A B-29 crosses the Hump in 1944, transporting supplies from India to an airfield in southern China. The Matterhorn Missions By John T. Correll The B-29 was rushed into production and sent to India to strike at Japan through staging bases in China. hen the Army Air Forces of 30 hours per man for the first crews 29s had to do much of their own hauling, got the B-29 Superfor- deploying to combat in 1944. Few had initially including all of the fuel used on tress, the United States ever fired the guns or dropped a bomb missions flown from China. Wfinally had a weapon to strike the Japanese from their B-29s before departing. “The scheme of operations had been homeland. There had been no US aircraft Most critical of all, proper bases were dreamed up like something out of ‘The over Japan since the Doolittle Raiders not available. The B-29 could have reached Wizard of Oz,’ ” said Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, bombed Tokyo in April 1942, but the every important target in Japan from the officer who commanded the operation B-29, with a combat radius of more than the Marianas—Guam, Saipan, and Tin- at its peak. “No one could have made it 1,600 miles, was about to demonstrate ian—but the islands were still in Japanese work. It was founded on an utterly absurd the vulnerability of Japan. hands. The Soviet Union would not al- logistic basis. Nevertheless, our entire The Boeing Superfortress was the first low its US ally to operate from eastern nation howled like a pack of wolves for airplane to be classified as a very heavy Siberia, which was only 700 miles from an attack on the Japanese homeland. The bomber. It had more speed, range, and Tokyo. Parts of Japan were within range high command yielded. The instrument payload than its predecessors, the B-17 from western China, but it was not fea- wasn’t ready, the people weren’t ready, and the B-24, which were rated as heavy sible to have main operating bases there. nothing was ready. Folks were given an bombers. The Japanese held all of the seaports impossible task to perform.” So great was its promise that the B- and strategic waterways and had cut off Impossible or not, the four B-29 bomb 29 was rushed into production and then the land access route from the west, the groups of XX Bomber Command from rushed into war. The purchase order for Burma Road. June 1944 to January 1945 tried valiantly 1,664 airplanes was placed before the The solution hit upon was Operation to make the Matterhorn plan work, fly- first prototype flew. Production aircraft Matterhorn, which called for basing the ing combat missions in one of the most rolled off the line in 1943 before flight B-29s in India and staging them through complicated strategic operations ever tests were completed. It was the most forward airfields in China to strike at tar- attempted. complex airplane US industry had ever gets in Japan, Manchuria, and east Asia. Much of the push to get the B-29 in built and it went into operation before the They would be sustained by ammunition, action came from President Roosevelt, bugs were worked out. fuel, and other military supplies, every who wanted to buck up flagging National- Fortunately, the pilots and copilots were pound and gallon of which had to be flown ist Chinese spirit and keep China in the handpicked men with experience in B-17s across the “Hump” of the Himalayas to war. Roosevelt promised the Nationalist and B-24s. Late deliveries of aircraft cut the China bases. Tankers and transport leader, Chiang Kai-shek, that bombers training in the United States to an average aircraft were in short supply, so the B- would strike Japan from China. 62 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2009 Roosevelt was displeased when opera- China. XX Bomber Command and one The first B-29 combat mission was not tions did not begin in 1943 and groused of its bomb wings, the 58th, deployed to against Japan and did not use the China that, if the B-29s were not ready, “we the south of Bengal state in India. The bases. On June 5, Wolfe launched 98 have several other types of bombing other wing, the 73rd, was held in the bombers from their bases in India against planes.” As Roosevelt knew full well, United States until bases were available the Makasan railway yards in Bangkok. the bomber with the next best range, the in the Marianas. More than a dozen B-29s aborted, but B-24, could not reach Japan, but Gen. H. The first commander of XX Bomber 77 hit the target. It was officially rated H. “Hap” Arnold, Chief of the AAF, got Command was Brig. Gen. Kenneth B. an operational success but the damage the message. Wolfe, who had been in charge of the inflicted was modest. Arnold was under pressure to make B-29 production, testing, and training Arnold was pressing for a large strike an expensive program pay off. Develop- program. His headquarters in India was on Japan. On June 15, Wolfe finally had ment of the B-29 had cost $3 billion; by at Kharagpur, about 90 miles west of enough fuel pre-positioned in China to comparison, the US would spend only $2 Calcutta. Each of the 58th wing’s four send the B-29s, on their second combat billion for the entire Manhattan Project bomb groups had a base in Bengal. The mission, against the Imperial Iron and to develop the atomic bomb. four forward bases in China were 1,000 Steel Works at Yawata on Kyushu. They Arnold needed to establish a strategic miles to the northeast, around Chengtu, left Bengal battle loaded, refueled in plan for the B-29 before one of the other the capital of Szechuan Province. By May China, and flew their 3,200-mile round- theater commanders could grab it. Both 1944, Wolfe had 160 B-29s in India. trip mission from there. Of the 68 bomb- Gen. Douglas MacArthur in the Southwest ers launched from the China bases, two Pacific and Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, who Arnold Pushes for a Large Strike crashed, 10 had mechanical problems, commanded the broad sweep of “Pacific Modification kits followed the B-29s and nine diverted to other targets. Forty- Ocean Areas,” wanted the B-29 to sup- to India as shakeout of the new system seven of them reached Yawata, which port their surface campaigns. The Joint continued under combat conditions. It was was obscured by cloud cover. Most of Plans Committee was inclined to give it tough going. The aircraft in-commission the B-29s bombed by radar and there to MacArthur, whose air chief, Maj. Gen. rate in July was 27 percent and 36 percent was only one direct hit on the iron and George C. Kenney, proposed to base the in August. steel works. Some of the bombs landed B-29s in Australia and use them against The worst problem was the powerful miles away. However, the eight news regional Japanese installations. Wright Cyclone R-3350 engine, which correspondents who went along on the Rather than dribbling the B-29s out had a tendency to overheat and catch fire. mission filed favorable reports and the new on tactical targets, Arnold wanted to use Accidents, crashes, ditchings, aborts, and vulnerability of the Japanese islands to air them as strategic weapons against Japan diversions were common events. Eventu- attack made the front pages of newspapers to achieve results that might shorten the ally, the original R-3350-13 engines were in the United States. war. To keep them out of the hands of replaced with improved R-3350-21s. On July 4, Arnold relieved Wolfe, who regional ground commanders, Arnold sold According to James L. Pattillo, a former was not meeting his expectations, and the idea of a strategic air force—Twentieth B-17 instructor pilot and one of the first the 58th Bomb Wing commander, Brig. Air Force—which he would command B-29 pilots, the “engine was a disaster the Gen. LaVerne G. Saunders, took over himself as executive agent of the Joint first year in combat, but as [it] became XX Bomber Command temporarily. No Chiefs of Staff. more reliable, noticeable by May-June successor was named to command the All of the B-29s were assigned to Twen- 1945, the B-29 proved to be the world’s wing, which faded into the background, tieth Air Force. A subordinate element, best heavy bomber of World War II and and, under an organizational realignment, XX Bomber Command, was activated a good, reliable airplane.” the four bomb groups reported directly in November 1943 and began training at Smoky Hill Field near Salina, Kan., with two bomb wings. Constant churning of the program made it even harder to bring B-29s on line on an accelerated schedule. Even before the first test flight, military officials had ordered some 900 modifications, and they kept coming. Deliveries fell behind, and there were not enough airplanes for training. Arnold went to Kansas March 9 to see the B-29s off to war and discovered that none of them were ready to go. The famous Arnold temper erupted in what became known as “The Battle of Kansas” and a crash program had the first 11 B-29s deploying to the combat theater by the end of March, with more to follow. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved Operation Matterhorn, directed at targets in Manchuria and Kyushu, the south- Brig.