Nl;;\'! YOHK Tnms, Sun::lay, 2 July 1967

The announcement here !laid that the plane had landed at an A.Jgerlan airflel~ and that the crew and passengers were found to be aliJJled. All are under the surveUlance of Algerian security for mterrogaUon, it said. TJ!e Belgian and Spanish

onbf.$id.es tHe arrivhere aldeclined of the c~~=~~!j!~~~~~~T party. The Congo has matlc representation In

J • _..t ~ I _ • I !_ " t I I ' r ~ r,- ~ · : ., . . '"" . - -- ~ NEF YORK TTI-1ES , Honday, 3 July 1967

mains valid. He had been charged with treason. [Informed sources in Kinshasa said, ac- . cording · to Reuters, that .the Minister of State, Bernard Dia­ ka, would fly to Algiers to. dis~ •· c_uss Mr. Tshombe's extradi- l tion.] .· .. ~- _ . . Algerian officials, suggesting The Algerian Government there had been a hijacking radio said Mr. Tshombe and SOUGHT BY CONGO said yesterday . that . severai some Europeans on the plane, ~t;rcenary soldiers and Belgian whi<:h m~de an unscheduled c1t1zens w~re on the plane with : landmg In Algeria Friday Mr. T_shombe. They denied that : night, were . under the . 1'sur­ Ex-Premier, Under a Death Aigena _had arranged for the ! velllance" of the Algerian pl~!le to ~a~d at the Boufarik : security pollee for questioning. Sentence at Home, Is 1 m1htary a1rfreld, 17 miles west 1 The radio confirmed yester- of Algiers. . . day that a plane carrying Mr. Questioned iJJ Algeria Reports reaching Paris from / Tshombe and a group of Euro- Aigi~rs quoted a spokesman of p_cans .h~d landed at an Alge­ . Pres1d~nt Houari Boumedlene 1 nan a1_rf1eld . . · as saymg his Government was j Fore1gn news reports had 1 taken by surprise by Mr · suggested that the plane was · .Tshombe's arrival · hijacked and forced to land In These reports ~aid the Gov- Alg~ria Friday night while on emment had not yet decided a flight from Palma de Majorca what to do with the three Brit- to Ibiza-the Spanish Holiday . ish s~bjects aboard the plane- Islands, ~!-bout 200 miles off the pilot, co-pilot and hostess the Algerian coast. · The pilot · and co-pilot we~e There have been conflicting identified as Capt. David Tay- , repo~ on the number and na­ lor, and Capt. Trevor Copple- : tlonahtles of those aboard Mr. ston, both formerly of the Tshombe's chartered .plane. . Royal Air Force. The hostess · ~~- Sw!ss and Belgian Em- was not identified. , : basstes satd .they were seeking The plane was on charter : news about the crew and pas­ from · Gregory Air Services of , seng~rs ~rom the Algerian Denham near London . ·. Fore1gn Mmlstry. · · PI ' · · The .Swiss are In charge of · ane Reported Full .. British Interests here in the ab- Kenneth Gregory, head of the ; sence of diplomatic relations airline, said in London the : between Algeria and Britain. twin-jet Hawker-Siddeley 125 ; Mr. Tshombe and the others was on a five-day charter to 1 on the plane were kept incom­ a firm_ identified as Sedefl a : municado and their whereabouts tourist promotion agency ba~d : in Algeria was not known. in Madrid and Liechtenstein. He Beyond the terse announce­ said the flight started 1n Ge- ments by the ·Algerian radio, neva and had been expected to there has been no official com· cross Spain, France Italy and · ment on the status of Mr. Belgium. - . ' ·. .. · Tshornbe. The plane wAs set up .. to . ------carry a two-man crew arid ·seven passengers. · I . M~. ·· Gregory said that, · ac­ cording to messages he had re­ ceived, the plane was full when it landed in Algeria. He said he did not know Mr: Tshorribe would be a pasSenger. · · Th~ Belgi!ID charg6 _!i'affafres, Maunce Vrussl~re, went tO the Algerian Foreign Ministry· to s~~k the. release of ..the .Belgi!lJl Citizens on board. .; ·.· .. , -- ... Interrogation Continues ' · Speclal to Tho New York Time• / ALGIERS, July 2 - Algerian security ·officials continued to- ~· day to interrogate former Premier Tshombe. · President ot the Security COUDCU Nev York Frclll: MiJlaf'tet Ki.D.ahaaa

Regret to 1utom you tbat the Dellocratic Republic ot the Congo is at present, the obJect or agpesaion~£Zdi 'm*d by the Western coloa1alist imperialists. In short, the situation is as follon. Sane t:llle aso, acts ot sabotage were cCIIIIIitted in Kate.Dga by C"'Pal'doa traiDad aDd staticmed in Ansola. FollawiJls the arrest ot TshCII'be, we bave received intormation that Ccwpandos would be sent to ~ _.territary to provoke disturbance!_and~~s1bly to attempt to rea~1Uike7· This morning, at 6: }0, ~·.local tiDle two lmidentified aircraft landed at Kisangani airpOi"t, dropp1D8 groups ot merc--.rifJS by para­ chute. At. the saae tiae, so called volunteer. enpsed ~id by the :O.OCJ'&tic Repbblic ot the Congo but untortunately in leape with the hired killers M who ha4 been dropped by parachute attacked the valiant troup of our national &l'IQ'• This coutitutes real assression tl'CIIIl outside. While clashed were reported at Kiaanaa.ni, mercenaries ot Belsian, French and Spe.Di.sh ori~~ in concert with Kata.Dgtse ex-se'Qderas, also opened ho&Uit{Jat Bulcaw. We draw the aui... l the serious attention fit the fteoui.lty ComcU to the fact that this situation is calcalated to tJeope.rdize peace in Central A:f'rica. It is for the CouncU to call to order the Western · COUiltries wboae mercemries have been sent to the Conso to proYoke 41atUrbances, in cODfOl"JDity with resolution No.226 ot 14 October 1966 stating that •the Security Council, baviDS heard the nat•ents of the represartative ot the Delllocratic Republic ot the coaso and lh ot the repreaeatative of Portupl, taklns note ot the stateaent ot the representative ot the DIMcratic Replblic of eonso Mlli tbat ADsolA UDder Port'U8\leae edmin1at1"&tion is being used as an operaticmal baae for foreip aercenaries With a View to interference in the dcmeatic affairs of the DemODr&tic Republic of the COJ38o, taldns note also ot the stateaent of the representative ot Portupl tb&t there are fin Angola no merceD&ries, caapa, or war me.teri&l inteDdecl to disturb the peace in the ne.ocratic Republic ot ccmso, deeply concerned at the course ot events in the reston, recalling the relnant resolutions of the Security councu &Del the Genel'al Asaebly; l. urses tea Pe• the Portugese GOTel"DDleD't, in Tiew of ita own atat•ent, not to pel'llit foreign aerceuaries to uae qola aa an operational baae for interference in the danestic af'tairs ot the Democratic Republic ot the Conso; 2. lnvites all states to ref'raiD or desist ~ 1Dteneni.Da in the dcaestic attairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; }. requeata the Secretar;r~ral to follow closely the impl•entaticm ot this reaolutiCD. ~ On the basis ot tbia resolution, the Democl"&tic Republic of the Canso, fi.nd'lns itself the Victim ot aggression, co.aitted by cdonist, imperialist powers, Will not shrink from~ sacrifice to ensure the peace, tranquility and security ot its people. The disastrous conaequence of these ennts can be the responaibility Glll.7 or their authors who are supporting the tlunlq ot the iaptrialist YhCIIl it is abhorrent to us to nu.e. We therefore count upon. the energetic intervention ot the Security Coantil to eneure that these acts ot banditry cease ilmedlately. Hishest consideratioo. SE/12. Lieutenant General J. n.· Mobuto, President ot the Democractic Republic of the canso. Unot:ricia.J. Tre.nala.tion i"rca French

Permanent Mission ot the Democratic Republic ot the Conso to the United Nations TI/va No. 0753/67

Rev York, 5 July 1967

Sir,

I have the honour to forward to you herev1th a cable addressed to you by B.E. Lieutenant-General Josepll-Desire MCBlJ!'U, President ot the Democratic Republic ot the Congo.

The agsression caaaitted &&ainst the Democratic Republic ot the Conso by the agents ot intematiOft&l. 1,mfer1al1a is a pre-meditated act invol­ Ting the responsibility ot a number ot Western powers.

I shall be grateful it you, as this month • s President ot the Security CCNDcil, w1ll, as requested in the ssase traR the President ot the Democratic Republic ot the Ccmso Member Sta es, particular~ the Powers concerned, ot their obligations under the relevant provisions ot the Charter.

Accept, Sir, the assurances ot my highest consideration.

(Signed) Theodore IDZUNBUIR Allbassador ExtraordiDary and Plen1potentiar;y Permanent Representative

Ht-E. L.E. MAKONNEN President ot the Seeur1ty Council lfev York 17, N.Y. NEW YORK TIMES, Wednesday, 5 July 1967

olBe 'I'shQmbe, former Premier of the Congo and previously leader of the rebellious Katanga Province, bas fallen into the hands of bitter enemies-the Al­ gerians. This is one suspicious aspect of his sensa· Uonal kidnapping in the sky while on a flight during which his chartered plane was seized and taken to a military airbase near Algiers. Mr. Tshombe is the victim of an extraordinarlly nurky and complicated machination that makes the 'ictional plots of thriller novels seem tame. The Con­ JOlese Government wants him back in order to execute the sentence imposed when he was belatedly con­ ~emned to death for treason last March. That is their business, even if it is a barbaric one. After all, fol­ lowing the Katanga secession and Mr. Tshombe's first ~eriod of exile, he was recalled to Kinshasa (Uopold­ rille) and was Premier for fifteen months. What is outrageous is the naked aerial piracy that nade him captive. This was not an ordinary incident. fhere are all sorts of lurid threads in the pattern­ :he hostility of the Algerians; the pro-Tshombe senti­ nents of the Belgians who own the rich Katanga :opper mines; the white mercenaries who beat down 1 rebellion for the Congolese Government; and most of all the persistent rumors that Moise Tshombe bas ~een hiring more mercenaries in Europe, buying arms, md plotting his return to Kinshasa. ••International laW"' has become a vague ideal in :his anarchic age, but there is no understanding or "bat a nation can and should do that justifies this tYPe of piratical behavior. The Congo has been called "a potential cancer ln ~frica" because of her political instability, military :ivalries, tribal strife and her huge, chaotic, badly ,ovemed interior. She wi.ll not improve her image in ~frica or in the world by resorting to lawlessness in uder to eliminate a feared exile. Obviously, the ghost of the murdered Patrice Lu­ numba-wbose death many congolese blame on doise Tshombe-is still stalking across the Congo. all tbe dark forces for which he,.JU~~~UJU . :·: ~~ ~ v;-··i -~~ THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, JULYS, 1967 fl. ..·... - ; . ?": l • ' . - - - .. c..-'· UNITED NATIONS • NATIONS UNIES

CONSTANTIN A. STAVROPOULOS

To: Secretary-General

Attached you will find the note you had requested on the invocation of Article 99 of the Charter by Mr. Hammarskjold.

6 July 196'7

... 6 July 1967

Na.rE O:N THE INVOCATION OF ARTICLE 99 OF 'llllli CHARTE..li BY THE SECRh~ARY-GENERAL liTCON NEXION wr.rH 'riB SI'.rUATIOH IN THE REPUBLIC OF THE COimo

Introduction

1. Article 99 of the Charter provides that:

·~he Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."

This Article was invoked by Mr. Hammarskjold on 13 July 1960, when he brought the situation in the Republic of the Congo before the Security Council. The present note first briefly describes the factual background to this step by the Secretary-General, and then describes the response of the members of the Security Council, as it appears from the records of the Council, to 1tr. Hammarskjold's action.

Background Infonnation*

2. The Belgian Congo became independent at midnight on 30 June-1 July 1960, under the name of the Republic of the Congo, in accordance with the decisions of a round-t~ble conference of Belgian and Congolese representatives held in Brussels in January and February 1960. The first Congolese Cabinet, led by M. Patrice Lumumba, took office on 24 June, receiving votes of confidence from the Congolese Chamber of Representatives and Senate which had

*The information which follows in paragraphs 2 to 6 is summarized from the account appearing in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1959-1960, p. 17594 and pp. 17639-17642. - 2-

been elected in the preceding weeks. M. Joseph Kasavubu was selected as first President of the new State by the two Chambers of Parliament later the same day.

3. From the very b~ginning the new State was the object of internal and provincial strife. Early in July unrest developed among soldiers forming part of the Force Publigue. On 5 and 6 July soldiers mutinied in Leopoldville and Thysville, primarily against their Belgian officers. Belgian forces remaining in the Congo were placed in a state of alert. In the days which immediately followed there were increasing reports of attacks by members of the Force Publigue against the European population and the mutiny of the Force Publigue became more widespread.

4. On 8 July the Belgian Cabinet decided to re-inforce Belgian troops already in the Congo with some companies of troops stationed in Germany and to make arrangements for the evacuation of European refugees. On 10 July Belgian troops in the Congo, stationed at Kamina, went into action for the first time, by entering Elisabethville and disarminc the mutineers there. Belgian parachutists were also dropped into Luluabourg the same evening and intervened in other areas where the mutineers appeared to have the upper hand.

5· On 11 July the Prime Minister of Katanga, • Tshombe, announced that Katanga had decided to proclaim its independence from the Congo. The same day, M. Lumumba appealed to the United Nations, through Dr. Bunche who was then in Leopoldville, for the help of military specialists to assist in the reorganization of the Congolese military forces. On 12 July, after meeting with representatives of certain African Member States in New York, - 3-

Mr. Hammarskjold announced that he had decided to set up a technical assistance office in Leopoldville, under a resident representative; first consideration would be given by this office to "matters .of high urgency", and the arrangements would fall within the United Nations technical assistance programme - "more especially the programme for assistance in public administration."

6. While these developments were taking place, clashes continued between Belgian and Congolese troops. The Congolese Government, without the approval of M. Kasavubu and M. Lumumba who were away from the capital, appealed on 12 July to the United States Government for "about 3,00011 troops to help restore order in the Bas-Congo. Later the same day the United States Government announced that "such military assistance would be better for the Congo if it did not come from the United States or any of the Western nations."

1· On 12 July, while fighting continued at various points " between Belgian and Congolese troops, M. Kasavubu and M. Lumumba addressed a telegram to the Secretary-General (S/4382), by which they requested:

"· •• urgent dispatch by the United Nations of military assistance. This request is justified by the dispatch to the Congo of metropolitan Belgian troops in violation of the treaty of friendship signed between Belgium and the Republic of the Congo on 29 June 1960. Under the terms of that treaty, Belgian troops may only intervene on the express request of the Cb~ese Government. No such request was ever made by the Government of the Republic of the Congo and we thei'efore regard the unsolicited Belgian action as an act of aggression against our country ••••

" ••• We accuse the Belgian Government of having carefully prepared the secession of Katanga with a view to maintaining a hold on our country ••• " - 4-

The following day, M. Kasa,Y¥bu and M. Lumun1ba addressed the following clarificatio;-(S/4382) of theirrequest to the Secretary-General:

''In connexion with military assistance requested of the United Nations by the Republic of the Congo, the Chief of State and the Prime Minister of the Congo make the following clarification: (1) the purpose of the aid requested is not to restore the internal situation in Congo but rather to protect the national territory against acts of aggression committed by Belgian metro­ politan troops. (2) The request for assistance relates only to a United Nations force consisting of military personnel from neutral countries and not from the United States as reported by certain radio stations. (3) If the assistance requested is not received without delay the Republic of the Congo will be obliged to appeal to the Bandung Treaty Powers. (4) The aid has been requested by the Republic of the Congo in the exercise of its sovereign rights and not in agreement with Belgium as reported."

Invocation of Article 99 of the Charter

8. It was against the above background of mutiny by the Congolese Force Publigue_, intervention by Belgian troops (both stationed in the Congo and brought in from Europe), and requests for military assistance from the President and Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo, that i,{r. Hammarskjold decide-.! to ask for a meeting of the Security Council* on the evening of 13 July. II For this purpose, he addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council informing him (S/4381) that:

*In addition -to the five permanent members the Council was at that time composed of Argentina, Ceylon, Ecuador (President for July 1960), Italy, Poland and Tunisia . •'

- 5 -

"· •• I have to bring to the attention of the Security Council a matter which, in my opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. Thus, I request you to call an urgent meeting of the Security Council to hear a report of the Secretary-General on a demand for United Nations action in relation to the Republic of the Congo."

9· In further explanation of the above request, which expressly embodies the language of Article 99 of the Charter (see para. 1 above), and shortly after the Council convened on the evening of 13 July, the Secretary-General said, inter alia, that (S/PV. 873):

"18. The reason for my request, under Article 99 of the Charter, for an immediate meeting of the Security Council is the situation which has arisen in the newly independent Republic of the Congo. [Underlining added]

"19. The difficulties which have developed in the Congo are well known to all members of the Council. They are connected with the maintenance of order in the country and the protection of life. But the difficulties have an important international bearing as they are of a nature that cannot be disregarded by other countries."

10. r. Hammarskjold then outlined the three communications he had received from the Government of the Republic of the Congo. The first, which had been transmitted through Dr. Bunche (see para. 5 above), and which related to a request for assistance in building up the Security Forces of the Congo was said by Mr. Hammarskjold to be (S/ PV. 873, para. 21) "within the limits of the competence of the Secretary-General and l have sent it informally to the members of the Security Council, only because of its bearing on the general problem." He outlined the steps he was taking to accede to the request for assistance in developing the security administration of t he Congo and declared that (S/PV. 873, para. 25 ): "we must ••• realistically recognize that this work will t ake s ome time and that t herefore there i s an ..

- 6 -

intermediary period during which the Government may find it difficult to operate in the security field. with all the needed efficiency."

11. As regards the presence of Belgian troops in the Congo the Secretary-General, v1hile refusing "to pronounce himself on this action and its legal and political consequences" concluded (S/PV. 873, para. 26):

" from the comn1unications received from the Government of the Congo that the presence of these troops is a source of internal, and potentially also of international, tension. In these circumstances, the presence of the Belgian troops cannot be accepted as a satisfactory stopgap arrangement pending the re-establishment of order through the national security force."

He then said that (S/PV. 873):

"27. It is in this light that I personally wish to see the request for military assistance, which has been addressed to me by the Government of the Congo. Although I am fully aware of all the problems, difficulties anJ even risks involved, I find that the stopgap arrangement envisaged by the Government of the Congo is preferable to any other for1nula. It is, therefore, my conclusion that the United Nations should accede to the request of the Government of the Congo and, in consequence, I strongly recommend to the Council to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Congo, to provide the Government with military assistance during the pe~iod which may have to pass before, through the efforts of the Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces are able to fully meet their tasks. It VJould be understood that were the United Nations to act as proposed, the Belgian Government would see its way to a withdrawal."

1ir. Hammarskjold invited "the Council to act with the utmost speed", saying that "a decision in principle reached today would be of the highest value" (S/PV. 873, para. 29). - 7 -

12. Upon the conclusion of the Secretary-General's statement the meeting was suspended by the President for fifteen minutes, at the request of certain members, to enable them to consult together. In the course of that recess a draft resolution was prepared, and submitted by Tunisia, which was adopted at the end of the meeting, becoming Security Council resolution 143 (1960) of 14 July 1960. That resolution, in addition to calling upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo, decided:

" ..• to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks;"

This latter operative paragraph is largely a paraphrase of the Secretary-General's recommendations to the Council, contained in paragraph 11 above (see quotation from S/PV. 873, para. 27).

13. As already seen, the substantive business of the 873rd meeting of the Security Council on 13/14 July 1960 opened with the Secretary-General's invocation of Article 99 of the Charter, and closed with the adoption of resolution 143 (1960). In the course of the debate at that meeting, the members of the Council did not discuss in any great detail the Secretary-General's action in using his powers under Article 99 of the Charter, although many of them approved his request for a meeting and the proposals that he made in his statement (see para. 18 below). Before the substantive business commenced, however, a procedural discussion took place regarding the provisional agenda, which might be interpreted to have some bearing on the invocation of Article 99· ..

- 8-

14. The provisional agenda described the item to be brought before the Council as follows: "Letter dated 13 July 1960 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/4381)." The representative of the USSR (Mr. Sobolev ), while saying that he did not intend "to object to the proposed agenda", suggested "an addition which would make it more precise" (S/PV. 873, para. 2). For this purpose he proposed that a colon be placed after the item on the provisional agenda and the following words added (S/PV. 873, para. 3):

"Telegram dated 12 July 1960 from the President of the Republic of the Congo and Supreme Commander of the National Army and the Prime 1Iinister and Minister of National Defence addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (S/4382)."

The representative of the USSR explained that this addition was necessary because (S/ PV. 873, para. 2):

11 the Secretary-General's letter does not ••• indicate that this demand for United Nations action emanates from the Congolese Government. But the Members of the Council have before them a telegram •••• from the Government of the Congo stating that United Nations assistance is needed because aggression has been committed against the Congo by Belgium."

15. The Secretary-General explained that he had not expressly proposed a reference to the Congolese requests in the provisional agenda as those requests were addressed to the Secretary-General and made "no reference to the Security Council" (S/PV. 873, para 5).

16. The proposed change in the provisional agenda was questioned by the repres entative of the United States (Mr. Lodge), who said that (S/PV. 873): ...

- 9 -

"10. The Government of the Republic of the Congo has not asked for a meeting of the Security Council. They are obviously perfectly capable of asking for one if they want to. The Secretary-General has not asked for a meeting of the Security Council on behalf of the Government of the Republic of the Congo ••• "

The representative of the USSR then declared that he would not press his proposal (S/PV. 873, para. 11), and the provisional agenda was therefore adopted without any change.

17. After the adoption of the agenda the Secretary-General made his statement referred to in paragraphs 9 to 11 above.

18. Following on the Secretary-General's statement, his action in requesting the convening of the Council and in making certain proposals, was approved, in some instances explicitly, by Members of the Council.

a) The representative of Tunisia (Mr. Slim), spoke of the "interest" with which he had heard the Secretary­ General's statement (S/ PV. 873, para. 74), and he introduced a draft resolution which, as already seen (para. 12 above), in essence paraphrased the Secretary-General's proposals (S/PV. 873, para. 91).

b) The representative of the United States said that:

"96. The United States, therefore, welcomes the initiative of the Secretary-General in requesting this meeting of the Security Council. \e believe that the recommendation which he has made f or a United Nations force is reasonable and proper ••• ".

c) The representative of Italy ( 1~. Ortona) declared that "after having heard the report of the Secretary-General, we have a clear picture of t he situation" (S/PV. 873, para. 117) .,......

- 10 -

and that "the right approach to the problem of the Congo is the one outlined by the Secretary-General in his recommendations" (S/PV. 873, para. 125).

d) The representative of the United Kingdom (Mr. Beeley) stated that his Government was "in full accord with the purposes outlined in [the Secretary-General's] statement" (S/PV. 873, para. 131).

e) The representative of France (Mr. Berard) declared that "we welcome the initiative taken by the Secretary­ General"(S/PV. 873, para. 139), and pointed out that (S/PV. 873, para. 138): "The Security Council has met this evening, under Article 99 of the Charter, at the Secretary-General's request, to consider ways and means of restoring order and peace in the Congo."

f) The representative of China (Mr. Chang), declared that (S/PV. 873, para. 151) "the Secretary-General has asked the Council to give him a mandate" and that "it seems to my delegation that we should do so".

g) The representative of Ceylon (Mr. Wijegoonawardena) said that his delegation (S/PV. 873, para. 153) "supports the approach made by the Secretary-General in regard to providing the necessary assistance to the Government of the Republic of the Congo for the preservation of the security arrangements of the State".

h) The representative of Argentina (Mr. Quijano) stated that he had listened with the "greatest interest to the Secretary-General's report" (S/PV. 873, para. 164) and that ".. ,.-. ..

- 11 -

"the plan submitted by the Secretary-General in his report

appe~rs to offer an adequate solution to the main problems confronting the Government of the Congo" (S/PV. 873, para. 166).

i) The President of the Council (Mr. Correa), speaking as representative of Ecuador, declared that (S/ PV. 873):

"172. The urgent requests for military aid made by the Government of the Republic of the Congo are justified by the facts and warrant favourable action on the part of the Council. The Secretary-General has acted wisely in submitting them to the Council. The recommendations made by the Secretary-General in his statement today are, in our opinion, appropriate to the situation."

19. The representatives of Poland ( ·r. Lewandowski) and of the USSR appear to be the only two members of the Council who confined themselves only to the communications from the Congolese Government and who did not expressly cite with approval either the Secretary­ General's action in bringing the matter before the Council, or his proposals for dealing with the situation. These representatives, however, joined in voting in favour of the draft resolution before the Council, which embodied the Secretary-General's proposals. •

... •

i n

1 ' ( /4 >. • 5 -

(8/

10

11

-7 -

11. ll t he ot the leoNt at t the the id.t t I' t JUI'lee, at ~ r .... t outaia n , to ltl t o oouult t Ia tlle ot t t no a a d 1" ion IU tt laia, wld • eel t t he 4 ot the 1» oil r Mllltion 14) (19&<>) ot 14 J'i17 19 • titi to l t with.d.ftw

1 • t ,. t d id I

...... DMe88U7 8t~, -Jil.... 1o ot tke ...... 11 ..... •tt Uift \e theiz- t

latta op tlw u.w~.-.,,a

~~,~~~L~u'• r~.. ~~ ooata . .... ( ot t1 • 21 ).

1). ,. Z'eaq • ' t • .. ti aeft il OD 1)/1 J'ul7 19'<> OP8DM iole 99 of t he C 1 143 (19,0). In ot the d.eMte at \ ha era of u Co id Dot di • hi•pown of th• h •

,-.a ..... _ . ....:a t 1....

eo~••utld, how er, a proc,Mutu ion too • pl / nYiai 1 , whi • int• ~ 0 • 1AYDOa'\1on ot A.riicl - 8 -

•

ln),

• tt

15

) -9

. tl,

) ot •

., t ( I . T ' • 125)

)

• l ll) • '

( v

•

o ...l .. ( • W1ji.__,..,.len&) ...... n. t - ll-

th in hia ap to t t r adequate olution i o the in p:robl o ro t the Oov t of th Co " {S/ V. 73, para. 166).

1) he ai t the Ooanoil, ( • Correa), ep.... ~~~~o a r epreeentatiTe of -~-...or, deolared t t (B/PV. 873)•

19. 'l'h• ) of the US to be the oal7 two he CoUilOil who oent1u4 t h lYe• onl7 t th 1 tiona fro t e Oo GeT t and who did not reaal7 aite with pp:ro

.&.Pt!l•IJ!e) t h t h Oounoil, or hi Pl'O.vwo-,u ~ b !h •• repr ativea, he. v r, join ur ot th n r aolution tore t h Counoil, hich 1 th eo tary e l' ropoe 1•.

BOSTO~ GLOBE, Friday, 7 July 1967

- .. - ;;· f . " .. ' • l \_ . . v l'i ;,, o Asks U.N. To Halt ~ggression'

By DARIUS S. JHABVALA Glohe U.N. Bure&u UNITED NATIONS-The United were in control of Bukavu in Kivu Nations Security Council shifted its Province and Kisangani in Oriental focus Thursday from the Middle East Province. Kisangani is the former to central Africa. With its task of find­ Stanleyville most important city in ing a peaceful solution to the Arab­ Eastern Congo. United States citizens Israeli conflict still incomplete, the in the eastern Congo were being air­ long-dormant problem of the Congo lifted to safety. was once again dropped into its lap. . (In Washington, State Department At an urgent meeting, requested Press Officer Robert McCloskey said by Congolese Ambassador Theodore the United States "strongly condemns Idzutnbuir, the 15-member body was the actions of those who can only im­ informed that unless there was some pede the progress of the Congolese action taken now civil war would government under the leadership of once again flare up in the Congo. President Joseph Mobutu.)

The immediate cause of the latest In a cable to the United Nations crisis, according to Id~umbuir; is the on Wednesday, Congolese President presence of mercenary paratroops in Mobutu claimed "the commandos" the two Eastern cities of Kisangani were sent "to our territory to foment and Bukavu with the intent of disturbances and possibly seek to eliminating the authority of the cen­ liberate thejr lackey." tral government in those cities. The "lackey" referred to is Moise According to reports reaching the Tshombe, the onetime powerful leader United Nations, the mercenaries num­ of the secessionist movement in Ka­ ber about 200 and are Belgian, Italian tanga Province and exiled Premier of and Spanish nationals. the central government who is now in Algerian hands after his _i?~e was ·pua-l{a

-~~~u-...t g u by natn , z referring to the Belgian- Jn nal affairs Tshombe was sentenced in bac~ed consortium, Union state. M.inlere which operates the Th u 't d St t ts absentia to death on March ·amond' and gold mines in e D1 e a es suppor dl the Congolese government 13 by a military court in Kaianga. and was deeply disturbed over Kinshasa, central capital of He appealed to the council any threat to its steady pro­ the Congo, plotting the over· "to put a halt to the recruit- gress, Buffum continued. throw of the Mobutu regime. menl of this international The council was apparent- The reasons for the fight­ mafia (mercenaries) . ·.. and ly unwilling to go into depth 1 ing in Kisangani are not remind all states of their on the Congo question and I clear. But officials believe fundamental duty not Lo inter- thus when President Endal· the mercenaries are acting on Iere in internal affairs." kachew. Mankonnen of Ethi- behalf of Tshombe and will Soviel Ambassador Nikolai opia adjourned the meeting bargain the departure from Fedorenko and Mall's Moussa until 4 p.m. Friday there was · the country for his release, Leo Keila sought to link the no objection. 1 However, Idzumbuir told «extravagances in the Congo'' The problems of the Congo the council the present gov­ with Israel's continued occu- are not new to the United ernment "is the victim of an pation of Arab lands. Nations. Ever since its inde- · international conspiracy of Speaking for the United pendence from Belgium in monopolists" who disapprove Slates, William B. Buffum said July 1960, the U.N. has been of the "recent economic re­ the charges made by the involved almost continuously forms in the country" are are, Congolese government we.re in ~~in& in the therefore, "determined to serious and the type of action a~.a...... u ~.a~:a:a ..~a~- ..- ... ma$e ~e very difficult for that was alleged contw:e.ll~~ .l theM ew, to overthrow the spirit and letter it anu to its knees.'' U.N. ch.arter. The :1Ullltl~J NEW YORK TIMES J FRIDAY, 7 JULY 1967

Washington Voices Support for Mob4t~ _Qovernment.

Speelalto Tht,Ntw York nm;• WASHINGTON; .July e--:The United States pointedly sup- ported today the Government

of President Joseph D. Mooutu1 against dissident military in the eastern provinces of Congo. · ' The State: Department said: "The United States Govern- ment supports the Govemmen of the Democratic Republic the Congo, as it has corlsis:telllt- ly done in the past, .in Government's search for stabil- ity and peace:" Referring to the units, led by mercenaries, were reported to have seized control in two cities in the east­ ern Congo, the State Depart­ ment said the United States "strongly condemns the of those who can only rarily impede the ress of the under the of Presi- dent Mobutu." The department also ren>ort.ed ~ that 46 of the ·65 · citizens In the area "of nu•<.. vu. one of the two eastern reported to be under the con- Such trol of the dissidents, been would have b~e!l evacuated to expected If there were a pohti- • Rwanda and that other Amer- ca purp

Is·~ retw · ~ . ~ faces a Asserts Loyal Troops ~_lJ!e whUe he was in aile In The conaol- Army"• foreJtln Foreign Mercenarle~ ~ ~~ volunteer Ullit In Kisanpnl, Kfsangani and Buk!Ma known as the Sixth COm1$1Jdo, Is headed by a French colanel, Bob Denard. MOBILIZATION ORDERED As the Kinshasa

U.S. Crltlcf~es the Rebels, Reported to Have Galhed _,~ Cont1·o1 in Both Places NEW YORK TIMES' Friday' 7 July 1967

charges had been he said, and he hopes Council will be pro­ "••·•··'·'"· .. with llll the facts needed · &· conclusion. Mean- ,

1) Saturday, July 8, 1967 • THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR * • UN resists• Congo propaganda By Mario Rossi for purposes of propaganda of international ward Mr. Tshombe is seen at' the UN as re· Special correspondent of events threatening the peace. flecting a clash of personalities thirsting for The Christian Science Monitor What counts is whether there is a willing­ power rather than of divergent political ness to keep UN debate and action within tenets. • United Nations, N.Y. a framework likely to prove constructive The only charge that the Soviets and some despite all the p'ropaganda and mutual ac· Africans could level was that of interference The United Nations, which has lived with cusations. by Western nations in the internal affairs of trouble in the Congo for years, is once again Africa. That much-abused word " aggres· concerned with the problems of the former Collusion charged sion" was heard repeatedly in

If there were not innocent men and ing interests in Mr. Tshombe's home prov­ women repeatedly getting caught in the ince of Katanga. political and military cross fire, the ups Of one thing we can be virtually sure: and downs of events in the Congo would General Mobutu will see in the events of ·outdo the wildest of comic operas. In the the past few days yet another desperate midst of charges and countercharges, move by the Union Miniere or the Belgian two facts are established. First, Moise Government to discomfit, even to topple Tshombe, former Premier of the Congo him. These happenings had been preceded but - in most African eyes - an out­ by acts of sabotage in Katanga. A Bel­ rageous Uncle Tom, sits shanghaied in gian allegedly implicated in the sabotage, Algiers, wondering what will happen to and subsequently said to have been him next. And second, Bukavu - one of tortured by the Congolese, was recently the most important cities in the Eastern the subject of stern representations from Congo - wp.s seized by "mercenary­ Brussels to General Mobutu. The lat­ led army dissidents." We have the word of ter was saying only a week ago: "I find the the United States consul in Bukavu for attitude of Belgian diplomacy suspicious." that. There are probably many last-d-itch President Mobutu of the Congo has re­ Belgians who cannot forgive General Mo­ ported an even more ominous threat to his butu for having at the turn of the year so authority. Two unidentified planes, he defiantly challenged the Union Miniere­ said, had landed foreign paratroopers in a source of valuable income to many Bel­ Kisangani, better known to most outsiders gian investors - and having virtually as Stanleyville. gotten away with it. The agreement even­ Whether there is a direct connection be­ tually reached between the two parties left tween the kidnaping of Mr. Tshombe and a bitter taste in many Belgian mouths. The the troubles reported from Bukavu and . bitter taste was matched by lingering sus­ Kisangani has yet to be proven. But most picions on General Mobutu's part. African nationalists will be quick to estab­ The first need for undisturbed progress lish one. In their eyes, Mr. Tshombe has in the Congo is the simultaneous removal always had to fall back on foreign mer­ of the bitter taste and tlie suspicions. And cenaries. And further, he always has it might help, too, if there were wider seemed to most Africans the darling of the recognition that General Mobutu has him­ Union Miniere, the great Belgian concern self been doing ' job many had onopoly of the min- first expect NEW YORK TIMES, Saturday, 8 ~

•

The New York TilDa J UIJ I, 11187 Congo said It had routed rebels in Klsanpnl (I) and Bukavu (2). Fighting was,reported in Klndu (3). The rebels flew casualties to Kariba, Rhodesia (4).

Reports Victory in Kisangani and Bukavu-Mercenaries Said to Flee by Plane

B7 Ulllltd Prw IDienllllaul I KINSHASA, the Congo, July 7 - The Congolese radio re­ ported today that loyal army troops had routed rebel forces in the northeastern Congo cities of Kisangani and Bukavu. It said defeated white merce­ nary troops were airlifting their forces to Rhodesia. A dispatch from Salisbury, Rhodesia, said a Congolese Air Force DC-3 carrying dead and wounded mercenaries from the fighting at Klsanganl, the former Stanleyvflle, and Bu­ kavu landed tonight at Karlba, Rhodesia. The Kinshasa radio pro- 1cJaimed a "great victory" over :the foreign mercenaries re­ ported to have attacked the two provincial capitals Wednes­ day. Authoritative reports said oyal CQn,go)ne .f..or.ces pad ~ ­ apturec[ '~vu. CAPIW 9/ ' Mtititce, attd a; !'c!e~ ~ .turday,

By RAYMOND DANIELL o I Spedalto Tile New York '1'lmel UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., Julybeing held in Algiers. A plane.· 7-The representati-ve of the in which he was a passengjlr Congo charged today that the was hijack~d last week aA4 fighting that broke out in his taken to Alg~.ers. The Congole~a country on Wednesday was an Government has demanded hC~ invasion and part of a plot to extradition. He faces ~ death restore fanner Premier Moise sentenee for treason, llllposed Tshombe to power. . while he was in exile. - '· TModore Idzumbujr, the chief 3 Phases are OUtlined "' _representative h~re of the"Gov· Financial interests with · ~ ernment of ?re~tdent Joseph .0· stake in the Congo when it ~ Mobut_u, sa1~, 1n the . Secm:'ty a Belgian colony were involved ~oll!lcil that the J?hystcal elllll· in the plot, Mr. Idzumbuir ICio mation of the ch1ef of state" serted. was part· of th~ plot. The Congole!ie delegate o~t~ Mr. Idzumbuir accused the lined what lie asserted ·were Governments of Belgium, Por- three phases of the conspirac1,; tugal and Spain of tolerating which he said involved "the re­ the activities of the conspira- cruiting of mercenaries in tbrs on their soil. Despite the Belgium, Spain and Portugal. assertion by Spain that Mr. These were: · • · Tshombe was not ~rmitted to 41The sabota~e of vital power take part in political activities, and PQrt facilities in the Conte· many of the meetings with his in late June. · supporters were held in Spain, t)The subversion of a na:; Mr. Idzumbuir Rid. tiona! army unit of former gen· The former l'temfer, :wtu:! Iuad es of Katanga Provincff, been I in exile- IIi ~'ls l!r)U<:};I mutinied and joined in~ YIJiDg commandos at KisBJt-1 . gani and Bukavu, cities in the east, on Wednesday. · . " 41The overthrow of Preslden~ Mobutu's Goveriun~t and tbe physical elimination of the President. . "I have indicated," Mr. Idzum· bulr said, "that the landing of _ foreign commandos in Kis­ angani did not coincide with· l mutiny of a unit of Katang~ gendarmes at Bukavu by hazar~ They joined one another ai!il then they were joined by foro eign civilians with weapons ar1"H engaged in fights with the ioc'id units of the Congolese ArmY,.:' Only Speaker at Sessioa ;." Mr. Idzumbuir, who. was tlte only speaker at today's session of the Council, said that heavy damage ·and many deaths l'&" suited from the skil'IJlish, Avt· Kisangani, he said. deserters from the Congolese Army join~ the commandos in seizing the airport and two military plan~ of the Congolese Air Force, These, he said, were used to bomb units of the national army. ""!' Just before the meeting ~ gan, Mr. Idzumbulr saidJ he hall been informed that the ~ vaders had escaped ffom Kif: angani on three planes, one ot which was "a commercial pl&l!,~ belonging to the National JiJi' ConJO,..- CODqmmication - planu ~-ted thai~IIMIIM heacumfJ odes{& gcs. other"'''i' Ia, Mr.lc!Ziitnbfm' said. His Government, he sal!'J' had asked the British and Pdl" tuguese Governments to arrest the mercenaries and return the stolen planes. Rhodesia, a fQr,­ mer British colony, ~ d~clar~ its independence. Angola is~ a Portuguese territory. :r •• Mr. Idzumbuir ask;ed tiil! Cqtincll to cQndemn: co~~ntrl~~~ that countenance recruiting mercenaries on theii' soil llJl allow themselves to · becoml!! bases for attacks against other countries. · After hearing the charge$ Endalkachew Makonnen .o~ Ethiopia, president of the Coun­ cil this month, adjourned the meeting until Monday after­ noon, on the understanding thtrt an earlier meeting would be held if a crisis developed. , .. Nli!Vl YORK TIMES. Sundav. 9 Ju

...... ~I J ~)) .; '~ ~I ••• ' ' I '

C • <. • ' I:~ ~J :.. .. ~I ; ' I .' flew to Klsanganl Wedl)eaday. o ne of the group's two DC· In the 3's of the Congo Air Lines was Bukavu area to Rwanda at stolen at Kisanganl yesterday the start of the hostilities. and flown to Rhodesia with The diplomatic and Red Cross wounded mercenaries. officials at the border said the The communlqu~ today said rampage of the Congolese that in November, 1965, when troops lasted most of yesterday. President Mobutu gained ~er The soldiers were Slid to have throUgb. an army coup ihere 5 Europeans Report ed to Be been seeking revenge for the were 1,800 foreign mercenaries Among the Slain After easy capture of Bakavu by serving with . the Congolese Katangese mutineers and mer· Army. Recapture of Bukavu cenaries, who took over the They had been recruited by town without firing more than Moise Tshombe, who had been a few shots. The Congolese gar- the Congolese Premier until BY The Asit)C1a tt d Preas rison fled Into the bush and shortly before the coup, the KAMEMBE. Rwanda, July 8 about 150 of them sought communlqu~ said. It @&..ld the -Congolese Government refuge in Rwanda. mercenary units had been grad· who had been routed by rebels Thursday afternoon the muti· ually reduced until by January aided by white mercenaries on neers left Bukavu. After day- of this year the number had break yesterday, the Congolese stood at 656. VVednesday returned to soldiers in the bush realized the When fighting broke out in border city of Bukavu yester­ mutineers had left and surged the eastern provinces earlier day and killed more than 60 back into town, witnesses said. this week, there were 189 pe~;son~. including five Eufo· Three Belgians Killed foreign mercenaries In the reg· ion, most of them in the Sixth peans, in a wild rampage of be soldiers then sought out Commando. revenge, diplomatic and Red Europeans they suspected of The unit was made U)? of Cross official6 reported today, having aided the mercenaries Frenchmen, Belgians, Italians, They said disciplined Congo· and shot several of them at Britons and Spaniards and was lese paratroopers then brough point-blank range. The dead in· led by a Frenchman, Col. Robert calm to Bultavu after thei r eluded three Belgians-a male Denard. The government said val by air from Kinshasa, the teacher; a grocer and a busi- the unit joined the insurrection. nessman-and two residents of ICcm2olese capital. Greek nationality. The Con- h0 desla ~ .._:.....;_, The reports fro m golese dead Included numerous R .Pill~" reaqhed this neighboring nation women and children, shot down s~lll to n • lf"' 'i'orli~ as the Congolese radio an­ as the troops returned. SAU&BURY, Rbodeslli. ~ ,July The witnesses that that tb.ere 8-The rebel Govertsmelit of that forces loyal to had been widespread looting Rhodesia, striviml for :i~· 1Pro•$< i~IP. nt Joseph D. Mobutu had and that some Europeans living tional recognJ.tioii, prdnlUeet7 '!f· mercenaries and in outlaYing areas·bad not been day a "full investigatlon'" o.f we in Ki ~angani, the seen since Friday momJng. circumstances into the.:~qm* Stanleyville, and In The uprising ln Bukavu ap- last night of a planewo6. o1 peared to be connecUd with mercenaries, including E\lro­ Mr. Tshombe. When the news pean and African woUhded, ot his kidnapping reached the from the Congo. troops of Katangese origin The regime of Prlrite ~ operating under Uie. command Ian D. Stillth, whiCh unilatiral· of Belgian; French and Spanish ly seized 1ndepenaence from · mercenaries, they mutinle'ii Britain In November, 1965, against the reaime of President countered an assertion by the Mobotuj informed sources said. Congolese Government that it The mercenary officers, was givin' asylum to "foreign heavilY outnumbered, a~parent· pirates" wtth a rigid observance ly had no cltolce but to ~9ln th.e of protocol. movement They occuptl!ld Bu- The Govem111ent Infonnation kavu early Wednesday, ap- Department ~ld the DC-3 tluit parently at the same time that brought the men into Rhod~ia similar mutinies by Katagnese had been impounded and would troops occurred in Klsangani be held "pending clarification and Kindu. of the position." The statement said: ''Twelve Mer<:enarles Rouse Anger of the occupants were needing KINSHASA, the Congo, July medical care.. .involving surgery, 8 (Reuters)-Furious official and were flbwn to Sallsbu,ry. reacti!'n against foreign m~ ~ ce.nar1es in the Congo set today as the Government p l claimed complete victory o · a short-lived insurrection in t!ie east. A communiqu~ by President ~ob~tu said the army would diSmiSS the last of its foreign tnercenary units, at least one of which. the Sixth Commando, was alleged to have headed the insurrection. The Commlll'llqu~ said the mercenaries captured in the three days of fighting would be tri~ed91. mllltFY cour:ts. . :.... ~~J•~ here 1IWA .,,. ~ of !Iii NEW YORK .TIMES, Monday, 10 July 1967 NEW YORK TIMES, Monday, 10 July 1967 , NEW YORK TIMES, Monday, 10 July 1967

gfan and Italian

and 2,000 to 31000 K~tangese · rebels Jn the Q4tem ongo. The mercenaries, organized into a dispersed unft called the Sixth Commal)do, were under Craft, in Noncombat Status, the command of a former Will Assist Government French officer, Col. Robert Den­ ard, whose headquarters was in Ending Rebellion at Kisangani. . There were also reports here today that Congolese had killed By NEIL SHEEHAN Europeans in Lubumbashi, Spedallo Tbe New YorU1mec . formerly EJisabethVfUe, and in WASHINGTON, 8ukavu. The Gove.mment troops United States has retook Bukavu Friday after 20 three large miUtary ~·l>lt~""!jllt" tbe exact causes to 30 mercenarJe. and aeveral aircrflt to the Congo .Nttelliion,were unclear. the hundred Katan&e~e :there tJecl s~ to a request by ·umemenanes and the Katangese into the country,sfde. There had dept Jbseph D. Mobutu, WDIIJ5ellw•,r• believed by officials here been no fighting in Lubwnbashi. GOvettmJ.ent Is putting down be sympathizers of former State Department sourcet rebellion led by white Moise 'J'shombe. Mr. s d that the-epproximateJy 60 aries, who is under a sen- Americans in the Bukavu area, of death in the Congo, most of them missionaries and tivllavllw•t• beiq detained in Algeria, members of the consulate staff• he was taken June 30 tin the city, had been safelyl --~rr~.-:,i'tiWbuld "provide:tong· his plane was hijacked' evacuated to neighboring ran e ~~c support for the on a flight over the Rwanda. There were a number, eo ese overnment In Mediterranean. of American missionaries in the fng ~ mercenary-led American officials were un- Kisangani and Kindu regions, lio.. .If sure whether the rebellion oc- but there have ~een no reports Mr.- Bartch said that curred In reaction to the kid·· sourcesthat they said. are lJ1 danger' planes would operate in "a napping of Mr. Tshombe or Defense Department v ..,,_ .. , • .,, combatant status," and been planned earlier. said the three American 1 thdr f:U.Spatch was uncertain to sent to the Congo were with American support for 464th Tactical Airlift at Pope Afr Force Base in "tenitorlal lntegrjty and Carolina. They left for of the Congo." Congo yesterday afternoon Planes to Ferry Troops were expected .to arrive in The Planes, State Departmetlj shasa early tomorrow morning. officials said, will ferry Con propAboard transports the four-engine were turbo- golese troops and military sup- American servicemen under plies to iltaglng points in the command of Col. w. L. h ·th Deputy Operations eastern Congo, w ere e re- the United States Strike beWon is ta~ place. mand. TJie qreement with Presi· The contingent included a dent Mobutu stipulated that the platoon of about 45 oar·atrnnr1-1 aircraft fly only to airfields ers from the 82nd Amnnr'"' held ~ Congolese Government who are oro,vid'el ,prc>tec:ti

The Socurity Council, Having taken cognizance of the message of the Congolese Governm8nt contained in document S/8031, Having discusaed the serious developments iu the Democratic Republia of the Congo, Conucrned by the threat posed by foreign intorforence to the indepen- d8nce and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, lo Reaffirms its resolu:tion 266 . (~966) of 14 October 1966~. ~ ~t ~" ~·~ v... -~~, - . c r~ t~c-1\, o Condemns ali States ~A pUm'i:t or tolorat~the recruitment of - mercenaries and the provioion of facilities to them with the objective of overthl!owing the Govemmentf3 of Member States;

i}J ~· "Roguests all Governments to take all necessary measures t•o e~auro that their territory and other territories under their control, as well au their nationals, are not used for t~ planning of subversion, and tho ro- cruitment, training and transit of mercenaries, i~ed for the overthrow of Governments of Statos MemberB of the United Nations, in particular thG Democratic Republic of the Congo;

4. Decides that the Council shall r~main seized of th~ question; 5. Requeato the Secretary-Gonoral to follow closely the implement ation ot the present resolutione Unofficial translation

CABLE

~~ UNDP 306 BUNCHE HOFF:r-1AN OWEN 001EDIATE TRANSMISSION. I HAVE REQUESTED AMERICAN

EMBASSY TO TRANS:Hri' THE FOLLmJING l1ESSAGE TO YOU:

"IN VIEW OF DEVELOPMENT OF SITUATION AND DIFFICULTIES IN vlAY OF OBJTAI Nll~G ADEQUATE

INFORNATION 00 THE FATE OF FOREIGNERS IN REGIONS OF NILITARY OPERATIONS, WE SUGGEST

AFTER CONSULTATIONI WITH WE& McBRIDE.t,HUNITED STATES AFJ3ASSADOR, THAT SECRETARY-

GENERAL ADDRESS AN APPEAL TO INTERNATIONAL RED CROOS TO INTERVENE IN REGIONS

INVOLVED AND ENSURE EVACUATION OF FOREIGN COMNUNITY. RECOl•ll.ffiND INQUIRE OF INTl!BNA TIONAL A-sour RED CROOs'-~:t.iEANS tml£ AT ITS DISPOSAL FOR H~iEDIATE OPERATIONS AND ASK rr TO :Mat

INDICATE SECTION, 'HHH-~ LOGISTIC 'iifiiWU .. IT WOUlD REQUIRE ON THE SPOT."

UNITED STATES Al-ffiASSADOR HAS ALSO TRANSMITTED THIS ¥JESSAGE TO UNI'IED STATES DELEGATIOO

TO UNITED NATIONS AT G8NEVA AND~ NEW YCRK. I WISH TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE PURPOOE OF

THE 'BIBRun' INTERVENTION WHICH THE MI!II!IIM iL{ SECRETARY-GENERAL YilGHT REQUEST OF THE R.B;D

AND OF CROSS vlOULD .IE TO ENSURE THE EVACUATION OF CIVILIAN~ PARTICULARLY'. •B!OREIGNERS

IN DANGEROUS ZONES.J-,ESFECIALLY- IN THE KISANGANI REGION. THE CI VILIANS IN QUESTIOO

ARE NOT UNITED NATIONS PERSrnNEL, EXCEPT PERHAIS FOR DR. SANZGADEA OF WHO. I SHOULD ...

-2-

ALSO LIKE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT TIUS MISSION BY THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS HAS BEEN

~~:.~QUES~ THE GCVERNMENT.

~flTH REGARD TO OUR COIDruNICATIOO NO • .30.3 ~ /IlK SITUATION AT BUKAVU HEWNS UNCHANGED. MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR TSHISHEKEDI

lEFT LUBUNBASHI BY AIR AT 0900 HOURS Fffi BUKAVU. vlJE HAVE RECEIVED ASSU ~1ANC:i~HAT

ISSUED If.!STRUCTIONS HAVE R~N !YMI!I BY THE GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO ENS ORE SECURITY OF UNITED

NATIONS PERSONNEL AND, IF NECESSARY, TO PROI'ECT THEIR EVACUATION. FROMRADIO :t-:ESSAGES

'-or.J~ 1 oe-tt€ J) To FROt--1 GERNAY, OUR ADMINISTRATOR, IT SEENS THAT THE UNDP OFFICE AT BUKAVU IS~GAl~B '

~ ~ , ToWN 'AS""THE MOST SECURE PLACE IN THE~ ~ THE TiiOJllEMBERS Ht.eai=UtX MENTION.t!;D IN OUR COMHUNICATION NO • .30.3x lb\'ffl :Eti!lSN

W'imJ ~ RELEASED YESTERDAY AFTERNOON.

RUMOURS COKING FROM KISANGANI ARE AS DISQUIETING AS THEY AilE VAGUE.

LEGER .• ... - · 1

CY1 g SSS CUNDP) KINSHASA 299 11 163 72= H1MEDIATE UNATIONS UNDEVPRO NEWYORK= UNDP 306 BUNCH£ HOFFMAN OWEN TRANSMISSION IMMEDIATE J'AI DEMANDE

~· AMBASSADE AMERICAINE VOUS TRANSMETTRE LE MESSAGE SUIVANT CITATION VU EVOLUTION SITUATION ET DIFFICULTES POUR OBTENIR INF0Rf1ATIONS SUFFISANTES SUR LE SORT DES ETRANGERS DANS REGIONS OPERATION MILITAIRES, SUGGERONS APRES CONSULTATION AVEC MCBRIDE, AMBASSADEUR EUA, QUE= P2= -. SECRETAIRE GENERAL LANCE UN APPEL A CROIX ROUGE INTERNATIONAL£ POUR INTERVENIR DANS REGIONS AFFECTEES ET ASSURER ·EVACUATION COMI"JUNAUTE ERARNGERE. RECot1t1ANDE S 'ENQUERIR AUPRES CROIX ROUGE INTERNATIONAL£ DES MOYENS DONT ELLE DISPOSE POUR OPERATIONS IMMEDIA- .

TES ET LUI DP!l\NDER INDIQUER SECTION LOGISTIQUE DONTELELE ~URAIT BESOIN SUR PLACE. FIN DE CITATION= P3= AMBASSADEUR USA A AUSSI COMMUNIQUE CE MESSAGE A DELEGATION USA AUPRES ONU A GENEVE ET NEWYORK. JE TIENS A PRECISER QUE L'INTERVENTION QUE LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL POURRAIT DEMANDER DE LA ,... PART DE LA CROIX ROUGE AURAIT POUR OBJECTIF. L'EVACUATION DES CIVILS .-- ET PARTICULIEREMENT LES ETRANGERS DANS LES ZONES DANGEREUSES= P4= ... ET PLUS PRECISEMENT DANS LA REGION DE KISANGANI. LES CIVILS DONT IL S'AGIT NE SONT PAS DU PERSONNEL ONU A PART PE!IT ETRE LE DOCTEUR

~· SANZGADEA Of1S. JE DESIRE AUSSI PRECISER Q.UE CETTE MISSION DE LA CROIX ROUGE INTERNATIONAL£ A ETE DEMANDEE AVEC FORCE ET D'URGENCE ..

P5::: GOLNERN£t.1ENT PARA EN CONTINUATION NOTRE 303 SITUATION A BUKAVU RESTE INCHANGEE MINISTRE INTERIEUR TSHISHEKEDI A QUITTE LUBUMBASHI PAR AVION A 0900 ZULU POUR BUKAVU. NOUS AVONS RECU ASSURANCES QUE INSTRUCTIONS ONT ETE DONNEES PAR GOUVERNEHENT AFIN ASSURER SECURITE PERSONNEL ONU ET SI NECESSAIRE PROTEGER LEUR EVACUATION PAR i·1ESSAGES RADIO= P6/49= · - . DE NOTRE ADrHNISTRATEUR GERNAY IL PARAIT QUE BUREAU UNDP A BUKAVU EST CONSIDERE COMME ENDROIT LE PLUS SUR DE LA VILLE PARA LES DEUX MEMBRES DU PERSONNEL MENTIONNES DANS NOTRE 300 ONT ETE RELACHES HIEn APRES MIDI PARA LES RUMEURS VENUES DE KISANGANI SONT AUSSI DECONCERTANTES QUE IMPRECISES= LEGER+ COL 306 303 0900 30o+

-'9UNATION ~22422

UNDEVPRO KIN -i c::;; c rr1 -..CM z TERrUNE PSE CFi1 AND GA SI QQUE CHOSE'' r c.... _, f'll c: (i) I. rn :::0 0 l> - .c_"7' -u , ? :r: :3: _, UNATION 222422 c -.. ,-..._, z 0 z -i Q) (J)

UNDEVPRO KIN UNATION 222422 PSE CFl'·1 LS18+ I n ., r n x 13 17Z • IT AT

8 Cvr~ ......

ICJ: Aile c: +

c I

1

• I Mercenary Force Encircled at Kisanganl Breaks Out and Heads for the Bush

By HENRY TANNER 119fctalto Tilt New York Ttmtt KINSHASA, the Congo, July 13 - The rebellion of the French and Belgian mercenaries in the eastern Congo appeared today to have collapsed. A group of 180 white merce· naries who had held the airport of Kisangani for eight days broke out of a Congolese army encirclement las t night and headed into the African bush. Two privately-owned C- 46 · airplanes, which had been char· tered by the Swiss Red Cross, landed at the Kisanganl airport! this morning and returned here tonight with 100 passengers, in· eluding about 60 Congolese sol· dlers wounded In clashes with the mercenaries at the airport. Three Americans Included The group evacuated from iKisangani included three Amer· leans: Mrs. Ben Hopgood, wife of the assistant director of the University of Kisangani; Mrs. Harry Fechter, of Fort Worth, Tex., wife of a faculty member, and her granddaughter. Mrs. Hopgood and Mrs. Fech· ter told newsmen that they had been "treated royally by the Congoii!Se and the mercenaries." Congolese authorities an· nounced earlier this week that the mercen11ries had taken hos· tages at the Kisangani airport. It was feared this morning that the mercenaries had taken the hostages with them •• tbeY. i~{l ew,. ~I'.Z...:I :;.'llla1te lt"Q,ta_. ep b~ di4 llie~_.-les •• hey tied from Kinsanganl airport were found safe, ac· cording to a Reuters dispatch I!Uoting Red Cross officials in Geneva. Details of the release of the hostages were not · given by the Red Cross team on the scene.] Civilians Said to Have Gone The two American women IEn•bauv. said that perhaps two or three civilians had gone with the The women said 1 ~;~.;.&-:lr~:.. ~~~~~an COURTS CAIRO, U.A.R. JULY 15 (REUTERS)- THE AUTHORITATIVE NEWSPAPER . AL AHRAM SAID TODAY THAT ALGERIA IS CONSIDERING SETTING UP A REVOLUTIONARY COURT TO TRY PEOPLE WHO OPPOSE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND COLLABORATE WITH IMPERIALISM. IT REPORTED THAT IN PARTICULAR ALGERIA WAS MAKING CONTACTS WITH THE CONGO (KINSHASA) ON THE POSSIBILITY OF HOLDING A COURT TO TRY FORMER CONGOLESE PREMIER MOISE TSHOMBE. TSHOMBE IS BEING HELD IN ALGERIA AFTER HIS PLANE WAS FORCED TO LAND THERE. THE CONGO IS SEEKING HIS EXTRADITION ON A CHARGE OF TREASON. THE PROPOSED •REVOLUTIONARY COURTS• WOULD BE MADE UP FROM REPRESENT~TIVES OF LIBERATION ~OVEMENTS IN AFRICA, ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA AND WOULD TRY •cRIMINALS• OF LIBERATION WARS, AL AHRAM SAID. HAA 6:00A TO The Secretary-General .

FROM Jean Gazarian

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

DATE 21 AUG 1967

,.. UNITED NATIONS - NATIONS UNIES

NEW YORK

IIIIU'&III&HC& PO 230 OONGO ( 6)

The enclosed translation of a communication dated

10 August 1967 is transmitted to the Permanent Missions of

the States Members of the United Nations at the request of

the Charg~ d'Affaires a.i. of the Democratic Republic of the

Congo to the United Nations.

· 15 August 1967 2

"It is clear that the above -mentioned facts are in flagrant contradiction with resolution 226 (1966) adopted by the Security Council on 14 October 1966, am with paragraph 3 of the most recent resolution on the Congo adopted by the Security Council, which called upon Governments to ensure that their territory and other territories under their control, as well as th~ir nationals, are not used for the planning of subversion to overthrow the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In order to combat the activities of mercenaries inside the country and to avoid a possible extension of the conf'lict which might endanger peace in central Africa and particularly in Angola, I should be grateful if you could:

(i) bring the above-mentioned facts to the attention of the members of the Security Council;

(ii) invite the members of the Security Council and countries friendly to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to supply, as soon as possible, logistic support or assistance of any other kind for maintaining order in the region;

(iii) provide aid to the populations which have suffered so much.

"It is hoped that the replies to this request will contribute to the implementation of the last two resolutions adopted by the Security Council on the Congo. I would be grateful if you would keep me informed of the results of your consultations.

''With my highest consideration,

(Signed) Justin-Marie B

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Jean K. NGUZA Charge d'Affaires a.i.

His Excellency U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, New York, N.y. 18 August 1967

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

In connexion with the Tshombe episode, Lord Caradon saw the Secretary-General on I Cf ~ • He inf'ormed the Secretary-General that the two pilots of the plane which was forced to land in Algeria were British. Lord Caradon requested the Secretary-General, unofficially, to use his good offices to obtain their release.

On 2-c ~ ' l 1 "7 , the Secretary-General took up the matter with the Foreign Minister and the Permanent Representative of Algeria: Mr. Yazid was also present at this meeting. The Foreign Minister promised to look into the matter on his return to Algeria. He pointed out, however, that the hearing of the case against Tshombe had not been concluded and these two pilots were important material witnesses.

On 9 August the Permanent Representative of Belgium saw the Secretary-General and made a similar request in regard to the Belgians who were in the Tshombe plane. Apparently there were three Belgians, two men and one woman, of whom the woman had been released. The two men were still in Algeria in custody and the Permanent Representative sought unofficially the good offices of the Secretary-General to secure their release.

The Secretary-General met the Charge d'Affaires of Algeria on 15 August and took up the matter with him. The Charge d'Affaires promised to report the matter to his Government.

C.V. Narasimhan

cc: Mr. Lemieux •

1

1r,

.Ul1XJ'~It.:1arJ llii1Dc:J:oa~1c ~1 y ill* \ .r ••

\JISSION PER\1ANENTE DE LA REPUBLIQu E DEMOCRAT IQ UE Dl' CO, GO aupres des :\'ations C nies

211 t·:ast -1"1rd Street 1\"cw York 17. \:. Y. TI /ec Tel T \: 1-G-HiO, 62 0805/68

Exce llence, J'ai l'honneur de vous transrnettre en annexe copie d'unc lettre que je viens d'adresser au President du Conseil de Securite. Agreez, Excellence, l'assurance de rna t res haute conside- ration.

Theodore UIR Arnbassade et Plenip +!1~~~~~d inaire Represent f r ermanent

Son Excellence U. THANT Secret air e General des Nations Unies NATI ONS UNI ES New York, N. Y. •

•

•

Tl/ec No. 080

A S.E. r . G. BALL Pr6sident du Conseil do S6curit~ pour le mots de juin 1968 N tions Unies ew York, N. Y.

Excell nee,

I J'ai l'honneur d'ordre de n gouvernement de porter ~ votre connaissance les faits suivants . Le 23 j uin 1968, des avions .de la force erienne portugaise en op6ration en Angola ont bo bard6 le vill ge de YONGO (province du ongc Central)situg 3 s de la fronti~r angolaise c usant outre des destru tions importantes des aisons, des blessures graves deux h bitants.

Cette op~ration est la troisi~me d'une setie d'actes d' gre~ sion entrepris depuis quelques semaines par la soldatesqu colonialiste portugal e contre la R6publique D6nocratiqu du Congo et qui ont caus6 la ort de 27 personnes la premi~re fois et de 1 personnes la deuxi m fois. Ces actes de provocation et d'agression la part des autorit~s portugaises se poursui vent en violation des diverse r6solution! perti nentes du Conseil de S~curite et de l'Assemb16e Gen ~ralc ainsi qu des disposit ions formelles de la Charte des Nations Unies • On peut sp Tf que les gouvernements dont I'assistance au Portugal lui permo de ma nten: aux front i~res do la Rcpublique Dcmocratique du Congo tine situation colo­ niale anachronique, source de menace caract~risee pour la paix intern - tionale saisiront ln gravit§ de leur responsabilit6 dans la mor et 1 souffrance de t ant de citoyens. • • Je vous saurai gre en te inant. Monsieur le Pr~siden de porter ces faits l la connaissance des embr s du Conseil de SecuritG et de faire publier cette lettre en tant que document des Nations Unies.

Veuillez agr~er , Excellence, •assuranc de ma tras h ute consideration.

Theodore IDZ BUI Ambassadeur Extraordinaire t Plenipotentiair Representant Permanent.

\

( .._ , ., I r.. . ~ , • i

I \ .

• MISSION PERMA!\ ENTE DE LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO aupres des Natwns Unies

2!l East 43rd Street

New York 17, ~- Y. Tel TN 7 64GO, 62 TI/ec 08 08/68

Excellence, J'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre en annexe copie d'une lettre que je viens d'adresser au President du Conseil de Se curi t e.

Je vous saurai gre,Excellence, de tenir compte du contenu de celle-ci dans votre rapport au Consei l de Securite au sujet de !'app lication de la resolutiori y preci see. Agreez, Excellence, !'assurance de rna tres haute conside" ration.

Theodore muiR Am bas sad xtraordinaire et Pleni tiaire Represen Permanent

Son Exce llence u. THANT Secret aire General des NATIONS UNIES NATIONS UNI ES New York, N.Y. •

TI/ec 0806/68

A S.B . Mr G. BALL Pr~sident du Conseil do Sf§curi t6 pour le mois de j uin 1968 NATIONS UNIES New York , N.Y. ------~------

Excellence,

D'ordre de on gouvernement , j'ai 11 honneur de vous informer des consid~rations suivantes relatives la r~solution 25 3 (1968) adopt~ par le Conseil de S 6curit~ le 29 i 1968.

Le gouvernement congol is a~ntien, en ce qui le concerne la position qu 1 11 a de t out t e s d6f ndue. Seul s lon lui et da s left circonst nces prfci es do l a rebel ion rhod~ s ienn • l'usage de a force peu~ ner r apidement la fin de la r6bellion et le ro~nbl i ssemen~ des droits Ugitimes de la maj orltt; africaine. '

Cette solution, 1 Grande Brotagne se refuse tt l ' envis g r pour lo cas de la Rhod6s1 alors qu'elle n•a pas h6sit€ encore tout r~cemment l y recourrir pour pr6venir ce qu'elle consid6rai t @tre unc enac l l'ordre ot l la tranquil ite publt~~ · .

P r cont re elle s' ing~nue l recourrir aux sanctions 6cono~1- ques volont aires d'abor d, obligatoires ensuite dont le rfisul t at st de causer des dommages injustifigs aux Etats vois ins innocents et aux ss africaines innoccntes de la Rh od~sie pendant que, pnr ndoxe, ces m mes san ct i ons , par le r efus de cooperation de !'Afrique du Sud et du Portu ne font qua r enforcer la d~t ermination du regime Smith de poursuivre ot consolider sa r6bellion.

A ce propos mon ROuvern ement voudr ait p rticuli6rement soul igner la charge que fait pcser sur son economic le aint en de Ia rebellion en Rhod6s ie.

• .• I •.. • • Du f it de la r~be l lion rhod~si enne et du r ecours l des mcsures ~conomiques pour y t tre fin, les soci6t~ s mini r es congolais~ s e trouvcnt dan !'obligation de s 'approvisionner en coke et charbon su des lointains carch6 avec pour cons~quence une depense suppl ~m taire de l'ordre d 5 million de dollars US par an . En tenant compte du fait que le gouvernement congolai s vient i p in de proc~der a la reforme mon~tair J une d~penso suppltimentaire nnu lle de cet ordr menace d'annuler sans l 'ombre d'un dout tous les effets b6nefiques de cette reforme mon6taire. Ces observations m6ritent d'8tre prises n consideration par' les puissances ~conomiquement dfivelopp6es et p rticuli r nt par a puissance dminlstrant lorsqu'elles s'efforcent u soin de l'or anisation des ations Uni de rcchercher les oyens approprifis pour ttr f in rapidement a la rfibellion rhod~sienne .

Veuillez agr&er, Excel l nc , !'assurance d tr~s haute con · d~- r ation.

Th~odore IDZUMBUIR Amba d ur Extraord naire et Plfinipotentiai Repr6sentant.. Permanent ...... 68-24137 igp

Translated from French

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO TO THE UNI1~ NATIONS

TI/ge No. 1432/68 The Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary--General of the United Nations and has the honour, in accordance with the oral communication made by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs in Charge of International Co-operation, H.E. Mr. Umba di Lutete, at the meeting which took place on 23 October last, to transmit to him herewith the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade, H.E. Mr. Justin-Marie Bomboko, regarding the Mulele affair. The Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations takes this opportunity to renew to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the assurances of his highest consideration.

New York, 1 November 1968

H.E. U Thant Secretary-General of the United Nations United Nations New York

I ... 68-24137 bg -2-

Statement by Minister Bomboko regarding the Mulele affair

So, the lovers of sensationalism will have been well satisfied. For some time past, one great topic has been providing material for the newspapers, for conversation and for the radio of a neighbouring State. The topic is one which is now being given the revised name of the "Mulele affair". The excitement which has surrounded this affair has risen to such a pitch that it has become common talk that I, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, am in conflict with the President of the Republic and Head of Government. There cannot possibly be any conflict, and there never could be any. A government does not maintain tvlO policies, but one, and in this case it is the policy laid down by the President of the Republic and Head of the Government. This is even more true in our country, since the Constitution clearly states that the Head of State shall direct and supervise foreign policy. We, therefore, are merely the administrators of that policy and, being human, we may sometimes be mistaken in our choice of methods and in our interpretation of directives. It is our duty, should the circumstance arise, to fall unquestioningly into line with the position of the Head of State. Having said this, in normal circumstances I should say nothing more; for the general public is usually satisfied to see the results of long-term action without wishing to know the ins and outs of the matter. However, in view of the attitude which f or nearly sixty hours now has been ostentatiously taken by our brothers - at l east, we think they are our brothers - in Brazzaville, ,.,ho have seen fit for obvious propaganda purposes to broadcast at will the statements we have made to Brazzaville, and in order to avoid a further compounding of the confusion, we have decided to discl ose to public opinion in the Congo and throughout the world part of the dossier on what is gener ally known today as the "Mulele affair". These few disclosures will enable the public to form an exact idea of the apparent conflict ,.;hich some have clai med to s ee in this affair. Let us, then, look at the f acts. What is t his all about? For some time , our security servi ces had been aware of a plan dr awn up by those same people who armed and trained the rebels and who are at present rearming the remnants of the Mulele rebels.

; ... 68-24137 bg -3-

These underminers of our country, realizing that any rebellion which did not start from Kinshasa was doomed to failure, decided to change their tactics. They therefore persuaded Mulele and his associates to launch the rebellion anew from the capital city. From that moment, the plan began to be put into effect. In order to realize how matters stood, one need only count the impressive number of ex-Simbas who are infesting the capital at this very moment. Next, the Mulele strategists noted that such an enterprise would have to have a logistical base in the very near vicinity, where the future conunandos could obtain supplies and training while waiting the arrival of D-Day. Brazzaville was the obvious answer. Had it not given asylum to several rebel leaders after the 1964 rebellion? If anyone needs proof of what I have said, our intelligence services already have the names and addresses of the chief leaders of the rebellion who, for the time being, have taken up residence in the capital city of our brothers across the river. It is a strange kind of brotherhood which is propounded by scientific socialism, but I let that pass ....

I shall only quote a few names to illustrate ~hat I have said: former

Minister Michel Mongali, former Deputy FtHix Mukulumbudu, ~Iathias Kemishanga, one of Mulele 1 s senior officers, and others such as Louis Molundu, Nima •... That was by no means all! A number of UGEC students \'Tho were at the bottom of the subversion here in the Congo had also taken refuge in Brazzaville! Some of them were packing their bags in expectation of the great day -v1hen they could return to Kinshasa. Let me, by way of reminder, add to this string of names that of the Malanga group, which was very well known in trade-union circles in Kinshasa.

~nis was one of the strands in the great web of subversion of the Congo. Our intelligence services were qui te c_ategorical: there '\vere in Brazzaville approximately 300 Simbas ,,. ho had been "rell trained by the Chinese and the Cubans and \'lho were ready, when the time came, to pounce on a number of targets in well-defined sectors of the capital. This number did not, of course, include those i¥ho ,.,ere in training at the Gamboma camp . This camp did not comprise only Congolese, since it was the lair of all the bandits who dream of regaining power in their mm countries. Hence, there vrere Gabonese, Cameroonians, men from the Central African Republic and others.

I ......

68-24137 bg -4-

The third and last phase of the plan required an influential figure to direct operations in Kinshasa itself. It was also apparent l'lho this should be. Cubans and Chinese in Brazzaville brought in Mulele to discuss reconciliation - this is the latest vogue - so that he could return to Kinshasa. However, it \'las not certain that the Kinshasa authorities would agree to his return, and for good reason. Meam;hile, one of Mulele' s chief lieutenants had to be sent to Kinshasa. Anodjo vras instructed to form a number of subversive cells and to take conunand of the operation on what the strategists called in rebel jargon "the southern front". Knowing all this, we acted accordingly, our number one objective being: (a) To prevent the plan from developing, (b) To strike one .great blow which would spare the Congolese people the calamities inflicted on them in 1964-1965 by these same brigands under Chinese leadership. We knevl that Mulele and the brains behind him v1ere suspicious. If we had waited too long the plan would have been carried out, and we had to act without delay in order to avoid being taken by surprise. As always, the Brazzaville authorities were aware of what was afoot against us, but thought that we did not know about it. We nevertheless approached them to find out l·rhether they would be willing to allow Mulele to return to Kinshasa. Mulele himself, who had the last word, declared that his

struggle had become pointless and that the Mobutu r~gime was doing wonders. With an affection as sincere as it was spontaneous, he pledged allegiance to

that r~ g ime; the kiss of Judas incarnate! We quite suspected what was being planned, but felt that perhaps Mulele might still change his ways and halt his bloody designs. Basically, it was a deceitful bargain: the means used were fair, but both sides had their own convictions and were content to reel off a lot of nonsense without believing in it too much. But it was necessary to avoid arousing the suspicions of

I ... ' • .

68-24137 bg -5-

Mulele and his Chinese and Cuban masters. In order to accomplish that, his return had to be as normal as possible, and even more so than he had expected, so that his accomplices would reveal themselves. The result was immediate; men coming in canoes from Brazzaville tried to land secretly in Kinshasa. The forces of law and order intercepted them. As a result, one rebel was killed, one canoe capsized and its contents fell into the 111ater. One of the canoeists '\•ras arrested '\orith a complete set of subversive literature by Mao Tse-tung. This was not all. The security services, which had been alerted, intercepted a letter to Mulele from one of the leaders of the Kinshasa operations. This letter s hm·Ted that Mulele had been expected and had come to attend to the final details preceding the launching of operations.

Thus, as can be seen, our actions, some of -vrhich I am nO"'T disclosing

together ~rith the true reasons for them, did not conflict '\-Tith the thinking of our Head of State. The position of the Head of State is ahrays consistent and clear. It procl aims amnesty for those who followed blindly and applies the letter of the law to the leaders who instigated such criminal acts against their own people. In our desire to prevent suffering and hardship of the kind which we painfully remember and to which we were to have been subjected once again by the evil actions of the Cubans and the Chinese, we were forced to act and, in the heat of action, 1-re used every means at our disposal to bring Mulele to Kinshasa in order to attain our objective, which was to destroy the subversion and sabotage perpetrated by him. This explains the apparent conflict.

Our objective ,.,as generally agreed upon and '\·Te had a number of alternatives as far as its attainment was concerned, but we chose the method -vre believed to be the most expeditious. This being the situation, i s it not false and dishonest to speak of international morality? Is it to be held against the Democratic Republic of the Congo that it brought Mulele back (a little sooner than he himself '\·rould perhaps have wished) in order to foil a ne1·r plot T1rhich vroulcl once again have plunged our country into bloodshed?

I I ••. . · ~

63-24137 bg -6-

The reason for all the excitement is that the Chi nese and the Cubans see their cherished dreams and illusions crumbling. It has become the highly reprehensible habit of certain supposedly fraternal State leaders to give shelter and arms to gangsters and murderers for the purpose of ,.. rreaking havoc in neighbouring countries. Does not international rnorality condemn such practices more severely t han it does the mere fact of passing final judgement on a hired killer against whom, moreover, we 1V'ere acting in self -defence? If every country v1ere allm·red to be a refuge for bandits of all kinds who cherish dreams of conquest, i nter-State relations would be i mpossible. How, then, can one deprecate such a situation w·ithout pointing out that the Brazzaville authorities were covering up the actions of Mulele and the Chinese v1hile at the same time proclaiming themselves our brothers? Is this a repetition of the kiss of Judas? Perhaps we should agree that i t i s. • • • •

,#- ,

CVN/ CC

J.

Le Se ret aire general de l ' Oresnisatio des Nations Unies a ' bonneur d ' ac cu~ er r ception de le note No 1432/68 du Representant per manent de la Republ ique democratique du Corgo a p:ccs e l'Orcani sation, en ate du ler novembre 1968 , par aquell le Repn3se t ant penuanent ui a. tran .... mi s e

t c t e d 1 une UCCl rati0n il U 1'-U 1istrt::: deS affnires etrangeres et du concuercc xte ieu1·, S. E. 1. ustin t>'b.r e Bomok0,

r l ative h 11 1 ' ffain~ Aulele" .

Le Secret aire ge1eral sais i t cette occn ion pour renou'{eler au Represent ant permanent les assurances de sa. t res haute consideration.

Le ll nove bre 1968

,, c.... ~ . /~ vl r lvfiSSION PERMANE~TE DE LA REPL13LIQCJ} DE~IOCRATIQCE DU CO~GO auprcs des :'\ations lJnies PERMANENT MISSION OF THE OEMOCRAnC

REPUBLIC OF TH£ Cfm30 TO TliE U. II. 1!11 ~sse 4'JJJ ~tiel!t 400-402 EAST 51st STRfET ).; c:: Y o:l: I i, ?L \'. TI/ge HEW YORK, M. y, 10022 T L TH T 6 l!ifil;f i No.l432/68

Le Representant Permanent de la Republique Democratique du

Congo aupres des Nations Unies presente ses compliments au Secretaire. General des Nations Unies et a l'honneur de lui transmettre 'en annexe, conformement a la communication verbale du Vice-Ministre des Affaires, Charge de la Cooperation Internationale, S.E. Mr. UMBA DI WTETE a l'audience du 23 octobre dernier, la declaration du Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres et du Commerce Exterieur S.E. Mr. Justin-Marie BOMBOKO, relative 1 l'affaire MULELE.

Le Representant Permanent de la Republique Democratique du Congo aupres des Nations Unies saisit cette occasion pour renouveler au Secretaire General des Nations Unies les assurances de sa tras haute consideration.

1968

s.E. u. rnANT Secretaire General des N~U NATIONS UNIES NEW YORK, N.Y. •

A PROPOS DE L'AFFAIRE ~ruLELE --~------

DECLARATION DU MINISTRE Bm1BOKO ------

Les amateurs de nouvelles h sensation auront done ete servis.

Depuis quelque temps, une grande rubrique alimente les journaux et les conver~ sations et la radio d'un Etat voisin. Il s'agit de ce qu'on appelle desormais

sous une version revisee "L 'AFFAIRE ~mLELE".

L'agitation entretenue autour de cette affaire revet de telles propotitions qu'il devient courant d'cntendre que nous serions, en tant que Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, en contradiction avec notre President de la Republique et Chef de Gouvernement.

Il n'y a pas de contradiction possible et il ne pourrait y en avoir. Un Gouvernement ne defend pas deux politiques, mais une seule, celle ~ qui en l'occurence est con~ue par le President de la Republique et Chef du Gouvernement. Ce l'est d'autant plus vrai pour notre cas que la Constitution

stipule nettement que le Chef de 1 1 Etat dirige et contr6le la politique Etran- gl!re. Nous ne sommes done que les exccutants de cette politique et etant hommes, il peut nous arriver de nous tromper dans le choix des moyens

et dans !'interpretation des directives. Not~e devoir est, le cas echeant, de

nous ranger sans reserve ~ la positiott du Chef.

Cela etant dit, et dans les ·conditions normales, nous nous .. '

• • •• 2 •••

arreterions la, car le grand public se contente generalernent d'enregistrer les effets d'une action longuement concertee sans en conna1tre les tenants et les aboutissants.

Mais devant !'attitude affichee depuis bient6t 60 .heures par

nos fr~res (du moins nous le croyons) de Brazzaville, qui se sont permis, ~ des fins manifestes de propagande, de diffuser, it l'envie, nos declarations

il Brazzaville et pour eviter que la confusion n'en devienne plus inextricable,

nous sommes resolus de reveler ~ !'opinion publique congolaise et internationale quelques elements du dossier de ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler aujourd'hui "L'AFFAIRE MULELE".

Ces quelques revelations permettront a l'opinion de se faire une idee precise de l'apparente et pretendue contradiction qu'on veut voir dans l'affaire.

Voyons done les faits : De quoi s'agit-il ? Depuis quelque temps, nos services de securite sont au cou-

rant d'un plan etabli par ceux-1~ m@mes qui ont arme, entraine les rebelles et qui presentement rearment les restes de rebelles mulelistes.

Ces fossoyeurs de notre pays realisant qu'une rebellion qui • ne partirait pas de Kinshasa est condamnee, ont decide de changer de methode. Ils ont convaincu done MULELE et ses partisant de relancer la rebellion l par­

tir de la capitale. Et depuis lors, ce ' ~lan a commence l recevoir un debut d•execution. I1 suffit pour s'en rendre' compte de recenser le nombre impres­

sionant d'ex-Simba qui, en ce moment m@~e, infestent la capitale. " ·, ••• 3 •••

Ensuite les strat~ges de ~ruLELE remarquent qu'une telle entreprise doit 'avoir un soutien logistique tres proche ou les futurs com- mandos peuvent se ravitailler et s'entrainer en attendant le jour J.

Brazzaville est t~ut indique. N'a-t-il pas dej~ abrite

lors de la rebellion de 1964 quelques chefs de rebelles ?

Veut-on des exernples de ce que nous avan~ons ? Nos services

de renseignements sont dej~ en possession des noms et adresses des grands

lieutenants de la r~bellion, qui, pour la circonstance, ont elu domicile dans la capitale de nos freres d'en face. Dr6le de fraternite que celle pr6nee par le socialisme scientifique, mais nous en passons •••

Nous n'illustrerons nos assertions que de quelques noms : 1' ex-Ministre MONGALI Michel, 1' ex-depute MUKULUMBUDU Felix, un des officiers superieurs de MULELE KEMISHANGA Mathias et d'autres cornme MOLUNDU Louis, Nima ......

Est-ce tout ? Que non ' Certains etudiants de~~qui

etaient ~ la base de la subversion ici au Congo se sont egalement refugies

~ Brazzaville ! D'aucuns parmi ces derniers prevoyant le grand jour font

leurs bagages pour rcgagner Kinshasa. Ajoutons pour mcrnoire ~ cette kyrielle ' des nom, celui du groupe MALONGA tr~s bien connu dans les milieux syndicaux de Kinshasa.

C'est une des rnailles qui constituaient le vaste reseau de subversion du Congo.

Ainsi nos service$ de renseignements sont formels il y ..

.. . 4 ~ •• a l Brazza environ 300 Simba bien entratnes par les Chinois et les Cubains,

pr@ts, le moment venu, ~ fondre sur des objectifs situes dans des sectcurs bien definis de la capitale. De ce chiffre, il faut evidemment exclure ceux qui s'entratnent dans le camp de GAMBOMA.

Il n'y a pas que des Congolais dans ce camp qui est le repaire de tous les bandits qui r@vent de reconquerir le pouvoir dans leur pays. On y trouve done des Gabonais, des Camerounais, des Centrafricains etc •••

Enfin, troisUme :phase du plan, il faut une personnalite influente pour diriger les operations l Kinshasa m@me. Elle est egalement tout indiquce.

Cubains et Chinois installc ~ Brazza font venir ~ruLELE

qui agitcra la reconciliation (c'est le th~me ~ la mode) pour rentrer ~ Kinshasa. Cependant, il n'est pas sOr que les autorites de Kinshasa accep- teront le retour, et pour cause.

En attendant, il faut dep@cher ~ Kinshasa un des grands

lieutenants de ~RILELE. ANODJO est designe pour installer des cellules de subversion et prendre le commandement des operations de ce que les stra- ti!ges appelent en jargon de rebelles "LE FRONT SUD".

Etant en possessi~n de ces elements, notre tactique va

s'Uaborer en consequence et notre o~jectif numero un sera :

I a) d'emp@cher ce plan de mOrir, b) frapper un grand coup qui 6pargnera au peuple congo­ lais les calamites qu'il a connues en 1964/1965 par ..

• • • 5 ••• ces memes brigands guides par les Chinois.

Nous savons que MULELE et ses mattres a penser sont mefiants. Si nous attendons trop longtemps le plan va mOrir et pour eviter toute surprise, il faut agir sans retard.

Comme toujours les autorites de Brazza sont au courant de ce qui se trame contre nous, mais croient que nous l'ignorons. Nous les abordons cependant pour savoir si elles consentent que MULELE regagne Kinshasa. La derniere parole etant a MULELE lui-meme, celui-ci declare ·

que sa lutte est devcnue sans objet et q~'au demeurant le regime Monuru fait merveille. Dans ce cas avec un amour sincere autant que spontane,

il lui fait allegence ; le baiser de Judas en chair !

Nous nous doutom bien de ce qui se prepare, rnais peut-

etre que MULELE peut encore changer et arr~er ses desseins sanguinaires. Dans le fond, c'est un marche de dupes, tous les moyens sont bons mais chacun a sa conviction et se contente de debobiner ses sornettes sans trop

y croire. Mais i1 ne faut pas eveiller la mefiance de MULELE et ses mattres chinois et cubains. Pour cela, il est necessaire que sa rentree soit la plus normale possible et meme au-dell de ses esperances pour que ses com- plices se demasquent.

Le resultat est imm~diat ; des piroguiers venant de Brazzaville tentent un debarquement clandestin l Kinshasa. Les forces de '/ l'ordre les interceptent. Bilan : un rebelle tue, une pirogue chavire et son chargement tombe l l'eau. Un des piroguiers est arrSte avec toutc une litterature de subversion, made by MAO TSE TOUNG. Ce n'est pas tout. Les ...... • .

• • • 6 •••

services de la securite en alerte, interceptent une lettre destince ~

MULELE par un responsable des operations ~ Kinshasa. Cette lettre de- montre que MULELE etait attendu et venait mettre les derniers details precedant le declenchement des operations.

Ainsi, comme on s•en aper~oit, notre action dont nous revelons aujourd'hui quelques elements et le veritable motif, n'est pas en contradiction avec la pensce de notre Chef.

Cette position du chef de l'Etat est toujours constante et claire. Elle proclame l'amnistie pour les suiveurs aveugles et soumet

~ la rigueur de la loi les leaders qui avaient inspire des actes si criminels contre leur peuple.

Voulant epargner tant de souffrances et de misere de si triste memoire et qui allaient de nouveau s'abattre sur nous par l'action

malfaisante des Cubains et Chinois, nous avons ete amenes ~ agir et dans le feu de l'action pour atteindre l'objectif qui etait d'anihiler la sub- version et le sabotage de MULELE, nous avons utilise tous les moyens pour' l'amener l Kinshasa. C'est !•explication de l'apparente contradiction.

Objectif sans discussion et possibilite d'autres moyens dans !'execution, mais avons choisi ceux que nous avons cru les plus ex- peditifs.

Telle se presente la situation, n'est-il pas faux et ~ malhon@te de parler de morale internationale. Doit-on tenir rigueur l la I R~publiquo Dcmocratique du Congo d'avoir attire MULELE chez elle (un peu • • • 7 ••• . ' plus t6t qu' i1 ne 1' aurai t peut-@tre voulu lui-meme) pour ecarter un nou- • . I

veau complot qui allait derechef ensanglanter notre pays ?

L'agitation s'explique par le fait que Chinois et Cubains voient s'ecrouler les r@ves et les illusions dont ils se nourrissaient.

Il est une habitude hautement condamnable qu'on prise

certains responsables d'Etat pretendOment fr~res, d'heberger et d'armer des gangsters et des assassins pour porter la desolation dans les'pays voisins. La morale internationale n'est-elle pas plus severe contre de parcilles pratiques que le simple fait de 'juger sans remission un tueur

~ gage ~ l'egard duquel on agit par legitime defense par surcrott ?

Si tous les pays pouvaient @tre les refuges des bandits de toutes sortes qui nourrissent des r@ves de conquistador, les relations inter-etats seraient impossibles. Alors comment verser des larmes devant pareille situation sans faire croire que les autorites de Brazzaville couvraient les agissements de MULELE et des Chinois m@me si par ailleurs ils se proclament nos freres. Serait-ce la reedition du baiser de Judas ? Il faut peut-etre en convenir. CO/CC'

CCI Jlr. x..aieux si•try

-·- .. ..,' ~.. f ~ - •

DE LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE . . . · aupres ·des Nations Unics ... ·- :.).. . .. · . .JUN .1 81969

, .. ... '

Le Representant Permanent de la

du Congo aupres des Nations Unies presente ses compliments 'au Secretaire · .. . . r ~ ..\ General des Nations Unies, et a l'honneur de lui faire parvenir en . ·I • : Iii

annexe, l e t exte de l'allocution adressee a l a Nation congolaise par . le President de la Rcpubliquc a la suite des incidents provoques mercredi

,., 3 juin 1969 par les 6tudiants de l'Universit e Lovanium.

Lc l(eprlSsentant Permanent de la Rcnublique Democrat i que

Ju Congo aupres des Nations Unies saisit cette occas ion pour r enouveler

au Secr6tair e general des Nations Unies, les assur ances d e sa tr~s haute consideration./ .. -

,_,. . . • New York, le 9 juin 1969

...

Monsieur 1~ Secretaire general

:des Nations Unies · ···.. New York, N.Y. 10017 J .~,... . 400:..402 East Slst Stree - New or ' '·

,• '1 ' -, .. \ ~ . . ' 0 0 M ·H U N I Q U E DE . . PRESS E ------~------

' < • I '

,<, Voici 1e texte de 1' allocution adr essee a la . f~t:i par le

Pr~sident de la Republique A la suite des inci dents provoqu6s mercre~i

1 3 juin par les etudiants de 1 Un iversite Lovanium \ . : .. { ."" ; ,. • CITOYENNES, . ,· .. •:1"".: - CITOY ENS; -

Des evenements graves viennent une fois encore d'endeui ller

la nation congolaise.(stop) Le vendredi 16 mai veille des festivites du . ~ . . deuxi~me anniversaire du mouvement populaire de la revolution n Ki,angani J'ai preside un important Conseil des Hinistrcs. Stop •

. , Parmi les points a l'ordre du jour figuraient principalement ceux relatifs au sort des classes laborieuses et a celui des universites et des grandes ecoles (Stop) Deux commissions f urent creees j ce propos{Stop)

- ' -I' ... - _ .- - . ~· .. C'est ainsi qu 'en ce qui concerne la commiss ion sur 1es probl ayant trait aux universites et grandes ecoles et presidee par le Ministre de !'Education Nat ionale les travaux ont abouti a la conclusion qu'il fallait •· · l' lever le taux de la bourse allouee A ces

crant cet ~t at de choses etaient egalement prets et n'attendaient que mA

-~ ) . sign ture. (Stop) Lors demon passage par Kisangani et par Lubumhas~ i

· l'occa~ion d'annoncer personnellement aux 6tudiants et la maj oration du taux de bourses des 6tudiants.

, .. ~ .

' . J 'ajout qu 1 apr~s 4 mois d•activit au cour

I . . . " . .· I le Gouvernement de la RSpubltqu s•est dan

' ' Gna r Je budget d 11BXel'clce 1969. Stop Alor que dan

. ~ • t ,. • • • ' ' 6tli d rigueur, aeul. le ·\ludg t du Mini t .. r~·.·. ,., •" f. ', I 1• t -~ t . ;r "· ..t i' 'i .. ,. ""' .. • I 2 I ' ... 'It;; t•. :·,· . .~( .:~t ~ ·.. . f ...... t !) ..... -:. i'! ... ; • : ~ ' • • , • ' .,. ... ~ .. •• • ... •'~> 1 ·~;:i, f ee ~~i·p ~;~uve que 1' interet· q~~· ~oi - m me et mon _Gouvernement ~ous par ons l' _ · • • ·: •. _j<' ·· ·.:t: ' ~ .. ···~ r .. : /··· aui pr- obl~me s de ! 'Instruction Publique.(Stop) Aus si quels ne furent pas· ma ·, ..-: ,· . . , _ ...... • ,• ~ ' -' I surprise et· mon etonnement d-lapprendre qu'a l'Un.iversite Lovanium des ~ t u- ~ ' . ' . . \(• \ .. di~t · fro)e.~- ~ient des mouveme~t s de violence pour revendique! ". . i, ' • ' ' . du ,-t~ux '-de ~~ - bourse d' etudes '! (St op) . . ·'· I . ,

De Ia part des etudiant s cette e lite qui est notre espoi r

main une telle malhonnetete intelectuel le ne ~ouva it ~tre que proprement de-

cevante . (Stop). Entretemps en dl!pit de 1 'agitation qui r~gnait j 'ai garde l e I

I ' contact ~uasi permanent avec mon Hinistre de !'Education Nationale. Parnlle- \

lement j'ai pris contact avec la·plus haute personnalite ac ad~mique de l'Uni- I I

ver site Lovanium.Stop , .• -·t·

Pourquoi des lors cette violence alors que le contenu des textes f . ! . .... i!o consacrant !'augmentation du taux de la bourse etait connu? Pouvais-je m'i-

maginer un seul instant en pacificateur que j'ai toujours ete et en pere de "• ,· famille que je suis, pouvais-je m'imaginer dis-je, que ceux que j'ai toujours

aimes par-dessus tout en arriveraient par des methodes inconnues du peuple

co~golais, c'est-a-dire empruntees a 1 1 etr anger a me contraindre d'annoncer a la nation congolaise des nouvelles aussi tristes et aussi dramatiques pour certains foyers, certaines families et pour la nation toute entier e ? Stop

Car qui d'entre vous mettaient en doute notre volonte decl ~e de restaurer !'entente, la tranquillite, la paix et la concorde dans tout es l es couches

de la population ?(Stop) En faudrait-il une preuve que depuis le 24 novembre .. r: 'r • . -' • t 1965 toute !'action entreprise et menee sous la deuxieme Republi que t endra1t ·~ . · ... L

il la f ournir a ·suffisance. (Stop) ...' -

"": ,1'. . ··, ·; . 'Au fond que s'est-il passe ? (Stop) Ce mercredi 4 juin a

·des pancartes, des cocktails Molotov et des g enodes

sur leur passage . St~ .. et d' tr ainsi arm6s prouve que leur action d6bordait i • ., . ~ . ' :" ...... , ... - " · sa is quoi ont utilise leUTs cocktails Molotov ct leurs grenades.

que l'on sait des forces de l'ordre.Stop

. . · citoycnnes, ..

Citoyens, . I

Tels sont lqs faits que nous avons appris tous avec beaucoup

d'affliction.(Stop)

Hais une question nous ·vint directoment a l'esprit.(Stop1 Pourquoi .. cola ?(Stop) Grace a la paix et a ld tranquill ite retrouvee, le peuple congo­ ·-!.> _lais vivait dans la concorde.(Stop) Cctte societe congolaise integree que

nous no cessons de proner exclut-elfe une catceorie quclconque de citoyens ?

(Stop) Citoyennes, Citoyens, vous taus qui m'ecoutcz, vous tous qui m'avez

toujours temoigne votre confiance, je m'adressc ~ vous en votre qualite de

peres de famillc ct meres de famille et d'cducateurs en vous demandant d'unir vos efforts, d'etre a mes cotes pour que notre jeunesse ne puisse devicr de ses responsabilites de demain qui sont cclles de maintenir l'ordre, lacon-

corde et la paix si cherement acquise.(Stop) Que Dieu protege la Republique Democratique du Congo et la nation congolaise.Stop -

/

, .. ·' X•Yl 185 S CUN> NY 61 lJ 2006Z: ETATPRIORITE SOl EXCELlENCE MONSIEUR CYRILLE ADOULA I . MINISTR! DES A'YAIRES ETRANGIRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCftATIQUE DU CONGO HOPlTAL IESTL! LAUSANNE CSVITtERLAND>~ - CIST AVEC B!AUCOUP DE REGRET QUE ~AI APPRIS VOTRI HOSPITALISATIOI A LAOSAII!. VEUILL!l ACCEPTER MEl VOEUX LES PLUS SINCER!S POUR

Ul PROMPT RETOUR A LA ~OIN!: SANTE. AVEC MES SENTIMENTS LIS PLUI AIIJlCAUXz U THAT SICRiTAIR! GENERAL D!S NATlOIS UIIES+ COL NIL+ 9 June 1970

Mrs. Adoula is thanking for the wishes for a prompt recovery or her husband the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

~p MISSION PERMANENTE DE LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO aupres des Nations Unies

400-402 East 51st Street New York, New York !0022 JKN/jdb Tel. (212 ) 758-8060 No. 0618/70

New York, le 9 juin 1970

Excellence, J'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-dessous le texte d'un message emanant de Madame Cyrille ADOULA, epouse du Ministre d'Etat charge des Affaires Etrangeres : "ai ete tres sensible 1 la vive sympathie temoignee a l'endroit de mon mari ainsi qu'aux voeux de prompt retour a la bonne sante que vous lui avez exprimes Stop Je vous en sais infiniment gre " Fullstop. Madame ADOU LA PAXHOI'EL, LAUSANNE. Je vous prie d'agreer, Excellence, !'expression de ma tres haute considerstion.

1 Son Excellence U THANT Secretaire General des Nations Unies

c c LL 21 October SG: The attached is a copy of the statement the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Congo (Kinshasa) will make when he calls on you this evening. Jean gave us a summaxytranslation below. "Conveys apologies from President for not being able to attend Commemorative session in person because of presidential and legislative elections in his country. Congo is a living example of achievement on part of the UN. Congo is offering a cheque as token contribution to collective effort of the UN in peace-keeping field."

em ly UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES '· INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

22 October 1970 TO: Mr. Bruce R. Turner DATE: A: Controller REFERENCE: ------1 THROUGH: S/C OE:

FROM: C. V. Narasimhan DE: Chef de Cabinet

SUBJECT: OBJET:

I attach hereto a cheque for $100,000 which was handed over to the Secretary-General yesterday by the Chairman of the Delegation of the Democratic Republicaf the Congo to the United Nations.

My understanding is that this cheque is not ..., . . .. to be presented for encashment, but a subsequent ,I cheque will follow and this cheque will then be returned to the Delegation. If this is not done • I during the next three or four weeks, could I please be informed eo that I could inform the Delegation.

I • cc -Mr. Lemieux /

: "'

=rl' '''5 j l ' ~ r ~ ~ ~ ~~~ ~ ~ f ~! !! l5f l J!' .. · :t · cr .. ~ .... ~ i ifr . ~ i t i : ~ ~ r ! r I, ~ ·~ f. . ''f l\ fl J ... f \ . ;:: J,, ~ ,t •• li,f ! f~ ,.P' ; ! ! I f - i ! t f p ~ s: i .. !" ; J ~;l~l! f I .. ~ ~~ r ~ • t: ~}' jf l ~ s ! ~ ItI ~ tf•i: l ,l\f i ( il . fr l :r .. ! , g .. a i r: !Jl' l l. j ! • i I l lr~~ £ rll~.. 0 l .. t - ~ ..• • . ~ ·'-"' ; " · '(

UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME DES NATIONS UNIES DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT (;;;

TEl.t!PHONEI 3821 · 3928 BOlTE POSTALE 7248 ADRESSE T~Le.GRAPHIQUE UNDEVPRO · KIN5H49A KINSHASA I I REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO

K~ 976 (. ·t ' i) '~· 25 !3eptembe_r 1970 ,. rL ·. ....t. C. <, It .., ' , / l ; r ..; It /7CI

:Dear Mr. Secretary-~eneral,

Poli tic ar:credi ted to both Govern ments are Ftble to obt 2- i..n al'l)roval to cross on the once-a-week schedule now eRtablished.

This restr:i.ction has brought about gre;,. t diffi9ul ties to members of thA rrni ted Nations o:r·e; e.nizations, to their staffs ' and to tr,eir proc;rammes . This letter is, in fact, beine; forwarded to yoLl at the re,1uest of the ' Chiefs of Mission of tbe various Aeencies rep resented in Kins hasa. I have a l so had cau8A to diP cuss t'be problem wi tb my collo:'! [;:;l l.e across tbe river, tl:w nesiden t Pe.rre."entati ve in Brazzaville, who co!lcurs in the yro~os a l we 3re about to mHked

Th ~c.; Gover!lr.l rt'1 of the two Con t:!;OS }wve Cl(:','I'Eled to resum El normal relations Rcrnss-the-bo8 rd ir1 a proeressive m~onar. A Commission on whi~l f it~ r e prt!Sent0.ti v es of tle two Cone;os ancl othe r Central African countries peri..odica.lly meets to review pr·og ress alan~ tld s line. ThA next mAetint; is scheduled to be held on 24 October \'rbieh happily coincide8 Nith the 25tl::. anttiversary of our Oreanization.

It in recommended tbat your Officfl contact representatives of the two Con(:',OS at tlJP. Fni ted Nati o n :-1 to flU~~;es t tha t more liber·J, ) arranGe­ i ments b e mad e for· t he 1 · <'!:> ~1:J~e of men1ber:c; of the United H!:l.tions fa111 ily.

U Thant Se cretar;y-C8neral United Nr:t.tiom; Ne1• York - 2 -

As ~rou no doubt realiRt~, various Ui\T delegations and commissions are called upon to vis it both Braz?,avillo ~il" d Kin~h osa . The four ldl orneter passa~f) has had to be m.:tde indiror;i;ly b ~ r r_,J Eme via f:lUCh distant _placr:;s of tbe c;roupo

Tht'l WHO Regional Office situated in Brazzaville is virtually inaccessible to the liHO Office in Kinshasa. I am informed that during the past year WHO has h:-,d to spend an additional $400,000 to effect the passage of its staff between Kinsha sa and Brazzaville via indirect routings.

The Representative of the Office of the High Commission for Refugees in Kinshastt, while not accredit8d to Brazzaville, has some responsibilities for r·efugees in Congo-Brazzaville, but is not authorized to take thP- ferry.

The re are innumerable other examples of unnecessary ha!L'dships to which members of the United Nation::; are subjected.

We are informed unofficially thH.t the Commi;:~:sion overseeing the 1'\0rmalisation of relationA between the two countries is prepared to recommend that the United Nations family be permitted f reer access in the use of the ferry services. Its voice would be strenethen8d immeasurably if t he vie'lt3 of your Office vrere made knmm in this matter.

On behalf of the various United Nations Organizations here, I respectfully request that serious consideration be Given to this proposal ·.

Yo _s incerely/"" / ~ ~ t.... Pierre L. Sales Resident Re pres enta tive a.i. .. - ...

TO The Secretary-General

FROM Jean Gazarian

FOR YOUR INFORMATION UNITED NATIONS • NATIONS UNIES

NEW YORK

CABLE ADORESS-AORESSE T£LEGRAPHIOUE· UNATIONS NEWYORK

•n~••Nca , PO 2)0 CONGO

The enclosed translation ~f a communication dated 0 ••••• 17 the Permanent Missions of

the States Members of the request of the President of the D ratic Republic of the Congo. () (J 28 December 1970 Translated from French

DEMCCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

Kinshasa, 17 December 1970

Sir, Over the last ten years you have had several opportunities to appreciate the devotion of the Democratic \Republic· of the Congo to the United Nations and its ideals. This devotion was inspired by the effective action taken by the international organization to restore peace and security in our country, when they were threatened during the years immediately following our accession to independence. At that time, and even afterwards, several of my compatriots, yielding to external pressure, committed offences against the security of the state. Over the last five years, however, the Congolese people have under my leadership made a recovery which you yourself were

able to see during your brief visit to our country~ On the threshold of the Development Decade which the United Nations has proclaimed for the benefit of the developing countries, the Democratic Republic of the Congo intends, through the programme described in the enclosed speech, to give a good account of itself when the Third World forgathers in 1980. To do this, our country needs the help of all its children. It cannot

His Excellency U Thant Secretary-General of the United Nations New York -2- therefore reject outright those of them who went astray. Each must resume his place in the community.

This is o1hy, on 30 November 1970 I enacted lep :.-,.J. u . iJJ. ve ordinance No. 70-o83, enclosed herewith, granting amnesty to all Congolese citizens who, between 1 July 1960 and 30 November 1970, were guilty of offences against the security of the State. However serious their ~ilt, the national community is ready to take them back, on the sole condition that they demonstrate their repentance by returning to the country before 31 January 1971. My personal representative, Ambassador-at-Large Marcel LENGF:Iv1A, the bearer of this letter, has been instructed to give you further information on the exact scope of this measure. I should be grateful if you would bring the contents of this letter and its enclosures to the attention of the Governments of States Members of the United Nations and of the President of the Security Council. Accept, Sir, the assurances of my hip;hest consideration.

, , (Signed) Joseph-Desire MOBUTU Lieutenant- General President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo LmiSIATIVE ORDINANCE No. 7Q-08~ OF ~0 NOV»>BER 1970 granting amne•ty to all Congolese involved in offences against the security of the State between 1 July 1960 and ~0 November 1970

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, Bearing in mind the Constitution, and in particular article 46 and article IV of title IX (Transitional provisions), Decrees that: Article 1. All citizens involved in an offence against the security of the State between 1 July 1960 and ~0 November 1970 shall be granted amnesty for that offence and any other offence directly related thereto which they may have committed. Article 2. This measure shall apply to Congolese citizens abroad, provided that they return to the country before

~1 January 197L Article 3. This legislative ordinance shall enter into force on the date of its signature.

Done at Kinshasa, on ~0 November 1970 J.D. MOBUTU Lieutenant-General (Stamp of the ot'fice of the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo) OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ARCHIVES, DOCUMENTATION AND PRESS UNIT

POLICY STATEMENT MADE ON 5 DECEMBER 1970 BY J.D. MOB1JI'U, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, UPON TAKING THE OATH OF OFFICE

"Presidents and dear colleagues, Honourable Delegates, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Citizens, As we officially take up office, our first words must be to thank and welcome our eminent guests from Africa who, on the occasion of this ceremony, have been kind enough to Join us in order to demonstrate their friendship and sympathy towards us. We are thinking particularly of Their Excellencies

President Fran~ois Tombalbaye of Chad, President Albert­ Bernard Bongo of Gabon, President Michel Michombero of Burundi, President Marien Ngouabi of the People 1 s Republic of the Congo and President E1 Nimeiry of the Sudan. May they all accept this expression of our deepest gratitude. We also extend thanks to nis Majesty King Baudouin I of Belgium and to our esteemed colleagues, Their Excellencies

Mr. F~lix Houphouet Boigny, Mr. El Hadj Ahmadou AhidJo and

Mr. Gr~goire Kayibanda, who had wished to be with us at this ceremony but, being unable to do so, have sent outstanding delegates to represent them.

The economv in the service of man

Citizens, By electing us to the Presidency of the Republic, you have shown that you want the action taken by the Government since 24 November 1965 to be continued. The seven-year tenn which is now beginning will therefore be one of continuity. We should now like to express our thanks to you for having reiterated your confidence in us with such enthusiasm. During the five years which have just passed, you were the makers of a model revolution. In order to rebuild the extensive ruins, you had to place yourselves in the service of the economy. During the coming decade, it is the economy which will be in the service of man. This is vhy the time ahead will be an era of social progress and development. - 2 -

We are taking as our reference point a whole decade, in order to coincide with the programme which the United Nations is evolving for the benefit of the developing countries. Thus all our action will fall within the framework of a ten-~ear plan. In 198o, the date set by the United Nations, the Democratic Republic of the Congo must give a good account of itself when the Third World forgathers. But at the end of the term of office of the current legislature - the mid-point in our ten-year plan - we shall already draw up a partial balance-sheet which will enable us to see how far we have come and, if necessary, to correct any errors we have made on the way. Every citizen will have to make an effort and exercise continuous self-discipline, if our programme is to be fulfilled. In order for each person to understand the need for the effort demanded of him, he must be aware of the fundamental objectives of the State's action during the next seven years. We shall now outline these object,ives.

Youth, the Congo of tomorrow

In the political and administrative fields, the National Party has shown frequently and particularly in the presidential and legislative elections that it is firmly entrenched in the Republic. However, its structure must be further strengthened so that it will not age and wither, whoever the leaders of its organs may be. The objective of the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution is to strengthen the community spirit of each citizen and help him thoroughly to understand the doctrine contained in the N'Sele Manifesto and to become increasingly imbued with the spirit of the revolution. It must concentrate on the training of young people. Our young people are the Congo of tomorrow. They should became increasingly aware of the role which they are called upon to play. They are the yeast which makes the bread rise. We must admit that at times they have not been kept properly informed. - ) -

The M8uvement Populaire de la Revolution will therefore organize a continual dialogue between youth and those responsible for nati8nal affairs. Furthermore, an ever-increasing r8le will be given to youth

in the governing organs of the Mouvement Populaire Ge la Revolut!~, in the Government and in public services. Great strides have already been made in that directi8n, but our aim is to go ever onwards. We hope that, as true Congolese, the young will take the closest interest in the real problems facing the country and become less irresponsible th:m some of them are today. We do not a priori reject student unrest, but we want it to be constructive ancj truly Congolese. The young people, working side by side with more mature men and sharing responsibilities with them, will be able to impart to all the institutions the dynamism characteristic of their age, while refraining from rash initiatives which would reveal a lack of maturity on their part. The Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution will not only concern itself with the elite of our youth but will also provide the framework within which young people who do not join the Army will perform the civic service permitted by the Constitution in lieu of military service. With regard to the Administration, puLlic services should be made more efficient. In that respect, civil servants and officials at all levels should realize the importance of t e ta ~ k entrusted to them in the city. They need jreater diligence, di ~ cipline, rigidity, c nscientiousness and competence. They will show their community spirit by making a sustained effort

to improve the~selves through the process of C8ntinuous training, which is very popular abroad.

Strenthening our ties with African countries and other continents

Our policy of completing the building of the State and improving the community spirit of Congolese citizens will be supplemented at the international level by an active diplomatic policy of strengthening our ties with our brother African countries and with the States of other continents. - . 4 -

Faithful to the ideals of the Organization of African Unity, the

Democratic Republic of the Congo ~ill continue its policy of aid and assistance to the African Territories still under foreign domination.

Its objective is to help the ~hole of our continent to become free, independent and prosperous. Our Government v1ill continue to make its contribution to

consolidating peace, to strengthening co-operation bet~een States and

to promoting progress throughout the ~orld in all fields.

Opening ourselves to the ~orld does not, ho~ever, mean that ~e are prepared to give foreigners any opportunity to threaten our independence. We certainly have no intention and no means of pursuing an imperialist policy of interfering in the internal affairs

affairs of other States. Nor could ~e tolerate attempts by foreign

States to divide us by so~ing subversion in our midst. The

rebellions ~hich ~e have experienced and the aggression ~hich has

been committed in certain African States ~auld caution us to be even more vigilant. Thus, in order to safeguard its independence~ development and progress, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is compelled to

forenrm itself ~ith an adequate deterrent force. In this ~ay, it

~ill protect itself against any enemies ~hich may try to impose on it their ideologies and systems of government or to dominate it economically.

As ~e have said, during the coming decade, all the Government's

political activity ~ill be mainly geared to social progress and

development. We must n~ explain this further.

Wresting our economy from the control of foreign monopolies

The_,first five years of the Second Republic ~ere marked by toil and austerity. All the energy and all the resources of the nation

~ere concentrated on reviving our economy, ~hich had been ruined . by years of neglect,ond laying the proper political, economic, financial and institutional foundations for harmonious and independent economic and social development.

This t~ofold task ~as so urgent and so costly that it ~ould have been dangerous to embark on a policy of restoring the economic machinery and of expansion at the same time as a broad social policy.

------5 -

The reactivation of the econ~my and the strur,gle asainst monop~lies vrere undertaken 'd th such determination and self-denial that they absorbed most o:? the efforts of' the natbn between 1965 and 1970. TClday, thanks to the toil and sacrifices of trc: ne>•:.:.on, our economy has been wrested from the control of foreign monopolies. We have accordinv,ly reorr,anized our ecnnomic infrastructure. The success achieved in the economic, financial end monetary fields end the spirituel end moral gains which accompanied them have changed the pattern of our national li~e to such an extent that we must rethink our economic end social policies. Social progress must be conceived as the gradual attainment of a higher standard of living by all strata of the population. In particular, the State should encourage employers end workers to improve their performance in order to increase their output and thus raise their income. Such social progress also means that culture, leisure, medical care and medicines are made available to ell through the appropriate infrastructure. Greeter well-bei,g for ell cannot, however, be achieved without sj_multeneous and harmonious economic development in all regions. Could the Congolese people tolerate indefinitely an economic development which systematically enriched certain regions at the expense of others? Could they accept an economic development which favoured only the towns, to the detriment of the rural areas? Would they not condemn a policy which enabled certain people to acquire wealth dishonestly at the expense of others? Could they develop the economy of the country if a war of generations was being waged there? In this connexion, we make a solemn appeal to our students and invite them honestly and objectively to consider the world of today. They will note that the implacable and sectarian ideological clashes of yesterda~, are gradually disappearing. Both on the national and international scene, yesterday's adversaries are today joining together in order to safeguard peace and promote their common progress. - 6 -

No one has the right to deprive the Congolese people of the benefits which they can derive from their enthusiastic and loyal support for the war which we are waging for progress.

Reforms will increase the social utility of Congolese education

For development which will guarantee our economic independence, national cadres must be trained. The Congolese State will therefore pay special attention to the problems of education. In recent years, the school system of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been expanded and diversified. School enrolment has increased rapidly at all levels but we must unfortunately admit that the results obtained have been slender in comparison with the human and financial investments. This situation will be studied in detail by the Government. Reforms which will increase the social utility of our education at all levels will be enacted and put int·o effect. Young people who have embarked on a course for which they are unsuited will be directed to institutions which will develop their abilities in order ·to make them useful to the whole of society. The harmonious development of the Republic requires a balanced geographical distribution of all types of school.. This policy is in accordance with the basic concept underlying our economic organization, which is based on the three development centres. Furthermore, the training of cadres does not suffice in itself. The training must be adapted to our economic development programme. As well as education, other economic sectors will also be given Government attention. A special effort will be made to solve the problems of transport and telecommunications, agriculture, mining, industry, tourism and physical planning •

. Adeguate infrastructure and equipment for transport and telecommunications

Our transport and telecommunications infrastructure and equipment are still inadequate. Yet the economic and social development of a country as vast as ours needs an adequate infrastructure and adequate equipment for transport and telecommunications, in order to ensure the rapid circulation of people and goods, ideas and techniques.

---- - 7 -

Without a proper transport and telecommunications system, the integration of vast rural areas into the modern economy would be impossible, and there would be a consequent risk of a constant rise in the prices of agricultural products in the centres. Our effort to modernize lines of communication and transport equipnent will cover river, road, rail and air transport. As regards road transport, a far-reaching effort will be made on a nation-wide scale. It will aim at re-establishing certain routes which had become hazardous for lack of upkeep. At the same time construction work will be started on arterial highways, including one linking Banana and Bukavu .!!! Luluabourg and one linking Kisangani and Rwuindi via Bukavu and Goma. In the light of the experience of the experience of recent years, the construction and maintenance of motorable tracks will be entrusted to the local population. For this work we shall call upon young people, who, under the provisions of the Constitution, will henceforth perform their civic service by doing work of national interest. With regard to rail transport, some projects already drawn up will shortly reach the execution stage. One of these is the project to link Sakania with the seaport to be constructed at Banana. This long and important line of communication will involve numerous engineering projects, among which mention should be made of the bridge which will span the river at Matadi. With regard to air transport, the Government will tackle the task of restructuring navigational aids and aeronautical telecommunications. It will begin work on the construction of two international airports, at Kisangani and in the Goma region. In the field of telecommunications, we shall continue the programme for the installation of a long-distance, high-capacity and high-quality network. By 30 June 1971 the satellite telecommunications station currently under construction will be completed and will enable us to communicate directly with any point on the globe. - 8-

Expanding our domestic market by increasing agricultural prQQuction Agriculture, like transport, is one of the priority sectors in our programme. In spite of the action taken over the last five years, this sector of the economy has not yet reached a satisfactory level. One cannot over-emphasize the benefits accruing to the country from increased agricultural production. It limits the volume of imports of food-stuffs and gives the country a foreign currency surplus. Furthermore, by improving the standard of living of farmers, who constitute the bulk of our population, it expands the domestic market, which is necessary for industrial expansion. With these ends in view, the main objective of our agricultural policy is to meet national food needs, to diversify our agriculture and, above all, to create a strong agricultural products industry. The country must therefore produce more food-stuffs, particularly rice, maize and sugar. D.lring the last five years we have stepped up our production of rice, cotton, manioc and maize, but we must produce still more, not only for our own consumption but also for export. In this decade, the Congo must become a net exporter of staple products. At present 70 per cent of our meat is imported. In the near future, we hope to reduce this percentage to 50 per cent at most. To that end, our extensive grass-lands will be used for stock-breeding.

Strengihening the econgmy by diversifYing the sources of mining investments and operators

The same policy of improving and stepping up production will be followed in the area of mining. We must establish a geographical balance in the production of raw materials. In order to reduce the risks caused by fluctuations on world metal markets, we must broaden the range of·our mineral exports.

------9 -

In order to strengthen the economy, we must also diversify t he sources of mining investments and operators. The aim of such diversification is to achieve a better distribution of mining throughout the Republic and to enable the people to derj_ve greater bencfi t from it. This policy is being implemented by stepping up the systematic prospecting of deposits with a view to guiding investors. We may mention by way of example the petroleum exploration being carried out on the coast and the mining prospecting operations in Oriental provl.nce. Another priority sector in our programme is the processing industry. The modernization of the economic and social structures of the country and its development will, to a large extent, depend on this industry. In general our equipment is antiquated and in some cases badly designed and unsuited to current demand conditions. Our industry will have to follow the expansion of the market with a view to diversifying production whenever new manufacturing possibilities arise; but above all an effort will be made to improve its competitiveness. In the next fe1v years, we shall establish new equipment and intermediates industries to supply the other branches, thus laying the foundations for an integrated network of inter-industry relations. The establishment of all these industries will require cheap supplies of energy. A start has therefore been made on the study of the second stage of the Inga power station and the transportation of the power produced by it to Katanga, the second development centre.

Town planning: the last pri ority sector

The last priority sector is town planning. In this connexion, it will be noted that the urban population has increased considerably during the past decade. It is likely that tbis growth trend will continue. This population explosi on, which it has not been possible to control, raises serious problems in our towns deterioration, public thoroughfares, traff ic, water and e l ectricity supplies. - 10 -

The Government is steadi~ implementing a rational policy of town planning. The anti-deterioration work already begun in some centres will be continued. Town plans will be systematical~ drawn up. Housing needs will be met through State construction projects. In the towns, health and aesthetic requirements will be scrupulous~ respected. Before concluding, we must tell you the Government's plans for the third centre of growth. The third centre, which comprises Oriental province and Kivu province, has suffered more than any other from the murderous and destructive activities of the rebels and mercenaries. The nascent small manufacturing industry, the banking, commercial and hotel infrastructure, and the lines of communication, transport equipment and plantations there have been bad~ affected. But, what is worse, these provinces have lost their reputation. By many foreigners, as well as Congolese, these regions are regarded as dangerous. In order to destroy this myth, we must rebuild the infrastructure, embark on large-scale public works and develop agriculture, industry and tourism.

Each must resume his place in the community Citizens, Now that our main objectives have been defined, we must proceed to action without wasting time on useless words. The Congo must continue to present to the world the face of a young, dynamic and promising country. In order to attain the objectives we have set ourselves, the country needs the help of all its children. It cannot therefore reject outright those of them who went astray. .Each must resume his place in the community. - 11 •

This is why, on 30 November 1970, we enacted a legislative ordinance granting amnesty to all Congolese citizens who were guilty of offences against the security of the State between 196o and the present. However serious their guilt, we are ready to take them back, on the sole condition that they demonstrate their repentance by returning to the country before 31 January 1971. We ask all our companions in arms and all our fellow-citizens to be understanding towards these brothers who went astray. It is human nature to err, but every sincere conversion calls for forgiveness and rehabilitation. In order to make a fresh start, we must forget the bad memories of the past decade. We must henceforth all unite and join forces. Only then shall we achieve the objective we have set ourselves for the coming years: social progress through development. May God protect the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its people." UNITED NATIONS ~~'~ NATIONS UNIES ~

• • UNITED NATIONS • NATIONS UNIES

~ NEW YORK

CA8L.E ADDAESS-ADRE.SSE TELEGAAPHIQUE: UNATI ONS NE.WYORK

REFERE.NCK:

• ROU'l'ING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION TOa., The "Secretary-General Aa FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS--NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMA:NDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION X POUR INFORMATION

~ ~ . . ~ ~ ~ .~ ·. .. t: ~ ~

c -. ~~· ~·'l1fe~O ::----~--

Date: FROM: Jean Gazarian 29 December 1970 DE:

CR.13 (11-64) - ..' ~ ' ~ . UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

NEW YORK

CADL.E ADDRESS-ADRESSE TEL.EGRAPHLQUI!.' UNATION S NEWYORK

R£FERENCK, PO 230 CONGO

The enclosed translation of a communication dated

17 December ~970 is transmitted to the Permanent Missions of

the States Members of the United Nations at the request of the

President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

28 December 1970 •

Translated from French

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO THE PHESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC Kinshasa, 17 December.. 1970

Over the last ten years you have had several opportunities to appreciate the devotion of the Democratic Republic of the Cong o to the United Nati ons and its ideals. This devotion Has inspired

by the effe~tive acti.on taken by the international ore;anization to restore peace and sccuri ty in our country, v1hen they were threatened during the years i rruncdiately folloHing our accessi on to indepenuence.

At that tL ~ e, and even aftenvards, several of my compatriots, yieldinr; to external pressure, corruni tted offences ae;ainst the security of' the State. Over the last five years, hov1evcr, the Congolese people have under my leadership made a recovery which you yourself' were able to see during your brief visit to our country. On the threshold of the Development llicade which the United Nations has proclaimed for the benei 'it of the developing countries, the Democratic Republic of the Congo intends, through the pro[.S ranJne described in the enclosed speech, to give a e;o od account of itself Hhen the Third World forgathers in 1980. To do this, our country needs the help of all its children. It cannot

His E:xcellency U Thant Secretary-General of the United Nations New York .. ..

-2-

therefore reject outright those of them who went astray. Each must reswne his place in the community. This is v1hy, on 30 November 1970 I enacted l egislative.. ordinance No. 70-cf33, enclosed herewith, granting amnesty to all Congolese citizens v1ho, between l July 1960 and 30 November 1970, -.Jere guilty of offences against the security of the State. However serious their guilt , the national community is ready to take them back, on the sole condition t hat they demonstrate their repentance by returning. to the country before 31 January 1971. My personal representA.tive, Ambassador-at-Large Marcel LENGEMA, the bearer of t his letter, has been instructed to give you further information on the exa ct scope of this measure. I should be grateful if you v1ould bring the contents of this letter and its enclosures to the attention of the Governments of States Members of the United Nations and of t he President of the, Security Council. Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

, ~ (Signed) J oseph-Desire MOBUTU Lieutenant-General President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ..

• :.

-3:-

LEGISLATIVE ORDINANCE No. 70-083 OF 30 NOVEMBER 1970 granting amnesty to all Congolese involved in offences against the security of the State between 1 JUiy 1960 and 30 November 1970

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, Bearing in mind the Constitution, and in particular article 46 and article IV of title IX (Transitional provisions),

Decre~s that: Article 1. All citizens involved in an offence against the security of the State between 1 July 1960 and 30 November 1970 shall be granted amnesty for that offence and any other offence directly related thereto which they may have committed.

Article 2. This measure shall apply to Congolese citi~ens abroad, provided that they return to the country before 31 January 1971.· Article 3. This l egislative ordinance shall enter into force on the date of its signature.

Done at Kinshasa, on 30 November 1970 J.D. MOBUTU Lieutenant-General (Stamp of the office of the Pr esident of the Democratic Republic of the Congo)

I

I

ll

•· r . - ... • -4-

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ARCHIVES, DOCUMENTATION AND PRESS UNIT

POLICY STATEMENT MADE ON 5 DECEMBER 1970 BY J.D. MOBUTU, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, UPON TAKING THE OATH OF OFFICE ..

"Presidents and dear colleagues, Honourable Delegates, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Citizens, As we officially take up office, our first words must be to thank and welcome our eminent guests from Africa who, on the occasion of this ceremony, have been kind enough to join us in order to aemonstrate their friendship and sympathy towards us. We are thinking particularly of Their Excellencies President Fran~ois Tombalbaye of Chad, President Albert­ Bernard Bongo of Gabon, President Michel Michombero of Burundi, President Marien Ngouabi of the People's Republic of the Congo and President El Nimeiry of the Sudan. May they all accept this expression of our deepest gratitude. We also extend thanks to His Majesty King Baudouin I of Belgium and to our esteemed colleagues, Their Excellencies Mr. Felix Houphouet Boigny, Mr. El Hadj Ahmadou Ahidjo and Mr. Gregoire Kayibanda, who had wished to be with us at this ceremony but, being unable to do so, have sent outstanding delegates to represent them.

The economy in the service of man

Citizens, By electing us to the Presidency of the Republic, you have shown that you want the action taken by the Government since 24 November 1965 to be continued. The seven-year t erm which is now beginning will therefore be one of continuity. We should now like to express our thanks to you for having r eiterated your confidence in us with such enthusiasm. During the five years which have just passed, you were the makers of a model revolution. In order to rebuild the extensive ruins, you had to place yourselves in the service of the economy. During the coming decade , it is the economy which Will be in the service of man. This is why the time ahead will be an era of social progress and development. I • . • - -5-

We are taking as our reference p ~ int a wh ole decade, in or der t o C:Jincide with the pr:Jgramme which the United Nations is evolving

f:Jr the benefit of the developing c ~ untries. Thus all our action wi ll fall Hi thin the framework of a ten-cyear plan. In 1980, the date s et by the United Nations, th. .e Democ.n:i.tic Republic of the Congo mu s t give a good account of itself when t he Third World forgathers. But at t he end of t he term :Jf office of the current legis lature - the mid-point in our ten-year plan - we shall already draw up a partiDl balance-sheet which 'r.i.ll enabl e us t ::> see how far we have come and, if nec. essary, t o c ::> rrect a ny error s we have made on the way . Every citizen will have to make an effort and exercise continuous s elf-discipline, if our programme is t ::.> be fulfilled.

In order f or each per son t o understand the need for the e ff ~ rt demanded of hi m, he mu s t be awa r e 0f the f und amental ob j ectives ::> f the State' s action during the next seven years. We shall now :Jut line these obj ect.i ve s .

Youth, the Congo of tomorrow

In the pol itical a nd admini stra tive fiel ds, the National Party has shown frequently and particul arly in the presidential and l egislative el cctic·ns that i t is firmly entrenched in t he Republic. Howeve r, its s tructure mu st be furt her strengthened so tha t it will not age and wi ther, wh:Jever the l eaders of its or gans may be .

The :Jb j ective of the Mouvement Popul aire de l a R~v o luti on i s t o s trengthen the community spirit of each citizen and help him thor oughly t o und er s tand the doctrine contained in the N' Sel e Manifest :J a nd t o b ec ome increa si ngly imbued vdth t he s pirit of the r evolution . It mus t concentrate on the traini ng of young people. Our young people are t he Congo of t omorrow. They should become increasingly aware of the r ol e which t hey ar e called upon t o play . They are the yea st which makes the bread ri se . We mus t admit tha t a t t i mes they have not been k ept properly i nformed . -6-

The M8uvement Populaire de la Revolution will therefore organize a continual dialogue between youth and those responsible for national affairs . Furthermore, an ever-increasing r ple will be given to youth in the governing organs c-f the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolu0on, in the Gove rnment and in public services . Great s ~rides have already been made in that direction, but our aim i s t o go ever onward s . We hope that, as true Congolese, the young will take the closest interest in the real problems facing the c ountry and become l ess irresponsible th . n some of them are today. We do not a priori r e ject student unres t, but we wa nt it t o be constructive an~ truly Congoles e .• The y ::::.ung pe:)ple, \>/(irking side by side with m:Jre mature men and

s haring r esponsibilities with th~m, will be able t o impart t o all the institutions the dynami sm char act er istic of their age, while refraining from rash initiat i ves \-Jhich w::mld r eveal a l ack of ma turity on their part. The M o uv e men~P o pulaire de la Revolution Hill not only concern itself wi t h t he el ite of our youth but will al so provide the framework within 'f!hic h young peopl e \-lho do not j oin the Ar my will perform t he civic s ervice permitted by the Constitution in lieu of milita ry service. VJith r egard to the Admini s tratL.m, pul. lic s ervices sh ::Juld be made mor e efficient. In t ha t respect, civi l servant s and offj cials at a ll

leve l s should r ealize the importance of t e ta ~ k entrus t ed t o them in the city. They need ~~ ea t e r dili gence, diEcipline, rigidity, c nscientious ness and competence . They vrill show their communi ty spiri t by making a s us t ained effort t o improve the~nselv es through the process of ccmtinuous t raini ng, whi ch i s very popular abroad .

Strenthening our ti e~ ; with African countries and other conti nents

Our policy of completing the building of the St a t e and improving the community spirit of Congol ese citizens ·Hill be suppl emented a t t he i nternational l evel by a n active dipl omatic policy of s t rengthening our ties w_i_ th our brother African countri es aml vii th the States of other continents . . :' . • -7-

}aithful to the idea l s of the Organization of African Unity, the Democra tic Republic of the Congo will continue its policy of aid and o s siste nce to the i\f rican Territories still under foreign domination. Its objective is to help the >vhole of our continent. to become f ree, independent and prosperous . Our Governmen-t '.' i ll c ontinue to m8ke its contrib ution to consolida ting pence, to s trene;thening c o-opera t ion beb·Jeen State s and to promot inL p rogres s throughout t he 'dOrld in all fields .

Opening ourselves to the v;orld does not, h o,t~ever, mea n that iv e are prepared to give for eigners a ny opportunity to threaten our i nde_Jendence. \le certainl,y hove no intention a nd no means of

p urs ui ng

~:;cates to di v i de us by ~o m 7 i ng s ubversion in our midst . The rebellions which "We have experienced a nd the a ggres s ion i·J hich h

even more v igil~nt.

Thus , -i n order to S8 f eguard i ts i nd ~pendence, , developme nt and p roGress, the Democra t ic Republic of the Congo is comp ell ed to ore:; m itself with a n a dequate deterrent force . I n this way, it \iill p rotect its elf - t;ainst e ny enemies ,,,hich may try co i mpose on it thei r ide ologies and sys tems of government or t o dominate it economi cally.

As vie hi-JVe said, during t he coming decFJde, e l l t he Governrnent ' s politicul a ctivity i·lill be ms inly geared t o sociol proGress a nd development. vi e mus t nm-1 expl

Wresting our e conomy f r om the control of fore ign monopolie s

The firs t five y ea r s of the Second Republi c v1 ere m ~.~ rked by t oil [Ud a usterity. All the energy and a ll the res ources of the nati on ,,,e re c oncen trated on revi ving our economy, v-'hich ha d been ruined

by ye ~ r s of neglect, ond l nying t he pr oper political, economi c , fina nci

Thi s tivo f old toslc v1a s s o urgent and so costly thc:t it would ha ve been da ngerous to embark on a policy of restoring the economic machinery and o f expansion a t the sa me t ime as a broa d s ocial policy. ' . : \

-8-

'l'h <: reactivation of U1 c e con'!my ond t he s trun :: l e a c;ainst monopolies Here undertaken Hith such dcterm:i.nation a nd sel f - de nial that they absorbed

most of i-11 . f fo r ts o · t P nation uebvc en 19fl5 and 1970 . T0•l ay, thanks t o t he V d J and s a r i ficr::s of tl'c: nati.- on, o ur e conomy has b een VIrc: s ted from th _ c . n ·r o l 'J f forei cn monop: lie:::; . We bave a c co1·chn;rl y r e0rr a nizc·d C"Ju r econ omic i ri'astru ctuJ. <' .

1'ht~ 2ucc e r;s a ch i t~ ·erl in th . ~ ccno mic , fi_nanci a l a nd monetary fielcl s

and t ,. sp-i l':i. tual ~m el m:wal ga h12 w i ch accnmrxm i e cl them have chang P.d

t h L 'F-· t c R H.: h an extent tJ1EJt •.-r c mu <:: t r ethinl\:

t huG rairc t eir inc· r e .

:=uc h ::: ~ ciDl pr·")r'r e f s als • mean •. tha t cul t Prc , J e i surc _, rrfechce l eEn ·c

and medici.ne c n r t~ macle ova ilab le t o All thr 1.1 gh t h e a 1pr n Jri at:e

j n rast n JChl e . Gre a ter \·re- -b e i [' n ')l:' all cannnt- , ht) /ever, b e achiev cc.·c'

'·rit l1out :::i multancou " an(' lw rmoni.ou s e con _, mic df~ '.rr' l 'l P en t in a ll nyr. i nns .

deve l o pme nt ul1 ich syf't~ma ti . ca lly cnri r ll cd c e r to ·i.n r · p: i o n~ at t ht ·2 xpcn::.."~ of a the r ::: ?

Co1 ,lc thc.'r Dccc:Jt em e ano mie ceve l me nt ub j d • r av•I1Jre (i or>ly tl~,, ·;

t u.-r m:; , t o t 11e detriment ~) the ru ra l a eaP?

V•Julc t hey J1(lt c·.mdr:nm a ~} l].i y 1.fh 'ch ('fl 8-).8d c e J· ain _0c p l c- t ·_·>

a cqui rc >r c

wa s b e i n g w a ~ c d there ?

In tf.Ji:::: connexioo , \ re:; make a solemn a presJ. to r·ur students and invite

1~c m hone stl y and objectively t o c ~ n s i d c r the wo l d of toda y . TI1e y will

n(lt <: that tllc implacable enci sectarian i de ·l ogical clashe s ·:)f Y <'~ r:tcrday are r;r-adually cH sappr"?arinc; . B th on the natjonal a nd inte rnati.0 nal scene,

y cstcn:la y ' s adv .rsaries a1·e today ,i 0inj ne t o t:;et ll .r in 0rder to SE!t'er;ua r d

peace and p ro mot ~ their common progr e ss. -9-

No one has the right to depr±ve the Congolese people of the benefits vlhich they can derive from their enthusiastic and loyal support for the war which we are waging for progress. Reforms will increase the social utility of Congolese. .education For development which will guarantee our economic independence, national cadres must be trained. The Congolese State will therefore pay special att ention to the problems of education. In r ecent years, the school system of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been expanded and diversified. School enrolment has increa~ed rapidly a t all l eve l s but we must unfortunately admit that the results obtained have been sl ender in comparison with the human and financial investments . This situation >vill be studied in detail by the Government. Reforms Hhich will i ncrease the social utility of our education at all levels will be enact ed and put into effect. Young peopl e who have embarked on a course for which they are unsuited will be directed to institutions which will develop their abilities in order to make them useful to the whole of society. The harmonious development of the Republic requires a balanced geographical distribution of all types of school. This policy is in accordance with the basic concept underlying our economic organization, vJhi ch is based on the three deve l opment centre s. Furthermore, the training of cadres does not s uffice i n itself. The training must be adapted t o our economic development programme. As we ll as education , other economic sectors will also be given Governme nt attention. A special effort will be made to solve the problems of transport and telecommunications, agriculture , mining, industry, tourism and physical plannin g ~

Ad equate infrastructure and equipme nt f or transport and t elecommunications

Our t ransport and t el ecommun ications infrastructur e and equipment are still inadequate. Yet the economic and social development of a country as vast as ours needs an adequate infrastructure and adequate equipment for transport and telecommunications, in order to ensure the rapid cir culation of people and goods , ideas and t echniques . ..

-lo-·

Without a proper transport and teleco~unications system, the integration of vast rural areas into the modern economy would be impossible, and there would be a consequent risk•of a constant rise in the prices of agricultural products in the centres. Our efforif to modernize lines of communication and transport equipment will cover river, road, rail and air transport. As regards road transport, a rar-reaching effort will be made on a nation-wide scale. It will aim at re-establishing certain

routes whi~h had become hazardous for lack of upkeep. At the same time construction work will be started on arterial highways, including one linking Banana and Bukavu via Luluabourg and one linking Kisangani and Rwuindi via Bukavu and Goma. In the light of the experience of the experience of recent years, the construction and maintenance of motorable tracks will be entrusted to the local population. Fbr this work we shall call upon young people, who, under the provisions of the Constitution, will henceforth perform their civic service by doing work of national interest. With regard to rail transport, some projects already drawn up will shortly reach the execution stage. One of these is the project to link Sakania with the seaport to be constructed at Banana. This long and important line of communication will involve numerous engineering projects, among which mention should be made of the bridge which will span the river at Matadi. With regard to air transport, the Government will tackle the task of restructuring navigational aids and aeronautical telecommunications. It will begin work on the construction of two international airports, at Kisangani and in the Goma region. In the field of telecommunications, we shall continue the programme for the installation of a long-distance, high-capacity and high-quality network. By )0 June 1971 the satellite telecommunications station currently under construction will be completed and will enable us to communicate directly with any point on the globe. . . ,. . .

-ll-

Expanding our domestic market by increasing aericultural production ' Agriculture, like transport, is one of the priority sectors

in our programme. In spite of tne action taken ove~the last five years, this sector of the economy has not yet reached a satisfactory level. One cannot over-emphasize the benefits accruing to the country from tncreased agricultural production. It limits the volwue of imports of .food-stuffs and gives the country a foreign currency surplus. ilirthermore, by improving the standard of living of farmers, who constit ute the bulk of our population, it expands the domestic market, which is ne-cessary for industrial expansion. With these ends in view, the main objective of our agricultural policy is to meet national food needs, to diversify our agriculture and, above all, to create a strong agricultural products industry. The country must therefore produce more food-stuffs, particularly rice, maize and sugar. During the last five years we have stepped up our production of r i ce, cotton, manioc and maize, but we must produce still more, not only for our own consumption but also for export. In this decade, the Congo must become a net exporter of stapl e products. At present 70 per cent of our meat is i mported. In t he near future, we hope to reduce this percentage to 50 per cent at most. To that end, our extensive grass-lands will be used for stock-breedi ng .

Strengthening the econo~ by diversifying the sources of mining investments and operators

The same policy of improving and stepping up production wi l l be followed in the area of mining . We must establish a geographical balance in the production of raw materials. In order to reduce the risks caused by f l uctuations on world metal markets, we must broaden the range of our mineral exports. -12-

In order to strengthen the economy, we must also diversify the sources of mining investments and operators. The aim of such diversification is to achieve a better distribution of mining throughout the Republic and to enable the people to dedve greater benefit from it. This policy is being implemented by· stepping up the systematic prospecting of deposits with a vie"' to guiding investors. We may mention by way of example the petroleum exploration being carried out on the coast and the mining prospecting operations in Oriental province. Another priority sector in our prograrrune is the processing industry. 'lhe modernization of the economic and social structures of the country and its development will, to a lare;e extent, depend on this industry. In general our equipment i s antiquated and in s ome cases badly designed and unsuited to current demand conditions. Our industry '\olill have to follow the expansion of the market with a vie"' to diversifying production whenever new manufacturing possibilities arise; but above all an effort will be made to improve its competitj_veness . In the next fe'v years, we shall establish new equipment and intermediates industries to supply the other branches, thus laying the foundations for an integrated network of inter-industry relat ions. The establishment of all these industries will r equi re cheap supplies of energy. A start has therefore been made on the study of the s econd stage of the Inga power station and the transportation of the power produced by it to Katanga,_ the second development centre.

Tmm planni ng: the last priority sector

The last priority sector is town planning. In this connexion, it wiil be noted that the urban population has increased considerably during the past decade. It is likely that this growth trend will continue. This population explosion, which it has not been possible to control, raises serious problems in our towns deterioration, public thoroughfares, traff ic, water and electricity supplies. . . •.. '

-13-

The Government is steadily implementing a rational policy of town planning. The anti-deterioration work already begun in some centres will be continued. Town plans will be systematically drawn up. .' Housing needs will be met through State construction projects. In the towns , health and aesthetic requirements will be scrupulously respected. Be fore concluding, we must tell you the Government's plans for the third centre of growth. The third centre, which comprises

Ori e nta~ province and Kivu province , has suffered more than any other from the murderous and destructive activities of the rebels and mercenaries . The nascent s mall manufacturing industry, the banking, commercial and ho t e l infras tructure, and the lines of communication, transport equipment and plantations there have been badly affected. But, what is worse , these provinces have lost their reputation. By many foreigners, as well as Congolese, these regions are r egar ded as dangerous. In order to destroy this myth, we must rebuild the

infrastructure , embark on l ar ge -scale public ~ro rks and develop agriculture, indus try and tourism.

Each must resume his place in the community

Citizens, Now that our main obj ectives have been defined , we must proceed t o action >vi thout wasting time on useless words. The Congo must continue to prese nt to the world the face of a young , dynamic and promising country. In order to attain the objectives we have set ourselves, the country needs the help of all its children. It cannot therefore r e j ect outright those of them who went astray. Ea ch must resume his ploce in the community. -14-

This is why, on 30 November 1970, we enacted a legislative ordinance granting amnesty to all Congolese citizens who were guilty of offences against the security of the State between 196o and the present. However serious their guilt, we are ready to take them back, on the sole condition that they dembnstrate their repentance by returning to the country before 31 January 1971. We ask all our companions in arms and all our fellow-citizens to be unde rstanding towards these brothers who went astray. It is human nature to err, but every sincere conversion calls for forgiveness and rehabilitation. In @rder to make a fresh start, we must forget the bad memories of the past decade. We must henceforth all unite and join forces. Only then shall we achieve the objective we have set ourselves for the coming years: social progress through development. 1 May God protect the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its people." ,.·

I

(Or t etlan for Introduction to Annu l R port>-(;1?v- 7 1) r~· \-4! ;-., ~ "~)

The moat urgent probl confzontln th United Natlona t t ti

1 c me Actt s cret ry•G al, nd th t ton, a th t of th • ce from

elgl 1960, i n oc ton or joyful c lebr lon

1 rul • 0 ly a f <~ clay 1 t r,

th CO rj plUD

and s bl dl tttn , pa of publlc rder nd

Th Belgian lnlst tor d ~t nd t a lglan t op rriv , uninvited.

Th co onl 1 ut ltl llttl to educ:at or tr In t pcopl 0 th t Cb y r y to t th lr new re ponstblllti •• and among ll v sotou lng h Congo's population, th

sen e of tlo 1 td tlty t uld count r factional lntereats

traditional riv lrle · a ab n • A p rlod confu ton or lnatablllty, tf

not confllct1 . U ly und uch clrcumat nces. Many ne tiona have endured trl la of lnt mal trl a lthout qulrlng sc lon by the

International community; ln th Comgo, ver1 dom tic probl transfo d Into a crt t to 1 propo tons a result of external lnfluen dl ct mtltt ry tnt rven ton to economic

manlpul tlon by foreign co • lt.t? The ne t app led to the Unit Na tons for help on 12 July -;:::-

19601 nd th S curt y Oouncll authortced the rcqu t d Unit d Natlo~ mlllt ry al tanc • Wtthln 48 houra, th flrst 1 nts of th Uni ed

Nation Force errlv d on the acene. During th fou. years of the Unit d

Nation Operation In th Congo (ON~), 34 countrlee euppll d mllitnry contingents

or l'er nnel. 'l'b Force reached a tqt 1 of r than 20 1 000 t Its peak ' .

•2• strength. All but very f of the 93 1 000 who erved as •• blu h lmat perform d dndrably aa aoldler• of p ac •• an often dangerou and ruatr l

a lgnment 1 d ndlng th cour ge of patience and reatr int. In t bll h g and lat r wldenlna th mand te of ONUC, the Security Council mod th

Unit d Natlonl p~tactor of the Congo against ta external interf rene ,

g rantor of 1 and ord r, defender of It lnd pend nc and t rritorl 1

integrity, and avber and h lp r of th young nation through the mo t

extenalv t chnl 1 lch had ev r be n undert en by the Unit d N tlon •

When th compl x taak of utdtng the op ration ~ passed to m 1

the sltuaclon l dy und oaa r pld changes. The tragic en 1

between July 1960 aDd Nov r 1961 had be n marked by Internal chao

...... 't -'1 ' of a l'lnd r r ly If v r count r d~ fore or since; the total breakdo

of government 1 authority, nd the neuvarlng of rival groupa1 each cl lmlng

to be l'wful gove tl mi under t&ndlng nd fsl tflcatlona as to

United Nations objectlvea and ctlon ; ttacks upon the Organlaation1

ita Seer t ry-G ral nd Ita tsff from v rlous quarter ; dl sa lon

among the major Po r r State upplylng personn 1;

mounting ovid nee of th involvement of mer~enaries and foreign lntar st ;

and, for Dog ••kJold and P trlca Lumumbo, as for many Congole e and

non•Congoleee0 clvlllan and ~lltary, a udden and violent death. W tev r progr n made at that time had come abou with

palnf~l difficulty. th wlthdrs 1 of Bel lao troop unit had en

carr! out 11 for by th S curlty Councll 0 althoush tbe process took two mont • part of th country, th re presence of ONUC exerted a c 1mlft8 lnflu nc • Th Force ble to protect many

endang red p pl •• lndlvldual t thre minority groups refugee , and • ata both tio 1 nd provincial offici 1 • Although ttempts to ' .

traln t natloul rmy nd pmvld lt. "lth a c:orpa of officer• and t

dlaclpll had met 'dth Utt1 aucce a, United Mat1ou clvUI n opal' tlo re furnl hlng not only advlc but opor tlonal p reonn 1

ln mony eeaen I 1 fl lda, lntalnI' th' country' baeic s rvlc a d

d 1 lcb t dd d burd of conomtc: paralysle• a gzo ins

refugees, flood and f In •• Th rr1va1 of ONUC unlt in Kat s

had abtev llc re to ton of h ODnso• tnt grl y, b t he

lnaplred, lnatlg ted1 l need nd ...... ,.,,..

by trr ponal bla non•r.on nta ln conntva ce with c In mernber

0 the tang p inc l 8 accept •• lod durlng which ONUC ught courag ooncUtatlon t.o prev a from uslng force on

another •• a tlo 1 unl 'I at la t been fo d ln Augua 1961. * * * Th aft r

the Sec l&y Council o fflrmed tbe purpo of th

United lo ln t Con ( ) to lntaln It t rrltorlsl

Integrity and.polltl 1 l ...... ,;;&acea (b) to al t the C ntral vernment

ln the re ~ tlon nd lnterumc::e o 1 w and ol'der' (c)

the occurren f clvll ra (d) to eacur th lmmedl ltb.dr tml

a d ev c clon of all or lgn ~llt ry, •mlUt dvl ory personnel • not d r Unlt Nat to t (G) to r t cbnlcal a al nee. Anoth r obJ c&lv , Uy ac pt auch no fo lly

exPree dt I to PI' nt collfron tlon of th Po 1'8 la. thls

vast, ml 0 0 ltb c t lnty ether• or to

t xt • t Co m1 bt hav co of d&r ct s ruggle bet en

ast aRd W t I tb Unl ed Nations bad no to th r u at for ald.

At th tim 1 hftott.111111,nJ'1 thel'e ~ re ufflct. t t lcatlan tlult ucb a po alblllty dld ln act xlat. .. •

In puraul l tiona gov rned by cort In baalc ntnci not tnt ono ln th Congo'

tnt a to be used only os a 1 t reao , 1 ff ~~·· ln lf•d f nc or for th apoal lc purpo as stated by th Seeurl y Council'

and th t 0 uc to 1th r n zm of the Government nal' an occup ton Y•

It ll 11 un u• underlying po ltlon ln hla r ~ Ed,

on ~th tch 1 fully agr In lta r solution of 21 Feb EY

1961, t to ll olutlon of the problem o . h Co o ltea tn th th s lv lthout y

tnt rf t no olut1on lthout

conclllatton"1 a "t I eltlo of y olutlon, lncl ln th

fol'matlOD Of any QoVet~PIIWIIII>ft' on genuln conciU tlon uld1

far f~om • ttU ly nc the d ng of nfllct

within th Congo lnt mat tonal pe ce and aecu~lty •.

Thl n ce ary po ltlon fo th United Nation 1 ln view o lta d tlon to tb prlnclpl of ettllng dl putes b1 pe ce ul means. Such ya conal tent ulth conventional

norms of pur ly Uury f lol cy. tha glv objectives ?f

malntalnlng o~ and of avoiding tnt rf nc ln dom atlc ffolr al

a ppeared t tl to conflict, for whll ONUC orupulou ly avoided any

action lch could a uch tnt f d led

or t taken by ONUC

did hav lndlr ct r percus polltlaal It tlon. The dilemma faced In lly op ratlorwl d ol Ions evl enta lf ONUC took o certain action to In atn o th accusation of pl ylng a p rtlsan role

by ad aaal tlng on idea lf, on the otb h Dd 0 lt choa not to t.ako

euch ctlon, lt might a to be laxtdm f vourlng not her fact lon. In

this context, lt In vltable th t the Unlt Nations lt elf csma a target for un\ rrante crltlclsm and vlctou propaga a, even thounh its act •S•

wer fl' e of any bl•••

t': * Tb dlfflculty ln lancing aU of the united Natloas alms

princlpl d natrat in regard to th challenge of Katanga, Which had th th Congo problem once

th Central Gove nt1 r Prim Mini t r Adoula 1 had Aa 1 d clar In 1962a "the th Congo problem 1 that o the

s ce lon of ¥St gaa th p bl o the Katanga se salon l prl rlly

a pi'Obl of finance; th p bl o flnane 1 ln turn, ta the probl of the jor mlnln •"

The seeurlty 00 ell ft 24 NQv r 1961 bad auth•rtz th "r qul mea ure of for lf necea ~,. for t~ r val of for lsn mlltt ry and

par -military pereo al rl a, and d anded an end to th eo alonl t c&lvltl • lt 111 recalled that hun r o

Ill ln b l

ry pi'Oblem by y of negotl tions1 or by n ruatlng

he matter to consul te ~lt ln th Coogo, had bean inadequate.

~he Security Qouncll, 11 a th Ge al Aosembly1 h d call for measur s by St t ln support of th Unlt Nation goals ••

ln partlcular1 nA1~~Annel from departing for the Congo i to refrain f upplytns a nd qulpment1 nd to pr ent th l natlonala fi'Om d ln 1 to d y r naporta&lon nd tr lt facllltl s for sueh upplle or pe DR 11 "to r: fraln from pnmo&lng, co nlng, or giving

upport by a ta of 6lon. dlr ctly or 1 lrectly, to ac lvltl a 8 ln ' United N tlo oft I' ~1 lng tn a ho Uitles ag In t th It Na tons forces p nnel" to refra ln fi'Om any

.. action tc ad ht lmp th poltotes d pu~po ea of th Ublt

tn th Co ~ goa • to accept a c rry out hea decl tone tn ac lth Art I cl • 2 49 of th Chart •

In y fir 01' he Secul'l t y Council Actl s or t ~1-

of h 1" lutlon of 24 1" 1961,

which I" rcUng ONUC' nd t •• 1 obs rved ~ ' th Unit upport log the t 1'1'1 ort 1 tnt dy of th co i au actlvltl

Cen 1 alonl tba I

lntol rabl t clvtl r IUS to chl r lon.

hould ly 0 t by p:rof

Ill Y• . f th Con 1 tc J tlflc tton, no lntel' Din eo ln. dl ld

lonlata r h p pl , t unit a p ratl t in th Co y did th fund their 1, lth th of h old thelJr rvlc s o th

o Belgl n CO~PGratlon 1 plex, ta du to th tr 1

th l lly or uaincentto heel oecomo tnvolv In cUsrup U I 1 c&tvltl tch could nted ou 0 ly ll bl o the Province. atmag by

a 1 ding role ln the hostUl of Sept rand ·o uc a att'. ·ung to r Advl ey Co Itt 'a COM IU

A to 25 49, I d clQ t t t tl had com fo~ t a obll tl to be honour in action. In Au t 19 2, 1 propo od th Plan of Natlo 1 Recanclltatlon, which a promptly cc pt b,y Prl Ml let and Mr. T hom ; but once ag ln tb Kat nge authorltl fall o tak oy tep to lmpl nt thl pl n fozo !entRUl yatem of govel'lltDlltnt. Flnally1 in Dec the 1 ck f oo-o ration led me to pro s:.a to brin economlc pn sd by prevontln rt tnga'a copper and cobalt and ensuring t t p ymen of revanu a to Katango uould b 'dt

B fo these pJOpoa ls cou of th ahapt by 1Cat4Dga' the ONUC Ill cy p ceful

a Uttl a mlnlmum of fl nadines to

Mlnlst ald t n 2 authority. of ONUC's ll • It to Na ton Memb r •

With it

ONUC also ' 11 d u n co tat ln o nl l'lan ml ton Ill paota of t CoD •

revic o Utty in th

Congol lo In r for t i purpo • 'l'he ord r ln ; y t th Unit lcm lely s an au 1 l ry

N tl n c rm.ot

. ' •9•

p th CDago1 or any o country, f lnt 1

t lona by l • 0 or nlc growth unlty e lo a of xt 1 lotuf ., hl carrl out by and p pl 0 f th 1 • t lA ly furth p

OD 30 1 • Unl fl

3 th t h

Ar:my 1 a ault th

per dt

lnl fl 1 of 1 n 6, by he * I 1 ltuatlon d t rio followl t no qu from the Co f I on, r u t re tl n to • t I ha th t .oft r

t up ~ l'Ul thl tl to 1 Yl

·-·-.. ion in

s t fj

t Security -to.

Council lled to~ to forelsn lntei'V tlon and app led

for Ch~ wlthd~ 1 of rcenarl

of th l1 • at anc of the Organ! n

~lty ( U) aD.i th Q)uncU gBV it upport to the OAU effort&• Late

1964 1 I expr sad th bop thn th Co uld muster tho Ul a a.bl I y

to ctt tn bD cu ty and 1 stability. ~ ue.Uy, a( t

period of ~·B departu:e, tb D crctla 11 of

It , the extenaiv lt f tlo to provld lOugh th and tralnl atlons p gr ou by

th Or

kept up 'Wb 1 CtJ

took over t

for ch Co ld th.e of h Con '

tc a. Do ora, t chel'&t rtaultur l advls rs1 1 field

controllan1 pubUc W)l'k many other ul£111 th tr nselgnm n s unde~ trying and oft train ln PI'OIJftl 1 tna ltu Slld ot er cducatlo 1 effort asra tod by the r~ tlons bl moJ!'o Con tp to IUtiUDIIDIIII:I: I' lace th Ub.lted NatloM p sonnel.

Unit Na&lo ~ hnlaal -opar tlon pr~tnva t~t ctlvltl a

twve ntlnu t of the D er tla Republic of the

Congo up to th p d Y• Tb olte only one rec t le (May 1971) 1 o study of rtvu t:t: ruspor elaproent

Prog ltlll8 (U ) 1 to o project for lac lng the navtg btllty of the Coll&O Rl\•Ell' tuary nnd t Rosa! At• !' and rP.habl Utatton nf t fle.et, -w1 h $7 mllUon credit from th Int motional DevelopmGt Association. * ,. Th eo t of th Co o t lvemant. ...,.. Ill""" • ON~ "" uoltlas v Included 126 tlled tn ction eetdant~. &xpendltu B (lncludinn \ n the ctvill op ratio ) to nad;t $400 mil U on. And tht! over ftnancln& c r-tatloru~.

lon for f cl the operations lt u hor1 Con , a It

the position tb t.,ere "expense f t lng o Artlcl 17 f tl

Ch.Rrter. Thll lplfl obll t pey th lr ass soed 1 Cou of Juealc • in an ~dvl ry plnlo

th co:-1tn expenses of th Or ill ,., end atUl ref me •• pay tb tr arlo polttleal r on •

A an traordl~ry to provtd n Gd up to 200 mtlllon rth of Unit

Bonds. wll sur s h.ould t d fu ur ftDDnal af tlnlae.d Na o

o 82.1 mtlllo •

The total ceo~ expens 9337 mllll , Only 1 9 mllllon

he I au p G143 llllon n~ volunt ~ c ntrlbutlons an ddl tonal 36 mtlllona

•.

•;'. I . ' t , ·12•

Wlthou

aal ln regard ta th Co

by th Security COuncllJ t t

co ell l.tl pp lea af cl 1 lo nd pcclfl "' tat obj atlve • that h Co cU, ln dl c .1

t tb y uld u

no luw. function ef ctl ly

ln pending an

n ope~ tl n la ln

with 11 th t h Court I I

advt In the ll t of t of

r tt 11:' 1ft tlo s Ul'l Council Ddt 1' tlo '• t l bl or lmpl

Th nor

t Secu ''' uncll •• tb Se at f • u In

f 0

ould l Con t t l t

nlmlty1 a lf lt uld n t

poa lble ... . . •ll•

ul ., ouah loo and to demo~atrat • t " . ton or lnt re.tat ton or

waa wron 1 thll t.h y-Ge 1 or hi at ff, or th 5 rl 1

Council or ONUC p 1, ld a dtff t urs •

Even In uc f u

to h lJn.lt r tiona Fo

ch ed lf of o party or

anothera r t. ough.

t;t na by tho a dlr ctly l

Con ts lng. Mor dl urblng th

tm,juatlfi ks a - not only in tit fo of

t tn th 1 app81' nt

activltl 1 ore

cannot he allan to th Nation , 1 and th plac l l du to p niaan lnt

Congo• a poUt I al truggl r tlt r than ~o dlff lng Interpret f I

Council solution o nxJ y ftc ltlou reports o etrocltl •

dh to heir Ch rt bll &S Ions pram.unad In regard o he coagG, t n glvlDg p lorlty to/ lonal int

the t k of the Un) Natton.a en far 1 dlfflcul •

But fo t pr h Unl d Nation t th Co 1 1 cor!IQE~nted

In 1963, that ~~~n~•y uld to pl c • Th Unit N lo p ence

th d ct IY th COn 'a t rrl o tal lnt gr ty and

ln full• 1 olvll n~t~M'f!!l! f outald a lt ol d helped the peopl 0 t eonme~ es bllah brldg erom th pe% tion of 1960 to a mor for thelr young na lon. ...

·14·

! CllDtl to beltevo that d~•olte t • hoTtcomtng. ot the l .lt

~~~tions Opu tl tn th ():)ngo 1 lt s cee ful e pert t In

lnternstlo 1 responllbllt y nd ae lch not only pi'Oved but

ext ed t e 01' lzatloft' a lU y o m rgency Rltuations. If,

at thft a tt 1 tt brou It to . ha l) ftJcu th dl f lng vle

ope1' tlon t not rf!sult I My lea D

dln s to • u~ eslatanee ha

ln evert pe t wtll do bt c ttnue to unlea!l

in I'Elg rd t ., 0 to •

If ca 1 ln Congo•llk lt~otlo 1 States taatton gain o uch n

knoutng th • Yet tn factnn t t or y other .ent ln y to •

mu al ln 60 1 ulllt g o aspond.

c" · TO The Secretary-General

FROM Jean Gazarian

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

DATE 4 NOV 1971 UNITED NATIONS • NATIONS UNIES

NEW YORK

CA8LI: AODit&S&-ADII&5Sil T&LilGJtA,.HIOUI:· UNATION& N&WYOJtK

UPIUIENCIE' OR 511 ZAIRE

The enclosed translation of a communication dated

••••• 27 October.l971 is transmitted to the Permanent Missions of the states Members of the United Nations at the request of the

Permanent Representative of Zaire to the United Nations.

2 November 1971

M< Translated from French

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAIRE

to the United Nations

400 East 51st Street New York, N.Y., 10022

f1JIJ./ge No. 2679/1

The Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to inform him of the decision taken by his Government on 27 October 1971: from that date, our country will be called "THE REPUBLIC OF ZAIRE" and its nationals "ZAIRIANS".

Information concerning the national fla~ and the national anthem, which have also changed, will be communicated to the Secretary-General at a later date. The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Zaire to the United Nations would be grateful if the Secretary-General of the United Nations would communicate the foregoing to all States Members of the Organization. The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Zaire to the United Nations takes this opportunity to renew to the Secretary­ General of the United Nations the assurances of his highest consideration.

New York, 27 October 1971

Secretary-General United Nations New York, N.Y., 10017