END of the COLD WAR and the DISSOLUTION of USSR From

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END of the COLD WAR and the DISSOLUTION of USSR From END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE DISSOLUTION OF USSR From detente to the second Cold War, 1969­85. By the late 1960s, several factors had emerged which made the USA ready to follow a policy of détente with the USSR; The growing impact of the Vietnam war. Soviet economy was declining A growing fear that the risk of nuclear war increased. Growing Soviet concerns about the Sino­Soviet split, by 1969 almost resulting in a full scale war. dec 17­09:43 1 Nixon and his foreign minister Kissinger abandoned the idea of ‘rolling back’ communism, in favour of a policy of détente and linkage (Sino­Soviet co­ operation in restraining revolutions in the third World for concessions in nuclear and economic fields). The price was assistance in the US withdrawal from Vietnam. In order to avoid new direct US involvements in the developing states Nixon launched his doctrine (1969). Instead of direct involvement ‘client states’ would be given US weapons and training. Four summits were held 1972­74 but USSR remained suspicious of US motives. dec 17­11:07 2 SALT1 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks started in 1969 on the subject of arms control, not reduction. The existing ‘terror balance’ which was seen threatened by new developments in arms technology would be restricted by SALT decisions. SALT 1 was signed in 1972; five year freeze on all ICBMs (inter Continental Ballistic Missile); SLBMs (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile), and long range bombers, while each side agreed to have only two ABM (Anti Ballistic Missile) sites. Failed to include limitations on MIRVs (Multiple Independently targeted Reentry Vehicles). SALT 1 appeased USSR and reduced tensions between the superpowers. dec 17­11:07 3 With Willy Brandt’s new West German government tension also fell in the relations between USSR and western Europe. In 1975 the Helsinki agreement was signed which accepted status quo in Europe. dec 17­11:09 4 A SECOND COLD WAR 1979 A remaining problem was that even though USSR wanted stability in Europe, it also wanted to extend its influence in the developing World. Of special interest were possible allies with naval bases as USSR had no operational bases outside its own country. As a wave of revolutions spread over the developing World USSR saw its chance to improve its international position. MPLA UNITA dec 17­11:09 5 Problems also arose in relation to SALT 1 because several systems were not covered by the treaty and Nixon decided to develop these. dec 17­11:10 6 THE PROBLEMS OF MAINTAINING SU CONTROL OVER EASTERN EUROPE NATIONALISM A major problem faced by the USSR throughout the period 1945­91. Communism had never achieved majority support in any country outside USSR (as it hadn't in USSR either) As part of this problem Yugoslavia broke off the SU dominance and was expelled from Cominform 1948. 1948­1990 the country remained a communist state independent of the USSR. Nationalism also affected Soviet control in other east european states. Even within the Soviet Union national feeling had the potential to disrupt the state. jan 16­17:51 7 ECONOMY The war, the abscence os the Marshall Aid, USSR's policy of nationalising easteuropean wealth and the introduction of Soviet­style central economic planning and collectivised agriculture resulted in a dramatic division between a wealthy, developing and industrialised west and a poor, stagnated and agricultural east. The contrast was most apparent in Berlin, where eastberliners could freely travel to the west before 1961. This resulted in a strong wave of migrants leaving the east for greater wealth and political freedom in the west. jan 16­17:51 8 LACK OF POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM Eventhough only Chechoslovakia had a longer tradition of democracy a desire for a relaxation in the rigid control of the communist party was apparent in all easteuropean states. In the Catholic countries the church supported anti­communism and struggled against the SU dominance. In 1978 the Catholic church received a considerable boost with the election of a polish born pope (John Paul II). jan 16­17:52 9 CRISES OF USSR DOMINANCE IN EASTERN EUROPE POLAND 1956 Partly as a concequence of the changes in the SU leadership SU faced major challenges in Poland. 28.6.1956 workers began a series of political strikes aimed against soviet dominance and poor living and working conditions. The upheavals were chrushed but there was also a governmental change towards a stronger polish nationalistic government. The mass movement of Polish workers, followed by a mass revolution of Hungarian workers, is a perfect historical demystification which whittles away the cold war mythology, of the “real socialism” and the “free world”, telling us loud and clear how a “different reality” is possible, how it is a goal of this “hidden history” which reveals itself through every trace of struggle of the real people against the world which puts them down and turns them into alienated objects. jan 16­17:52 10 HUNGARY 1956 Partly inspired by events in Poland and East Germany Hungarian nationalists clashed with Soviet militatry forces during the fall 1956. After 4 days of fights the result was the creation of a multiparty government and a decision by Hungary to leave the Warsaw pact. USSR responded by invading the country, killing 3000 and forcing 200 000 to escape. The hungarian communist leader Imre Nagy was executed for his part in the uprising. The western powers didn't intervene in any of the east european revolts (the division after 1949 was accepted by both east and west). jan 16­17:52 11 CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1968 In 10.4.1968 the communist government of Czechoslovakia tried to introduce a new liberal version of communist rule in which the conditions of the country as well as democracy would have a strong precense. The country was invaded in August. The Brezhnev doctrine was introduced; USSR had the right to intervene in any communist state. jan 16­17:53 12 POLAND 1980­81 Poland drifted in to a major economic crises 1980 and needed SU economic aid. The Polish gornment was forced to increase the prices of basic foodstuffs. This triggered a number of strikes which eventually developed into an independent trade union, Solidarity. Supported by liberals, nationalists and the church Solidarity was successfully led by Lech Walesa. Instead of SU invasion the Polish p.m General Jaruzelski introduced martial law and Walesa was placed under 'house arrest' for a year. jan 16­17:53 13 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w8Vmx9Pg5Js&feature=related USSR in Afghanistan Chernenko Chernenko was expected to replace Brezhnev when he died in 1982 but he was passed over in favour of Yuri Andropov. Andropov attempted to introduce a series of reforms but he died in 1984 before he could complete his programme. Chernenko now became the new leader but ill­health forced him into retirement and he was replaced by Andropov was elected to the Politburo, and, Mikhail Gorbachev. as Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev’s health declined, Andropov began to position Konstantin Chernenko died in 1985. himself for succession, resigning his KGB post in 1982. Andropov was chosen by the Communist Party Central Committee to succeed Brezhnev as general secretary on November 12, scarcely two days after Brezhnev’s death. He consolidated his power by becoming chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (president) on June 16, 1983. Ill health overtook him by August 1983, and thereafter he was never seen again in public. He accomplished little and was succeeded by a former rival, Konstantin Chernenko. jan 20­10:59 14 To what extent did Gorbachev overcome the internal problems he faced as leader of the USSR between 1985 and 1991? jan 7­10:27 15 GORBCHEVS 'REVOLUTION' • General secretary of the communist party 1985 • Objectives: to turn the tide of Soviet economy, from stagnation and decline to expansion and growth • Stop the rearmamentbattle to cut costs • Concluded this would be possible as USA faced the same problem dec 18­12:58 16 DOMESTIC ARENA • 'PERESTROIKA' ­ modernisation of the Soviet economy. Increase productivity to achieve a growing general welfare • 'GLASNOST' ­ open mindness. Problems should be exposed, dicussed and solved in public. Critisism encouraged. Battle against corruption and stagnation. The party also open to critisism • 'DEMOCRATISATION' ­ a democratisation on all levels in society. Population encouraged to participate dec 18­13:03 17 The rearmarmentrivalry meaningless and fatal as it undermined the national economy and could result in disaster • The concept of class struggle abandoned • Peaceful coexistence and detente • The global expansion of socialism abandoned • Chruschevs and Breschnevs doctrines of conquest abandoned • The disarmarments talks with the USA restarted • The 'Stalinists' of USSR very critical • 6 summits between USSR­USA dec 18­13:42 18 Productivity in USSR was dropping in the late 70s. The country was looking more as a developing country with widespread alkoholism, spoiled environment, dropping birthrates and lifeexpectancy. Gorbachev concluded that the financial burden of maintaining the military power was to great and its effect on the soviet economy would ultimately undermine soviet security. dec 18­13:48 19 As a superpower USSR also had to support the east european satellites. • Economically, credits, cheap energy, arms. • Epansionism in thethird world countries; aid and arms. • The costs of the military ­ 15% GNP dec 18­21:28 20 At his first Central Committee in april 1985, Gorbachev announced his intention to reopen arms control talks with the USA. • withdrawal from Afghanistan planned • clear distance from Breschnevs policy • appointed the liberal Edward Shevardnanadze foreign minister dec 18­21:33 21 1983 Reagan announced USA's aims of SDI(Strategic Defence initiative) a antirobotdefence system.
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