Integrated management of resources, risks and dependability of railway facilities at lifecycle stages. Case studies of the methodology application in Russian Railways divisions Zamyshlyaev A.М. Head of R&D Complex for Traffic Safety and Station Automation Systems, Dr. Sci. Session II – 12th October 2015 QUOTES

A lot of yesterday's solutions are today's problems.

Sam Nunn

The wheel that squeaks the loudest is the one that gets the grease.

Henry W. Shaw

2 PATTERN OF THE MODERN COMPANY’S WORK

Increase of income

Compliance Management

Cost reduction

3 INFRASTRUCTURE AND ROLLING STOCK FACILITIES OF JSC RZD Infrastructure:: Length of operational tracks 85 200 km Length of electrified lines 43 100 km Lines equipped with signalling equipment 62 196 km Railway stations 5 428 Traction substations 1 402 Service units ( divisions) 742 Rolling stock fleet: Freight (electric and diesel) 11 191 Freight cars of all types and owners 1 600 000 Shunting engines (diesel) 6 016 Long-distance passenger cars 24 100 Commuter cars 15 600 Motive power and car depots 411

4 URGENT ISSUES

TODAY

° Technical maintenance of the network of Russian railways requires tremendous expenditures related to maintaining the dependability of infrastructure facilities and ensuring the safety of transportation process.

° The share of railway infrastructure basic funds is more than 60% of total JSC RZD fixed assets value.

° The share of OPEX for infrastructure facilities is about 35% of total scope of JSC RZD OPEX.

5 TRANSFORMATION OF RAMS METHODOLOGY INTO URRAN SYSTEM - THE SYSTEM OF DECISION-MAKING SUPPORT

What are consequences How often does failure occur? of some events?

RELIABILITY SAFETY

RAMS What operation facility How well/badly can volume is given the system at the disposal? be maintained?

AVAILABILITY MAINTAINABILITY

6 SYSTEM FOR DECISION MAKING SUPPORT TRANSFORMATION OF THE RAMS METHODOLOGY INTO URRAN SYSTEM OBJECT

LIFE CYCLE

SAFETY DEPENDABILITY RESOURCES Prolongation Risk Life cycle cost Indicators Reliability Maintainability Availability Durability of a set service management management life Operation Utilization Installation Acquisition Development

RAMS URRAN 7 URRAN – SET OF STANDARDS, METHODS AND GUIDELINES USED FOR MANAGEMENT OF LIFE-CYCLE PROCESSES OF RAILWAY SYSTEMS OBJECTS OF TECHNICAL BASIC PROCESES REGULATION OF RAILWAY TRANSPORT Track facilities TECHNICAL MAINTENANCE

Technical maintenance of Facilities of infrastructure facilities and electrification rolling stock and power supply

Modernization of infrastructure and rolling stock Facilities of signaling and remote control Procurement management

Telecommunication facilities Management of environmental, fire, industrial and labor safety

Locomotive facilities URRAN normative and methodological framework — 109 documents Purpose of URRAN introduction: increase of the efficiency of railway transport operation based on adaptive management under the conditions of scarce resources 8 RESOURCE MODEL OF TRACK LIFE CYCLE OPTIMIZATION ON THE BASIS OF PHISICAL DEPRECIATION EVALUATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE ELEMENTS

9 D ИC LIFE CYCLE OF RAILWAY TRANSPORT FACILITY

Stage 1 INCLUDING THE PROCESS OF MANUFACTURING Concept of RT facility Analysis of the existing Stage 13 state of RT facilities, D ИC Monitoring of market research operational Specification of project parameters scope and purpose Stage 2 Collection, analysis and evaluation of data on Development of RT facility Definition of RT facility performance indicators concept variants and their and its application feasibility studies conditions (initial Collection, analysis and requirements D C evaluation of data on Project management specification) dependability and safety arrangement C Definition of maintenance Monitoring of hazards and conditions influencing RT threats, updating of hazards Revisions of previously facility operation and threats list reached dependability and Stage 3 safety indices (including Monitoring of costs and profits analogs) Specification of RT facility Risk analysis technical parameters of RT facility operation, LCC analysis Report on concept Specification of maintenance Identification of risks and D C C D M CB C M development and design and repair hazards (including application cyberthreats) Specification of safety policy C D M Definition of risk criteria Development of dependability and safety Risk level definition (rate Stages 10 и 11 Stage 12 Stage 15 plans for design stages and consequences Stage 4 analyses) Validation and Operation and De- Specification Risk estimation Acceptance maintenance commissioning D C CB Check of conformity with RT facility use for intended and Disposal Risk evaluation Specification of RT facility all contract specification purpose Stage 9 requirements Decommissioning planning Expertise of RT facility C M Various types of specification CB Installation Acceptance testing maintenance and repair as to the rules or RT facility state Documentation preparation, deregistration Patent researches Stages 5 и 6 Conformity proof (by Apportionment of Installation planning acceptance) Material and technical Development of technical M C Stage 8 support Development of Safety Plan status map requirements, for Decommissioning and procurement Revision of Safety Policy Documentation Development of Disposal stage Review and revision of Design and for further operation preparation, registration Dependability and Safety Dependability and Safety Plans for Operation and Plans Implementation Dismantling of components Conceptual design development Preparation of Maintenance stage Development of acceptance requirements for RT facility Revision of Dependability Commissioning testing plan (validation Stage 7 or its components to be and Safety Plans for Disposal plan) Engineering design development procured Manufacture stage Safety case revision Preparation of maintenance Manufacture and service manuals and Development, agreement and Development of instructions for operators (production) Bid notice approval design specifications, Dependability and Safety operational and maintenance Manufacture of Plans for Manufacture manuals preproduction batch Analysis and comparison of stage upon acceptance manufacturers (suppliers) results Development of SW for functional offers components and program Supervised operation of documentation preproduction batch (if required) Selection of manufacturer (supplier) Stage 14 Integration of SW and HW Qualification testing of Preparation of supply Modification and Review and revision of preproduction batch contract specification and retrofit Dependability and Safety Plans contract signing

Safety case preparation Approval of design documents upon results of Manufacture and customization qualification testing of prototypes

Factory testing of prototypes Safety Policy revision for To stage 2 Manufacture stage Approval of design documents upon results of factory testing Development of Dependability and Safety Acceptance testing of prototypes Plans for Manufacture stage

Supervised operation of Conformity proof (for mass prototypes (if required) production) Approval of design documents upon results of acceptance C - Customer testing

Conformity proof (of single products, prototype batch) D - Designer

M - Manufacturer Verification

CB - Certification body Validation

10 URRAN NORMATIVE AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

GOST – 2 Provide for: Terminology GOST R – 5 subject matters: • Procurement with consideration – risk management; of a life cycle cost. – classification of dependability and functional safety indicators • Repairs according to technical STO RZD corporate standards – 16 condition based on risk subject matters : assessment. – risk management including professional risks management; – requirements and indicators of dependability and functional safety ; • Improvement of reliability and – life cycle cost management; safety of technical devices – assessment of cyber security of control systems SW under the conditions of scarce resources. Methodology instructions – 78 subject matters : • Improvement of efficiency of the – technical devices risk assessment; resources redistribution over life – calculation of reliability and functional safety; cycle stages – economics and procurement; – performance assessment of structural divisions

Classifiers – 8 subject matters : – pre-failures; – procurement 109 documents in total 11 GOST R 54505-2011. FUNCTIONAL SAFETY. RISK MANAGEMENT ON RAILWAY TRANSPORT The standard outlines the approach and guidelines for risks management on railway transport related to traffic safety and railway operation.

The standard will allow to use a new approach towards the management of dependability and functional safety of railway transport facilities based on risks management.

Also, Guidelines are developed for practical application of this national standard where one can find the standard clauses clarified, the methods of risk analysis examined and the examples of risk calculations provided.

12 RISK DEFINITION ACCORDING TO RAMS METHODOLOGY

According to IEC 62278 (the international standard on RAMS):

RISK is a combination of the probability of harm occurrence and the severity of that harm

13 TYPICAL LEVELS OF EVENT RATES

Event frequency Rate Description per year, f

Frequent f > 10 -3 Can occur frequently. Continuous hazard

Probable 5×10 -4 ≤ f < 10 -3 Repeated occurrence. Frequent occurrence of hazard is anticipated.

Occasional 10 -4 ≤ f < 5 ×10 -4 Probability of repeated occurrence. Repeated occurrence of hazard is anticipated.

Probability of the event occurring sometimes during the life cycle of Remote 5×10 -5 ≤ f < 10 -4 a facility. Grounded expectation of hazard occurrence.

Probability of occurrence is unlikely but possible. Hazard can Improbable 10 -5 ≤ f < 5 ×10 -5 presumably occur in extraordinary cases.

Incredible f ≤ 10 -5 Probability of occurrence is very unlikely. Hazard cannot presumably occur. Note: Values of event frequency per year are provided as an example.

14 TYPICAL LEVELS OF CONSEQUENCES SEVERITY (EXAMPLE)

Severity levels Consequences as to types of risks of consequences Internal risks External risks 1 or more dead, or 5 or more railway employees critically injured 1 or more dead, or 5 or more railway employees critically injured or or Catastrophic Train damaged to the point of being put out of the fleet park or Threat to environment caused Damage to infrastructure facility in the size of over 5000 MW emergency of federal or interregional scale

Up to 5 railway employees critically Up to 5 railway employees critically injured or injured. 1 dead, or 1 or more people 1 dead, or 1 or more people critically injured as a result of deliberate or critically injured as a result of careless actions of the victim or other persons who are not railway deliberate or careless actions of the employees or victim or other persons who are not Critical Damage to rolling stock requiring to do capital repair for its operation railway employees. recovery or or Damage to infrastructure facility in the size of 1500 to 5000 MW Threat to environment caused orTotal loss of goods emergency of regional or intermunicipal scale

Mid-size damage to health or Mid-size damage to health Damage to rolling stock requiring to do mid-size or depot repair for its or Insignificant operation recovery or Threat to environment caused Damage to infrastructure facility in the size of from 500 to 1500 MW emergency of local or municipal scale or Partial loss of goods

Minor damage to health or Minor damage to health Damage to rolling stock requiring to do running repair for its operation Negligible or recovery or Insignificant threat to environment Damage to infrastructure facility in the size of less than 500 MW

Note: MW is a minimum wage that may be legally paid to employees in Russia.

16 MODELS AND METHODS APPLIED FOR RISK ASSESSMENT IN JSC RZD Failure mode, effects and criticality analysis Fire-related risks on diesel locomotives (FMECA) Level of blocking of an initiating event Specifies the possibility to prevent initiating events by means of proper maintenance and repair and/or structural feature. Depends on

Effect Attenuation Sensibility YИН =m1·ББАЗА + m2 · БТЕХ + m3 · БЭКСПЛ + m4 · БЧФ + m5 · ББиМ Level of blocking of escalation of fire-related events Specifies the possibility to block the chain of fire-related failures and stop the development level on failures of a component without firing. Depends on the operation at the route and fire danger of the applied materials Physical Construction, Functioning of a object’s security dangerous EXAMPLE Yблок =m1·Бпуть 2 + m2 · ББиМ factor features element Level of blocking of Level of blocking of Average level of Unit/component initiation, % escalation, % blocking Diesel exhaust system 80 70 75 Cooling system 75 80 78 Fuel system 80 70 75 Exhaust system , 75 80 78 drainage system Electrics 60 80 70 Traction motor 80 70 75 Oil system 75 80 78 Turbocharger 75 80 78 Failure tree analysis (FTA) Fire-related failures on electric locomotives

Картс рисков « Нагрев » Уровень 3. Возникновение источника зажигания Уровень 2. Уровень 1. Переходные процессы ( ПС ) Основное пожароопасное System failure 1.1 Инициация событие 3.2 Воздействие источника 3.1 Источник зажигания 1.2 Развитие ПС ПС зажигания

Нарушение Failure of components БПС крепления Холодная скрутка

Некачественная Failure of elements пайка

Отключение защиты

Events generating failures Отсутствие

Событие Нагретая Применение Оплавление Нагрев возгорания поверхность Термическое нетиповых деталей Types of effects воздействие Нарушение изоляции Заклинивание Излом

Отказ Обледенение

МЗ

Причины пожара Узлы Событие возгорания 1) Электрические машины и их электрические цепи ; Процесс , предшесвующий возгоранию 2) Электрические аппараты и оборудование ; Группа причин ПС 3) Вспомогательные электрические машины и их электрические Быстротечные элект . процессы цепи ; Электические процессы 4) Высоковольтные цепи ; 5) Низковольтные цепи ; Механические процессы 6) Систему вентиляции локомотива ; Человеческий фактор /ремонт 7) Пневматическое оборудование ; 8) Другое . Человеческий фактор /эксплуатация 17 MATRIX OF FIRE-RELATED RISKS IN RAILWAY STATIONS

Railway Station Risk Level Standardized Number of risk level potential fire Fire risk with no Fire risk with sources consideration of fire consideration of fire protection systems protection systems

Kazansky Undesirable Negligible 5,07·10 -3 2

Rizhsky Undesirable Acceptable 2,97·10 -3 3 Savelovsky Undesirable Negligible 7,6·10 -3 2

RISK LEVEL LEVEL OF CONSEQUENCES

Frequent

Probable

Occasional Rizhsky Remote Savelovsky Improbable Kazansky Incredible

17 RESULTS OF TEST CALCULATIONS OF FIRE-RELATED RISKS IN RUSSIAN RAILWAYS’ STATIONS

Station Fire-related risk Public (social) risk Samara 10-- −-6 4·10-- −-6 Belorussky 10-- −-6 5,3·10-- −-6 Saratov 10-- −-6 4·10-- −-6 Kaliningrad -Yuzhny 10-- −-6 5,3·10-- −-6 Rostov-glavny 4·10-- −-6 1,6·10-- −5 Chelyabinsk 10-- −-6 4·10-- −-6 Yaroslavl 10-- −-4 5,4·10-- −-4 Krasnoyarsk 5,5·10-- −-7 2,2·10-- −-6 Novosibirsk 1,1·10-- −-4 5,5·10-- −-4 Kievsky 1,1·10-- −-4 4,4·10-- −5 Moscovsky 5·10-- −-6 2,5·10--−-5 Leningradsky 5·10-- −-6 2,5·10-- −-5 Kazansky 10-- −-6 5,18·10-- −-6

18 ETA METHOD FOR ASSESSMENT OF WORK RELATED INJURIES

Step1) Analysis of the event possible occurrence : determination of major criterion affecting the activation of hazard impact under the э ∙ опер work performance

Step 2) Calculation of the expected

number of injuries occurred by the Ба рьер = э ∙ опер state of each barrier =1

Event Tree

Step 3) Calculation of the expected 3

number of injuries in general for the проишествие = Ба рьер performed work =1

19 MODEL OF RISK ESTIMATION OF PEDESTRIAN INJURY RATES AT ONE-LEVEL PEDESTRIAN CROSSINGS

Single-track section Double-track section

Average time of train being on a pedestrian crossing of i-th track (i = 1, 2) for train length Li , train speed v i and width of crossing d + τ = Li d i vi Average time of a pedestrian being on a pedestrian crossing of single track with pedestrian movement speed v p and crossing length l τ = l p vp

20 EXAMPLE OF A FAILURE TREE FOR DETERMINATION OF PROBABILITY OF THE PEDESTRIAN CONGRUENT BEHAVIOR

TOTAL

(τ + τ )(1 − P ) f = 1 П a aп 1, ⋅ T1 TП 21 RISK MATRIX OF PEDESTRIAN INJURY RATES AT ONE-LEVEL PEDESTRIAN CROSSINGS (exemplified by POVAROVO )

CONSEQUENCE (DAMAGE) LEVEL 1 and more 1 fatality category 3, insignificant 1 serious injury 2 - 5 fatality > 5 fatalities (2-10 serious category 2, injures 200 thousand of 20 000 thousand > 20 000 traumas) category 1 <50 thousand of rubles. rbl. thousand rbl. 4 000 thousand rubles. rbl.

Insignificant Serious Critical Catastrophic Disastrous FREQUENCY LEVEL 1 2 3 4 5 9,9·10 -1 R≥ 10 -1 Frequent F F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 10 -2 ≤ R < 2,3·10 -1 Probable P P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 10 -1 1,64·10 -2 10 -3 ≤ R < Occasional O O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 10 -2 10 -4 ≤ R < Remote R R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 10 -3 10 -5 ≤ R < Improbable IP IP1 IP2 IP3 IP4 IP5 10 -4 R < 10 -5 Incredible I I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 2010: 2 fatalities, 3 injuries 22 FREIGHT WAGON BOGIE (example)

bolster - 1 solebar - 2

Number of bolsters Number of solebars manufactured by one manufactured by one supplier per year: supplier per year: 20 000 10 000 – 70 000 units – 16 0000 units

Allowable number of faulty selebars per Allowable number of batch: 2х10 -4 faulty bolsters per batch: 4х10 -4 Allowable rate of failure of moulded parts: 1х10 -6 per year (1 failure per 1 mil items per year) Frequency of wagon inspection during maintenance: one per 800 km travelled, on the average. 23 SPECIFICATION OF STANDARD (ALLOWABLE) VALUES

Allowable rate of failure of moulded parts: 1×10 -6 per year (not more than 1 failure per 1 mil items per year)

Allowable number of faulty solebars in R-55 per batch: 2×10 -4

24 USER INTERFACE OF THE SYSTEM OF CONSTRUCTION OF RISK MATRICES RELATED TO BREAKS AND DEFECTS OF FREIGHT WAFON SOLEBARS

System version: 1.15 Revision list Risks related to breaks and defects Report type Report type of frames produced by Production of batches As of

Risk matrix (breaks of truck frames) Forecastgraph Uralvagonzavod since till quarter year TO FORM

Choice of the period Choice of the report type for analysis • Full matrix • Summary matrix • Forecast graph Choice of the production year

Choice of the manufacturing plant • Bezhitsk steel plant • AzovElectroStal • Altaivagon • Kremenchug steel plant • Promtraktor-Promlit • Uralvagonzavod

25 CONSTRUCTION OF A COMPLETE MATRIX OF RISKS RELATED TO BREAKS AND DEFECTS OF FREIGHT WAGON SOLEBARS

System version: Revision list 1.15 Risks related to breaks and defects Report type Report type of frames produced by Production of batches As of Risk matrix (breaks of truck frames) Full risk matrix Bezhitsk stall plant 2002 2013 1 quarter 2014 year to form

REFERENCE DATA

Defects Breaks Failures Critical breaks

Very frequent

Frequent

Probable

Occasional

Remote

Frequency Level Frequency Incredible

Improbable Insignificant, Critical, Marginal Catastrophic Level of severity of consequences

26 CONSTRUCTION OF THE FORECAST GRAPH OF A RISK LEVEL FOR 2002-2013 YEARS OF BATCH PRODUCTION BY URALVAGONZAVOD

Report type Report type Risks related to breaks and defects of frames produced by Production of batches As of Risk matrix (breaks of truck frames) Forecastgraph Uralvagonzavod since till quarter year TO FORM

REFERENCE DATA Dynamics of breaks related risks - UVZ the frequency of catastrophic events events catastrophiccatastrophicofof frequencyfrequencythethe Risk levelreduced Riskto

Year of observance Year of manufacture

27 MATRIX OF RISK OF DOWNTIME DUE TO THE FAILURES OF MDRS EQUIPMENT BY THE EXAMPLE OF SVERDLOV DIRECTORATE FOR THE YEAR 2014

FREQUENT

PROBABLE 1, 2 and 3, 1 year per 3, 2 and 1,

OCCASIONAL No. Types of equipment Risk level, train-h per year 1 2 3 Electrics of a power circuit , REMOTE 1 ancillary circuit and control 2099,3 unacceptable lines failure of technical facilities of categoriescategories of of facilitiesfacilities technicaltechnical of of failurefailure 2 Diesel and diesel equipment 7,8 acceptable IMPROBABLE Locomotive underframe and 3 421,4 undesirable mechanical equipment Event frequency – frequency Event INCREDIBLE 4 Traction electric engines 668,2 undesirable Brake and air brake control 5 344,5 undesirable equipment Automatic control systems for INSIGNIFICANT MARGINAL CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC 6 traction and brake modes, negligible

Specific damage — mean downtime for 1 failure, train-h electrics 7 Safety equipment 65,3 negligible

8 Ancillary electric machinery 1,3 negligible

TOTAL 3607,8 UNACCEPTABLE

28 COMPARISON OF THE RESULTS OF MAINENANCE PLANNING BASED ON LEGACY METHOD AND URRAN

State of the art Unacceptable Undesirable Acceptable Negligible rate Failure

Yaroslavl Arkhangelsk

Legacy planning method URRAN-based planning Failure rate Failure Failure rate Failure

Yaroslavl Arkhangelsk Yaroslavl Arkhangelsk – 19 line section of total 174,6 km identified – 47 line sections of total 199,5 km identified – sections with the given average failure rat – corrected sections with average failure rate of chosen

Activities are scheduled in the Northern Railway where the failure rate is 9 times higher than under the legacy procedure 29 EFFICIENCY OF URRAN IN GENERATION OF TRACK MAINTENANCE PLANNING

Bakhmetskoye — Tugulym line

BEFORE MAINTENANCE Technical characteristics

Unacceptable Length: 7,001 km Undesirable Freight traffic: 92,48 mil gross t Acceptable Tonnage handled: 1418,1 mil gross t

Negligible отказов Частота Track coordinate, km Failure rate , per year km 24,3·10 –2

AFTER MAINTENANCE

Unacceptable Undesirable Acceptable

Negligible отказов Частота Track coordinate, km

Failure rate, per year km 7·10 –3 EFFECTS

Technical Economic Reduction of failure rate Reduction of maintenance cost by 23,6·10 –2 per year km by 9,24 mil RUB 30 FINDINGS: EFFECTS CAUSED BY THE INTRODUCTION OF THE URRAN METHODOLOGY INTO THE TRACK SECTOR OF THE NORTHERN RAILWAY

Effect 1. Reduction of expenditure on operational maintenance Is achieved by

Carrying out capital repairs on lines where operational maintenance expenditures exceed the limit of an economical criterion as well as introducing into the repair plan those lines where the highest reduction of expenditures on operational maintenance is forecast

Effect 2. Reduction of the average annual cost of capital repairs

Is achieved by

Extending the service life for lines that have processed all the predefined tons but have not reached the limits in terms of either technical or economical criteria

Economic effect per 1 km of track sections selected for repairs is 94 thousand of rubles 31 DETERMINATION OF TIME FOR THE NEXT PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE OF THE OBJECT

where С1 is a penalty for the object’s failure, С2 is a penalty for preventive maintenance of the object, Y(n i) is a decision function, and with Y(n i) > 1 one makes a decision on the object’s overhaul.

32 URRAN SYSTEM HIERARCHY

Risk of non-provision of service SERVICES GOST R Passenger traffic RISK 54505- 2011

Freight traffic MANAGEMENT TRANSPORTATION PROCESS PROCESSES Traffic management Process violations PROCESS Railway infrastructure and rolling stock (KASAT) DEPENDABILITY maintenance, etc. FUNCTIONAL FUNCTIONAL DEPENDABILITY RAILWAY LINES RAILWAY TECHNICAL SYSTEMS Railway systems (complex systems) dependability CL PI EMUs CTC КС ПСС Sw ОТС electric locomotives bridges TSS ТП ЛЭП ОбТС diesel locomotives etc. marsh. СПД syst. DMUs etc. и т.д. Technical failures GOST RAILWAY SYSTEMS COMPONENTS Components (KAS ANT) 32192-2013 (simple systems) Electric equipmentэ dependability rails lights supports КОО braking equipment sleepers relays cables АСП diesel equipment fastenings switches insulators КО ...... DEPENDABILITY STRCTURAL ballast cables switches OFCL electric traction machines frogs batteries transformer АФУ safety devices etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. EMUs supply Railway Railway Railway Railway ...... Locomotives Railway Railway track Railway Railway power remote control remote automation automation and telecommunications RAILWAY INFRASTRUCTURE ROLLING STOCK 33 IMPLEMENTED FUNCTIONALITY OF KASANT

SYSTEMS INTEROPERABLE KASANT KASANT OPERATIONAL WITH KASANT RESULTS CONTROL OVER THE USER SC SC SC Automated system of the WORKING IN THE SYSTEM train scheduling Data for report systems (GID «Ural-VNIIZhT») (Information service «Effect») Control НЗ-1 of the Appointment НЗ-1 of Equipment for control of failure timeliness the responsible persons in case of the rolling stock technical controversies state on a train run (KTSM ) Analytical data of USER WORKING WITH DATA ON operation of technical FAILURES OF TECHNICAL FACILITIES facilities and causes of Automated system of their failures warnings generation and cancellation (ASU VOP-2) Forward to Considerati Input of failure Initial data for reliability another on of investigation department failures materials calculation in URRAN Automated system of the system monthly inspections of Automatic generation of initial

RZD RZD RZD TECHNICALTECHNICAL FACILITIES FACILITIES information about a failure, and stations transfer to a relevant department, (AS KMO ) directorate Initial data for the planning of measures to improve reliability of technical facilities Automated systems Single base of failures of the facilities (and their causes) management of technical facilities

SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE INFORMATION ABOUT FAILURES JJ OFOF ABOUTABOUT FAILURES FAILURES OBJECTIVEOBJECTIVEOFOF SOURCE SOURCE INFORMATION INFORMATION (ASU SH-2, ASU E, ASU P)

34 TECHNOLOGY OF LONG-TERM PLANNING OF REPAIRING ACTIVITIES BASED ON DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEM ADK-I ERA

Forecast of deviation growth rate System of control of basic rail Analysis of deviation growth and assessment of track state parameters depending on the operational based on probabilistic estimate results (incl. handled tonnage) according to the results of diagnostic system control

Failure Failure rate λ(t)

35 INCREASING INFORMATION RELIABILITY AS PART OF KASANT FUNCTIONALITY DEVELOPMENT

OVER 25 000 ACTIVE USERS ARE CURRENTLY CONNECTED TO THE SYSTEM , OVER 120 FORMS OF OUTGOING REFERENCE DOCUMENTS IMPLEMENTED AT DIVISION AND NETWORK LEVELS 15500

14000 DEVELOPEMNT OF SYSTEM AND AVERAGE NUMBER OF IDENTIFIED DIAGNISTICS FACILITIES TECHNICAL FAILURES PER MONTH 13000

EXPANSION OF FUNCTIONALITY AND DEPLOYMENT SITES OF INDUSTRY ACSs 11000 INTEGRATED WITH KAS ANT

8000 KAS ANT INTEGRATION EXPANSION OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT RELIABILITY RELIABILITY RELIABILITY OF OF INFORMATION INFORMATION WITH KTSM 4000 EXCHANGE IN TRAIN GRAPH OPERATION

MANUAL DATA INPUT+ DID URAL-VNIIZHT KAS ANT INTEGTATION MANUAL IN FACILITIES’ ACSs DATA INPUT

Since mid-2006 Since July 1, 2008 Since July 1, 2009 Since June 2010 2011 – 2013 ARM PSO SYSTEM FIRST STAGE OF KAS ANT SECOND STAGE OF KAS ANT KAS ANT FUNCTIONALITY DEVELOPMENT

36 FAILURE DISTRIBUTION IN THE OPERATION OF TECHNICAL FACILITIES

BY FUNCTIONAL UNITS BY RESPONSIBILITY OF EXTERNAL COMPANIES (6 months 2015) IN SEPTEMBER 2013

Signalling and remote control 10,13% Track Power supply 9,78% 1,97% Passenger division 1,29% мер Other causes Wagon complex

(c.5.16 of Regulations) принятия 35,93% 1,02% неотложных неотложных Область Область

Other external companies, service 0,89%

Other 1,76% Transportation complex 0,39%

НОД -4 Petropavlovsk 0,24% Construction and installation organizations 0,19%

Other divisions, affiliated to JSC к RZD 0,05% -4 Track RZD» control НОД complex

Locomotive complex companies, Power supply Power organizations

38,12% external Other Transportation Transportation Petropavlovsk Petropavlovsk Wagon complex Wagon Passenger division Passenger (c.5.16 Regulations) (c.5.16 Locomotive complex Locomotive Other causes Other Signallingremote and Construction and installation and Construction Other divisions, affiliated to JSC JSC to affiliated divisions, Other

37 LOSSES DUE TO TECHNICAL FACILITIES FAILURES AND TECHNOLOGICAL VIOLATIONS ON THE RAILWAYS IN SEPTEMBER 2013 50000 47 494

45000

40000 34 808 35000

30000

25000 19 517 19 510 20000 17 885 18 159 16 551 16 724 13 958 14 615 14 123 15000 12 668 9 896 10 506 9 970 10000

5000 1728 1319 1271 2 4 430 783 247 337 286 243 887 779 365 699 571 305 0

LOSS OF TRAIN-HOURS DUE TO TECHNOLOGICAL LOSS OF TRAIN-HOURS DUE TO TECHNICAL BREAKDOWNS FACILITIES FAILURES GENERALLY THE LOSSES DUE TO TECHNICAL FACILITIES FAILURES ESTIMATED ABOUT 4% OF TRAIN-HOURS LOSSES REGISTERED IN KASAT

38 STATE OF THE ART AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF KASAT FUNCTIONALITY

SUBSYSTEM FOR EVALUATION OF POROCESS EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF PRIVATE VIOLATIONS IMPACT ON THE OPERATIONS WAGON FLEET SIZE ON THE STABILITY OF THE TRANSPORTATION PROCESS CALCUALTION OF TRAIN HOUR LOSSES, DETERIORATION OF OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE IN RELATION TO PROCESS VIOLATION INVESTIGATION MATERALS GENERATION OF NETWORK-WIDE DATA ON ACTUAL TRAIN DIVISIONAL DATABASE TRAFFCI BASED ON STATISTICS ON TRAIN DELAYS BASED ON OF ASOUP2 SYSTEM GID URAL-VNIIZHT DATA SYNCHRONISATION UPON RECEIPT OF INFPORMATION ON CHANGES. CALCULATION OF INVESTIGATION OF VIOLATIONS CONSOLIDATED INDICATORS PER SUBDIVISIONS, TERRITORIES WITHIBNRAILWAY GENERATION OF INFORMATION ON TRAIN TRAFFIC THROUGH ENDS OF BLOCK SECTIONS BASED ON DATA SUBDIVISIONS, TERRITORIES SUBDIVISIONS, REFERENCE INFORMATION ON RECEIVED FROM ASOUP-2

DATA ON THE CAUSES, RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROCESS VIOLATIONS AND DELAYED TRAINS

MARK STATIONMASTER’S IDENTIFICATION OF CAUSES OF TRAFFIC CLASSIFIER WORKSTATION SUBSYSTEM FOR ACCOUNTING AND ANALYSIS OF DISRUPTION IN PRIMARY ROUTES STATIONMASTER’S MARKS PROCESS VIOLATIONS URAL-VNIIZHT TRAIN ON TRAIN GRAPCH DISRUPTIONS GRAPH CLASSIFIER OF CAUSES INPUT OF INFORMATION ON CUASES OF PROCESS OF PROCESS VIOLATIONS VILATIONS USING EXTENDED KASAT CLASSIFIER ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS OF LOSSES CAUSED BY PROCESS VIOLATIONS. PREPARATION OF MEASURES FOR CONFIRMATION OF RESPONSIBILITY OF A FACILITY FOR PROCESS VIOLATION OR REDIRECTION BASED INCREASING THE DEPENDABILITY OF ON THE RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION OF CAUSES TRANSPORTATION PROCESS SERVICE (DIRECTORATE) OR STATIONMASTER’S SHUNTING DISPATCHER’S MARKS UNIT DISPATCHER’S MARK ON PROCESS VIOLATIONSIN CLASSIFIER WORKSTATION WORKSTATION STATION’S TRAIN GRAPH GENERATION OF INITIAL INFORMATION ON AUTOMATED SYSTEM TECHNICAL VIOLATIONS BASED ON DISPATCHER’S (STATION ACS) NOTE

FUNCTIONS IMPLEMENTED IN CURRENT VERSION OF THE SYSTEM POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT

39 ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGICAL VIOLATIONS IN KASAT MORE THAN 30 FORMS OF RESULT REFERENCES FOR THE WORK WITH SYSTEM DATA ARE AVAILABLE FOR THE USERS ON DIVISIONAL AND NETWORK LEVELS FORMS OF RESULT REFERENCES ARE IMPLEMENTED WITH A POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER DETALIZATION TO ENSURE, IF NECESSARY, THE REVIEW OF INFORMATION OF A SPECIFIC VIOALTION FLEXIBLE SETTINGS OF THE RESULT REFERENCES PARAMETERS ALLOW TO SET VARIOUS CRITERIA FOR THE SELECTION OF DATA FOR A DETAILED ANALYSIS

Analysis of technological breakdowns of cat. 1-2

Reporting period

Period from tototo

Data source

Breakdown point

Railway

Division

Station

Open line

Breakdown category

Breakdown type

SOME FORMS OF REFERENCES ARE DEVELOPED FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF CRITICALITY OF VIOLATIONS CAUSES THROUGH THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE LOSS OF TRAIN-HOURS 40 FRAGMENT OF THE RESULT REFERENCE OF LOSSES DUE TO TECHNOLOGICAL BREAKDOWNS AT THE YARDS AND APPROACHES

Failure of a Handling of Non- locomotive Untimely Non- the trains of acceptan Train control by Maintenance of crew to be forward of a acceptan Yard name TOTAL superior Construction ce by a a duty Other locomotive fleet present at locomotive ce by a direction , and repairs neighbor dispatcher in operation the train crew station coupled ing line device departure trains

THE REFERENCE REPRESENTS THE LOSSES OF TRAIN-HOURS IN FREIGHT TRAFFIC DUE TO TECHNOLOGICAL BREAKDOWNS. THE REFERENCE COULD BE DETALIZED UP TO A SPECIFIC RAILWAY 41 STRUCTURE OF THE UCP URRAN SYSTEM AS ETD

Decisions execution control Planning of strategic Operational activities UCP URRAN KPI control measures plan (Unified corporate platform URRAN) Economy unit Decision making support unit Operational costs and URRAN SYSTEM Database Database investments Indicators calculation unit (primary) EK ASUTR KASKOR (SDO)

Subsystem of decision Safety Unit for risk analysis and - Probability of fault-free operation making support for evaluation of business - Hazardous failure rate Preparation of plans of - Average time of secure state recovery activities of Tr, S, E Delivery of proposals for to management of motivation of employees of technical training of Database Database dependability of Tr, S, E divisions JSC RZD business units Infrastructure Directorate Dependability employees EK ASU FR ASU Invest divisions’ facilities Reliability - Failure rate - Probability of fault-free operation Business units Availability performance - Availability factor evaluation unit Unit for prediction of Tr, S, E - Efficiency retention factor Acquisition of data as per Acquisition of data as per - Downtime ratio operational activities plan strategic measures plan facilities’ condition - Routine breaks sufficiency factor Longevity Database Maintainability evaluation unit SIS Effekt - Average downtime - Average recovery time Subsystem of decision - Average time between maintenance Analysis unit of the URRAN system Communication of JSC RZD making support for Robustness infrastructure condition extension of design lifetime indicators - Material flows management, inventory; - Robustness factor of Tr, S, E facilities - Operational robustness factor Unit for generation of - Contract management, balance of payments railway infrastructure execution; Resources components database subject to operating Unit for optimization of - Design life extension - Financial and economic analysis. - Mean total labor intensity of routine maintenance conditions Database resources distribution - Mean and total cost of operation an maintenance GIS RZD (economy unit) - Total cost of overhaul (modernization)

Unit for generation of output reports on evaluation and planning Unit for generation of output Display of calculation results on the electronic map of the of JSC RZD business activities calculated indicators references railway system

Basic ACSs IS ASU-I Industrial ACSs Database Database Database Database AS TsNSI TsOMM ASU T, ES PUL ASK PS Database Database Database of Database of Databases of services Database KASANT ASOUP-2 warnings incidents Tr, S, E of possessions Interface for acquisition of Interface for acquisition of Interface for acquisition of Interface for acquisition of general classifiers, data on locomotive facilities data on KTSM safety Interfaces for acquisition of data from driver routes Interface for acquisition of reference books, etc. Interface for acquisition of Interface for acquisition of condition Interface for acquisition of Interface for acquisition of data on superstructure devices condition information on trainflows data on warnings information on maintenance data on technical failures data on malfunctions and pre- condition, Sg and El from ASOUP-2 activities from KASANT failure conditions services facilities

Database Database Database DatabaseDatabase Database Database Database ASU V Database (EK ASU I (ASU-P)) of GI AS EP MVPS ESMA Database Database Database AS RB KASAT GID-Ural ADK-I ERA AS KMO KVL-P, etc. Interface for acquisition of data on rolling stock - Diagnostic systems data; Interface for acquisition of Interface for acquisition of Interface for acquisition of Interface for acquisition of facilities condition Interface for acquisition of Interface for acquisition of - Mobile diagnostic and measuring data on maintenance cost, data on the results of data on electric multiple data on communications Interface for acquisition of Interface for acquisition of data on technical data on events affecting systems data; repair, modernization of general inspections of track units condition facilities condition information on operational data on monthly disturbances from KASAT train traffic safety - Inspections data. infrastructure facilities * - ASU PTO, AR BH activities from GID-Ural (PU 28/29) commission inspections

AS ETD 42 FACILITIES AND UNITS EVALUATED IN URRAN

№ Services, facilities Assessed facilities Assessed units

Department of Tracks and ° Main tracks; ° Track maintenance trains; Structures ° Station tracks; ° Track sections; 1. And Central Directorate for ° Switches; ° Maintenance sections; Track Maintenance ° Track maintenance trains. ° Track facilities at division level.

° Open line sections of catenary line between anchor supports; ° Catenary system regions; Station sections of catenary line between ° Traction substations; Department of Electrification ° ° Power supply regions; 2. anchor supports; and Power Supply Traction substations; ° Power supply division; ° ° Electrification and powers supply facilities at ° Transformer substation ; division level . ° Power lines. ° Switch control systems; Department of Automation ° Block sections; ° and block system division; 3. ° Marshalling automation systems; ° Automation and remote control facilities at and Remote Control ° CTC systems; division level. ° Train separation systems. Railway telecommunications network; Central Communications ° ° Regional communications centers; 4. ° Communications centers; Communications facilities at division level. Station ° Sections of communications lines. ° ° Operational motive power depots; Department of Locomotive ° Locomotives; ° Regional traction directorate; 5. ° New-generation locomotives; ° Maintenance motive power depot; Fleet ° Locomotive control system software. ° Regional motive power maintenance directorate. EMUs; Central Directorate for ° ° EMU depot; 6. ° DMUs; Regional EMU directorate. Multiple Units ° Diesel-electric trains. °

43 IMPLEMENTATION OF URRAN METHODOLOGY IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES Publishing of Dependability journal in English

Approval of common approaches to methods of resource, risk and dependability management at meetings held with representatives of foreign railways during 2011-2015

Germany Spain Austria France

44 THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!

Alexey Zamyshlyaev

Head of R&D Complex JSC NIIAS Dr. Sci.

JSC NIIAS 5, bldg 1 Orlikov per., 107996 Moscow, Russia Е-mail: [email protected]

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