’s American confidants, especially Wolf Ladejinsky. In a

March letter to Wesley Fishel, Ladejinsky suggested that the uprisings resulted at least partially from the president’s oppressive policies.185 Diem’s political opponents already had drawn the same conclusion. On April 26, they gathered at the Caravelle Hotel in

Saigon and demanded that the president liberalize his regime.

The protesters who signed the so-called Caravelle Manifesto in April 1960 included former cabinet ministers and members of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects.

Calling themselves the Bloc for Liberty and Progress, the group demanded greater political freedoms for opposition groups and constitutional guarantees of civil liberties.

They also called for Diem to make military appointments based on merit rather than loyalty, echoing complaints from South Vietnamese officers who thought that the Can

Lao had gained too much influence over the army.186

Wesley Fishel, greatly concerned about Diem’s faltering image, promptly wrote the president just days after the manifesto’s appearance. He decried the

“Communist propaganda stressing the authoritarian character of your government,” while claiming that Diem’s critics misunderstood the leader’s political philosophies. To deflect criticism from the press, Fishel merely recommended that Diem have his public relations

184 William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1996), 205. 185 Ernst, Forging a Fateful Alliance, 116. 186 Edward Garvey Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam (Cambridge: Press, 2013), 206. 62 counsel pre-approve his public statements.187 To defame the Caravelle protesters, Fishel also told Diem to provide the foreign press with incriminating evidence about the group’s ties to former Emperor Bao Dai and the French.188 Fishel’s fears about Diem’s media coverage proved overblown. While the American press carried news of the protest, journalists offered only mild criticism of the regime in Saigon, while also maintaining that Diem remained better than any alternative.

New York Times correspondent Tillman Durdin acknowledged the “growing dissatisfaction among non-communists with the Diem regime.” However, he also defended the president’s methods: “Tough political and security controls . . . are necessary if the country is to survive.”189 Newsweek listed the Caravelle group’s demands, but insisted that Diem’s oppression grew primarily in response to “stepped up .

. . terrorist activities in the South Vietnamese countryside.”190 While Time characterized

Diem’s reaction to the protests as “stubborn,” the newsmagazine also suggested that the president’s removal would only invite a communist take-over.191 Only Robert P. Martin of the U.S. News and World Report challenged the standard narrative. “The manifesto issued in Saigon,” he argued, “is the first open warning that a strong man apparently must be more than anti-Communist to win full support against the Reds.”192

187 Professor Wesley R. Fishel to President Diem, 30 April 1960, FRUS, 1958-1960, 1, 431. 188 Joseph Morgan, The Vietnam Lobby: The American Friends of Vietnam, 1955-1975 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 67. 189 Tillman Durdin, “In Asia: The Response is Generally Favorable Despite Concern in Authoritarian Regimes,” The New York Times, May 1, 1960, E3. 190 “Vietnam-Free to Fight,” Newsweek, May 9, 1960, p. 44. 191 “South Viet Nam: Problem of One Man,” Time, July 11, 1960, 40. 192 Robert P. Martin, “Where Danger Threatens Another U.S.-Backed Country,” U.S. News & World Report, May 16, 1960, 120. 63

Meanwhile, the academic press continued to take pains to justify Diem’s authoritarianism. Robert Scigliano, an MSUG member, admitted that Diem’s policies prevented the rise of true opposition in South Vietnam. He stressed patience, however, adding that “it should not be expected that representative institutions and practices will develop in Vietnam as they have in the United States.”193 Like members of the American press, U.S. officials were aware of Diem’s faults, but unwilling to consider alternatives more deserving of support.

Following the highly publicized release of the Caravelle Manifesto, the

Eisenhower administration called for an interdepartmental assessment of the situation in

South Vietnam. On the subject of Diem, officials found themselves split. Ambassador

Durbrow, for instance, called for reforms on the part of the central government, while

Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, the Military Assistance Advisory Group Chief, gave whole-hearted support for Diem and his policies. Ultimately, the State Department heeded Durbrow’s advice and pressed Diem to send his brother Nhu abroad and remove constraints on the press and opposition parties.194 Diem refused to initiate the reforms, however, and even his most ardent defenders voiced doubts regarding his staying power.

In September 1960, Lloyd Musolf, Chief Adviser of the MSUG, regretfully informed

Michigan State University President John Hannah about Diem’s refusal to liberalize his regime. According to Musolf, Communist successes resulted mainly from Diem’s unwillingness to delegate authority in the army and government. While Musolf claimed

193 Robert G. Scigliano, “The Electoral Process in South Vietnam: Politics in an Underdeveloped State,” Midwest Journal of Political Science 4, no. 2 (May 1960): 161. 194 Michael R. Adamson, “Ambassadorial Roles and Foreign Policy: Elbridge Durbrow, , and the U.S. Commitment to Diem’s Vietnam, 1957-61,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 32, no. 2 (June 2002): 237. 64 that South Vietnam lacked “a real leader who could replace Diem,” he also acknowledged the ever-present possibility of a coup d’etat.195 In October, after Diem flatly refused to abolish the Can Lao, Ambassador Durbrow accepted a coup attempt as inevitable.196

Musolf’s and Durbrow’s suspicions were correct. On 11 November 1960,

South Vietnamese under the leadership of Colonel Nguyen Chanh Thi surrounded Diem’s presidential palace demanding his resignation. Besieged and unsure if he had U.S. support, Diem initially negotiated with the paratroopers and agreed to dissolve his government. When loyalist troops arrived at the palace, however, Diem reneged on his concessions and ordered the military to attack suspected coup sympathizers.197 In many cases, the American press proved sympathetic to the rebels.

One day after the coup attempt, the Washington Post proclaimed that “the realities in the southern half of bisected Viet-Nam had begun to cry for a type of leadership that Ngo

[sic] seemed unable to offer.”198 A 13 November New York Times editorial hailed Diem’s victory, while also expressing concern about his “repressive rule, nepotism and corruption.” The editorial called for Diem to meet his people’s “justifiable grievances” with necessary reforms.199 Similarly, Newsweek urged Diem to negotiate with his political opponents to avoid splitting South Vietnam’s anti-Communist forces.200 Time

195 Chief Adviser of the Michigan State University Group Lloyd Musolf to President of Michigan State University John Hannah, 23 September 1960, FRUS, 1958-1960, 1, 587. 196 Michael R. Adamson, “Ambassadorial Roles and Foreign Policy,” 237. 197 A.J. Langguth, Our Vietnam: The War 1954-1975 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 110. 198 Don Frifield, “Saigon Coup Seemed Inevitable,” Washington Post, November 12, 1960, A6. 199 “Failure of a Coup,” New York Times, November 13, 1960, E10. 200 “Stand at Saigon,” Newsweek, November 21, 1960, 49. 65 claimed that the revolt turned Diem “more dictatorial than ever” predicting that “another revolt was only a matter of time.”201 Time’s analysis was prophetic.

After the coup attempt, Diem became less tolerant of criticism and more inclined to suppress his opposition. His unwillingness to institute reforms even as South

Vietnam’s security steadily deteriorated led many of his proponents in the American press to change their tune. Members of the MSUG, for example, no longer rationalized

Diem’s authoritarianism. MSUG economists Milton Taylor and Frank Child blamed

Diem’s police state tactics for the rising tumult in South Vietnam and welcomed a successful coup against the embattled president. Their articles, which appeared in the

New Republic in 1961, led Diem to terminate his government’s contract with the

MSUG.202 The American Friends of Vietnam (AFV) initially rallied behind Diem after the coup, with Leo Cherne and Wesley Fishel penning positive articles about the president. Privately, however, the AFV pressed Diem to institute reforms, who in defiance soon cut ties with AFV public relations consultant Harold Oram.203 Diem’s fracture with the MSUG and AFV combined with his own repressive policies accounted for the appearance of more negative articles about his regime.204 These commentaries became more prevalent and Diem’s relationship with foreign correspondents grew more contentious as American involvement in Vietnam escalated.

In November 1961, under the leadership of President John F. Kennedy, the

U.S, government agreed to provide Diem with helicopters, light aircraft, and more

201 “Southeast Asia: Double Trouble,” Time, November 28, 1960, 26. 202 Ernst, Forging a Fateful Alliance, 121. 203 Morgan, The Vietnam Lobby, 80. 204 James Aronson, The Press and the Cold War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), 189. 66

American advisers to assist the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).205 With

Vietnam quickly evolving into a war story, the New York Times, United Press

International, and the Associated Press established press bureaus in the increasingly war- torn nation in January 1962.206 Foreign correspondents quickly grew frustrated with the indeterminate nature of the war, and placed the blame squarely on Diem. Diem responded to the criticism with predictable heavy-handedness. In August 1962, he expelled Francois

Sully from Vietnam after the Newsweek correspondent claimed that the war could not be won with Diem at the helm.207 In early 1963 Diem’s government-controlled press attacked journalist Neal Sheehan after he criticized ARVN’s performance during the battle of Ap Bac.208 Considering themselves targeted, the newsmen took advantage of a precious opportunity to bring Diem’s failed policies before an international audience in the summer of 1963.209 Western photojournalists, who had received tips beforehand from

Diem’s opponents, captured Thich Quang Duc as the monk set himself ablaze in protest against Diem’s repression of the Buddhist community. The event set off a Buddhist protest movement that ultimately would bring down the Diem regime.

While tensions between Buddhists and Catholics had plagued Saigon for years, the 1963 Buddhist revolt benefited from the presence of Western newsmen.

205 Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time For War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 112. 206 Wyatt, Paper Tigers, p. 81. 207 Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Iraq (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press), 414. 208 David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam During the Kennedy Era (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 92. 209 Malcolm Browne, “Viet Nam Reporting: Three Years of Crisis,” Columbia Journalism Review 3, no. 3 (Fall 1964): 6. 67

Browne’s photo, in particular, forced officials in Washington to confront Diem’s religious intolerance.210 According to then Ambassador Frederick Nolting, “the American media played a major role in undermining U.S. confidence in the Diem government” during the .211 John Mecklin, a former journalist and then head of the U.S.

Information Agency in Vietnam, supported this notion, claiming that “American news coverage of the upheaval contributed directly to destruction of a national U.S. policy of direct importance to the security of the United States.”212 When U.S. Ambassador Henry

Cabot Lodge endorsed the coup that unseated Diem in November 1963, many journalists approved of the action, as well as remaining supportive of U.S. intervention generally.

Like their predecessors, correspondents who increasingly had been critical of Diem, such as David Halberstam, Charles Mohr, and Neil Sheehan, were fervent believers in the

American crusade against communism in Vietnam and would remain so until the late

1960s.213 Prior historians have failed to emphasize how the American press, by remaining faithful to the Cold War consensus in its Vietnam coverage for over a decade, occupied the role of willing accomplice when the U.S. government chose to approve direct military intervention in Vietnam.

For those expecting Diem’s successors to bring peace and stability to South

Vietnam, the November 1963 coup proved a false dawn. Under the military dictatorships

210 Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 221. 211 Frederick Nolting, From Trust to Tragedy: The Political Memoirs of Frederick Nolting, Kennedy’s Ambassador to Diem’s Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1988), 86. 212 John Mecklin, Mission in Torment: An Intimate Account of the U.S. Role in Vietnam (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 162. 213 Knightley, The First Casualty, 417. 68 of Generals Duong Van Minh and Nguyen Khanh, the Viet Cong made great gains in the

Vietnamese countryside, while in Saigon the religious tension between Buddhists and

Catholics continued unabated.214 With South Vietnam careening toward collapse,

Washington sought a reason to justify direct retaliatory action against North Vietnam, and found it in the summer of 1964. After two U.S. destroyers, the Maddox and C.

Turner Joy, reportedly came under fire from North Vietnamese torpedo boats in the Gulf of , the Johnson administration authorized American air strikes against North

Vietnam.215 The first U.S. Marines would land in March 1965.

After the Tonkin Gulf Incident, the press relied almost exclusively on press releases from the president’s office and Defense Department for its reporting, and avoided printing contradictory information. New York Times columnist Tom Wicker later admitted that his own concerns about Communist expansion in Southeast Asia led him to uncritically accept President Lyndon B. Johnson’s response to the Tonkin Gulf attacks as legitimate.216 As the preceding pages have shown, the press supported an active U.S. role in Vietnam from the start. From 1954 to 1960 journalists approved policies that ultimately made American military intervention inevitable because they viewed South

Vietnam as a critical front in the fight of the “Free World” to defeat communism.

Through the French withdrawal, the non-observance of the 1956 elections and the rise and fall of the Diem regime, American journalists presented the Vietnam story through

214 William J. Duiker, Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995), 165. 215 George Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 143. 216 Daniel Hallin, The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 41. 69 the lens of the Cold War consensus, setting a precedent the news media would follow in subsequent years.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Conventional wisdom attributes U.S. defeat in the Vietnam War partially to criticism in print and televised reporting that undermined public support. A profound irony of the conflict is that from 1954 to 1960, the American press acted as a promoter of

U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The great majority of American journalists believed in the

Cold War consensus, which held that Communist movements in Southeast Asia took orders from both the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union. Believing that the loss of Southeast Asia to communism threatened the fate of the “Free World,” American journalists supported efforts to prevent the Viet Minh from gaining control over all of

Vietnam. Initially the press approved measures, such as the creation of the Southeast Asia

Treaty Organization (SEATO), that designated Vietnam as a vital security interest of the

United States. When SEATO proved an ineffective deterrent to Communist expansion, the American press charged France with hindering the rise of a strong anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam.

Although the American press raised serious concerns about Premier Ngo Dinh

Diem’s regime in South Vietnam at first, many journalists praised his nationalism and criticized the French for obstructing his government and appeasing Hanoi. Diem’s victory against the political-religious sects in May 1955 helped him to consolidate power.

Significantly, the American press applauded his subsequent election as president, largely

70 71 ignoring the patently undemocratic nature of his “victory” against former French puppet

Emperor Bao Dai in the October 1955 referendum. In his opposition to the unification elections that France and North Vietnam had agreed upon at the 1954 Geneva

Conference, Diem also found support from the American press. Due to the fact that the

Republic of Vietnam did not formally sign the Geneva Accords, Diem denied that he had to honor the nationwide elections provision in the document. The U.S. government, which was providing direct aid to Diem in 1956, endorsed his position, against the protests of the French who thought that elections would prevent a resumption of hostilities in Vietnam.

The American press feared a Communist victory at the ballot box. Most media and academic commentators, with the exception of Professor Hans Morgenthau, agreed that the vote should not take place. American journalists and their editors, some of whom belonged to the American Friends of Vietnam and thus had a vested interest in the survival of the Diem regime, claimed that North Vietnam’s repeated violations of its conditions had nullified the Geneva Accords. Others emphasized the exaggerated accounts of Communist atrocities to suggest that a North Vietnamese victory was simply unacceptable. With U.S. approval, the elections ultimately did not take place and, in

1957, Diem emerged as the undisputed leader of a South Vietnam. As president, Diem lacked popularity and owed his position largely to U.S. aid. Despite this fact, the

American press hailed him as a “miracle man” who had saved Vietnam from Communist domination. When Diem created a family dictatorship and refused to initiate liberal reforms, the press found ways to rationalize his authoritarian behavior. All this contributed to deepening the U.S. commitment to preserve the survival of South Vietnam.

71

72

Although South Vietnam’s urban areas had achieved remarkable security by

1957, the countryside remained vulnerable to Communist political domination. To strengthen the Saigon government’s support in the villages, Diem initiated a “denounce the Communists” campaign that relied on arbitrary arrests and the use of concentration camps. Diem also abolished village elections and forced villagers to relocate their families in heavily guarded agrovilles. In many cases, Diem’s draconian policies turned otherwise passive peasants into Communist recruits. Nevertheless, the mainstream and academic press, with notable exceptions such as journalist Bernard Fall, overlooked

Diem’s faults and argued that his measures were necessary to contain the Communist threat.

For political guidance, Diem relied principally on his close family and prevented true oppositionists from holding power in South Vietnam’s National

Assembly. While some American journalists criticized Diem’s transparent nepotism, they stressed patience, arguing that Western standards should not be the yardstick observers used to judge his government. In most cases, they suggested that establishing security came before achieving political freedom in besieged South Vietnam. Despite limited foreign criticism, however, domestic opposition grew and presented a formidable challenge for Diem, who nearly lost power during an abortive coup attempt in November

1960. The failed revolt brought increased scrutiny to the Diem regime, and the American press proved less willing to tolerate his authoritarian style. More important, despite their increasing opposition to Diem, the press remained faithful to the Cold War consensus even after his ouster and tacitly supported direct American military involvement in

Vietnam in 1964.

72

73

American journalists uncritically accepted the Cold War consensus in the mid-

1950s and early 1960s. As a result, they often approved of developments that increased the likelihood of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. For example, the American press in general supported the creation of SEATO, although North Vietnam’s government interpreted it as an act of war. When the Western powers placed South Vietnam under

SEATO’s protection, the People’s Army of Vietnam promptly began reinforcing its guerrilla forces in the South in preparation for armed conflict.217 Non-observance of the

1956 nationwide elections, which aroused no protests in the American press, convinced

Communist cadres that peaceful unification was impossible. Indeed, when Hanoi began openly supporting an armed rebellion against Diem, it did so at the insistence of operatives in the south distressed about their inability to enforce the mandate for elections.218 Further hurrying descent into war was Diem’s repressive policies that the

American press largely ignored or rationalized until 1961. Diem’s issuance of the 10/59 decree led southern insurgents to dramatically escalate their activities, forcing

Communist party leaders to reassess their strategy in South Vietnam.219 When Hanoi opted to place military above political objectives in late 1960, they set in motion a conflict that ultimately would witness the deployment of U.S. troops on Vietnamese soil.

This thesis has examined American press coverage of South Vietnam from

1954 to 1960. During these critical years of early U.S. involvement, the American press

217 Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975, trans. Merle L. Pribbenow (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 20. 218 Jean Lacouture, Vietnam: Between Two Truces, trans. Konrad Kellen and Joel Carmichael (New York: Random House, 1966), 54. 219 Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 45.

73

74 viewed Vietnam as a pivotal outpost in the U.S. battle to combat international communism. A steadfast belief in the geopolitical consensus regarding the Cold War inspired American journalists to support the U.S. government actions designed to bolster the newly created anti-Communist state in South Vietnam. While press coverage in this period resulted largely from writers’ close ties with the U.S. government and the Diem regime, it also sprang from journalists’ genuine faith in the American mission abroad.

Reporters in the 1950s believed that only an interventionist U.S. foreign policy could counter the Soviet threat, and patriotism colored their stories.220 This consensus informing reporting endured, even as correspondents lost confidence in the Diem regime.

Ultimately, in their earnest support for an anti-Communist state below the 17th Parallel, the American press endorsed policies that would lead to U.S. embrace of a disastrous war in Vietnam.

220 Bernard Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 75.

74

BIBIOLOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Alden, Robert. “Saigon Casts Off ’54 Geneva Pact.” New York Times, March 9, 1956, 5.

______. “Vietnam Blames French in Crisis.” New York Times, April 3, 1955, 1.

Alsop, Joseph and Stewart. “Rest of Vietnam Next Red Goal.” Washington Post, August 29, 1954.

The Ambassador in Vietnam Donald Heath to the Department of State, 3 November 1954. U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1952- 1954. XIII: Indochina, part 2. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982.

Browne, Malcolm. “Viet Nam Reporting: Three Years of Crisis.” Columbia Journalism Review 3, no. 3 (Fall 1964): 4-9.

Buttinger, Joseph. “An Eyewitness Report on Vietnam.” The Reporter, January 27, 1955.

______. “Are We Saving South Vietnam?” New Leader 38 (27 June 1955): 510-15.

______. “Our Policy Toward Vietnam.” New York Times, January 30, 1955.

The Charge in Vietnam, Randolph Kidder to the Department of State, 14 December 1954. U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1952-1954. XIII: Indochina, part 2. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982.

Cherne, Leo. “The Saigon Picture.” New York Times, December 12, 1955.

______. “To Win Indochina We Must Win These People.” Look, January 25, 1955.

Chief Adviser of the Michigan State University Group Lloyd Musolf to President of Michigan State University John Hannah, September 23, 1960. U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1958-1960. I: Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986.

Childs, Marquis. “Eden, Dulles Try to Aid Mendes-France.” Washington Post, December 31, 1954.

76 77

“Collins to Indochina.” Washington Post, 8 November 1954, 12.

“Constitution Proclaimed by Diem in So. Vietnam.” Washington Post, 27 October 1956.

Corley, Francis J. “Viet-Nam Since Geneva.” Thought 33, no. 4 (Winter 1958-1959): 515-68.

Dillon, C.D. C. Douglas Dillion, Ambassador in the Department of State. “Telegram.” (May 11, 1955). U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1955-1957. I: Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985.

Dooley, Thomas. “Deliver Us From Evil.” Reader’s Digest, April 1956. du Berrier, Hilaire. “About South Vietnam.” American Opinion 1 (February 1958): 7-12.

Dulles, John F. John Dulles, Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam. “Telegram.” (April 4, 1955). U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1955-1957. I: Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985.

Dulles, John F. John Dulles, Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam. “Telegram.” (May 27, 1955). U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1955-1957. I: Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985.

Durbrow, E. Elbridge Durbrow, Ambassador in Vietnam to the Department of State. “Telegram.” (August 28, 1959). U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1958-1960. I: Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986.

Durdin, Tillman. “Diem Stand Held Bar to Elections.” New York Times, July 17, 1955, 7.

______. “In Asia: The Response is Generally Favorable Despite Concern in Authoritarian Regimes.” New York Times, May 1, 1960, E3.

“Failure of a Coup.” New York Times, November 13, 1960, E10.

Fall, Bernard. “Indochina Since Geneva.” Pacific Affairs 28, no. 1 (March 1955): 3-25.

______. “The Political-Religious Sects of Viet-Nam.” Pacific Affairs 28, no. 3 (September 1955): 235-53.

______. “Viet-Nam’s Chinese Problem.” Far Eastern Survey 27, no. 5 (May 1958): 65-72.

77

78

Fishel, Wesley R. Professor Wesley R. Fishel of Michigan State University to Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of Vietnam. “Letter.” 30 April 1960. U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1958-1960. I: Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986.

______. “Vietnam’s Democratic One-Man Rule.” New Leader, November 2, 1959.

______. “Vietnam’s War of Attrition.” New Leader, December 7, 1959.

Frifield, Don. “Saigon Coup Seemed Inevitable.” Washington Post, November 12, 1960, A6.

“Gamble in Vietnam.” Washington Post, December 11, 1954, 10.

Grant, J.A.C. “The Viet Nam Constitution of 1956.” The American Political Science Review 42, no. 2 (June 1958): 437-62.

Hammer, Ellen. “Progress Report on Southern Viet Nam.” Pacific Affairs 30, no. 3 (September 1957): 221-35.

Henderson, William. “South Viet Nam Finds Itself.” Foreign Affairs 35, no. 2 (January 1957): 283-94.

Hensel, Herman S. Herman Hensel, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security to Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern. “Letter.” 22 April 1955. U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1955-1957. 1: Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985.

Honey, P.J. “Progress in the Republic of Vietnam.” The World Today 15, no. 2 (February 1959): 68-78.

“Indo-China: A Fateful Thumb.” Newsweek, January 31, 1955.

“Indo-China: Clash and Compromise.” Newsweek, May 23, 1955, 45.

“Indo-China: Dangerous Vacuum.” Newsweek, May 23, 1955, 16.

Intelligence Brief Prepared in the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, February 7, 1956. U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1955-1957. I: Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985.

Jaffe, Sam. “Dilemma in Saigon: Which Way Democracy.” The Nation 180, no. 26 (25 June 1955): 581-82.

78

79

Jumper, Roy. “Mandarin Bureaucracy and Politics in South Viet Nam.” Pacific Affairs 30, no. 1 (March 1957): 47-58.

______. “Problems of Public Administration in South Viet Nam.” Far Eastern Survey 26, no. 12 (December 1957): 183-90.

Kaskeline, Egon. “South Vietnam Set to Proclaim New Constitution.” Christian Science Monitor, October 18, 1956, 11.

Ladejinsky, Wolf. “Vietnam: The First Five Years.” The Reporter, December 24, 1959.

“Lessons of Indochina.” Washington Post, October 15, 1954.

Lieberman, Henry R. “Diem Sees Delay on Unity Upheld.” New York Times, October 26, 1955.

Mansfield, Mike. “Reprieve in Viet Nam.” Harper’s (January 1956): 45-47.

Martin, Robert P. “Where Danger Threatens Another U.S.-Backed Country.” U.S. News & World Report, May 16, 1960.

“Mission to Vietnam.” New York Times, November 5, 1954, 20.

Morgenthau, Hans. “The Immaturity of Our Asian Policy-1: Ideological Windmills.” The New Republic 134 (12 March 1956): 22.

______. “The Immaturity of Our Asian Policy-2: The Danger of Doing Too Much.” The New Republic 134 (16 April 1956): 15.

Moseley, George V.H. “U.S. Aid to Indo-China.” New Leader, February 24, 1958.

Nolting, Frederick. From Trust to Tragedy: The Political Memoirs of Frederick Nolting, Kennedy’s Ambassador to Diem’s Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1988.

Oka, Takashi. “Vietnam Measures Diem.” The Christian Science Monitor, November 2, 1955.

Osborne, John. “The Tough Miracle Man of Vietnam.” Life, May 13, 1957.

“Out on a Limb.” Newsweek, August 1, 1955, p. 22.

Phan Quang Dan. “Vietnam and SEATO.” Washington Post, September 18, 1954.

“President Ties Aid to Vietnam Results.” Christian Science Monitor, October 25, 1954, p. 7.

Roberts, Chalmers. “Diem-Symbol of Free New Asia.” Washington Post, May 8, 1957, 1.

79

80

______. “Southeast Asia Pact: Three Main Problems Involved.” Washington Post, August 21, 1954.

The Secretary of State to the Department of State, December 17, 1954. U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1952-1954. XIII: Indochina, part 2. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982.

Scheer, Robert and Warren Hinckle. “The Vietnam Lobby.” Ramparts 4, no. 3 (July 1965): 16-24.

Schmid, Peter. “Free Indo-China Fights Against Time: Vietnam’s Winding, Rocky Road.” Commentary 20 (January 1955): 18-29.

Scigliano, Robert G. “The Electoral Process in South Vietnam: Politics in an Underdeveloped State.” Midwest Journal of Political Science 4, no. 2 (May 1960): 138-61.

Shaw, Diana. “The Temptation of Tom Dooley.” Los Angeles Times, December 15, 1991.

Soustelle, Jacques. “France Looks at Her Alliances.” Foreign Affairs 35, no. 1 (October 1956): 116-30.

“Southeast Asia: Double Trouble.” Time, November 28, 1960.

“South Vietnam.” Newsweek, November 28, 1960

“South Viet Nam: The Mixture as Before.” Time, September 14, 1959, 31.

“South Vietnam: Problem of One Man.” Time, July 11, 1960.

“South Viet Nam: Victory for Diem.” Time, March 19, 1956, 40.

“South Viet-Nam Voters Repudiate Ex-Emperor.” Los Angeles Times, October 24, 1955, 7.

“South Viet Nam: The Wreck of the Majestic.” Time, August 1, 1955, 7.

“Stand at Saigon.” Newsweek, November 21, 1960, 49.

Stead, Ronald. “South Vietnam: Two Years of Geneva.” Christian Science Monitor, July 20, 1956, 4.

______. “Vietnam: A House Divided.” Christian Science Monitor, December 27, 1954, 9.

Sulzberger, C.L. “Indirect Aggression and Total War.” New York Times, December 20, 1954.

80

81

______. “Teaching the Sultan’s Horse to Speak.” New York Times, January 17, 1955.

______. “Trouble Ahead With Paris: The Background.” New York Times, June 15, 1955.

Thiriet, Joan. “Paris Weighs U.S. Policy in Vietnam.” Christian Science Monitor, April 20, 1955, 14.

“U.S. Inherits Another Headache: France Turns Over Indo-China Job to America.” U.S. News and World Report, December 10, 1954, 26.

Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975. Translated by Merle L. Pribbenow. Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2002.

“Viet Nam: All Quiet on the 17th Parallel.” Time, July 30, 1955, 24.

“Vietminh Charges U.S. Breaks Truce.” New York Times, December 9, 1954.

“Vietnam Armistice Remains in Effect.” New York Times, July 15, 1956, 15.

“Vietnam Constitution.” New York Times, October 26, 1956.

“Vietnam—Free to Fight.” Newsweek, May 9, 1960.

“Vietnam Won’t Vote.” Christian Science Monitor, March 13, 1956, 18.

“Visitor from Saigon.” New York Times, May 12, 1957, E2.

Walker, Gordon. “France, Reds in Secret Pact?” Christian Science Monitor, May 4, 1955, 1.

Young. Kenneth. Kenneth Young, Acting Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs to J. Lawton Collins, Special Representative in Vietnam, 15 December 1954. “Letter.” U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1955-1957. 1: Vietnam. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985.

81

82

Secondary Sources

Adamson, Michael R. “Ambassadorial Roles and Foreign Policy: Elbridge Durbrow, Frederick Nolting, and the U.S. Commitment to Diem’s Vietnam, 1957-61.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 32, no. 2 (June 2002): 229-55.

Anderson, David. Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.

Aronson, James. The Press and the Cold War. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970.

Braestrup, Peter. Big Story. I: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington. Boulder: Westview Press, 1977.

Buttinger, Joseph. Vietnam: A Political History. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1968.

Cable, James. The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986.

Chapman, Jessica. “Staging Democracy: South Vietnam’s 1955 Referendum to Depose Bao Dai.” Diplomatic History 30, no. 4 (September 2006): 671-703.

Cohen, Bernard C. The Press and Foreign Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963.

Combs, Arthur. “The Path Not Taken: The British Alternative to U.S. Policy in Vietnam, 1954-1956.” Diplomatic History 19, no. 1 (January 1995): 33-57.

Cooper, Chester C. The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam. New York: Dodd & Mead, 1970.

Duiker, William J. The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996.

______. Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam. New York: McGraw Hill, 1995.

Ernst, John. Forging a Fateful Alliance: Michigan State University and the Vietnam War. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1998.

Fall, Bernard. “The Cease-Fire- An Appraisal.” In Viet-Nam Witness: 1953-66. Edited by Bernard Fall. New York: Praeger, 1966.

______. “Religion in Politics.” In Viet-Nam Witness: 1953-66, edited by Bernard Fall. New York: Praeger, 1966.

82

83

______. “Settlement at Geneva-Then and Now.” In Viet-Nam Witness 1953-66. Edited by Bernard Fall, 69-83. New York: Praeger, 1966.

Fisher, James T. Dr. America: The Lives of Thomas A. Dooley. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1997.

Fitzgerald, Frances. Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the

Americans in Viet Nam. New York: Vintage, 1972.

Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History. New York: Penguin, 2005.

Greene, Daniel P. O’C. “John Foster Dulles and the End of the Franco-American Entente in Indochina.” Diplomatic History 16, no. 4 (October 1992): 551-71.

Halberstam, David. Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam During the Kennedy Era. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008.

Hallin, Daniel C. The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.

Hammer, Ellen. The Struggle for Indochina: 1940-1955. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1955.

Hammond, William M. Reporting Vietnam: Media and Military at War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998.

Herman, Edward and Noam Chomsky. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. New York: Pantheon Books, 1998.

Herring, George. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002.

Herzstein, Robert. Henry R. Luce, Time, and the American Crusade in Asia. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Hilsman, Roger. To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy. New York: Doubleday, 1967.

Hoopes, Townsend. The Devil and John Foster Dulles. Boston: Little Brown, 1973.

Irving, R.E.M. The First Indochina War. London: Croom Helm, 1975.

Jacobs, Seth. America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004.

83

84

Johnson, David Patrick. “‘Selling Operation Passage to Freedom’: Dr. Thomas Dooley and the Religious Overtones of Early American Involvement in Vietnam.” Unpublished Master’s Thesis, University of New Orleans, 2009.

Kahin, George McTurnan. Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1979.

Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking Press, 1983.

Knightley, Phillip. The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from Crimea to Iraq. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004.

Kolko, Gabriel. Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience. New York: Pantheon, 1985.

Lacouture, Jean. Vietnam: Between Two Truces. Translated by Konrad Kellen and Joel Carmichael. New York: Random House, 1966.

Langguth, A.J. Our Vietnam: The War, 1954-1975. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000.

Lansdale, Edward Geary. In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

Levenstein, Aaron. Escape to Freedom: The Story of the International Rescue Committee. New York: Freedom House, 1983.

Lien-Hang T. Nguyen. Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2012.

Logevall, Fredrik. Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam. New York: Random House, 2012.

Mecklin, John. Mission in Torment: An Intimate Account of the U.S. Role in Vietnam. New York: Doubleday, 1965.

Miller, Edward Garvey. Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013.

______. “Vision, Power and Agency: The Ascent of Ngo Dinh Diem, 1945-54.” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 35, no. 3 (October 2004): 433-58.

Mohr, Charles. “Once Again—Did the Press Lose Vietnam?” Columbia Journalism Review 22, no. 4 (November/December 1983): 53.

Morgan, Joseph. The Vietnam Lobby: The American Friends of Vietnam. Chapel Hill: The University Press of North Carolina, 2007.

84

85

Moyar, Mark. Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Olson, Gregory A. Mansfield and Vietnam: A Study in Rhetorical Adaptation. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1995.

Prochnau, William. Once Upon a Distant War: David Halberstam, Neil Sheehan, Peter Arnett—Young War Correspondents and Their Early Vietnam Battles. New York: Vintage Books, 1995.

Scheer, Robert. How the United States Got Involved in Vietnam. Santa Monica, CA: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1965.

Schulzinger, Robert. A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Scigliano, Robert. South Vietnam: Nation under Stress. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963.

See, Jennifer. “A Prophet without Honor: Hans Morgenthau and the War in Vietnam, 1955-1965.” Pacific Historical Review 70, no. 3 (August 2001): 419-48.

Shaplen, Robert. The Lost Revolution: The U.S. in Vietnam, 1946-1966. New York: Harper & Row, 1965.

Statler, Kathryn. “The Diem Experiment: Franco-American Conflict Over South Vietnam, July 1954-May 1955.” Journal of American-East Asian Relations 6, no. 2/3 (Summer-Fall 1997): 145-73.

______. Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2007.

Tomes, Robert. Apocalypse Then: American Intellectuals and the Vietnam War, 1954- 1975. New York: New York University Press, 1998.

Welch, Susan. “The American Press in Indochina: 1950-1956.” In Communication in International Politics. Edited by Richard L. Merritt, 207-231. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972.

Wyatt, Clarence. Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995.

Young, Marilyn B. The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990. New York: Harper Collins, 1991.

85