Peace Agreements As Counterinsurgency by Caroline M
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Peace Agreements as Counterinsurgency by Caroline M. Brandt A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Associate Professor Michaela Mattes, Chair Associate Professor Aila Matanock Associate Professor Leonardo Arriola Assistant Professor Ra´ulS´anchez de la Sierra Spring 2020 Peace Agreements as Counterinsurgency Copyright 2020 by Caroline M. Brandt Abstract Peace Agreements as Counterinsurgency by Caroline M. Brandt Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Berkeley Associate Professor Michaela Mattes, Chair Peace agreements are heralded as tools for ending civil war. However, exclusive peace agreements, accords that include only a subset of a conflict’s warring parties, are unlikely to bring an end to a civil conflict. I argue that exclusive peace agreements serve a purpose beyond conflict resolution. Exclusive peace agreements are a counterinsurgency strategy. Combatting more than one rebel group strains governments' military abilities by dividing resources across multiple wars. Governments that would otherwise be able to defeat a rebel group may be unable to do so when tied down by multiple insurgencies. Based on this logic, and in contrast to the literature on spoilers in peace processes, I argue that the threat posed by other insurgent groups increases the likelihood that a government and rebel group sign an exclusive negotiated settlement. Exclusive peace agreements allow governments to consolidate military resources into the fight against the remaining insurgency. Exclusive peace agreements can further strengthen a government's counterinsurgency capabilities by including provisions for military power-sharing that transform conflict adversaries into war- fighting allies. To test this hypothesis, I analyze all multiparty civil wars from 1975-2013. In support of the theory, I find that the threat posed by other rebel groups is positively correlated with the likelihood that a government and rebel group sign an exclusive peace accord. I then use a case study of civil war in the Southern Philippines to bring to light the mechanisms that undergird these correlations. In line with the theory, the threat posed by other rebel groups jump-started stalled peace talks with Moro insurgent groups. I also find that exclusive peace agreements were successful mechanisms for incorporating rebel soldiers into the government's fight against other rebel groups. 1 To Charles i Contents Contents ii List of Figures v List of Tables vi 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Exclusive Peace Agreements . 3 1.2 Peace Agreements as a Counterinsurgency Strategy . 5 1.2.1 Theoretical Contributions . 8 1.2.2 Theoretical Limitations . 9 1.2.2.1 Which Rebel Groups Sign Exclusive Peace Agreements? . 9 1.2.2.2 Inclusive Peace Agreements . 11 1.3 Research Design . 11 1.4 Plan of Study . 13 2 A Theory of Peace Agreements as a Counterinsurgency Strategy 14 2.1 Exclusive Peace Agreements . 15 2.1.1 Why Governments Sign Exclusive Peace Deals . 15 2.1.2 Why Rebel Groups Sign Exclusive Peace Deals . 20 2.2 Military Power-Sharing . 24 2.2.1 Current Conceptualizations of Power-Sharing . 24 2.2.2 Why Governments Sign Peace Deals that Include Military Integration 28 2.2.3 Why Rebel Groups Sign Peace Deals that Include Military Integration 32 2.3 Conclusion . 35 3 Conflict Dynamics and Peace Agreements 36 3.1 Hypothesis . 38 3.2 Data . 40 3.2.1 Universe of Cases . 40 3.2.2 Outcome Variable . 41 3.2.3 Key Independent Variables . 42 ii 3.2.4 Control Variables . 45 3.3 Empirical Strategy . 47 3.4 Results . 48 3.4.1 Peace Agreement Inclusivity . 50 3.5 An Alternative Conceptualization of Exclusive Peace Agreements . 54 3.6 When Do Warring Parties Sign Agreements that Include Military Integration? 57 3.6.1 Data . 57 3.6.2 Empirical Strategy . 59 3.6.3 Results . 60 3.7 Conclusions . 62 4 Peace Agreements in the Southern Philippines 64 4.1 Historical Context . 66 4.1.1 A History of Marginalization . 66 4.1.2 The Beginnings of a Moro Insurgency . 69 4.1.3 The Tripoli Agreement . 70 4.1.4 A Democratic Revolution and the Jeddah Accord . 72 4.2 Conflict in the Philippines in the 1990s . 74 4.2.1 The Abu Sayyaf Group and the Massacre at Ipil . 75 4.2.2 The MILF Escalates Violence . 77 4.2.3 A Resurgence of the Communist Insurgency . 77 4.2.4 Analysis of Events . 78 4.3 The 1996 Final Peace Agreement and Its Consequences . 81 4.3.1 Redistributing Resources: the Battle of Camp Abu Bakar . 82 4.3.2 Actor Reputations . 83 4.4 Military Integration in the 1996 Final Peace Agreement . 85 4.4.1 Why Were Warring Parties Willing to Agree to Military Integration . 86 4.4.2 Testing the Alternative Explanations for Military Integration . 90 4.5 Failure of the Final Peace Agreement Agreement . 92 4.5.1 Other Instances of Rebel Group Counterinsurgency Cooperation . 93 4.5.1.1 MNLF Cooperation Against ASG . 94 4.5.1.2 MILF Cooperation Against JI . 95 4.6 An Exclusive Peace Agreement with the MILF . 98 4.6.1 Actor Reputations . 100 4.6.2 The Mamasapano Clash . 100 4.6.3 The Battle of Marawi . 101 4.6.4 Bangamoro Organic Law . 103 4.7 Why is the Agreement with the MILF Succeeding Where the Agreement with the MNLF Failed? . 106 4.8 Conclusion . 107 5 Conclusion 109 iii 5.1 Theory in Brief . 110 5.2 Summary of Findings . 112 5.3 Future Research . 114 5.4 Policy Implications . 116 Bibliography 118 A Appendix 133 iv List of Figures 3.1 Histogram of No. of Groups ........................... 43 3.2 Histogram of Strength of Rebel Groups ................... 44 3.3 Histogram of Battle Deaths ........................... 45 3.4 Coefficient Plots from Table 3.2 ........................ 50 3.5 Coefficient Plots from Table 3.6 ........................ 62 4.1 MNLF Soldiers Integrated into the AFP ................... 85 4.2 Peace Corridor from Marawi . 102 v List of Tables 1.1 Multiparty Conflict in Afghanistan, 1995 . 10 3.1 Descriptive Statistics, 1975-2013 ........................ 43 3.2 Logit Analysis on Exclusive Peace Agreement . 49 3.3 Logit Analysis on Inclusive Agreement .................... 53 3.4 Logit Analysis on Exclusive Peace Agreement, Country-Level . 56 3.5 Peace Agreements in Multiparty Conflicts . 58 3.6 Logit Analysis on Exclusive Military Integration Agreement . 61 A1 Peace Agreements in Multiparty Conflicts . 133 A2 Logit Analysis on Exclusive Peace Agreement, Robustness Check . 136 A3 Multinomial Logit Analysis on Agreement . 137 A4 Logit Analysis on Military Integration Agreement . 138 A5 Multinomial Logit Analysis on Agreement . 139 A6 Logit Analysis on Military Integration Agreement, Includes Single Party140 vi Acknowledgments I owe a large debt of gratitude to my committee. Aila Matanock has provided support for my project and graduate career at every step of the way. I decided to study civil conflict because of the work I did with her early in my graduate career. She helped me learn the tools I would need to answer worth-while puzzles. Leonardo Arriola provided much-needed insight at the beginning of my research, and most importantly, when this project was in a rut. The cross-national analysis included in this dissertation reflects his insights from that period. Leo has also been an enthusiastic supporter of my work; every young graduate student should be lucky enough to have someone like Leo on their committee. When I most needed it, Ra´ul S´anchez de la Sierra reminded me that no setback is too big to overcome. Finally, I often joke that I have made a countless number of mistakes in graduate school. But asking Michaela Mattes to be my advisor is the one thing I'm certain that I got right. And you can overcome a lot of small mistakes if you get the big ones right. It's difficult to describe how generous she has been with her time. Michaela has been the guiding force of not just this dissertation, but of my entire academic career. Her dedication to answering big questions with integrity inspires me. She encouraged me to find interesting questions and to develop rigorous answers, and her contributions are present on every page of this manuscript. I couldn't have asked for a better mentor or a more insightful guide. Additionally, I would not have survived graduate school without the funny, kind, relent- less, sharp as a tack Tanu Kumar. Tanu was there to celebrate the highs and grovel at the lows. Over the last seven years, she has challenged me to tackle difficult research methods and the people who thought we weren't enough. Together, we were. I benefited from some excellent research assistance during my time at Berkeley and would like to thank Anashe Barton, Catherine Chang, Harumi Honsey, Rosalyn Jeffries, Ariana Jessa, Andrew Kaplan, Autumn McMahon, Michael Obuchi, Cordelia Ongerth, and Guy Rotstein. I also owe an impossible gratitude to my parents, Scott and Mary Anne Brandt. Keen ob- servers of my love of learning, and my infinite ability to become distracted, they transformed our childhood playroom into a study. I was the only 11-year-old I ever met that had their own study. When I wanted to enroll for a fourth year at college to write an honors thesis, rather than graduate early, they paid for another year of impossibly expensive undergraduate learning so that I could pursue the research I loved. But most importantly, they have been the bed stone of a life filled with an immense amount of laughter and joy. Finally, this dissertation is dedicated to Charles.