China Perspectives

68 | november- december 2006 Varia

Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/1057 DOI: 10.4000/chinaperspectives.1057 ISSN: 1996-4617

Publisher Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine

Printed version Date of publication: 1 November 2006 ISSN: 2070-3449

Electronic reference China Perspectives, 68 | november- december 2006 [Online], Online since 01 June 2007, connection on 28 September 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/1057 ; DOI : https:// doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.1057

This text was automatically generated on 28 September 2020.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Geopolitics

China’s Presence in Latin America Strategies, Aims and Limits François Lafargue

Economy

The Economics of the “China Price” Peter Navarro

Political science

The NGO Community in China Expanding Linkages With Transnational Civil Society and Their Democratic Implications Chen Jie

History

China's Search for Cultural and National Identity from the Nineteenth Century to the Present Werner Meissner

Literature

Poetry Movements in Taiwan from the 1950s to the late 1970s: Breaks and Continuities Alain Leroux

Book reviews

Barry Sautman, June Teufel Dreyer (eds.), Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development and Society in a Disputed Region New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2006, 349 pp+index Fabienne Jagou

Aurore Merle and Michael Sztanke, Étudiants Chinois: qui sont les élites de demain ? Paris, Autrement, 2006, 109 pp. Karine-Hinano Guérin

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Thomas David Dubois, The Sacred Village. Social Change and Religious Life in Rural North China Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 2005, 275 pp. Katiana Le Mentec

Elise Anne DeVido, Benoît Vermander (eds.), Creeds, Rites and Videotapes: Narrating religious experience in East Asia Taipei Ricci Institute, 2004, 265 pp. David Palmer

Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian (eds.), The Chinese Communist Party in Reform London, Routledge, 2006, 268 pp. Wu Guoguang

Bell Daniel A., Beyond Liberal Democracy, Political Thinking for an East Asian Context Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006, 379 pp. Sébastien Billioud

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Geopolitics

China Perspectives, 68 | november- december 2006 4

China’s Presence in Latin America Strategies, Aims and Limits

François Lafargue

EDITOR'S NOTE

Translated by Philip Liddell

1 For its first fifty years the People’s Republic of China (PRC) took little interest in Latin America1. The United States exercised unrivalled political and economic power in the region, and is still the dominant influence2. While Cuba established diplomatic relations with China from 1960 onwards, most Latin American governments waited until President Nixon’s visit to Beijing in February 1972 before recognising the People’s Republic: in 1972 Argentina and Mexico recognised the PRC, followed by Brazil two years later and, later still, Bolivia in 1985. This period of relative indifference was now at an end. President Hu Jintao’s visits, towards the end of 2004, to Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Cuba and, a year later, to Mexico attested to Beijing’s interest in the region3. While numerous studies have focused on China’s policy towards Africa, its role in Latin America is less frequently touched upon. Yet, its growing presence there is of the greatest economic and geostrategic significance; and raises concerns and anxieties both in Latin America and in the United States, where Beijing’s interference in the region has aroused something less than enthusiasm. In media and political circles, periodic alarms have been sounded over the Chinese presence in America’s “back yard”4. Washington’s fears have been strengthened over the past year with the electoral triumphs of Michelle Bachelet in Chile, Alan García in Peru and then Lula da Silva in Brazil, all of whom are openly seeking closer relations with Beijing. China in Latin America: a growing influence 2 China’s influence in Latin America can be evaluated in two ways. From the outset, one objective consideration must be noted: so far, China’s presence is limited. As a proportion of China’s overall trade, Latin America represents only 3.55%―a modest total as yet5. According to Chinese government data, in 2004 less than 18% of all China’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), that is US$8.2 billion6 worth was placed in Latin

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America. And China’s share of the incoming flow of FDI amounted to only 6%7. Yet this data has to be treated with caution. On a careful reading of the MOFCOM statistics, it appears that China’s investment in the region is mainly concentrated on the Cayman Islands and the Virgin Islands, both of which are notorious as tax havens. In all probability, this capital is sent back to mainland China for reinvestment, qualifying now for the benefits accorded to foreign investors. When this investment in the Caymans and the Virgin Islands is excluded, Latin America receives no more than 1.5% of China’s overall FDI. And a comparable figure is suggested by UNCTAD8: in 2002, China invested US$653 million overall, 1.5% of its total outward investment. But these figures do not reflect the rapid expansion of financial relations between Beijing and Latin America. China’s total foreign investment in 2005 is put at US$6.9 billion, bringing the cumulative figure for its investment across the world to US$50 billion. And, since 2003, China has signed public and private investment projects in Latin America, detailed below, worth nearly ten billion dollars in all. In November 2004, in Brasilia, President Hu addressed members of the National Congress promising that China would be investing US$100 billion in the region over the next ten years. The promise is in the process of being fulfilled.

3 At the same time, the volume of bilateral trade is increasing exponentially, from US$12.6 billion in 2001 to US$40 billion in 2004, settling at over US$50 billion in 2005 (see Table 1). By 2010 the figure of US$100 billion should have been reached. China’s main trading partners are Brazil, Mexico and Chile, who between them represented 62.2% of all exchanges9 in 2004 (charts 1 and 2). Data provided by MOFCOM is set out in Tables 1 and 2; it is used as reference material for the international institutions. But most Latin American countries reject these figures, putting China’s exports to them at lower levels. And the gap may be significant. There is a simple reason for this underestimate. A large proportion (12%) of China’s exports to the region are officially destined for Panama―rather surprisingly, considering Panama’s small population (3 million) and the fact that it does not maintain diplomatic relations with Beijing. The truth is that Panama performs on the American continent a role comparable to that of Hong Kong in Asia (an area where industrial products are assembled and China’s exports are packaged) and is in reality no more than a point of transit.

4 It is also worth noting that Mercosur or, in English, the Southern Common Market (linking Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela) allows for Chinese goods to be circulated far from its initial destination10. China’s interest in Latin America may be explained in terms of three imperatives: oil supplies, minerals and agricultural products.

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1. Trade between Latin America and China (US$ billion)

2. China’s share in Latin American countries’ trade in 2004 (US$ billion)

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3. Top five recipient countries of Chinese exports in Latin America (2004)

4. China’s top five suppliers in 2004

Oil supplies 5 By 2002, China had become the word’s second biggest consumer of oil, after the United States but ahead of Japan. And between 2000 and 2005, Beijing moved up from ninth to

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third place among the world’s oil importers. These foreign purchases, representing nearly one-third of China’s oil consumption in 2000 and rising to one-half today, is likely to reach 60% between now and 2010. So China has committed itself to a policy of diversifying its supplies of hydrocarbons by investing in Africa, (Sudan and Angola in particular), Central Asia and Latin America.

6 Latin America, with 9.7% of the world’s oil reserves, was producing by 2005 8.8% of world output11. For the time being, China’s presence in the hydrocarbon sector remains modest. It is, admittedly, the third largest importer of Latin American oil, but lags far behind the United States in terms of volume12. By 2005, the region provided 3.1% of China’s oil supplies, 107,000 barrels per day (bpd). This may seem a small amount, but these exports were up by 28% on the previous year (83,000 bpd) and were nearly twenty times more than in 2001. An undeniable rise in importance is taking place, with Latin America’s contribution to China’s oil imports estimated to have doubled last year.

7 China has established particularly close relations with Venezuela, an oil producer in the first league. Venezuela has 6.6% of the world’s oil reserves (putting it in sixth place) and 68% of Latin America’s reserves (as against Mexico’s 11.3%). As a producer it ranks in seventh place, with 4% of world production.

8 In December 2004 and again more recently in August last year, President Hugo Chávez paid an official visit to Beijing, where he and President Hu signed several agreements on economic and commercial co-operation. Bilateral trade between the two countries rose from US$150 million worth in 2003 to US$1.2 billion in 2004 and US$2.14 billion in 2005. China’s Vice President, Zeng Qinghong, visited Caracas in January 2005, attesting Beijing’s interest in Venezuela. On that occasion, several new contracts were signed. China plans investments worth US$350 million in the development of 15 oilfields (which might contain up to one billion barrels of oil) and US$60 million towards infrastructure costs (building a rail network, refineries . . .). The China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) and Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) have also signed agreements on offshore gas exploration. Then, at the end of August 2005, the two countries formed a joint company to develop the Zumano oilfield in Anzoátegui State, which promises an output of 50,000 bpd. China has also created a US$40 million credit line for Venezuela’s purchase of agricultural equipment from China.

9 The volume of Venezuela’s oil exports to China rose between 2004 and 2005 from 12,300 bpd to 70,000 bpd. Last year it reached 160,000 bpd13, a figure likely to double over the year ahead, on course to reach 500,000 bpd by 2010. By the second half of 2006, Venezuela was supplying about 5% of China’s oil imports. China is its second biggest customer, after the United States, purchasing about 15% of its oil exports.

10 Yet, the volume of hydrocarbon exports remains restricted for the present: the Panama Canal is too narrow14 for large tankers to pass through it. The other sea route, around the Cape of Good Hope, takes twice as long (nearly 45 days) as the Pacific crossing. In May 2006, Beijing and Caracas signed a contract worth a total of US$1.3 billion for China to supply 18 oil tankers and to provide technical aid for Venezuela to build more tankers of its own.

11 A further difficulty worth noting is that the Venezuelan oilfields yield a crude that is extra heavy (high in sulphur); and China’s refineries are not properly equipped to process it. While Venezuela is looked on as the linchpin of China’s oil strategy, Beijing does not neglect the more modest producers such as Ecuador and Peru.

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12 Ecuador has the third largest oil reserves in South America, after Venezuela and Brazil. It produces 11.5% of South America’s oil exports, ranking next to Venezuela with 74.2% and its potential is significant. Ecuador has the further advantage of a coastline on the Pacific side, which facilitates trade with Asia. In August 2003, in Ecuador, the China National Trading Corporation (CNPC)15 was granted prospecting rights by President Lucio Gutiérrez. A few months later, China National Chemical (SINOCHEM) bought 14% of an oilfield (2,200 square kilometres designated as “bloc 16”) in Orellana Province from Conoco Philipps for the sum of US$100 million. The oilfield, expected to produce 8,000 bpd for SINOCHEM, is being mainly developed by the Spanish company Repsol- YPF (55%) and the Taiwanese company Chinese Petroleum Corporation (CPC) (31%).

13 Lastly, in September 2005, the consortium Andes Petroleum led by the CNPC bought out the interests of the Canadian company EnCana Corporation for US$1.4 billion―that year’s third most significant financial transaction in Latin America. By means of this acquisition China will have access to oil production of 75,000 bpd (thanks mainly to the output from the Tarapoa and Shiripuno oilfields) and to reserves put at around 143 million barrels. In Peru, as early as 1993, the CNPC had acquired drilling rights in block 6 (155 square kilometres) and block 7 (184 square kilometres) of the Talara oilfield, with reserves estimated at 22 million barrels.

14 In Brazil, where China’s investments are more limited, SINOPEC and the Brazilian firm Petrobras have pledged themselves to increase their joint ventures in foreign countries, such as Iran. In Argentina, during President Hu’s visit in 2004, he promised to invest US$20 billion over ten years, of which a quarter would go into the oil industry. Energía Argentina and a Sino-Angolan company (China Sonangol International) are jointly engaged in offshore exploration in waters off Argentina.

15 In 2004, the CNPC bought out the subsidiary of Grupo Pluspetrol in Peru, Pluspetrol Norte16 for a total of US$200 million. Then in Cuba in March 2005, SINOPEC concluded a deal with Cubapetróleo (CUPET) in order to develop the Pinar del Río oilfield on the west coast of the island. Similarly, Mexico has not avoided China’s envious attention, even though it is a member of the NAFTA Secretariat. The visits there by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in December 2003 and by President Hu in September 2005 led to the signing of oil contracts. So far, Mexico is not exporting any hydrocarbons to China, but the CNPC has obtained exploration permits.

16 Beijing’s presence in Bolivia is still modest; but this country, with its significant gas reserves17, could also in the long run become an important supplier. The triumph in the 2005 presidential election of Evo Morales, a harsh critic of the United States, might seem to favour a rapprochement with China. In January 2006, Morales undertook a ten- day foreign tour, taking in Cuba, Venezuela, Spain, France, China, South Africa and, finally, Brazil. While he was in Beijing, he met President Hu and pressed China to come and invest in Bolivia. Above all, the decision last May to nationalise the assets of foreign hydrocarbon producers (such as Repsol, and Total―but also the Brazilian Petrobras) will deprive the country of investment in this sector and oblige it to seek new partners. This is because these enterprises must now agree to sign new and much less generous contracts or else leave the country. A mining interest 17 Latin America has 45% of the world’s copper reserves, a quarter of its silver reserves and a third of its pewter reserves: for China it represents an invaluable source of raw materials to draw upon. Chile and Peru between them produce 44% of world copper

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output and for China, the world’s biggest consumer, half its imports. It is hardly surprising that China is building up its investments in the mining sector. Its giant steel- maker, Shougang Group, via its subsidiary Shougang Hierro Peru, has since 1992 been working several Peruvian iron ore mines, including the one at Marcona to the south of Lima.

18 In Chile, in June 2005, the Chinese company Minmetals Corporation joined forces with Codelco (Corporación Nacional del Cobre)18 to secure annual deliveries of 55,000 tons of copper for 15 years. China may also take a share in developing the Gaby copper mine with its expected yearly production (from 2008 onwards) of 150,000 tons.

19 Among Cuba’s trading partners, China now ranks third after Spain and Venezuela. The relationship is being extended. The island is the world’s third largest producer of nickel19 and has significant reserves of copper and cobalt. In November 2004, on the occasion of President Hu’s visit to Havana, Minmetals and Cubaniquel agreed jointly to develop the nickel deposits at Las Camariocas in Holguín Province, 800 kilometres east of Havana: production has reached 22,500 tons a year. This collaboration is expected to push Cuba’s annual copper production, currently 75,000 tons, up to nearly 132,000 tons. A further deal has been signed between the China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) and Cubaniquel to develop the nickel deposit at San Felipe in Camaguey Province. Chinese investments look likely to swell still further in the years ahead. On September 9th 2005, a colloquium was held in Xiamen on China’s opportunities for investment in Cuba. The Cuban delegation proposed 12 projects including building sugar houses and tourist infrastructure.

20 Brazil is also one of the main targets for Chinese investment. After India and Australia, Brazil ranks as China’s third biggest supplier of iron ore, providing a quarter of all its imports. In five years, 2000-2005, China moved up from fifteenth place among Brazil’s trading partners to being its third biggest customer. In October 2001, the Brazilian firm Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), the world’s leading producer and exporter of iron ore, undertook to deliver six million tons of ore per year to the steel-maker Baosteel, China’s leading producer. From 2010 onwards the annual order will increase to 20 million tons. In spring 2004, Baosteel, CVRD and Arcelor decided jointly to build a steel- making complex in Brazil, near the port of São Luis in Maranhao state. The plant is designed to produce 3.7 million tons of steel plate per year, from 2007 onwards. It is no further than a day’s journey by rail from the mine at Carajas and a few days by sea from Panama. The total investment came to US$2.5 billion, of which Baosteel put up 60%. CRVD has also concluded agreements with Shougang to deliver iron ore. But Latin America represents not just a source of raw materials, but an agricultural storehouse too. An agricultural interest 21 In China, the damage wrought in some regions by industrialisation and poor irrigation has diminished the available farmland and progressively reduced national farm production. Thus, the soya crop, 17 million tons in 2005, was no bigger than it had been ten years before. Today, China is the world’s leading consumer and importer of soya (38% of world imports). Half of its soya consumption is imported, mainly from the United States, Brazil and Argentina, the world’s three biggest exporters20. Argentina by itself provides a third of China’s soya imports. Between 1999 and 2004, the value of Chinese imports of soya from Brazil and Argentina increased ten times over. Improvements in living standards also led to an increase in meat consumption: per

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person, it has doubled since 1990. The meat was bought in large measure from Brazil and Argentina, which provide between them 20% of Beijing’s meat imports. Concerns over the Chinese presence 22 China’s presence has upset the economic and geostrategic balance in the region. These massive investments have provoked a real debate21 across Latin America, where governments fear their countries may be confined to the role of providing agricultural and mineral raw materials. The figures speak volumes: three quarters of Argentina’s exports to China consist of agricultural products. China is the main customer for soya beans, buying 45% of the total exported; Thailand comes next with 13% and Spain with 7%. And when it comes to Brazil’s exports to China, 37% consist of agricultural products. The dependence of the Latin American countries is undeniable. China is the destination for 70% of the iron ore, 47% of the lead and 37% of the copper exported by Peru, 33% of the pewter exported by Bolivia and 16% of the copper leaving Chile. Far from allowing development, trade with China tends over the long term to weaken the Latin American economies. China reinforces the rentier attitude in these countries. The appreciating prices for raw materials22 and the growth rates in Chile (5.9% in 2004 and then 5.1% in 2005) or Argentina (9.2% in 2005) do little to encourage people to diversify their production. The opening up of trade is the root of many disappointments. Imports from China swamp the local markets, a situation that might be aggravated by the creation of a bilateral free-trade area. The sometimes unfair competition from Chinese goods has also been denounced. In 2005, several governments including Brazil and Argentina23 did not hesitate to employ anti-dumping measures against textiles and toys. Beijing’s trading deficit with Latin America is fairly quickly absorbed. Brazil’s trading surplus with China has been considerably reduced, falling from US$5 billion in 2004 to US$1.48 billion the following year. On top of everything, Latin American countries are up against Chinese competition in foreign markets, especially in the United States. Between 2003 and 2005, with the end of the Multifibre Agreement (MFA), China’s share in US textile imports doubled, increasing from 25% to 56%.

23 It is also worth noting that recriminations against Chinese investors and their management methods are rising sharply. Brazilian workers at the Gree Electric Appliances factory, a Chinese investment in Manaus, complain of excessive production rates and insensitivity to social etiquette. There are many such examples.

24 Even so, a study by the Inter-American Development Bank24 sets out to be reassuring: it considers that Latin American economies are not endangered by direct Asian competition. Quite the contrary: China appears to offer a potential export market, especially for Brazil. Moreover, China is the target for a third of Brazil’s foreign investments, including those by Brasmotor and Embraco Snowflake, producers of domestic appliances, and by Sabó and Marcopolo, makers of cars and buses respectively. The Brazilian aircraft manufacturer Embraer has also embarked on a joint venture with China Aviation Industry Corporation, to produce in Harbin the ERJ 145 regional transport aircraft.

25 Thus, it may be an exaggeration to see in these Chinese investments only the behaviour of an economic predator, as the United States frequently asserts. As evidence of this bilateral rapprochement, in November 2004, Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Chile awarded to China the status of market economy, a recognition still withheld by the United States and the European Union. Beijing is asking its main trading partners to make this

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acknowledgement, in order to defend itself against anti-dumping proceedings that governments may bring against it25. Washington’s distrust 26 In the United States, most reports and assessments devoted to China’s presence in Latin America come to the same conclusion. Beijing is a real threat26, in three areas, political, diplomatic and military. Latin America without the United States? 27 Within a few years, following the elections of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (1998) and Lula Da Silva in Brazil (2002), most Latin American countries elected governments of the populist left, with mostly hostile attitudes to American policy; their leaders include Nestor Kirchner in Argentina (2003), Tabaré Vasquez in Uruguay (2004), Evo Morales in Bolivia (2005) and Michelle Bachelet in Chile (2005). In particular, the victory of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua last November perplexes the United States, which dreads even the thought of any lessening of its influence in the Latin American continent. US fears are all the more justified because, since September 11th 2001, the United States has paid scant attention to Latin America. On the political front, China’s presence erodes the influence of Washington, whose growing isolation is evident. Only Nicaragua, Honduras, the Dominican Republic and Salvador joined the United States-led coalition to fight in Iraq27. Latin American countries are no longer afraid to defy Washington; and they see in China a more conciliatory partner than the IMF. The point is illustrated by Bolivia’s decision to follow Ecuador’s example in nationalising its hydrocarbon sector. China will be taking over the American and European investments.

28 On the oil front, Latin America provides more than a quarter of US imports28; but they have had to reduce their purchases from Venezuela because of President Chávez’ policies. Relations between Caracas and Washington are on the slide. Chávez is seeking to create a common front against what he calls North American imperialism. His rhetoric is reflected in closer relations with governments condemned by Washington, such as Belarus and Iran.

29 China, being a major investor, may enable Venezuela to rid itself of US influence29. But Chávez looks well beyond the function of supplying hydrocarbons. He sees a political role for himself on the international stage. In October 2006, Venezuela made a bid―with China’s support―for one of the non-permanent seats on the UN Security Council―in vain, however. Venezuela fought a bitter battle with Guatemala (which had support from Washington)―and Panama won the election.

30 And China will probably be asked to deliver arms to Caracas, following in the footsteps of Spain (due to supply transport aircraft and corvettes) and Russia (Sukhoi fighter planes). Chávez’ self-confidence has been rewarded by the links forged with China. His project, the “Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas” is designed to strengthen co- operation between economies in the region. In June 2005, Venezuela concluded an alliance known as Petrocaribe30 with 13 Caribbean states, enabling it to support socialist municipalities in Salvador and Nicaragua31 and to contribute to the popularity of left- wing movements. Similarly, Cuba has achieved oil independence thanks partly to its own production (which covers half the island’s needs), and partly to deliveries from Venezuela. Meanwhile, the region’s two other powers, Mexico and Brazil, are the focus for real attention from Beijing.

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31 In 2001, the Sinatex textile company, a subsidiary of China Worldbest Group, was established in Obregón in Mexico. This is China’s most significant investment in the country to date. Bilateral trade, still limited, is growing fast. By 2004, the volume of commercial exchanges had risen to US$7.112 billion, 44% up on the previous year. The political closeness between Mexico and Washington, and the ban on foreign enterprises investing in the oil sector, have the effect of discouraging joint projects, at least for the present.

32 With Brazil, China has formed a real partnership since 1986 in the space sector. The two countries have pushed ahead with the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) programme. The highlight of this joint venture was the launch in October 1999 of the CBERS satellite (known in China as Zong guo Zi Yuan) designed to collect meteorological information. In October 2003, China went ahead with the launch of a second satellite (Zi-Yuan-2), the technical specifications of which have not been disclosed. The launches of two new satellites, CBERS-3 and 4 are planned for 2008 and 2010. This Sino-Brazilian collaboration extends to the energy field, with Brazil now planning to supply China with uranium to fuel its nuclear power stations.

33 Lastly, Beijing’s presence in the region seriously compromises the plan for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) promoted by President Bush. In November 2006, at the Mar del Plata summit, the 34 participants were unable to reach any agreement. Latin- American governments considered Washington’s concessions too meagre. For its part, Beijing is proposing to conclude preferential trade agreements. In November 2005, China and Chile signed a first bilateral free trade treaty, designed to be extended in due course to the other countries in the region. Already 92% of Chile’s exports to China are exempt from customs duties. Diplomatic issues 34 China’s peaceful ascendancy in Latin America may induce some governments to break with Taiwan, thus intensifying the island’s isolation. Among the 25 states that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, nearly half are in Latin America and the Caribbean: Belize, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Salvador. Taiwan could lose the support of a close ally since Daniel Ortega won last November’s election in Nicaragua. The United States is also concerned by China’s growing military influence. A contested military role 35 For the present, admittedly, military co-operation is still limited32; but there is every indication that Beijing will not reject the approaches of some countries in the region. Bolivia, like Peru, is one of the few Latin American customers for Chinese military hardware. Military co-operation between La Paz and Beijing began as far back as the 1980s. In 1993, China delivered to the Bolivian government 28 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in respect of a bilateral co-operation agreement. In October 2005, anticipating Evo Morales’ victory, American military advisers working in complicity with Bolivian army commanders succeeded in moving the missiles to the El Alto airbase near La Paz and then flew them to the United States33.

36 Cuba allows China to use the telecommunications installations built―and later abandoned―by the Russians, including the Lourdes spy base at Torrens near Havana, which houses some sophisticated equipment. The base was built in 1964 and up until 2001 was home to over a thousand Russian technicians. In strengthening Chinese

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influence (reflected in exchanges of military missions), Beijing is taking advantage of Washington’s relative self-effacement, which has intensified since the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) governed by the Rome Statute. The United States does not recognise the competence of the Court34: it adopted in August 2002 the American Service Members Protection Act, which blocks any military co-operation with states that recognise the ICC’s status. So far, with the exception of Chile, Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua, all Latin American governments have signed and ratified the Rome Statute. In response, the United States demanded that its personnel should be granted immunity from the Court’s proceedings35 by means of Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs)―but in vain. To persuade the most reluctant, the Nethercutt amendment, voted through in December 2004, provided for financial sanctions against ICC member states refusing to sign the BIAs. After Colombia, Bolivia too was forced in May 2005 to submit to a bilateral agreement. It is understood that Honduras and Panama have also signed confidential deals with Washington. Reporting to the US Senate, General Bantz J Craddock36 declared that it was dangerous to suspend military co-operation with most Latin American countries, those which have rejected the principle of allowing immunity to the United States. He said the United States was denying itself the opportunity of providing military training for countries in the region.

37 So Washington considers China’s presence as disadvantageous. The sharp increase in bilateral trade is reflected in a worrying rise in criminal activity (such as smuggling and counterfeiting). Beijing’s attitude, in lending support to populist and demagogic political parties, is a destabilising influence on the American continent.

38 Yet, it would be wrong to conclude that Latin America was coming under Beijing’s influence or that such influence was all-powerful. Electoral changes in Latin America owe more to the development of Latin American societies (a financial crisis in Argentina, the rejection of the multinationals, the emancipation of Indian majorities, the final stages in the process of democratisation) than to any particular Chinese influence or strategy. Instability and political changes are also weakening Chinese enterprises, as in Bolivia and still more recently in Ecuador.

39 In September 2004, two Chinese enterprises, Lutianhua and Chengda Chemical announced their joint venture with the Bolivian firm LisaTum to build a petrochemical plant designed to produce ammonia. Three months later, in December, a subsidiary of SINOPEC, Shengli Oilfield, signed several contracts with YPFB37, the Bolivian state oil company; their projects included two refineries, a power station near Villamontes, ten oilfields in the Chaco and the Chapare region. The agreement had been made possible when China accepted a minority stake with 49% of the shared enterprise: this would have been a colossal investment38, amounting to US$1.5 billion, the equivalent of 18% of Bolivia’s GNP in 2004. However, the legal minefield surrounding investments in Bolivia’s hydrocarbon sector eventually prompted Shengli to pull out of the project.

40 China has also become embroiled in legal difficulties in Ecuador. In May 2006, the state oil company revoked the operating contracts awarded the US oil company, Occidental Petroleum. Oxy, as it is known, was accused of having illegally transferred, six years before, a 40% interest in its fields to the Canadian group EnCana. EnCana, however, had then passed these holdings on to the Chinese consortium, the Andes Petroleum Company, which now finds itself having to contest ownership. Conclusion

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41 In Latin America, China finds itself adapting to an environment less familiar than that which it previously found in Africa39. Ever since the 1950s, China has been forging its links with black Africa and has helped some of its peoples in their struggles for freedom. With Latin America, shared memories are fewer and friendships are quite recent. The Chinese political system arouses distrust in a region that has its own tragic experience of dictatorships, a region where democratic institutions are still fragile. The relationship between Beijing and Latin America is not one of subjection. Brazil, the world’s tenth-ranking economic power (its GDP is twice that of sub-Saharan Africa) sees itself more as China’s partner than as its henchman.

42 Looking beyond the fine words in praise of friendship and cooperation, one can detect a hint of mistrust. In 2004, Beijing joined the Organisation of American States (OAS) with the status of permanent observer; but its application for membership of the Inter- American Development Bank has so far been rejected several times over. There is a fear that, within that body, Beijing might weigh still more heavily on the economies and the governments of the region.

43 China does not hesitate to sacrifice its friendships when its fundamental interests are at stake. Beijing refused to support Brazil’s claim to a UN Security Council seat, though Brazil is one of the original Group of Four (with Germany, India and Japan) proposed for permanent membership. The plan is for enlarging the Council from 15 to 25 members, six of the seats permanent, of which two would be for the African continent and four for non-permanent members. No decisions have been reached. Within the World Trade Organisation (WTO), China is very far from being supportive to the Latin American countries in their battles against the agricultural subsidies paid by the EU and the United States to their producers. Beijing is not affected by this question and is reluctant to add any extra source of grievance to its trading relations, already stormy, with the West. Yet, Beijing will not be able to maintain its stance of cautious commitment, with the growing involvement of India in Latin America, for long. Delhi is seeking new sources of raw materials and political support in its bid for a Security Council seat: it too is taking an interest in Latin America.

44 For the present, Latin America amounts to only 2.2% of India’s foreign trade40. Yet, these figures should not be allowed to mask the real dynamic for growth or the acceleration in trade exchanges over the past few years41. These bilateral exchanges have increased since January 2004 when India and the members of Mercosur42 signed a preferential trade agreement on 450 products, intended over the long term to create a Free Trade Area. Indian investments in the region are still limited, as noted in an UNCTAD report.43 In 2004, India’s overall FDI amounted to US$6.6 billion, of which only 2% was in Latin America. But, over the past three years, the presence of Indian enterprises in Latin America has been built up. Quite soon, Latin America will become a fiercely contested market. And the three leading powers of the mid twenty-first century will confront one another there.

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NOTES

1. In this article, Latin America includes South America, Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean. 2. The United States is still the leading investor in Latin America, being the main customer and among the main suppliers of most countries in the region (it is the main customer of Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico . . .) But these countries’ individual share in US trade is still small, apart from that of Mexico, which takes 13% of US exports. Brazil represents 1.1% of US trade. The total amount of trade between the United States and Latin America (worth US$445 billion in 2004, and then US$461 billion in 2005) is ten times the exchanges between China and Latin America. 3. In April 2001, Jiang Zemin made an extensive tour of the area, visiting Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Uruguay and Venezuela. 4. Cf. Peter Hakim, “Is Washington Losing Latin America?”, Foreign Affairs, January- February 2006. 5. Sources: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM) and the United Nations: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/databases.htm 6. This figure is given by MOFCOM and cited in William Hess’s study, “Going Outside, Round-Tripping and Dollar Diplomacy, An Introduction to Chinese Outward Direct Investment”, Global Insight, January 2006. 7. In 2005, Latin America received US$68 billion worth of investment, as against US$61 billion the previous year. 8. UNCTAD report: “China: an emerging FDI outward investor”, December 4th 2003 9. By 2005, China was the second largest trading partner of Chile and Peru and Brazil’s third largest. Beijing was set to become Brazil’s second largest trading partner by the second half of 2006. 10. Smuggling is an equally flourishing activity in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) where Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil meet. On this subject, cf. François Lafargue, “Stratégies pétrolières chinoises en Amérique latine”, Défense nationale, January 2006, pp. 84-93. 11. Source: “BP Statistical Review of World Energy”, 2006. 12. In 2005, China bought 1.9% of the oil exported from Latin America, while the United States took 81% and the EU 9.2%. 13. As reported by the Associated Press, July 18th 2006. 14. Several plans for widening the canal are under consideration, but they are up against financing problems. 15. The CNPC is the second largest of China’s national oil companies, ranked after SINOPEC (China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation) and ahead of CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation). 16. Pluspetrol is an Argentinian company, but its majority shareholder is the Spanish firm Repsol YPF. 17. Bolivia has the second largest proven reserves of gas in Latin America, after Venezuela. 18. Codelco produces 12% of the world’s output of copper. 19. Nickel accounted for 36% of Cuba’s exports in 2003. 20. Brazil is the world’s second biggest producer of soya (35% of world production), after the United States and ahead of Argentina.

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21. The Economist, “China and Latin America, Magic, or Realism?”, No. 8407, January 2005. The Inter-American Development Bank, in many reports, stresses the threat represented by China. http://www.iadb.org/ 22. Between November 2001 and May 2006, the price of a ton of copper on the London spot market rose by nearly seven times. 23. Matt Moffett, Geraldo Samor, “Brazil Regrets its China Affair” The Wall Street Journal, October 12th 2005. 24. Inter-American Development Bank, “The Emergence of China, Opportunities and Challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean”, March 2005. 25. China is denied the status of market economy by the EU and the United States because of its impenetrable financial and banking system and the interference of the state in the economy. 26. US Senate report “China’s role in Latin America” 2005; or again, Evans Ellis, “ US national security implication of Chinese involvement in Latin America”, Strategic Studies Institute, 2005. 27. By the start of this year, only Salvador still had troops in Iraq (nearly 400 men). 28. In 2005, the United States imported 12% of its oil from Mexico, 11% from Venezuela and 3% from Brazil, Colombia and Argentina. At present, the United States buys 60% of Venezuela’s oil exports. 29. At present, the United States buys 60% of Venezuela’s oil exports. 30. In 2005, the United States imported 12% of its oil from Mexico, 11% from Venezuela and 3% from Brazil, Colombia and Argentina. The alliance provides for Venezuela to supply oil at preferential rates, so as to diminish US influence over economies in the region. 31. In April 2006, a deal was signed between Venezuela and several Nicaraguan municipalities led by the Sandinistas. It provided for the supply of 10 million barrels per year at market prices, 60% of the payments being made within three months and the rest over 25 years. Of Salvador’s municipalities, 16, controlled by the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, have signed a similar agreement for Venezuelan oil supplies. 32. The armies of Latin America are mainly equipped with American and French hardware. 33. Martin Arostegui, “Removal of missiles roils U.S.-Bolivia ties”, Washington Times, December 22nd 2005. 34. Bill Gertz, “China Military Trains in West”, Washington Times, March 15th 2006. 35. These Immunity Agreements prohibit the surrender to the ICC of any US military personnel, diplomats, members of the government or public officials. 36. Report to the US Senate, “China’s Role in Latin America”, September 2005. 37. Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos. 38. For 2004, foreign direct investment in Bolivia amounted to US$134 million. 39. Cf François Lafargue, “La Chine, une Puissance africaine”, Perspectives Chinoises, 2005, pp 2-10; and Etats-Unis, Inde, Chine, “Kriegspiel pétrolier en Afrique”, Politique internationale, n°112, 2006, pp 402-422. 40. Latin America receives 2.7% of India’s exports (half going to Brazil and Mexico) and supplies 1.8% of its imports. Source: Indian Department of Commerce http:// commerce.nic.in/ 41. Since 2000, trade between India and Latin America has increased by two and a half times.

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42. Since 1991, Mercosur or, in English, the Southern Common Market, brings together Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and, since December 2005, Venezuela. 43. According to the UNCTAD report “India’s outward FDI, a Giant Awakening?”, 2004.

ABSTRACTS

For half a century, the People’s Republic of China took only limited note of Latin America, a region over which the United States exercised real political and economic hegemony. This period of indifference is today at an end. For five years now, China has been extending its investments from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego, and is now a leading partner of Brazil, Argentina and Chile. Yet, this new presence is raising doubts and anxiety both in Latin America and in the United States, which is less than enthusiastic about China’s involvement in the region. China has also run up against the ambitions of India, equally concerned about supplies of raw materials.

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Economy

China Perspectives, 68 | november- december 2006 20

The Economics of the “China Price”

Peter Navarro

Introduction “The China price”(…) the three scariest words in US industry. Cut your price at least 30% or lose your customers. Nearly every manufacturer is vulnerable -- from furniture to networking gear. The result: a massive shift in economic power is underway. Business Week1

1 Given China’s demonstrated ability to conquer one export market after another, an important question for both would-be competitors and world policy-makers weighing up various protectionist measures is this: How has China been able to emerge as the world’s “factory floor”? The answer lies in the eight major “economic drivers” of the China price: low wages, counterfeiting and piracy, minimal worker health and safety regulations, lax environmental regulations and enforcement, export industry subsidies, a highly efficient “industrial network clustering”, the catalytic role of foreign direct investment (FDI), An undervalued currency.

2 These drivers have been identified from research conducted as part of the “China price Project” at the Merage School of Business, UC-Irvine (described in the Appendix). This article seeks to derive estimates of the relative contributions of each of these eight drivers to China’s competitive advantage. The United States manufacturing sector is used as the benchmark for comparison. The analysis yields several important insights for both policy-makers and management strategists.

3 First, the determination of the China price extends well beyond issues of cheap labour, currency misalignments, and a lax environmental regime―the “usual suspects” in many trade debates. Second, there are important synergies between many of the China price drivers. For example, both an undervalued currency and export industry subsidies help attract additional FDI, which in turn, facilitates industrial network clustering. Finally, aspects of many of the China price drivers appear to fall outside the norms of international trade agreements (e.g. the World Trade Organisation (WTO))

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and/or international standards for environmental protection and worker health and safety.

4 These findings have important implications for companies and their management strategists seeking ways to compete with China and facing decisions about outsourcing and offshoring production activities to China. The findings have equally important implications for world policy-makers (and therefore corporate, environmental and labour lobbyists) seeking ways to counter the many sharp competitive edges of the China price and its threat to domestic employment, income, the global environment and labour market. Data and methodology 5 The cost structure of the typical US manufacturing firm is used as the benchmark of comparison. At the outset, two important limitations of the analysis are noted.

6 First, cost structures across individual manufacturing sectors are likely to vary substantially. For example, textile manufacturing is highly capital intensive while the apparel made from finished textiles is highly labour intensive.

7 A second issue of comparability arises because US and Chinese manufacturing entities tend to be concentrated in different industries. For example, while the United States has a large aircraft industry, China does not. This limitation not withstanding, it may still be useful to look at how the four major components of a typical production function―land, labour, capital and energy―are deployed in the two respective countries as a means of identifying the sources and size of any competitive advantages.

8 This US cost structure has been developed from multiple sources, including, but not limited to, data from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers of the US Census Bureau, the Industry Economic Accounts of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Compustat database, Blackfriar’s Communications for marketing data, Gartner for software expenditures, and Technology Review for data on research and development expenditures. 2 This cost structure is summarised in Table 1, which reports relative costs by the percentage of a dollar of manufacturing output. For example, raw materials represent 46 cents on the US manufacturing dollar, labour costs represent 21 cents, advertising and marketing 9 cents, and so on.

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1. The U.S. Manufacturing Cost Structure Dollar

9 The analysis that follows illustrates how each of the eight economic drivers of the China price reduce one or more of the components of the total cost for Chinese manufacturers. For the six of the eight drivers in the list above, the cost impacts may be directly measured, e.g., lower labour costs in China directly reduce the labour cost component, lower regulatory compliance costs reduce environmental and health and safety costs. However, for two economic drivers in the list, FDI and the impacts of an undervalued currency, the cost impacts are of a more indirect or aggregate nature and require a different approach to valuation. Driver #1: Low wages for high quality work What is stunning about China is that for the first time we have a huge, poor country that can compete both with very low wages and in high tech. Combine the two, and America has a problem. Professor Richard Freeman, Harvard University3

10 The available data on wages and compensation in China is scant and of poor quality. Many enterprises regularly underreport data to avoid taxation and payments to social insurance and often keep two sets of books for “management accounts” and “tax accounts.”4 Acknowledging such large variances, this analysis relies on the best available data compiled by Judith Banister (2005),5 who has calculated an average hourly compensation rate of $0.57.

11 This rate is not the lowest in the world. However, the productivity of Chinese workers is considerably higher than many other lower wage nations. Accordingly, to properly estimate the cost advantage of China’s low hourly compensation, it must be adjusted for productivity.6

12 Using supplementary data provided by the US Conference Board, Table 2 compares hourly compensation in the US and China on a productivity-adjusted basis. It illustrates that China’s hourly compensation costs are about one-fifth of those in the United States

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(18%).7 This suggests that Chinese manufacturers save 17 cents on the manufacturing dollar for labour costs relative to their US competitors.

2. Productivity-adjusted Compensation Rates in China

13 In most cases, the wage advantage of a developing country disappears, or at least narrows considerably, over time as it experiences rapid economic growth and labour markets tighten. How long this advantage is likely to persist is an open question.

14 Short-term downward pressure on wages is being exerted by a large “reserve army” of unemployed workers estimated to be anywhere from 100 million to 200 million. Many of these workers have been laid off or furloughed (xiagang) as a consequence of the privatisation of inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs). They have become part of a larger “floating population” of migrants. With labour unions banned in China, there likewise has been no emergence of any bargaining power for worker units.

15 Longer term, the heavier counterweight to rising wages is China’s official policy of rapid urbanisation to combat chronic rural poverty. The Chinese government is seeking to move as many as five hundred million peasants off the farm and into China’s factories over the next several decades. To put these numbers into perspective, the combined current workforces of the United States and Europe number less than 400 million. Thus, despite unprecedented rates of economic growth, wage pressures in China are unlikely to significantly rise soon, making low wages a significant and perennial component of the China price for decades to come.

16 As to the timeframe in which productivity-adjusted wages may rise, recent data suggests that nominal wages may be rising quite quickly (10%-15% a year since 1999. Because productivity has been rising at a faster rate, unit labour costs remain in decline.

17 Note, however, this decline in unit labour costs is largely a function of the high rate of entry into the labourforce. This rate of entry will be at its peak from now until about 2011 and then should start to decline.

18 Once new entrants into the labourforce start to decline significantly, it is quite possible that unit labour costs will start to rise since businesses will have to pay more to retain workers for longer. Thus productivity-adjusted Chinese wages could start to rise as early as in the next decade. Driver #2: Piracy & counterfeiting

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China is the epicenter of the counterfeits boom…. Just a few years ago, counterfeiting was all Gucci bags and fake perfume. Now it's everything. It has just exploded. It is many times larger a problem than it was only a few years ago. The counterfeit inventory ranges from cigarette lighters to automobiles to pharmaceutical fakes that can endanger a life. I would bet that there are companies in this country [the US] that don't even know they're getting screwed around the world. Frank Vargo, National Association of Manufacturers8

19 “Piracy” refers to the unauthorised production, distribution or use of a good or service. The goal of a pirate is to create a look-alike “knockoff” that can be sold to a customer as such. “Counterfeiting” involves trying to pass off the pirated products as that of the real, branding corporation. Thus, a golf club that looks like a Callaway driver but has a name like “Hallaway” is a pirated knockoff, whereas as knockoff sold as a “Callaway” club is a counterfeit.

20 The World Customs Organisation estimates that counterfeiting accounts for 5% to 7% of global merchandise trade and represents the equivalent in lost sales annually of around US$500 billion.9 Such counterfeiting costs the pharmaceutical industry alone close to US$50 billion a year, the auto industry more than US$10 billion annually, and the software and entertainment industries billions more.10

21 China is not the only country engaged in this half a trillion dollar trade. Other hotbeds include Russia, India, Vietnam and South Africa. However, China is considered to be the largest pirate nation; it accounts for an estimated two-thirds of all the world’s pirated and counterfeited goods and 80% of all counterfeit goods seized at US borders.

22 Despite tough rhetoric from the Chinese government, many critics have argued that much of the country’s counterfeiting and piracy is state-sanctioned. As noted by numerous scholars, such institutionalised violations of international intellectual property rights laws and treaties create millions of jobs, help to control inflation, and boost the standard of living of hundreds of millions of Chinese consumers. The question for this analysis is what impact might Chinese piracy and counterfeiting have on the China price. To answer this question, three of the most important elements of the counterfeiting and piracy cost equation―software piracy, reduced marketing and advertising expenses, and lower capital expenditures on research and development―are examined.

23 The rate of software piracy in China is well over 90%. This provides substantial savings in both the operating and capital budget portions of the balance sheet for most Chinese enterprises. Based on data published by Gartner, US companies spend, on average, 0.3% of their overall budget on software.11 Assuming a piracy rate of 90%, this suggests that a China price savings of a little less than one-third of a cent relative to the US manufacturing dollar.

24 In addition, Chinese counterfeiters need not incur either significant research and development expenditures or substantial advertising and marketing costs to promote

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their “brand”. As noted by A.T. Kearney, “counterfeiting allows skipping the investment necessary to create, develop and market products and go directly to profits. No R&D headaches. No brand building. No advertising.”12 (As a counterpoint argument here, it is useful to note that it has also frequently argued that this failure to develop branding and intellectual property depresses the value of Chinese-made products and limits the markets in which they can be sold.)

25 A study conducted by Blackfriar’s Communications of companies of all sizes and across many industries suggests that an average of roughly 9% of revenues are devoted to marketing expenses.13 To translate this into an effect on the China price, it is first necessary to assume that some fraction of the Chinese GDP is attributable to counterfeiting and piracy activity. Oded Shenkar (2005) reports estimates that range between 10% and 30%.14 This suggests that 0.9% to 2.7% of the China price advantage or a mid-range of 1.8 cents on the manufacturing dollar may be attributed, on average, to the lack of marketing expenses for pirated goods.

26 A similar calculation may be made for industrial research and development (R&D). Industries such as autos, biotechnology, semiconductors and pharmaceuticals are particularly R&D-intensive, with R&D expenditure as a percentage of revenue in the range of 15% or more. More broadly, based on sector-level data reported by Technology Review, the weighted average of R&D spending across all sectors of the global economy is estimated to be 8.5%.15 This suggests that 0.85% to 2.55% may be attributed to the absence of R&D expenditure for counterfeit goods, or a mid-range of 1.7 cents on the manufacturing dollar. That leaves a mid-range total of 3.77 cents on the manufacturing dollar that Chinese manufacturers save because of counterfeiting and piracy.

27 This is likely to be a conservative estimate. There are also more diffuse cost savings and it is far more difficult to estimate effects of counterfeiting and piracy not accounted for in these calculations. For example, legitimate companies face warranty costs, which often must be honoured even when a counterfeit part leads to failure. Legitimate companies also often incur costs of protecting their own intellectual property. Companies like Nike, Louis Vuitton, Microsoft and IBM now spend considerable sums on IP protection. They also suffer damage to their good will and reputation when counterfeit products fail (and fail to be recognised as counterfeits). Driver #3: Minimal worker health and safety regulations Yongkang, in prosperous Zhejiang province just south of Shanghai, is the hardware capital of China. Its 7,000 metal-working factories―all privately owned―make hinges, hubcaps, pots and pans, power drills, security doors, tool boxes, thermoses, electric razors, headphones, plugs, fans and just about anything else with metallic innards. Yongkang, which means "eternal health" in Chinese, is also the dismemberment capital of China. At least once a day someone... is rushed to one of the dozen clinics that specialize in treating hand, arm and finger injuries, according to local government statistics.... The reality, all over China, is that workplace casualties have become

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endemic. Nationally, 140,000 people died in work- related accidents last year… according to the State Administration of Work Safety. Hundreds of thousands more were injured. The New York Times16

28 While the Chinese government instituted new health and safety laws in 1995, few enterprises, either public or private, abide by the laws. There is also very little enforcement by either the central government or local and provincial governments because the goal of economic growth has taken precedence. Nor does any properly functioning legal system exist to protect workers and insure fair compensation for those who are injured so the legal liabilities of Chinese manufacturing enterprises are very limited.

29 As a result, according even to China’s own under-reported statistics, China is one of the most dangerous places to work in the world. The highest risk industries include building materials, chemicals, coal production, machinery manufacture, metallurgy, plastics and textiles. Diseases ranging from silicosis and brown lung to a variety of cancers caused by the ingestion, inhalation or contact with toxic chemicals and waste are endemic. Workplace injuries are endemic.

30 In this regard, there are those who may legitimately argue that the current relatively lax worker safety and environmental enforcement is a natural feature of China’s stage of industrial development. In this regard, it is unlikely that China’s lax regulatory environment is any worse than in the United States, Europe or even Japan at comparable earlier stages of their development. While this may be true, it is likely also true that this lax regulatory environment provides a cost advantage relative to other countries whose regulatory regimes are tighter. The goal of this analysis is simply to provide some albeit rough measure of this advantage.

31 As for the cost advantages to Chinese manufacturers inherent in a lax health and safety regulatory regime, these range from the use of cheaper equipment for workers and fewer safety-related expenses to savings on training and safety-related large capital expenditures. For example, Chinese textile companies are unlikely to invest in anti- noise or dust control equipment. Chinese coal mining companies tend to skimp on masks, goggles, and emergency rescue facilities while a wet drilling system costs as much as 60% more than a dry drilling system but significantly reduces hazardous dust emissions.

32 One way to estimate the cost advantage of China’s lack of adequate health and safety regulations is to compare the expenditures on regulatory compliance in the United States versus China at the aggregate level. Specifically, the cost of regulatory compliance in the United States as a percentage of some relative metric, e.g., total cost or total revenue, can be used as a benchmark of comparison. Then, some fraction of that cost can be subtracted from the Chinese cost equation based on the looser standards.

33 A joint study by Mark Crain and Joseph Johnson (2001) was used as the US benchmark. It estimates health and safety compliance costs in the United States to be 1.6% of gross revenues.17 Under the conservative assumption that China spends a third of what the United States spends, this suggests that the contribution of lax health and safety

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standards to the “China price” may be rather modest (the extreme pain and suffering of Chinese workers notwithstanding)―about one cent on the manufacturing dollar Driver #4: Lax environmental regulations and enforcement China’s population is so big and its resources so scarce that if we continue to ignore our environmental problems, that will bring disaster for us and the world. Pan Yue, Deputy Director, Chinese State Environmental Protection Administration18

34 China is rapidly becoming one of the most polluted countries in the world. It is home to 16 of the 20 the world’s most polluted cities. Of its almost one hundred cities with over a million people each, two-thirds fail to meet World Health Organisation (WHO) air quality standards.

35 China is also the world leader in the sulphur dioxide emissions and produces the

second highest CO2 emissions. It releases six hundred tons of mercury into the air annually, nearly one-quarter of the world’s non-natural emissions,19 and it is the world leader in the generation of substances that deplete the world’s ozone layer. Acid rain, which severely damages forests, fisheries, and crops, affects one-quarter of China’s land area and one-third of its agricultural land. As much as 50% of the acid rain in Japan and Korea is of Chinese origin. According to the Chinese Academy on Environmental Planning, more than 400,000 Chinese die prematurely from air pollution related diseases, primarily from lung and heart disease.20 That number is expected to reach more than 500,000 within a decade.

36 The statistics on water pollution are equally stark. Of China’s seven major rivers 70% are severely polluted, and 80% fail to meet standards for fishing.21 90% of China’s cities and 75% of its lakes suffer from some degree of water pollution,22 and 700 million Chinese “have access to drinking water of a quality below WHO standards.”23 Liver and stomach cancers related to water pollution are among the leading causes of death in the countryside. 24 All of China’s coastal waters are moderately to highly polluted. 25

37 Not all of China’s air and water pollution can be blamed on its manufacturing industries. Other major sources include pesticide and fertiliser runoff in the agricultural sector and large quantities of human and animal waste that are dumped into waterways or seep into ground water. However, China’s industrial sector is the primary contributor of toxic (versus organic) pollution.

38 The worst polluting industries include paper and pulp, food, chemicals, textiles, tanning, and mining. The most common toxic pollutants include dioxins, solvents, and PCBs, various metals such as mercury, lead, and copper and highly persistent pesticides ranging from chlordane and mirex to DDT.26

39 Many of the polluting factories are small-scale and locally owned. Even when such enterprises are highly unprofitable, they represent important job generators in rural areas plagued by high unemployment. That makes it very difficult for a local environmental protection bureau to either close the polluters down, fine them, or otherwise force them to comply with the pollution control standards.

40 In addition, in many cases, large factories equipped with the latest and most sophisticated pollution control technologies simply do not use the technologies for fear

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of driving up production costs. Typically, this is done without any fear of sanctions by lax regulators and often complicit local officials.

41 While China has some strict environmental laws on the books, the fines that may be levied to enforce the regulations are so insignificant that they are seen merely as a cost of doing business rather than a true deterrent. Local authorities that collect the fines will often recycle the revenues back to the polluters as tax breaks.

42 A major problem with enforcement is that China’s state environmental protection agency (EPA) is critically understaffed and under-budgeted. While the US EPA employs close to 20,000,27 China’s SEPA employs only 300. This is to oversee environmental protection in a country with over a billion people and with close to 100 cities of a million people or more. Finally, as with its weak health and safety regime, China’s legal system makes it extremely difficult for pollution victims to properly seek any redress.

43 China’s lax environmental regulations and weak enforcement provide a variety of cost advantages to its industrial sector. Enterprises save money by not buying protective equipment for workers. Many do not need to invest in pollution control technologies while those that do save money by not investing in them. Their waste disposal costs are thus considerably reduced.

44 The impact of these cost advantages on the China price may be estimated in two ways. First, in a variation on the approach taken earlier in measuring the impact of a lax health and safety regulatory regime, the costs of environmental regulatory compliance in China can be compared to that in the United States at the aggregate level under the assumption that Chinese manufacturers spend a fraction of what US firms do. Second, the results may be cross-checked by comparing actual expenditures of a few select Chinese and US firms in the same industries.

45 Using the first approach, Blodgett (1997) provides a summary of pollution control compliance costs in the United States that accounts for both capital expenditure and pollution abatement operating costs.28 As a percent of value added, costs vary widely across industries. They range as high as 17% for petroleum, 9% for pulp mills, and 4% for chemicals to less than 1% for industries such as food, textiles and printing, with an overall average of 1.48%. Again assuming that China spends one-third of the amount that the United States spends, this suggests an effect of environmental compliance costs on the China price very similar to that of lax health and safety regulations of just about one cent on the manufacturing dollar (albeit considerably higher for certain industries).29

46 Using the second approach, Table 3 compares annual environmental expenses as a percentage of gross revenues and costs for two pairs of companies in the relatively high polluting chemical and steel industries in China and the United States.30

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3. A Comparison of Environmental Compliance Costs in the Steel & Chemical Industries

47 US Steel reports spending roughly 3% of its revenues on environmental expenses. By comparison, China’s Bao Steel spends only about one-tenth as much. The figures for Dow Chemical versus China’s Sinopec are similar. This data lends support to the assertion that the assumption that China spends one-third that of the United States on regulatory compliance is a conservative one.

48 One final observation may be useful here. This relatively small contribution to the China price notwithstanding, China’s environmental cost advantages at the individual enterprise level are likely being offset to a significant degree by the aggregate social costs. The World Bank estimates that pollution annually costs China between 8% and 12% of its more than US$1 trillion GDP in terms of increased medical bills, lost work due to illness, damage to fish and crops, money spent on disaster relief, and so on.31 The useful policy point to make here is that a cost-benefit analysis would likely suggest that China could significantly improve its environmental regime without significant loss of competitive advantage and that the benefits of such a reform would likely far outweigh the costs. Driver #5: Export subsidies The subsidization of manufacturing by the Chinese government extends beyond what might be considered normal bounds to even include the acquisition of raw materials. A fellow NAM [National Association of Manufacturers] member in the copper industry tells us that exports of copper and brass scrap to China have increased about 50% a year for several years, driven in large part by a special subsidy of 30% of the VAT tax applied by the Chinese government to imports of scrap. This subsidy is given to the scrap consumer to invest in upgrading facilities. This subsidy amounts to about seven cents a pound of the copper content in a market where the successful bidder may be determined by a margin of a

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quarter cent. Al Lubrano, President, Technical Materials, Inc.32 China's state-run banks have routinely extended loans to state-owned-enterprises that are not expected to be repaid. And right now, the big four state banks in China are, for all practical purposes, insolvent. US-China Economic and Security Review Commission33 Under state control, many Chinese state-owned manufacturers are operating with the benefit of state-sponsored subsidies, including: rent, utilities, raw materials, transportation, and telecommunications services. That is not how we define a level playing field. US Department of Commerce Secretary Donald Evans34

49 As a condition of entry into the WTO, the Chinese government promised to eliminate, or greatly scale back, the complex web of subsidies and tax preferences that had benefited export manufacturers in the decade or more preceding its entry into the WTO in 2002. Because the Chinese government has not been fully transparent about its compliance with this condition, it is difficult to determine the degree to which this condition has been met. Some evidence does, however, suggest some potentially significant non-compliance.

50 First, energy and water remain heavily subsidised.35 Many manufacturers likewise benefit from subsidised rent and/or cheap or free land and preferential access to land by local and regional governments. Assuming a subsidy level of one-third of the total costs for these cost components, this would add a modest 1.38 cents to the China price advantage.36

51 Second, and of potentially more import, China’s state-owned banks continue to hold a large portfolio of non-performing loans (NPL). These NPLs often have been issued without expectation of repayment. The biggest beneficiaries of this “free money” policy have been struggling SOEs, which are concentrated in heavy industries like steel and petroleum. Because of continued inefficiencies, many of these industries run at a loss. However, the Chinese government is loath to allow them to go bankrupt because of the loss of jobs that would entail. Accordingly, NPLs historically have represented a major lifeline to these enterprises, with the enterprises responsible neither for interest payments on these loans or repayment of principal.

52 Since entry into the WTO, the Chinese government appears to have attempted to clean up the existing NPL portfolios on the books of state-owned banks. There remains considerable controversy over how successful these efforts have been. On the one hand, the official rate of NPLs has fallen significantly in the last several years, from a reported 15% in 200337 to 8.6% in 2005.38 On the other hand, outside observers have estimated that the percentage of NPLs is two to four times higher than the single-digit statistics now being officially reported.39 In addition, according to a recent IMF study, China’s state-owned banks continue to issue new NPLs.40

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53 To estimate the effect of NPLs on the China price, a rate of 15% is conservatively assumed. Under the additional assumption that interest rate payments on debt represent, on average, 3.44% of total costs, 41 this suggests an advantage of 0.52 cents on the manufacturing dollar (with any such advantage heavily skewed towards sectors dominated by China’s SOEs) or about one half of one cent.

54 Third, China continues to use an extensive value-added tax rebate system for its export industries. China’s “VAT” is imposed over multiple stages of the domestic production and distribution process, generally in the range of 13% to 17%. In some cases, the Chinese government first collects, and then rebates, this tax for exports. In other cases, exporting firms are simply exempted from the tax..42

55 In this regard, it may be argued that exempting exporters from payment of VAT on imported inputs is simply a way of levelling the playing field between exporters from countries in VAT regimes and those from non-VAT regimes. In this line of argument, an export VAT rebate is an export subsidy. Quite the reverse: if export VAT rebates are eliminated, this constitutes a tax on exports.

56 Whether or not one defines a rebate as a true subsidy, there is, nonetheless, significant evidence that the use of VAT tax rebates represents a violation of the WTO rules against export subsidies. Perhaps the most compelling piece of evidence is the fact that the Chinese government voluntarily suspended the VAT tax rebate in a number of industries, including most prominently semiconductors, after threats from the United States of filing WTO complaints.43.

57 In the cost structure of US manufacturers, value-added represents 35.8% of the current- dollar gross output of the manufacturing sector.44 Assuming an average VAT rate of 15%, this suggests a tax benefit of 5.4 cents to the China price dollar.

58 The analysis yields, then, a total contribution of export subsidies to the China price of 7.3 cents. As with many of the estimates in this analysis, it is likely to be a conservative estimate as it does not include other possible sources of subsidies such as other forms of tax relief, “government contracts with payments well below costs and privileged use and retention of foreign exchange earned from exports.”45 Driver #6: Industrial network clustering National and regional economies tend to develop, not in the isolated industries, but in clusters of industries related by buyer-supplier links, common technologies, common channels or common customers. The economies of the Pearl River Delta region are no exception. The region has developed a broad range of clusters in garments and textiles, footwear, plastic products, electrical goods, electronics, printing, transportation, logistics, and financial services. The Pearl River Delta region's electronics and electrical cluster is particularly strong and accounts for the vast majority of Chinese production in a wide range of industries…. Regional Powerhouse46

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59 Industrial network clustering refers to the practice of locating all or most of the key enterprises in an industry’s supply chain in close physical proximity to one another. Examples of such clustering abound and include Detroit as the “motor city” hub for auto and auto parts manufacturing, New York as a financial centre, Silicon Valley as a nexus for technology, and so on. What is different about industrial network clustering in China is not just its large scale and broad scope. It is also the emergence of a myriad of “supply chain cities” that focus on a single product or set of products and serve as the focal points for highly localised supply chains.47

60 For example, in the Pearl River Delta area of China, the city of Huizhou has emerged as the world’s largest producer of laser diodes and a leading DVD producer. Foshan and Shunde are major hubs for appliances like washing machines, microwave ovens, and refrigerators. Dongguan’s Qingxi Township is one of the largest computer production bases in China. Hongmei focuses on textile- and leather-related products, Leilu on bicycles, Chencun on flowers, Yanbu is the underwear capital, and so on.48

61 This type of localisation of industrial focus generates significant production and distribution benefits as it speeds both physical and information flows and extends “just in time” principles to the entire supply chain. In this regard, China’s unique form of industrial network clustering is quite different from the “just in time” form of supply chain management that triggered the vaunted Japanese miracle of the last century.

62 In the Japanese model, the various parts necessary for production arrive from all over the world literally just in time for assembly and manufacturing. Chinese enterprises, often with the synergistic and catalytic help of FDI, have taken this system one level higher by quickly transforming whole cities and towns and tens of thousands of acres of “green field” farmland into industrial production sites. In this model, Chinese manufacturers do not have to rely on an elaborate and globally dispersed supply chain like the Japanese. Instead, many of the various factors of production are located in close proximity to each other in any given industrial network cluster.

63 Figure 1 illustrates the well-known toy cluster in Guangdong province. Virtually every single factor needed for toy production is produced in very close proximity to the major toy manufacturers. These factors range from packaging, plastic parts, paint and label printing to springs, screws and nuts, soft filling and synthetic hair.

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Figure 1. The Toy Cluster of Guangdong Province

64 In terms of direct cost reduction benefits to the China price, clustering reduces transportation costs by locating factors of production closer to one another. It reduces inventory costs by speeding up throughput times. It reduces “line down time” costs caused by broken links in the supply chain, e.g., a firm lacking a key input is able to secure that input more quickly.

65 Indirectly, network clustering also generates significant positive information externalities in the form of technology spillovers, knowledge sharing among competitors, and the localised flow of industry information. Firms likewise face reduced search costs while infrastructure costs to both private enterprises and the government are reduced because of the compactness of the supply chain and production grids.

66 Case analyses of the air conditioner and tannery industries conducted as part of the China price Project suggest that the direct benefits of network clustering alone lead to a 10% to 16% reduction in fixed and operating costs.49 Assuming that raw materials represent 46% of the manufacturing dollar,50 this suggests savings in the range of 5.4 cents to 8.6 cents per manufacturing dollar from the direct cost reduction benefits alone. Driver # 7: The catalytic role of FDI [A]s capital floods in and modern plants are built in China, efficiencies improve dramatically. The productivity of private industry in China has grown an astounding 17% annually for five years…. Business Week51 [A] major driver of Chinese productivity gains has been the rapid growth of foreign and foreign- invested firms. These ventures represent foreign direct investment―long-term investments in the Chinese economy that are directly managed by a foreign entity. Close oversight of these operations

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by experienced foreign managers provides for the transfer of modern technical and managerial techniques, leading to higher productivity levels. In fact, joint ventures of foreign companies with Chinese firms are seven times as productive as state-owned operations and over four times as productive as domestically run private enterprises. The US Conference Board52

67 Among developing nations, China has become the leading destination of FDI. Since 1983, FDI has grown from less than US$1 billion a year to over US$60 billion. 72% of China’s FDI targets manufacturing.

68 Of China’s FDI 20% to 30% is estimated to be of domestic origin. It is the result of the “round tripping” of mainland Chinese capital, primarily through Hong Kong (and also the Virgin Islands). This round tripping is driven by the special preferences awarded to FDI in the form of lower tax rates, land-use rights and subsidies, administrative support, and other subsidies (most of which represent violations of the WTO) as well as by a desire to evade foreign exchange controls.53

69 Other major FDI participants include the United States, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. While the availability of cheap labour and the allure of China’s large and largely untapped consumer market certainly play a major role in attracting these participants, lax environmental and health and safety regulatory regimes synergistically factor into the FDI decision. In this regard, multinationals are increasingly being criticised within China for exporting their pollution to the mainland.

70 In addition, China’s undervalued currency also provides considerable FDI synergy. An undervalued yuan makes Chinese assets appear relatively cheap to foreign investors.

71 China’s catalytic FDI provides a variety of competitive benefits. It finances the transfer of the most technologically advanced production and process technologies. It has brought with it managerial best practices and skills as many FDI-financed enterprises are managed by foreign talent. FDI is also often tied to the improvement of both marketing and distribution skills. When all of these attributes are tied to one of the least expensive labour forces in the world, FDI becomes a powerful competitive driver.

72 While identifying the many benefits of FDI qualitatively is relatively straightforward, quantifying those benefits regarding the China price is inherently more difficult and therefore, of all of the China price drivers analysed, this is the most speculative. The approach taken begins with the observation that FDI has played a key role in generating the robust rates of productivity growth observed in China. Various sources place this rate in the range of 8.5% annually since 2000.54 This compares to a rate of 4.9% in the US manufacturing sector over a similar time period.55 However, China’s rate is also likely to be much higher in industries where FDI has been particularly heavy.

73 Consider China’s textile industry. It has been the largest purchaser of both new shuttle- less looms and spinning equipment in recent years, much of it paid for with FDI. The result is that Chinese textile workers now enjoy similar rates of high productivity as US textile workers.56

74 In labour markets characterised by the lack of surplus labour, productivity gains normally translate into wage increases rather than price reductions. However, in

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China, there is little evidence other than some minor wage inflation in the coastal areas to suggest that the decreases in production costs from increases in productivity are being offset by rising labour costs. It follows that China’s annual productivity gains are providing Chinese enterprises either with the opportunity to lower prices or monetise the productivity gains as increased profits.

75 Additional evidence suggests that China’s productivity gains are likely being translated into price maintenance or price reductions rather than in the distribution of profit. Rates of return on capital are relatively low in China on a risk-adjusted basis.57 There is also growing surplus capacity in many industries and intense competition among Chinese firms―often all the more intense because of network clustering.

76 Based on these observations, it is possible to first surmise that some fraction of China’s rapid productivity growth is being driven by FDI. This is a finding consistent with the work of Yu Chen and Sylvie Démurger (2002), who found a clear link between higher rates of productivity and FDI.58 What is interesting here, however, is that such rapid labour productivity growth alone is unlikely to have a sizeable effect on the China price precisely because labour costs are so low, e.g., an 8.5% rise in productivity would lower the China price by less than half a cent on the manufacturing dollar in any given year.

77 It is highly unlikely, however, that the productivity gains from catalytic FDI are being limited to a single factor of production, i.e. labour. Rather, a more realistic assumption is that FDI has provided a spur to total factor productivity growth. That is, in a “KLEMS model framework”, FDI allows Chinese manufacturers to use all four major factors of production―capital, labour, energy and raw materials―more efficiently.59

78 Under the conservative assumption that the rate of total factor productivity growth is comparable to the rate of labour productivity growth in China, one can postulate a net annual gain in total factor productivity of 3.6% relative to US manufacturers. If one- quarter to one-half of this productivity gain is attributable to FDI, this suggests an annual recurring benefit of 0.9 to 1.8 cents on the manufacturing dollar, modest in any one year but arguably quite significant over time as benefits compound. Driver #8: A chronically undervalued currency China's undervalued currency encourages undervalued Chinese exports to the US and discourages US exports because US exports are artificially overvalued. As a result, undervalued Chinese exports have been highly disruptive to the US and to other countries as well, as evidenced by trade remedy statistics. US-China Economic and Security Review Commission60 Greater scope for market forces to determine the value of the RMB would also reduce an important distortion in the Chinese economy, namely, the effective subsidy that an undervalued currency provides for Chinese firms that focus on exporting rather than producing for the domestic market. US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke61

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79 Since 1994, China has pegged its currency, the yuan, to the US dollar at roughly an 8- to-1 ratio. Under pressure from the United States and the international community, China adopted a “managed float” regime in 2005 based on a market basket of currencies. For all practical purposes, however, the dollar peg remains intact; and the yuan remains, by most estimates, considerably undervalued. Table 4 provides a representative sample of some of the more credible estimates of the degree of this undervaluation, as well as the estimation methods used.62, 63

Table 4: Chinese Yuan Versus U.S Dollar Undervaluation Estimates

80 To calculate the effect of an undervalued currency on the China price, this analysis will use a mid-range estimate of 20%. Note that even such a mid-range estimate is highly speculative; and despite numerous studies, the question of the extent of the exact subsidy remains equally speculative. (Those who take the view that China’s currency may be closer to fair value than many studies suggest rightfully point out that Chinese exports remained highly competitive internationally even in the late 1990s, when all estimates suggested that the yuan was overvalued.)

81 In this calculation, a common error is to assign a “one-to-one” correspondence between the degree of undervaluation and the cost advantage to exporters. However, it is critical to also take into account the import content of exports. Any benefits from selling exports with an undervalued currency will be at least partially offset by the need to buy from foreigners the raw materials, electronic components, and other imported inputs used in the manufacturing process with that same weak currency.

82 The import content of most Chinese manufactured goods has been estimated to be quite high, which substantially mutes the currency effect. Lawrence Lau (2003)64 and William Overholt (2003) suggest that this content is in the range of 75%.65 Based on this estimate and an assumption of a currency undervaluation of 20%, the contribution of

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an undervalued currency to the China price is five cents on the manufacturing dollar. In highly competitive global markets. Summary, limitations, and strategic and policy implications 83 Table 5 provides a summary of the relative contributions by percentage of each of the eight major economic drivers of the China price using the mid-range estimates developed in the preceding analysis. Given the difficulty of obtaining accurate and reliable data and the need for some simplifying assumptions, these estimates are likely to have a wide margin of error. However, they do provide some important perspective on the relative importance of the various sources of competitive advantage in China.

5. Relative Contributions of the Eight China Price Drives

84 Lower labour costs account for 39% of the China price advantage and clearly represent the dominant driver. This finding suggests that more than one-third of China’s competitive edge is driven by a “fair” advantage in a “free trade” environment, i.e., China’s comparative advantage in labour resources. However, China’s labour advantage has not gone without criticism with respect to unfair trading practices. As noted in a petition by the US AFL-CIO to the Office of the US Trade Representative, “workers in China frequently are paid less than the country’s minimum wage, denied overtime pay, denied collective bargaining rights and often subjected to abusive treatment.”66

85 Industrial network clustering provides another 16% of the China price advantage, and this is perhaps the most important area where foreign competitors have the most to learn from Chinese manufacturers in the free and fair trade arena. As noted in the text, the scale and scope and high evolutionary form of this supply chain management practice is unparalleled in the world, and provides China with a significant cost advantage. Both foreign corporations and other countries have much to learn from this technique.

86 Five of the remaining economic drivers of the China price are those which have been widely criticised as constituting unfair trade practices. Export subsides account for 17% of the advantage, an undervalued currency adds 11%, and counterfeiting and piracy

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contribute 9%. Lax environmental and worker health and safety regulatory regimes add another 5%. Together, these drivers account for 41% of the China price advantage.

87 Lastly, there is the driver of FDI to consider. It provides 3% of the China price advantage―and likely a much greater cumulative contribution over time. As previously noted in this analysis, FDI is arriving in China for at least some reasons other than a legitimate attraction to cheap labour and a desire to gain a foothold in what may soon be the world’s largest and most lucrative consumer markets. One major aspect of China’s FDI that falls into a grey area of potential unfair trading practices is the widespread “round tripping” of domestic Chinese capital to avoid currency controls and gain preferential treatment regarding such elements as taxes, subsidies and access to land. Other aspects of FDI which are open to criticism from a fair trade perspective include the desire of foreign corporations to manufacture under far laxer environmental and health and safety regulatory regimes.

88 Future research may wish to focus on developing a more comprehensive database and refining the methodologies offered in this study. Future research may also want to better address issues of comparability and engage in a more fine-grained, sector-by- sector analysis to determine how the China price advantage varies across industries. Lastly, future research may want to look at the effects of FDI on the China price in a more dynamic framework.

89 In the meantime, the limitations of this analysis notwithstanding, this snapshot of Chinese competitiveness represents the first scholarly effort to disaggregate the many drivers of Chinese competitive advantage. By doing so, it provides both business executives and policy-makers with useful insights about how to respond to intense competitive pressures in a global economy.

90 The China Price Project was conducted at the Merage School of Business from October 2005 to March 2006 as an experiential, multidisciplinary and integrative class exercise. An initial discovery phase identified the major economic drivers of the China price. Students then participated in two additional phases. The first phase focused on a detailed team analysis of each of the eight specific economic drivers of the China price. Industry analyses were conducted in the second phase. I’d like to thank all those students who participated in this project. For a full roster of these students and the various project phases they participated in, please visit http:// www.peternavarro.com/chinaprice.html

NOTES

1. “The China Price”, Business Week, December 6th 2004. 2. The use of multiple data sources poses some problems of addition and comparison and is noted as one of the limitations of the analysis. 3. “The China Price”, Business Week, December 6th 2004. 4. Banister, Judith. “Manufacturing earnings and compensation in China”, Monthly Labour Review, August 2005, p. 34

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5. Banister, Judith. “Manufacturing earnings and compensation in China”, Monthly Labour Review, August 2005 6. Adjusting for lower quality would also be appropriate based on a metric such as higher defect rates. However, the data was insufficient to make this adjustment. 7. Comparative productivity data provided by the US Conference Board for 2002 by email correspondence. 8. Quoted in “Genuine Problem: Counterfeit Products from China Continue to Bedevil Makers of Legitimate Goods”, Journal of Commerce, June 27th 2005. 9. “Fakes!”, Business Week Online, January 28th 2005. Quoted in http:// www.atkearney.com/shared_res/pdf/Staying_Ahead_of_Chinas_Counterfeiters.pdf p. 16. 10. “Fakes!”, Business Week Online, January 28th 2005. Quoted in http:// www.atkearney.com/shared_res/pdf/Staying_Ahead_of_Chinas_Counterfeiters.pdf p. 16. 11.Gartner finds that average spending by manufacturing firms on IT was 1.71% of revenues in 2004 and that software expenses constituted 16.2% of the operating budget, p. 43. Similar results were found for the manufacturing of industrial machinery, i.e., 1.76% of revenues and software as 19.2% of the budget. See “Strategic Analysis Report: Gartner 2003 IT Spending and Staffing Survey Results”, October 2nd 2003. This suggests about a third of penny on the manufacturing dollar is spent, on average, on software, http://computing.arizona.edu/networkmasterplan/117666.pdf 12. A.T. Kearney, “The Counterfeiting Paradox”, undated, http://www.atkearney.com/ shared_res/pdf/Counterfeiting_Paradox.pdf 13. Blackfriars Communications, May 16th 2005, “Blackfriars Finds Growth and Shifts in US Marketing Spending in 2005”, http://www.tekrati.com/research/News.asp?id=5096 14. Shenkar, Oded, The Chinese Century: The Rising Chinese Economy and Its Impact on the Global Economy, the Balance of Power, and Your Job, Wharton School Publishing, 2004. 15. “R&D 2005”, Technology Review, September, 2005. 16. Kahn, Joseph, “China’s Workers Risk Limbs in Export Drive”, The New York Times, April 7th 2003. http://www.asria.org/ref/library/social/lib/ 031208_NYTimes_sweatshops_inchina.pdf 17.Crain, W. Mark and Johnson, Joseph, “Compliance Costs of Federal Workplace Regulations: Survey Results for US Manufacturers”, Regulatory Studies Program, Mercatus Center, George Mason University, Arlington, Virginia, December, 2001. http://www.mercatus.net/pdf/materials/57.pdf 18. Wonacott, Peter, “Polluters in China Feel No Pain”, Wall Street Journal, March 24th 2004. 19. Pottinger, Matt, Stecklow, Steve and Fialka, John J, “Invisible Export – A Hidden Cost of China’s Growth: Mercury Migration”, The Wall Street Journal, December 20th 2004. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5058 20. Jonathan Watts, “Satellite Data Reveals Beijing as Air Pollution Capital of World”, The Guardian, October 31st 2005. 21. Zhang, Guang-Xin and Wei, Deng, "The Groundwater Crisis and Sustainable Agriculture in Northern China", Water Engineering & Management 149(4): April 13th 2002. 22. “China Says Water Pollution So Severe That Cities Could Lack Safe Supplies”, China Daily, June 28th 2005. 23. Butler, Tina, “China’s Imminent Water Crisis”, May 30th 2005, http:// news.mongabay.com/2005/0531-tina_butler.html

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24. Butler, Tina, “China’s Imminent Water Crisis”, May 30th 2005, http://news.mongabay.com/2005/0531-tina_butler.html 25. Xinhua Agency Report, “The Frequency of Offing Red-Tide Increasing”, http:// monkey.ioz.ac.cn/bwg-cciced/english/warnings/warnings.htm 26. “Toxic Chemicals To Be Phased Out”, China.org.cn, November 11th 2004, http:// www.china.org.cn/english/2004/Nov/111804.htm 27. Democracy in America, “Bureaucracy: A Controversial Necessity”, http:// www.learner.org/channel/courses/democracyinamerica/dia_8/dia_8_video.html 28. Blodgett, John, “Environmental Protection: How Much It Costs and Who Pays”, Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division, Congressional Research Service, April 16th 1997. Note that this may be the best survey available as it is based on the last annual surveys of pollution control costs conducted by the Bureau of Census and Bureau of Economic Analysis. These surveys were discontinued after reportage of the 1994 data. http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/risk/rsk-10.cfm 29. For a summary of some of the early literature, see US Office of Technology Assessment, 1992, Trade and the environment: Conflicts and opportunities, Report no. OTA- BP-ITE-94, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Appendix E: “Assessing Trade and Competitiveness Impacts of Environmental Regulations on US Manufacturing”, http://www.ciesin.org/docs/008-067/appendixe.html 30. United States Steel Corporation, Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10-K, for year ending December 31st 2004, Annual Report, 2004, Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation, 2004 Environmental Report, Baoshan Iron & Steel Co. (Baosteel was formerly known as Baoshan.) Dow Chemical, Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10-K, for year ending December 31st 2004, Annual Report, 2004, Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation.Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Company Limited, Form 20-F, Securities and Exchange Commission, for fiscal year ended December 31st 2004. 31. World Bank, Clear Skies, Blue Water: China’s Environment in the New Century, Washington, D.C., 1997. 32. Statement of Al Lubrano President, Technical Materials, Inc., Committee on House Small Business Subcommittee on Tax, Finance and Exports, May 27th 2005. 33. “The Importance of Trade Remedies to the US Trade Relationship with China”, US- China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 16th 2005, p. 1. 34. Remarks by Commerce Secretary Donald L. Evans to the President's Export Council―American Chamber of Commerce in Beijing, China, June 23rd 2004, http:// hongkong.usconsulate.gov/uscn/trade/general/doc/2004/062301.htm 35. China’s policy of offering free land use to multinationals has been particularly effective in attracting foreign direct investment. 36. The sum of energy, land and rent, and utilities in the US manufacturing cost structure is 4.15%. 37. The China Banking Regulatory Commission announced on January 11th 2004 a rate of non-performing loans of 15.19% in 2003. “Rate of Non-performing Loans and Remaining Amount Both Decreased”, People’s Daily, January 13th 2004, http:// english.people.com.cn/200401/13/eng20040113_132481.shtml 38. “China commercial bank NPL ratio falls to 8.6 pct”, Xinhua Financial Network News, January 17th 2006. 39. In a report that it later withdrew under pressure, Ernst and Young reported non- performing loans of US$358 billion for China’s four big commercial banks and a potential exposure of US$911. This was in contrast to the official level of US$133 billion,

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“Ernst & Young Withdraws Non-performing Loan Report”, Australian Associated Press, May 13th 2006. After the Chinese Government called the figures “distorted” and “ridiculous”, Fitch Ratings subsequently issued a report claiming the level of bad loans to be US$220 billion, an amount “close to one-third larger than the stock of capital in the entire banking system”, “Fitch estimates China bad loan losses at US$220 billion”, Xinhua Financial Network News, May 31st 2006. 40. “China Banks Fail to Cut Bad-loan Risk, IMF Reports”, International Herald Tribune, March 31st 2006. “Progress in China's Banking Sector Reform: Has Bank Behavior Changed?”, IMF Working Paper 06/71, by Richard Podpiera, March 1st 2006, http:// www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp0671.pdf 41. The rate was calculated from a sample of 4,700 US industrial companies using the Compustat database. 42. For details, see “China VAT & Export Rebates”, Dezan Shira & Associates, http:// www.dezshira.com/china_export_rebates.htm 43. See, for example, “China Encourages IC Research & Development”, China Daily, September 8th 2004 44. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Annual Industry Accounts, September 2005, Manufacturing. 45. Eckaus, Richard, “China’s Exports, Subsidies to State Owned Enterprises and the WTO”, China Economic Review, 17 (2006): 1-13, p. 5. 46. Enright, Michael, Scott, Edith and Chang, Ka-Mun, “The Greater Pearl River Delta and the Rise Of China”, John Wiley & Sons, May 27th 2005, p. 57. 47. See, for example, Kusterbeck, Staci, “China Appeals to US Buyers with 'Supply Chain Cities'”, Apparel Magazine, August 20th 2005. 48. See Enright, Michael, Scott, Edith and Chang, Ka-Mun. Enright, Michael, Scott, Edith and Chang, Ka-Mun. “The Greater Pearl River Delta and the Rise Of China”, John Wiley & Sons, May 27th 2005, for analysis. 49. See Huang, Qin; Stanciu, Silvia; Yeh, Jerry; and Cruz, Jonathan, “Network Clustering Effect on the China Price”, February 8th 2006. See Duell, Tyler; Eickhoff, Brent; Hong, Charles; Hu, Jane; Hwang, Silvie; Song, Iris; Xie, Anna; Yeh, Jerry, and Yoshida, Junji. “China Price-Phase II: Appliances-Air Conditioners”, March 15th 2006. Unpublished manuscripts online at www.peternavarro.com/chinapriceproject.html. 50. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Annual Industry Accounts, September 2005. 51. Engardio, Pete and Roberts, Dexter with Bremner, Brian in Beijing and bureau reports. “The China Price.” BusinessWeek, December 6th 2004, http:// www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_49/b3911401.htm 52. McGuckin, R. H. and M. Spiegelman, “China’s Experience with Productivity and Jobs”, The Conference Board, 31, 2004, http://www.conference-board.org/publications/ describe.cfm?id=809 53. Numerous studies have examined this phenomenon. See, for example, World Bank, "Global Development Finance 2002", Washington, D.C., 2002, p. 41. 54. The Economic Survey of China, 2005 reports a rate of 8.5% for 2003. “Economic Survey of China 2005: Improving the productivity of the business sector”, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, September 16th, http://www.oecd.org/ document/54/0,2340,en_2649_201185_35350582_1_1_1_1,00.html. The Conference Board reports a rate of 8.7% annually since 2000, “The Conference Board: US Productivity Growth Slowing Sharply, As Emerging Markets Catch Up, The Conference

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Board Reports”, Webbolt Newsroom, January 19th 2006, http://webbolt.ecnext.com/ coms2/news_58545_TRN 55. US Department of Labour, Bureau of Labour Statistics, Major Sector Productivity and Cost Index. Series PRS30006092, Output per hour, manufacturing. 56. Kincanon, Michelle; Gutzwiller, Charles; El-Badawi, Sharif; Jung, Kyle; Fan, Lawrence; Cook, Jr., Christopher; Ibanescu, Cosmin; and Wei, Andy, “The China Price: A Look Into the Textile Industry”, March 15th 2006. Unpublished manuscript available online at www.peternavarro.com/chinapriceproject.html. 57. As noted in Business Week, “BusinessWeek analysis of Standard & Poor's (MHP ) Compustat data on 346 top listed companies in both nations shows Indian corporations have achieved higher returns on equity and invested capital in the past five years in industries from autos to food products. The average Indian company posted a 16.7% return on capital in 2004, vs. 12.8% in China.” “A New World Economy: The balance of power will shift to the East as China and India evolve.” August 22nd 2005. http:// www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_34/b3948401.htm 58. Chen Yu, and Démurger, Sylvie, “Foreign Direct Investment and Manufacturing Productivity in China”, CEPII Research Project, April 2002, http://www.bm.ust.hk/ ~ced/Yu%20CHEN.pdf 59. For an explanation and application of the KLEMS model framework see Strassner, Erich H., Medeiros, Gabriel W. and Smith, George M, “Annual Industry Accounts: Introducing KLEMS Input Estimates for 1997-2003, Survey of Current Business, September 2005. 85-9, pp. 31-65. The KLEMS model also includes purchases services. 60. “The Importance of Trade Remedies to the US Trade Relationship With China.” US- China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 16th 2005. 61. Remarks by Chairman Ben S. Bernanke At the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China December 15th 2006. “The Chinese Economy: Progress and Challenges”. 62. Purchasing power parity (PPP) is based on the “law of one price”. The Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER) is based on a comparison of a country’s internal and external current and capital account balances. Another frequently used method is the Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER), which uses the modelling of economic fundamentals like business cycles, productivity growth, and interest rate differentials. 63. Coudert, V. and Couharde, C. “Real equilibrium exchange rate in China: Is the Renminbi undervalued?”, working paper, Centre D’Etudes Perspectives et D’Informations Internationales (CEPII), 2005. Preeg, E. “Exchange Rate Manipulation to Gain an Unfair Competitive Advantage: The Case Against Japan and China”, Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI, October 2nd 2002. Williamson, J. “The Renminbi Exchange Rate and the Global Monetary System”, Institute for International Economics, October 29th 2003. Goldstein, M, “China’s Exchange Rate System,” Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade, and Technology Committee on Financial Services, Institute for International Economics, October, 2003. Funke, M. and Rahn, J, “Just How Undervalued is the Chinese Renminbi?”, The World Economy, 28/4, (2004): 465. Yang, J. and Bajeux-Besnainou, I, “Is the Chinese Currency Undervalued?”, Occasional Paper Series, School of Business and Public Management, The George Washington University, GW Center for the Study of Globalization, CSGOP-04-26, February 10th 2004. 64. Statement of Lawrence J. Lau, “Is China Playing By the Rules?”, Congressional- Executive Commission on China, September 24th 2003, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/ hearings/092403/index.php

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65. Overholt, William, “Exposing the Myths”, South China Morning Post, November 17th 2003. 66. “Unions Urge Sanctions in China Labour Case,” The Wall Street Journal, June 9th 2006.

ABSTRACTS

Chinese manufacturers have the capability to significantly undercut prices offered by foreign competitors over a wide range of products. Today, as a result of the “China price,” China has captured over 70% of the world’s market share for DVDs and toys, more than 50% for bikes, cameras, shoes and telephones, and more than one-third for air conditioners, colour televisions, computer monitors, luggage and microwave ovens. It has also established dominant market positions in everything from furniture, refrigerators and washing machines to jeans and underwear (yes, boxers and briefs). This article examines the eight major economic drivers of the China price and provides estimates of their relative contributions to China’s manufacturing competitive advantage. Lower labour costs account for 39% of the China price advantage. A highly efficient form of production known as “industrial network clustering,” together with catalytic foreign direct investment, add another 16% and 3%, respectively. The remainder of the China price advantage is driven by elements challenged as unfair trade practices by foreign competitors. These include export subsides, which account for 17% of the advantage, an undervalued currency (11%), counterfeiting and piracy (9%), and lax environmental and worker health and safety regulatory regimes (5%).

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Political science

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The NGO Community in China Expanding Linkages With Transnational Civil Society and Their Democratic Implications

Chen Jie

1 This article looks at the growing democratic implications of the expanding relations between the community of non-governmental organisations (NGOs, or 民间组织 minjian zuzhi) in China and transnational civil society (TCS). It starts by explaining TCS and global governance, providing a framework for the analysis it offers. The second section presents a brief profile of Chinese civil society. The following two sections explore the increasing transnationalisation of China’s NGOs and its subtle democratising impact. Due to the complexity of the emerging phenomenon of the transnationalisation of Chinese NGOs, some of the main arguments in this article are only tentative. Further statistical and empirical research is needed.

2 Besides mainly contributing to the discussion of China’s socio-political pluralisation and democratisation from a meaningful new perspective, this article also fills a major lacuna in both China and TCS research. Transnational dimensions of civil society have been neglected by mainstream China scholars studying the country’s politics and society. Studies of China’s international relations are predominantly state-centric or business-centric, placing little attention on civil society’s solidarity with the transnational NGO milieu. Meanwhile, China has long been ignored by the published literature on TCS, unlike some South American countries and India, from where the grassroots social and environmental campaigns are often used as case studies in discussing TCS. TCS and global governance 3 China faces a world that is witnessing a growing interconnectedness of TSC, multinational business, states and inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), in an emerging and loosely structured framework of global governance. The post-Cold War world has seen a massive proliferation of NGOs across the world, and a “global associational revolution”―an upsurge around the world of organised voluntary activity and the creation of private, not-for-profit or non-governmental organisations. Associations, foundations and similar institutions were formed in numerous countries

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to deliver human services, promote grass-roots economic development, prevent environmental degradation, protect civil rights, and champion gender equality 1.

4 Reflecting a major phenomenon in the post-Cold War world politics, transnational civil society refers to the rapidly expanding cross-border co-operation and networking by NGOs, private foundations and activist research centres from various countries. Such transnational collaboration in shared ideas, funding, advocacy and campaigning seeks to challenge the status quo or provide services in the areas of human rights, labour, women, environment, indigenous affairs, humanitarian relief, poverty alleviation, corporate globalisation, peace and security, and health epidemics. The most important single actors in this cause-oriented movement of "globalisation from below" are the sort of NGOs which are by definition transnational, namely those NGOs that maintain their own branches in many countries. These so-called INGOs (International NGOs) include Oxfam, Save the Children International, World Vision, Amnesty International, Transparency International, Greenpeace International, and World Wide Fund for Nature, etc. It is estimated that today there are 12,260 INGOs and 5,807 internationally oriented national NGOs 2. The growing number of transnational networks and collaborative arrangements among non-profit and non-governmental organisations across the world can be attributed to their common economic, social, cultural, environmental, political and security concerns. Under the pressures of globalisation in a variety of issue areas, many similar challenges face human society, requiring transnational responses. Yet governments are increasingly limited in their ability to deal with those problems. Meanwhile, developments such as the dismantling of the Cold War ideological barrier and technological advances in communication and transportation have improved the conditions that make transnational actions possible.

5 NGO networks and their key members are playing an increasingly prominent role in world politics. Global governance refers to collective efforts by states, IGOs and non- state actors at a global level to tackle issues and challenges of common concern to the international community. Despite their fragmentary and fluid nature, such collective efforts have become more institutionalised and operate with increasing use of international law, though their cohesiveness varies in different issue areas. Both formally and informally civil society activists take an active part in a host of key IGOs, particularly the UN and its specialised agencies, and many international treaty bodies focused on more specific issues. It has become a norm that the major international conferences organised by IGOs or state treaty bodies also hold parallel NGO forums, in order for non-state actors to take part in international policy discussions. Through such participation in policy debate, standards-setting and norm-making, non-state actors help reform policies of states and IGOs. Those arrangements, materialising partly under the pressure of transnational actors themselves, have provided a catalyst for the formation of many INGOs. A special institutionalised mechanism within the UN is the so-called “consultative status”, designed to give citizen groups access to influencing policy-making at the global level. The UN Charter specifically says that the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) should take measures to consult non-state actors regarding affairs in its field. By 1992 more than seven hundred INGOs and internationally oriented NGOs had attained consultative status and the number has steadily increased ever since to more than 2,300 today 3. In summary, Ghils maintains that INGOs exert influence in world politics in three ways: as shapers of opinion, as autonomous actors, and as competitors with states 4.

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A brief profile of China’s NGO community 6 Since the 1980s, there have been mounting issues and challenges calling for citizens in China to organise in order to articulate and pursue shared interests. Competing interests and constituencies within Chinese society have emerged as a result of economic reform and the modernisation drive. Growing numbers of activists have thus established organisations, networking and expanding. However, although generally there is more space for an autonomous NGO sector to develop, the government harbours anxieties about social “instability”, imposes severe restrictions on NGOs’ activities and bans the formation of any autonomous organisation in politically sensitive issue areas such as human rights and the free movement of labour. Thus autonomous citizen groups are predominantly concentrated in what the authorities deem as less threatening areas of social service provision, economic development, gender equality and domestic violence, environment, migrant workers, children, the disabled, and animal protection. Beijing knows that administrative structures alone are unable to manage all those issues, particularly considering its acute budgetary pressures and its desire to streamline administration 5. Some international events, such as the US bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade (1999), the invasion of Iraq, and, in particular, the Japanese government’s provocative acts signifying a lack of remorse over Tokyo’s wartime atrocities, also led to the networking and organising of agitated Chinese citizens. However, fearing the scenes of voluntary protests, the authorities suppressed those activities as soon as their politico-diplomatic value was exhausted.

7 The fear of bottom-up social mobilisation as well as practical needs have led the government to create a semi-official NGO sector, a policy practiced with increasing enthusiasm from the 1990s. Government and Communist Party departments at various levels have been setting up foundations and other organisations to advance charitable, research, information and policy objectives. These creatures are commonly called “GONGOs” (Government Organised NGOs). One major category of GONGO is born of traditional Leninist mass organisations (人民团体 renmin tuanti). There are eight of them, including the All China Youth League, All China Women’s Federation, and the All China Federation of Trade Unions. The government is trying to gradually restructure the function of these mass organisations away from their original role as Communist Party overseers of particular constituencies, towards one more of service facilitation and provision. As a result, satellite agencies (associations and foundations) have been created. There are two major purposes of the GONGO sector. One is to receive expertise and philanthropic funding that the government itself finds hard to access, particularly from international sources including INGOs. Some government departments establish organisations in their professional field with the apparent purpose of making it possible to conduct exchanges with international organisations and to participate in overseas study tour programmes in an unofficial capacity. Another consideration is that at some distance from mainstream government agencies makes it easier for government-initiated organisations to explore new areas of work, such as providing contraceptive advice for unmarried people, or HIV/AIDS prevention programmes for sex workers and drug addicts 6. With few exceptions such as the China Society for Human Rights Studies, established to serve the authorities’ human rights diplomacy as well as study international standards, GONGOs’ areas of interest are similar to those of the more autonomous groups. Both are predominantly concentrated in the areas of social service provision, economic development, women’s rights and environmental protection.

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8 Autonomous NGOs and GONGOs together constitute China’s NGO community. Statistics from the Ministry of Civil Affairs suggest that today, officially registered NGOs including GONGOs in China numbered 244,000 7. The total number of bottom-up and self-governing autonomous NGOs is unknown. But Chan estimates that in 2000, around 26,000 registered social organisations in China could be classified as “NGOs in a Western sense” 8. The transnationalisation of China’s NGO community 9 TCS connections of Chinese NGOs of both the above categories have expanded dramatically over the past decade, which is a major factor in the recent growth of Chinese civil society and some of its accomplishments. Activities by autonomous groups like Friends of Nature, Global Village of Beijing, Green Earth Volunteers, Maple Women's Counselling Centre, Village Women Know It All, and Aizhi Action have become well known in transnational campaign networks.

10 Participation on four fronts is essential to NGOs in any country if they are interested in TCS and global governance. First is participating as observers in the forums of the UN, its specialised agencies, and various international treaty bodies, in order to take part in international policy discussions. The most important form of such participation is to enjoy a UN consultative status. The All China Women's Federation, China Society for Human Rights Studies and China Disabled Persons' Federation (the latter two are major GONGOs) enjoy such status. The second front of participation is the NGO forums which are wholly for civil society but nonetheless organised by the UN system. For example, Friends of Nature attended the NGO forum of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, 2002), and numerous Chinese women groups participated in the NGO forum in parallel to The Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995). The third front is membership in major INGOs, and the fourth is the more loosely structured transnational forums which are organised by the different countries’ NGOs themselves, with both hosts and participants being exclusively NGOs. For example, Chinese women’s NGOs have been participating in the East Asian Women's Forum, a biennial event organised by Asian women NGOs since 1994.

11 The above general model, created from my own research on TCS 9, is useful for study of Chinese NGO interaction with foreign NGOs, since such interaction occurs on all those four fronts. However, empirical indications are that the most important site of interaction is the home turf of Chinese groups, namely their co-operation with INGOs for projects operated in China itself, while expanding membership in INGOs is also a significant indicator of interaction. Before exploring such interactions, it is helpful to draw a bigger picture of Chinese NGOs’ transnational relations by discerning two kinds of relationship―or two parallel relations―between Chinese NGOs and TCS. In the eyes of the authorities, one is illegitimate and the other is legitimate and often encouraged, as explained below.

12 The first kind of relationship is part and parcel of TCS campaigns against the Chinese state on human rights, labour, Tibet and other high political concerns. This usually involves INGOs like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Reporters Without Borders, Pen International, Transnational Radical Party, etc. They rely on key information provided by those banned or underground groups inside China such as The Tiananmen Mothers, formed by parents campaigning to hold the government accountable for their student children missing in the 1989 incident, and Independent Chinese Pen Centre, a forum of dissident writers championing freedom of expression.

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On the other hand, the most active Chinese sections of those co-ordinated transnational campaigns are the Chinese dissident groups in exile, often headquartered in the United States. The principal ones would include Human Rights in China, specialising in research, documentation and lobbying; the Overseas Chinese Democracy Coalition, an umbrella for many hard-core activist groups based in the West; and the various campaign networks fostered by the Falun Gong religious movement, which moved abroad after it was banned in China in 1999. With crucial information provided by domestic groups, those INGOs and particularly the leading dissident groups expose the Chinese government at the annual sessions of the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, try to influence various governments’ opinions at such forums, and lobby the United States Administration and Congress. Such advocacy networks do protect some domestic activists by giving them much international limelight, financial and moral support, prizes, and occasionally even helping in the release of jailed activists and writers. On the other hand, the impact that transnational rights campaigns have on China’s political development is debatable.

13 In the above kind of relationship the most important NGO parties (namely INGOs and Chinese groups in exile) must stay out of China while working on China. Yet under the second kind of relationship, which is the focus in this paper, members in China’s domestic NGO community co-operate with international groups in permitted ways and issue areas, and even encouraged by the Chinese government. This usually means that the interested INGOs can operate within China if they wish. Conservative estimates suggest that more than 490 INGOs (such as Save the Children, Oxfam, and the Lions) and major international foundations (including Ford Foundation and The Rockefeller Foundation) have set up projects and opened offices in China 10. It is impossible to calculate the exact number of international groups operating in China because many do not have offices or staff permanently based in China. According to Wang Ming (王名), Director of NGO Research Center, Tsinghua University, there are between 3,000-6,000 foreign NGOs based in China, including about 2,000 foundations, 1,000 implementing groups, 2,500 chambers of commerce, and 1,000 religion-based organisations. He claims that most are not registered, but operate under silent endorsement from the authorities 11. On another front, according to the Yearbook of International Organisations, China’s membership in INGOs increased steadily in the reform era, from 71 INGOs in 1977, to 484 in 1986, and 2,297 in 2002 12.

14 As for the percentage of Chinese NGOs that have developed transnational linkages, one can only provide an informed impressionist picture. In a major piece of research conducted recently by the NGO Research Center at Tsinghua University, questionnaires were circulated to 226 people representing 249 NGOs of various types in six provinces/ cities (Yunnan, Shanghai, Beijing, Liaoning, Hunan, Gansu), and 17% stated that a significant number of Chinese NGOs were joining international networks, and reaping benefits by way of funding, exchange of information and technology, and staff training. Over 40% thought that few or even none had developed transnational relations. The remaining 40% did not answer this question 13. Considering that Chinese civil society itself is still not strongly developed, and transnational NGO linkages were little heard of in China during the 1980s, the above figures should be read positively. The final report by the NGO Research Center points to a rapidly emerging and developing trend by concluding that NGOs in China “are making more and more contact with international organisations” 14.

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15 INGOs operating in China appear to mostly base their programmes in poor regions, particularly south-western China such as Yunnan Province, while also maintaining representation in Beijing. A Beijing office helps in connections to the central political system, considering the uncertainties of the existing regulatory framework within which civil society actors operate. Concentration in the poor provinces reflects China’s overall restrictive policy towards civil society. Such restrictions on the nature and scope of domestic NGOs naturally translate into the sort of transnational relations between Chinese and international groups. Thus transnational projects of Chinese NGOs cannot occur in any politically sensitive issue area and cannot involve any political or militant INGOs. Under this policy, INGOs that are allowed to work within China are mostly humanitarian, development and environmental groups that usually take less interest in rich provinces and set their sights on the poor and ecologically rich but increasingly fragile Yunnan, Sichuan and Tibet instead. If human rights and labour INGOs can freely set up in China, their priorities may well be Shanghai, Guangzhou and Beijing. That transnational participation is largely limited to the non-political or de- politicised layer of TCS is also reflected in INGO membership. An overwhelming majority of China memberships are in the social/health, scientific/technical, sport/ recreational, academic/professional, economic development, and welfare areas15. However, the apparent non-political or de-politicised nature of TCS penetration in China does not mean that it has no civic and political implications, as vigorously argued in the following section. Transnational connections: democratic implications for China 16 Studies of TCS and the issue of democratisation have usually concentrated on campaigns by transnational NGO coalitions to make inter-governmental organisations more accountable and transparent (case studies involve the World Bank, IMF, WTO, and the various organs of the UN) 16. More recently, literature has moved beyond the theme of international policy-making and started to discuss TCS impact on national processes of democratisation. Kumar examines transnational campaigns to promote democratic governance in Mexico and Haiti, while Chilton and Kaldor analyse how civil society coalitions between Eastern and Western Europe helped bringing about regime changes in some former Soviet bloc states 17. On the other hand, more literature has discussed how transnational advocacy networks promoted international human rights norms in many “third world” countries. Analysis has been carried out as to how transnational NGO coalitions successfully contributed to the improvement of human rights standards in Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, Tunisia, Morocco, Indonesia, the Philippines, Chile, Guatemala and Eastern Europe 18.

17 There is little said about China in the published literature on the theme of “transnational civil society and democratisation”. One publication does mention―though in passing―transnational citizen campaigns and China’s democratisation. What he has said may represent the thoughts of other scholars and thus explain why China does not figure in the discussions. Having examined the more successful cases of transnational democracy campaigns targeting Mexico and Haiti, Kumar points out: The case of China shows just how difficult it can be to form effective transnational campaigns for democracy in other regions. There are many groups outside China pushing for democracy within the country. Most are based in the US, often supported by private American foundations, and many include prominent Chinese exiles. Yet

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their influence on US policy toward China has been limited, and their influence on China itself even less 19.

18 Thus transnational NGO coalitions’ ineffectiveness to achieve the expected results in China is due to such campaigns having to be waged outside China, unlike the other examined cases in which transnational and domestic NGOs co-ordinated their campaigns across porous national borders. This “domestic-transnational spiral model” is particularly emphasised in the theorising of the more successful transnational campaigns on democracy and human rights 20.

19 It seems that existing literature takes seriously only those transnational campaigns involving political and/or militant INGOs and their strong and fully mobilised national counterparts. As a result, discourse of “TCS and democratisation” has avoided China since bona fide civil society capable of engaging in full-blown transnational solidarity on political issues does not exist in China, despite the activism of a handful of internationally known but domestically illegal and suppressed groups. This makes it impossible for TCS to successfully campaign for democracy and human rights in China by fully collaborating with Chinese rights NGOs.

20 However, I’d argue that the theme of TCS and China’s democratisation is a highly relevant and worthy one. One needs to take a broader and longer-term perspective, looking beyond the usual exciting models of transnational democracy/human rights campaigns involving high-profile political INGOs like Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch in close collaboration with fully mobilised domestic civil societies of a political nature. My central argument is: though not involving any politically sensitive issue area and political or militant organisations (either Chinese or international), transnational linkages of Chinese NGOs are having now a pluralising and democratising influence at the grassroots level both subtly and gradually. This is so despite both transnational and domestic activists themselves not looking at their operations from the perspective of China’s future democracy.

21 To understand this point, one needs to first see more seriously the democratising implications of Chinese “semi-civil society” itself since the transnational linkages mainly facilitate and amplify such implications. The democratising impact of the Chinese NGO community may not seem significant if one applies the dominant analytical model often used when discussing civil society’s contribution to the process of democratisation. This model conditions its analysis on the prior existence of a reasonably strong civil society that is in a position to challenge and campaign against an authoritarian state 21. The typical cases include some former party-states in Eastern Europe, South Korea and Taiwan during the 1980s. This threshold is too high in the Chinese case, for which a more realistic but still meaningful perspective should be adopted. Though not all NGOs in China are democratically operated, mere existence of an expanding autonomous social sector bodes well for the country’s political future, even though, again, none of their activities touch on politically sensitive issues. In a context like China’s, still marked by state corporatism and a socio-cultural preoccupation with family ties, any associational experience and collective voluntary activities focussed on issues and causes, thus beyond traditional family and friendship ties, is politically positive. In particular, if a top-down democratisation move occurs while individual citizens as a whole have no associational and campaign experience on basic social and environmental issues, thus remaining “a plate of sand (一盘散沙 yipan sansha)” to borrow Sun Yat Sen’s (孙中山) famous saying, the democratisation process

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will be shallow and chaotic. Nick Young rightly argues that Chinese NGOs’ interest in volunteerism helps create a more liberal political culture and independent citizenship. Much of this volunteering is essentially charitable in nature, described and prescribed by the Chinese groups in terms of “loving hearts”, “warm heartedness”, etc. This may not seem a particularly exciting manifestation of “civil society” to those who associate the term primarily with citizens' movements that shook Eastern Europe in the 1980s. But it may be a significant indicator of social capital, civic consciousness and reciprocity that help bind societies together. This is encouraging for a country where volunteering and charity were the exclusive domain of the state and social “participation” was synonymous with Leninist mass mobilisations in the not-too- distant past 22. Indeed, if a bowling club is believed to have democratic effect even in the US23, one then has more reason to be encouraged by the voluntary and associational activities of Chinese YMCAs/YWCAs or other self-governing social and environmental groups. Meticulous field research co-ordinated by Young has found that even many GONGOs have been evolving into having a more autonomous relationship with the government, acquiring a more independent identity, and gradually developing a sense of themselves as belonging to a distinctive, non-government community, since they have to increasingly rely on non-governmental sources for funding and expertise and their relations with the community are more direct than those of government agencies 24.

22 According to Pye, two major cultural obstacles to democracy in China are its rules of civility and traditional social capital. He points out: Chinese rules of civility have elaborate standards of personal civility, but they are strikingly weak in the areas of impersonal interaction; Chinese have vivid standards for superior-inferior relations, but few guidelines for the behaviour of equals; and they demonstrate over-sensitivity to any sign of antagonism, which is a serious obstacle to any legitimisation of political competition 25. Pye also argues that in terms of social capital, which builds on the norms of civility and testifies to the critical level of trust among the members of a society that makes collective action possible, it has a different tradition in China. He criticises the Chinese brand of social capital as embodied in a system of guanxi (關係), or institutionalised nepotistic personal connections among family members, friends, acquaintances with the same birthplace or from the same school 26. China’s NGO community as a whole, no matter how ineffective judging from the standards of an “authentic” civil society of a liberal democratic style, does in general have democratic implications in challenging those traditional rules of civility and non-liberal brand of social capital. NGOs, oriented as they are towards causes and public concerns, directed by the society’s most educated and visionary elements, and featuring a spirit of volunteering for the community interests, tend to help create trust beyond family and friends, build equality and fairness in superior-subordinate relations, and encourage respect for differences in opinion and thereby allow constructive competition to take place. Operational concentration on non-political issue areas does not totally diminish such gradual democratising influences as argued earlier.

23 If one takes the democratising implications of China’s NGO community more seriously, then logically one must also note the similar implications of the Chinese NGOs’ connections with TCS, despite a concentration of co-operative efforts in functional areas or “low politics”. There are two ways to read such implications. First, transnational co-operation assists the growth of the Chinese NGO sector. Second, from

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transnational sources Chinese groups receive ideas and practices which have a democratising impact.

24 There is a clear transnational dimension to the rise of the Chinese NGO community. As mentioned, GONGOs are created partly to receive international assistance. On the other hand, one investigation suggests that foreign NGOs’ maverick activism at the NGO forum of The Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995) was a major catalyst for the strengthened dynamism of grassroots activist NGOs in China, and many large ones are financially sustained mainly by international sources such as the Ford Foundation 27. In her detailed analysis, Howell argues that China’s hosting of that event resulted not only in the refashioning of the relationship of the All China Women’s Federation (ACWF) with women and state, but also in the rapid proliferation of new and more autonomous women’s organisations across the country. The conference exposed participants from these organisations to a range of issues being discussed by women all over the world, to the key axes of tension on controversial topics such as abortion and to diverse styles of debating. By exchanging with international feminists, Chinese activists were not only introduced to the diverse functions of NGOs, for example, as service agencies or advocates of change, but also to the plethora of imaginative ways of mobilising, communicating, organising and raising funds 28. Bentley also argues that some highly-regarded women’s groups such as Maple Women's Counselling Centre and Village Women Know It All got their start in the run-up to the 1995 Conference and have been supported by international funds since 29.

25 A great number of Chinese NGOs in various issue areas have benefited from international partners (foundations, INGOs, UN agencies and governments) in capacity- building, programme planning, management and accountability 30. In particular, significant assistance has been given by many INGOs who operate projects inside China with local partners, mainly in the areas of women, environment, public health, poverty and education 31. With very extensive experiences with the transnational scene of Chinese NGOs, Tan Leshan (谭乐山), China Country Director of ORBIS International, a New York-headquartered group striving to eliminate avoidable blindness and restore sight in the developing world, elaborately argued that INGOs operating in China influenced local NGOs considerably. First, some INGOs fostered local groups, using projects to establish partner organisations. Second, INGOs often provided funding to local NGOs. Third, INGOs assisted local groups with their expertise in project management and assessment, financial auditing, grant application, thus helping to build their capacities. Very often INGOs functioned as role models for local groups 32.

26 Aggregate social investments in China made by (or through) TCS groups operating in the country, roughly estimated to be near US$200 million per year, is very small compared to the level of annual international commercial investment in China (roughly US$50 billion) 33. However, what matters more to the Chinese groups is that they learn from international groups new and advanced concepts originating from the expanding forums of global governance, such as international standards and a form of global rhetoric on sustainable development, endangered species, and gender-related violence, as contained in the various international treaties and UN conventions. ORBIS International is responsible for informing Chinese NGOs and health authorities of Vision 2020: The Right to Sight Global Declaration of Support, an initiative launched in 1999 by the World Health Organisation and ORBIS itself, aiming to eliminate avoidable blindness by 2020 34. The New York-headquartered Wildlife Conservation Society has

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been educating Chinese conservation organisations, zoos and school children on the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna 35. Those international standards are important to the Chinese groups as leverage when lobbying the authorities and as a foundation for community education. Compared to the Chinese groups, INGOs have more access to, and more first-hand experience in, international law-making in the UN’s specialised agencies, treaty bodies and programmes, where key concepts, norms and conventions are debated. Citizens in China have little idea about what international treaties and conventions their government has signed and ratified. This leaves TCS as a major transmission belt of international standards and norms.

27 One should also mention that the many awards given to Chinese activists by international NGOs and foundations―such as The Goldman Environmental Prize (the world's largest prize honouring grassroots environmentalists) to Yu Xiaogang (于晓刚), of Green Watershed (Yunnan) in 2006 and International Banksia Award for Environment Protection to Liao Xiaoyi (廖晓义) of The Global Village of Beijing in 2001―should also encourage the further growth of their organisations. Indeed, a recently completed study by some of the leading NGO researchers in China has identified international linkages as one of the most important keys to enhance the growth of Chinese civil society 36.

28 Transnational connections play a special facilitating role in the growth of some large and old Chinese NGOs, which enjoyed special linkages with Western groups before the coming to power of the Communist Party in 1949, and which had their activities frozen during Mao’s era. A prominent example is the Shanghai YMCA, which boasts 4,000 fee- paying members (the largest YMCA in China) and claims to have become a role model for YMCAs in the developing world. When it was re-established in 1984, the Shanghai YMCA was very small and weak, a shadow of its pre-1949 self. Through exchanges with international YMCAs (first with those in Japan and Hong Kong, then those in the United States, Canada, South Korea, Singapore and Malaysia), it started to develop and prosper. International YMCAs, particularly those in Japan and the United States, provided training in effective management and capacity building, helped train volunteers, and provided funding. Support and new perspectives from international sources contributed to the Shanghai YMCA’s increased independence since the mid-1990s with its new emphasis on “citizen’s self-management” 37.

29 Quite apart from their expertise in their own professional issue areas, INGOs transfer democratic perspectives and practices to their Chinese partners despite the seemingly non-political nature of their co-operation, including the ideas of autonomous citizenship, grass-roots activism, public participation, direct action, issue-oriented advocacy, collective decision-making―and most importantly, a sense of “third sector”. It is definitely true that INGOs like ORBIS, Save the Children and Animals Asia Foundation do not mean to be political in their China programmes, and their operators and Chinese partners do not think in terms of how their activities can be related to China’s democratisation. Yet they can have a democratising effect on their Chinese partners and society at large, in the current context of China where any sign of civil society growth is good and any form of assistance to help such growth and make the Chinese groups more liberal and accountable in operation ought to be taken seriously. One example is the experience of Lions’ Club International, which established branches in Guangzhou and Shenzhen in 2002. Despite its expressly non-political nature (few in

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the West would associate the Lions with democracy), the Lions has helped transform official and popular attitudes toward NGO activity by operating in China. First, there is the Lions’ own democratic structure, with the members from Shenzhen and Guangzhou branches reportedly inspired by its annual presidential elections, participatory mechanism, equality among leaders and members, dedication, and transparency. Second, such culture is also influencing the operations of the two branches themselves 38.

30 One may extrapolate from the Lions model that those numerous Chinese groups that are members of INGOs must have gained extensive democratic excises by participating in free deliberation of issues and voting. Broad socio-political ramifications can also be read with Animals Asia Foundation, a Hong-Kong-based group which campaigns globally to eliminate cruel bear farming in China, and operates a bear sanctuary in Sichuan Province. Its public education and awareness programmes regarding animal protection and its success in negotiating with the local authorities the release of caged bears have stimulated public interest in volunteering, spawned local conservation NGOs, and encouraged local activists to see the value of direct action 39. This cannot but have potential significance beyond bear-related issues. Again in her study of the influence of the Fourth World Conference on Women on women’s organisations in China, Howell argues that more important than learning from foreign NGOs’ issues- specific strategies, Chinese groups had the chance to broaden their view of what a NGO was, what it took to be an NGO and how it differed from a governmental agency. She rightly emphasises that this was particularly important in a country where civil society was weakly developed 40. Sometimes the way to influence can be simple and direct, as demonstrated by Hands On Shanghai, founded in 2004 by a group of young foreign professionals based in the city as an affiliate of Hands On worldwide network (head office in Atlanta). It has mobilised an army of about 700 volunteers (more than half are Shanghai locals). Five times a week these people are organised to visit and help orphanages, rehabilitation centres, animal sanctuaries and various environmental projects. Richard Brubaker, Director, regards this as an effective way to reinforce to society the virtue of volunteering and help people be the change they want to see in their community 41.

31 Extensive case studies have also shown that GONGOs’ recent tendency towards independence has been mainly due to increased access to the international community 42. Interactions with INGOs have also made some mass organisations (such as ACWF) develop a new sense of autonomy 43. Imperatives in dealing with TCS makes it necessary for them to behave like NGOs and they have to be accountable to international donors. For example, Victoria Moy, Managing Director (China) of The Smile Train, a New York- based organisation which seeks to provide free surgery for children in developing countries suffering from a cleft lip and palate, pointed out that her organisation successfully pushed its official partner, China Charity Federation, a major GONGO, to adopt the practice of international auditing as a precondition for donations and services, thus making its operation more transparent 44.

32 INGOs have also gone a long way to convince the government of the value of civil society, mainly because they are mostly humanitarian and environmental “do- gooders”. This general conclusion was reached after my interviews in Shanghai with the country directors or programme managers of Hands On, ORBIS, The Smile Train, Wildlife Conservation Society, Project Hope, and DKT International, during September-

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October 2005. This point was particularly emphasised by C.M. Leung (梁智明), Director of Administrative Operations (China) of Project Hope, which is headquartered in Millwood, Virginia and has invested heavily in educating health professionals and providing medicines and supplies to hospitals in China 45. Those organisations generally enjoy good working relations with authorities at various levels, with some like ORBIS even signing formal agreements and running joint projects with government agencies, and have contributed to the government’s own social and environmental priorities. Indeed, there is no reason for the Chinese government not to embrace a group like DKT International, a Washington, D.C.-based charitable organisation whose mission is to ensure that modern contraceptive products are within easy access of low income groups for the sake of family planning and prevention of HIV/AIDS. DKT’s “social marketing” in Shanghai means that low-priced but good quality condoms are delivered to “high-risk” people such as migrant workers in places like Karaoke bars 46. INGOs have impressed the officials of various levels with their dedication and effectiveness. This in turn may translate into these officials’ more liberal attitude towards civil society. One evidence is that despite the sensitivity due to President Bush’s rhetoric on worldwide democracy promotion in his 2005 State of the Union address, the Chinese authorities did not crackdown on a training workshop held in Kunming (Yunnan) in November that year, which saw both domestic and international groups such as the US- based Sierra Club teaching university student representatives from around China (there were 40 student organisations in attendance) how to become activists, set up an NGO, run effective campaigns, and organise protests 47.

33 At the risk of verbosity, it is important to emphasise that while traditional Western organisations such as YWCA/YMCA, the Lions and a host of other humanitarian and charitable groups are generally not viewed as democratising in their original Western context, their transnational activities may be read differently by taking into account the unique socio-political and cultural context of the hosting non-Western societies. Such different contexts may mean that some “simple” social and humanitarian activities by those groups may have at least some indirect liberalising impact simply because a hosting society’s traditional socio-political norms are so repressive that most Western-style NGO operations may look liberalising and democratising, disseminating progressive ideas and training pro-democracy behaviour. For example, Garner extensively discusses the significant role of the International YWCA and its Japanese branches in improving Japanese women’s social and political status during the first half of the twentieth century, although YWCAs are generally not known in the West as staunchly feminist 48. One may also cite China’s own historical experience. When the prototype transnational social movements started to develop from the late nineteenth century, a handful of European housewives-turned-activists were able to spawn numerous Chinese NGOs in an anti-footbinding movement (a movement tolerated by the Qing dynasty government). These transnational advocacy campaigns, involving both Western and Chinese women activists, made considerable contributions to Chinese women’s subsequent political emancipation 49.

34 There are certainly limitations to what INGOs can achieve in their joint campaigns with local groups, even within the issue areas permitted by the government. The comparative power of Chinese civil society and authorities mean that high-profile campaigns against the government’s development priorities can fail. For example, Khagram refers to the failed China campaigns by International Rivers Network and Friends of the Earth in trying to halt the big dam projects in China, symbolised by the

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mammoth Three Gorges project 50. The Bush administration’s rhetoric of democracy export also made Beijing sensitive to INGOs’ connections with their Chinese partners. However, with the country becoming more integrated with international regimes and with the government’s ever increasing need of NGOs to address immediate social and environmental tension, a “two steps forward, one step back” trajectory of China’s civil society growth will continue.

35 The utility of transnational exchanges for China’s democratisation can also be argued from their role in diluting popular nationalistic sentiment in the country. Such sentiment is rising in recent years, targeting particularly Japan and the United States. Yet at the same time a growing number of Chinese NGO operators have become involved in issues-oriented exchanges with their Western counterparts. Nationalistic fever hinders democratisation, particularly if it is manipulated by the state, a stark lesson from pre-1949 Chinese history. On the other hand, exchanges in issue areas of environment, gender, the disabled, orphans and AIDS can make societies see common concerns and shared values, and learn from each other, cultivating a sense of a “global village”. Chinese people who are interested in NGOs’ roles in water pollution treatment in the United States and waste processing in Japan are necessarily more detached from nationalistic ideals. Conclusion 36 Chinese NGOs have expanded their connections with TCS, INGOs in particular. Co- operative projects are concentrated on the issues of gender, environment, public health, poverty and education, where the government avidly seeks assistance to tackle a range of social, environmental and rural headaches. Chinese NGOs have benefited from transnational co-operation in capacity-building, programme planning, management and accountability. More importantly, despite their apparent non- political nature, transnational linkages of Chinese NGOs nurture a more healthy and autonomous third sector, thus having potentials to facilitate socio-political pluralisation. “Globalisation from below” helps China’s NGOs in gradually and peacefully chipping off the country’s traditional authoritarian and state/family- dependent political culture, preparing a more cohesive, civil and dynamic society for the ultimate tipping moment of democratisation. It can be hoped that a “domestic- transnational spiral model”, with Tiananmen Mothers acting with the sort of domestic legitimacy and open transnational solidarity enjoyed by the strikingly similar Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in the democratising Argentina in the 1990s, will become applicable in China with the progress in political reform and maturing of civil society.

NOTES

1.L.M. Salamon, “The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4, 1994, p.109. 2.Yearbook of International Organizations 2002-03 (Munich: K. G. Saur, for the Union of International Associations, 2002), Vol. 2, p.1607. Hereafter YIO.

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3.ECOSOC website: http://www.un.org/docs/ecosoc/ 4.P. Ghils, “International civil society: international non-governmental organisations in the international system”, International Social Science Journal, Vol. XLIV, No. 133, 1992, pp. 421–427. 5.Nick Young, “Searching for Civil Society”, in Nick Young, ed., 250 Chinese NGOs: Civil Society in the Making (internet edition), Beijing, China Development Brief, 2002. Matt Forney, “Voice of the People”, Far Eastern Economic Review, May 7th 1998, pp. 10-15. 6.Nick Young, ibid. 7.The ministry’s website: http://www.mca.gov.cn 8.Chan Kin-man, “Development of NGOs under a Post-Totalitarian Regime: The Case of China”, presented at the International Conference on NGOs and the Nation in a Globalising World: Asia-Pacific Views, organised by Academia Sinica (Taipei) and Institute for the Study of Economic Culture (Boston University), Taipei, June 21st-22nd, 2002, p. 9. 9.Chen Jie, “Burgeoning Transnationalism of Taiwan's Social Movement NGOs”, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10, No. 29, 2001, pp. 613-644. 10.This is based on online database of China Development Brief (http:// www.chinadevelopmentbrief.org.cn/page.asp?sec=4&sub=4&pg=0), a Beijing-based magazine on NGO affairs which also functions as an international consultancy group providing information and services to facilitate international NGOs’ exchanges with Chinese groups. 11.Southern Weekend ( Nanfang Zhoumo) (internet edition), May 19th 2005. 12.YIO 2002-03, Vol. 2, p.1611. 13.NGO Research Center, Tsinghua University, Beijing, ed., A Nascent Civil Society Within a Transforming Environment (a report prepared for CIVICUS and released in April 2006), p. 32. 14.NGO Research Center, ibid., p. 32. 15.YIO, various years. 16.For example, M. Edwards and J. Gaventa, Global Citizen Action, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001; and P. Willetts, ed., The Conscience of the World: the influence of non-governmental organisations in the UN system, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1996. 17.C. Kumar, “Transnational Networks and Campaigns for Democracy”, in Ann Florini, ed., The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society, Tokyo, The Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000, pp. 115-142. P. Chilton, “Mechanics of Change: social movements, transnational coalitions, and the transformation processes in Eastern Europe”, in R. Thomas, ed., Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 189-226. M. Kaldor, “The Ideas of 1989: The Origins of the Concept of Global Civil Society”, in M. Kaldor, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War, Cambridge, UK, Polity, 2003, pp. 50-77. 18.A leading study is R. Thomas, S.C. Ropp and K. Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human Rights: international norms and domestic change, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1999. 19.C. Kumar, “Transnational Networks and Campaigns for Democracy”, p. 137. 20.R. Thomas, “The Power of Norms versus the Norms of Power: Transnational Civil Society and Human Rights”, in Ann Florini, ed., The Third Force, pp. 177-209.

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21.For example, Gordon White, “Civil Society, Democratization and Development (I): Clearing the Analytical Ground”, Democratization, Vol. 1, No. 3, Autumn 1994, pp. 375-390; and Gordon White, “Civil Society, Democratization and Development (II): Two Country Cases”, Democratization, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 56-84. 22.Nick Young, “Searching for Civil Society”. 23.Robert D. Putnam, “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1995, pp. 65-78. 24.Nick Young, “Searching for Civil Society”. 25.Lucian W. Pye, “Civility, Social Capital, and Civil Society: three powerful concepts for explaining Asia”, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, xxix:4, 1999, pp. 766-769. 26.Lucian W. Pye, ibid., p. 771. 27.Deng Guosheng (邓国胜), “Changes and development in mainland China’s NGOs since 1995 (1995 nian yilai dalu NGO de bianhua yu fazhan qushi)”, presented at the conference “Cross-Strait Symposium on NGOs – Transformation and Development of NGOs”, hosted by Himalaya Foundation, Taipei, July 31st 2002, pp. 29-31. 28.J. Howell, “Women’s Organizations and Civil Society in China: making a difference”, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 5:2, 2003, pp. 191-215. 29.Julia G. Bentley, “The Role of International Support for Civil Society Organizations in China”, Harvard Asia Quarterly, Winter 2003, p.16. 30.Deng Guosheng, “Changes and development in mainland China’s NGOs since 1995”, p. 37. 31.Nick Young, “Searching for Civil Society”. 32.Interview of Tan Leshan, China Country Director, ORBIS, Shanghai, September 22nd 2005. 33.Nick Young, “NGOs: the diverse origins, changing nature and growing internationalisation of the species”, in Nick Young, ed., 200 International NGOs in China: a special report from China Development Brief, Beijing, 2005, p. 223. 34.Interview of Tan Leshan. 35.Interview of Li Bing (李冰), WCS program officer, Shanghai, September 29th 2005. 36.NGO Research Center, ed., A Nascent Civil Society, p. 68. 37.Interview of Wu Jianrong, General Secretary, Shanghai YMCA, September 26th 2005. 38.Susan V. Lawrence, “The Lions in the Communist Den”, Far Eastern Economic Review, August 22nd 2002, pp. 24-27. 39.Interview of Jill Robinson, CEO and Founder of Animals Asia Foundation, April 21st 2005, Perth, Australia. 40.J. Howell, “Post-Beijing Reflections: creating ripples but not waves in China”, Women’s Studies International Forum, 20:2, 1997, pp. 244-246. 41.Interview of Richard Brubaker, Director, Hands On Shanghai, October 1st 2005. 42.Wang Ming, Liu Guohan and He Jianyu, Reform of China’s Social Organizations: from governmental preference to social preference (Zhongguo shetuan gaige: cong zhengfu xuanze dao shehui xuanze), Beijing, Social Science Works Publishing Agency, 2001, p.172. Wu Fengshi, “New Partners or Old Brothers? GONGOs in Transnational Environmental Advocacy in China”, China Environment Series, No. 5, 2002, pp. 45-58. 43.Deng Guosheng, “Changes and development in mainland China’s NGOs since 1995”, p. 33. 44.Interview of Victoria Z. Moy, Managing Director (China), The Smile Train, Shanghai, September 23rd 2005.

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45.Interview of C.M. Leung, Director of Administrative Operations (China), Project Hope, Shanghai, September 23rd 2005. 46.Interview of Fang Kong Xin, Marketing Manager (China), DKT International, Shanghai, September 22nd 2005. 47.Russell Harwood, an Australian attendant at the 4th NGO Forum in Kunming, November 7th-11th 2005. Personal emails. 48.Karen Garner, “Global Feminism and Postwar Reconstruction: the World YWCA Visitation to Occupied Japan, 1947”, Journal of World History, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2004, pp. 191-227. 49.Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, “Historical Precursors to Modern Transnational Advocacy Networks”, in Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks In International Politics, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1998, pp. 60-66. 50.S. Khagram, “Toward Democratic Governance for Sustainable Development: Transnational Civil Society Organizing Around Big Dams”, in Ann Florini, ed., The Third Force, p. 106.

ABSTRACTS

China is no longer an outsider to the co-operation among and networking of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) across national borders. Chinese NGOs, in particular international NGOs (INGOs), have expanded their connections transnationally with civil society. Co-operative projects are concentrated in areas of gender, environment, public health, poverty and education, where the Chinese government requires assistance in tackling a range of social, environmental and rural problems associated with pro-market reform. Transnational collaboration in shared ideas, funding, advocacy and campaigns helps Chinese NGOs to provide their services and, in many cases, thus challenge the social status quo. It is also helping to further the growth of an NGO community in China. More importantly, despite their apparent non-political nature, transnational links among Chinese NGOs transfer democratising views and practices to grassroots communities and organisations, which could in turn further the country’s broader socio-political development.

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History

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China's Search for Cultural and National Identity from the Nineteenth Century to the Present

Werner Meissner

1 This article describes and analyses crucial elements of cultural and national identity- building in China from the nineteenth century to the present, in particular the response of China’s intellectual elite to Western influences. In this context, I will first touch briefly on similar phenomena in other regions, such as Russia, the Arabic world, and Germany. By doing so, I hope to show that what happened in China was, and is, not an isolated case but typical of modernising societies.

2 Secondly, after a brief description of the term “Chinese cultural identity”, the unfolding of the identity crisis in China following its continuous defeats by Western powers in the nineteenth century will be described. The third part of the article outlines the attempts of China’s intellectual elite to develop a new cultural and national identity after the decline of Chinese Marxism-Leninism. The article deals with the main currents of identity-building and the perception of the West by discussing the rising importance of Confucianism, the role of history and language, and the renaissance of Western thought.

3 Finally, the focus will shift to the emergence of different types of Chinese nationalism as a response to Western imperialism: Anti-Manchuism at the end of the nineteenth century, the nationalism of Sun Yat-sen and his followers, the state-nationalism of the Chinese communists until 1979, and the discourse on nationalism since the 1980s. Discourses on cultural and national identity 4 Identity has become a paradigm for the individual and for groups and nations in their search for safe ground in disturbed times. The term is defined in its most general form by Erikson: “the term identity expresses … a mutual relation in that it connotes both a persistent sameness within oneself (selfsameness) and a persistent sharing of some kind of essential character with others.”1 Thus, individual identities can only be established within group identities. Each person has multiple collective identities,

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which can be defined through gender, kinship, space or territory (local and regional identity), class, education, occupation, institution, religion, ethnicity, race, culture and, finally, nationality and supra-nationality.2

5 Individual and national identities are not static, but are changing continuously. Each individual, group and nation always tries to redefine his/her/its identity when it is challenged, endangered or broken. This is understood as an identity crisis. The search for and redefinition of a new identity is a process of adaptation, in which a new equilibrium is sought between traditional elements and new challenges. The identity crisis is solved as soon as a new equilibrium, however temporary, is achieved.

6 Discourses on cultural and national identity have been part of nation-building in Western Europe since the eighteenth century. They can also be found in Russia and Germany in the nineteenth century. Outside of Europe, they started dominating intellectual debates in Asia as soon as it was threatened by Western powers and Western ideas, but also in the Arabic world. It was a discourse on modernity, which at first began in the European states, and then, as a response to Western imperialism, continued until today in those parts of the world that were or still are under the influence of Western powers.

7 I would like to mention three examples that show similar patterns to those found in China. The first is Russia, where there was a discourse between “Slavophiles” and “Westernisers” from the 1840s to the 1870s (and again today). The Slavophiles wanted Russia’s future development to be based on values and institutions derived from the country’s early history instead of from the West. They took their ideas mainly from German philosophy, especially German Idealism (Herder, Schelling, Fichte and Hegel). The two main founders of the Slavophile movement, Khomyakov (1804-1860) and Aksakov (1817-1860), thought that Russia should not use Western Europe as a model for its modernisation, but should follow a course determined by its own values and history. Western Europe, especially Britain and France, was viewed as morally bankrupt and Western liberalism and capitalism as outgrowths of a decaying society. The Russian people, by contrast, should adhere to the Russian Orthodox faith and unite in a “Christian community” under authoritarian rule. Spiritual values should replace Western rationalism, materialism, individualism, capitalism and liberal democracy. The Slavophiles were opposed by the Westernisers, a group that developed simultaneously with them and which insisted that Russia should imitate the Western pattern of modernisation and introduce constitutional government into the tsarist autocracy.

8 A second example is Germany. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the German “Bildungselite” developed the foundations of a German national identity that was separate from the western part of Europe. Many German intellectuals rejected the ideas of the French Revolution and, further stimulated by its excesses and the subsequent Napoleonic Wars, developed an anti-Western mindset. Moreover, the emerging political liberalism was weakened in Germany following the failure of the 1848 revolution. As a corollary, political modernisation and industrialisation did not progress in a synchronic way. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the traditional political and socio-cultural structures were not transformed during the rapid industrialisation. To some extent, industrialisation was stuck onto the existing state and society.3 The Prussian landed aristocrats, the German army officer corps, and the state bureaucracy clearly tried to dodge any attempts at political reform. The political and social development, in particular the formation of a liberal, parliamentarian constitutional

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state, therefore lagged behind the technical and economic developments. The majority of the cultural and political elite did not regard itself as part of the “West”; on the contrary, its aim was to create a strong and authoritarian nation-state, based on an ethnic German national and cultural identity, in opposition to Western European ideas of liberalism and parliamentarianism.4

9 German Idealism, Romanticism, and historicism had always stressed the particular individuality of German intellectual life in the face of the cultures of the Western European nations. Together with the idea of the special role of German culture, these elements were merged into a defensive ideology against the ideas of Western European and American parliamentarianism and political liberalism in the field of politics; the dominating role of empiricism, pragmatism and positivism in the field of philosophy; and against capitalism in the field of economics.

10 Finally, in the Arab world, there was (and still is) the struggle between clerical conservatives―or even fundamentalists―and modernists. Since the seventh century, some Muslims currents have believed in the superiority of their culture over all other cultures. But with the rise of the West, Islam lost its sense of superiority, and the crisis in modern Islam has led to the emergence of a “defence-culture” (the consequences of which can still be felt today). The ideas of Egyptian theologians Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) here exhibit a pattern comparable with the Russian and German example. They wanted to modernise Arab societies based on Islam and the Koran. They too, did not accept the concept of Western culture, but they did accept the technical-scientific aspects of Western modernity, a pattern that Bassam Tibi once described as a “dream of half modernity.” In other words, to face the challenge, it was necessary only to adopt and develop modern technology, but not its cultural aspects (the “project of cultural modernity” by Habermas).5

11 Generalisations in history are always dangerous. The deeper one looks into each single case, the more differences will be found. But despite many differences, the above- mentioned patterns can be found in nearly all modernising societies in the past, not only in Russia, Germany and the Arabic world, but also in China. In all of these cases, intellectuals and politicians claimed the superiority of their allegedly “spiritual culture” (the Christian faith, Islam, the German spirit and, in China, Song-Ming Neo- Confucianism) over the so-called rationalist and “material civilisation” of the West, whereas their opponents favoured a political philosophy that was based on a utilitarian-rational worldview with the idea of a democratic representative government.

12 Nations that suffered from Western oppression, occupation, and/or expropriation tended to move to and fro between extreme ideological orientations: either fending off Western modernity or selectively integrating parts of it into their own, frequently overdrawn, traditional worldviews, or even dismissing their own culture in part or in whole and replacing it with radical ideologies such as Marxism-Leninism. This is also true for China. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, large parts of China’s political and intellectual elite have followed similar patterns to find an answer to the “Western threat”, whether it was based on a Confucian or, later, on a Marxist-Leninist tradition. In search of cultural identity 13 Although Chinese intellectuals differ on how to respond to the Western challenge, more or less all who have dealt with Chinese history in one way or another agree on certain

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aspects, which they regard as parts of Chinese cultural and national identity (perhaps with the exception of the early Marxists). Among these main aspects are: • the long history of China―at least four to five thousand years; • the identity of the Han people as the descendents of the legendary Yellow Emperor; • the continuity of the idea of a Chinese Empire running through all dynastic changes and foreign rule; • the uniqueness of the Chinese language; • the tradition of religion and philosophy (or Chinese thought); • Chinese literature, poetry, painting, ceramics, music, etc.; • the impressive number of inventions in areas such as medicine, weaponry, shipbuilding, porcelain, etc, which in many cases were unsurpassed until the Renaissance; and • despite many regional varieties, a common everyday culture, including Chinese food.

14 At the beginning, this self-perception was not so much an ethnic one – belonging to the Han race―as a cultural one, belonging to the Chinese “Kulturkreis” (culture area), a Chinese culturalism. Chinese culture was so attractive that it led to a long-lasting predominance over the nations and tribes that surrounded it. This predominance, and the feeling of being superior to other nations, was an additional aspect of the identity that had developed over the centuries.

15 The loss of China’s traditional hegemony in Asia, when tribute states such as Annam, Siam, Burma, Laos and Korea became Western or Japanese colonies, and the so-called “unequal treaties,” by which the Western powers forced their conditions upon China, were felt to be a deep humiliation (xiuru羞辱). Later this humiliation was even “instilled into the pupil’s mind”6 to arouse nationalistic feelings. This feeling of humiliation became part of China’s national identity.

16 China’s defeat in the Opium War in 1840 was the beginning of a perennial identity crisis among intellectuals that lasts until today. The crisis caused by the West was different from the previous crises of the Chinese Empire, such as the occupation by the Mongols and later the Manchus, and could not be met with the same response―the assimilation and acculturation of the “barbarians,” who finally became Chinese. Although the Manchu emperors never questioned the cultural identity of the Chinese educated elite―on the contrary, they promoted it in many ways because they needed it to rule China―the West challenged the essence of Chinese culture and the fundamentals of the elite’s self-perception.

17 China’s search for a response to the Western threat unfolded roughly within five periods. The first period 18 The first period lasted from the middle of the nineteenth century until 1895. During this time, the classic paradigm was “Chinese learning as essence (or substance), and Western learning for application (or as) function” (Zhongxue weiti, xixue weiyong 中學為 體，西學為用). This slogan meant a selective adoption of Western civilisation, namely its technological and scientific aspects for technical application only, whereas “Chinese learning,” the traditional Chinese culture, was to remain the essence of individual life, society and state. The Western threat was reduced to the problem that China would only have to “learn from the superiority of the foreigners in order to rein in their superiority” (Zhang Zhidong, 1837-1909).

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19 As a result, the political elite started building a modern arms industry and laying the foundations of the industrialisation of the empire by establishing arsenals, mines, railways, etc. The aims of these modernisation policies, which ran from 1861 to 1894 under the slogans, “Movement for self-strengthening” (ziqiang yundong 自強運動) and “ Yangwu movement 洋務運動” (in which yangwu stands for foreign affairs), were: • the protection of the threatened territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire; • the protection of the predominant role of Chinese culture against the allegedly subversive influence of Western ideas; and • the conservation of the existing Confucian system of rule in the interests of the political and social elites.

20 This conservative or partial modernisation failed, as we know. The factories that were established did not function properly, and in 1894 China lost the next war, this time with Japan, which had started out on the road not only of economic, but also of political, reform through the introduction of a constitutional monarchy. The second period 21 During the second period (1895-1911), a different pattern emerged. Intellectuals, such as Kang Youwei (1858-1927), Liang Qichao (1873-1929), and Tan Sitong (1865-1898), recognised that it was not sufficient merely to adopt Western technology, but that political reform was also necessary. However, for the leading reformer, Kang, a radical break with tradition was not conceivable. Instead, he looked to the Confucian classics to find an answer to the Western challenge. In his article “Confucius as Reformer,” (Kongzi gaizhikao 孔子改製考) published in 1897, he presented the idea that the great master had himself been an adherent of institutional change. Under the slogan, “changing the institutions based on the teachings of the old times” (tuogu gaizhi 托古改 製), Kang attempted to win the necessary ideological legitimisation for political change by returning to a reformed Confucianism. In his memoranda to the emperor, who appointed him as his adviser in 1898, he recommended a series of reforms, which aimed to bring about three important changes: • the abolition of the traditional Sino-centrist worldview and the acknowledgement of foreign powers as states enjoying equal rights; • the equality of Chinese and Western learning (Kang demanded the introduction of educational institutions following a Western pattern and the founding of a university in Beijing, later called Beida); and • the transformation of the empire into a constitutional monarchy.

22 The “Hundred Days Reforms” in 1898 foundered, partly because of the hastiness with which they were implemented and partly because of the resistance of conservative court circles. Nevertheless, it is evident that Kang Youwei and his reformers clearly recognised one thing: the adoption of Western technology alone was not sufficient to rescue the existing political system or even China. For the first time, Chinese intellectuals acknowledged the equality of Chinese and Western learning. The third period

23 The third period covers the first republic from 1911 to 1949. In my view, this period is the most important. Neither before nor since have Chinese intellectuals discussed so thoroughly and comprehensively Western ideas and Chinese culture. As in a prism, one can find all political groups from the right to the left and their respective attempts to find an answer to China’s pressing problems. Four main groups emerged.

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24 Confucians, such as Gu Hongming (1827-1928), a long-time subordinate of Zhang Zhidong and trenchant critic of Westernisation, and Zhang Junmai (Carsun Chang, 1887-1969), an adherent of Neo-Confucianism, a strongly idealistic and mystical form of Confucianism that goes back to Zhu Xi (1130-1200) and Wang Yangming (1472-1528). Gu accused the radical intellectuals of betraying China and destroying the oldest civilisation in the world. To him, European civilisation was a “material monster” that was going to destroy Chinese civilisation like a “Trojan horse” from within.7 On the other side, China’s civilisation was superior, because it was “spiritual” (jingshen), and should help the West to free itself from the ideology of “materialism.” Zhang also believed in the superiority of China’s “spiritual culture” (jingshen wenhua 精神文化) over the “material culture” (wuzhi wenhua 物質文化) of the West, especially as far as the mechanistic natural sciences were concerned. In this context, he already distinguished between Germany and the West and favoured a selective adoption of science, Western idealist philosophy, in particular German Idealism, and the German model of social and economic development.8

25 Nationalists around Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) and his party, the Guomindang. Sun tried to synthesise the Confucian tradition with Western political liberalism in his main work, Sanminzhuyi 三民主義 (Three People’s Principles). He too was convinced that China’s culture was superior, but was ready to introduce Western democratic institutions in China as part of a national government.

26 Liberal thinkers such as Hu Shi (1891-1962), who had been influenced by American pragmatism (John Dewey). In contrast to the Neo-Confucians, they were convinced that only the “scientification” of Chinese thought in all areas―i.e., not just in technology, but also in the social sciences and humanities―and the “total Westernisation” (quanpan xihua 全盤西化) of Chinese civilisation, connected with the adoption of political liberalism and a controlled capitalism, would bring about the re-establishment of China’s greatness.9 Hu Shi, under the influence of John Dewey, was also the first to recommend a federal political structure for China based on “self governing provinces” 10 (liansheng zizhi 聯省自治), rather than a centralised political system.

27 Marxists, such as Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Mao, and others, who looked at the Soviet Union as a model for China. They aimed to destroy Chinese “feudal” culture, especially Confucianism (dadao kongjiao 打倒孔教) and establish a new socialist identity based on Marxism-Leninism.

28 These groups clashed in numerous controversies, starting with the “May Fourth Movement” in 1919; the controversy over “East West culture” and “Science and Metaphysics” in the early 1920s; and over “Westernisation” in the 1930s. In these discourses, China’s cultural tradition became an essential part of national identity. The educated elite realised that it was necessary to create a national language to protect China’s culture, to develop national education, and, if possible, even to prove that science, through which the West had demonstrated its superiority, had its roots in China as well. Only by a thorough overhaul of China’s culture and institutions, was it possible to cope with the Western threat. Linguists, educators, historians, archaeologists, artists, and scientists: they all became the architects of China’s new cultural and national identity. Here I will touch briefly on the sciences only. Other areas, such as sociology, philosophy, religion, language and literature show similar patterns regarding their role in the search for cultural identity. Sciences

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29 Chinese scholars frequently mention the “Four Great Inventions” (si da faming 四大發 明: compass, paper, gunpowder and printing) as examples of the high level of Chinese civilisation in many fields. How did Chinese intellectuals get along with the fact that the Western sciences were superior? Conservatives simply declared that all Western sciences were of Chinese origin (Xi xue zhong yuan 西學中原) and that one should adopt only those aspects that could already be found in China. By pointing to the Chinese origin of Western sciences, superiority over the West was maintained. At the same time, this attitude facilitated the adoption of modern sciences and technology and made it easier to acknowledge their temporary superiority, simply because they, allegedly, originally came from China. However, during this process of adoption, the Chinese scientific tradition was classified by Western categories of natural and social sciences and partly reinterpreted. The setting up of modern disciplines, especially in the 1920s and 1930s, was paralleled by intensive research on Chinese precedents and by an attempt to link up Western sciences with Chinese tradition. By doing so, intellectuals hoped to develop a genuine identity as Chinese scientists.

30 This attitude was common to conservatives, liberals and Marxists. Hu Shi, for example, who was perhaps the most “Westernised” literary scholar and who had initiated the “literary revolution”, looked for the roots of science in China. Together with the reformer Liang Qichao, he believed that the scholars of the early Qing dynasty, such as Gu Yanwu (1613-1683), Huang Zongxi (1610-1695), and Dai Zhen (1724-1777), best represented the scientific tradition. In their view, these scholars had used empirical methods in their research on history, philology and phonetics that could easily match Western sciences. A second example was Ding Wenjiang (1887-1937), the well-known geologist who had studied in London and had been Director-General of Greater Shanghai in the1920s. Ding regarded the famous geographer Xu Xiake (1586-1641) and his research as a precedent of modern Western geography. The general view was that to revive China’s great tradition in science and technology, it was only necessary to link up the empirical tradition of the Qing period with modern science. Whether Hu, Liang and Ding were right in their assumption does not matter here. I think they exaggerated a bit, but the most important aspect here was that they tried to bring Chinese and Western knowledge together and to present them as one part of the world’s common knowledge and wisdom: we, the Chinese, take part in the global emergence of a scientific world community, bringing our own achievements.11 Westernisation 31 The discourse on science, but also on liberalism, the European enlightenment, and the future model of the Chinese state, was embedded in the general discourse on Westernisation (xihua 西化). The dispute about the supposed necessity to Westernise or about the similarly asserted necessity to take one's own path independently of the West became the red thread of all discussions. These were not limited to the 1920s, but continued in the 1930s (and returned in the 1980s).

32 From 1933 to 1935, there took place among Chinese sociologists an up to now largely disregarded controversy on “Total Westernisation” (quanpanxihua). Among the adherents of Westernisation were Chen Xujing (1903-?), a professor of sociology and political science at Lingnan University in Canton, as well as other scholars, such as Lu

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Guanwei, Feng Enrong and Lü Xiehai, also at Lingnan University. The main arguments of the “Westernisers” in the 1930s were: • the uniformity of culture and the interdependence of all of its aspects (politics, philosophy, the economy and social institutions); • the superiority of Western culture and the idea that the old Chinese culture was not suited to the modern world; • Westernisation as a general, world-embracing trend, with the idea that if China wanted to have an influential place in the world, then it must Westernise itself; and • that certain parts of Chinese culture were already Westernised, but only externally (i.e., the system of government, the traffic system, industry) and that this Westernisation was not only insufficient but also dangerous, because it concentrated only on the material achievements of the West and neglected the spiritual foundations of Western society that were the basis of these achievements.12

33 Among the opponents of Westernisation were the Neo-Confucian scholars Zhang Junmai and Liang Shuming (1893-1988), to name only two. To Zhang, it was necessary to connect the Chinese (special) path (dao 道) with Western instruments (qi 器), to preserve the national characteristics (guoqing 國情), and to shape Chinese culture on a Chinese foundation (Zhongguo benwenhua 中國本文化).

34 Chinese scholars also made a very clear distinction between the West and Germany. Germany was not perceived as belonging to the West. Many opponents of Westernisation, especially the modern Neo-Confucian camp, regarded Germany―its culture, its policy of state-guided modernisation since Bismarck, and its education system―as a model for China’s rebirth. In their search for ideological allies against the West, the Confucians of the 1920s and 1930s looked above all to Germany (whereas the Chinese communists looked to Russia, and the liberals to America). They hoped to revive the Confucian and spiritual tradition by integrating German metaphysics, primarily the philosophy of Kant, Hegel and Fichte.13 Chinese and German (mostly conservative) intellectuals even envisaged some kind of cultural co-operation in addition to the already very close military and economic co-operation of the time. German idealistic philosophy and Chinese philosophy should unite against Western civilisation. Translation projects (German philosophical works into Chinese and Chinese philosophical works into German) were started with exactly this purpose in mind, among them, of course, Fichte’s famous “Reden an die deutsche Nation”. The Chinese translation was published on the occasion of Japan's occupation of Manchuria. 14 More than 1,300 German-language books had been translated into Chinese by the beginning of the Second World War, the majority of them works on culture and philosophy.15 This discourse slowed down in the late 1930s, due to two major events: the Chinese-Japanese War and the looming victory of the Chinese communists in the civil war after 1945. The fourth period 35 The fourth period, from 1949 to 1978, was characterised by the attempt to create a cultural and national identity based on Marxism-Leninism. After the establishment of the new Chinese central state, Marxism-Leninism, in combination with the thought of Mao Zedong, became the new state-orthodoxy. The new political class legitimised its claim to absolute power by Marxism-Leninist doctrine. This “New Philosophy” (xin zhexue 新哲學) provided an official identity for the individual and the nation, and the followers of other intellectual currents, such as Western liberalism, positivism,

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pragmatism, idealism, religion and traditional Chinese thought, were frequently forced out of their positions and persecuted. On might say that Marxism-Leninism served as the new ti 體 (substance), whereas modern science and technology were again regarded as yong 用 (function).

36 The period between 1949 and 1978 can be regarded as a period of the far-reaching dismissal of European and Chinese culture at the same time. The Party tried to eradicate Western influence with the exception of the natural sciences and Marxism. It also tried to root out so-called Chinese “feudal” culture. However, the Party obviously failed in its attempts to impose a cultural and national identity based on communist ideology upon the Chinese people. The fifth period 37 Following the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in 1978, at which Deng Xiaoping’s reform policy was initiated, the fifth and, so far the latest, period began. It was characterised by three important developments: • the renaissance of Confucianism; • the renaissance of Western thought; and • the emergence of various nationalist movements in the Chinese-speaking area. The renaissance of Confucianism

38 In most post-Leninist countries, we can observe a renaissance of traditionalist thought that is frequently linked to nationalistic and ethnic or even racist tendencies. Strong tendencies towards re-traditionalisation can be observed in non-communist countries too―in particular in the Islamic world, where anti-Western movements are on the advance―but also in the United States, so speaking of a global phenomenon is justified.

39 The renaissance of Confucianism started around 1986 under the guidance of the Communist Party, when the then member of the state council, Gu Mu, became the chairman of the newly founded Confucian society.16 Furthermore, between 1986 and 1989, more then 300 articles were published on modern Neo-Confucianism alone, represented by Feng Youlan (Feng Yu-lan), Tang Junyi (T’ang Chün-yi), Mou Zongsan (Mou Tsung-san), and Du Weiming (Tu Wei-ming). Since then, numerous studies on Confucianism and Taoism have been published. A further indication of this revival were three international symposiums on Confucianism at the beginning of October 1989. More than 300 scientists and adherents of Confucianism came together, some even from Taiwan. This happened only three months after the crackdown on the pro- democracy movement. Obviously, the adherents of Confucianism were not offended by the suppression of the student movement.

40 The speeches delivered by high cadres Jiang Zemin, Gu Mu and others at the symposiums revealed that the political leadership clearly functionalised traditional concepts to broaden its dwindling legitimisation after June 4th.17 Confucianism became part of a traditionalist cultural nationalism and an instrument to counter Western political influence. One year later, at an international congress in November 1990 in Beijing, Zhu Xi, the founder of Neo-Confucianism in the twelfth century and once the ideological archenemy of the Chinese communists, was finally rehabilitated.

41 There is no doubt that the renaissance of Confucian thought helps to solve the problems of cultural identity that necessarily arise during rapid modernisation. However, similar to the intellectual situation in the 1920s and 1930s, modern Neo- Confucianism also shows a tendency against Western political liberalism. For the

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Chinese Communist Party, the revival of Confucianism in the 1990s served a dual purpose. Confucianism implies order, obedience to one’s superior, devotion to the state, and the protection of the family. It puts the interests of the group above the interests of the individual, and thus helps to promote social harmony and stability. Its authoritarian aspects can be used to build a “socialist spiritual civilisation” and to promote social harmony. At the same time, Confucianism can help to provide people with some sort of national identity and to defend Chinese culture against the so-called threat of Westernisation.18 A “National Confucianism” can serve as a bulwark against the ideological impact of the West following rapid modernisation.19 The international symposium in Xi’an, also in November 1990, on China’s modernisation and Chinese traditional culture, obviously not only re-established Confucianism as a means to check the social and political effects of modernisation, but also as a part of a national ideology.20 The rewriting of history 42 Parallel to the renaissance of Confucianism began the rewriting of Chinese history that started slowly in the 1980s and accelerated after 1989. One example is the re-evaluation of former national heroes such as Zeng Guofan (1811-1872), the governor-general and first moderniser; Li Hongzhang (1823-1901), the second great moderniser; Lin Zexu (1785-1850), who drove the British out of Canton; Guo Songtao (1818-1890), the first ambassador to Britain; and even General Yue Fei (1103-1142), a national hero of the Southern Song Dynasty. I will focus here on Zeng only. In 1993, a three-volume historical novel about Zeng was published and reprinted 19 times within two years, with more than two million copies sold. An encyclopaedia of Zeng Guofan was published in 2000, and the number of articles and books about him is rising.21

43 Throughout modern Chinese history, Zeng has been regarded as a model of national salvation and nation building. Liang Qichao, Yuan Shikai and Chiang Kai-shek praised him as a national hero who had helped to preserve the Chinese “race” and state. Only Sun Yat-sen was critical of Zeng, because he had supported the Manchus, but even Mao Zedong admired him before Marxist historians labelled him as a “traitor of the Han” (hanjian 漢奸). In their view, Zeng was a “lackey” because he served the Manchus. Moreover, his modernisation policy allegedly only served Western interests.22

44 There are several reasons why Zeng is now held in high esteem. Firstly, he was a great moderniser and reformer, not a revolutionary. Secondly, his modernisation policy was based on Confucianism. Thirdly, he defeated the Taipings (once regarded as the precursors of the Chinese communist revolution), who were Christians (a Western religion), and had attacked Confucianism. Finally, he defeated a political movement that was based on the peasantry. Understandably, to many historians, Zeng safeguarded Chinese culture and “Chineseness,” which were under threat from two sides: Christianity from the outside and peasant uprisings, which were from the inside, but which had allegedly been hijacked by outside forces. Zeng thus becomes a symbol of resistance against Westernisation (from the outside) and revolution (from the inside).

45 One can speak of a paradigmatic shift in the perception of national history that has had deep repercussions with respect to national identity and domestic politics. As a result, Marxist-Leninist historiography seems to be in retreat. The rehabilitation of Zeng puts into question the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party as a representative of the peasantry and the proletariat. Peasant movements are not regarded as progressive forces anymore, and the period since 1911 is seen as an aberration of China’s real

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history. Cultural identity means turning to the roots of China’s culture, and dismissing the West and social uprisings. The self-image of the Chinese Communist Party is here at stake. Language 46 The rewriting of history after 1979 cannot be separated from another aspect of Chinese cultural identity: language. Cultural nationalists around the renowned International Chinese Character Research Association and its main organ, “Chinese Character Culture” (Hanzi wenhua 漢字文化, CCC), believe that the old characters (fantizi 繁體字) are an essential part of Chinese culture and identity. Chinese linguists, such as Shen Xiaolong, Xu Jialu, Ji Jin, and Xiao Tianzhu, even claim that ideographs are superior to phonetic scripts and that Chinese is not only the clearest and most concise language in the world, but also the easiest to learn. They also claim that Chinese grammar is the closest to mathematics and may be the best international language. Subsequently, the “theory of the superiority of Chinese” has replaced the previous “theory of backward characters.” There is no space here to go into more detail, and I again refer readers to Guo Yingjie’s study.23 However, there are two more aspects that underline the arguments put forward by the linguists, and to which I would like to add.

47 First, Taiwan and Hong Kong have always used fantizi. They have been the two regions of the Chinese-speaking world that have had the fastest modernisation in Asia (apart from Japan). The old characters may not have promoted modernisation, but they have definitely not been an obstacle to it. They have also not been an obstacle to alphabetisation and character learning, as the literacy rate is still higher in Taiwan and Hong Kong than it is on the Chinese mainland. Therefore, the Party’s policy of language reform was probably based on wrong assumptions. Secondly, neither Taiwan nor Hong Kong, nor overseas Chinese communities, will stop using traditional Chinese characters in the future. Communication and cultural identity building have now become more complicated due to two different character systems. Thirdly, to build a genuine cultural and national identity, there is no way of getting around the old characters when dealing with historical documents and reading the classics. Finally, and in my personal view, Chinese traditional characters are very beautiful and of high aesthetic value―something that is missing in many of the simplified characters. It would be a loss to China’s culture and to the aesthetic education of the people if the traditional characters disappeared from textbooks and from daily life. The renaissance of Western thought 48 The renaissance of Western thought is the second important development. Following the opening up of the country, Chinese intellectuals started translating numerous philosophical books and articles on Western philosophy into Chinese and published an even greater number of their own studies on this topic. There now exists for the first time statistical material about Chinese publications on Western philosophy over a period of 11 years (1987-1997).24

49 The number of titles during that period is approximately 10,000 (today the figure will be much higher). They include more than four hundred and fifty translations of books, approximately seven hundred translations of articles, and approximately six hundred and fifty books and eight thousand articles by Chinese authors. The titles can be further divided into three hundred and fifty general introductions and textbooks, nearly seven hundred studies of comparative philosophy (China and the West), three hundred and fifty studies of aesthetics, more than three hundred and twenty of ethics, and around

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four hundred and fifty of the philosophy of science and technology, to name only the largest groups. The figures look even more impressive if one bears in mind that only titles on Western Marxism have been included (i.e., the Frankfurt School), but no titles on Chinese Marxism or Marxism-Leninism.

50 A brief look at the titles provides evidence that Chinese scholars have a strong interest in European continental philosophy, especially German-language philosophy, but not as much in Anglo-American philosophy. German philosophy accounts for a large share, with about one-third of the titles. This is due in part to the fact that after 1949, German Idealism, in particular Hegel’s philosophy, was able to survive in the shadow of Marxism-Leninism. Still on top between 1987 and 1997 is Hegel with more than four hundred and sixty titles, followed by Kant (437), Heidegger (178), Nietzsche (174), Sartre (154), Popper (128), Aristotle (114), Husserl (95), Wittgenstein (93), Plato (87), Hume (84), Schopenhauer (82), Rousseau (79), Habermas (68), and Gadamer (59). Among the few Anglo-American thinkers are Rorty (41), Locke (39), Quine (30), Dewey (27), Rawls (26), Hobbes (14), James (12), Mill (6), and Hayek (4). (All figures refer to the period 1987 to 1997.)

51 One major field of interest is comparative studies. There are 650 studies alone of the differences between Western and Chinese philosophy. Some focus on the general differences between the two philosophies and cultures. Others compare Chinese and Western philosophers, for example, Kong Zi and Meng Zi with Protagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Kant; Zhuang Zi with Sartre; Xun Zi with Hegel; Lu Jiuyuan with Berkeley; Zhang Zai with Spinoza; Wang Fuzhi and Yan Yu with Kant; Yan Yuan with William James; Hu Shi with Gadamer; Zhuang Zi with Nietzsche; Dai Zhen with Descartes. Several studies investigate the differences between Heidegger and Zhuang Zi.

52 The question of the depths of these comparative studies cannot be answered here, but the figures and titles show a rising tendency among Chinese scholars to investigate the differences between Chinese and Western philosophy and to develop their own standpoint and cultural identity by contrasting Chinese tradition with Western thought.25 National identity 53 During national crises, such as the Chinese-Japanese War in the 1930s and 1940s, language and literature, science, pedagogy, history, philosophy and art have been subsumed into nationalist ideology and movements and the discourse on national identity. The overarching ideology of all of these aspects is nationalism and national identity. Hence, I would like to make a few comments on Chinese nationalism here.

54 Since the 1990s, the amount of literature on Chinese nationalism has grown rapidly. I mention here only the most important ones: studies by Unger, Dikoetter, Pye, Schubert, and Hays Gries, and by our Chinese colleagues, Zhao Suisheng, Zheng Yongnian, and Guo Yingjie, to name only a few. However, having run through the literature regarding the definition of nationalism, I am still inclined to follow Kohn’s general distinction between a Western, more liberal kind of nationalism (also called liberal or civic nationalism) and a Central and Eastern nationalism (also called ethnic and cultural nationalism), to which German nationalism belonged until the Second World War. Whereas Western nationalism comprised, at least in its origins, the ideas of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism that were current in the eighteenth century, the emerging nationalism in Asia tended towards a different development. Dependent

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upon, and opposed to, influences from without, this new nationalism was characterised by an inferiority complex that was often compensated for by over-emphasis and over- confidence. As Kohn rightly observed: “All rising nationalism was influenced by the West … yet this very dependence on the West often wounded the pride of the native educated class as soon as it began to develop its own nationalism, and ended in an opposition to the “alien” example and its liberal and rational outlook.” 26

55 One major reason for this was the cultural hubris, arrogance and, frequently, racism that had become an inherent part of Western nationalism and imperialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Therefore, the Asian nationalist movements developed in opposition to the West and contained strong cultural, ethnic, and even racist―but few liberal―elements. Nationalism mainly meant liberation from Western oppression, not from autocratic rule in one’s own country. National leaders, such as Sun Yat-sen in China, Nehru in India, and Sokarno in Indonesia, developed their concepts of national identity out of a struggle against Western and Japanese imperialism.

56 The first type of Chinese nationalism was ethnic and even racist. Originally, it was a movement to get rid of the Manchus and went back to the seventeenth century, when Ming loyalists such as Gu Yenwu (1613-1682), Huang Zongxi (1610-1695), and Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692) continued to fight against the newly established Qing dynasty (1644-1911). Anti-Manchuism, together with anti-imperialism, was also expressed in the writings of Zhang Binglin (1868-1996), who regarded China’s penetration by the West as the biggest threat. To prevent the decline of Chinese culture, the “yellow race” should unite against the white invaders.27

57 The second nationalist concept, minzuzhuyi 民族主義, was developed by Sun Yat-sen. Minzuzhuyi is usually translated as “nationalism.” However, this translation is very vague. The characters minzu clearly indicate a meaning of “race” and “nation”. Min means “people”, and zu can be translated as “clan”. In connection with zhong (zhongzu 种族), it means “race”. Hanzu 漢族 is translated as “Han nationality”. In Sun’s view, there are several elements that contribute to nation building: above all, the blood relationship (xuetong 血統), followed by the conditions of life (shenghuo 生活), language (yuyan 語言), and religion (zongjiao 宗教). According to Sun, the blood relationship is the most important power that constitutes the Chinese nation.28 His nationalism (minzuzhuyi) belongs to the category of so-called ethnic/cultural nationalism and is comparable to the early nationalism of Germany (Volkstumsidee)29 and some Eastern European countries. Sun also stated that Chinese culture was superior to Western civilisation, but, at the same time, he strongly emphasised the necessity of adopting Western science and political institutions. He tried to combine his idea of nationalism with the basic concepts of Western liberalism, representative democracy, and the separation of powers, and proposed five democratically elected political institutions (three Western and two Chinese)―the five Yuan―thus offering for the first time a synthesis between Confucian tradition and Western liberal democratic values.30

58 The nationalism of the Guomindang was very different from the concept of “patriotism” (a term borrowed from the Soviet Union, and, in Chinese, aiguozhuyi 愛國 主義) represented by the Chinese communists, which Mao Zedong mentioned for the first time in his famous speech on “The Place of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War” in 1938.

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59 During the period of Maoist “patriotism”, communist historiography did not regard classic Chinese culture as an important element of Chinese identity. On the contrary, the nation was based on classes (class nation),31 the peasantry, the proletariat and the petty and national bourgeoisie. In the 1980s, after the so-called Cultural Revolution, when large parts of China’s cultural heritage were destroyed, the Chinese Communist Party’s approach to culture slowly changed. Step by step, the Party began to reinstate Chinese culture as an element of Chinese nationalism, together with ethnic aspects and Confucian ideology.

60 Patriotism became especially important in the aftermath of June 4th. The embattled Party searched for a new legitimisation and developed a two-pronged approach. First, the Party insisted that patriotism and socialism could not be separated.32 According to Jiang Zemin: “in China today, patriotism and socialism are unified in essence.” Patriotism is regarded as the premise behind China’s socialism, and socialism is the inevitable conclusion of genuine patriotism. Second, the Party took the lead in re- evaluating China’s history and making use of traditional concepts, such as cultural nationalism,33 Confucianism, and even racial nationalism, to promote social stability and to strengthen its legitimacy. The original patriotism, which had been based on class structure, was discarded, and the debate on cultural nationalism explored the concept of “Chinese modernity” as an alternative to Western modernity. Events, such as the Taiwan crisis (1995-1996) and strained relations with the United States and Japan, played a catalytic role in this debate, as they helped to divert attention from the real issue of political modernisation to ethnic nationalist emotions.

61 One of the most important aspects of the 1990s was the re-emergence of racial nationalism. A brief look at Chinese history reveals that racist thinking has never been foreign to Chinese politics. In the past, the traditional term “barbarian” could easily be loaded with racial connotations, as Wang Fuzhi did with reference to the Manchus. The list of racial stereotypes used by Chinese scholars since the nineteenth century is long. 34 Reformers from Yan Fu to Liang Qichao regarded racial identity as a key element in China’s struggle for racial survival (baozhong 保种) and rebirth. The “yellow race” was engaged in a merciless struggle with the “white race.” Chiang Kaishek (Jiang Jieshi) spoke of the “various stocks” in China not just as one nation, but also as “one race.”35 Darwinism, combined with racism and a belief in China’s cultural superiority, became the main building blocks of Chinese national identity before 1949. However, one should always take into consideration that this terminology was strongly influenced by European ideas. Racism in Europe was in vogue at the beginning of the twentieth century, and Chinese intellectuals were by no means alone in applying racial terms and theories. They took them from the West.36

62 Racial nationalism seems to have become more and more important as an element to help establish collective identity, especially after 1989. Sautman has collected statements by high-ranking Chinese communist cadres that obviously reveal racial thinking.37 Official documents emphasise the common ancestry of the Han and minorities. Han and Tibetans are regarded as parts of a common race, and the early historical Tibetan and Yellow River cultures are regarded as identical. Tibetans allegedly belong to the Chinese nation through this blood relationship.38These and other examples indicate that racial nationalism seems to be on the rise and plays an important role in the discourse on national identity.

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63 Despite all of the attempts to create a national identity through the revival of tradition and even racial thinking, one cannot speak of one Chinese national identity or one Chinese nationalism. Instead, as Gladney has argued39, one can observe the fragmentation of Chinese identity, even among the Han majority, and the emergence of various regional identities and national movements in the Chinese-speaking area. The Communist Party is struggling to keep all of these, in some cases centrifugal, forces under control by utilising traditional cultural, ethnic, and racial elements under the umbrella of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics.”

64 In addition to the already existing state nationalism or patriotism of the Party, one can identify the following “nationalisms.” • Popular autonomous nationalism, which emerged in the 1990s and surfaced in various autonomous demonstrations (against the United States and Japan [1999, 2005]) and publications.40 The government seems to be indifferent to such nationalism, although it could become dangerous (as in 1919) if the Party does not take the right measures against Japan or the United States to placate the movement. It is not possible to say in which political direction this nationalism might head in times of national crisis―whether more democratic and anti-government or more conservative and anti-foreign. The second option seems to be more likely. • Tibetan and Uighur nationalisms, which became stronger in the 1990s. Both are ethnic and religious movements.41 The first may even contain democratic elements, due to the personality of the Dalai Lama and the exiled Tibetan elite. The second is clearly ethnic and religious, either demanding autonomous rights guaranteed under the Constitution or even independence. • Taiwanese nationalism. The rehabilitation of Taiwanese culture has favoured the cultural identity of the Taiwanese and has supported the rise of Taiwanese nationalism in the 1990s. Though the ethnic aspect is very strong, the synthesis of ethnic and democratic concepts has created a civic and liberal type of nationalism in a Chinese-speaking area for the first time, which could be a model for the Chinese mainland too.42 • Democratic nationalism, which is clearly underdeveloped on the mainland. There are a few scholars who favour democratic nationalism and the introduction of a democratic regime in China, such as Wu Guoguang, Ding Xueliang and Zheng Yongnian, but none of them teaches on the mainland.

65 In view of these different types of nationalism, it is perhaps better to speak of “nationalist movements in the Chinese-speaking area” rather than of “Chinese nationalism,” and of a still troubled Chinese national identity. Outlook 66 Since the 1980s, intellectuals, as well as the people, have had the possibility of recovering their cultural past. This is one of the most positive aspects of this period. For the first time since 1949, Chinese people on the mainland have had the chance to develop their own identity by immersing themselves in their own culture and simultaneously adapting to modernity.

67 What is the political dimension of these new developments? Are they indicators of a desirable democratisation of Chinese society in all areas? As desirable as this would be, skepticism is yet called for, as the following observations show. 1. One can observe the build-up of two main positions, both of which might become the dominating political movements in the future and both of which to a certain extent refer to traditions in Chinese thought. There is not only an extremely disputed and officially

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combated tendency towards Westernisation, but, as already seen in the 1920s and 1930s, there has emerged at the same time a counter-tendency in the form of a revival of conservative ideologies. 2. The pro-democracy movement of the 1980s and its theoretical foundations revealed strong deficiencies regarding socio-political preconditions, as far as the path to a more democratic and pluralist state in future was concerned. In the following years the partial modernisation conducted by the government favoured negative developments, such as corruption and the abuse of power, and no independent political institutions have been created for their control. At the same time, the building up of a counter-ideology, of a bulwark against the political liberalism and pluralism of the West, continued. 3. The renaissance of traditional Chinese thought, especially of Neo-Confucianism, seems to support a rising ethnic and cultural nationalism, and not necessary political liberalism and democracy. (In this, there is some similarity to the partial modernisation of Germany as a “delayed nation” in the second part of the nineteenth and first part of the twentieth centuries and its anti-Western and anti-liberal ideologies.) 4. However, the quantity of translations and Chinese studies on Western thought since the 1980s represents a phenomenal feat by Chinese intellectuals, and it is no exaggeration to speak of the beginning of a new chapter in the intellectual history of China and its dealing with Western ideas. This is, together with the “recovering” of the Chinese past, a very positive aspect. Although Marxism-Leninism and Maoism still prevail on the surface, the foundations of other systems of thought have been laid down and have started to exert their long-lasting influence. The pluralist nature of the intellectual discourse is no longer stifled by a closed system of thought as it was in the past. Chinese scholars have started recovering their philosophical tradition, and, in comparing it with the West, they are building new cultural identities in their search for modernity. Moreover, there is reason to hope that the continuous study of Western philosophy in China, and of Chinese philosophy in the West, will lead to a common understanding that basic modes of thinking can be found in both cultures, and that these can be used to establish the foundations for a better intellectual discourse in the future. 5. The attempts to apply some modes of Western thought do not necessarily imply a rapprochement between China and the West, in which the fundamental political values of Western democracy and parliamentarianism will eventually be adopted in something like a “democracy with Chinese characteristics,” as has happened in Taiwan. On the contrary, one cannot rule out that the traditional anti-Western ideology in China will become an amalgam consisting of Confucian elements, combined with set pieces of Party ideology, anti-Western, non-liberal philosophy, and based on an ethnic, or even, racist identity. Under the slogans of “patriotism” and “Chineseness,” such a nationalistic ideology could be used by the leadership to present itself as the core of the “Chinese nation,” which, in addition to the Han people, would automatically include the official minorities, the Taiwanese, Hong Kongers, and overseas Chinese.

68 The rising nationalist rhetoric and the attempts to create a collective Chinese identity among all of these different groups is a threat to their individual ethnic and cultural identities. It is this official policy that forces the minorities to rediscover and redefine their own identities, and which arouses national feeling among them. A solution to the clash between conflicting cultural and national identities in China could lie in the development of a multi-ethnic nationalism that is based on the principles of political liberalism. However, this would mean the adoption of the second “half of modernity.”

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NOTES

1. Erikson, Erik H. (1959) Identity and the Life Cycle. New York, Norton, pp. 27-28. 2. Smith, Anthony D. (1991) National Identity. Reno, University of Nevada Press, 3ff; Dean, Kathryn (ed.) (1997) Politics and the End of Identity. Brookfield (United States), Ashgate, pp. 1-46. For an attempt to clarify the concept with regards to China, refer to Dittmer, Lowell & Kim, Samuel S. (eds.) (1993), China’s Quest for National Identity. Ithaca, Cornell University Press. 3. Ralph Dahrendorf (1965), Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland (Society and Democracy in Germany). Munich, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 55 and 59. 4. On the problems addressed here, compare above all the works by Dahrendorf R., op.cit.. Faulenbach, Bernd: Ideologie des deutschen Weges. Die deutsche Geschichte in der Historiographie zwischen Kaiserreich und Nationalsozialismus. München 1980. Vierhaus, Rudolf: Die Ideologie des deutschen Weges der politischen und sozialen Entwicklung. In: Die Krise des Liberalismus zwischen den Weltkriegen. Edited by Thadden, Rudolf von. Göttingen 1978, pp. 96-114. Mosse, George L.: The Crisis of German Ideology. Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich. New York 1964. Stromberg, Roland N.: Redemption by War. The Intellectuals and 1914. Lawrence 1981. From the French side also the essay by Groh, D.: Le "Sonderweg" de l'histoire allemande entre 1848 et 1945: mythe ou réalité? In: Annales 38, 1166-87. A short but very good summary of the problems can also be found in Löwenthal, Richard: Gesellschaftswandel und Kulturkrise. Zukunftsprobleme der westlichen Demokratien. Frankfurt a. M. 1979, pp. 268-70. 5. Jürgen Habermas: Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne, Frankfurt 19863. The “project of cultural modernity” is based on the universality of the values of the Enlightenment and the French revolution, subjective reason as precondition of any scientific activity, reflective dealing with tradition, emancipation from traditional bonds and social/political powers. Compare Habermas, 10f, and Bassam Tibi, Islamischer Fundamentalismus, moderne Wissenschaft und Technologie, Frankfurt 1992, p. 20. 6. Compare Frank Dikoetter, “Culture, ‘Race’ and Nation,” in: Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 49/2, Winter 1996, p. 602, footnote 25. 7. One of his works has been translated into German: Ku Hung-ming (Gu Hongming), Chinas Verteidigung gegen westliche Ideen. Kritische Aufsätze, Eugen Diedrichs Verlag, Jena 1911. 8. Cf. Werner Meissner (1994), China zwischen nationalem ‘Sonderweg’, und universaler Modernisierung - Zur Rezeption westlichen Denkens in China, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, pp. 147-171. Still the best biography on Zhang Junmai is Roger Bailey Jeans, Democracy and Socialism in Republican China: the politics of Zhang Junmai (Carsun Chang) 1906-1941, Rowma and Littlefield 1997. The only German presentation is Hung Mao-hsiung (1980): Carsun Chang (1887-1969). Seine Vorstellungen vom Sozialismus in China. Inaugural Dissertation. München.. Short presentations also in Tan, Chester C. (1972), Chinese Political Thought in the 20th Century. Newton Abbot, pp. 253-266. 9. On Hu Shi, see the still unmatched work by Grieder, Jerome (1970) Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press.

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10. Hu Shi zuopin, Taipei 1986, pp. 75-82. Refer also to Grieder (1970), p. 195). 11. Cf. Meissner (1994), 50ff, 184ff. 12. A short overview of the controversy is provided by Kolonko, Petra: “The Challenged National Identity. When Chinese Wanted to Become Westerners. The "Debate on Total Westernization," in: China 1934-35. In: East Asian Civilizations, No. 2, 1983, pp. 168-174. The Chinese contributions are printed in: Lü Xiehai (Editor): Quanpanxihua yanlunji (Collected essays on total Westernisation), Canton 1934; Feng Enrong (Editor): Quanpanxihua yanlunxüji (Further collected essays on total Westernisation), Canton 1935, and Mo Faying (Editor): Quanpanxihua yanlun sanji (Third collection of essays on total Westernisation), Canton 1936. (References from Kolonko, op. cit., p. 168.) See also Gransow, Bettina: Geschichte der chinesischen Soziologie (A history of Chinese sociology), Frankfurt/ New York 1992, S. pp. 101-114. 13. Compare Meissner (1994), p. 171. 14. “Reden an die deutsche Nation” (Speeches to the German Nation), published in 1808 on the occasion of Napoleon’s occupation of Germany, became the “bible” of German nationalism. Translated by Zhang Junmai: Feixide deyizhiguominrenjiang, 1932, Reprint Taipei 1970.4 15. Cf. Lee Kuo-chi (1975), Kultureinfluß Deutschlands auf China im 20. Jahrhundert, in: Tradition und Neubeginn. Internationale Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert. Edited by Hütterer, J. et al. (1975), Köln, pp. 215-220, cf. 219. 16. A good survey of the revival of Confucianism can be found in Lee Minghui: “Das Konfuzianismusfieber im heutigen China,” in: Der Konfuzianismus, Ursprünge – Entwicklungen – Perspektiven, eds. Ralf Moritz und Lee Minghui, Leipzig 1998. Also Jing Wang, High Culture Fever. Politics, Aesthetics, and Ideology in Deng’s China, Berkeley 1996, p. 64ff. 17. Cf. Renmin Ribao (October 8th and 9th 1989), Guangming Ribao (October 8th and 9th 1989), and XNA, (October 8th and 9th 1989). 18. So Chen Zhengfu and He Zhiqing, explicitly, in their book Kongzi, Ruxue yu Zhongguo xiandaihua (Confucius, Confucianism and Chinese Modernisation) (Fujian: Xinhua 1992), page 238ff: “Xiandai xinrujia yu Zhongguo xiandaihua.” 19. The term “National Confucianism” was first used by Jean-Philippe Béja in his article: “The Rise of National-Confuciansm,” China Perspectives (Nov. /Dec. 1995), pp. 6-11. 20. Cf. Brunhild Staiger “Chinas Modernisierung und die traditionelle Kultur,” in: China aktuell (January 1991), p. 31-39. 21. The following paragraph is mainly based on the excellent study by Guo Yingjie, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China, London 2004. 22. For details compare the chapter on Zeng in Guo, 49 pp. 23. For details of the debate, see Chapter 5 in Guo, 91 pp. 24. Cf. Werner Meissner (2001), Western Philosophy in China, 1993-1997. A Bibliography. Euro-Sinica, Vol. 11, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, Frankfurt, New York, Oxford, Wien: Peter Lang Verlag 2001, and Die Rezeption der westlichen Philosophie in der VR China, 1987-1992. Eine Bibliographie, in co-operation with Liu Weijian, Münster, 1996. 25. A brief look into the Yearbook of Chinese Philosophy (Zhongguo zhexuenianjian) published since 1998 shows that the occupation with Western philosophy has intensified. Compare Zhongguo zhexue nianjian, 1998 – 2006, Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan zhexueyanjiu suobian, Beijing.

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26. Kohn, Hans (1945) The Idea of Nationalism. Macmillan, New York. Kohn’s distinction has been the focus of much criticism. However, the German, the Russian and the Chinese cases, as well as the developments in the former Yugoslavia, seem to justify his definition. Refer to Hutchinson, John & Smith, Anthony (eds.) (1994) Nationalism. Oxford & New York, Oxford University Press, 160ff. 27. On Zhang Binglin, compare Laitinen, K. (1990), Chinese Nationalism in the late Qing Dynasty ‑ Zhang Binglin as an Anti-Manchu Propagandist, London. 28. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People, trans. Frank W. Price, ed. L. T. Chen (Shanghai, China: China Committee, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1927. 29. Cf. Gottfried Karl Kindermann, who made this point already very early in his book: Konfuzianismus, Sunyatsenismus und chinesischer Kommunismus, Freiburg 1963 30. Legislative Yuan, Executive Yuan and Judiciary Yuan, taken from the Western system, combined with two institutions from the Chinese administration: the control Yuan and the examination Yuan. 31. Cf. Gunter Schubert (2002), Chinas Kampf um die Nation. Hamburg, 116ff, 133ff. 32. Qiushi (1990), vol. 9: 8-9, quoted after Pye, Lucian (1996) “How China’s Nationalism was Shanghaied,” in: Unger, Jonathan Chinese Nationalism. New York, M. E. Sharpe, pp. 86-112, p. 106. 33. Cf. Schubert (2002), p.192 ff. on cultural nationalism in the 1990s. 34. Frank Dikoetter, “Group definition and the idea of race in modern China (1793-1949),” in Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 13, no. 3, July 1990: 420 ff. 35. Chiang Kai-shek (1947), China’s Destiny, New York: 39. 36. Cf. Frank Dikoetter (1992), The Discourse on Race in Modern China, London. 37. Barry Sautmann, “Racial Nationalism and Chinese External Behaviour,” in: World Affairs, Fall 1997, Vol. 160, Issue 2: 78 ff. 38. Haemoglobin studies have been conducted to prove the supposed racial kinship of the Chinese and the minorities. For details, see Sautmann, op. cit. 39. Dru C. Gladney, Dislocating China: Muslims, Minorities and Other Subaltern Subjects, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2004. 40. The best known were China can say no (Zhongguo keyi shuo bu), published in 1996, and Behind the scenes of the Demonization of China (Yaomohua Zhongguo de beiho), also in 1996. For more details see Jean-Pierre Cabestan: “The many facets of Chinese nationalism,” in: China Perspectives, No. 59, May-June 2005, pp. 26-40. 41. On the emergence of Hui and Uighur nationalism in China, compare Gladney, op. cit., also Werner Meissner, Der internationale Terrorismus aus ostasiatischer Sicht – Chinas Reaktion auf den 11. September und die Veraenderungen seiner geopolitischen Lage, in: Sicherheit und Verteidigung nach dem 11. September 2001, Strategische Kultur Europas, vol 1, ed. by August Pradetto, Frankfurt 2004, pp. 157-174 42. On Taiwanese nationalism, compare in detail Gunter Schubert, Chinas Kampf um die Nation, op. cit., 277ff., and Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “Specificities and limits of Taiwanese nationalism,” in: China Perspectives, No. 62, November-December 2005, 32ff.

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ABSTRACTS

The paper describes and analyzes crucial elements of cultural and national identity-building in China from the 19th century to the present: the unfolding of the identity crisis following its repeated defeats by Western powers in the 19th century and the attempts of China’s intellectual elite to develop a new cultural and national identity. The paper also deals with the main currents of identity-building and the perception of the West since the 1980s by discussing the rising importance of Confucianism, the role of history and language, and the renaissance of Western thought after the decline of Marxism-Leninism. Finally, the focus will be on the emergence of different types of Chinese nationalism since the 19th century and the recent discourse on nationalism.

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Literature

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Poetry Movements in Taiwan from the 1950s to the late 1970s: Breaks and Continuities

Alain Leroux

EDITOR'S NOTE

Translated by Jonathan Hall

1 The historical beginnings of modern poetry in Taiwan2 can be traced back to the Retrocession (the return of the island to the Republic of China after the Japanese surrender in 1945), or, more pertinently still, back to 1949 when the remnants of Chang Kai-shek's army and administration retreated to Taiwan. It is not that nothing had happened in the Chinese and Japanese literature of the previous period―in fact, this literature is being rediscovered―but the historical circumstances of those times disrupted any direct continuity. Apart from a few exceptional cases, it took another twenty years for an authentically Taiwanese heritage to reappear on the literary scene. After 1946, the Nationalist government implemented a policy of imposing Chinese culture and language, which meant effectively removing Japanese influences, and this opened a rift between the administration with its official culture and the Taiwanese, upon whom the Japanese had imposed the exclusive use of their language after 1936. Consequently, all political and cultural control on the island passed into the hands of the new arrivals from the Mainland.3

2 During these early years, those who were to play a leading role in the development of modern literature and poetry brought with them their recent inheritance from Chinese history, with all its struggles and problems. Principal among these were the still ongoing civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists, and the recently concluded conflict with Japan. And in a more distant way there were all the consequences of the May 4th Movement, which itself had been the outcome of the

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earlier traumatic encounters between China and the West (from the fall of the Qing dynasty to the early days of the Republic).

3 Modern poetry in Taiwan inherits all of this as its point of departure. That is why it is useful to make a preliminary survey―as briefly as possible for the purposes of this article―to cover the preceding thirty years going back to the May 4th Movement and its consequences. It was during this period that those questions first arose that were later to confront modern Taiwanese poetry, concerning the language and form of poetry as well as its cultural situation and social role.

4 In Taiwan, in accordance with the KMT programme for literature and the arts drawn up in 1942,4 and in order to maintain the morale of its troops, the army set up an active cultural service. While encouraging cultural activities and the preservation of traditions, this also ensured the maintenance of the correct political line. As for new poetry in this context, what we find is the newspaper publication of material which could best be described as more or less well versified slogans. This was a literature stripped of reality, which barely concealed defeat and cultural collapse. Moreover, the surrounding climate for several years was one of ever-present paranoia, spy-mania, and arbitrary police action.5 The Modernist movement and "horizontal transplantation" 5 In this atmosphere a reaction against official art arose, led by people with higher demands. The first of these leading figures were those who had taken part in literary movements before the war: Ch'in Tzu-hao 覃子豪, who had been involved with the Crescent Moon 新月, founded a literary supplement, which he called Blue Star 藍星; Chi Hsien 紀弦, who had taken part in the group led by Dai Wangshu in Shanghai, relaunched a journal under the same name of New Poetry Xin shi 新詩in 1952, which then became Xiandai shi 現代詩 in 1953 (Modern Poetry). Its primary purpose was to continue the aims of Dai Wangshu "to express modern emotions, as felt by modern people in modern life, through modern poems in modern language".6

6 With regard to poetic form, Chi Hsien made some clear-cut choices which were to exercise a decisive influence over the early development of poetry in Taiwan. For him "poetry is not chained to musicality; it must be free,"7 it had won its independence in the nineteenth century, when it bid farewell to music, a freedom he dated back to Baudelaire's prose poems. Hence, Chi Hsien concluded, the need to abandon every rule, rhyme and metre, in short every pre-existent form into which the poem must be squeezed. Instead, each poem must create its own form, which is therefore determined by its content.

7 A little later, Chi Hsien adopted an even more radical stance. He took to extremes the Westernising trend which had appeared with the May 4th Movement, but he broke with all the subsequent developments, particularly those which came after the 1930s. In February 1956, his "Modern Poetry" issued a new manifesto intended to set Taiwanese poetry in the context of the worldwide Modernist trend, or rather, trends. The first article proclaimed, "We are a group belonging to the Modernist school, who keep alive the spirit and the poetic practices of all the innovative poetic schools which have flourished since Baudelaire". His journal thus claimed as its only inheritance all international poetic movements since Baudelaire. For him the correlative to this Westernisation was the total refusal of Chinese traditions, ancient and modern.

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8 The second article in the manifesto summed up this position with a formulation that was bound to provoke a vigorous response: "We believe that the new poetry is a horizontal transplant (橫的移植, hengde yizhi), not a vertical inheritance".8 It was this second article that aroused the greatest controversy. Its proclamation of the abandonment of everything that made up the Chinese tradition, in favour of an international modernity, provoked violent polemics. "Horizontal transplantation" was seen as the end of Chinese cultural identity. Despite this furore, Chi Hsien continued to insist, in a commentary on his manifesto, that "our new, universal poetry is not the expression of a "national essence" like the T'ang poems or the Sung Ballads".9 7 and 6 - Chi Hsien

A stick in the hand 7 A pipe in the mouth 6 The number 7 is like a stick. The number 6 is like a pipe. And here I am.

The stick 7 plus the pipe 6 = me 13

A poet. A genius. The unluckiest of numbers!

Oh, a tragedy. Tragedy tragedy here I am. And you clap your hands and cheer. 7與6 -紀弦

拿著手杖7 咬著煙鬥6 數字7是具備了手仗的型態的。 數字6是具備了煙鬥的型態的。 於是我來了。

手仗7 + 煙鬥6 = 13之我

一個詩人。一s個天才。 一個最不幸的數字！

唔，一個悲劇。 悲劇悲劇我來了。 於是你們鼓掌，你們喝采。

9 Shunned by the conservatives, Chi Hsien received widespread acceptance among the younger poets of the time. About a hundred of them enrolled under the banner of the Modernist School, which brought together various poets who had assimilated the Western traditions, like Fang Ssu 方思, (known particularly for his translations of Rilke), several native Taiwanese poets, such as Pai Ch'iu 白萩, and Lin Heng-t'ai 林亨泰, who had been educated under the Japanese occupation and were ill at ease with the Chinese language but had become familiar with foreign poetry through Japanese channels, and other young poets who nonetheless remained sensitive to the Chinese tradition, like Cheng Ch'ou-yu 鄭愁予. There were still others who, because of the war and more recent upheavals, had often received only an erratic education and whose literary formation might be called somewhat summary.

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Landscape No. 2 - Lin Heng-t’ai

Lines of trees to break the wind And beyond them other Lines of trees And beyond them other Lines of trees And beyond them others

And now the sea and the lines made by the waves And now the sea and the lines made by the waves 風景no.2 -林亨泰

防風林 的 外邊 還有 防風林 的 外邊 還有 防風林 的 外邊 還有

然而海 以及波的羅列 然而海 以及波的羅列

10 No doubt that was one of the reasons for the enthusiastic reception of "Modern Poetry". This was a call for a literature which deliberately saw itself as rootless, even as it projected a largely abstract vision of the West; and the reason why it elicited such a response from men and from women who had been thrown this way and that by History, was because they saw themselves being led to a new promised land with only their talent and imagination to rely upon.

11 Eve those who were culturally better equipped suffered from the consequences of exile, which included being cut off from their native land and its emotional ties, but also from the cultural links and the physical reminders of China's past. Moreover, more recent books and documents were not available, even when they were not banned. These included the better part of all the cultural achievements since the 1930s. Under such circumstances, the West was able to provide a certain intellectual sustenance which, moreover, the regime was inclined to tolerate. This point cannot be overstated. In those years, the enabling condition for the development of modern poetry was the refocusing of creativity onto a purified poetry which, in opposition to the dominant ideology, allowed for the expression of individual feelings, and the rejection of politics, or rather its separation from artistic creation.

12 The leading personalities were too diverse to allow this school to develop a genuinely homogeneous style, even if that had been its intention. Nonetheless it enabled the exploration of all sorts of structural plays with meaning, formal experiments, calligrams and innovative page layouts. Admittedly, the themes and materials of these poems were often inspired by Western literature.10 And while the dominant themes were the tragic self's feelings of exile, nostalgia and solitude, it nevertheless managed to present them within a perspective free of both sentimentality and the stale presuppositions of everyday speech.

13 Although this school was dissolved a few years later, leaving Chi Hsien with the sense of having failed to "precipitate", as in chemistry, the production of modern Chinese poems, nonetheless poetry in Taiwan was definitively marked by his exacting demands.

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From him it acquired its concern for intellectual content, its refusal of emotional outpouring, its careful attention to expression, and its condensed use of language.

14 However, one consequence of the positions taken by his journal was a certain abandonment of the sound of a poem, and a vacillation between poetry and prose, leaving the question of the specifically poetic quality of a poetic text broadly unanswered. The Blue Star, and the defence of the lyrical tradition

15 Reacting against Chi Hsien's intellectualism, his "horizontal transplantation", and the Modernist tendency in general, a group was formed around Ch'in Tzu-hao, editor of the Blue Star literary supplement, whose intention was to maintain the lyrical tradition. They did not repudiate the whole Chinese tradition, either in the form of its ancient classical heritage or its more recent developments in the 1920s, particularly in the works of the Crescent Moon, such as Wen Yiduo 聞一多and Xü Zhimo 徐志摩.

16 Those who gathered around the Blue Star were more like an informal group than an organised movement. One of its leading lights, Yang Mu 揚牧, referred to it as a literary "salon". This point is illustrated by Yü Kwang-chung's recollections of its creation: "We never elected a president, and still less did we issue a manifesto or proclaim some 'ism' or other. On the whole, our gatherings were a reaction against Chi Hsien. He wanted to transplant contemporary poetry into Chinese soil, and we were totally against that. Even though we may not have considered our mission to be the perpetuation of the Chinese poetic tradition, that does not mean that we were willing to blindly carry out his horizontal transplantation"11

17 This group's indisputable role in the development of the poetry of Taiwan was due to the personality of its members12 and the quality of their works, rather than to its theoretical positions. Nevertheless, violent polemics with the Modernists broke out, often with Yü Kwang-chung at their centre, over such issues as the importance of prosody, the need to maintain verse, the concern with creating new stable forms, and the role of tradition. On several occasions, however, Yü Kwang-chung took an opposing position and resolutely defended the new poetry against the proponents of classicism, which, in the first years or even decades, still represented the dominant trend in the intellectual establishment. Solitude - Chou Meng-tieh

Tailing the dusk Quietly creeping up from behind to enfold me, wrap around me An incomplete moon hangs lonely in the sky Reflected in the reed-tangled bed of the stream The surface of the stream as clear as the glass in a mirror With now and then a floating wisp of white cloud And the shadows of birds crying softly as they skim the water ….

Sitting cross-legged I see myself on the bank See my shadow in the water

Roused from contemplation, I smile And with a twig snapped from a willow On the unblemished surface of the water

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I carefully trace the character for “man” Once, twice, three times… 寂寞 -周夢蝶

寂寞躡手躡腳的地 尾著黃昏 悄悄打我背後裡來裹來 , 裹來

缺月孤懸天中 又返照於筕藻交橫的溪底 溪面如鏡晶澈 紙偶爾有幾瓣白雲冉冉 幾點飛鳥輕噪著渡影掠水過......

我趺坐著 看了看岸上的我自己 在看看投影在水裏的

醒然一笑 把一根斷秙的柳枝 在沒一絲破綻的水面上 著意點畫著 「人」字 一個 ,兩個 , 三個......

18 The Blue Star also played a leading role in extending the influence of modern poetry, whether through its publication of single authors and collected works, or through organising group recitals and public readings. Both of these activities helped the younger generations to appreciate the new poetry.

19 With the benefit of several years' hindsight, the differences between these schools probably appear less clear cut; Westernisation, along with the repudiation of tradition, seems mainly a matter of degree. However, it was above all the poets of the Blue Star group who, having made the greatest effort to sift through the Western imports, and having maintained with the greatest deliberation the taste for Chinese traditions, were the first to introduce the practice of re-interpreting the classical tradition. Because of this, they also made the biggest contribution towards gaining acceptance for modern poetry. "Epoch" and the exploration of limits 20 The third journal to make a decisive contribution appeared in 1954. This was Chuangshiji 創世紀 (Epoch, or alternatively Genesis or Creation, according to other translations). After Modern Poetry and the Blue Star this journal, which followed the direction opened up by the May 4th Movement, gave a new impulse to poetry in Taiwan in the 1960s.

21 Chuangshiji was launched by three young men, Lo Fu 洛夫, Ya Hsien 瘂弦, and Chang Mo 張默, who were naval officers at the time. Their primary intention was to "assert the national direction in the new poetry".13 In that sense, like Blue Star, it was set up in reaction against "horizontal transplantation". In an article entitled "The form of the new national poetry"14, the new journal advanced two criteria. The first of these was general in nature: the new poetry must have "an oriental and specifically Chinese flavour" and it must "take advantage of the particular qualities of the Chinese language in order to express the life experience of an oriental people"; the second was more technical: there must be no purely psychological or emotional display of feeling. On the

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contrary, the poem must be "an expressive image, and the development of its meanings". To refuse the immediate expression of the ideas or emotions, one might say, amounts to "probing the verse", except that in this instance it was less a question of poetry than prose. Once rhyme and metre have been discarded, and even the particular page layout of poetry has disappeared, what is left to distinguish it from prose? To this question, which had been left open since Baudelaire's "Spleen de Paris", and to which Chi Hsien had found no real answer, Epoch replied "the image". And it is most likely that this reflection on the image is what led the group to place itself under the banner of Western Modernism and even, in the end, of "horizontal transplantation".

22 So in 1959, this group set about fomenting its "new revolution in the new poetry". To the same degree that it had once seen itself as representing national traditions, it now saw itself as a voice of universal poetry. In this second phase, which occurred in the 1960s, there were two major contributions from this group (which does not mean that these were their sole activities), namely the adoption of surrealism and a poetics of pure experience.

23 Did André Breton ever know that in Taiwan, far from the rue Fontaine, there were poets proclaiming their adherence to surrealism? Yet, at that time at least, those poets had never read his Surrealist Manifestos. As Lo Fu wrote, "Of course, the surrealist works of our poets were not written as a result of understanding French surrealism, and even less after reading André Breton's 'Manifestes du Surréalisme' or other texts, reports, or programmes. In reality, they were influenced by the literary works of the French surrealists and, more broadly by those from other countries".15

24 One of the leading representatives of this surrealism was Shang Ch'in 商禽, who excelled in the prose poem. Although this tendency was unable to take up the task of total revolution, it nonetheless impelled its adherents to free themselves from the constraints of logic and to shake off social and moral norms, at least in their writing, by combining dreams with realism, and summoning up the unconscious. They occasionally practiced a somewhat controlled automatic writing, granting to objective chance and unexpected affinities their share in the final outcome. Death in a stone cell - Lo Fu

Happening to raise my head towards my neighbour’s corridor, I am transfixed At dawn, his body naked, he has rebelled against death Sending a black tributary roaring through his veins I am transfixed, and when my gaze sweeps the stone wall I see two bloody grooves cut into it

My face opens out like the bole of a tree, a tree matured in fire All is still, only the eyes are moving behind their lids Moving towards that of which many men dare not speak And I am the bitter pear-tree cut down by the saw In whose rings you can still hear clearly the wind and the cicadas 石室之死亡 -洛夫

祇偶然昂首向鄰居的甬道，我便怔住 在清晨，那人以裸體去背叛死 任一條黑色支流咆哮橫過他的脈管 我便怔住，我以目光掃過那坐石壁 上面即鏨成兩道血槽

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我的面容展開如一株樹，樹在火中成長 一切靜止，唯眸子在眼瞼後面移動 移向許多人都怕談及的方向 而我確是那株被鋸斷的苦梨 在年輪上，你仍可聽清楚風聲、蟬聲

25 Furthermore, for many years the main criterion for success in poetic writing was based on the idea of tension (張力), which ensured the poem's intensity as well as its capacity for epiphanic revelations. Tension should not be understood as a gap between a hypothetical degree zero of language―the absolutely direct language of ordinary speech―and the artistic language of poetry, but rather as a semantic distance within poetic discourse itself, between the terms constituting the image (whether through metaphors or metonymic associations). Moreover, these might be purely verbal constructions with no reference to external reality at all. In such cases, this poetry of tension goes beyond giving figural representation to the unconscious, to pose the possibility of creating images entirely free of representation.

26 Another way of opening the doors of mental space through forging a poetic instrument of increased plasticity was the poetry of pure experience, whose leading theoretician and best practitioner was Yip Wai-lim 葉維廉. Although this approach relies equally on the image, pure experience is not necessarily detached from the external world. It seeks to separate sensations from ideation, to seize the moment when objects of perception reach the surface of conscious awareness in all their immediacy, just before critical judgement reduplicates them in a representational language which fixes their identity. In other words, here poetry attempts to present a pure, intransitive, absolute "here is", and not an expositional "this is a".16 Meditation on the sky - Yip Wai-lim

1 Suddenly illuminated by silence the mountains the light are ruffled by a keen wind

2 Starlight soundlessly shakes the turbulent river

the dyke crumbles then a white bird plunges into the mountain air

Such a powerful negative!

3 In the moon are mountains in the mountains a moon either

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mountains or moon mountain moon moon mountain flawed split apart knowing nothing of blood 攸 -葉維廉

然突 自沈默亮起 山 光 被疾風吹皺了

負

星光 無聲 搖動 兇猛的河流

堤 崩便隨 白色的鳥 沉入山氣裏

啊好一個雄渾的負數

27 Later these poetic practices were criticised for escapism, subjectivism and even narcissism. It is true that the investigation of the poet's inner world and the search for a language of pure expression played a prominent role in them. But, leaving aside the point that the failures of mediocrities often conceal the successes of superior talents, it is no exaggeration to say that exile and loss of roots, in a virulent combination with a repressive regime and an all-enveloping psychosis, provide ample explanation of why they pursued this path, giving prominence to what they felt: ennui, anxious torment, the sense of an unchanging present, frustrated desire, loneliness, imprisonment, and helplessness.17

28 Existentialism, at that time, provided a major frame of reference. Of course, this was part of the general post-war climate. But in addition to their sense of being outsiders in the world, these poets had known the most extreme situations, such as war and the surrounding presence of death. Their detractors point to their nihilism, but it would be better to point to their laying bare of the human condition. As Lo Fu put it: "Hold a mirror before you, and you will not see the face of modern man, but the cruelty of his fate. Writing poems is a means of taking revenge on this fate".18

29 They have also been criticised for their hermetic language. Such obscurity may have been partly a protective measure against the obscurantism of the censors. As one of these poets told me, "we were smarter than they were".19 But obscurity, or what appeared as such, was probably a necessary consequence of their poetic practices. In all events, they certainly pushed the language to its limits, and more than any others, they

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made a major contribution towards forging modern Chinese into a truly poetic instrument.20 Bamboo Hat and collective memory in Taiwan

30 Twenty years after the Retrocession, and amidst all the developments which until then had been the work of the émigré poets, a voice was heard claiming to be specifically Taiwanese. In 1964, the journal Li 笠, meaning "bamboo hat", was set up. It has often been called "the fourth leg of the tripod", because it played a no less decisive role in the development of poetry in Taiwan than the three mentioned already, while at the same time it brought in new and different concerns. Li represented two interconnected phenomena, the resurgence of a properly Taiwanese collective memory and an engagement with the realities of the local situation. With one exception, this movement consisted entirely of native poets born in Taiwan. Like the name of the journal, this simple fact is a sufficient indication of the direction which the group set out to follow. As the journal proclaimed several years later, "we take our point of departure from the real historical and geographical situation of Taiwan. At the same time, we give a voice to the vicissitudes undergone in the years since our island's return to the motherland"21

31 Among the forty or so members associated with the journal Li, the youngest had been educated in Chinese, but those older had had to "step across the language gap", by learning Mandarin. Moreover that gap was precisely why they had had to wait before making their presence felt on the literary scene. In addition, many of them had some prior experience of modern poetry.22

32 But their desire to establish a solid reconnection between the poetry of Taiwan and their native land itself, led them to turn their backs on those very avant-garde trends in which many of them had actually distinguished themselves in former times.23 Instead of just representing themselves, they now intended to speak for all: "Standing upright on our island, with our two feet on our native soil, and knowing the experiences of all our people, we wish to sing of the great historical scenes which sadden or inspire us all".24

33 Some readers at the time wished to see nothing but linguistic ineptitudes in the poems published by the journal. Such flaws might be explained by the fact that many of these poets had had to learn Chinese relatively late. But in fact, the simplicity of their diction was deliberate and linked directly to their intentions. They wanted to give expression to the daily lives of the people around them. Pai Ch'iu wrote that "the strength of language arises from the fact that it creates new relationships. A sentence may be very simple, for it is enough for it to uncover new potential relations in order to capture the human mind and carry it further, into a realm which will not be easily forgotten".25 Clearly it was not for them a matter of simply reproducing a reflection of daily life. According to Huan Fu 桓夫, the reality effect that they aimed at consisted in "seeking the meanings in life, without getting lost in the mass of daily details, and trying to express them in a structured crystallisation".26 It should be added that their poetry adopted a deliberately sarcastic tone, offering no illusions about society and history. The sky - Pai Ch’iu The sky must have the gentle bosom of a mother. Broad enough to sense the warmth of fresh blood, yet always comforting. But A Huo lies in a trench like a flower torn to shreds Felled by gunfire. His dying eyes look at the sky filled with fury at having been brought to life

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never having asked to be born never having asked to die then, with difficulty, he raises his gun towards the sky and shoots it dead. 天空 - 白萩

天空必有母親般溫柔的胸脯。 那樣廣延，可以感到鮮血的溫暖，隨時保持著慰撫的姿態。 而阿火躺在撕碎的花朵般的戰壕 為槍所擊傷。雙眼垂死的望著天空 充滿成為生命的懊恨 不自願的被出生 不自願的被死亡 然後他艱難地舉槍朝著天空 將天空射殺。

34 At first, the influence exercised by Li was not sufficient to make any significant difference to the way most poetry was written, since both its choice of content and its aesthetics went against the mainstream.27 The same applies to Putaoyuan 葡萄園 (“The Vine”), a journal which, from 1963 onwards, called for clarity in writing and a return to China. But both of these journals heralded the major turning point of the 1970s. The 1970s and the return to the soil 35 The 1970s were to bring about radical changes in cultural preoccupations, particularly in the field of poetic creation, by refocusing them on both Chinese traditions and the real situation in Taiwan. In the first half of the decade, a series of geo-political events precipitated a new awareness. In 1971, the return of the Diaoyutai (or Senkaku) islands to Japan by the United States provoked a wave of patriotism, particularly among the youth of student age who rediscovered their attachment to the country where they lived. Also in 1971, the Republic of China left the UN, which was on the point of expelling it, and this marked the end of its favoured diplomatic status. But while it withdrew to the territory marked by its frontiers (or to be more precise, to the territory still under its jurisdiction), it emphasised its Chinese cultural identity, contrasting it with the Mainland's embroilment in the throes of the Cultural Revolution, which seemed to be liquidating that heritage. Then, after the death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, his son, Chiang Ching-kuo undertook a cautious Taiwanisation of the state apparatus, at least at its lower levels, and began a relative liberalisation of the regime.

36 Furthermore, to be twenty years old at that time meant that one had been born in Taiwan, or had at least spent his or her early childhood there. It also meant having been educated, with a fair degree of success, in Chinese cultural values, especially in having a sense of China's literary tradition. In this new cultural environment, the younger generation made its presence felt precisely through its own new demands. They also felt sick of the "glut of imagery" and saw no reason to go on with what was called, rather too hastily, "nostalgia literature".

37 These early years of the decade saw the appearance of a number of journals, with significant and ambitious titles such as Longzu 龍族 ("People of the Dragon"), Dadi 大地 ("The Earth"), and Zhuliu 主流 ("The Mainstream"). They were founded and actively supported by young poets who were mostly still students. The slogan put out by Longzu was typical: "Sound our own gong, beat our own drum, and dance to the rhythm of our own dragon".28

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38 This slogan was clearly a challenge from the rising generation to the previous one. They clarified their new concerns as follows: "Seize hold of the Chinese style of this time and place, express our thoughts in Chinese words, and, while criticising society, also accept criticism from society".29 And indeed, this questioning of the position and function of poetry in Taiwanese society was to determine a range of new options.

39 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, various activities (such as exhibitions and public readings) and several publications, overseas and in Taiwan, gave people a new exposure to modern poetry as it had been practiced over the previous twenty years.30 Actually, it was not so much the publications themselves but the reactions which they provoked in the mainstream press, which attracted attention to contemporary poetry and aroused new controversies. Notable examples of this were a couple of articles in the China Times 中國時報31 by the Singaporean Professor Kuan Chie-ming 關杰明, who wrote that, "the so-called 'new poetry' is mostly a display, not of national qualities but of an infatuation with imports from the new world [of North America - A.L.]. In addition, these poets have no mastery of the language etc."32 Such reproaches were not new. Their novelty lay in their being pronounced ex cathedra to address a wider public. These criticisms met with widespread approval from intellectuals, from the poets of the Bamboo Hat tendency, and from younger generation poets as well.

40 In 1973 the journal Longzu set the framework for the debate in a special issue, devoted to criticism of the poetry of the previous twenty years: "Readers do not expect their major poets to write very Greek fashion, or very French, or very Allen Ginsberg ; they only expect the words of their poets to resemble their own"33 Driving the point home, the journal asserted that Westernisation was the reason for the divorce between poetry and its readership.

41 Several well-established poets supported these criticisms. Yü Kwang-chong returned partly to what he had said about Chi Hsien, while others who had gone along with Epoch, turned to self-criticism, emphasising the need to take account of the realities of life and the readers' concerns. They raised the key question: for whom do we write? The journal also gave space to its readers, while other articles carried on the debate. These articles identified two things to be rejected, namely Westernism and hermetic language, and three positive goals: to return to China, to get back to reality, and to address a wider popular readership.

42 Perhaps the most surprising outcome was that these reproaches struck home. The writers themselves, including the older poets, took the criticisms on board, and responded to this public reaction by modifying their practice. So there was indeed a return to China, and in the first instance to its literary memories. For example, while Lo Fu continued to defend the demands of pure poetic language, for which excessive obscurity is at least better than excessive clarity, he felt it necessary to recall that the T'ang poets (Li He, Li Shangyin, and even Du Fu) employed hermetic language, and even practiced a kind of surrealism avant la lettre. So he situated his own surrealism within a tradition that saw poetic insight as analogous to chan illumination which, by leaping over the bounds of logic, achieves a kind of revelation. In the same way, Yip Wai-lim also linked his writing to the kind of experience conveyed in T'ang poetry.

43 From this point onwards, far from opposing tradition, these poets set out to recover its spirit, continuing it through their modernising activities. In their thinking as well as in their poetic forms, they drew inspiration from the whole of Chinese poetry since the Shijing 詩經. They revisited the history of Chinese literature, borrowing its forms and

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themes, and seeking to adapt its language. Blue Star had already taken this path, and in the pertinent issue of Longzu Yü Kwang-chung had written, "There are two ways to return to China. The first, which I followed ten years ago, is to transform the classical tradition. The other is to rummage about in the tradition, which means to be typically Chinese".34 Taking readers' reactions into account also meant showing a concern for readability and ease in understanding, which led to a simplification in language. The search for surprise and striking effects gives way to a more natural discourse.

44 Through this return to China and to a more accessible language, in other words through turning towards its readers, modern poetry gained popular acceptance. It became the definitive contemporary form of Chinese poetry, just as the T'ang quatrain and the Song ballad had been in their time. The newspapers started to publish it, and it soon took its place in school curricula. Then composers started setting it to music. This made Lo Fu feel able to write, "The conception of poetry has broadened. If we are asked what modern poetry is, we could reply that basically poetry is what it is and the way it is. Modernity or tradition, transplantation from outside or transmission from within, realism or surrealism, hermeticism or clarity, intellectualism or effusive expressionism, are all secondary questions".35

45 In addition to the felt need to reconnect fundamentally with the Chinese tradition, there was taking local realities into account. The poets of the 1970s were less concerned about exploring their inner selves than with discovering the external world. They into different trends by lending their voice to protagonists on the social scene, identifying themselves with those whom they observed. For them, taking social reality into account without being necessarily exclusive in their allegiances, became a prime necessity. This led to a realism which could be as critical of social developments as it could be supportive of particular individuals. The range of themes broadened into an unprecedented variety. A number of young poets began publishing their works at this time, laying the basis for a notoriety which would become widely established a decade later. They included such figures as Lo Chih-ch'eng 羅智成, Chen Li 陳黎, Do She-sun 杜 十三, Su Shao-lien 蘇紹連, Hsiang Yan 向陽, and Pai-Ling 白靈, to name but a few.

46 In the meantime, the island of Taiwan had undergone an accelerated process of economic and urban development, taking it from its rural status to being an industrial society. This was not without its anxieties and accompanying nostalgia, producing confusion in social values and an incoherent confrontation between ways of living, as well as a conflict between ancient and modern forms of representation. Thunderbolt - Wu Sheng

The flashing gold of lightning, the angry growl of thunder The thunder, bringing a sense of alarm When a moment ago there was fierce sun Your bodies were covered in sweat, yet before it could be wiped away You were soaked once again with rain Your alarm, as you earnestly exhort each other in Your persistence Quickly hide now All those clods of earth waiting impatiently to be turned All those seeds waiting impatiently to germinate Leave them for a while The old sky with its ever-changing face Sneers at you coldly People singing in their living-rooms

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Use a mass of convincing theories To reproach you coldly All the exhortations, all the sneers and reproaches Beneath the criss-cross flashing gold of the lightning You understand them all And the companion who fell screaming, his body blackened You will always remember Why, oh why have you not put down your tools? I think that heaven too must need People who can endure such toil So that at this time each year It sends golden flashes of lightning Straight to the fields of my country And in the fields where there is no protection Only you stand firm between heaven and earth 雷殛 -吳晟

金閃閃的閃電，怒叫著雷聲 雷聲，催趕著驚惶 剛剛還是猛烈的太陽呢 滿身的汗水，還來不及擦拭 又是滿身的雨水 你們的驚惶，苦苦相勸 你們的固執 趕快躲避吧 每一塊急切等待翻掘的泥土 每一顆急切等待生根發芽的種籽 暫且不管吧 容易變臉的老天 陰陰冷冷的恥笑 坐在客廳唱著歌的人們 以一大堆雄辯的理論 陰陰冷冷的指責 所有的苦勸，所有的恥笑和指責 金閃閃的閃電交映下 你們都明明白白 慘叫倒下，渾身發黑的同伴 你們都記憶深深 為甚麼，為甚麼還不擱下農具？ 想來，天上也正欠缺 勤於勞動的人們吧 所以年年此際 必定派遣金閃閃的閃電 直奔吾鄉的田野 而沒有甚麼遮蔽的田野上 唯你們頂天而立地

47 These concerns find an echo in actual poetic creations, such as can be found in the work of Wu Sheng 吳晟, for example. The journal Li had foreshadowed these trends and which it now accompanied, while keeping a certain distance from this "native-soil literature" (鄉土文學 xiangtu wenxue). "Native-soil literature" was doubtless the last attempt in Taiwan to give literature a broad popular appeal, by basing it in an awakening political consciousness. It was a committed, deliberately ideological literature, which set out to speak for those excluded from economic development and political power. It was clearly influenced by the Cultural Revolution and its proletarian

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ideology, and it looked back beyond Modernism, which it saw as just "a lackey of US imperialism", to rejoin the militant literature of the 1930s on the Mainland.

48 Although the debates over this "literature of the soil" in the latter half of the decade were more concerned with fiction than poetry (in itself perhaps an important sign that novels and novellas were about to replace poetry as the dominant genre), there was a definitely poetic aspect to its literary output. But the realism which it proclaimed mostly led to a largely mythical vision of the peasant and the fisherman, based on a naïve nostalgic opposition of town to countryside, and an extremely simplistic apology for traditional family life and its virtues.36

49 In fact this trend found a very limited response, and was rejected by most poets, whatever their political persuasion, partly because they did not wish to reduce literature to its social role alone, and partly because this was a poetic discourse that did not construct its own meanings or develop its own language. On the contrary, it treated language instrumentally, by pressing it into the service of a preceding cause or a future goal. In this sense, it is more pertinent to study it in the context of a history of ideologies,37 rather than of literary criticism or history.

50 The first issue of a journal entitled Caogen 草根 ("Grassroots"), the leading spirit of which was Lo Ch'ing 羅青, appeared in 1975. This journal declared its allegiance to four principles, of which the first two were a concern for the country (China) and the need for poetry to reflect the totality of human life. The second two were as follows: "3) We realise that popularisation and specialisation are both indispensable. The difference between them concerns the treatment of the subject matter and the aesthetic means used. We wish to see both present in mutual harmony. 4) Towards the past we feel a respect that is unblinkered, and towards the future confidence tempered by prudence. We accept Chinese traditions without rejecting the West. We wish to dedicate ourselves wholeheartedly to our beloved land, Taiwan".38

51 Some commentators have seen in this programme "the first compromise between modernists and realists".39 But it was a somewhat precarious balancing act, which the new developments in the following decades (postmodernism, and the increasingly pronounced ideological splits around Chinese versus Taiwanese consciousness40) were to call into question. At all events, in the 1970s Caogen was certainly the last journal to proclaim, through its very moderation, a normative project based on a manifesto. The many journals that followed no longer played the militant role such journals once had.

52 By the end of the 1970s, modern poetry in Taiwan had gained itself a durable foundation. It has found its place in Chinese literary trends, and has forged a language corresponding to contemporary life. In the process it has acquired a diversity which it will soon extend still further, in tandem with the country's present economic advances, its opening up to China, its democratising process, its rapid increase in foreign travel and cultural exchanges, and its participation in globalisation. Poetry always accompanies the sensitivities and questionings of its contemporary readership, and sometimes it even anticipates them. But from now on, its role will be decided less by ideological and aesthetic allegiances than by the laws of the market and the encompassing power of the media.

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NOTES

1. In Lo Men (ed), Xinkong wuxian lan (An infinitely blue universe), Taipei, Erya Publications, 1986, p. 5. 2. Without entering into current debates over the precise definition of Taiwanese literature, I will restrict myself in this article to poetry written in Taiwan using the so- called national language (國語 guoyu), or Mandarin (普通話, putonghua i.e., "common language"), which was the principal literary language in Taiwan after 1945. 3. See Hsiau A-chin, Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism, London and New York, Routledge, 2000, chapters 2 and 3. 4. In September 1942 (in May of that year Mao Zedong’s Yenan Talks on Literature and the Arts appeared), Chang Tao-fan 張道藩, who was currently director of the KMT propaganda department, had drawn up a list of "six don’ts" and "five dos" in a publication entitled "The literary and artistic policy which we need". The don’ts were: not to describe the baser sides of society, not to foment class conflicts, not to dwell long upon misfortunes, not to indulge in romantic expression, not to write works without positive meanings, and not to point in false directions. The "five dos" were: to create our national art, to write for the least privileged people, to write from the national point of view, to write rationally, and realistically. See Michelle Yeh, Xiandai shi wen lun, (Essays on modern Chinese poetry), Taipei, Unitas Press, 1998, p. 35. 5. For an evocation of the dominant mood, see, among others, Yip Wai-lim, “Shuangchong de cuowei: Taiwan wu liushi niandai de shi si” (A double interpolation: poetics in Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s), in Epoch, no. 140-141, 2004, p. 59. 6. Quoted in Hsiao Hsiao Xiandai shi rumen (Introduction to modern poetry), Taipei, Guxiang Publications, 1982, p. 55. 7. See Chi Hsien shilun (Theoretical writings of Chi Hsien), Taipei 1954, pp. 33ff. 8. The manifesto of the Modernist School was republished in the journal Xiandai wenxue (Modern Literature), n° 46 (1972), pp. 90-91. 9. Ibid. 10. Nowadays, with more hindsight we can make a more balanced assessment of the depths of this displacement. For a re-evaluation of the opposition between the Western and Chinese traditions in Chi Hsien, see Yang Tzung-han, Taiwan xiandai shi shi. Pipan de yuedu (History of Modern Taiwan Poetry: A Critical Reading), Taipei, Juliu, 2002, pp. 285-315. 11. Xiandai wenxue (Modern Literature), n° 46 (1972), pp. 12-13. 12. Yu Kwang-chung himself, but also Yang Mu, Chou-Meng-tieh 周夢蝶, Lo Men 羅門, Jung Tzu 蓉子, Hsiung Hung 敻虹, and other members of this group. 13. It should be noted that Lo Fu and Ya Hsien were influenced by Ai Qing, He Qifang, and Bian Zhilin. 14. Chuangshiji (Epoch), n° 5, 1956. 15. Lo Fu, Lo Fu zixuanji (Selected poems by Lo Fu), Taipei, Liming, 1975, p. 273. 16. Yip Wai-lim bases his approach on an acknowledgement of the non-discursive and non-analytical nature of the Chinese language. His goal is to rediscover, in a modern poetic form, a type of experience analogous to that which is to be found in the great poets of the T'ang dynasty. See Yip Wai-lim, “Zhongguo xiandai shi de yuyan”

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(Problems of language in the modern Chinese poem), in Zhixu de chengzhang (Ordered Growth), Taipei, Zhiwen, 1971, pp. 170-172. 17. In this respect too, more recent reassessments show that these poets did take account of the real state of things, and that social criticism played its part in their poetry of the time. See Chien Cheng-chen, Taiwan xianshi meixue (The Aesthetics of Taiwan Modern Poetry), Taipei, Yangzhi Wenhua Publications, 2004, pp. 75-79; and Michelle Yeh, Frontier Taiwan, New York, Columbia University Press, 2001, p. 33. 18. Lo Fu, op. cit., 1975, p. 217. 19. Chou Ting, Conversations, 1986. 20. See Ong Manhan, “Taiwan xiandai shi zai baihua jiegou shang de gongxian” (The contribution of modern poetry in Taiwan to the structure of vernacular) in Chuang shiji (Epoch), n° 140-141 (2004), pp. 105-106. 21. In Hsiao Hsiao, op. cit., p. 27. 22. The Taiwanese had participated in modernising movements since the 1920s. For example, Hoang Chao-ch'in 黃朝琴, Hoang Cheng-tsong 黃呈聰, and Chang Wo-chun 張 我軍, took part in the May Fourth Movement and its aftermath on the Mainland. See Gu Jitang, Taiwan xinshi fazhan zhiwen (History of the development of the new poetry in Taiwan), Taipei, Wen-shi-zhe, 1989, p. 18-21. Upon his return to Taiwan, Chang Wo- chun created the journal Fengche 風車 (The Windmill), which introduced surrealism as early as the 1930’s (ibid., p. 49). Many debates took place at this time on whether to use Mandarin Chinese or Taiwanese. Cf. Chin Shang-hao, Zhanhou Taiwan xiandai shi yanjiu lunji (Collected research papers on modern poetry on post-war Taiwan), Taipei, Nongxing, 2005. In 1936, the Japanese language was made the official language on Taiwan and its use imposed, to the exclusion of other languages, giving rise to a Taiwanese literature in Japanese. It was often a literature of resistance, which the older writers knew. (Gu Jitang, op. cit., 1989, p. 45) In addition, after the return of the island to China, there were discussions between the writers over the specific qualities of Taiwanese literature in comparison with the Chinese. These were suppressed after 1947 (See Hsiau A-chin, op. cit., 2000). 23. In particular Pai Ch'iu and Lin Heng-t'ai (vide supra). 24. Quoted by Hsiao Hsiao, op. cit., 1982, p. 27. 25. Quoted by Chang Mo, Wu chen de jingzi (Mirror without dust), Taipei, Dongda Books, 1981, p. 26. 26. Quoted by Li Fengmao, Zhongguo xinshi shangxi 3 (Critical readings in new poetry III), Taipei, Chang'an, 1981, p. 43. 27. However, we should note that although the movement around Li aimed at altering the contents of modern poetry, it did not call its forms or its aesthetic values into question. See Hsiau A-chin, op. cit., pp. 81-86. 28. Quoted by Gu Jitang, op. cit., p. 402. 29. Ibid. 30. In particular: Chang Mo and Ya Hsien (eds), Zhongguo xiandai shixuan (Anthology of Modern Chinese Poetry), Taipei, Epoch Poetry Society, 1967; Lo Fu, Chang Mo, and Ya Hsien (eds), Qishi niandai shixuan (Anthology of Modern Poetry of the 1970s), Taipei, Daye, 1976; Lo Fu, Chang Mo, and Ya Hsien (eds), Zhongguo xiandai shi lunxuan (Anthology of theoretical writings on modern poetry), Taipei, Daye Books, 1969; Wang Hsian-yang, Xinshi jinju xuan (A selection of the finest works of new poetry), Taipei, Juren, 1970; Lo Fu and Pai Ch'iu (eds), Zhongguo xiandai wenxue daxi (Panorama of contemporary Chinese literature), Taipei, Juren, 1972. In addition, the literary and fine

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arts review You-shih (Youth Literary) published a special issue on poetry in June 1969 (n° 186). Another review, Hsien-tai wenhsüeh (Modern Literature) devoted its 46th edition, in March 1972, to modern poetry. This was followed by the journal Zhong wai wenxue (Chinese and foreign literature), in June 1974 (n° 25). As for publications overseas: in the United States Yip Wai-lim edited an English anthology entitled Modern Chinese Poetry (Iowa City, Iowa University Press, 1970), and this was followed by Rong Chih-ying (ed), Modern Verse from Taiwan, University of California Press, 1973. In Japan, an Anthology of Modern Chinese Poetry, edited and translated into Japanese by the Taiwanese journal Li was published in Tokyo in 1970. In Korea, the journal Contemporary Poetry published 17 Taiwanese poets in Korean translation in August 1971. 31. “Zhongguo xiandaishi de kunjing” (The difficulties of modern Chinese poetry), literary supplement Renjian (Humanity), February 28th and 29th 1972. 32. Quoted by Chen Fang-ming, Shi he xianshi (Poetry and Reality), Taipei, Hongfan, 1977, p. 43. 33. Longzu, n° 9, July 1973, p. 6. 34. Ibid., p. 13. 35. Zhong wai wenxue, vol. 10, n° 12 (May 1982), p. 18. 36. See Michelle Yeh, Xiandai shi wenlun (Essays on Modern Chinese Poetry), pp. 37-38. 37. See Chien Cheng-che, op. cit., 2004, pp. 90-91. 38. Zhong wai wenxue, vol. 10, n° 12 (May 1982), p. 203. 39. See Chang Tsuo, Qian qu zhi dao (Isle of a Thousand Songs), Taipei, Erya, 1987, p. 35. 40. Despite later post hoc interpretations, it was only in the 1980s, following the events in Kaohsiung in 1979, that a Taiwanese national awareness emerged in literature in opposition to Chinese consciousness. Until then, from the Li poets to the writers of “the soil”, all national consciousness was above all Chinese. See Hsiau A-chin, op. cit., 2000, pp. 83-86.

ABSTRACTS

The period between 1950 and the late 1970s saw the birth of modern poetry in Taiwan and its emergence from a “rebellion” that took place both within and against the overarching influence of classical poetry, which it finally replaced. During this period it created its own language and cultural space, and finally found its rightful place among the general cultural activities of the time. At a time when "poets could not avoid forming alliances", as Yü Kwang-chung (余光中) has observed1, the journals and the movements for which they provided a voice and a rallying point, played an essential part in encouraging reflection on the nature and role of contemporary poetry, and in developing its language. In addition to the poems they published, the authors they introduced, and the translations of foreign works they made known, each of these journals expressed clearly defined theoretical choices, and made their own contribution to what came to be known in Taiwan as the modern poem (現代詩, xiandaishi).

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Book reviews

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Barry Sautman, June Teufel Dreyer (eds.), Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development and Society in a Disputed Region New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2006, 349 pp+index

Fabienne Jagou

EDITOR'S NOTE

Translated by Michael Black

1 This book, with fourteen analyses based on Chinese and Tibetan interpretations of political theories and facts, gives us a contemporary history of Tibet on the themes of the politics, the economy, the sociology and the culture as well as the internationalisation of the situation in Tibet. It provides a vision of contemporary Tibet which seeks to be impartial (and in this the authors are often successful) and considers the question of Tibet's present political status (both factual and theoretical) while envisaging solutions for its resolution (perspectives).

2 The first part, devoted to the subject of internal politics, begins with a questioning of the exercise of autonomy through the Tibetan representation and its strength within the administration set up in the Autonomous Region of Tibet (T.A.R.). Robert Barnett shows how much the Tibetan participation in government decision-making and action depends on the historical and political hazards to which China is subjected. He draws a subtle picture of the Tibetan participants (both state and civil), which differs from that provided by many Westerners and exiled Tibetans. This is a model article, which makes possible the subsequent approach to the theoretical aspects of autonomy, brilliantly synthesised by He Baogang. He first provides the point of view of the Tibetan government in exile (which calls for real autonomy for Tibet according to free market

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principles), and then the evolution in the Chinese government's point of view (regional autonomy deriving from the Marxist principles of class struggle, which would lead to the abolition of the notion of nationalities in favour of that of classes according to Mao Zedong, to which Deng Xiaoping added the market economy as a factor for the development of the nationalities). Amy Mountcastle pursues this train of thought in an analysis of the definition of "The Question of Tibet", in which she argues that the real problem is the independence of Tibet, to which the Tibetans in exile have added the question of Human Rights in order to internationalise it. Lastly, Wang Lixiong considers, in a highly pragmatic fashion, the practicality of the solution put forward by the Dalai Lama, while keeping to the guiding principle that in order to satisfy both parties, some form of freedom and autonomy which guarantees the unification of China must be found.

3 The status of regional autonomy does not favour the development of the Tibetan economy, which is the theme of the second part of the book. June Teufel Dreyer and Dawa Norbu, while emphasising the lack of reliable statistical data, manage to recount half a century of economic history, and conclude that notwithstanding the disasters and the grandiose projects, Tibet remains the poorest region in China. However, there has been considerable progress, particularly since the decollectivisation period (Melvyn C. Goldstein et al.). Hu Xiaojiang and Miguel A. Salazar analyse the development of private business in Lhasa. They suggest that henceforth the flow of Han migration to Tibet should be studied on a sociological basis, no longer as a deliberate policy but rather as one fact of migration among many others. They also provide excellent analyses of this population of migrants and of their economic activities in the T.A.R. In the third part of the book, Barry Sautman questions the demographic data put forward by Westerners and Tibetans in exile, and shows the extent to which the occupation of Tibet has not been harmful to Tibetans in terms of the number of its inhabitants.

4 In the final analysis, the international dimension of the "Question of Tibet" is approached from a historical and political point of view, including, in particular, an update on the utilisation of various concepts used to define the status of Tibet and the importance of the role played by the British in this definition (Dibyesh Anand and Xu Mingxu). Lastly, A. Tom Grunfield emphasises the importance of American perceptions and interpretations in understanding the contemporary history of such a definition.

5 The book, while occasionally repetitive, manages to provide a summary of the stumbling blocks in the path of the T.A.R., and examines the feasibility of a number of political solutions. It seems however, that in seeking distance themselves from the dichotomy between Tibetan victim and Chinese oppressor, the authors have also made villains of the Tibetans in exile and their determination to internationalise the "Question of Tibet". For example, not until page 298 is there a reference to the Tibetan government in exile "which was created in a democratic fashion in order to obtain legitimacy in the West" rather than to "the Dalai Lama", who up to that point appears to be the autocratic leader of an abstract community. The book thus lacks a presentation and contextualisation of the achievements and failures of this government in exile, as well as an analysis of its possible, but unlikely transposition to the T.A.R.

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Aurore Merle and Michael Sztanke, Étudiants Chinois: qui sont les élites de demain ? Paris, Autrement, 2006, 109 pp.

Karine-Hinano Guérin Translation : Michael Black

1 Aurore Merle and Michael Sztanke's book is a useful tool in understanding the present generation of Chinese students. There has been little research into this subject, with the existing literature concentrating on their elders, the Tiananmen Generation. However the role and values of this new generation of students are fundamental, since they will make up the elite of tomorrow in a China which will be at the forefront of the world stage. In the preface to the book, Cai Chongguo, a former philosophy professor and political dissident who has been in exile in France since 1989, uncompromisingly sets out the constraints on a generation which has little political awareness and virtually no ideals: (political control combined with the control of history is producing) a generation without memory or dreams, whose identity is fragile, and who are becoming increasingly anxious and standardised.

2 Synonymous with success in the gaokao, a competitive examination which opens the door to higher education, access to the University is now a dream shared by all Chinese families. In the context of globalisation, China must reform its universities in order to meet the challenge of the "massification" of higher education. Since 1999, access to higher education has broadened but at what cost? Some families have gone into debt to the benefit of the universities. One remembers the vandalism perpetrated by the students in Henan when the diplomas awarded did not bear the name of the prestigious university as had been promised in exchange for exorbitant tuition fees1. This book raises a number of questions about the transformation of the Chinese university system: how can universities be reformed while maintaining the quality of the teaching and meeting the demands of the job market2? The day-to-day lives of the students on university campuses are revealed, with an emphasis on the state of depression of these only children obliged to live in a community. The university campuses are like a city

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within a city, composed of classrooms and housing for the students and their teachers. While they are open to the market economy and to the new trends in society, the campuses remain under the control of the Chinese Communist Party, whose strategy is to integrate the intellectual elite from the beginning of their training. Thus most students belong to the powerful Youth League in order to secure their future rather than through political conviction. Nevertheless they all seem to agree to working towards bringing China's power to a peak internationally. Despite their pragmatism and their desire for individual financial success, some Chinese students question the political system under which they live, by means of more or less discreet social or civil commitments. Many students no longer hesitate to express themselves on Internet sites, and some help those who have been marginalised by economic growth, by rallying to the cause of migrant workers, of the peasants in the west of the country or of the victims of AIDS.

3 Blending description, interviews and analysis, the book does not limit itself to providing an external view of the subject in question, but seeks to show the critical point of view the students take of themselves and of the China in which they live.

4 At a time when the focus is mostly on the injustices suffered by the peasants and on the emergence of the middle classes, the importance of the student population tends to be forgotten. The questions of the students' feelings of belonging to an elite and of nationalism as well as their desire to see the emergence of a more egalitarian (or more elitist) Chinese society are raised through this fascinating study, which includes numerous interviews carried out in China from 2000 to 2005.

NOTES

1. Cf. Bruno Birolli, "La chasse aux emplois enflamme les universités" ["The job hunt stirs the Universities"], www.nouvelobs.fr 2. 30% of University graduates are unemployed. Cf Yu Yanping "Les jeunes diplômés chinois en butte au chômage" ["Young Chinese Graduates Exposed to Unemployment"], Perspectives Chinoises, n°. 80, November-December 2003, pp. 4-12.

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Thomas David Dubois, The Sacred Village. Social Change and Religious Life in Rural North China Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 2005, 275 pp.

Katiana Le Mentec

EDITOR'S NOTE

Translated by Michael Black

1 Examining the varied expressions of religious life in a rural district of North China, the historian Thomas David Dubois, in The Sacred Village, gives us a glimpse of the world of such practices and beliefs at local level, as well as their evolution since the end of the Qing dynasty. This book is the result of archival research enriched with interviews conducted in the district of Cang (in southeastern Hebei province) at the end of the 1990s, with the author seeking to combine the understanding of the anthropologist with a historical perspective on social change.

2 With its account of the mosaic of forces which gave shape, over time, to local religious life, Dubois' book provides new knowledge about the religious institutions in northern China, as well as their processes of transformation and adaptation to village life. The main thesis of the book is the specificity of religious life in the village, which adapts and recreates itself according to local particularities. As Dubois sees it, there is no single model: each entity, which possesses its own identity, has developed a clearly distinct form of religious life. The latter, through the adaptation and reinterpretation at the local level of religious themes common to northern China, is the result of a complex mixture between the institutional religions (such as Buddhism, Taoism or sectarian teachings1) and what the author calls "diffuse religion" which corresponds to the mass of beliefs and practices. Dubois takes a functionalist point of view in his

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reasoning when he states that some of these religious institutions have survived because of their ability to satisfy needs, whether community or individual.

3 The first chapter, based on various demographic statistics, provides the reader with a swift description of the historical, structural, economic and religious framework of the district of Cang, which seems in many ways to be absolutely typical of the north of China. The author describes the sphere of local culture and then focuses on certain characteristics of religious practice in China (requests for divine assistance, visits to the temple, etc.) to which he returns in the conclusion with his concept of "active or passive religiosity" particularly by comparing personal piety, the role of morality and participation in ritual in the Christian religion (a comparison he refers to in several other places in the book). He then sets out elements of religious life in the district, such as the temples and their forms of worship as well as the sects, emphasising the many campaigns aimed at eradicating them since the end of the Qing dynasty. The apparent religious uniformity of religious life presented in the first chapter conceals, however, as the author sees it, "the importance of the local in the formulation and the expression of religious knowledge and the expression of worship" (p 38), which he shares with us in the following chapters.

4 The second chapter elaborates and theorises the question of religious life in the village community. Dubois sees the village as bringing together religious institutions, influences and resources. It thus forms for the inhabitants, a significant unit of organisation and personal identification within a relatively closed local cultural sphere. The village makes up a ritual community of worship and sharing of religious resources, which has formed a unique identity, according to the infrastructure, the specialists and the religious traditions which local history has made available.

5 In this chapter, the author retraces the evolution of religious life in Cang since the end of the Qing dynasty with an emphasis on the dismantling it was subjected to during the reforms that followed the establishment of the communist regime and on its reorganisation in the 1970s. Having illustrated his subject with a range of contemporary examples of religious life in the village (in some cases centred on a temple or a "sect", Dubois shows that despite the restructurings of the community and the decline of religious life, the village still represents a strong unity and maintains its capacity to mobilise solidarity in the service of the newly-formed community.

6 Focusing on how external changes (and political ones in particular) have affected local religion, the author devotes chapters 3 to 7 to presenting and comparing various religious practices and traditions in the north of China, and in Cang in particular, where some have maintained an active presence. To the author each of them has had a distinct influence over time on the development of local religious life and has contributed to satisfying various needs on community, family and individual levels.

7 The practice of the xiangtou2 takes up most of chapter three. Coming from a long tradition of healing and shamanic practices, which is still very much present in China, these "healing practitioners" whom Dubois met, use the power of the fox spirits in their treatment. The author explains that, depending on the village, their numbers, their practices, their social role and their relationship with organised religions vary considerably. The chapter introduces the beliefs and practices associated with these religious specialists and then discusses their place in village society. Dubois sees the activities of the xiangtou, which are carried out in private places, as not being at the service of the welfare of the community but aimed at "satisfying the needs" and the

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expectations of individuals. These practitioners act alone and without any formal affiliation; they are identified with a locality as can be the case with village temples or certain "sects" which the author discusses further on.

8 Seeking to show that village religion was and remains an intensely local phenomenon, in the last four chapters Dubois studies the origins, internal organisation, evolution in northern China and adaptation of the various religious institutions which are present in Cang such as monastic Buddhism (Chapter 4), a "pseudo-monastic sect" — the Li sect (Chapter 5), the well-known apocalyptic sect Yguandao (Chapter 6) and lastly the "village sects": taishangmen, the tradition of the Supreme, and that of Heaven and Earth, tiandimen (Chapter 7).

9 Dubois notes the almost complete decline of monastic Buddhism in Cang by the end of the Qing dynasty, with the writings having been forgotten and the teachings "absorbed into popular religiosity". It was not until the end of the 1990s, with the reconstruction of a monastery, that this ecclesiastical institution began to grow again. As he sees it, it is only recently that this form of religious affiliation and expression, which is now acceptable, has penetrated the rural district of Cang.

10 Taishangmen and Tiandimen, on the other hand, quickly became independent, and their strong base was in fact built at the expense of their links with the movements from which they originated. The author emphasises that, in Cang, these two teachings show a remarkable continuity in their local organisation and make up a unique and more immediate contribution than any other tradition or practice to the religious life of the village. Dubois explains how these religious teachings, emerging originally from movements that were widespread in the north of China, were transformed, in the villages, into expressions of "local religiosity".

11 The book offers the author's reflections on the disappearance or the continuity of these religious institutions in Cang, which seem to be closely tied to this local adaptability, but also to their ability to fill the needs of "day to day religious life" by carrying out the ritual services which are considered to be vital to the well-being of the village. This was the case of the "village sects", Taishangmen and Tiandimen, whose teachings are strongly inspired by Confucianism and thus seemed orthodox and respectable in the eyes of the population. The Li sect, like the Yiguandao sect (whose shows historical development the author shows), since it does not carry out any rituals in the name of the community and of its members, has been unable to have any profound influence on the religious life of the village.

12 In this, his first book, which is on the subject of the doctoral thesis he presented in 2001, Thomas David Dubois, now an Assistant Professor of History at the University of Singapore, gives the reader a clear and particularly well-structured account. I particularly appreciated his presentation of the practices of the xiangtou, a phenomenon which, despite being widespread in China, has been too rarely studied. Also to be commended is the considerable introduction, in a work of history, of the ethnological approach although it is a little too functionalist, and one also regrets that the author was not really able to carry out this research alone and in the local dialect. Lastly, while the book accords considerable and justified space to the impact of policies on these religious movements, there are unfortunately frequent repetitions on the subject between the chapters.

13 These few small reservations should not make us forget the book's qualities, in particular the judicious comparison of the introduction at a local level of the various

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religious movements. This book has the merit, because of its combined global and local approaches, of being able to interest religious historians as much as sinologists. It will in particular provide neophytes with a very good introduction to religious practices and beliefs at village level in China.

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Elise Anne DeVido, Benoît Vermander (eds.), Creeds, Rites and Videotapes: Narrating religious experience in East Asia Taipei Ricci Institute, 2004, 265 pp.

David Palmer

1 In the introduction to this volume collecting contributions to a colloquium held at Fu Jen university (Taipei) in 2001, the editors propose the study of religious narratives as a fruitful angle for analysing and comparing the growing diversity of religious forms in contemporary East Asia, as “new religious movements appear every day” and traditional faiths and practices “experience revivals and changes induced by external influences”. Narratology indeed appears to be a promising approach, including not only mythology, hagiographies, conversion stories, and even ritual as the enactment of narratives, but “videotapes” as well. Indeed, video and digital recording are now ubiquitous in religious life, with the production and showing of video recordings becoming an essential form of religious narration: in Elise DeVido’s paper (Chapter 4) on Master Zheng Yan of the Ciji Foundation, for example, she describes how groups of participants at four-day Ciji retreats are constantly videotaped by an AV crew, while seeing themselves in the recordings which are simultaneously projected on TV screens placed in all meeting rooms and public spaces, and then, at the closing ceremony of the retreat, watch a screening of the official, edited videotape of the retreat.

2 Although the book offers a few intriguing examples of the applications of “narrative” to the study of religion, the concept is not clearly defined in the introduction, nor are any clear methodological guidelines given. The result is an eclectic collection of essays that have little coherence, some of them barely touching on narratives at all, or understanding it so broadly as to have no analytical usefulness. The chapters range from a philosophical study of 6th-century Tiantai Buddhist scholastic monk Zhiyi (Hans-Rudolf Kantor, Chapter 9) to a literary critique of Japanese writer Oe Kenzaburo’s work. Perhaps the volume’s most interesting cluster of papers concerns new religious

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movements and phenomena in Asia, touching on the Ciji Foundation (DeVido, Chapter 4); Japanese New Religions (Kisala, Chapter 5); conversion to Christianity among aboriginal Taiwanese (Chien, Chapter 6); the social significance of Falungong (Vermander, Chapter 7); the funeral business in Taiwan (DeVido, Chapter 10); and the evolution of the religion of the Yi minority in southern Sichuan province (Vermander, Chapter 11). Owing to my personal interest in the social scientific study of religion in contemporary Asia, I found plenty of interesting and useful data in these papers, but the notion of the narrative is not sufficiently developed or applied to draw any significant conclusions from a comparison of the cases presented.

3 The book itself ends on a more practical and inspiring level, with José Mario C. Francisco (Chapter 12) exploring how narratives can be used in the context of interreligious dialogue, discussing the case of efforts to reduce conflict between Christians and Muslims in the Philippines. In contrast to religious laws and principles, which are rigid and not conducive to dialogue, narratives are open-ended and foster emotional identification between people of different backgrounds, opening up the possibility of the intertwining and even the mutual weaving of narratives of people of different faiths.

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Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian (eds.), The Chinese Communist Party in Reform London, Routledge, 2006, 268 pp.

Wu Guoguang

1 Although China has undergone profound changes since economic reforms and marketisation were introduced in the late 1970s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still represents a niche surviving from before this period, not only in politics but also in many other dimensions of life in China. This simple fact has for a long time been virtually ignored, intentionally or not, in academic studies on China, as most of the energy in the field is, reasonably, devoted to following the fast-changing reforms that are expected to reduce the importance of the CCP. These expectations are not entirely

2 wrong, as the CCP itself is now reported to be under reform; they are not accurate, however, as the Party carries out reforms simply for the sake of maintaining and even strengthening its unchallenged ruling position, rather than in order to open the political market for the party competition and popular participation that are often assumed to accompany economic marketisation. In this context, how can one assess the CCP today and its efforts to adapt, while keeping its monopoly on ruling post-economic reform China? The volume under review is a timely contribution to answering this question.

3 The contributors, who are all Western-trained scholars, despite their diverse ethnic and personal backgrounds, mostly living in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe (for readers’ possible curiosity, only one contributor is based in the United States), are well qualified to discuss the theme and, in particular, their respective sub-topics. The 12 individual chapters are effectively organised to address three important dimensions of the CCP’s relevance to China today: the Party’s role in the country’s economic, social and political development; the Party’s own organisational adjustment to the modern governance of a transitional society; and the apparatus and operation of the Party

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machine. Many of the chapters are well researched, though some are less well- grounded than others.

4 Andrew Walder’s chapter analyses China within the broader comparative context with other former communist regimes, and examines the mobility patterns of China’s political elite with a sociological perspective. His conclusion defines the optimistic tone that many contributors to the volume share: the CCP can be an agent, rather than a target, of China’s future political change.

5 A veteran China expert specialised in the nomenklatura system, John Burns comes back to his own territory in this volume, and finds that, in spite of profound contextual changes, the CCP’s organisation shows “striking continuities” with the past. As he also focuses on the Party elite, but with a more institutional perspective, Burns’ cautious argument about the future of the Party is valuable and effectively balances Walder’s line of reasoning.

6 You Ji and Zou Keyuan turn their investigations to the two pillars that support the CCP regime: You is concerned with the old-fashioned gun barrel, namely, the PLA, and argues that a transition of its relationship with the CCP has taken place in the 1990s; Zou’s topic is an instrument of modern governance: the law, and tremendous Party control over legislation and jurisdiction are identified and discussed in depth. The comparison between these two chapters represents a typical intricacy in studies of ongoing China: when one looks at those realms where the CCP remains predominant, some new developments there can be surprisingly attractive; in those areas one assumes the Party is declining, however, the real mechanism can be still the old machine with some new decorations.

7 The three following chapters concern the Party’s cadre management and education systems. Kjeld Brodsgaard chooses a micro-case study of Yangpu Economic Development Zone in Hainan Province and, through the lens of the bianzhi system, confirms that the Party firmly controls governmental administration through cadre management. Maria Heimer studies the cadre responsibility system to look at how the Party implements its well-intentioned policies such as “people-oriented” and “balanced development” approaches to China’s modernisation. Her conclusion is a mixed reflection on the Party’s adjustment to reforms. Ignatius Wibowo and Lye Liang Fook’s chapter also emphasises the Party’s adaptability, as exemplified by cadre education reform at the Central Party School.

8 Moving to the societal level, at which the Party is also struggling to revitalise its connections with various social groups, two chapters of the book are devoted to examining its relationship with the urban working class, leaving aside the Party’s relations with other significant social forces such as farmers and entrepreneurs. In their chapter, Takahara Akio and Robert Benewick find the Party plays a significant role in urban communities, but it is also confronted with various challenges arising from marketisation. Cai Yonghsun’s discussion of workers’ power depicts a situation that contradicts the claims of the CCP: while the Party traditionally defines itself as “the vanguard of the working class”, and the reformed Party boasts the economic benefits it brings to everyone, the working class in today’s China in fact suffers from a great status decline both in terms of political power and welfare provision. The implications of these studies are complex, somewhat in contrast with some previous chapters that try to portray a CCP “making progress with passing time” (yushi jujin), as claimed by the Party itself. The Party is able to reaffirm its control of and penetration

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into Chinese society, but this capacity is not necessarily a positive adjustment to post- marketisation reform China; the Party’s embrace of the new rich is widely applauded, but cannot be seen as progressive if this step estranges the Party, the only effective channel for articulating and incorporating different interests, from the working class and farmers, the majority of Chinese population.

9 To achieve “balanced” progress, political democratisation should be placed on the agenda. Will the CCP be democratised? Will the CCP support China’s democratisation? The last three chapters examine these questions from different angles. He Baogang regards intra-party democracy as a hope, but his empirical evidence from which he draws support to the argued “hope” is really thin. Chien-min Chao and Yeau-tarn Lee discuss how the Taiwanese transition from one-party regime to democracy can be a model for China. Zheng Yongnian situates the CCP within the broader context of China’s democratic transformation as a nation, providing a comprehensive analysis of class-relations in today’s China and their impact for future democratisation. In sum, this is a well-edited volume, which definitely contributes much to the ongoing debate on how to assess China’s political change and what role the CCP plays in this change.

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Bell Daniel A., Beyond Liberal Democracy, Political Thinking for an East Asian Context Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006, 379 pp.

Sébastien Billioud

EDITOR'S NOTE

Translated by Peter Brown

1 This work by Daniel A. Bell can be seen as a provocative attempt to show that there are morally legitimate alternatives in East Asia to a Western-style liberal democracy. In the writer’s view, it is vital to take the local cultural context into account if one is to think of spreading human rights, democracy and capitalism.

2 Daniel A. Bell is a Canadian citizen who is Professor at Qinghua University in Beijing. His work lies in communitarianism, one of the more fruitful areas of contemporary American philosophy, which came into being in the late 1970s as a reaction to the “liberal” philosophy of John Rawls. Bell has, with others, contributed to getting first- rate philosophers such as Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer, who came out of this movement, interested in the Chinese intellectual tradition.

3 Methodologically, Bell's position is at the junction of theory and practice. For him, thinking the political also means thinking of its concrete applications. His approach is resolutely inter-disciplinary, with input from philosophy, political science and even sociology.

F0 4 Beyond Liberal Democracy is composed of 12 chapters BE some of which had already been

F0 published as articles BE , a bibliography and an index. Following an introductory chapter, the book is divided into three parts, which deal, in order, with human rights (chapters 2 to 4), democracy (chapters 5 to 8), and capitalism (chapters 9 to 11). A final, original

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chapter aims to clear up a certain number of misunderstandings, which Bell claims are due to inadequate responses he had given at various lectures.

5 In the first of the three chapters devoted to human rights, Bell uses Mencius to think about what can constitute a just war. The Chinese thinker's “theory” would allow war to be justified, quite possibly more than would the humanitarian right of interference, when a civilian population is deprived of the means of subsistence. Conversely, it would also undermine the bases of any justification of war for communitarian reasons (in the name of recovering ancestral lands, or of a linguistic or racial community, etc.).

6 Bell then gives an overview of a certain number of debates that have taken place on human rights and values in Asia: (a) the debate over the possibility or otherwise of assigning a priority to certain rights; (b) the debate over the foundation of human rights and the taking into account of local values; (c) the question of “moral pluralism” and the possibility of reducing or extending human rights in Asia; (d) the question of the interest of intercultural dialogue over human rights.

7 Chapter 4 draws especially from the practical experience of NGOs working in the field of human rights. Bell examines four “ethical challenges” facing them: the conflict between human rights and local cultures; the issue of economic, social and cultural rights; the compromise required when working with authoritarian regimes; the risks of the loss of independence associated with fund raising campaigns. In the writer’s view, given that any strategy comes at a cost, it is the context, more than grand principles, which must finally determine the approach to be adopted. In extreme cases of conflict between “Western inspired norms of human rights” and local cultural rules, he tends to privilege the latter, at least where they are derived from values worthy of respect.

8 Chapters 5 to 8 are concerned with the question of democracy. A study devoted to physical education in antiquity enables the author to put forward the view that its promotion in Greece gave birth to a conception of “active citizenship”, which remains unimaginable in Confucian societies: it would come up, on the one hand, against a tradition that has always valued the family more highly than the polis and, on the other, against an elitist conception of the political.

9 Inspired by the thought of Huang Zongxi, Bell tackles the question of elitism in the following chapter, which he relates to the possibility of a Confucian-inspired democracy. A democratically controlled meritocracy, which had in former times been institutionalised through the examination system, would still today be a solution to the management of complex societies. In a two-chamber system, the upper chamber could become a Xianshiyuan, an assembly of scholars recruited by competitive exam who would be more capable of maintaining some critical distance than their peers in the lower house.

10 In Chapter 7, Bell takes as his starting point the experience of several Asian countries to explain that democracy can, in some cases, put ethno-cultural minorities at risk, particularly as programmes of nation-building are often centred on the majority culture. In his view, the promotion of democracy must therefore be accompanied by an assessment of the risks that it is likely to carry both in terms of social cohesion and peace.

11 The final chapter in this second part consists of the author's thoughts on an experience in teaching political theory in Singapore. This has two superimposed elements: one is a reflection on the extent to which cultural differences are taken into account in the

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classroom; the other, to which Bell devotes less attention, involves considerations on the finality of the educational process in the development of citizens.

12 The final part poses the question of the validity of the liberal capitalist model in East Asia. First, Bell deals with the influence of Confucianism on the distribution of wealth. Taking his cue from texts by Confucius and Mencius, he makes the point that the major issue for any good government is how to resolve, first and foremost, questions of a material kind. There are two corollaries to this, involving, on the one hand, restrictions on property rights, and, on the other, even today, a particular conception of this right, which, focusing more on the family than on the individual, would tend to protect those who are weaker.

13 Bell then tries to identify a type of East Asian capitalism that is adapted to the current period of globalisation, that is, one which is characterised both by its efficiency and by its positive contribution to social and political objectives. He distinguishes it from Anglo-Saxon capitalism, as well as from the Asian model glorified prior to the crisis of the 1990s. In particular, he explores the positive aspects of strong state interventionism in terms of education and the contribution of often informal and non-state mechanisms to the politics of social protection. Lastly, he stresses that such an East Asian capitalism also strengthens the cohesion of a community and the emotional links between its members.

14 Finally, the writer addresses the issue of the rights of migrant workers through the example of household employees (Filipinos and Indonesians in Hong-Kong and Singapore, migrants in Chinese cities). He explains how the call for formal equality between individuals can be counter-productive and why non-liberal laws, in addition to Confucian ethics, can in the end enable very difficult situations to be managed in a way that may be more just and harmonious.

15 By taking an interest above all in questions of values and by proposing to think in a non-dogmatic way about their practical implications, Bell must be praised for entering into a debate which is likely to be increasingly topical and lively with the emergence of new powers like China and India. He finds a formula that very nicely encapsulates the challenge that lies ahead by evoking “the encounter between various universalisms” (p. 328). Putting it like that is, in our view, both to recognise the importance of culture (for defining public policies, setting up institutions, etc.), and to refuse to engage in discourses that would essentialise it only to instrumentalise it the better. Finally, and this is an important point, it is also to note that the spread of values cannot be unidirectional and that Chinese thought today has something else to offer besides the production of ideological artefacts. The difficulties do not of course disappear merely by articulating such factors; indeed, Bell does not engage in much theoretical speculation on his conception of universalisms, as he is especially interested in the way in which those policies that take account of the cultural context are implemented. In doing so, he exposes himself to a number of objections.

16 No doubt anticipating the polemical debates to which his book of essays will give rise, the author is very careful to hedge his arguments with a great many provisos. He largely anticipates the objections and strives to forestall them by means of a sophisticated, measured and well-informed presentation, without being afraid on occasion to point out any weakness of argument even when it is on the same track as his own. In short, his presentation, albeit normative, is in no way dogmatic, and his propositions, whether one accepts them or not, are a stimulating impetus to discussion.

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Another of the book’s strengths lies in the multitude of concrete examples and scenarios that serve to illustrate its more theoretical propositions. Bell often has recourse to humour, sometimes to good avail, as he peppers his work with lively personal anecdotes drawn from many years of living in an Asian environment. He also calls on his lived experience to make many fruitful comparisons between different countries in the region.

17 Notwithstanding all these elements, a certain number of questions do arise in the reader’s mind. An initial observation that one can make has to do with the areas of Chinese thought dealt with by Bell, foremost amongst which is Confucianism, and to a lesser extent Legalism. The Confucian sources to which he refers are in the main the great classics (Confucius, Mencius, Xunxi) plus a few other personalities like Huang Zongxi (1610-1695). No one would think of contesting the major importance of these figures or the inspiration that they can still offer us today. Yet, Chinese thought has been constantly reconfiguring itself over the ages. In the twentieth century, for instance, Confucianism encountered Western philosophy and this saw the emergence of first-rate figures (Xu Fuguan, Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, among many others). Even today, there are many intellectuals who have drawn their inspiration from Confucianism, although Bell does not deal much with them. It seems paradoxical that a work that tries to think about the present-day world does not consider all those contemporaries who have been asking very similar questions. In any case, it runs the risk of presenting the Western reader with a reductionist view of Chinese and Confucian thought. On questions like democracy, contemporary Confucian intellectuals are far from being all on the same wavelength, and it would have been worthwhile to allow the reader to understand this point fully rather than to reify the opposition between Confucianism and Western-inspired liberal democracy, as the author often does.

18 This leads us to make a second observation. In order to highlight certain key values of present-day East Asian societies, the book presents Confucianism as something very diverse. It refers at times to thinkers (most often from Antiquity), at others to political practices (for example, the recruitment by competitive exam of civil servants, which is the product of a later imperial China), and even to the “deep structures of Chinese culture” (to borrow Li Zehou’s expression), that is to the crystallisation of habits handed down from the past (a sense of hierarchy, the promotion of the family, care for elders...). The use of these different dimensions can no doubt be readily justified, although a less-informed reader may feel that it is short on explanation in some respects. More problematic in our mind is the fact that there is hardly any overall integration of these dimensions in the book. Bell makes liberal use of ancient philosophical sources to think about present-day East Asian societies, but he pays scant attention to the dynamic interaction between ideas and history (social, political) in analysing what the “central values” of these contemporary societies really are.

19 The very issue of these so-called “central” values (p. 335) raises indeed another difficulty. Taking these values as a focal point tends to pass over the tensions at work, historically, in the political experience and the intellectual world of each of the societies observed. The risk, once again, is to reify oppositions and to make it more difficult for the author to arrive at the overall synthesis that it is his stated aim to achieve. For example, he opposes, albeit with a certain subtlety, Confucian elitism and Western-inspired democratic institutions to advocate a sort of compromise between

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the two in China (the democratic election of a lower house, the establishment of a kind of assembly of sages, recruited by competitive examination, who are capable of viewing things more dispassionately). The paradox is that, to get away from an overly Western view of democracy, he himself comes to regard democracy in a somewhat restrictive way, mainly through the prism of present-day Western institutions (and the vote). Yet this is to leave aside not only all the internal tensions in the history of democracy, but also those aspects of it that are not directly institutional. The writer, who is opposed to a dogmatic approach to democracy, runs the risk of ensnaring himself in what would merely be a displaced normative approach, substituting for a Western-ideal type of democracy another Confucian-ideal type, one valid in an “Asian context”. The works of Pierre Rosanvallon, which invite us first of all to consider politics as a space of experience, have showed the contradictions to which a normative approach can lend itself. In La contre-démocratie1, (Counterdemocracy) he examines the non-institutional practices of surveillance, prevention and judgement that are increasingly innervating the democratic experience, with the consequent need for reconfiguration. Many of these practices (actions by independent authorities, mediators, rating agencies, etc.) have the precise goal of introducing some perspective or wisdom that the members of an upper chamber competitively recruited could, in Bell’s view, demonstrate. Pierre Rosanvallon also says of them that they are to be found almost anywhere and at all times and that they could form the basis of a generalised comparative approach. A discussion of the validity of a Xianshiyuan could actually find its place in a consideration of representation in China, without Confucian and liberal archetypes of democracy being necessarily opposed.

20 Beyond Liberal Democracy, while at times problematic, is nonetheless an intellectually stimulating and interesting work, falling within the wider orbit of the circulation of ideas between China and North America.

NOTES

1. Pierre Rosanvallon, La contre-démocratie. La politique à l’âge de la défiance, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 2006.

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