GO 11 4 stubborn resistance brought the Zd Battalton to within striking distance of the main enemy position. High winds and typhoon rains hampered engineer and pioneer operations and made supply and evacuation by hand carry extremely difficult. Well-trained enemy infantry in good physical condition and armed with a high percentage of automatic weapons, defended the knife-cdged ridga of the positions, which were completely tunnelled through and honeycombed with cares. Jungle arid ver~icalrlilfa on either pank canalize3 the attack of the 26 Battalion. For 4 days, i.he 2d Buttalion hurled attacks against this position unlil it was finally taken on 5 July by a savage assault with hand grenades, bayonets, and satchel charges. The enemy fought to the death, and friendly casualties were high. During. the nighls of TAand G7 July, the enemy attemptd to retake the position with fielrc counterattacks which were beaten back. During the period 23 June to 7 July 1945, 345 enemy dead were counted on the front of the 2d Battalion and two prisoners of war werc taken. The defeat was a decisive one and opened the way to the seizure of Kiangan. Tons of ammunition and large amounts of vehicles, supplies, and equipment mere captured along the route of aduarxe. The losses of the battalion werc 18 dead and 42 wounded. Every officer and nlan disvlased-. the hiahest kind of fortitude, resourcefulness. and deuolion to dnty. The distinguished performance of duty by the 2d Battalion, 6.?d Ififanli'~,Rroiment, rxemgllfles the true sllirit of the American Arms and piled States Army Forces, Pacific.) ,J6.The 2d Battalioi&,Sllth Infantrff Regiment, is cited for outstandinp per- Germany, against fanatical defense. and advanced at night over 4&KI0 yards of enemy-held terrain to eaptn?e Ruhrberg. Germany, on 4 February 1I145. ' Thc Pd Battalion continued its attack at 0330, 5 February 1045, over very rugged mountain terrain lo capture Woffelsbach, Gernlany, and the high ground to the west and north. Sornc 23 pillbows were captured in this operation. On 7 February 1945, the 2d Bnttnlion fought its way over 300 yards of mountainous forest, with slopes of from 30' to 60" to be overcome and defended by dclermined enemy in concrete pillboxes, wooden bunkrrs, and cntrenehments. By its daring and vigorously persistent owrations. this battalion outflanked the Stmaugh- Steckenboro segment of the Siegfried Line; successfully attacked and cleared the enrmy from kcy termin south aud southwest of Schmidt, Germany, and thereby provided for the rapid reduciion of the strongly fortified area protecting the Schwammenanel Dam, with a minimnm of casualties The courage, fortitude, nnd devotion to duty shown by the members of the 2d BnttaZia, 311th Infa,btr~ ILegiment, for a protracted period of 9 days in the face of severe weather and a determined, entrenched eoemy-3 days of this operation being over terrain impassable to movement of any type uf motor vehicle, necessitating the hand carrying of all supplies, equipment, and ammunitiou-resulted in a &mile advance into die enemy territory and the capture of three towns with over 300 prisoners. (Gencml Orders 324, Headquarters 78th Infantry Division, 30 June 1946, as approved by the Commanding General, United States Army Forces. European Theater (Main).) 5'; Thc gd Bottalhon, SSOth Infantru Reginlent, is cited for outstanding per- formance of duty in armed conflict with the enemy. At 0830 on 7 August 1944, the 2d Batteliorr 380th Infanlrv Regiment, launched an attack toward St. Joseph, France. By 0530, the leading company began receiving intense A00 2988B artillery, machinegun, and smnll~armsfire. All through the rest of the day, heavy fighting vent on and the two leading companies were able to ad- vance another a00 yards before darkness came and defensive positions were prepared for the night. B- ore dawn on S August, the German artillery he- wn a concentration which blanketed the entire battalion area and lasted for 45 minutes, and its intensity delayed the jump~offtime of the battalion's attack. The battalion sector was some 1800 yards in widch and ran through wmds of varying density and over bald, open hills that were under direct enemy observation and subject to all their fire power. At about 0800, the battalion resumed the attack. Here the battalion bore the brunt of the di~isionattack, being almost in the center of the division sector. It en- countered the strongest of enemy installations, including permanent gun em- placements hewn out of thc granite rocks of a quarry and an extensive series of fox holes and trenches reinforced by stone walls and barbed wire entanglements. Sereral times hand-to-hand nmbat was needcd to reduce these positions. Even though outnumbered, it continued the attacks against fanatlcal opposition in the face of intense artillery concentrations, including multiple-barrelled rocket projectors, antitank guns, 88mm guns, mortar, and machine fire. Through agg.~resairenesa, determination, and sheer cour- age, by 1030 it had gained FoO yarda of bltterly contested ground. Then the enemy counterattacked. The numerically superior enemy closed in upon the battalion and a furious hand-to-hand battle raged. Radio operators, runners, and liaison personnel all joined in the battle to muster every avail- able weapon to force the enemy hack. Finally, the flghting skill and spirit of the Bd Battalion showed its effect. Those enemies who were not killed, wounded, or captured were put to rout and their morale broken. Without respite the battalions' attack continued. When one company was suffering heavy casualties and becamc disorganized by lire from a self-propelled gun, the last remaining officer in the company, at great risk to his life, knocked it out with a bazooka. Such leadership and disregard for personal safety characterized the actions of all members of the battalion. By nightfall it had advanced to within GOO yards of the St, Joseph fortress, and by constantly pouring fire from small arms, mortars, and artillery into the fortress, they prevented the enemy from manning their gun pasitions atop the fortress, thus being able to clean up the outposts of the enemy that surrounded the fortress. The heavy shelling shook the fortress continuously throughout the night. me next morning, the German commander of the fortress, his troops decisively defeated and thoroughly demoralized, and seeing the hopelessness of his Situation, surrendered the fortress. Battalion losses during the 3-day action were 154 kilied, wounded, or missing. An estimated 261 Germana were killed, 428 taken prisoner, and 178 wounded. Five enemy assault guns, three self-propelled guns, five antitank guns, seven antiaircraft guns, one tank, and seven mortars were destroyed. An undetermined but large amount of enemy small arms, ammunition, and food stores was captured or destroyed. Thus, during the 3-day period from 7 through 9 August 1944 the Zd Battalion, 330th Infantry Regiment, wilh a notable display of courage, combat skill, and determination broke stubborn enemy resistance at St. Joseph and the approaches to St. Malo, decisively defeated the enemy, and prevented them from denying our entry into the St. Malc-Dinard area. The undaunted courage and unswerving devotion to duty shown by ench man of the battalion reflect the highest traditions of the armed forces. (General Orders 231, Headr~uarters836 Infantry Division, 5 December 1915, as ap AGO 2960B proved by the Commnnding General. Third United States Army and Eastern Military District.) 8. The 3d Battaliorb, 137th infantrv Regiment, is cited for outstanding pr- formance of duty in action againat the enemy in France from 18 to 21 November 1934. On the morning of IS November 1944, the Sd Battdion, 137th InfantvU Regiment, launcheil an attack toward high. -ground nnrth~easrof Harprich. as Dart of tile 35th Infanrry Division offensive designed to break the winter offerrrive line established by the Germans on the axis uf Nancy. Sarreguemines, and Mannheim. The iirst objective was seized nt 0916 tamns, aftcr the hattaliun had forded an icy stream and had driven through barbed Kire entanglements at tile muddy upproaches to thc town of Beiling. Pausing momentarily, the troops pmsed 011 11ndcr increNSingly accurate shellfire, across open terrain, nud entered the towrl of Bistrofl. Bitter houw-tn-llunse fighting ensued, until 1230 bourn when possession of the town was sri-urnd. Marshy ter~~inin tbat vicinity defied all efforts to move either track or wheeled vehicles. In anticipation of an attempt to retake Bistroff, antitank mines were hand carried under eovcr of darkness and plamrl astride the two roads lending into the towo. At NO0 19 November, Company K launched an attack on Hiil 315, thc outstanding terrain feature in this arca, studdea with gun emplacements which denied the use of nearby roads to our forces. Pimultnneuusly the G~rmauscuuntcrattaeked che town of Bistroff in compnny strength, suiworted by two Mark Y Panther tanka. Roth tauks were dimbled by the well-plated antitank mines, and the 9d Battalion riflemen, witil artillery support, placed withering fire among the enemy rnnks, stalled the enemy attack, gradually turuerl it, and forced lhr Germans back with heavy casuaU.ies. In the meantime, Company K achicveil a tactical surprise and, SUpportCd by a heavy nlachiue gun plntoon, stormed the dug-in positions on nil1 315. The capture of this hill pierced the errerriy defense line, and enabled armor and other units on the right to advance and seizc Gros-Tenquin. At WDO 20 Kuvemher, the Sd Battaliox uiored toward the enemy stronghold of Arey- bouse, across soggy terrain and under artillery and mortar fire, seized several intervenirrg fortifi2d positions, and that afteruoon laulrched an attack which carried into the outskirts of Freybouse. The enemy reacted t;trongly wltb well organized counterattacks. By nightfall, one platoon of Conlpany K was estab- lished in s group of houses in the town.