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Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How Effective Are They? Yuchengco Center – De La Salle University-Manila Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How Effective Are They? Rommel C. Banlaoi Yuchengco Center De La Salle University Manila i Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How Effective Are They? © Copyright 2009 by the Yuchengco Center Printed in the Philippines. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without the permission in writing from the Center. ISBN: 978-971-94089-2-5 Please address all inquiries to: Yuchengco Center 2nd Floor, Don Enrique T. Yuchengco Hall De La Salle University 2401 Taft Avenue, Manila 1004 Philippines email: [email protected] fax: (632) 525-3457 url: http://yc.dlsu.edu.ph ii Yuchengco Center – De La Salle University-Manila TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Figures …………………………………………….….………………… iv List of Tables …………………………………………….…..………………… v List of Acronyms …………………………...…………….…..……………… vi Acknowledgement …………………………………………....……………… xi Foreword …………………………………………………….………………… xiii Abstract ………………………………………………………………………… xix Introduction …………………………………….……….……………………… 1 Chapter I: Conceptualizing Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Definition, Evolution and Causes ………………………..……………… 5 Chapter II: Terrorist Groups in Southeast Asia and Modes of Operation ……………….………………….….…....………… 31 Chapter III: Impact of Terrorism on Socio-Economic Development in the Region ………………...……….………………… 67 Chapter IV: National Responses to Terrorism ……………...…… 73 Chapter V: Regional Cooperation to Counter Terrorism…....… 89 Chapter VI: Support of Major Powers to Counter Terrorism in Southeast Asia …………………..…….…..… 95 Chapter VII: The Future of Terrorism in Southeast Asia ……………………………………………………………… 109 Summary and Conclusion …………………………...….…….……… 111 Bibliography ……………………………………………..…...…………… 113 Appendix: ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism……………….……… 135 About the Author…………..………………………..…...…..………… 149 iii Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How Effective Are They? List of Figures Figure 1. Number of Published Books with “Terrorism” in Their Title ………………..……………………………… 7 Figure 2. Mantiqi Structure of Jemaah Islamiyah ……………… 34 Figure 3. Organizational Structure of Jemaah Islamiyah ……......……………………………………………… 35 Figure 4. Two Major Factions of Jemaah Islamiyah ……………………………………………………………………… 36 Figure 5. Dream Map of Daulah Islamiya Nusantara ………………………………………..…….…...……………… 37 Figure 6. ASG Organization Envisioned by Abdurajak Janjalani ………………………………………...….………… 50 Figure 7. Strength of the ASG, 2000-2008 …………………….… 52 Figure 8. ASG Current Organizational Structure ……………………………………………………...……………… 53 Figure 9. ASG Cellular-Type Organizational Structure ………………………………………………..……..…………… 54 Figure 10. ASG – Al-Qaeda Link Through Transnational Islamic Organizations ……………………...…...… 59 Figure 11. Philippines’ Most Wanted Terrorists ………………………………………………….......…………… 82 iv Yuchengco Center – De La Salle University-Manila List of Tables Table 1. UN Conventions’ Response to Various Criminal Acts of Terrorism in Southeast Asia …………..…….…… 11 Table 2. Four Class Divisions of Terrorism in Southeast Asia………………………………………………....…………… 18 Table 3. JI Regional Partners and Linkages in Southeast Asia………………………………………………………………… 21 Table 4. Major ASEAN Declarations and Conventions Against Terrorism After 9/11 …………………………….…..………… 26 Table 5. Australia’s Counter Terrorism Capacity Building Initiatives in Southeast Asia………………………………… 97 Table 6. Areas and Scope of ASEAN-India Counter Terrorism Cooperation ………………………….….……… 98 Table 7. Areas of Cooperation in ASEAN-Canada Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism……………………………….….... 99 Table 8. Japan’s Counter Terrorism Support to Southeast Asia ………………………………..……………….…..… 103 v Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How Effective Are They? List of Acronyms ACCT ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism ADB Asian Development Bank ADMM ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines AHAI Al Harakatul Al Islamiyyah AMLO Anti-Money Laundering Office AMMTC ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting ASG Abu Sayyaf Group ATA Anti-Terrorism Assistance ATC Anti-Terrorism Council ATTF Anti-Terrorism Task Force BCTP Bali Counter Terrorism Process BI Balik Islam CATR Council for Asian Terrorism Research CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear CGCC Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation CIDG Criminal Investigation and Detection Group CITOC Counter International Terrorist Operations Center COCIS Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security COCIT Committee of Counter-International Terrorism CPP Communist Party of the Philippines CRS Congressional Research Service vi Yuchengco Center – De La Salle University-Manila CSTPV Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence CTCB Counter Terrorism Capacity Building CTFP Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade DI Darul Islam DIN Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara DJACT Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism DND Department of National Defense DOD Department of Defense EG Executive Group EU European Union FDI Foreign Direct Investment FMF Foreign Military Financing FMS Foreign Military Sales FRTFSI Fund for Regional Trade and Financial Security Initiative FSDMF Fi-Sabilillah Da’wah and Media Foundation FTO Foreign Terrorist Organization GWOT Global War on Terrorism ICC International Criminal Court ICG International Crisis Group ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IDP Internally Displaced Persons IEC Islamic Executive Council IED Improvised Explosive Device IIRO International Islamic Relief Organization ILEA International Law Enforcement Academy IMET International Military Education and Training ISCAG Islamic Studies, Call and Guidance vii Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How Effective Are They? ISD Internal Security Department JCTC Joint Counter Terrorism Centre JI Jemaah Islamiyah KMM Kampulan Mujahidin Malaysia MALSINDO Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia MBG Misuari Breakaway Group MCFF Mujahideed Commando Freedom Fighters MDT Mutual Defense Treaty MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front MMI Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia MNLF Moro National Liberation Front M1 First Mantiqi M2 Second Mantiqi M3 Third Mantiqi M4 Fourth Mantiqi NACTAG National Counter Terrorism Action Group NADR Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Activities NATCG National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Group NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDF National Democratic Front NICA National Intelligence Coordinating Agency NII Negara Islam Indonesia NISP National Internal Security Plan NPA New Peoples’ Army OMA Office of Muslim Affairs PAS Islamic Party of Malaysia PIPVTR Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research PISCES Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System viii Yuchengco Center – De La Salle University-Manila PNP Philippine National Police PUPJI Pedoman Umum Perjuangan-Al-Jama-ah Al- Islamiya (The General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah) ReCAAP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia RM Rabitatul Mujahidin RSIM Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement RSM Rajah Solaiman Movement SEACAT Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism SEARCCT Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter Terrorism SEC Securities and Exchange Commission SOMTC Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crimes UN United Nations UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNSC United Nations Security Council US United States WOG Whole-of-Government ix Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How Effective Are They? x Yuchengco Center – De La Salle University-Manila ACKNOWLEDGEMENT In writing this work, I am extremely grateful to Yuchengco Center, particularly Dr. Trinidad Osteria, for the research grant. Without the generous support of Yuchengco Center, this work could not have been accomplished. I am also deeply appreciative of the friendship and encouragement of Dr. Rizal “Rollie” Buendia for opening my doors to the Yuchengco Center. I sincerely thank my colleagues at the Council for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR), particularly RADM Richard Porterfield, Dr. Caroline Ziemke and Dr. Katy Oh Hassig, for putting me in the loop of terrorism scholars in the Asia Pacific. In CATR, I always enjoy the company of Hekmat Karzai, Praveen Swami and Ranga Kalansooriya. I also convey my sincerest respect to Ambassador Hussin Nayan, the founding head of the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter Terrorism (SEARCCT), and Major General Alexander P. Aquirre, Chairman of the Strategic and Integrative Studies Center where I had a pleasure of working as Executive Director. I acknowledge Dr. Andrew Tan, Dr. Peter Chalk, Dr. Carl Ungerer, Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, Dr. Kumar Ramakrishna, Dr. Kit Collier, Dr. Carlyle Thayer, Prof. Peter Anderson and Prof. Clive Williams for a very valuable intellectual exchange on terrorist threats in Southeast Asia. At the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR), the following colleagues are extremely helpful: “Boogie” Mendoza, “Bert” Ferro, Noor Muog, Billy Rodriguez and Diane Mendoza. From the military and police sector, I thank General Arturo
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