Essays on Long-Term Real Rate and Safe Asset Trends, 1311-2018
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Essays on Long-Term Real Rate and Safe Asset Trends, 1311-2018 The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Schmelzing, Paul Ferdinand. 2019. Essays on Long-Term Real Rate and Safe Asset Trends, 1311-2018. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences. Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:42013032 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA ESSAYS ON LONG-TERM REAL RATE AND SAFE ASSET TRENDS, 1311-2018 A dissertation presented by Paul Ferdinand Schmelzing to The Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of History Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts August 2019 © 2019 Paul Schmelzing All rights reserved. Dissertation Advisor: Niall Ferguson Paul Ferdinand Schmelzing ABSTRACT With recourse to archival, printed primary, and secondary sources, the first article of this dissertation constructs global real interest rate series on an annual basis going back to the 14th century, covering 78% of advanced economy GDP. I show that throughout monetary and fiscal regimes, and across fixed income assets, real interest rates have not been “stable”, and that since the major monetary upheavals of the late Middle Ages, a trend fall of 0.6-1.8bps p.a. has prevailed, despite temporary reversals such as the 17th Century Crisis. Currently depressed sovereign real rates are in fact “at historical trend” – a trend that makes narratives about a “secular stagnation” environment misleading, and suggests real rates could enter permanently negative territory in the coming years. I posit that the data here reflects a substantial share of “nonhuman wealth” over time: the resulting “R-G” series derived from this data exhibit a downward trend over the same timeframe: suggestions about the “virtual stability” of capital returns are thus equally unsubstantiated by the historical record. With recourse to both archival and published data, the second paper constructs a 546-year survey of “safe asset” dynamics in advanced economies. I document performance for historical “safe asset providers”, and identify nine major “safe asset shortage periods”. These have on average seen net reductions in safe asset supply of over 40% within 20 years, and are now secularly becoming more intense. In contrast to recent propositions, sub-par inflation has not been overcome by a boost in net safe asset supply. The third paper posits that it is entirely plausible that early modern economies exhibited “modern” net investment ratios, and that historical capital depreciation rates of 3% and more appear unlikely. But why were capital stocks relatively low at the beginning of the industrial age? I construct long-term “war- induced capital destruction series” to show empirically that the changing nature and capital destruction III intensity of wars over time likely constitute a key influence on the capital accumulation process. I link these geopolitical dynamics to present interest rate discussions – and seek to provide new replies to Simon Kuznets’ early modern capital accumulation model. IV Table of Contents I. Global Real Rates, R-G, and the ‘suprasecular’ decline, 1311-2018………………………….1 II. 546 years of safe asset cycles…………………………………………………………..……89 III. Capital accumulation and the capital destruction process, 1495-2018……………………135 Back matter Bibliography………………………………………………………………………160 Appendix………………………………………………………………………….188 V Front Matter For excellent support and many valuable discussions, I particularly thank my advisor Niall Ferguson, and for their insights and long support my dissertation committee members Barry Eichengreen, Charles Maier, and Kenneth Rogoff. For further useful discussions I thank Michael Bordo, Steve Broadberry, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Andy Haldane, Andrew Metrick, John Lewis, Ryland Thomas, and Gertjan Vlieghe, as well as participants at the Joint Seventh CEPR Economic History Symposium-Fifth Banco de Espana Economic History seminar, the UC Berkeley economic history seminar, the Bank of England research seminar, the CEPR-BoE monetary policy roundtable, the Applied History Meeting at Harvard Kennedy School, the Reinventing Bretton Woods Conference Hamburg and discussants at Yale SOM. I thank Simon Neal for assistance with the transcription of early modern archival sources. I thank the Hoover Institution, Stanford, for financial research support during 2017-2019, and the Bank of England for the hospitality given to me as a visiting researcher since 2016. I particularly thank my parents, siblings, and grandparents for continued support and encouragement. Mountain View, September 7, 2019. VI EIGHT CENTURIES OF GLOBAL REAL RATES, R-G, AND THE ‘SUPRASECULAR DECLINE’, 1311-2018. I. INTRODUCTION The evolution of long-term real interest rates has in recent years attracted significant academic interest. Partly in the context of the “secular stagnation” debate and related contributions, which in different variants have advanced theories on the drivers behind a low rate environment, supposedly originating in the second half of the 20th century. Partly in the context of “inequality” and “wealth” debates, particularly accelerated by the contributions of Piketty (2014), and its peculiar view of long-term asset and wealth returns in their relation to broader income growth. Despite regular recourse to “history” from the proponents of such theories, it will be posited in this essay that both debates advance a misrepresentative view of long-run interest rate and wealth return trends – and only partly because they overwhelmingly omit archival and other historical factual evidence. The discussion of longer-term trends in real rates is typically confined to the second half of the 20th century, identifying the high inflation period of the 1970s and early 1980s as an inflection point triggering a multi-decade fall in real rates. And indeed, for most economists’ eyes, considering interest rate dynamics over the 20th century horizon – or even over the last 150 years – the reversal during the last quarter of the 1900s at first appears decisive. Equally, the historical relation between real wealth returns (R) and broader real growth (G) has assumed a central role in the current debates on long-term inequality trends, culminating in the widely- discussed contribution of Piketty (2014). The latter contended – on the basis of positing a “virtual stability of the pure return of capital over the very long-run” – that excess real capital returns over real growth rates would perpetuate an “endless inegalitarian spiral” (ibid, 206, 572). From what are, at their core, return and capital cost debates, have sprung various related policy and academic contributions. For instance, more recently the spread between “Safe R” (the real capital cost for 1 the “safe” sovereign debt issuer) and “G” (its respective real income growth rate) since 1950 has been documented, and highlighted as a key variable to assess public debt sustainability (Blanchard 2019). This essay approaches these subjects from a historical perspective, arguing that the recourse to archives, printed primary sources, published secondary works, and assessed written evidence from the past, qualifies many of the assumptions underpinning such present debates. In what follows, I attempt to document for the first time the particular evolution of both GDP-weighted global and “safe asset provider” long-term sovereign real rates over a span of 707 years, relying on a collection of evidence from 14th century European registers to current Federal Reserve data. First, the approach here modifies various of the empirical findings by what is perhaps the most comprehensive existing investigation on interest rate trends, the work of Homer and Sylla (1996, 2005). The latter do not take into account primary sources, and even the secondary source material is limited, once assessed in detail. Neither do they discuss real rate dynamics, or attempt to build “GDP-weighted”, global series. In consequence, the timing and evolution of interest rate trends is partly inappropriate, partly inapplicable for current debates both in the historical and the economic literature. A key empirical finding advanced here is there is no evidence of a “virtual stability” of real capital returns over the very long run. Rather, – despite temporary reversals such as the period between 1550- 1640 – global real rates have shown a persistent downward trend over the past five centuries, falling between 0.9 (safe asset provider basis) and 1.75 basis points (global basis) per annum, with the former displaying a continuous decline since the deep monetary crises of the late medieval “bullion famine”. This downward trend has persisted across monetary regimes, is visible across various asset classes, and long preceded the emergence of modern central banks. It is not directly relatable to growth or demographic drivers, though capital accumulation trends, first visible in 14th century Northern Italy and the merchant towns of the Holy Roman Empire, may go some way in explaining the phenomenon. Together, I posit that these assets go some way in enabling the reconstruction of total “nonhuman” wealth returns since the 14th century. Prior to the recording