Divisive Elites: State Penetration and Local Autonomy in Mei County, Guangdong Province, 1900S-1930S

Home , Beiyang government, Chen Jiongming, Chen Xujing, Eastern Expedition, Haifeng County, Henk Sneevliet

Divisive Elites: State Penetration and Local Autonomy in Mei County, Guangdong Province, 1900s-1930s

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

Wenjuan Bi

Graduate Program in History

The Ohio State University

2015

Dissertation Committee:

Christopher A. Reed, Advisor

Patricia Sieber

Ying Zhang

Wenjuan Bi

2015

Abstract

This dissertation focuses on the rise of a group of new elites in Mei County, northeastern Guangdong, and their conflict with the local traditional gentry caused by the

Chinese state’s new attempt to strengthen and modernize itself from the late Qing to the

Republican periods (roughly from the 1900s to the 1930s). From the 1900s, the Chinese state, facing a series of internal and external threats, rather than prioritizing a stable social system, sought to achieve economic growth and national strength as soon as possible. Since the weak government had no ability to plunder external resources to support the expensive reform agendas, the government turned to more aggressive approaches to extract resources from local society. The state’s attempt to strengthen itself by extracting local resources, however, created sharp conflict between the central government and traditional autonomous communities. It also led to the estrangement of the traditional gentry, who, having consolidated their dominance over local society by controlling lineages and militias, were not enthusiastic about collaborating with the state to promote reform.

In order to conscript resources to support the state’s reform agendas and to weaken the local gentry’s control of local resources, the late Qing government promoted a new group of elites with commercial backgrounds and Western knowledge who could better serve the state’s goal of mobilization. The new elites, most of whom had accumulated wealth but had not established cultural authority, vigorously sponsored the reforms in an

ii attempt to enhance their status in local society. The new elites continued their collaboration with the government when the post-Qing regimes respected their agency. However, as the reform agenda became increasingly aggressive under the Nationalist Party’s rule, and after the new elites gained control of the political platforms and accumulated their own cultural capital, they, like the traditional gentry, tended to defend their vested interests by monopolizing local reform projects. The new elites thus passed beyond the control of the central government too.

Drawing on previously untapped country archives, and through an in-depth study of how the various state-strengthening agendas were implemented in rural Mei County, this dissertation reveals a continuous theme in Chinese modern politics: the modernizing state, in order to enlist local support for national goal, closely collaborated with a minority of local population who were willing to serve the state’s goal while sparing no effort to eliminate any power holder who was concerned about local interests.

Different from previous studies which either stress the weakness or the obedience of local communities, this dissertation argues that despite the state’s effort at penetrating, local elites, including both the traditional gentry and new elites, well defended their sectional interests and undermined the state’s attempt of extortion based on their control of various local organizations. By studying how local leaders foiled the state’s attempt to extend authority in local society, this dissertation provides a bottom-up perspective to understand why China’s modern regimes became increasingly authoritarian. As shown here, the state’s inclination to eliminate local power holders and establish direct control of local society, which reached a climax under the Communist rule after 1949, rather than

iii being merely the result of the state’s choice of political ideologies, was more a response to deep-rooted local autonomy and pervasive resistance to state-penetration efforts.

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to Xiangyu.

Acknowledgments

I would not have had the chance to spend my last nine years working on a topic –

China’s state-society relationship – that has intrigued me since I was an undergraduate student if I had not been admitted as a Ph.D student by the History Department of The Ohio

State University. Professors Cynthia Brokaw and Christopher A. Reed not only gave me this opportunity but also provided me with numerous forms of assistance during my study here. Professor Brokaw introduced me to the world of academia in America. Before I came to OSU, I had rarely read academic works or written an essay in English. She taught me how to read books and write essays efficiently. In my second year at OSU, she took me to the Annual Conference of the Association for Asian Studies and taught me how to present myself in an academic conference. Though she left OSU for career reasons, I am deeply grateful to her for her guidance and assistance in my early years in the U.S.

Professor Reed is a sharp and inspiring scholar. I enjoyed all the heated discussions in his classes and benefited greatly from his strict requirement in writing. Without his straightforward and sincere critiques, my writing could not have achieved its current shape.

His detailed and informative comments on my dissertation not only helped me correct historical errors, but also enlightened me on how to clearly present and organize my arguments. As my primary advisor, Professor Reed has also exerted great effort in helping me building my career. He has always been willing to share with me his knowledge about vi academia and his personal experience as a teacher in various academic settings. Most importantly, he has always given me generous encouragment when I made progress in writing. His approval kept me hanging on in the writing stage of this dissertation, especially when I was buried in my materials and doubted my ability to finish this project. I will be forever greateful to him for his constant encouragement and support.

I am also grateful for guidance and support from my other two committee members,

Professors Patricia Sieber and Ying Zhang. Professor Sieber, though being an expert on

Chinese literature, has broad interests in different disciplines. Her understanding of the most up-to-date topics and questions in different fields broadens my views on my current project. My interest in the connections among the people in south China and Southeast

Asia is owed to her introduction to the issue of transnational cultural exchange. A warm person, she always sends students the most supportive words when we encounter difficulty or are assailed by self-doubt.

Professor Ying Zhang arrived at OSU when I began my dissertation writing. Her class on the Chinese gentry broadened my view of Confucianism and Confucian scholars.

Her comments on my dissertation prospectus also helped me sharpen the thesis of this dissertation. Without my talks with her, I would not have been able to push myself to think about the broader implications of this project.

Other professors in Department of History in OSU, though not sitting on my committee, have also provided generous support in the past years. Professor Philip Brown, stressing that he could not forget those hard days when he just arrived in Japan, always provided extra care and patience to foreign students. Professor Judy Wu introduced the

vii classic works on women’s history, a field that has long interested me and on which I plan to work in the future.

I have also benefited greatly from my friends and colleagues at OSU: Yan Xu, Di

Luo, John Knight, Austin Dean, Man He, Mengjun Li, and Qiong Yang. They not only offered inspiring ideas during and after classes, but also provided the companionship which helped me survive this long and lonely journey.

I also want to mention that I was fortunate to have begun my study in history at Sun

Yat-sen University, where professors such as Liu Zhiwei, Chen Chunsheng, Cheng

Meibao, Huang Guoxin, and Wen Chunlai taught me the basic skills of the historian, such as how to read classic Chinese texts, how to combine methods of institutional study and cultural research, and how to collect materials through field work. Those interesting field trips clinched my decision to pursue an academic career in history. When I started this project on Mei County, they also provided countless support, such as writing me recommendation letters and introducing me to the local notables in northeastern

Guangdong.

In Meizhou, the scholars and students of the Hakka Research Center in Jiaying

University, such as Xiao Wenping and Zhou Jianxin, and the officials in the Mei County

Archives, such as Cai Meisheng, were all of great help. Their knowledge of the area was indispensable to my research. They provided clues about how to collect information about the pratogonists in my dissertation and accompanied me to local villages personally. I cannot name the many people who provided introductions when I visited the villages in

Mei County. Without their assistance, I would not have been able to finish this project.

viii

Finally, my deepest appreciation goes to my husband Xiangyu Yang. He is a scientist who always pays a close attention to the logic of any argument and writing. In the past several years, my dissertation has become the major topic of conversation during our dinners. Xiangyu could always pick out the logical flaws in my argument and pushed me to reorganize my writing. These discussions enabled me to understand the historical figures from the perspective of themselves, rather than making judgments based on my personal preference or hindsight reasoning. If I show both sympathy and suspicion to most figures in my dissertation, it should be ascribed to those dinner discussions. So this dissertation is dedicated to Xiangyu.

Vita

2004...... B.A. History, Sun Yat-sen University

2006...... M.A. History, Nankai University

2006-15 ...... Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department of

History, The Ohio StateUniversity

Fields of Study

Major Field: History

Table of Contents

Abstract ...... ii

Dedication ...... v

Acknowledgments...... vi

Vita ...... x

Table of Contents ...... xi

List of Figures ...... xiii

List of Tables ...... xiv

List of Historical Names of Mei County...... xv

Introduction ...... 1

Chapter 1: Setting: Mountain, Sea, Lineages, and Migrants ...... 32

Chapter 2: Late Qing Reform: Reshuffling Local Power Structure ...... 84

Chapter 3: Revolution: Metropolitan Enthusiasm and Local Indifference ...... 139

Chapter 4: Revolutionary Rule: Confronting Traditional Gentry and New Elites ...... 198

Chapter 5: A Period of Chaos: Collaboration and Self-dependence ...... 221

Chapter 6: The Nationalist Regime: From Collaborators to Accomplices ...... 257

Conclusion: State Penetration and Local Autonomy ...... 309

Bibliography ...... 335

xii

List of Figures

Figure 1. Round-dragon houses, Mei County ...... 32

Figure 2. Lianfanglou, Xiyang Town, Mei County ...... 33

xiii

List of Tables

Table 1. Self Government Income of Songkou Town (1929) ...... 291

Table 2. Self Government Income of Likeng Village (1929) ...... 291

xiv

List of Historical Names of Mei County1

Chengxiang County (程鄉縣) (479-917)

Jing Prefecture (敬州) (917-971)

Meizhou Prefecture (梅州) (971-1369)

Chengxiang County (程鄉縣) (1369-1733)

Jiaying Prefecture (嘉應州) (1733-1911)

Mei County (梅縣) (1912-1979)

Meizhou City (梅州市) (1979-present)

1 This dissertation uses the historical names of Mei in the accordant periods. xv

Introduction

In October 1909, upon its establishment under the central government’s command, the Guangdong Provincial Assembly initiated a series of social reforms. One of the reforms targeted opium smokers. A juren (舉人)1 named Ling Zhiting (凌植庭) from Jiaying

Prefecture (嘉應州), a rural prefecture in northeastern Guangdong, was caught in this campaign. In a written reply to a local magistrate, he defended himself:

I was fortunate to have won an examination degree. … In the past, I

had strictly followed my family’s instructions and never offended other

people. Recently the social atmosphere has changed. I rarely visited the

county town and had never met [the prosecutor] Huang Huaiyin (黃槐蔭).

Neither was I acquainted with any “great reform-minded leader from the

commercial and educational circles” (維新紳商大領袖 weixin shenshang

dalingxiu). I was so astonished knowing that I had been listed as an opium-

smoker by Huang. I had made a living by teaching in private schools and

earned no more than 10,000 wen (文) every year. After the imperial

examination was abolished [in 1905], my life became increasingly difficult.

I could not possess extra money to purchase opium. Alas! Neither could I

1 Juren is the title awarded to the qualified graduate who passed the three-yearly imperial examination held at the provincial level. 1

control new-style public institutions like the chamber of commerce to

confront the scholar-gentry nor could I take the opportunity of running new-

style schools to levy taxes and make profits for myself. I did not dare to

participate in the revolutionary party and got emboldened through this way

either. I would like you [the magistrate] to take away my right to vote, like

how the Western governments treated their poor residents. I do not want this

honor [of voting] and by this way I hope those “dogs” [such as Huang

Huaiying] would stop crazily barking at me.2

This lament suggests the delicate situation of the traditional gentry at the turn of the twentieth century. Joseph Esherick, in the conclusion of Chinese Elites and Patterns of

Dominance, has optimistically argued that when marked and rapid social discontinuities occurred in the twentieth century, a significant number of traditional gentry maintained their social standing by flexibly adapting to the new sources available to them.3 Yet Ling’s case suggests that this group of title-holders did not always occupy advantageous positions under the new policies. Many other scholars, such as Timthy Brook and Pransenjit Duara, have regretfully pointed out that the traditional title-holders had lost their cultural privilege after the government abandoned its commitment to Confucianism and were totally defeated by a group of new elites.4 Ling’s reply demonstrates that this argument is untenable too. In

2 Li Jingzhong, Jueshe lu (The record of chats) (Shanghai: Zhenya tushuju, 1927), 2-4.

3 Joseph Esherick and Mary Rankin, eds., Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 307.

4 Philip Huang, The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985). Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).

his response to the magistrate, Ling not only openly scorned the “reform-minded leaders” for their arrogance and selfishness, but also dared to depict them as dogs, which suggests that Ling did not fear the new elites at all.

Ling’s lament also reveals the complicated identity of the new elites. Scholars of modern Chinese history have generally divided the new elites of the early twentieth century to two separate groups. One group consisted of urban reformers, who, driven by their desire to save the nation and modernize the country, actively promoted cultural and political reforms from the late nineteenth century. A second group, including village bullies or military bosses, acted as the government’s pawns and established their leadership in rural society through coercion or violence. Ling’s lament, however, suggests that the new elites in Mei could be both the ardent supportors of the reform and the opportunists who utilized the reform to suppress the local population. In general, Ling’s lament discloses the sharp contradiction between the traditional gentry and new elites as well as their dynamic relationship with the state in the late Qing reforms.

Scholars have done excellent studies separately on the traditional gentry of the late imperial period and the new elites who rose in metropolises like Shanghai in the early twentieth century. The interaction between the two groups of elites in the transitional period and the correlation between the state-strengthening reform and the division of local elites, however, has not been fully explained by existing scholarly works. The popular opinion, as is held by both Chinese scholars such as Chen Hansheng and Fei Xiaotong5 and

Western scholars like Philip Huang and Presenjit Duara, indicates that the modernization

5 Chen Hansheng, Landlord and Peasant in China: A Study of Agrarian Crisis in South China (New York: International Publishers, 1936); Fei Xiaotong, Peasant Life in China: A Field Study of Country Life in the Yangtze Valley (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1939). 3

reform brought devastating consequences on rural life and led to the disintegration of the traditional cultural nexus, which in turn forced the upright gentry to leave villages while leaving the leadership positions to a group of ruffians. This opinion, however, overlooked the agency of the elites who had actively supported the reforms and underestimated the ability of the traditional gentry in defending their vested interests.

This dissertation, by bringing both the traditional gentry and new elites into the discussion and focusing on their dynamic relationship with the state, argues that the division of local elites was caused by both the state’s attempt to penetrate local society and the desire of the two groups of elites to defend their distinctive sectional interests. Rather than taking the traditional gentry and new elites as given entities, I treat them as both the products and shapers of the reforms initiated by the various regimes from the late Qing to the Nationalist periods. On one hand, I stress that the modernizing state’s new target of promoting economic growth and national strength alienated the traditional gentry while providing opportunities for a group of new elites with commercial background and Western knowledge to distinguish themselves and gain the trust of the government. On the other hand, I point out that the two groups of elites, according to their different concerns over private or sectional interests, took constrasting attitudes toward the reform which in turn shaped the state’s strategy in reaching into local society.

Before further discussion, it is necessary to define the terms used to denote the protagonists in this dissertation. I use “traditional gentry” and “new elites” to define the two groups of elites who were in constant tension with each other from the late Qing reform.

According to Luo Zhitian’s exploration, the terms were first used by the elites themselves during the Hundred Days’ Reform of 1898. As the Qing government initiated a series of

new reforms after 1901, the terms became more popular since the different factions of elites tended to use the labels to consolidate their alliance and to attack other factions.6 Although the contrasting words “new” and “traditional” were used, the words did not necessarily imply the political orientation of the elites. As both Luo’s research and this dissertation demonstrate, the members of the traditional faction not always opposed the reform; while the new faction often had reservation toward some new policies.7 The inner attitudes were easy to change and difficult to measure.

The traditional gentry, having established cultural authority by earning official titles and consolidated their control of local society through dominating lineages, had little interests in sponsoring the expensive reforms. The new elites, most of whom had accumulated wealth but had not acquired cultural resources to legitimize their power, in comparison, vigorously invested in the reforms with the attempt to enhance their social status. However, the desire to defend their vested interests acquired through the reform also created conflict between the government and the new elites and weakened the efficiency of the reform.

This study, instead, points out that the local elites chose the political camps mainly based on the concern that which camp could bring them advantageous positions and maximum interests. The leaders of the local established lineages, having established cultural authority by earning examination degrees and consolidated their control of local communities through dominating lineages, had little interests in sponsoring the expensive reforms from which they could benefit little. Even if some of them had openly expressed

6 Luo Zhitian, “Jindai Hunan quyu wenhua yu wuxu xinjiu zhizheng” (The regional culture in Hunan and the conflicts between the new and the traditional faction after 1898), Jindaishi yanjiu 5 (1998): 58.

7 Ibid., 62-65. 5

support to the reform policies, they still stood steadily on the side of the traditional faction, since their interests were closely connected to the faction. Conversely, a group of commercial town elites, mainly the nouveaux riches who had accumulated wealth but had obtained an opportunity to legitimize their power with cultural resources, vigorously invested in the reforms with the attempt to enhance their social status. Some scholar-gentry from weak lineages also joined in the camp of the new faction as they were able to exude more influence by associating with the faction. In general, members of powerful lineages in the political center tended to maintain the existing while merchants and literati with weak family backgrounds were more enthusiastic in supporting the reform.

The questions that concern me are broad, but I will answer them by focusing on

Mei County in northeastern Guangdong. This choice was made partially by accident and partially by design. I started my field work with a general interest in the life of “commoners” in northeastern Guangdong and during that process I discovered a large number of

Republican and Nationalist government documents in the Mei County Archives. A cursory reading of the numerous archives made me realize that local people in the early twentieth century, rather than taking actions independently, were closely associated with various local organizations. In civil litigations, for example, the disputes between two individuals were rare. Instead, the litigants in most cases were the representatives of a lineage, a village with several lineages, or a local institution such as a new-style school. Other publications preserved in the Archives, such as local newspapers, journals published by local schools, or the periodicals published by voluntary associations, disclose a more interesting phenomenon, that is, most litigations were caused by the contradiction between the two factions in the county. Local publications, according to their places of origins, defined the

two factions as the “urban faction” (城派 chengpai) and the “rural faction” (鄉派 xiangpai), or, according to the schools they separately controlled, termed them as the faction of the

“Meizhou Middle School” (梅州中學) and the faction of the “Dongshan Middle School”

(東山中學). The so-called “urban” area refers to the county seat, the political and cultural center of the county since the Ming dynasty. The “rural” area mainly refers to the towns along the Mei River (梅江) which were considered countryside but were growing as important commercial towns since the middle nineteenth century due to the prosperity of foreign trade. To investigate who the two factions separately included, I then checked the backgrounds of the leaders in the two factions. Some leaders, like Huang Zunxian (黃遵

憲 1848-1905), Qiu Fengjia (丘逢甲 1864-1912), or Ye Jianying (葉劍英 1897-1986), were nationally renowned political leaders. Their writings have been collected and published in their anthologies, bringing to light their role in both national politics and local affairs. Some less famous names required more meticulous search. But with abundant local newspapers, journals, and memoirs, it is not difficult to find clues about the role they had played in the transformation of local society.

Upon reading these materials, two questions arose: why was the relationship among local elites so strained from the late Qing reform period and what were the power foundations of the two factions of elites? The division could not have been solely caused by the divergence of political opinions since different factions of elites often shared the same political ideals. Huang Zunxian and Qiu Fengjia, for instance, got along well when they served as officials in Beijing in 1889 and had both actively supported the 1898

Reform.8 Yet their relationship immediately deteriorated as they returned to Mei and joined different local factions in an attempt to wield power in local public affairs. The factions not only determined the choice of the elites, but also shaped the relationship of the majority of the local population. Since the commercial town faction vigorously supported the late Qing reforms and the 1911 revolution, the county seat residents, despite their various political attitudes, always took an antagonistic stance toward reform policies promoted by the government and the commercial town elites.

The profound contradiction among the local population and the irrelevance of the political attitude to their conflicts suggest that the disagreement over ideologies was not the main reason for the division in local society. If ideology per se did not play an important role in dividing local people, then on what foundation were the two factions formed? It cannot be denied that conflict among the local population was quite common before the late Qing Dynasty as local lineages had often developed long-lasting animosities over the usage of public lands, water resources, or even the privilege in sacrificing to a diety. But these urban and rural factions were not formed until the Qing government began to implement the state-strengthening reform in the beginning of the twentieth century. In other words, it was the state’s efforts in strengthening itself and promoting national interests that led to the divisions among local elites in the county.

As this dissertation will demonstrate, the “rural faction” was formed when the commercial town elites tried to utilize the reform to expand their influence in the county seat while the “urban faction” was organized as a response to the challenge posed by the

8 Qiu Zhuchang, Qiu Fengjia jiaowanglu (The record on the people who had associated with Qiu Fengjia) (Wuhan: Huazhong shida chubanshe, 2004), 3-4.

“rural faction.” Under the name of raising funding for a new-style middle school in the county seat during the education reform, the commercial town elites established a trans- town alliance that was recognized by the government. By generously investing in the middle school, those elites gained the trust of the government and successfully controlled the new educational, commercial, and self-government institutions. The established gentry, to compete with the commercial town elites and to withstand the intrusion of the state, also strengthened their control of lineages and lineage alliances.

During the late Qing reforms, the established gentry, though failing to dominate new-style administrative instituions, forcefully defend their control of the local population and public resources. After the success of the 1911 Revolution, the new elites, as the supporters of the revolutionaries, became the legitimate agents of the ruling party and gained formal administrative power in the county government. The relationship between the government and the new elites, however, was not always smooth. The relationship started off as reciprocal but soon became strained as the Guangdong revolutionary government inaugurated a series of aggressive programs from 1911 to 1913. The new elites, after establishing cultural authority and gaining solid control of political platforms, were not willing to sponsor the government’s projects at a high cost and tended to consolidate their vested interests through monopolizing the reform projects. The new elites recollaborated with the Nationalists in the early 1920s as the Guangdong government, under the leadership of Chen Jiongming (陳炯明 1878-1933), a proponent of self-rule, respected the new elites’ leadership in local society. From 1925, the Nationalists, first collaborating with the Communists and then establishing one-party autocracy in Nanjing, tried to deepen its control of local society by setting up administrative institutions and mass

organizations at the county and sub-county levels. The new elites took advantage of the opportunity to further expand their power and influence. Although the Nationalist Party was not satisfied with the new elites’ dominance of the local political platforms, the party, failing to cultivate a group of loyal cadres, had to rely on the new elites to wrestle with the traditional gentry. The new elites, being able to participate in local administration in every aspect, gradually gained an upper hand in the competition with the traditional gentry over the management of local public affairs. However, the administrative power the new elites possessed was still insufficient to threaten the traditional gentry’s direct control of local resources or cut off local people’s loyalty to their lineages, which, though bot being accepted by the state as the legitimate agents anymore, still provided an important framework whereby rural population became organized and sought protection. The

Nationalist government, suffering from the estrangement of the traditional gentry and the intractability of the new elites, unsurprisingly, failed to mobilize necessary resources to achieve its objective of self-strengthening.

The major goal and contribution of this dissertation, therefore, is to explore how the various state-strengthening agendas proposed by different regimes during this period, by placing national interests in front of local interests, seized the support of a minority of local population but led to the estrangement of the majority of people from the state.

Scholars of twentieth-century China often get confused by various ideologies claimed by different political regimes. Historians who identify with the late Qing reformers praised their enthusiasm in promoting representative politics and self-government.9 Those who

9 See, for example, Norbert Meienberger, The Emergence of Constitutional Government in China (1905– 1908): The Concept Sanctioned by the Empress Dowager Tz'u–His (New York: Peter Lang International Academic Publishers, 1980); John Fincher, Chinese Democracy: The Self-Government Movement in Local, Provincial and National Politics, 1905-1914 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981); Ernest Young, The 10

favor the Nationalists regard them as the leaders of Chinese bourgeois revolution and applaud their determination in fighting for state modernization and national unity.10 And scholars who sympathize with the Communists hold that the Communists gained the final success by addressing the fundamental social problem in China, that is, the class conflict between landlords and peasants.11 As this dissertation illustrates, however, no matter which strategies the central regimes adopted, local people did not accept the state’s agenda as was expected by the state and frequently ran into conflicts among each other as well as with the state. This dissertation therefore concludes that it was not the different ideologies promoted by the regimes, but the state’s attempt to prioritize national interests above sectional interests, that created conflict among different local groups and led to the gap between the state and local society.12

This dissertation also reveals an important phenomenon in Chinese modern politics, that is, the state, in order to enlist local support for the national goal, closely collaborated with a minority of local population who were willing to serve the state’s goal while sparing

Presidency of Yuan Shi-kai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1977).

10 See, for example, Marie-Claire Bergère, Sun Yat-sen, trans. Janet Lloyd (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); Martin Wilbur, Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); Martin Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

11 See, for example, Harold Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951); Roy Hofheinz, The Broken Wave: The Chinese Communist Peasant Movement, 1922-1928 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977); Robert Marks, Rural Revolution in South China: Peasants and the Making of History in Haifeng County, 1570-1930 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984).

12 John Fitzgerald, by focusing on the resistance to the state penetration in the period of the first United Front, also addresses the issue of the conflict between the expansive state and autonomous society in the 1920s, though Fitzgerald, rather than further analyzing how different local groups responded to the state penetration in different ways, merely proposed that the state’s penetration led to general resistance. See John Fitzgerald, “The Misconceived Revolution: State and Society in China’s Nationalist Revolution, 1923-26,” Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 49, no. 2 (May 1990), 323-343.

no effort to eliminate any power holder who was concerned abot local interests. During the late nineteenth century, the Qing government had strengthened its ties with both rich merchants and scholars familiar with foreign affairs who identified with and vigorously supported the state’s self-strengthening agenda. To further strengthen the influence of the government and weaken the traditional gentry’s control of local resources, the Republican regimes, by widely setting up administrative institutions at county and sub-county levels, institutionalized the leadership of the new elites.

Despite the state’s penetrating efforts, this dissertation emphasizes that, local elites, no matter the traditional gentry or the new elites, defended their sectional interests well based on their control of various traditional and new organizations. The traditional gentry, by leading the autonomous organizations like lineages, strictly dominated local population and resources. The new elites, after monopolizing the new political platforms, also passed beyond the control of the government. By studying how local leaders foiled the state’s attempt to extend authority in local society, this dissertation provides a bottom-up perspective to better understand why China’s modern regimes were becoming increasingly authoritarian. The state’s increasing inclination to eliminate local power hoders and establish direct control of local society, as the case of Mei County suggests, rather than being merely the result of the state’s choice of political ideologies, was more a response to the deep-rooted local autonomy and pervasive resistance to the state-penetrating efforts.

This study focuses on Mei County where the vast majority of incidents discussed in the dissertation took place. So this dissertation can be categorized as a local history. Yet, as the above discussion discloses, the change in Mei was directly related to the process of

Chinese social transformation after the late nineteenth century. An in-depth study of a

county like Mei thus will provide a local angle to understanding the general social change of the period. As a county located in the southern hinterland, Mei County had distinctive characteristics while sharing common features with many other counties.

The county, though located in the mountain area of northeastern Guangdong, was connected to the eastern coastal area by several major river systems. When external conditions permitted, the Mei residents tended to migrate outward because of the disadvantageous ecological environment. This trend accelerated in 1860 when the

American and the British took the neighboring Chaozhou (潮州) prefecture as their treaty port. Quite a few of the Mei migrants became wealthy by doing business in Southeast Asia.

As a migrant center, Mei County thus was distinctive in that most new elites in the area accumulated wealth from the external world in a short period during the second half of the nineteenth century. As nouveaux riches, these merchants had a stronger desire to reshuffle the existing power structure, which strained their relationship with the established gentry.

But this tension between the nouveaux riches and the established elites, as some scholars studying Zhejiang and Jiangsu have noticed but not fully explained, was not atypical.

Shenbao’s (申報 Shanghai Morning Post) report details the prevalence of these conflicts in local society. According to a report on March 13, 1911: “The local government that is now being carried out is quite different from the local affairs of days of old, and for this reason, the gentry directors of the present day and those of the days of old are often found in two parties which are quite mutually exclusive.”13 This piece of news discloses that the experience of Mei was not an isolated case but rather reflected an important trend in local

13 Shenbao, March 13, 1911. Cited in Ma Min, “Emergent Civil Society in the Late Qing Dynasty: The Case of Suzhou,” in Town and Country in China: Identity and Perception, eds. David Faure and Tao Tao Liu (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 158.

leadership in the beginning of the twentieth century.

Also, in comparison to a metropolis like Shanghai or the extremely insecure areas like the villages in the plain of north China,14 Mei County provides a more “typical” case to understand how the majority of rural areas in China became involved in the social changes of the early twentieth century. As a hinterland area, the county suffered from its mountainous topography. Yet benefiting from the river system, the county could be easily connected to more prosperous regions through waterways. So although the county was isolated from the major metropolitan centers, the merchants in the area still benefited from maritime trade and the elites had opportunities to have access to urban culture. In this sense,

Mei County was similar to many counties in southern China. They were probably remote from metropolises but were connected to the regional economic centers through waterborne transport and had frequent communication with the centers due to the need of trade. Also, in comparison to the population in the urban areas, the residents in hinterland were not directly or deeply involved into the political changes. But the residents, through the opportunities of studying or doing business in big cities, also brought the new thoughts home and actively joined the reform and revolutionary activities in the early twentieth century.

Although Mei County was not isolated from the metropolitan areas, it must be stressed that the county did not experience dramatic changes as the metropolises did. The county initiated some modernization projects under the state’s command or the Western influence, but because of its disadvantageous location, no industrialist wanted to invest in the county. Until the 1930s, the county did not possess any modern factory. A movie theater

14 The villages studied by Presenjit Duara, for example, were typical insecure villages. Presenjit Duara, Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942. 14

was built in the county seat in 1931, though the owner of the theater tended to show traditional dramas rather than movies in the theater since the former was more popular among the local residents.15 Therefore, Mei County, as a rural county which was connected to but less influenced by the metropolises, provides a good case to understand how the majority areas in China which did not undergo dramatic and extreme change perceived and experienced the social transformation.

This revised understanding of the interaction between the traditional gentry and new elites in twentieth-century China is built on numerous excellent studies of the two groups of elites. In the following sections, I will firstly introduce how scholars’ views toward these two groups of people evolved in the past decades. I will then analyze why previous studies downplay or overemphasize one group of the two. On this foundation, I stress that the different power foundation of the two groups of elites and their different concerns over sectional interests had played a critical role in shaping the state-making agenda and the political structure in China.

Gentry’s Leadership in Late Imperial China

To understand the role played by traditional gentry in the twentieth century, it is important to make clear how they achieved leadership and interacted with the state in the late imperial period. This question has intrigued several generations of scholars. The earliest Western-trained Chinese scholars, influenced by Max Weber who regarded the

15 “Hanqing paiyuan zhizhi meixian xiyuan yanju you” (Please send a commissioner to forbid Mei County Theater to play drama), December 25, 1931, Box Jianshe ke (Construction section), Folder 20, Mei County Archives, Meizhou.

bureaucratic system to be the key to the success of Chinese empire,16 focused on official- degree holders and their engagement in local administrative affairs.17 Their main argument was that a group of extra-bureaucratic degree-holders, as representatives of government in local society, obtained their leadership position by assisting county magistrates to govern local society. These scholars use the term “gentry” (shenshi 绅士) to denote this group of elites. Though gentry usually refer to landed aristocracy in an English context, these scholars insist that, in the Chinese context, degrees and official titles were the most important source of gentry’s power. Scholars of the 1980s, with Hilary Beattie being the path breaker, argue that obtaining titles was merely one strategy for the local gentry to sustain their dominance. In Beattie’s view, the continuous holding of large land estates and the organization of lineages were also crucial to the persistence of power and authority for the gentry class.18 Later scholars complement this view by pointing out that local leaders could use various strategies, including investing in temples, organizing local relief, or even controlling military forces, to maintain their leadership. They also chose to use the term

“elites”, rather than “gentry,” to denote local leaders.19

The cultural history paradigm, which tries to understand society by investigating the activities of commoners, such as their rituals or religious beliefs, sheds new light on the study of local gentry. Prasenjit Duara’s book on northern China is a pioneering study

16 Max Weber, The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism, ed. Hans Gerth (1915; reprint, Windsor: Free Press, 1968). 17 See, for example, Chang Chung-li, The Chinese Gentry: Studies on their Role in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1955); Ho Ping-ti, The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: Aspects of Social Mobility, 1368-1911 (New York: Wiley, 1964).

18 Hilary Beattie, Land and Lineage in China: A Study of T’ung-ch’eng County, Anhwei.

19 Joseph Esherick and Mary Rankin, eds., Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance.

that adopts the method of cultural analysis.20 Duara argues that local society was organized through hierarchical organizations and networks of informal relations which derived authority from symbolic values embedded in the organizations. The manipulation of symbols in various cultural nexuses, including marriage networks, religions, lineages, and marketing networks, affected the exercise of physical power such as the power of allocating resources. Duara’s most innovative argument is that both the state and local leaders had to establish their legitimacy by conforming to popular beliefs and customs in the cultural nexus. By pointing out that there exist “myriad channels outside the gentry’s control through which the imperial state reached into local society,” 21 Duara challenges the traditional view that Confucian gentry were the most important mediators between the state and society. Historians in the 1980s, like Duara, generally hold that the local leaders built their power on various sources. As the authors in Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of

Dominance point out, earning an official title was just one method among the many strategies, including developing military force or gaining commercial success, to achieve dominance.22

However, a group of historical anthropologists who work on the Pearl River Delta, with David Faure as a lead scholar, refute this point by emphasizing that the embrace of

Confucianism and the scholar-gentry status was a critical strategy for local society to both gain the state’s recognition and achieve local autonomy.23 Taking a historical perspective,

20 Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942.

21 Ibid., 39.

22 Joseph Esherick and Mary Rankin, eds., Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

23 David Faure, The Structure of Chinese Rural Society : Lineage and Village in the Eastern New Territories (Hong Kong and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Zheng Zhenman, Ming Qing Fujian 17

they reconstruct how Confucian ideology and rituals were appropriated by local communities to maintain a reciprocal relationship with the state. They find that lineages,

China’s dominant local organizations, did not prevail until the sixteenth century when the state expanded its influence in local society. The organization of lineages was first promoted by some senior Confucian officials and then accepted by the Ming government.

Then the commoners found that by organizing their communities in the form of Confucian lineages, they could easily gain the trust of the government which in turn enabled them to maintain their autonomy. The pursuit of the scholar-gentry identity should also be seen as a means for local elites to both achieve upward mobility and to defend their communities in a language accepted by the imperial state. This argument points out that the popularity of Confucian ideology and the rise of the gentry class, rather than being owed to the state’s imposition, was to a large extent initiated by local communities to attain legitimate status and prevent official intervention. Therefore, according to these scholars, the success of local leaders in late imperial China did not lie in their respect for any popular value or norm arising from the natural order, but should rather be ascribed to their co-optation of

Confucian rituals which were accepted as orthodox by the state.

In sum, while the cultural historians reveals startlingly diverse images of local leaders and their various strategies to maintain dominance, the historians of Chinese

jiazu zuzhi yu shehui bianqian (Family lineage organization and social change in Ming and Qing Fujian) (Changsha: Hunan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1992); Liu Zhiwei, Zai guojia yu shehui zhijian: Ming Qing Guangdong lijia fuyi zhidu yanjiu (Between the state and society: Research of the registration and tax system in Ming-Qing Guangdong) (Guangzhou: Zhongshan daxue chubanshe, 1997); David Faure and Liu Zhiwei, Zongzu yu defang shehui de guojia renting: Ming Qing huanan diqu zongzu fazhan de yishi xingtai jichu (Lineages and the local identification of the state: The ideological foundation of the development of lineages in south China), Lishi yanjiu 3 (2000): 3-14; David Faure, Emperor and Ancestor: State and Lineage in South China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).

lineages remind us that the state had played a critical role in shaping the strategies adopted by the local people. Local communities, by promoting Confucian lineage rituals which were authorized by the state, shared the authority which had been monopolized by the state and accordantly had their power legitimized and consolidated. Directly controlling land and people, possessing the opportunity to participate in politics and local administration, and having these powers justified by the official ideology, lineage leaders were authentic power-holders in local society. For community members, lineage heads could be formidable figures who enjoyed absolute authority in adjudicating internal affairs, enforcing judgments, and collecting taxes.24 Lineage heads indeed often made profit for themselves or their branches by monopolizing the position, which often created tension and inequality among lineage members.25 Through the kinship relationship, though, a commoner could also gain protection or access to power from their influential relatives.

This was especially useful when the commoner was involved in conflicts with outsiders or with the government. The lineage also provided a legitimate incorporate structure which enabled lineage members to establish trusts and make collective investments. Those trusts not only facilitated commercial activities but also provided welfare to the poor and the old inside the lineage.

Although lineages were highly autonomous in daily administration, it must be stressed that they could not pose any threat to the rule of the imperial government. Since a lineage had to be organized under the premise of worshipping one ancestor, the lineage could only be a single-surname community. This meant that lineages were mutually

24 David Faure, Emperor and Ancestor, 182-183.

25 Rubie Watson, Inequality among Brothers: Class and Kinship in South China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 19

exclusive and could not grow to be a formidable force, which explains why the government was willing to encourage the development of lineages.26 Inasmuch as lineages continued to express allegiance by following Confucian rituals and provided moderate economic support to the state, the state was tolerant of local autonomy. In general, with the Confucian rituals as the linchpin and the gentry class as the intermediary, this mode of the coexistence of integration and autonomy ran smoothly until the early nineteenth century. However, from the middle nineteenth century onward, when a series of internal and external wars exhausted the government’s financial resources, and when the rise of local militia greatly expanded local gentry’s power, both the state’s demands and local expectations changed.

The Rise of the New Elites

Though scholars have not reached consensus over the nature of local leaders in the turbulent nineteenth century, it is generally agreed that local leadership experienced fundamental changes starting with the Taiping Rebellion (太平天國起義 Taiping tianguo qiyi, 1851-1864), which led to the rise of local militarization and created tension between the central government and local elites. Philip Kuhn holds that this trend began earlier, from the unrest during the White Lotus Rebellion (白蓮教起義 Bailianjiao qiyi, 1796-

1804) that broke out at the end of the eighteenth century.27 Frederic Wakeman adds that the

British invasions during the two opium wars (1839-1842; 1856-1860) accelerated this

26 Some small lineages residing in the same territory, in order to protect themselves from the invasion of the government or powerful lineages, chose to merge together by forging a common ancestor. But as long as a lineage was formed, it became exclusive and had to be organized around the principle of worshipping the common ancestor.

27 Philip Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

trend.28 Where scholars do agree is that the Qing government, being incapable of coping with the increasing number of rebellions and external threats, granted local gentry increasing authority to organize militias to defend their communities. The expanding militia enhanced the local gentry’s power, but at the cost of local stability. Although the government attempted to suppress the militias as soon as these rebellions were put down, the militias were sustained and became institutionalized in the late nineteenth century.

Though scholars share the understanding that the Taiping Rebellion strengthened the power of local elites, they diverge over the relationship between the elites and the state.

A popular view in the 1980s states that a group of new elites, including both gentry- merchants in the coastal provinces, such as Zhejiang (浙江) and Jiangsu (江蘇), and urban residents in commercial towns, like Hankou (漢口) and Chengdu (成都), developed rich managerial expertise and expanded non-governmental spheres during the Taiping

Rebellion and the post-rebellion reconstruction. 29 By organizing new-style welfare institutions which were open to every member in a community and also providing public services such as water controlling and fire fighting, they changed the meaning of gong (公 public) from a sense of governmental involvement to communal participation.30 Moreover, the advent of the modern public press and institutional reform at the turn of the twentieth century endowed local elites a broader vision of national affairs and provided them with

28 Frederic Wakeman, Jr., Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839-1861 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

29 Mary Rankin, Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China: Zhejiang Province, 1865-1911; William Rowe, Conflict and Community in a Chinese City, 1796-1895 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989).

30 William Rowe, Conflict and Community in a Chinese City, 9-10.

new platforms to engage in extra-local movements. Some of them abandoned the pursuit of official positions and chose journalism or publicists as their new professions.31 This group of new elites incorporated the idea of “popular power” to their writing and made the newspaper a site for confrontation with the power holders.32 Scholars have suggested that these changes shifted the balance between the state and local society and provided the social basis for the late Qing reforms and eventually the 1911 Revolution. Being dissatisfied with the government’s inability to deal with foreign threat, the new elites put forward their own political proposals for strengthening the country. As the government continued to disappoint the new elites and tried to strengthen its penetration into local self- government associations, the new elites, desiring for “economic independence, self- government, and political rights,” brought down the imperial government through the 1911

Revolution.33

This group of new-elites, in Rankin and Rowe’s opinions, could be equated to the bourgeoisie in eighteenth-century Europe who developed an urban community into an intermediate arena similar to the “public sphere” in Western societies.34 This attempt to draw a parallel between Chinese merchant-gentry and European bourgeoisie, however, was criticized by many scholars, such as Frederic Wakeman and Philip Huang. 35 They

31 Joan Judge, Print and Politics, Shibao and the Culture of Reform in Late Qing China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Christopher A. Reed, Gutenberg in Shanghai: Chinese Print Capitalism, 1876- 1937 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 2005).

32 Joan Judge, Print and Politics, Shibao and the Culture of Reform in Late Qing China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 63-67.

33 Mary Rankin, Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China, 301.

34 Ibid., 250.

35 Philip Huang, “The Paradigmatic Crisis in Chinese Studies: Paradoxes in Social and Economic History,” Modern China, vol. 17 no. 3 (Jul., 1991): 299-341; Frederic Wakeman, “The Civil Society and Public Sphere Debate: Western Reflections on Chinese Political Culture,” Modern China, vol. 19, no. 2 (Apr., 22

emphasize that no matter the gentry’s or merchants’ management of public sphere activities, to a large extent, was dependent on the government’s recognition and patronage. The new elites thus could not be equated to the bourgeoisie in eighteenth-century Europe, who, according to Jürgen Habermas, had created the idea of civil society to assert civic power against state power.36

Scholars might have overemphasized the “non-governmental” nature of the public sphere created by the new elites. But to ascribe the weakness of these new elites to their connections with the government might miss the point. The key to the public sphere, according to Habermas, was that it provided a platform through which different groups of people could get together and form public opinions which would produce the power to check the arbitrary actions of the ruling class. In other words, the significance of the public sphere did not lie in its distinction from the government, but depended on its ability to create a common discourse that could exert a regulatory influence on the government.

Chambers of commerce and self-government associations, as these scholars indicate, could be both dependent on and oppositional to the government. The establishment of those associations owed much to the sponsorship of the government. But after they were formed, the associations did provide a legitimate platform from which new elites could defend their interests and resist the government’s excessive impositions. Also, since the associations did not have to resort to traditional rituals but relied on law to protect their corporate status,

1993): 108-138. Scholars have organized several special panels to debate if a civil society had existed in China.

36 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991).

they were able to greatly expand the scale of the organizations and extend the scope of their activities.37

Although the new-style voluntary associations arising in late Qing did provide a platform for new elites to enhance their power, to debate weather the emergence of such associations signifies the appearance of a civil society in China might lead to a misunderstanding of the theme of the period. The primary concern of the elites of the time was not to create a sphere that was beyond the control of the state but to strengthen the state by promoting the power of the people. As Joan Judge admits, the idea of “popular power,” as it was preached in late Qing, was “tied to the concept of the nation.” The reformers highly praised this concept since they believed that “the development of popular power would ensure national salvation.”38 Similarly, the Constitutionalists, no matter the great figure like Liang Qichao (梁啟超 1873-1929) or the common journalist like Di

Baoxian (狄葆賢 1873-1939), applauded representative politics and self-government since they held that Western countries and Japan had all been strengthened by adopting such a system. When some reformers found that the promotion of the Constitutionalism could not achieve the effect of immediately strengthening the state, they lost patience and tended to adopt more radical and authoritarian methods to salvage the nation. So the various new- style voluntary associations, rather than the natural product of a civil society, were actually a by-product of the effort by the state and senior elites in enlisting local energies to strengthen the state.

37 Ma Min, “Emergent Civil Society in the Late Qing Dynasty: the Case of Suzhou,”159-161; William Rowe “The public sphere in modern China”, Modern China, vol. 16, no. 3 (Jul., 1990): 309-329.

38 Joan Judge, Print and Politics, 63.

State-strengthening Agenda and the Rise of the New Elites

The imperial state satisfied its limited requirement of resources by co-opting landlords and recognizing local autonomy. This mode, however, could not work in the new age when the state regarded state-strengthening as its primary goal. Without the ability to plunder resources from overseas, the Chinese government had to turn to a more aggressive way to extract resources from local society. Philip Kuhn has succinctly termed this new way of enlisting local support “mobilization.”39 Although the large-scale mobilization did not emerge until modern parties dominated the political stage in the 1920s, the state had tried to change its form of conscription during the Taiping Rebellion when the state encountered difficulty in raising taxes from local society. Since prosperous southeastern

China had almost fallen to the rebels, the Qing court devised many strategies to increase revenues in response. The lijin (厘金 taxation), a commercial tax imposed on merchandise in internal transit, for instance, was implemented during this time. After the rebellion was put down, the government tried to raise the land tax but ran into much difficulty.

Commercial taxes thus still constituted the most important sources of government income. 40 The rising commercial tax burden, however, as Susan Mann demonstrates, brought conflicts between merchants and the state but also contributed to the solidarity of merchant guilds.41 To enhance the efficiency of levying commercial taxes, the government

39 Philip Kuhn, “Local Self-government under the Republic,” 269.

40 David Faure has traced how the alliance among gentry-led militias undermined the government’s attempts to increase land tax and pushed the government to count on commercial taxes. See David Faure, Emperor and Ancestor, 298-304, 389.

41 Ibid., 307.

then farmed the tax to the merchant guilds, which, through this opportunity, expanded their sphere of activities and became the new leaders of urban public affairs. Since merchants constituted the new foundation through which the government extracted resources, the government had to elevate the status of this group of people and recognize the legitimacy of their organizations.

Late Qing reforms, including the promulgation of the Company Law in 1904, the abolishment of the imperial examination in 1905, and the promotion of self-government associations from 1906 onward, in Faure’s opinion, should all be interpreted as the part of the government’s efforts to enlist support in relationship to commerce.42 The abolishment of the examination, as the most important part of the late Qing reform, weakened the influence of traditional gentry and granted merchants the chance to quickly establish cultural authority. At the same time, the government promulgated the Company Law to allow the free registration of business companies and to recognize merchants’ status. The legal and administrative changes, according to Ma Min’s study of Suzhou merchants, granted merchant organizations legal protection and enabled them to greatly expand the scale of the organizations. 43 If the reliance on land taxes created the patron-client relationship between the state and the gentry, then the government’s requirement for commercial taxes and the desire for state-strengthening created a similar reciprocal relationship between the state and the new elites. After 1900, as this dissertation will demonstrate, the new elites became the primary allies of the government during the implementation of the reforms. They generously sponsored the expensive reform projects

42 Ibid., 336.

43 Ma Min, “Emergent Civil Society in the Late Qing Dynasty: the Case of Suzhou,”159-161. 26

like the construction of new-style schools or the establishment of modern factories. To reward their contribution, the government endorsed their leadership in the new-style voluntary associations, including the Promote Education Office (勸學所 Quanxuesuo), the

Self-government Association (自治會 Zizhihui), and the Chambers of Commerce (商會

Shanghui).

The reciprocal relationship between the state and new elites merely provides one perspective for understanding the failure of the state-strengthening agenda. To carry out these ambitious reform plans, the government could not merely rely on a small group of new elites. By granting new elites administrative power, the government expected them to mobilize greater resources from the local society. The resources, however, remained under the strict control of the local gentry. To understand why the state failed to enlist local energies for state’s goals, it is necessary to move the focus back to the traditional gentry and explore how they interacted with the new elites in the state-strengthening programs.

New Elites versus Traditional Gentry

Few scholars regard both the new elites and traditional gentry as the creators of

Chinese political structure in the twentieth century. The existing scholarly works, such as the studies of the “modernity” of Shanghai44 or the research of the decline of rural areas in northern China, either focus on the rise of the new elites in cities or stress the degradation of traditional leaders in the rural setting. These scholarly works give the impression that the new elites and the traditional gentry were isolated with each other and that urban and

44 See, for example, Leo Ou-fan Lee, Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930-1945 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999). 27

rural areas had distinctive boundaries. But this was not the case in the early twentieth century. Most new elites received education and participated in commercial activities in the cities. But many of them still maintained a close connection with their home communities that acted as an organizational framework whereby they could build alliances and seek mutual help in the cities. Moreover, some of them were still interested in transforming the cultural and economic capital they had accumulated to political influence in their hometowns, where their lineage members were still residing.

Some scholars are aware of the coexistence of the new elites and traditional gentry in local society. Even so, they stress the separation of the two groups of elites and assume that the new elites had an overwhelming advantage over the traditional gentry. Keith

Schoppa’s study of Zhejiang elites of the early twentieth century was the first major attempt to explore the tension between the new elites and the traditional gentry. Influenced by the spatial analysis framework posited by G. William Skinner, Schoppa divides Zhejiang gentry into the inner-core type and the outer-periphery type according to their geographical locations. He holds that in the economically prosperous central zone, the new elites rose to power and increasingly relied on newly installed self-government institutions to establish alliance and manage local affairs. In the peripheral rural hinterland, traditional gentry still reliedon lineages and native place connections to maintain parochial control over local politics. While the central zone elites more frequently engaged in national political affairs and took leadership positions in provincial and county governments, the peripheral elites became conservative and apathetic to the change. According to Schoppa, the political trend, also a remarkable pattern of Chinese revolution, was the central area’s politicization and

the “colonization” of the peripheral area.45

Scholars who work on northern China hold a similar though slightly different view of the relationship between the new elites and the traditional gentry. In northern rural areas, new commercial elites were fewer and less influential. But scholars find that a new type of leader, the village bully (土豪 tuhao), rose to power and gradually replaced traditional

“protective” gentry as the new political brokers between the state and society. Prasenjit

Duara, a proponent of this view, argues that since the modernizing state delegitimized many of traditional cultural symbols and values, the traditional gentry could not derive their authority from these resources anymore and unavoidably fell into decline. As the expanding state expected increased tax income from the local society, only village bullies were willing to collaborate with the state. Since they did not rely on traditional cultural resources to gain power, they did not respect traditional social relationships and were able to extract excessive revenue from local society.46

Both Schoppa’s and Duara’s studies depart from the assumptions that the dominance of new elites in local administration was a reflection of their comprehensive advantage over traditional gentry and that by occupying government positions the new elites would naturally establish control over local people and resources. These assumptions are based on another presupposition that the setup of administrative institutions would automatically grant the state the power to control local society. The presupposition, however, is made without making clear the power structure in rural China. As discussed above, local society gained a high level of autonomy in the late imperial period. Therefore,

45 R. Keith Schoppa, Chinese Elites and Political Change: Zhejiang Province in the Early Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).

46 Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 217-245. 29

in order to extract limited resources from local society, the state had to collude with local gentry by granting them titles and opportunities to participate in politics. In other words, it was by recognizing the gentry’s de facto control of local communities and by granting them titles as rewards that the state gained the ability to extract resources from the hands of the local gentry. It was not the titles per se that gave the state the ability to extract resources.

Since the local gentry did not rely on the titles to control local communities, the state could not eliminate their power by abolishing their titles. Likewise, the state could not automatically gain access to local resources by setting up a new administrative structure and granting titles to another group of elites.

The people and resources, according to Li Huaiyin’s research, were still controlled by the traditional community leaders. Focusing on southern Hebei, the prosperous “core” region in the North China Plain, Li argues that the local established gentry in this area were active in the late Qing reform and utilized the self-government movement to formalize their previous informal control of local society.47 Li’s book shows the continuing influence of traditional gentry in peaceful rural areas. Yet treating local elites as a cohesive entity and overemphasizing the continuity of traditional values and norms, Li fails to differentiate the sources of power within various groups of elites. The cases provided by Li often contradict his argument and actually suggest that even in less commercialized rural areas, local leaders could also be quite divisive and the different segments resorted to distinct strategies to achieve leadership. Li stresses that local officials still resorted to traditional cultural customs to solve the local disputes. For example, in the competition over the leadership

47 Li Huaiyin, Village Governance in North China: Huailu County, 1875-1936 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).

position of the Promote Education Office, the magistrate provided patronage to merchants and enabled them to win the traditional gentry. The political patronage, according to Li, was a sort of traditional custom.48 Yet the fact that the magistrate backed the coal mine owners rather than the scholar-gentry demonstrates that the constitution of local leaders was undergoing a fundamental change. Traditional gentry still maintained authority inside their communities. But they lost their leadership position in the management of local public affairs and no longer served as the intermediaries between the state and local society anymore.

In general, the coexistence of and the competition between the new elites and traditional gentry, rather than the replacement of one group by the other, was a more common phenomenon in local society at the turn of the twentieth century. How did the two groups of elites adapt to the resources and ideologies available to them? How did they compete with each other and interact with the state? Moreover, how did the interaction among the traditional gentry, the new elites, and the state reshuffle the local power structure and redefine the state-society relationship which laid the groundwork for the state’s choices in the future? The five chapters that follow, by focusing on the experience of the Mei

County population in the reforms and revolutions in the early twentieth century, try to provide in-depth and vivid answers to these questions.

48 Ibid., 180-181. 31

Chapter 1: Mountain, Sea, Lineages, and Migrants

If one visits northeastern Guangdong in person, one will be impressed by the numerous distinguished semi-circular walled communities. These walled communities are called round-dragon houses (圍龍屋 weilongwu) in Chinese. The majority of the houses were built with rammed earth, are single story, and could be surrounded by several layers of new circles following the completion of the first. Figure 1 shows a typical round-dragon house.

Figure 1 Round-dragon houses in Mei County

A few round-dragon houses were constructed as early as the sixteenth century; while the majority of these complexes were built in the eighteenth century as the dwelling

places for a single-surname lineage. In comparison to the rammed-earth houses, the more eye-catching buildings are new-style houses which fused both local and Western elements.

These buildings are constructed with bricks, in multi-stories, and would not add any subsidiary rooms when the entire building was complete. Most of these new houses were built in the early twentieth century as private villas by the Chinese returning overseas.

Figure 2 shows a new-style house built by a Chinese merchant from the Dutch East Indies in 1931.

Figure 2 Lianfanglou 聯芳樓, Xiyang Town 西陽鎮, Mei County 梅縣

The two different styles of buildings disclose two important stages in the development of local communities. The first stage was from the late Ming (明 1368-1644) to the Qing (清 1644-1912) dynasties, during which the residents in the mountains deepened their connections with the central state and gained the state’s recognition by organizing lineages according to Confucian rituals. Those semi-circular houses were just

built by local communities as a strategy to express allegiance to the state and to organize local population. The first half of the chapter will focus on this stage. The second stage was from the late Qing dynasty to the Republican period, during which numerous local residents made a fortune overseas and tried to establish authority in their hometowns relying on their newly accumulated wealth. The new-style villas were built by these emigrants to display their wealth and to win the respect of the local residents. The second half of this chapter will focus on the rise of this group of people. Before discussing the change of local leadership, however, it is necessary to deconstruct the myth concerning the identity of the people residing in northeastern Guangdong.

I. The Myth of the Hakka Identity

Historically, the people who resided in northeastern Guangdong, especially in the area close to Fujian and Jiangxi provinces, were usually called Hakka (客家 kejia), or

“guest people.” Scholars have treated the Hakka as a given ethnicity who had some common and essential characteristics separating them from other residents in the south.

This group of people were said to have migrated to the area as early as the late Song (宋

1127-1279) and early Yuan (元 1271-1368) dynasties. When they arrived in the area, they were often at war with earlier residents such as the She (畬) minority. Those compact walled communities were believed to have been built by them for the purpose of self- defense against the natives.1 It is also suggested that the Hakka successfully defeated the

1 This is a popular understanding of the function of Hakka houses. See, e.g., Mary Erbaugh, “The Hakka Ethnic Movement in Taiwan, 1986-1991,” in Guest People: Hakka Identity in China and Abroad, ed. Nicole Constable (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 211.

mountain minority, the She people, but became assimilated to that minority in terms of cultural and social practices.2 For example, the Hakka women, like the women from non-

Chinese hill tribes, did not bind their feet and more frequently worked outside the home; they practiced some rituals that were not considered orthodox; they were easily driven by religious fervor and constituted the main force of southern rebellions; and moreover, they developed and crystalized a distinctive dialect deriving from old Southern Chinese, which was believed to be a critical cultural marker for the Hakka. 3 These essential cultural peculiarities were believed to make the Hakka an ethnic group distinct from the Han.

This view of the Hakka ethnicity, however, has been challenged by several generations of scholars, who instead regard the Hakka ethnicity as a historical construction.4 Sow-Theng Leong was the earliest scholar who tried to reconstruct the

Hakka identity. He indicates that the Hakka did not develop a clear ethnic consciousness until Xu Xuzeng (徐旭曾 1751-1819), a Hakka scholar, wrote their origin myth down in the early nineteenth century. Xu’s main argument was that the Hakka originated from northern China and had migrated to the south during the Song-Yuan transition. They firstly settled in Tingzhou (汀州) of Fujian province and then spread to the neighboring Jiangxi and Guangdong provinces. Acoording to Xu, as the preserver of the Han culture, the Hakka were industrious, thrifty, and honest. All of these precious characteristics were said to be possessed by ancient Chinese but were lost elsewhere except in Hakka communities. Leong,

2 Sow-Theng Leong, Migration and Ethnicity in Chinese History: Hakkas, Pengmin, and Their Neighbors (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).

3 Sow-Theng Leong, Migration and Ethnicity in Chinese History, 32-36.

4 Nicole Constable has discussed how generations of scholars question an objective existence of Hakka identity. See Nicole Constable, introduction to Guest People, 3-36.

as well as scholars such as Cheng Meibao and Chen Chunsheng, point out that this discourse that stresses the northern origins of the Hakka became popular in the early twentieth century when a group of Hakka intellectuals and politicians achieved prominence in national politics and tried to promote the status of the Hakka. According to Chen

Chunsheng, the reason why Hakka literati developed interests in preaching the myth of

Hakka was because they witnessed the contradiction between the Hakka and other dialect groups in the treaty port Shantou (汕頭) and felt grieved about the low status of the Hakka.

This group of literati not only adopted Xu’s narrative but also incorporated the concept of ethnicity into the narrative. Relying on their influence in political and cultural spheres, they managed to create a systematic and positive narrative about the Hakka.5 The earliest preacher of the narrative, according to Chen, was Wen Tingjing, the chief editor of East

Guangdong Daily, who serialized his arguments on the newspaper from November 8th to

November 11th of 1903. Many other Hakka literati like Qiu Fengjia and Rao Fushang later also joined in him.

Sow-Theng Leong and Cheng Meibao also point out that the Hakka elites, in addition to promoting positive narrative about the Hakka, also organized united Hakka associations in metropolitan cities such as Guangzhou and Shantou to launch collective

5 See Chen Chunsheng, “Diyu rentong yu zuqun fenlei: 1640-1940 nian Hanjiang liuyu minzhong ‘kejia guannian’ de yanbian” (Regional identification and the division of ethnic groups: The evolution of the concept of the “Hakka” among the people in the Han River basin areas), in Jindai Zhongguo shehui yu minjian wenhua: Shoujie zhongguo jindai shehuishi guoji xueshu yantaohui lunwenji (Chinese society and popular culture: The first international conference on Chinese social history), ed. Li Changli and Zuo Yuhe (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2007), 38-67.

actions against any stigmatization of the Hakka image.6 Cheng Meibao further analyzes the role Luo Xianglin (羅香林 1906-1978) has played in the formation of the Hakka identity. In the 1930s, Luo Xianglin, funded by the Hakka merchant Hu Wenhu (胡文虎

1882-1954), adopted the method of biological anthropology to further “prove” that the

Hakka were “authentic Chinese.” Luo’s book popularized these stereotypical characteristics of the Hakka. His argument was also well circulated inside the Hakka community as it served as a useful tool to stimulate collective action of the Hakka. Hakka elites’ efforts in changing the connotation of the word “Hakka” achieved remarkable success in the early twentieth century. It was since then that the Hakkas were willing to use the label of “Hakka” to define themselves.7

The above scholars’ view that regards the Hakka ethnic identity as a historical construction prevents us from confusing the labels attached to the Hakka with the historical facts about the people living in northeastern Guangdong. Rather than assuming that the people in the area were all the descendants of the migrants from the north and shared some essential characteristics, this chapter seeks to place the Hakka’s choices under different historical contexts and explore how the historical forces shaped their survival strategies and determined the form of the organization of local communities.

6 Leong, Migration and Ethnicity, 69-93. Cheng Meibao, Diyu wenhua yu guojia rentong: wanqing yilai Guangdong wenhuaguan de xingcheng (Regional culture and national identification: the formation of the concept of Guangdong culture since late Qing) (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2006), 82-87.

7 Cheng Meibao, Diyu wenhua yu guojia renting, 241-259. See also William Skinner, introduction to Migration and Ethnicity in Chinese History, by Sow-theng Leong (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 28-29.

II. Mountain Bandits and Coastal Pirates

Northeastern Guangdong, especially the area that borders Fujian and Jiangxi provinces, was historically known as an isolated hinterland and a well-known “district of bandits.” 8 Like most impoverished hinterland regions in southern China, this area’s topography was dominated by mountains. Big mountain ranges like Luofu Mountain (羅

浮山) and Lianhua Mountain (蓮花山) extend from the northeast to southwest and isolated the region from the more prosperous coastal areas. More than 140 individual mountains, with an average elevation of one thousand meters, sit between Luofu Mountain and

Lianhua Mountain. At the intersection of these mountains, there are several small basins.

Xingning County (興寧縣) is located on the largest basin, the Xingning Basin, with an acreage of 320 square kilometers. It was half of the acreage of most counties in the Pearl

River Delta area. The other basins, including the Mei River Valley area, were about 100 square kilometers. In such a hilly area, arable land was scarce. To take Mei County as an example: hills and mountains account for 87 percent of the total acreage in the county while plains and basins merely account for 5 percent.9 Nevertheless, in an era when waterborne transport played a major role in connecting different areas, northeastern Guangdong, blessed by the Mei River, was not totally isolated from the neighboring regions. The Mei

River originates from the Lianhua Mountain and drains an extensive area in northeastern

Guangdong. It merges with the Han River (韓江) in northNorthnortheastern Guangdong

8 Jiaying zhouzhi (Jiaying gazetteer) (1898), vol. 31: “Koubian” (Bandits’ activities) (Taibei: Chengwen Press, 1968), 572-588.

9 Meizhou shizhi (Meizhou gazetteer), “Ziran huanjing” (Natural environment) (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1999), 275-280.

which then flows into the South China Sea. The existence of the Mei River made residence in the mountain areas feasible and meaningful. The rivers played an increasingly important role beginning in the late Ming dynasty when the demand of mountain products and raw materials soared due to a commercial boom.

The historical record of the area before the Ming dynasty is brief and sparse.

Though the Jin dynasty (265-420) had established a Xingning County as early as 331 and later a Yizhao (義昭) county in 413, those early counties mainly assumed the function of managing exiled officials.10 Until the Tang dynasty (618-907), the area was still considered a primitive frontier region and an ideal place of exile for the central court. In 819, Han Yu

(韓愈 768-824), one of the “eight greatest literati” in the Tang and the Song dynasty, was exiled to the neighboring Chaozhou area for criticizing the emperor’s support of Buddhism.

Besides a few Han Chinese officials and soldiers, the major residents in this area were southern ethnic groups. In the official records, those mountain residents were generally named Liliao (俚僚), which means the barbarians in southeastern China.

The periods of the Five dynasties (五代 907-979) and the Song dynasty (960-1279) were critical for the development of southern China, especially after the court withdrew to the south. The increasing contact with southern indigenous people also enabled Han literati to further differentiate local ethnic groups. The name Yao (瑤) succeeded Liliao to refer to people who lived in the mountains of northeastern Guangdong. In the eastern part of those

10 Wang Xiangzhi, Yudi jisheng (Exhaustive description of the empire) (c. 1221), vol. 100: “Chaozhou, guji” (Historical sites), cited in Zhou Xuexiang, Mingqing Minganyuebian kejia diqu de shehui jingji bianqian (Social and economic changes in the Min-Gan-Yue borderland of the Ming and Qing dynasties.) (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2007), 50.

mountains, the indigenous population became known as the She.11 In 971 during the Song dynasty, the court established Meizhou (梅州) prefecture in the area. The elevation of the county to a prefecture indicates the increase of the importance of the area, though it is still difficult to tell to what extent the central court controlled this area. During the Song dynasty,

573 Guangdong literati earned the degree of jinshi (進士)12 in the imperial examination, but only 17 of them came from northeastern Guangdong, indicating that the area was not fully developed.13 According to a late Song geography book, Yudi jisheng (輿地紀勝

Exhaustive Description of the Empire), Meizhou still had ample land in the late Song despite the scarcity of the land resources. The author comments that the indigenous people were lazy and only a few people lived on agriculture. Most lands had to be reclaimed by migrants from Tingzhou (汀州) and Ganzhou (贛州).14

The influx of migrants from Fujian and Jiangxi provinces promoted the development of local agriculture. But the migration also created endless social unrest. The newer “guest people,” in order to seize land and resources from existing settlers, often launched large-scale attacks against existing settlers. Besides the conflicts between different generations of migrants, the smuggling trade, especially the trade of salt, further exacerbated local turbulence. Following the practice of the Tang government, the Song

11 David Faure has traced in detail how these names were adopted by the Han literati and officials in different periods. See Faure, Emperor and Ancestor, 38-51.

12 Juren is the title awarded to the qualified graduate who passed the three-yearly imperial examination held at the provincial level.

13 Jiaying zhouzhi, vol. 20: “xuanju” (Examination degrees), 336.

14 Wang Xiangzhi, Yudi jisheng, vol. 102: “Meizhou, jingwu” (Scenes), cited in Zhou Xuexiang, Mingqing Minyueganbian, 60.

government continued the monopoly over the salt trade. Southern Jiangxi was ordered to purchase salt from the Huai River salt district. But to transport salt from the Huai River to southern Jiangxi was difficult.

In contrast, northNorthnortheastern Guangdong was connected to this area by three major river systems, the Han River (韓江), the Mei River (梅江), and the Ting River (汀

江). The transportation of salt from northNorthnortheastern Guangdong to the border area only took several days and the quality of sea salt was also much better than the Huai salt.

Salt smuggling thus became a very profitable activity. The smugglers from southern

Jiangxi and western Fujian often gathered and became a destructive force along the route they passed.15 Local gazetteers thus regarded “salt bandits” as the most important reason for local unrest. 16 The frequent bandits’ activities forced the central government to strengthen its control of the area. Under the rule of the Shaoxing (紹興 r. 1131-1162) emperor, the government began to dispatch large numbers of soldiers to maintain order in the area. Some of the soldiers ultimately settled in the area and could be the earliest northern people who permanently resided in the area.17

The arrival of the Yuan troops was undoubtedly a disaster for people in northeastern

Guangdong, especially after the area was occupied by the Song army as a main battleground to fight with the Yuan army. The uprisings, led by Song military generals in

15 About the problems caused by the division of the salt districts, see Dai Yixuan, Songdai Chaoyan zhidu yanjiu (Study on the official salt of the Song dynasty) (Shanghai: Shangwu chubanshe, 1957), 51-57. See also Faure, Emperor and Ancestor, 45; Zhou Xuexiang, Mingqing Minganyuebian, 249-250.

16 Jiaying zhouzhi, vol. 31, 570.

17 Huang Zhao, Shiku yizheng, vol. 1: “Zhengfu” (Conquer).

the transitional period and native people in the Yuan dynasty, frequently broke out. In 1288,

Zhong Mingliang (鐘明亮 1228-1290), who was believed to be the She people, organized more than ten thousand people to rebel against the Yuan government and occupied three counties in northeastern Guangdong.18 In 1351, Chen Man (陳滿 d. 1360), another She leader, occupied the prefecture town of Meizhou for ten years.19

There was no evidence that the officials draw the differentiation between the Han and the She people according to ethnic marks. Instead, in the writing of the Han officials, the mountain indigenous people of northeastern Guangdong, despite their various customs and cultural traits, were all attached the tag of She. According to Chan Wing-hoi’s analysis, the government’s criteria in differentiating non-Han from Han, rather than being based on ethnic difference, was mainly drawn according to the people’s relationship with the government. The people who had registered in the government record and paid their taxes would be labeled as the Han people while those who had not were regarded local minorities.20

To identify both Zhong and Chen as the She people suggests that most people in the mountains had not associated themselves with the government by this time. The so- called She revolts deteriorated in the dynastic transition from the Yuan to the Ming dynasty.

18 Jiaying zhouzhi, vol. 31, 572.

19 Ibid., 573.

20 About the relationship between She and Han, see Chan Wing-hoi, “Ethnic Labels in a Mountainous Niche: The Case of She ‘Bandits,’” in Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 255-84.

In the social upheavals, local strongmen further expanded their power and influence as more people had to seek protection from them.

In 1368, the warlords of Guangdong surrendered to the Ming regime, although the central government still had difficulty gaining substantial control of northeastern

Guangdong.21 In 1381, Rao Longhai (饒隆海), who was described as a pirate in earlier records but later was seen as a bandit coming from Chengxiang, colluded with a county functionary of Chengxiang,22 and sacked the county town.23 The unrest, however, provided an opportunity for the central government and local society to strengthen their ties with each other. To restore order, the Hongwu 洪武 (r. 1368-1398) emperor sent General Zhao

Yong (趙庸) to attack the rebels and also to establish military garrisons in the area. Local strongmen who tried to distinguish themselves from the bandits regarded the arrival of

Zhao Yong as an opportunity to establish connection with the government and to acquire a legitimate status in the empire. In Chengxiang, it is said a county resident Ye Wenbao

(葉文保), after the bandits occupied the county, immediately fled to Chaozhou prefecture to inform the governor. Under the assistance of Zhao Yong, Rao Longhai and other 150 rebels were arrested. In 1382, Zhao Yong established a military garrison called ‘a thousand households’ bureau’ (千戶所 Qianhusuo) in Chengxiang.24

21 About the tension between the central government and the coastal strongmen, see Yang Peina, Binhai shengji yu wangchao zhixu: Mingqing Minyue yanhai difang shehui bianqian yanjiu (Coastal lives and imperial order: Study on the social change of the Min-Yue coastal area) (PhD diss., Sun Yat-sen University, 2009), 12-25.

22 The Ming government had renamed Meizhou to Chengxiang in 1369.

23 Jiaying zhouzhi, vol. 31, 573.

24 Chaozhou fuzhi (1547), cited in Yang Peina, Binhai shengji, 22.

To conscript enough soldiers, the government began to require local households to register in the official registration system. Under this system, ten households formed a group called jia (甲) and ten jia was grouped as one li (里). The enforcement of the registration system for the purpose of conscription signifies the beginning of the interaction between the central government and the residents in northeastern Guangdong.25 In this process, local strongman, such as Ye Wenbao, played a critical role. They actively sponsored the government’s projects and in return received the patronage from the government. In Chengxiang, Ye’s donation allowed the county government to build a county town wall with bricks and stones in 1385. 26 Ye, because of his ties with the government, also established himself as a prominant figure in local society. The genealogy of the Ye surname edited in the late sixteenth century depicted Ye as a person fond of literature.27 Yet given the wealth Ye had accumulated, Ye could not be a pure literati. It is highly possible that Ye, like other strongment of the time, had benefitted from trans- regional trading activities which were usually associated with smuggling and bandits’ activities. Those smugglers and bandits, as discussed above, were more likely to be indigenous people who had never registered in official records before. Ye’s experience vividly demonstrate how local strongmen, by sponsoring the Ming government, had government recognize their dominating position in local society.

25 About how coastal residents were incorporated into the registration system, see Yang Peina, Binhai shengji, 25-74.

26 Jiaying zhouzhi, vol. 9: “Chengchi” (City wall), 156.

27 Lin Xichun, “Meizhou Yeshi zongci beiji” (The tablet inscription in the ancestral hall of the Ye lineage) (1595), in Luhexian Yeshi zongpu (The genealogy of the Ye lineage in Luhe county), 35.

Although the government obtained the support of local strongmen, it does not mean the majority of local residents easily submitted to the government. The boundary between residents and bandits, or minorities, was rather blurry throughout the early Ming dynasty.

The government established an administrative institution but was far from achieving full control. This situation deteriorated after the middle Ming dynasty, when the tax reform further shook the structure of local society. After the early sixteenth century, to get rid of the heavy burden of labor service which was often arbitrarily assigned by county functionaries, more families avoided enrolling in the lijia (里甲 registration) system. To cope with this predicament, some local officials first tried to fix the amount of required labor service of each county and later further adopted silver as the payment for labor service and tax. From then on, as long as officials could collect enough payment, local governments did not enforce the household registration anymore. 28 Migration to less exploited areas thus became possible and popular among the people who could not make a living in their hometowns.

From the middle of the sixteenth century, immigrants from the neighboring Fujian and Jiangxi provinces began to pour into northeastern Guangdong, which at the time was still sparsely populated. The influx of immigrants accelerated the development of economy in the mountains. They advanced the upland agricultural techniques and also learned new technologies in mining and forestry.29 Double cropping was also becoming prevalent in the

28 For an elaborate illustration about the tax reform in the late Ming and its influence on the household registration, see Liu Zhiwei, Zai guojia yu shehui zhijian: Mingqing Guandong diqu lijia fuyi zhidu yu xiangcun shehui (Between the state and society: The registration and tax systems and rural society in Ming Guangdong), (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2010), 94-185.

29 Jiaying zhouzhi, vol. 13: “Shihuo” (Food and products), 208-209.

late Ming period.30 At the same time, the prevalence of silver as a payment method for tax encouraged more commoners to participate in trans-regional commercial activities.

The development of the mountain region and the commercialization of the local economy, however, led to a rise of social unrest in northeastern Guangdong. The smuggling of rice was one important reason for the disturbance. Though the government had forbidden the private trade of rice, coastal people still regularly travelled upward through the Mei

River and the Ting River to purchase rice in the basin area like Xingning County or southern Jiangxi, stimulating the prosperity of commercial towns along the two rivers. But when there was a poor crop or output could not satisfy the demand of buyers, an upheaval usually broke out. Disturbances became more frequent in the late Ming as the influx of silver pushed up rice prices.31

The mining industry also attracted migrants and provided an important source for income for the region. The exploitation of mines requires huge capital investment and a large number of labors. Thus only local strongmen or powerful families were able to operate mines. Those strongmen often drew together thousands of migrants who were out of the official registration system to work in the mines. When the exploitation was not successful, those miners also became a great threat to social stability.32

30 Xingning xianzhi (Xingning County gazetteer) (1551), vol. 1: “Tianwen” (Astronomy) (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1999), 1011.

31 Jiaying zhouzhi (1750), vol. 1: “Fengsu” (Customs), 22.

32 Huizhou fuzhi (Huizhou Gazetteer) (1881), vol. 4: “Shanchuan” (Mountain and rivers); vol. 17: “Junshi” (Prefectural affairs), (Taibei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1966), 91, 254, 261.

Moreover, the commercialization of the economy enabled local merchants to participate in a business network that connected the mountainous areas to other areas, especially the coastal region which had already been integrated into an emerging world market since the middle of the sixteenth century. Though the Hongwu emperor banned maritime trade as early as 1371, smuggling activities never disappeared along the sea.

Coastal strongmen, collaborating with the bandits in the mountains, formed powerful pirate groups that dominated maritime trade.33

These strongmen monopolized lands and resources in northeastern Guangdong and frequently revolted against the Ming government. Under the reigns of the Zhengde (正德 r. 1506-1521) and Jiajing (嘉靖 r. 1522-1567) emperors, seven large-scale rebellions broke out in the area.34 The most influential one was led by Zhang Lian (張璉), who, like Rao

Longhai of the early Ming, came from the mountains of Chaozhou but was often depicted as a coastal pirate. In 1560, Zhang Lian, uniting Lin Chaoxi and Xiao Wan, established their own regime Flying Dragon Kingdom ( 飛龍國 feilong guo) in northeastern

Guangdong. In 1562, Liang Ning (梁寧), the leader of the miners in Chengxiang, joined in the kingdom and organized six to seven thousand people to invade Fujian and Jiangxi. The

33 See Chen Chunsheng, “Cong woluan dao qianhai: Mingmo Qingchu Chaozho difang dongluan yu xiangcun shehui bianqian” (From the invasion of “Japanese pirates” to the evacuation: Local unrest and rural change in late-Ming and early-Qing Chaozhou), Mingqing Luncong 2 (April, 2001): 73-106.

34 The five rebellions separately took place in 1510, 1512, 1516, 1522, 1542. See Jiaying zhouzhi, vol. 31, 574-580.

rebellion, involving up to sixty to seventy percent of the local population, cost the government four years to put it down.35

These strongmen’s activities, like bandits’ activities in the early Ming, forced the imperial government to deepen its control of the borderland and brought a profound change to the form of community organization in northeastern Guangdong. Before the sixteenth century, local residents still lived in scattered cottages.36 When the bandits arrived again in the middle sixteenth century, the residents either suffered or easily joined in the rebellion.

To cope with the situation, the government ordered local villagers to construct forts to defend themselves. Some villagers later directly lived together in the forts. 37 In northeastern Guangdong, the forts were gradually built in the form of a “round-dragon” house. After the rebellion, the government set up three new counties and dispatched patrolling inspectors to directly supervise local villages.38 Local residents, no matter if they had participated in the rebellion, were eager to claim their innocence. Many local families thus chose to reregister in the lijia system to gain official recognition of their legal status and the protection of their property. Since residing in the “round-dragon” house was seen as a symbol of loyal residents, local people chose to build all of their new houses in the

35 Rao Xiang, Sanxi wenji (1878), 9, cited in Xiao Wenping, Baihouxiang de gushi: Diyushi mailuo xia de xiangcun shehui jiangou (The story of Baihou: Rural social structure from a perspective of regional history) (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2011), 74.

36 Xingning xianzhi, vol. 4: “Fengsu” (Customs), 1218.

37 Guangdong tongzhi (Guangdong gazetteer) (1535), vol. 66: “Haikou” (Pirates), cited in Chen Chunsheng, Juluo xingtai yu shehui zhuanxing: Mingqing zhiji hanjiang liuyu difang dongluan zhi lishi yingxiang (Community patterns and social changes: The historical impact of local unrest in the Han River basin in the Ming-Qing transition), Shixue yuekan 2 (2011): 59.

38 The three counties were Pingyuan (1562), Chenghai (1563), and Puning (1564). Mingshizong shilu (The veritable records of the Jiajing emperor), vol. 517, 4-5.

style of the “round-dragon.” These houses constituted the basis of the semi-circular communities we see today. The late Ming thus was a critical period for local society to establish connections with the central government.

At the same time, Confucian scholars also rose as an important social group in the area and contributed to the integration of the state and local society. In comparison with the Pearl River Delta area, northeastern Guangdong produced very few high-ranking scholars in the Ming dynasty. Only six people earned the title of jinshi in the Ming, with five of them living before the Tianshun (天順 r. 1457-1464) period.39 Earning a lower- ranking degree, however, had become relatively easier since the late Ming period. The county produced 55 juren and 159 xiucai in this period. This new gentry class, to demonstrate their distinguished status and to display loyalty to the government in this turbulent era, showed strong interests in preaching Confucianism.

Local gazetteer records indicate they strictly practiced family rituals devised by

Zhu Xi (朱熹 1130-1200), the most influential Neo-Confucian scholar, and refused any popular religious element in their practice. Some of them preached the community pacts

(鄉約 xiangyue) drafted by Wang Yangming (王陽明 1472-1529), a Confucian scholar and official who had suppressed the rebellions in southern Jiangxi, with an attempt to purify popular customs and rituals they considered vulgar.40 To purchase lands in the name of providing sacrifice to their parents or ancestors had also become a common practice among

39 Jiaying zhouzhi, vol. 20, 336-340. In the Pearl River Delta, the three major counties, Nanhai, Shunde, and Panyu county separately produced 148, 99, and 66 jinshi.

40 Ibid., vol. 23: “Renwu” (Celebrity), 400.

capable gentry, 41 though there was no clear evidence that the gentry in northeastern

Guangdong had established ancestral halls before the seventeenth century. In general, by using the state-sanctioned ideology to regulate local orders, the elites tried to change the state’s impression that the area was a district of bandits and to enhance the relationship with the central government. But the profound change in the relationship between the state and local society would not take place until the majority of local people showed willingness or felt the necessity to collaborate with the state.

III. The Spread of Lineages

In the transition from the Ming to the Qing dynasty, Chengxiang County fell into the hands of coastal strongmen once more. Local elites, in the chaos, shifted their allegiance frequently.42 Some of them collaborated with the strongmen. Some colluded with the

Southern Ming (1644-1683) dynasty, which was established by a group of Ming loyalist in southern China to resist the Manchu troops. And some elites quit politics after the Manchus rose to power. But the Qing court, either by intimidation or through bribery, pushed most elites to return to their role in society. The established gentry, such as Li Shichun (李士淳

1586-1665), a jinshi of the Chongzhen (崇禎 r. 1627-1644) era and a compiler of the

Hanlin Academy (翰林院編修), took every opportunity to further consolidate their positions. Li had supported the Southern Ming regime in the dynastic transition. But when the Qing court sent the magistrate to Chengxiang, Li chose to actively cooperate with the

41 Ibid., 401.

42 Chen Chunsheng, “Cong woluan dao qianhai,” 96-102.

new government. Pu Yongjian has generalized Li’s activities in the early Qing, demonstrating Li’s continuous influence in the new era. In 1651 Li helped the magistrate oversee the construction of the county school. In the following year he reestablished the

Songjiang Academy (松江書院 Songjiang shuyuan) in his hometown Songkou town (松

口鎮). The scale of the academy was overwhelming, including one hundred and twenty study rooms and three community granaries. In 1653, he donated two hundred taels of silver to rebuild the Lingguang Temple (靈光寺 Lingguang si), which was the center of local religious activities. And in the same year, under the order of the magistrate, he edited

Chengxiang Xianzhi (程鄉縣誌 The Gazetteer of Chengxiang).43

However, the most important trend of the Qing dynasty was not the continuance of the dominance of grandees like Li Shichun, but the spread of Confucianism and lineage institutions among commoners. This trend, in David Faure’s words, “broke the class barrier established in the sixteenth century by the senior officials.”44 The spread of Confucianism was first facilitated by the popularity of the imperial examination. During the late Ming turmoil, Chengxiang County produced few title holders. After the Qing government withdrew the Evacuation Order (遷界令 1661-1683),45 the peaceful environment and the government’s encouragement provided local population more opportunities to earn a

43 Pu Yongjian, “Yinnashan tianchan susong yu shiqi shiji Guangdong Chengxiang xian,” (Yinna Mountain land litigation and the seventeenth-century Chengxiang County), Lishi renleixue xuekan vol. 7 (October 2009): 5-30.

44 Faure, Emperor and Ancestor, 177.

45 The Evacuation Order had been issued by the Kangxi emperor for the purpose of eliminating anti-Qing force along the sea. It required all the residents in the coastal areas to withdraw to the inland areas.

degree in the imperial examination. In the early Qing, Chengxiang County Academy was only allowed to admit twelve official students, even though, more than six thousand students participated in the county-level exam.46 Consequently, Hui Shiqi (惠士奇 1671-

1741), the provincial education commissioner, allowed students of Chengxiang County to take the exam in the neighboring Chaozhou county, which had not totally recovered from the Evacuation. Benefiting from this policy, more than one hundred Chengxiang students were admitted by the county academy.47

The gazetteer also discloses that many local strongmen showed strong interest in training their sons to be Confucian scholars, even if they themselves were illiterate.48 Local merchants were also enthusiastic in sponsoring their family members who had potential to earn an official title. It was said Song Xiang (宋湘 1756-1826), one of the most famous jinshi in northeastern Guangdong, would not have achieved success without the long-term assistance provided by his uncle Song Jiedeng (宋捷登), who made a great fortune in the salt industry.49 In 1733, Chengxiang County was promoted to a prefecture and renamed

Jiaying, partially due to the court’s concern over stability in the border region and partially the result of the rise of Confucian scholars in this area. Throughout the Qing dynasty, the

46 Li Xiangyuan, “Qing guang benyi xiang’e chengwen” (A petition for the expansion of the quota of county academy), in Cishutang ji (1931), cited in Xiao Wenping, Baihouxiang de gushi, 162.

47 Jiaying zhouzhi, vol. 32: “Congtan” (Jottings), 598.

48 Ibid., vol. 23, 407.

49 Ibid., 419.

prefecture produced 66 jinshi and 623 juren.50 The number was quite close to that of the counties in the prosperous Pearl River Delta area.

The popularity of the examination provided an opportunity for commoners without a glorious family background to achieve upward mobility and also stimulated a broader social group to develop interests in the official ideology – Neo-Confucianism. But a more critical reason behind the social transformation in the Qing dynasty was the deepened tax reform which was accompanied by the authorization of lineages as the basic tax-paying units. The Ming government had gradually abandoned the system of levying labor service but did not abolish all the services. The remaining services were allocated by hereditary

“heads of the jia” (甲長 jiazhang) who often deceived county magistrates and bullied weak families in the same jia. After the long-term unrest of the seventeenth century, the population of every jia became more uneven, which made tax collection based on the preexisting household registration inappropriate. To make the tax levy easier to manage, local officials encouraged families who possessed little land or were not satisfied with the head of their jia to merge with the co-surname lineages and to register their land under the same account. Many weak families, even with different surnames, tended to open an account together with a fabricated common family name. Lineage heads, replacing the head of jia, bore the main responsibility to deal with governmental orders and to urge lineage members to pay tax. 51 The Qing court, without the ability to penetrate local society, acquiesced in local initiation in transforming jia to lineages. Local families, especially

50 Ibid., vol. 20, 342-267.

51 About how lijia system was merged with the lineage institution, see Liu Zhiwei, Zai guojia yu shehui zhijian, 147-204; Faure, Emperor and Ancestor, 177-192.

those which had never registered before, actively responded to the policy since they could claim their legitimate ownership over their reclaimed lands by setting up a tax account in the government. By doing so, they could also get rid of the control of powerful families which usually assumed the positions of the heads of li and jia.

As lineages provided various benefits to all the commoners, lineage construction became a practice that was widely adopted even in the borderland. The integration of the state and the local populace, with gentry-led lineages as the intermediaries, was finally achieved in the early eighteenth century in northeastern Guangdong. The integration was not the result of the state’s military suppression, which could be effective in the beginning of the dynasty but could not maintain a long-lasting effect, but was mainly due to the interests the integration brought to both the state and local society. For the state, by passing part of the administrative power to lineage heads, it easily won the allegiance of local elites and reduced the cost of local governance. Local people, by claiming to be the descendants of a common ancestor, also gained a framework by which they could solidify their connections and defend themselves from outside threats.

In the prosperous and peaceful eighteenth century, the common interests of lineage members consisted of sharing the tax burden, providing welfare in the community, and making collective investment in business. All of these objectives could be achieved by collectively purchasing lands under the name of sacrificing to common ancestors. Since fulfilling the tax burden was the important precondition for a lineage to gain the recognition of the state, lineages often set up a common trust to collectively cope with this burden in

case a lineage member could not fulfill the tax responsibility. 52 The collective land- ownership was not only accepted by officials as the foundation for the tax collection, but was also justified by the neo-Confucian ritual reform that had been initiated by senior officials under the reign of the Jiajing emperor. 53 Land accumulation was considered righteous if the land was amassed under the name of providing perpetual sacrifice to ancestors and advancing their offspring’s welfare. In northeastern Guangdong, corporate holding of property under the name of ancestors appeared in the late sixteenth century and became prevalent by the early eighteenth century. The property of those lineage trusts could derive from the donation of affluent lineage members, but in most situations, they were collectively purchased by different branches of a lineage under the name of sacrificing to an overarching ancestor. The remote ancestor could be little known to his offspring and could even be a figure drawn from historic texts who had no direct relationship to the people who worshiped him.

The genealogy of the Wang lineage in Songyuan (松源) town clearly illustrates the process of how lands were purchased under the name of a founding ancestor who died two hundred years before. The founding ancestor Guirong (貴榮) of the Wang lineage was said to have been born in Fujian and moved to Chengxiang County in the late fifteenth century, though his tomb was still located in his hometown Fujian. The Wang lineage had never

52 Jiaying zhouzhi, vol. 23, 409.

53 In the 1520s, a controversy over The Great Rituals broke out in the court. During the controversy, Jiajing emperor , who was not the son of previous Zhengde emperor, insisted memorizing his natural father in the family temple to show his filial piety. Backed by a minority of officials, the emperor achieved success. To show their support to the emperor, some officials built similar family temples for their own lineages. The new style of sacrificing had more and more followers from common families which finally impelled the state to legitimize the practice. About an elaborate discussion on the ritual reform, see Faure, Emperor and Ancestor, 93-109.

provided sacrifice to Guirong in the past. In the late seventeenth century, the lineage decided to collect silver from local branches to purchase some sacred lands for Guirong.

The rent collection from the land would pay for the expense of yearly sacrifice held near the tomb of Guirong in Fujian. Twenty-four lineage branches made a contribution and twenty-two taels of silver were collected. The genealogy clearly listed the locations of all the purchased lands and the rent of each piece of land. It also prescribed that the more one segment contributed, the more reward the segment members could receive from the rent.

According to the genealogy, the segments who contributed four taels of silver were allowed to participate in the sacrifice activity once every year; while the segments donating two taels of silver could only go to Fujian once every two years.54 Participating in the sacrifice more frequently not only means more chances to receive blessing from the ancestor, but also means more opportunites to obtain benefits from the sacred land. The benefit could be merely a share of sacred meat, but it could also be surplus funds which would be distributed as dividend to share holders. The shares were inheritable and transferrable, though a lineage would usually restrict the sale of the shares to non-members.

Given the relative poverty of most families in northeastern Guangdong, lineage trusts might not bring as much economic benefit as those trusts in the Pearl River Delta area, but the trust still provided an economic foundation on which a solidary lineage organization was able to sustain. These lineage trusts not only offered relief in times of famine but also provided funding for basic welfare, which included free education, financial aid or award to students who took part in the imperial examination, and also

54 Songyuan Wangshi zupu (Genealogy of the Wang lineage in Songyuan) (1697).

assistance to the poor and the elderly within the lineage. A lineage could also use the funding to build roads, set up ferries, and establish new markets. These public facilities enabled lineage members to develop communal consciousness and to expand influence.

Most importantly, the funds provided the foundation for the perpetual sacrifice to common ancestors. By participating in the sacrifice together, all the lineage members, especially those who could never earn an examination degree by themselves, were able to share the glory of and consolidate the connection with their privileged lineage members.

In sum, by “dressing up” the communities with Confucian rituals, local people gained a legitimate structure to become organized and to achieve self-governance. For the state, lineages under the leadership of the gentry class were also the best building blocks for the empire since it guaranteed the allegiance of the majority of local people and reduced cost for the administration. With the lineages as a convenient interface, the state and the borderland also developed a reciprocal relationship with each other that lasted at least until the early nineteenth century.

IV. Militias and the Autonomy of Local Society

The northeastern Guangdong region was peaceful and prosperous until the early nineteenth century. Jiaying prefecture continued to produce numerous degree holders in the Jiaqing (嘉慶 r. 1796-1820) era. The mountain economy also boomed due to the commercialization of the national economy and the secret overseas trade. Although the sharp rise of population since the late eighteenth century did create tension in local society, there were no large-scale rebellions between the late Kangxi (康熙 r. 1661-1722) and the

Xianfeng (咸豐 r. 1850-1861) eras. The peace was finally disrupted in the middle nineteenth century, when the Triads (三合會 Sanhehui) uprising broke out. Several bandit groups in Jiaying prefecture also joined in the rebellion.55 The government, which was suffering from various internal and external pressures at the time, encouraged local villages to organize their own militias. Since the government was aware that the militias owned by villagers could be transformed into anti-government forces easily, it required all the militias to register with the government and be headed by degree holders.

Taking Nankou town (南口鎮) as an example, the town was the first besieged by bandits and the earliest to organize a militia under the leadership of local gentry. The militia in the town was organized by the Chen surname, which had produced a xiucai in the late

Ming and claimed it was the first “civilized” lineage in the town. In the Qianlong (乾隆 r.

1735-1795) period, by producing a military juren, the lineage further consolidated its leadership.56

During the Triads uprising of 1853, the Chen lineage naturally became the organizer of the village militia. The gazetteer states that the lineage leader not only helped to eradicate the bandits in his village, but also assisted the county government to conquer the rebels in the neighboring Changle County ( 長樂縣). 57 In recognition of their

55 Jiaying zhouzhi, vol. 32, 592.

56 Zhou Jianxin, “Meixian Nankou zhen zongzu shehui xushi jingji yu miaoyu shenming” (The lineages, markets, and temples of Nankou town), in Minjian wenhua yu xiangtu shehui: Yuedong Meixian wuda xuzhen kaocha yanjiu (Popular culture and rural society: Study on the five major markets in northNorthnortheastern Guangdong), ed. Zhou Jianxin et al. (Guangzhou: Huacheng chubanshe, 2002), 130.

57 Jiaying zhouzhi, vol. 31, 584.

contribution, the county government awarded the lineage an honorable plaque. The lineage wisely hung the plaque in the communal school rather than in its own ancestral hall, which could be seen as a strategy to both demonstrate the lineage’s muscle in the community and to show its obedient attitude toward the government.58

Though the rebellions of 1853 were quickly put down, the conquest of Nanjing by the Taiping army stimulated more large-scale uprisings in southern China. To cope with the disorder, the militia gradually became a standing army in most villages. Moreover, there were signs that local residents hired mercenaries to serve in the militia due to the inability and cowardice of the Qing officers. In 1858 when a large group of bandits from the Min-Gan-Yue border region (閩贛粵邊區) attacked Jiaying, the prefectural governor required all the thirty-six towns to each donate ten thousand tales of silver to help recruit

Chaozhou mercenaries, who were known for their courage and skills in the battlefield.

Before the arrival of Chaozhou mercenaries, it was said that the government force “could not move forward for one step.”59

In 1858 when the rebels came again, the prefect Wang Chunxiu fled in chaos and was killed by the bandits. Local gentry had to resort to Wen Xingrui (文星瑞), the son of a previous governor who resided in Jiaying at the time, to lead the local militia. In 1859, when news spread that Shi Zhenji (石鎮吉 b. 1835), the deputy of the Yi King (翼王

Yiwang) of the Taiping army, would attack Jiaying, the garrison leader in Jiaying was so scared that he fled with his troop of six hundred soldiers, leaving the town undefended. The

58 Zhou Jianxin, “Meixian Nankou zhen,” 131.

59 Jiaying zhouzhi, vol. 32, 592.

weakness of the government force was thoroughly exposed during the disorder.60 But it would be naive to assume that local gentry behaved more bravely than the Qing officials in these rebellions. When the Yi King eventually approached Jiaying, the prefectural town fell to the rebels in twelve days and more than four thousand people were killed by the bandits. During the battle, only Hou Sizhang (侯嗣章), a jinshi from a poor family, stayed in the town to help the prefect to organize the militia.61 Most powerful gentry members had already fled with their families during the crisis.

Although the gentry performed poorly in the battles against the rebels, the government still urged them to share the burden of defense since the government had exhausted its resources in the wars against the Taiping army in the north. In late 1859, Lao

Chongguang (勞崇光 1802-1867) replaced Bo Gui (柏貴 d. 1859), who had been arrested by the British and died in May 1859, to assume the position of the governor-general in

Guangdong. As soon as Lao arrived in Guangdong, he ordered the gentry in Jiaying prefecture to reorganize the militia. The three gentries who were formally commissioned to lead the militia were Zhang Qihan (張其瀚 1797-1865), Liang Xinjing (梁心鏡 b. 1806), and Yang Bingnan (楊炳南), who all possessed the title of juren.

What distinguished Zhang and Liang from the numerous juren in the prefecture was that they both came from affluent merchant families. There was an idiom in Jiaying saying that “in the upper market there was a Liang Millionaire and in the lower market there was a Zhang Millionaire.” The Zhang millionaire was the father of Zhang Qihan and

60 Ibid., vol. 31, 585.

61 Ibid., vol. 23, 430.

the Liang Millionaire was the grandfather of Liang Xinjing. The Zhang millionaire did not have any title but had made a great fortune through running a silk business in Guangzhou.

His son Zhang Qihan won the title in 1822 and assumed official positions in Shaanxi province. In 1850 when he was appointed the prefect of Guilin, he had successfully led the army to defeat a group of Hubei bandits who besieged Guilin. He returned to Jiaying in

1853 after getting involved in some official scandal. But his experience in Guilin gave him the position of head of the prefectural militia.62 The other head of local militia was Liang

Xinjing, whose grandfather made a fortune by reselling the cloth imported from Chaozhou in the late eighteenth century. His son Liang Shenzhen (梁慎楨) won the title of jinshi in

1811 and had served in the Board of Rites (禮部 Libu) in Beijing. Liang Xinjing was the sixth son of Liang Shenzhen and had grown up in Beijing when he was young. He returned to Jiaying after his father’s death in 1823 and won the title of juren in 1848.63 Though

Liang had never assumed any official position, his father’s distinguished status undoubtedly gained him advantage in winning the trust of the governor-general.

The third leader Yang Bingnan won the title of juren in 1839 and had served as a county magistrate in Shaanxi.64 Yang’s grandfather had the title of jinshi while Yang’s younger brother also won the title of juren. Though the Yang lineage was successful in the examination, it was not as affluent and influential as the Zhang and Liang lineages. Yang’s

62 Ibid., 438.

63 Ibid., 434.

64 Yang Bingnan was known for editing Hailu based on his countyman Xie Haiqing’s dictation. The book records Xie’s trip to 95 countries and provides the source for Wei Yuan’s Haiguo tuzhi, the first book introducing the West to China. See Jiaying zhouzhi, vol. 23, 430.

appointment suggests that the prestigious family credentials, which were the evidence of loyalty, still counted heavily in the government’s selection of militia leaders.

According to the gazetteer, the three gentry were conscientious in organizing the militia. They tried their best to hire capable warriors and established a trans-village alliance around the prefectural seat.65 But when the Kang King (康王 Kangwang) of the Taipings led one hundred thousand bandits to besiege the town in 1865, the gentry, once again, could not organize any effective resistance. As the Taiping army approached the city wall, it was said there were only a few dozens of soldiers patrolling in the town.66 Liang Xinjing, one of the major militia leaders, did not participate in the defense of the town with the reason that he had to stay at home to mourn for his mother’s death.67

The militia probably did not play much role in the open battles with bandits. But since the government still had to rely on the militia to manage local public affairs, and more importantly, to raise funds, the militia was not disbanded after the rebellion was put down.

Upon the order of the government, the militia was then renamed the Rehabilitation Bureau

(善後局 shanhouju). Another important figure who joined the bureau at the time was the merchant Huang Jisheng (黃際升), who did not possess any official title. Huang Jisheng’s family made a great fortune by running pawn shops and had risen to prominence through funding the philanthropic activities in the famine of 1865.68 Huang’s participation suggests

65 Ibid., 430.

66 Ibid., vol. 31, 586-588.

67 Ibid., vol. 23, 434.

68 Ibid., 438.

that financial ability was becoming a more important factor in determining a person’s status in local society. But what really made Huang Jisheng qualified as the bureau head was probably the juren titles his two sons separately won in 1856 and 1870. One of the sons

Huang Hongzao (黃鴻藻) was serving as an official in the Board of Finance (戶部 Hubu) in Beijing at the time.

From 1865, authorized by the government and under the collective leadership of the Zhang, Liang, and Huang lineages, the bureau initiated a series of recovery projects.

Since a famine immediately followed the 1865 rebellion, Zhang Linbao (張麟寶), who had inherited the position from his father Zhang Qihan after his death in 1865, proposed to use the funding of the militia to set up a charity granary. Since the funding of the militia had been mainly collected in the form of surcharge from local communities, the ownership of the granary was also in the hands of local gentry. The nature of the charity granary under the leadership of militia leaders thus was different from previous communal granary which, at least namely, belonged to the government. By transferring the funds of the militia to the granary, the local gentry continued to control local public funding after the end of the rebellion. Running granary could also be profitable for the gentry. Even in the 1865 famine, the granary leader Huang Jisheng insisted that to make the granary sustainable the granary should sell congee at a cheaper price rather than distribute rice for free.69

Building community granaries might be seen as what Mary Rankin has called

“extra-bureaucratic” activity. But the gentry, rather than going beyond the control of the government, still showed a strong interest in serving as the agent of the government by

69 Ibid.

sponsoring the government projects, since the government’s endorsement would not only enhance the gentry’s authority, but would also enable the gentry to greatly expand their power. This became clear in the rebuilding of the official academy and the Confucian temple.

In 1867, the prefect Zhou Shijun (周士俊) initiated the recovery of the prefectural academy, Peifeng Academy (培風書院 Peifeng shuyuan), which was established by the local government in the late Ming period. 70 In 1683, the magistrate reconstructed the academy, making it the most prominent school in the county. The academy had received generous donations and possessed school lands all over the county. According to the county gazetteer, in 1755 alone, the academy had received one thousand and two hundred tales of silver donated by officials and local gentry.71 But the academy declined during the early nineteenth century, to the point that it could not afford scholarships for its students. The uprisings in the 1860s further destroyed the buildings of the academy.

Since the construction of academies had always been regarded as a criterion in evaluating the achievement of local officials, the prefect immediately embarked on the recovery of the academy after he arrived in Jiaying. Zhou initiated the project but then assigned the task for fundraising to the Rehabilitation Bureau. The bureau leaders, especially the Zhang lineage, provided most of the construction fee. It seems that the gentry sacrificed their own interest because of assuming the task.

70 Ibid., vol. 16: “Xuexiao” (Schools), 271.

71 Ibid., 270-271.

If, however, one skims the record of the school lands, one would be surprised how much power the Rehabilitation Bureau had obtained after being authorized to organize such projects. Besides purchasing lands with the donation, the bureau in 1871 and 1873, under the name of banning gambling, shut down five gambling houses in four different markets and received one hundred and seventy-five taels of silver by selling the houses. All the taels were said to be used as the funding for the academy, which was presided over by

Zhang Linding (張麟定), the cousin of the bureau leader Zhang Linbao.72 What was most striking here was not the confiscation of the gambling houses but the fact that the rehabilitation bureau had replaced the government to enforce the law in local society.

In 1876, when the prefect decided to repair the Confucian temple, the bureau shouldered the responsibility of reconstruction again. This time the new prefect appointed the pawnshop merchant Huang Jisheng, whose grandson Huang Zunxian had just won the juren title, to direct the project. Besides Huang Jisheng, almost all the leaders in the 1876 project were the relatives or offspring of the leaders in the Rehabilitation Bureau established in 1865, who mainly came from the Zhang, Liang, Yang, and Huang surnames.73 This time only a few project leaders had earned examination degrees. But relying on the reputation and fortune their lineage members had accumulated, and more importantly, by institutionalizing the gentry’s leadership through the controlling of the

Rehabilitation Bureau and local academies, the younger generation of the major lineages successfully continued the dominance of their lineages.

72 Ibid., vol. 17: “Cisi” (Memorial temples), 280.

73 Ibid., vol. 16, 260.

In general, the major lineages in the prefectural town formalized and consolidated their leadership by organizing militias during the Taiping Rebellion and leading the

Rehabilitation Bureau after the rebellion was put down. They still regarded the patronage of the government an important resources for their power, but the facts that they could arbitrarily enforce the law and continue their leadership without obtaining official titles suggest that they did not rely on official recognition to maintain their leadership. The government could still maintain a semblance of control by awarding titles, but it had gradually lost its leverage in the negotiation with local gentry.

V. Overseas Emigration

The parts above demonstrate how the mountain residents in northeastern

Guangdong “transformed” themselves from minorities and bandits to lineage members and developed a reciprocal relationship with the central government by the middle Qing dynasty. Residing not far from the sea, the residents in the area had other options to make a living, that is, to engage in maritime trade or to migrate overseas. The endless unrest in the region initiated by pirates suggests that many people in the area were indeed living on the sea and did not easily submit to the central government. As mentioned above, until the mid-sixteenth century, the boundary between legal residents and bandits was still rather blurry. Local gentry estimated that at least half of the residents colluded with pirates to undertake maritime trades or pillage along the coast.74 Although the government had tried many ways to suppress pirates’ activities since the mid-sixteenth century, smuggling and

74 Lin Dachun, Jingdan xiansheng wenji, vol. 8, cited in Chen Chunsheng, Cong woluan dao qianhai, 77.

emigration, even in the period of the Coastal Evacuation, never ceased under the aegis of many independent regimes on the sea.75

When the government withdrew the Evacuation Order in 1684 and encouraged local people to reclaim the wasteland in the coastal area, more mountain residents chose to seek opportunities outside of the region. Southern Guangdong was their main destination.

But some of them arrived in much remoter areas like Zhejiang, Hunan, and Guangxi.76

Moreover, since the Kangxi emperor removed the ban on maritime trades, people in northeastern Guangdong began to openly migrate to overseas areas. The island of Taiwan, which was relatively close to the mainland and sparsely populated, became the first choice of people in northeastern Guangdong. At first local people chose to depart in spring and came back in autumn since the government forbade them to bring their wife and children to Taiwan.77 Later the Yongzheng (雍正 r. 1722-1735) emperor, afraid that the emigrants would organize rebellions against the government, strictly forbade those who had stayed overseas for several years to return home. Many of the emigrants thus were forced to settle in Taiwan or Southeast Asia.78

In 1727, under the pressure from senior officials, the Yongzheng emperor agreed to thoroughly abolish the maritime ban. From then on the junk trade between China and

75 The kingdom established by Zheng Chenggong’s family was the most famous one. The facts that Zheng had defeated the forces of the Dutch East India Company and resisted the Qing dynasty for sixteen years demonstrate the strength of those kingdoms.

76 Leong, Migration and Ethnicity, 53-62; Cynthia Brokaw, Commerce in Culture: The Sibao Book Trade in the Qing and Republican Periods (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard university Press, 2007), 41.

77 Kanori Ino, Taiwan Culture Records (Taibei: Taiwan wenxian weiyuanhui, 1985), 142.

78 Li Jinming, “Qing Kangxi shiqi kaihai yu jinhai de mudi chutan,” Nanyang wenti yanjiu 2 (1992): 63-71.

Southeast Asia entered a golden age. As the Qing government encouraged importing rice from Southeast Asian countries, especially Ayutthaya (Siam, 1351-1767), Chaozhou merchants seized this opportunity to dominate overseas trades and made the ports in northeastern Guangdong an important trading center.79 Jiaying merchants, as the neighbors of Chaozhou merchants, also took this opportunity to profit from the trade. During the

Qianlong period they had become an important party in the overseas business. A tablet in the Tianhou Temple (天後宮 Tianhou gong) of Chaozhou, the most important temple for oversea merchants, clearly indicates that Jiaying merchants were the major funders for the construction of the temple.80 The gazetteer also records that in the late Qianlong period a merchant called Li Guangbang ( 李光邦 ) had become a successful businessman in

Taiwan.81 But in comparison to Fujian and Chaozhou merchants who had developed an extensive overseas trading network, Jiaying merchants, most of whom came from the mountainous areas and could only serve as the suppliers of inland goods or second-hand dealers of imported merchandise, did not have much advantage.82

79 Before then, Fujian merchants, engaging in the spice trade, had been the dominants in overseas trades. See Tian Rukang, Shiqi dao shijiu shiji zhongye Zhongguo fanchuan zai Dongnanyazhou (Chinese sailing boats in Southeast Asia from the seventeenth to the middle nineteenth century) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1957), 18-19.

80 Jiang Peng, “Cong beike kan Qingdai zhonghouqi Zhanglin shehui de bianqian” (The study on the social change in Zhanglin based on tablet inscriptions) Hanshan shifan xueyuan xuebao vol. 24.4 (December, 2003): 16-21.

81 Jiaying zhouzhi, vol. 23, 435.

82 Zhuang Guotu, “Lun 17-19 shiji Minnan haishang zhudao haiwai huashang wangluo de yuanyin” (Discussion on the reason why southern Fujian merchants dominated overseas Chinese merchants’ network), Dongnan xueshu 3 (2001): 64-73.

From the middle of the eighteenth century, however, trade between northeastern

Guangdong and Southeast Asia declined because of a series of accidental incidents. In 1740, following the Dutch massacre of Chinese in Java, the Qianlong emperor suspended trade with Southeast Asia.83 In 1757, Guangzhou was designated as the sole legitimate trading port along the sea. Southern Guangdong gradually surpassed southern Fujian and northeastern Guangdong as the most important foreign trading center. As the European demand for spices was replaced by the need of silk, porcelain, and tea since the late eighteenth century, the Dutch East India Company (VOC), which had been occupied by the spice trade, was gradually overshadowed by the British East India Company (EIC).84

Since the mid-eighteenth century, the number of merchants’ ships between northeastern

Guangdong and Batavia decreased considerably.

But beginning in the late eighteenth century, the discovery of gold in Kalimantan provided a new opportunity for poor residents in northeastern Guangdong. The sultans in the island of Kalimantan, which had not been seized by the Dutch, invited the Chinese to help them prospect for gold on the island. The migrants from northeastern Guangdong, with their advanced technology in mining, greatly increased the output of gold. The

Chinese thus were in great demand in Kalimantan. According to Dutch reports, in 1754, seven junks from Xiamen (廈門) were found to carry as many as 4608 passengers to

83 Léonard Blussé, “Batavia from 1619-1740: The Ups and Downs of a Chinese Settlement,” trans. Xiong Weixia and Zhuang Guotu, Nanyang ziliao yicong 4 (1992): 80-87.

84 Wu Jianyong, “Shiba shiji de zhongxi maoyi” (Sino-West trades in the eighteenth century), Qingshi yanjiu 2 (1995), 113.

Batavia.85 After the 1770s, most junks sailing from China to Batavia did not ship any goods but mainly carried Chinese laborers.86 Most of these laborers came from northeastern

Guangdong, specifically Jiaying prefecture. Those early immigrants enjoyed relatively high social status before the nineteenth century. And with the Qing government promoting the policy of preventing overseas emigrants from returning home, those early emigrants tended to regard East Indies as their new home.87 Later they even established independent regimes on the island as both the VOC and local sultan declined in power.88

Yet since the middle of the nineteenth century, both the Qing emigration policy and the European rule in the East Indies had greatly changed, creating a shift in the political attitude and identification of Chinese emigrants overseas. In 1842, the Qing government was defeated in the First Opium War (1839-1842) and was forced to open four additional ports for foreign trade alongside Guangzhou. The opening of the new ports enabled many

85 Léonard Blussé, Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in V.O.C. (Hawthorne: Foris Publication, 1988), 146.

86 Ibid.

87 For a detailed introduction about the evolution of Chinese government’s policies on overseas Chinese, see Zhuang Guotu, Zhongguo fengjian zhengfu de huaqiao zhengce (Chinese imperial government’s policies on overseas Chinese) (Xiamen: Xiamen daxue chubanshe, 1989).

88 The most famous regime was Lanfang 蘭芳 Company, or the so-called Lanfang Republic (蘭芳共和國). The company had developed from small groups established by people with common hometown ties. Later through competition and annexation these small groups were merged into bigger associations. The two biggest associations, the Lanfang Association and the Association of the Heaven and Earth, were both engaged in agriculture in the beginning. In 1774, the Lanfang Association was defeated by the Heaven and Earth Association and was forced to move to Mandor. There they established the Lanfang Company and began to participate in mining industry. In the 1920s, the Hakka scholar Luo Xianglin made an analogy between the system adopted by the Lanfang Company and the republican system in America. That was how the Lanfang Company got the name the Lanfang Republic. See Tian Rukang, “Shiba shiji moqi dao shijiu shiji moqi xi Jialimandan de huaqiao gongsi zuzhi” (Chinese companies in west Kalimantan), Xiamen daxue xuebao 3 (1958): 136-138; Nagaokashin Jiro, “Xi Jialimandan huaqiao shehui de yange yu bianqian,” trans. Ni Wenrong, Dongnanya yanjiu ziliao 6 (1962): 9. About the analogy Luo Xianglin’s draws between American and Lanfang Company, see Xipoluozhou Luo Fangbo deng suojian gongheguo kao (The study on the republic established by Luo Fangbo in west Borneo) (Hong Kong: Zhongguo xueshe, 1961).

Chinese to travel overseas, though travelling and immigration was still regarded illegal until the 1860s. The endless rebellions and wars of the 1850s ravaged the countryside in the south and further stimulated rural people to search for a better life overseas. In 1868, the ban on overseas emigration was finally abolished when the Qing court was forced to sign the Convention of Peking with British government after losing again in the Second

Opium War (1856-1860). According to the convention, the Chinese were allowed to freely take labor service beyond sea and their families were also allowed to travel with them.89

The treaty not only provided legitimacy but also gave further impetus to the migrating activities, leading to a population rise of the Chinese throughout Southeast

Asia.90 Since most early migrants from Jiaying prefecture landed in Dutch East Indies, the migrants in the mid-nineteenth century still regarded this area as their first choice. But different from earlier immigrants most of whom chose to work in the mining companies of

Kalimantan, the careers of the new generation of Jiaying immigrants were more diversified.

Many of them profited from the “cultivation system” imposed by the Dutch colonial administration. The system forced Javanese peasants to plant cash crops for European markets and was often criticized for having brought hardship to the peasants.91 The system, however, enabled some Chinese immigrants to make a large fortune by taking charge of

89 “Article V,” Beijing Convention. Accessed Jan 8, 2015. http://www.chinaforeignrelations.net/treaty_beijing

90 See Tian Rukang, “Jindai huaqiaoshi de jieduan wenti” (The issue on the periodization of overseas Chinese), Xiamen daxue xuebao 3 (1958): 89-92.

91 According to the Dutch arrangement, peasants had to utilize one fifth of their land to plant cash crops like sugar and coffee. Javanese peasants thus often suffered excessive workload and the shortage of grain. See Jean G. Taylor, Indonesia: Peoples and Histories. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003), 240.

the management of plantations and trading cash crops. Zhang Zhenxun (張振勛 1840-

1916), possibly the richest Chinese immigrant from northeastern Guangdong, made most of his wealth by managing various plantations in Java.92 To increase revenue, the Dutch government also farmed out various monopolies, such as those on running gambling houses and trading opium, to rich Chinese merchants. This revenue farming system enabled

Chinese merchants to rapidly accumulate their wealth and power.

The increase of wealth of Chinese merchants, however, did not help to improve the social status of the Chinese population. On the contrary, Chinese merchants received greater suspicion from the Dutch who in turn set up stricter restrictions over the Chinese.

Since the 1850s, the colonial government enforced a separation system that not only required the Chinese to live in an assigned quarter but also forced them to obtain a permit whenever they travelled outside of the quarter.

To protect the Dutch monopoly over export products, the Dutch government began to abolish Chinese revenue farms which had provided the primary income for Chinese merchants. Moreover, the colonial government deprived Chinese privileges in the opium trade and eliminated Chinese-run pawnshops. The abolishment of these two monopolies had a disastrous effect on established Chinese families.

The colonial government also subjected the Chinese to Dutch commercial laws.

Before then the Chinese generally did business according to their customary law. This

92 Zheng Guanying, “Zhang Bishi jun shengping shilue” (A brief bibliography of Zhang Bishi), in Jindai Zhongguo shiliao congkan, vol. 75 (Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1972): 6-7.

policy led many Chinese to lose faith in the colonial government.93 From the 1860s, the influx of Chinese immigrants led to the demographic explosion in Chinese quarters and further created tension inside Chinese communities. The majority of the new immigrants came from northeastern Guangdong, many of whom had voluntarily participated or were passively involved in the Taiping Rebellion and were forced to leave their hometown in the post-war purge. Those new immigrants, also called Shin Khek (新客 xinke), were often in conflict with established Fujian and Canton people who had migrated to the area earlier.

Moreover, after 1900, the Dutch inaugurated a new ethical program incorporating the so-called humane colonial theory. Under the guidance of the theory, the Dutch clonial government claimed that it would be responsible for the welfare of all the “native population” living in the Dutch colonial establishment. The Chinese, obviously, were not considered a native group. Instead, they became the victims of the program. Lea Williams has analyzed the impact of this policy to the Chinese in detail. According to her study, the

Dutch colonial officialdom, by depicting the Chinese as the cause for all the miseries of the native populations, “consciously translated lofty (humanitarianism) ideals into hostility toward the Chinese.” The racist term “yellow peril” was spread through newspapers in the

Indies in no time.94

By classifying the Chinese as dangerous to the economic interests of the native people, the Dutch colonial government created tension between the Chinese and others.

93 J.R. Rush, “Opium Farms in Nineteenth Century Java: Institutional Continuity and Change in a Colonial Society, 1860-1910” (PhD Diss., Yale University, 1977), 231, cited in Onghokham, “Chinese Capitalism in Dutch Java,” Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 27.2 (September 1989): 172.

94 Lea E. Williams, “The Ethical Program and the Chinese of Indonesia,” Journal of Southeast Asian History, vol. 2, no. 2 (July 1961), 35-38.

And while the native people were given the chance to enter the officialdom under the humane policy, Chinese were still excluded from the bureaucratic system. The colonial government continued to grant titles like Capitan Cina or Lieutenant Cina to the heads of

Chinese communities. However, those titles became merely honorable after the 1890s.

Neither did the Chinese enjoy any benefit that was provided to the natives. When Malay language schools had been widely set up for the natives in the early 1900s, there was still no separate school for Chinese students. And, in the 1900s, most post offices still refused to deliver letters to Chinese communities.95

Being squeezed by the colonial government and facing increasing hostility from the native populations, Chinese immigrants began to reevaluate their situation in the East

Indies and their relationship with the external world, especially China, which had formulated a more friendly policy toward both the merchant class and overseas Chinese since the 1860s. Stimulated by the pressures from both foreigners and senior officials, the

Qing government was forced to open more treaty ports for foreign trade and also to initiate the self-strengthening movement that centered on economic and military modernization.

Since the 1870s, senior officials initiated a series of modern enterprises like the Merchants’

Steam Navigation Company (輪船招商局 Lunchuan zhaoshangju) and the Imperial

Telegraph Administration (中國電報局 Zhongguo dianbaoju). The operation of those enterprises required huge capital which was usually beyond the ability of the Qing officials.

Overseas merchants, rumors of whose real or legendary wealth had been well circulated in mainland China, caught the attention of the Chinese government and officials. In 1877,

95 Lea E. Williams, “The Ethical Program and the Chinese of Indonesia,” 41.

upon the suggestion of Guo Songtao (郭嵩燾 1818-1891), China’s first envoy in Britain, the Qing government set up China’s first consulate in Singapore.96 And with the goal of increasing revenue, the Qing government began to sell titles to overseas merchants. From

1877 to 1912, at least 291 titles were sold to merchants in British East Indies alone. Some wealthy merchants even purchased several titles to display their power and to strengthen ties with the Chinese government.97

Senior officers who were in charge of the modern enterprises were also eager to seek funds in Southeast Asia.98 In 1879, Li Hongzhang (李鴻章 1823-1901), the director of Merchants’ Steam Navigation Bureau, sent two delegates to Southeat Asia to learn experience in running steamship companies and also to solicit funds. One of the delegates,

Wen Zongyan (溫宗彥), was a merchant from Jiaying prefecture. Wen was probably chosen due to his potential to establish connections with the merchants from northeastern

Guangdong. Raising 115,200 taels of silver from Southeast Asia, Wen did not disappoint

96 About the process of the setup of the consulate in Singapore, see Yen Ching Hwang, Coolies and Mandarins: China’s Protection of Overseas Chinese during the Late Qing Period (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985); Cai Peirong, Qingji zhu Xinjiapo lingshi zhi tantao (Exploration on Chinese consuls in Singapore of the Qing dynasty) (Singapore: Bafang wenhua gongzuoshi, 2002).

97 Yen Ching Hwang, “Qingchao yuguan zhidu yu Xinma huazu lingdaoceng” (The system of selling official posts and the Chinese leadership in Singapore and Malaysia), trans. Zhang Qingjiang, in Xinjiapo huazu shilunji (History papers on Singapore Chinese), ed. Ke Mulin et al. (Singapore: Nanyangdaxue biyesheng xiehui, 1972), 51.

98 About why the absence of public accounting and the reliance on patronage network prevented Chinese merchants from raising abundant funds necessary for the development of modern factories, see David Faure, “A Historical View of Chinese Entrepreneurship,” in Comparative Entrepreneurship Initiatives: Studies in China, Japan and the USA, ed. Chikako Usui (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 15-35.

Li Hongzhang. The abovementioned wealthy merchant Zhang Zhenxun alone provided

3,600 taels. Zhang was also awarded a title of prefect because of the donation.99

In 1893 the Qing government, under pressure from overseas ambassadors, abolished the policy that had banned overseas people to go back to mainland China. Huang

Zunxian, Chinese consul in Singapore and also a native of Jiaying, played a major role in abolishing the policy.100 In 1903, the Qing court founded the Department of Commerce (商

部 Shangbu) and openly urged officials to solicit overseas investment. The government also granted high-ranking titles to merchants who made huge investments and provided them with tax incentives.101 Zhang Zhenxun, who had helped Li Hongzhang to develop mining, banking, and railroad industries, was granted a post of the first rank in the “nine ranks” system.

Hakka immigrants behaved most actively when interacting with the Qing government. They topped merchants of other dialect groups in various fundraising activities, though they were not the wealthiest merchants in the colonies.102 Their efforts in displaying loyalty were well rewarded by the Qing government. In 1893, when the

99 Gu Jiaxiong and Nie Baozhang, Zhongguo jindai hangyunshi ziliao, 1840-1895 (Materials on the history of shipping of early modern China), vol. 1 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1983), 984-988; Zhaoshangju zongguanlichu, Zhaoshangju zongguanlichu huibao (Management Office’s Reports on China Merchants Steamship Company) (Shanghai: Zhaoshangju, 1929), 32.

100 Daqing lichao shilu (The veritable records of the Qing dynasty) Guangxu (Guangxu emperor), vol. 327 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987), 201; Cai Peirong, Qingji zhu Xinjiapo lingshi, 49-68.

101 Yang Quan, “Wushi niandai Zhongguo zhi gongye” (Industry in the past fifty years), in Zhongguo jindai gongyeshi ziliao (Materials on China’s modern industry), vol. 1, eds. Chen Zhen and Yao Luo (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1957), 7.

102 Huang Xianqiang, “Keji lingshi yu Bincheng huaren shehui” (Hakka consuls and Chinese society in Penang), Asian Culture vol. 21 (June 1997): 183-186.

government tried to establish a consulate in Penang of British Strait Settlements, Zhang

Zhenxun was chosen as the first consul, despite the fact that Zhang’s businesses were mainly located in the Dutch East Indies. 103 Zhang himself was also clear about the importance of expressing absolute allegiance to the Qing government. It was said that the

Dutch colonial government intended to grant him the title of Capitan Cina several times but he always turned down the offer.104 One year later, Zhang was promoted to be the

Consul in Singapore, but he left this position in Penang to his business partner Zhang

Yunan 張煜南 (1851-1911), a native of Jiaying prefecture.

Zhang Yunan had immigrated to the Dutch East Indies in 1868 and soon amassed his wealth by associating with Zhang Zhenxun in the plantation business. Zhang Yunan also actively invested in modern industries in China. In 1902, with his countryman Wen

Hao 溫灝, the director of China Telegram Bureau in Hong Kong, as the go-between, Zhang

Yunan donated 110,000 taels to the Qing court and obtained an honorous fourth rank post.105 In 1903 he applied to construct the Chaoshan Railway (潮汕鐵路 Chaoshan tielu) that connected Shantou and Chaozhou. His application was immediately approved by the

Qing court. The railway was finished in 1906 and became the first Chinese railway constructed solely by merchants. Zhang Yunan resigned from the position in 1896 and his

103 Zhang Xiaowei, “Wanqing zhu Binglangyu fulingshi de chuangshe yu shouren fulingshi de pairen” (The setup of vice-consul in Penang and the dispatch of the first vice-consul), Zhongguo lishixuehui shixue jikan vol. 36 (July 2004): 270.

104 Ibid., 269.

105 Huang Dingyu and Wen Chongyuan, “Chaoshan tielu xingfei shimo” (The vicissitude of Chanshan railway), in Guangdong wenshi ziliao, vol. 9, ed. Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Guangdong sheng weiyuanhui, (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1963), 31.

successor Xie Rongguang (謝榮光 1848-1916) was still a native of Jiaying and a business partner of Zhang Zhenxun. Xie Rongguang had been a revenue farmer in Sumatra and was granted monopolies in railway construction and opium trading in the Dutch East Indies.

When Zhang Yunan initiated the construction of the Chaoshan Railway, Xie Rongguang contributed 500,000 taels, making him one of the four major shareholders.106 Xie stayed in the position until 1903 before passing the position to his son-in-law Liang Biru (梁碧如

1857-1912), a native of the Baitu town (白土鎮) of Jiaying prefecture. Liang Biru arrived in Penang in 1876 and earned his wealth by running tin mines. In 1903, he joined with

Zhang Yunan and Xie Rongguang in answering the call of the Board of Commerce to establish the first state bank in China, though the plan eventually dissolved because of the shortage of funds. This group of Jiaying merchants, by collaborating in business and officialdom, established an alliance and made Jiaying merchants an influential force among the major Chinese dialect communities.

When Jiaying merchants actively engaged in the Self-Strengthening Movement (洋

務運動 1861-1895) initiated by the Qing government, a strong nationalism evolved among the Chinese in Dutch East Indies, which was partially stimulated by the friendly attitude of the Qing government and partially provoked by the Dutch misrule. In this movement

Jiaying merchants played a major role. In 1900, the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies established the first trans-dialect association, the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan (中華會館 zhonghua huiguan), in Batavia. The aims of the association were to reform Chinese

106 “Chaoshan tielu yange shilue” (The history of Chaoshan railway), in Jindai huaqiao touzi guonei qiyeshi ziliao xuanji (The materials on overseas Chinese investment in Chinese modern industry), eds. Lin Jinzhi and Zhuang Weiji (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1989), 382.

customs by promoting orthodox Confucian rituals and to unify the Chinese all over the

Dutch East Indies by establishing branches of the association all over the colony.107 In 1901 the leaders of the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan established a Chinese language school, which introduced students to Mandarin with the goal of allowing students from different dialect groups to better communicate with each other. The founders also clearly stated that the school aimed to end the disunity of Chinese communities by making Confucianism “the spiritual knowledge for all the Chinese of the Dutch East Indies.”108 At the same time, in order to promote a “civilized” image of the Chinese, the school adopted a modern education system and textbooks imported from Japan. One of the founders, Qiu Xieting (丘燮亭), a merchant from Bingcun town (丙村鎮) of Jiaying, relying on his business network in Japan, directly recruited teachers from Japan and sent his daughters to receive education in

Japan.109 This nationalist movement that centered on both the promotion of Confucianism and the modernization of education system coincided with the reform promoted by senior officials in mainland China, with whom Jiaying merchants had established close connections.

107 Liang Youlan, “Badaweiya Zhonghuahuiguan sishinianshi” (The forty-year history of Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan in Batavia), 10, cited in Huang Kunzhang, “Xinbaopai yu yinni huaqiao minzuzhuyi yundong” (The new journal faction and the Indonesian Chinese nationalist movement), Huaqiao lishi 7 (1986): 25.

108 T.H.H.K.,“Bacheng chuangshe Zhonghuahuiguan xingban xuetang gongqi” (The public declaration on the establishment of the Chinese Association in Batavia), cited in Wang Aiping, “Yinni kongjiaohui huodong” (The activities of the Confucian Association in Indonesia), Nankai xuebao 6 (2007): 133.

109 Didi Kwartanada, “The Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan School: a transborder project of modernity in Batavia, c. 1900s,” in Chinese Indonesians Reassessed: History, Religion and Belonging, eds. Siew-Min Sai and Chang-Yau Hoon (New York: Routledge, 2013), 31.

It must be stressed that although all Chinese dialect groups joined in the Nationalist movement, not all of the Chinese shared the same interests in affairs relating to China. The

Hakka merchants, especially those who had just arrived in the Indies in the late nineteenth century, played a leading role. In comparison, the Peranakan, the immigrants who were born in Malaya, were in general indifferent to the movement. For example, the Peranakan merchant, Oei Tiong Ham, or Huang Zhonghan (黃仲涵 1866-1924) in Chinese, a descendant of Fujian and one of the wealthiest merchant in the Dutch East Indies, rarely participated in political movements relating to China and never purchased any title from the Qing government.110 The Hakka merchants’ enthusiasm in the nationalist movement thus should not be interpreted solely as the result of their interests in promoting the national status, but should also be construed as the consequence of their predicament. As later immigrants in the Indies, they were in a disadvantageous position in the competition with existing settlers and had little chance to achieve upward mobility because of the new colonial policies. Even if many Hakka merchants had achieved great success in the business world, they were overwhelmed by other dialect groups whose population was much bigger than the Hakkas. The major Chinese associations, no matter the Tiong Hoa

Hwee Koan in Dutch East Indies or the Pingzhang Association (平章會館 Pingzhang huiguan) in Penang, were still under the leadership of Fujian or Canton merchants.111

Under such a context, it was unsurprising that the Hakka merchants tended to seek patronage from the Chinese government and stress their identity as the Chinese.

110 Onghoklam, “Chinese Capitalism in Dutch Java,” 173-174.

111 Huang Xianqiang, “Keji lingshi yu Bincheng huaren shehui,” 187.

It was also against this backdrop that the Hakka merchants showed stronger interest in claiming their influence in their native region of northeastern Guangdong. Starting in the late nineteenth century, they frequently participated in public affairs and funded public projects in Jiaying. For example, the two most important bridges in Songkou town that cross the Mei River were both built with the funds donated by overseas merchants.112 The new-style round-dragon houses were also built in this period. These houses were grandiose, blending Chinese and Western elements and displaying the merchants’ elaborate life style.

The building of such houses was not for the purpose of incorporating all the population in a community but to demonstrate the owner’s distinguished status. Such an exhibition of power and wealth was of great significance for the house-owners since most of them were from poor backgrounds before immigrating to Southeast Asia and regarded the recognition from their home communities a primary goal in life. The exhibition also enabled the merchants’ lineages to expand the influence in their communities. It was meaningful to these linages since they had suffered from competition with the dominating lineages, which, including those mentioned in the first half of this chapter, had consolidated their leadership by achieving success in the imperial examination and also by controlling local public institutions since the Taiping Rebellion.

112 Fang Xuejia, Weibuzhu de weilongwu: Yuedong guzhen songkou de shehui bianqian (Round-dragon house that cannot be isolated: the social changes in Songkou town of east Guangdong) (Guangzhou: Huacheng chubanshe, 2002), 171-173.

Conclusion

By the twentieth century, the residents in the mountains and river valleys of northeastern Guangdong had been well integrated into the central empire. This group of population had been defined as the She or Yao minorities and bandits or pirates by Chinese officials before the Ming dynasty. But since the middle Ming dynasty, they had begun to submit to the rule of the central government and had gotten themselves organized in the form of lineages. It was not only because the government deepened its control in the area but also because by adopting the form of lineage local residents could easily gain legitimate status and an effective form of incorporation. The nineteenth-century unrest further provided an opportunity for a few distinguished lineages with excellent examination records to establish formal institutions to manage local public affairs. As their leadership had been formalized through those institutions, they were also increasingly out of the control of the government.

Another tradition of seeking livelihoods on the sea also played a major role in shaping the state-society relationship in northeastern Guangdong. Many people in the area had actively engaged in the smuggling and piracy activities along the sea. When the government strengthened their control in this area, some people chose to collaborate with the government and register in the official account. Many of them, however, were still beyond the control of the government and became the creators of great turbulence from the sixteenth to the seventeenth centuries. When the Qing government lifted the ban on overseas emigration in the middle nineteenth century, residents from northeastern

Guangdong poured into Southeast Asia again. Some of them made fortunes overseas. But the unequal treatment from the Dutch colonial government in the East Indies and the

suppression from other powerful dialect groups pushed them to stand on the side of Chinese government. With the enormous financial ability and experience in running modern enterprises which were in great demand of the Qing government, they became the newly trustworthy partners of the government, which now encouraged their return.

The two groups of elites, one of which had established dominance over the local communities while the other became the new favorite of the government, would inevitably run into conflicts in the management of local affairs. The following chapter, by focusing on their interaction in the late Qing reform, will discuss how their contradiction redefined the state-society relationship in the beginning of the twentieth century.

Chapter 2

Late Qing Reform: Reshuffling Local Power Structure

Introduction

In the summer of 1898, Huang Zunxian (1848-1905), the grandson of Huang

Jisheng, the leader of the Rehabilitation Bureau in Jiaying prefecture, was anxiously waiting to assume his new position as the Chinese ambassador to Japan. Before then,

Huang had served as an envoy or an envoy’s assistant in Japan, America, Britain and

Singapore. From 1877 to 1882, Huang was the secretary of China’s first ambassador to

Japan. Based on his personal investigation, he wrote Riben guozhi (日本國志 The gazetteer of Japan), the first Chinese book that comprehensively introduced the history of the Meiji

Reform. In 1895, finishing his diplomatic mission in Singapore, Huang returned to China and had the book published. The book immediately caught the attention of reform-minded officials, the number of whom was quickly increasing after 1895, when China was humiliatingly defeated by Japan. As an expert on Japan’s reform, Huang became a core figure among the reformers in Beijing and established close ties with Kang Youwei (康有

為 1858-1927) and Liang Qichao (梁啟超 1873-1929).1 In 1895, this group of reformers organized the National-Strengthening Society (強學會 Qiangxuehui) in Beijing, which attracted not only famous literati like Wang Kangnian (汪康年 1860-1911) and Zhang

1 About the biography of Huang Zunxian, see Qing Huang Gongdu xiansheng nianpu (Chronological Biography of Huang Zunxian), ed. Wu Tianren (Taibei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1985).

Yuanji (張元濟 1867-1959) but also gained the support of senior officials like Yuan Shikai

(袁世凱 1859-1916) and Zhang Zhidong (張之洞 1837-1909). The Guangxu (光緒 r.

1875-1908) emperor’s endorsement further brought this group of elites to the front of the political stage in the early summer of 1898. In June 1898, the emperor adopted the reform agenda drafted by Kang Youwei and formally initiated the modernizing reform. It was during this period that Huang Zunxian was appointed as the ambassador to Japan. The

Guangxu emperor had high hopes for Huang. He promoted Huang to third-rank official status and asked Huang to take a personal letter to the Meiji emperor, expecting to gain

Meiji’s support for his reform.2 However, the conflicts between the powerful dowager Cixi

(慈禧太后 1835-1908) and the emperor finally doomed the reform, which was ended in a coup launched by the dowager. Huang was arrested by the circuit intendant of Shanghai after the coup but later was released under the assistance of the British and Japanese ambassadors. In October 1898, Huang went back to his hometown in Jiaying prefecture, where he spent his last six years. Though having no chance to participate in the officialdom in Beijing, Huang still exerted substantial effort to promote the reform policies in his hometown, especially after 1901 when the Qing court resumed the reforms as a last-ditch effort to rescue itself.

Huang was not the only reform-minded gentry in his hometown, as by the late

1890s, several other senior officials who had been enthusiastic in promoting the reform also came back to Jiaying, with Qiu Fengjia (丘逢甲 1864-1912) as the most prominent one. Qiu, by descent, came from Zhenping County (鎮平縣) of Jiaying prefecture, but

2 Kong Xiangji, “Huang Zunxian ruogan zhongyao shishi dingzheng” (The correction on the facts about Huang Zunxian), Qingshi yanjiu 5 (2010): 114-124.

Qiu’s ancestors had migrated to Taiwan in the late eighteenth century and Qiu was born in

Taiwan. In 1889, Qiu obtained the title of jinshi and was appointed the secretary in the

Board of Works (工部 Gongbu).3 However, Qiu merely stayed in the position for several months and then returned to Taiwan to take care of his parents. In Taiwan, Qiu had taught in the Chongwen Academy (崇文書院 Chongwen shuyuan) in Tainan (台南) upon the invitation of Tang Jingsong (唐景崧 1841-1903), the circuit intendant and later the governor of Taiwan. In 1894, the First Sino-Japanese War broke out. As a senior title- holder, Qiu was commanded to organize militia to defend Taizhong (台中), where he was residing. When the Qing court decided to cede Taiwan to Japan in 1895, Qiu refused to obey the court’s order to surrender. In May 1895, Qiu and other resistant army leaders urged the now-governor Tang Jingsong to declare the independence of Taiwan and to continue the fight with the Japanese. Yet without the Qing government’s support, the resistance soon failed and Qiu was forced to go back to mainland China.4

Qiu and other returned Taiwan officials, however, were not trusted by the Qing court which was dominated by the dowager Cixi. Many of them thus associated with the reformers and became ardent supporters of the 1898 Reform. 5 Although Qiu did not directly participate in the reform, he kept in touch with his former colleagues and showed

3 Qiu got acquainted with two Jiaying literati when he took the examination in Beijing in 1889. One was Huang Zunxian, who was waiting for a new appointment in Beijing. The other was Wen Zhonghe, who also earned the title of jinshi in that year.

4 About the biography of Qiu Fengjia, see Minguo Qiu Canghai xiansheng nianpu (Chronological Biography of Qiu Canghai), ed. Zheng Xifu (Taibei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1981).

5 Sang Bing, “Jiawu zhanhou neidu guanshen yu gengzi qinwang yundong” (The returned Taiwan officials after the 1895 War and the Save-the-emperor Movement in 1900), Lishi yanjiu 6 (1995): 76-86.

strong sympathy for the reformers.6 His reputation as an anti-Japanese hero also helped him win the heart of many reform-minded elites in southern China and Southeast Asia. In

1898, as soon as Huang Zunxian came back to Jiaying, Qiu visited Huang and wrote a couplet for Huang’s new study room. From 1898 to 1900, these two frustrated officials had been in frequent contact, discussing their political ideals in letters and exchanging poems with each other.7 Overseas merchants like Qiu Shuyuan (邱菽園 1874-1941), who had provided generous financial support to Kang Youwei, also approached Qiu Fengjia and introduced him to overseas reformers.8 By 1900, Qiu Fengjia had become a well-known figure in the circle of the reformers in both south China and Southeast Asia.

Although both Huang and Qiu were ardent supporters of the 1898 Reform and had gotten along well when they served as senior officials in Beijing, their relationship quickly deteriorated, especially when they tried to implement in their hometown the modernizing reforms, which were resumed by the Qing government in 1901. Huang and Qiu, as the leaders of the two groups of elites in Jiaying, actively participated in the reforms. The elites under their leadership, as this chapter will show, however, frequently ran into conflict with each other.

6 Zheng Xifu, Minguo Qiu Canghai xiansheng nianpu, 154-161; Zhao Chuncheng, “Qiu Fengjia zai gengzi qinwang zhong heyi zhefu weidong” (Why did not Qiu Fengjia participate in the Save-the-emperor Movement in 1900), Xueshu yanjiu 10 (2006): 112-113.

7 Qiu Zhuchang, “Shilun Qiu Fengjia yu Kang Liang Huang zhi guanxi” (The discussion on the relationship among Qiu Fengjia, Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and Huang Zunxian), Xueshu yanjiu 2 (2001): 118-123; Qiu Zhuchang, Qiu Fengjia jiaowanglu (The record on the people who had associated with Qiu Fengjia) (Wuhan: Huazhong shida chubanshe, 2004), 5-10.

8 Qiu Fengjia, Qiu Fengjia wenji (Collected essays of Qiu Fengjia), ed. Qiu Chenbo (Guangzhou: Huacheng chubanshe, 1994), 269, 275; Li Qingnian, “Qiu Fengjia nanlai yuanyin jiqi huodong xinlun” (The reason why Qiu Fengjia came to the south and new perspectives on his activities). Accessed February 4, 2015, http://kenglian46.blogspot.com/2012/05/blog-post_11.html

Existing historiography tends to interpret the conflicts brough by the late Qing reforms through the perspective of ideological conflicts.9 This discourse could be traced back to the writings of the reformers, who often attached the tag of “traditional gentry” (舊

紳 jiushen) to the local established gentry while defining themselves as “the scholars of new-learning” (新學界人士 xinxuejie renshi).10 By emphasizing the dichotomy between the “old” and the “new,” the new elites ascribed the resistance to the reform to the conservativeness of the local gentry. Yet, the two groups of elites who were at daggers drawn in Jiaying, such as Huang and Qiu, not necessarily disagreed over the content of the reform. Their conflicts, however, were indeed caused by the reform.

Who exactly made up the traditional gentry while who constituted the members of

“the scholars of new-learning” in a rural setting? If these two groups of elites did not have different opinions toward the reforms, why were they in constant tension with each other?

Given that the beginning of their conflict coincided with the start of the state’s efforts to implement the reforms in local society, what role did the state play in creating the contradiction between them? This chapter is about how the late Qing reforms divided local elites.

9 John Esherick, for example, stresses that the urban reformists had alienated the rural masses by preaching the Western-inspired ideology. See John Esherick, Reform and Revolution in China: The 1911 Revolution in Hunan and Hubei (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976). Prasenjit Duara also holds that traditional gentry in rural society were almost untouched by the new ideology and lost the cultural resources during the reform upon which they had established their dominance. See Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power and the State.

10 About the antagonism between the new faction and the old faction, see Luo Zhitian, “Jindai Hunan quyu wenhua yu wuxu xinjiu zhizheng” (Regional culture in modern Hunan and the controversy over the new and the old in 1898), Jindaishi yanjiu, 5 (1998), 51-70.

I. Years between the 1898 Reform and the 1901 Reform

Though the coup brought an abrupt halt to the 1898 Reform, the enthusiasm in promoting a thorough political and cultural reform did not ebb among elites like Huang and Qiu. Their political ideals were also widely shared by the merchant class and a group of young literati who were eager to enhance their social status and fulfill their ambition through the reform. By the end of 1899, the merchants in the treaty port Shantou, suggested by the chair of the East Asia Common Culture Society (東亞同文會 Dongya tongwenhui), a Japanese civic organization aiming at promoting the mutual understanding between

China and Japan,11 decided to establish a middle school which taught both Chinese classics and Japanese language. The merchants admired Qiu Fengjia’s reputation and invited him to assume the president of the school.12 Qiu helped the merchants obtain the endorsement of the prefect and opened the school in Shantou in February 1900.13 The merchants in

Shantou provided the Tongji Charity Hall (同濟善堂 Tongji shantang) as the temporary house for the school.14 After the issues relating to the establishment of the school were settled, Qiu visited Southeast Asia upon the government’s request to propagate the new

11 The East Asia Common Culture Society (Dongya tongwenhui) was a Japanese civic organization established in 1898. The society aimed at promoting the civic exchange between Japan and China. Funded by Japanese government, the society had established five branches in China. The Guangdong branch was one of the five branches and had played an important role in the founding of Tongwen School in Shantou. See Sang Bing, “Riben Dongya Tongwenhui Guangdong zhibu” (The Guangdong branch of the East Asia Common Culture Society), Zhongshan daxue xuebao 1 (2002): 14-39.

12 Qiu Fengjia wenji, 981.

13 In 1899, two Tongwen Schools were separately established in Chaozhou and Shantou. But the school in Chaozhou was soon shut down since it did not obtain the official approval. In 1900 the merchants and reformers decided to co-establish a school in Shantou. See Chen Jingzhun, “Qiu Fengjia yu Lingdong Tongwen xuetang ruogan shishi kaozheng” (Qiu Fengjia and the investigation on some facts of Lingdong Tongwen xuetang), Shantou daxue xuebao vol. 22 (June 2006): 81-88.

14 Qiu Fengjia wenji, 817-820.

policies on the protection of overseas merchants.15 Qiu took the opportunity to collect a large sum of funding for the school from overseas Jiaying merchants. After coming back from Southeast Asia, Qiu reformed the content of the curriculum and adopted textbooks imported from Japan. 16 Upon Qiu’s call, many reform-minded literati in northNorthnortheastern Guangdong joined the school. The establishment of the school was a pioneering attempt given that the Qing government did not initiate education reforms until 1902.

Besides founding the new-style school, the reformers in Shantou also paid attention to the utilization of modern mass publications. In July 1901, to more widely circulate new publications from Hong Kong and Shanghai, the merchants and literati in Shantou donated money to establish a public newspaper reading room, which was an innovative practice in the beginning of the twentieth century. In May 1902, the organizers of the reading room, funded by an overseas Chaozhou merchant, published their own newspaper, East

Guangdong Daily (嶺東日報 Lingdong ribao, 1902-1908).17 Several instructors from

Tongwen School (同文學堂 Tongwen xuetang) joined in the editorial board. The editors ardently introduced the new political thought they learned from overseas publications and preached their reform agenda in the newspaper. In general, by 1902, a group of reform- minded literati, who were mainly taking activities in the treaty port, actively promoted

15 Ibid., 820.

16 “The 31 report on East Asia Common Culture Society,” in Chen Jingzhun, “Qiu Fengjia yu Lingdong Tongwen xuetang,” 84.

17 Wang Linqian, “Shantoushi xinwen shiliao shiling” (Some historical materials on the journalist industry of Shantou), in Shantou wenshi, vol. 2, ed. Shantoushi zhengxie wenshiziliao weiyuanhu (Shantou: Wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, 1985), 83-89; Wu You, “Wu Zishou kaituo Shantou zaoqi baoye” (Wu Zishou and the development of the newspaper industry in Shantou) Shantou Daily, August 29, 2011, 4.

new-style education and preached Western thought, even if the Qing government had not formally resumed the modernization reform.

Despite the enthusiasm of the literati and merchants in the treaty port, the reform did not progress much before the government reinitiated its own reform under the pressure of senior governor-generals. The standoff between the government and the governor- generals began during the 1898 Reform and reached a climax during the Boxer Uprising.

In the summer of 1900, the dowager Cixi had attempted to take advantage of the force of the boxers to oppose foreign activities in China. With the dowager’s support, the boxers entered Beijing in June 1900 and besieged the Legation Quarter in Beijing. Ignoring senior officials’ admonishment, the dowager then declared war against all the foreign powers in

China.

The governor-generals in southeast China, however, refused to join in the court’s declaration of war. 18 Moreover, the governor-generals, acting on their own, signed a neutrality agreement with the belligerent states, which provided that the governor-generals would protect foreigners in southeast China and in return foreigners would not invade the southern provinces no matter what happened in the north.19 Liu Kunyi (劉坤一 1830-1902), the governor-general of Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Anhui, and Zhang Zhidong, the governor- general of Hunan and Hubei, even agreed that if Beijing fell, they would establish an

18 This group of governor-generals included Li Hongzhang, the governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi, Zhang Zhidong, the governor-general of Hunan and Hubei, Liu Kunyi, the governor-general of Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Anhui, Xu Yingkui, the governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang, Yuan Shikai, the governor of Shandong, and Kuijun, the governor-general of Sichuan.

19 “Dongnan baohu yuekuan” (The convention of the protection of southeast China) (July 1900), in Zhongguo jinxiandai waijiaoshi ziliao xuanji (The compilation of the materials of diplomatic history in early modern China), ed. Xiong Zhiyong (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2012), 168.

independent federal government in the south.20 Although the pragmatic dowager soon reached a peace agreement with the Powers, this incident fully exposed the weakness of the court to local Chinese officials. The governor-generals also demonstrated their ability to take united action against the will of the Manchu court.

After the uprising, despite the dowager’s reluctance, the Qing court, under the pressure of the governor-generals, was forced to reinitiate reforms both to save itself from the foreign threat and to regain the trust of Chinese officials. From 1901, the government reinitiated a set of military, economic, and constitutional reforms. The reform policies included the training of a “New Army” in 1901, the promotion of new-style schools in

1902, the promulgation of the Company Law (公司律 Gongsi lü) in 1904, the abolishment of the imperial examination in 1905, and the encouragement of local self-government in

1906. These new policies were designed to lay the foundation for the establishment of constitutional rule which was expected to start in 1908. Since the education reform was the first and the only late Qing reform that cast a profound influence in northeast Guangdong, this chapter will center on local elites’ performance in the education reform.

II. Drafting the Education Reform in Guangdong

In September 1901, upon the appeal of senior officials like Zhang Zhidong and Liu

Kunyi, the court issued an edict that required all provinces to transform traditional

20 About how Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi Zhai made the decision upon the encouragement of the Japanese, see Zhai Xin, Jindai yilai riben minjian shewai huodong yanjiu (Japanese civic diplomatic activities in the early modern period) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2006), 102; Kong Xiangji, “Zhang Zhidong zai gengzinian de diwangmeng” (Zhang Zhidong’s dream of becoming an emperor in 1900), Xueshu yuekan 8 (2005): 92-102. 92

academies into new-style schools.21 To ease the concern of students who were suspicious about the new-style school diploma, the Boards of Personnel and Rites further anounced that the graduates of new-style schools would be granted traditional titles.22 With the Qing government’s endorsement, governor-generals in coastal provinces established more than twenty new-style schools from 1902 to 1904. In Guangdong, the governor-general Tao Mo

陶模 (r. 1900-1902) had petitioned the court to replace the examination system with the new-style school system as early as January 1901.23 However, since Tao Mo had numerous conflicts with the governor De Shou (德壽) and was impeded by the latter in many aspects,

Guangdong did not make much progress in the early stage of the reform. After Tao died in

1902, Cen Chunxuan (岑春煊 r. 1903-1905; 1907) was appointed governor-general of

Guangdong. Cen had tried to cultivate reformers before the 1898 Reform. As early as 1895,

Cen had joined the Learn-to-be-Strong Society organized by Kang Youwei.24 Although the reform was short-lived, Cen, as many other astute high-ranking officials, did not abandon his support for the reformers. During the Boxer Uprising of 1900, Cen was the first senior official who arrived in Beijing in response to the court’s call to save the emperor.

Contemporary reformers speculated that Cen, as the supporter of southeast reformers, had

21 See the edict in Guangxu chao donghua lu (The Donghua record of the Guangxu reign) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1958), 4719. About the role Zhang Zhidong played in the education reform, see William Ayers, Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).

22 Xuetang xuanju guli zhangcheng (Regulation on the encouragement of selection through new-style schools) (1901.12), in Zhongguo jindai jiaoyushi ziliao huibiao: Xuezhi yanbian (A compilation of materials on education history: The evolution of education administrative system), ed. Chen Yuanhui (Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 2007), 38.

23 Guan Xiaohong, “Tao Mo yu Qingmo xinzheng”(Tao Mo and the New Policies Reform in the late Qing), Lishi yanjiu, 6 (2003): 72-89.

24 Tang Zhijun, Wuxu bianfa renwu zhuangao, vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1982), 713-719.

originally plotted to overthrow the dowager.25 Discerning that the situation was turning against the reformers, Cen changed his mind. His quick response to the government’s call, ironically, gained him trust from the dowager.

Backed by the dowager, Cen not only seized the position of the governor-general of Guangdong but was also able to implement new policies without much opposition. After arriving in Guangdong, Cen recruited many reformers as his private advisers. In October

1903, four months after Cen assumed the position, he sought the court’s permission to establish the Department of Education Affairs in Guangdong and Guangxi (兩廣學務處

Liangguang xuewuchu). To enhance the authority of the department, Cen appointed his close advisor Zhang Mingqi (張鳴岐 1875-1945) to direct the department and granted the department enormous power.26

According to the department regulations, “the department is authorized to intervene in all the education affairs in Guangdong and Guangxi, either direct or indirect.”27 In his proposal to Cen, Zhang further suggested that the department should bear the responsibility to “force the counties which should establish new-style schools but have not done so to construct one” and to “provide instructions to the counties which aspire to establish new- style schools but do not have relating expertise.”28 Moreover, to prevent nonfeasance of

25 Contemporary reformer Zhang Taiyan had firstly put forward this argument. See Sang Bing, “Gengzi qinwang qianhou de Cen Chunxuan yu baohuanghui,” Jindaishi yanjiu 6 (2001): 67-70.

26 About the process of the establishment of the department, see Xu Wenyong, “Liangguang xuewuchu yange kaolue” (The investigation of the evolution of the department of education affairs in Guangdong and Guangxi), Lishi jiaoxue 18 (2008): 67-73.

27 “Yangcheng xinwen” (News of Guangzhou), Huazi ribao, October 19, 1903, 3.

28 Zhang Mingqi’s letter to Cen was collected in Guangxu guimao zhengyi congshu (Compilation of political letters in 1903), ed. Deng Shi, vol. 28 of Jindai Zhongguo shiliao congkan xubian (Continuation of the series of historical documents on modern China) ed. Shen Yunlong (Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1976), 411. 94

local officials and non-cooperation of the traditional gentry, the regulations stipulated that the provincial director had the power to dismiss officials who did not actively engage in the promotion of the new-style education. And if the “evil gentry” (劣紳 lieshen) tried to impede the construction of new-style schools, the governor-general would impose heavy penalties as soon as the case was reported and verified.29 This regulation demonstrated the government’s interest in directly intervening in local education affairs, which previously had been mainly under the leadership of local gentry.

The regulations also disclosed that the government’s motivation for promoting education had greatly shifted. According to the regulations, the reform would be finished through three steps. In the first stage, all the counties should prepare for the establishment of public elementary schools and preliminary vocational schools. In the second stage, elementary schools and vocational schools would be widely founded. At the same time the government would encourage the development of private elementary schools. Finally, middle schools and higher-level vocational schools would follow. Each step, according to the aggressive plan, should be accomplished within one year. By implementing the plan, the government hoped to “improve the intellectual level of the majority of people,” which, according to the government, was crucial “to the strength of a country.”30

By focusing on elementary and vocational education and regarding state- strengthening as the primary goal of education, this plan manifested a spirit different from that of the traditional education. In the late imperial period, for government officials, the

29 “Liangguang xuewuchu zhangcheng” (Regulation of the department of education affairs in Guangdong and Guangxi), Lingdong ribao, December 28-29, 1903, 4.

30 “Liangguang xuewuchu zhangcheng,” Lingdong ribao, December 18, 1903, 4. 95

establishment and expansion of official academies was seen as an achievement of the officials in civilizing local society. For local communities, the investment in education would bring direct benefits – the chance of upward mobility and the accompanying tax privilege. Because of these potential interests, both officials and local communities were willing to invest in official and community education institutions.

The benefit of the new-style education, however, was initially obscure. Although the government promised to grant new-style school graduates traditional titles, how the titles would serve as a stepping stone to officialdom was unclear. The government also stressed the importance of the vocational education. But in rural communities where modern industry had barely developed, vocational education was of little use to local people. Lastly, the regulation highlighted that the enhancement of the national strenghth would be the primary goal of education. Local gentry might have no dissent over the objective of state-strengthening. But the plan, without illustrating how the strengthening of the state would be related to the increase of local interests, as the following part will demonstrate, could be of little attraction to local gentry.

The Regulations demonstrated the government’s ambition in seizing direct control over local educational affairs and also to advance national interests through the education reform. However, the provincial government, which itself was running on financial fumes, lacked the necessary resources and expertise to support the reform. As a result, the government still had to rely on the local gentry to implement the reform. In the beginning of 1904, the Provincial Department of Education Affairs required all prefectures and counties in Guangdong to establish a Bureau of Education Affairs (學務公所 Xuewu

gongsuo) to make preparation for the construction of new-style schools. The bureau was to be semi-autonomous and semi-official according to the government’s design.

On the one hand, the provincial government clearly indicated that local officials and gentry had to raise funds and organize the bureaus by themselves. Since the bureaus were self-reliant, they enjoyed much power in self-governing. The leaders of the bureaus were all elected by local gentry themselves.31 On the other hand, the government attempted to strengthen its control of the bureaus by incorporating them into the formal administrative system. According to the regulations, the bureaus were the agencies of the Provincial

Department of Education Affairs and the bureau officers were also formal employees of the government who were supposed to be paid by the county government.32 Although the bureau members had the right to elect bureau leaders, the final appointment of the bureau heads had to be approved by the provincial government.

Every bureau was granted an official seal, which was accompanied by the power to intervene officially in education affairs all over its respective county. Accordingly, the bureau shouldered the responsibility to assist the government to fulfill the target of education reform.33 As semi-autonomous organizations which were funded and organized by the local gentry, the bureaus were similar to traditional local institutions like the

Rehabilitation Bureau. But the government, by granting the bureaus semi-official status,

31 Panyu xian xuzhi (Panyu county gazetteer) (1931), vol. 11: “Xuexiao” (Schools) (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2003), 1-2. In Xu Wenyong, “1904-1906 Guangdong chaojia diqu xinshi zhouxian xuewu jigou: Xuewugongsuo” (The education institutions in the Chaozhou and Jiaying areas: Bureau of Education Affairs), Lishi jiaoxue 22 (2011): 41.

32 “Liangguang xuewuchu zhangcheng,” Lingdong ribao, December 29, 1903, 4.

33 Ibid. 97

was trying to make the bureaus more controllable partners which were expected to more effectively answer the call of the government.

The government’s open encouragement of education reform and its endorsement on the Bureau of Education Affairs stimulated both traditional gentry and new elites to participate in the reform. The former group in the reform saw the chance to continue their leadership in the political change while the latter desired to take this opportunity to enhance their social standing. The initiation of the reform thus was quite smooth under the collective efforts of the two groups of elites. However, the different expectations of different groups of elites determined that their collaboration would not last long. By focusing on three major towns in Jiaying prefecture, the following sections will illustrate in detail how the two groups of elites responded to the reform cohesively in the beginning but soon split because of their different concerns.

III. Reformers in the Prefectural Seat – The Political Center

The reform-minded elites in Jiaying prefecture, like Huang Zunxian and Qiu

Fengjia, were all attentively watching the development of the situation upon Cen

Chunxuan’s arrival in Guangdong. In March 1904, only one month after the provincial government commanded the local gentry to promote new-style education, Huang Zungeng

(黃尊庚), the cousin of Huang Zunxian, submitted two petitions to the governor-general and the prefect separately. In the petition to the governor-general, Huang Zungeng asked for permission to establish an Association for Overseas Studies (遊學公會 Youxue gonghui) for the purpose of organizing students to learn pedagogy in Japan.34 In the petition

34 Shenbao, March 10, 1904. 98

to the prefect, he sought permission to organize the Bureau of Education Affairs in

Jiaying.35

Given the close relationship between Huang Zunxian and Cen Chunxuan, it was not surprising that the Huang lineage responded so quickly to the provincial command.

Both Huang Zunxian and Cen Chunxuan joined the Learn-to-be-Strong Society in 1895 and supported Kang Youwei in the 1898 Reform. In 1903, when Cen Chunxuan arrived in

Guangdong, Huang, through his friend, reminded Cen to prepare for the change of the situation rather than merely serving his duty as the governor-general. Cen personally wrote back to Huang to express his gratitude to the suggestion. 36 Huang Zunxian’s intimate relationship with the governor-general undoubtedly gained him an advantageous position in the reform. His cousin’s petitions were immediately approved by the government. Cen

Chunxuan also highly praised Huang Zungeng’s interests in learning pedagogy in Japan and even published his response in the newspaper.37

In April 1904, as soon as Huang Zungeng’s petition was approved, Huang Zunxian organized the Promote Education Committee (興學會議所 Xingxue huiyisuo) in the prefectural seat to prepare for the formal establishment of the Bureau of Education

Affairs.38 The Committee started smoothly and attracted the gentry in all 36 towns of the prefecture to join. The attendees then elected 40 members and chose Huang Zunxian as the

Committee chair. During the meeting, Huang drafted a regulation, stressing that the

35 Lingdong ribao, March 31, 1904.

36 See Sangbing, “Gengzi qinwang qianhou de Cen Chunxuan yu baohuanghui,” 73.

37 Shenbao, March 10, 1904.

38 Lingdong ribao, May 2, 1904. 99

Committee was set up in response to the government’s call for promoting the new-style education. The local gentry thus “had the obligation” to actively participate in relating affairs and reform local education according to the plans drafted by the government.39

Huang’s emphasis on the state’s requirement suggests that the state’s command was still the primary impetus that drove the local gentry to participate in the education reform.

Though the benefits of the reform were vague, the local gentry, who had rich experience in appropriating the connections with the orthodox culture to adorn their power, would not refuse the chance to participate in an officially recognized education committee.

Meanwhile, the influence and resources possessed by the Huang lineage also contributed to the smooth start of the committee. The Huang lineage, relying on the fortune accumulated through running pawn shops in the 1860s and also through the lineage members’ distinguished performances in the imperial examination, had become a leading lineage by the late nineteenth century. As discussed in Chapter I, Huang Zunxian’s grandfather was a leader in the Post-Taiping reconstruction. Since the 1870s, the Huang lineage, together with the Liang and Zhang lineages, had institutionalized their leadership by controlling local public bureaus like the Rehabilitation Bureau and the militia. These bureaus possessed enormous power in the management of public affairs as well as in the collection and allocation of public funding.40 As the leader of such an influential lineage,

Huang Zunxian’s appeal unsurprisingly received wide support among local gentry. Huang

Zunxian also utilized the resources he controlled to facilitate the operation of the committee.

39 Ibid.

40 The Huang lineage maintained its leadership position until well into the early twentieth century. Two pieces of news in Shenbao disclosed that when bandits besieged the prefecture in 1902, it was Huang Zunmo, the younger brother of Huang Zunxian, who ran to the provincial government to seek help on behalf of the prefecture. Shenbao, April 23, 1902; Shenbao, May 14, 1902.

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He firstly lent a shop owned by his lineage to the bureau as the temporary office for free.

Since the committee had not obtained regular funding, Huang agreed to allocate the income of the militia, which was under the Huang lineage’s control, to cover the expense of the committee. Supported by the established Huang lineage, the committee did not encounter much difficulty in the beginning of the reform. Following the conference, the bureau printed and distributed the Imperial Authorized New-style School Reguation (欽定學堂章

程 Qinding xuetang zhangcheng) to the gentry in the 36 towns of the prefecture. The prints sold well among the local gentry. The gentry in Songkou town alone reserved eighty copies.

In September 1904, the Bureau of Education Affairs of Jiaying prefecture was formally established. Huang Zunxian was indisputedly elected as the director of the bureau.

Huang then published “A Letter to My Countymen” in East Guangdong Daily to further elaborate his plan of developing the new-style education in the prefecture.41 In his letter,

Huang firstly criticized the popular tendency of hastily transferring the traditional academy to new-style middle schools or colleges. Huang stressed that the popularization of elementary education, rather than the blind construction of higher level schools, should be prioritized in the development of new-style education. To corroborate his argument, Huang argued that the reason why Germany and Japan could defeat much bigger countries like

France and Russia was just because they had implemented the compulsory elementary education.

Huang then listed detailed suggestions about how to develop elementary education.

The first thing, according to Huang, was to train suitable teachers for new-style schools.

41 Huang Zunxian, “Jinggao tongxiang zhujunzi” (A letter to my countymen), Lingdong ribao, September 27, 1904. 101

Huang said he planned to establish a teachers’ school in the prefectural seat in the coming year. He requested all the bureau members to select two to three talented people from their towns to receive training in the school. Traditional textbooks like the Twenty-Four

Histories, according to Huang, should also be replaced by new-style textbooks edited by

Wenming Press (文明書局 Wenming shuju) or Nanyang Public School (南洋公學

Nanyang gongxue) in Shanghai.42 The subjects should cover all the “common knowledge”

(常識 changshi) that included ethics, Chinese, mathematics, history, geography, science, physic training, art and music. Huang said he would personally go to Shanghai to purchase books for those new subjects. This detailed plan demonstrated Huang’ strong aspiration to modernize China after the Western model.

Huang repeatedly emphasized the importance of developing elementary education since he believed that the increase of the literacy of the general public, rather than the upward mobility of a few social elites, was more crucial to the strengthening of a country.

And according to Huang, since powerful countries like Japan and Germany were all strengthened by imparting “common knowledge” to its people, China should follow suit and teach science or geography rather than the Twenty-Four Histories in class. With relevant knowledge and strong enthusiasm in promoting the reform, Huang was capable of providing training to teachers and purchasing textbooks for new-style schools.

However, to widely establish new-style schools in all the villages, Huang tried to to seek collaboration with the local gentry. In the suggestion to local gentry, Huang urged the gentry in the 36 towns each to set up a branch office of the Bureau of Education Affairs.

42 About the textbooks published by the major publishers in Shanghai, see Christopher A Reed, Gutenberg in Shanghai: Chinese Print Capitalism, 1876-1937 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 2005). 102

In the meanwhile, Huang asked the gentry to count the number of school-age children who were between 6 and 14. Huang assumed these two tasks would be easy for local gentry.

But when Huang discussed the preparation of the building and funding for the schools,

Huang became fully aware of its difficulty. Huang recognized that the task of selecting a proper location for the school could be difficult since few villages possessed any public building. Huang suggested that since the provincial government had encouraged the local gentry to appropriate temples as a resource for education, they could use the available temples as the school buildings. Huang also warned that local people should not object the decision since the provincial government had approved the appropriation of temples.

Funding was also a problem, as Huang could not identify any available source and had to count solely on the potential tuition income. Huang made a tentative fiscal budget for every school. According to his estimation, the yearly outlay of every school should be no more than 400 yuan. Huang estimated that every school could receive 240 yuan tuition payment from students. For the remaining deficit, Huang suggested the local gentry collect donations from rich families or appropriate the public funding of lineages and militias.

Huang finally concluded that if the local gentry could vigorously promote the reform, every town should be able to establish three to four new-style schools.

Despite Huang’s optimism, his letter discloses that local society did not possess sufficient resources for the development of new-style schools. Facing such a difficult situation, a reformer like Huang showed an inclination to sacrifice local interests for the sake of national interests. For Huang, if there was no sufficient resource for the development of the new-style education, it was acceptable to occupy local temples or to force rich families to make donations to the reform. This tendency of pursuing national

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interests at the cost of local interests was partially encouraged by the government which was eager to implement its reform policies and thus granted reformers more administrative power. The strong nationalist sentiment that was shared by senior officials like Huang also played an important role. As a former diplomat, Huang had witnessed the strength of the

West and had a deeper understanding of the humiliation the Chinese suffered in foreign countries. When Huang arrived in the United States in 1882 to assume the role of Chinese consul in San Francisco, the country had just issued the Chinese Exclusion Act. Huang wrote many poems to express his anger about the unequal treatment the Chinese received in America. 43 In his letter to the ambassador, Huang reiterated that “the political negotiation would be easier if China were as powerful as America.”44 It is thus of little surprise that Huang would make the state-strengthening agenda a high priority and was willing to achieve it at the cost of the local interests. Huang himself practiced what he preached by making generous contribution to the education reform, but his special experience made him an outlier. For the majority of the local gentry, including the members of the Huang lineage, to embrace the state-strengthening ideology was one thing. To sacrifice local interests for the sake of the national strength was another matter.

The nationalist thoughts and the reform agenda preached by Huang, endorsed by the state, did not encounter much opposition from the local gentry. However, it did not mean the local gentry would support the reform at the cost of their own interests. This is especially true for the established gentry in the prefecture seat. On the one hand, they had

43 Huang Zunxian, “Zhukepian” (Driving the guests out), in Renjinglu shicao jianzhu (The poems written in Renjinglu, with annotation) (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1981), 362.

44 Huang Zunxian, “Shang Zheng Zaoru bing di 31 hao” (The 31st report to Zheng Zaoru,” in Chen Zheng, “Huang Zunxian waijiao sixiang chutan” (A preliminary examination of the diplomatic thoughts of Huang Zunxian), Jindaishi yanjiu 2 (1991): 85.

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less contact with the external world and did not suffer the same humiliation as senior elites did. On the other hand, having institutionalized their leadership of local society since the

Taiping rebellion, the local gentry had no urgency to use the new ideology to justify their power and thus had less desire to sponsor the reform at a high cost. Consequently, when the prefect urged the local gentry to raise funds for a new-style middle school, the gentry in the prefectural seat showed little enthusiasm. In July 1904, under the pressure of the prefect and upon the call of Huang Zunxian, the local gentry held a meeting to discuss where and how to establish the school. Yet the conference did not achieve any meaningful outcome due to the strong disagreement over the issue.45

In late 1904, Huang Zunxian became seriously ill and was unable to direct the education reform anymore. Without his leadership, the construction of the school was halted. In January 1905, the gentry finally presented a construction plan to the provincial government. They asked the government to allocate the Temple of Literature (文祠 Wenci) and the Chongshi Academy (崇實書院 Chongshi shuyuan) to them as the site for the new school. The temple and the academy, however, had been already occupied by another group of gentry from neighboring commercial towns for a private middle school. The provincial government, consequently, declined the request on the reason that the other group of gentry had borrowed the buildings first and their school was running smoothly.46

Finally, upon the repeated urge of the prefect, the gentry in the prefectural seat decided to use the Confucian Temple (學宮 Xuegong) as the building for the new school.47

45 Lingdong ribao, July 1st, 1904, 3.

46 Lingdong ribao, January 28, 1905, 3.

47 Lingdong ribao, January 17, 1905, 3.

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But the local gentry, against Huang Zunxian’s expectation, lacked interest in making donations to the school. Instead, they petitioned the prefect to collect funds by selling lottery tickets to commoners.48 In March 1905, the middle school, called Jiaying Official

Middle School (嘉應官立中學堂 Jiaying guanli zhongxuetang), finally opened, though the scale of the school was much smaller than the aforementioned private middle school established by commercial town elites. Because of their slowness in constructing the school, they lost the trust of the local government and were challenged by the new elites in the management of local public affairs. The competition in the construction of the new-style schools marked the beginning of the conflict between the gentry in the prefecture seat and the elites in the commercial towns, which we will discuss in detail in part IV.

In general, the prefectural seat, as the political center, responded quickly to the state-initiated reform under the leadership of senior reformers like Huang Zunxian.

However, the established gentry, who had gained a legitimate and solid control of local society through existing public institutions, did not see much room for private gains in the reform. As a result, they lacked the motivation to invest heavily in the reform. In comparison, another group of elites from commercial towns, mainly constituted by rich merchants from less distinguished families and literati from weak lineages, were much more enthusiastic in sponsoring the reform projects. Having little vested interest in the existing power structure, they saw a chance to reshuffle the system and enhance their status in local society.

48 Lingdong ribao, March 18, 1905, 3. 106

IV. Xiyang Town – A Commercial Town Dominated by the Established Gentry

The Mei River flows from the Lianhua Mountain in the middle of Guangdong to the coastal area of east Guangdong, bringing prosperity to the towns along the river. Xiyang is a just a prosperous commercial town which benefitted from the waterborne transport provided by the Mei River. In the Ming dynasty, the center of the town formed around the

Mingshan Temple (明山宮 Mingshan gong), which was built in the Song dynasty and had been sanctified by the Song court. In the Ming dynasty, the three major lineages, the Chen,

Qiu, and Li linages, also developed around the Mingshan Temple. As early as 1424, the

Qiu lineage had produced the jinshi Qiu Jun (丘俊),49 who later built the first community school in the town and renovated the Mingshan Temple.50 In the late Ming, the area had produced several other title holders who, according to the town gazetteer, vigorously preached Confucian rituals and community pacts.51 In the early Qing dynasty, a market, called the Baigong market (白宮市 Baigong shi), began to form around the Mingshan temple. The lineages in the area continued to prosper and produce senior title holders in the Qing dynasty.52 Because of the support of these distinguished lineages, the Baigong market had become the cultural and economic center of the town by the Qianlong period.

Since the eighteenth century, however, as the trade between the mountainous and coastal areas became increasingly prosperous, another market called the Xiyang market

49 Jiaying zhouzhi, vol. 20: “Xuanju” (Examination degrees), 337.

50 Xiyang xiangzhi (Xiyang town gazetteer), “Guji” (Historical sites), “Xuexiao” (Schools), ed. Xiyang xiuzhiju (Xiyang: Meixian Xiyang zhongxue chubanbu, 1946), 28, 41.

51 Jiaying zhouzhi, vol. 23: “Renwu” (Celebrities), 400; Xiyang xiangzhi, “Xuexiao,” 41.

52 Xiyang xiangzhi, “Xuanjubiao” (Examination degrees), 44-46.

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(西陽市 Xiyang shi) also began to develop in the town. The Xiyang market was located along the Mei River and benefited greatly from trans-regional trading in the borderland.

The Huang lineage, residing not far from the market and possessing numerous shops in the market, quickly rose as an influential lineage in the town. In 1779, the gentry in the town, led by a juren from the Qiu lineage of Baigong and a xiucai from the Huang lineage of

Xiyang, decided to build a Temple of Literature and Martial Gods (文武帝廟 Wenwudi miao) next to prosperous Xiyang market.53

In 1892, the gentry from both markets, under the leadership of Chen Zhujun (陳竹

君) from Baigong, established a new Temple of Literature (文祠 Wenci) and planned a community school inside the temple.54 The fact that they chose to build the most important temple for the gentry class in the Xiyang market rather than the Baigong market suggests

Xiyang’s rise in importance.55 As an influential and rich lineage residing next to the market, the Huang lineage actively participated in the construction of both of the temples. However, the Huang lineage, failing to produce senior title-holders except several xiucai, had to follow the leadership of the gentry from the Baigong market in local public affairs. The

Xiyang market, similarly, though having surpassed the Baigong market in terms of prosperity, was not considered the center of the town. The different backgrounds and conditions of the elites in the two communities, as will be shown below, cast a great influence on their performance in the late Qing reform.

53 Ibid., “Guji,” 30.

54 Ibid., “Xuexiao,” 42.

55 About the changing positions of the two markets, see Zhong Jiahua, “Miaoyu, Zongzu, Shishen: Yi Meixian Xiyang diqu weili” (Temples, Lineages, and Gentry: Taking Xiyang as an example), Kejia yanjiu jikan, 1 (1998): 212-258.

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In February 1904, merely three months after the provincial government inaugurated the education reform, the gentry in Xiyang town organized an Education Association (教

育會 Jiaoyuhui).56 The gentry from the two markets in the town, as in the construction of the public temples during the middle Qing period, closely collaborated in the organization of the association. Two leaders of the association, Li Chenruo (黎辰若) and He Bocheng

(何伯澄), were from the Baigong market while the other leader Huang Fangji (黃訪箕) was from the Xiyang market. Among the three leaders, Li Chenruo was more distinguished in terms of degree and scholarly reputation. Li possessed the title of gongsheng (貢生 senior licentiate) and had studied in Guangya Academy (廣雅書院 Guangya shuyuan) established by the governor-general Zhang Zhidong (r. 1884-1889) in 1888. 57 Li’s experience earned him a good reputation among his fellow literati in Xiyang. He Bocheng, though lacking Li’s high status, also possessed the title of xiucai. Huang Fangji, unlike Li and He, had not earned any title. Yet as mentioned above, the Huang lineage was quickly rising by controlling the market of Xiyang and participating in the leadership of local public affairs. Being eager to expand its influence, Huang lineage would not miss the opportunity to play a part in the education reform.

According to a report published in East Guangdong Daily on March 12, 1904， the Education Association ran smoothly. The report mentioned that the association aimed

56 Lingdong ribao, March 12, 1904, 3.

57 When in Guangya Academy, Li Chenruo’s writing received high recognition from Liang Dingfen, the president of Guangya Academy and a leading reformer who had associated with Kang Youwei. See Lu Yin, “Zhang Zhidong yu wanqing ruxue: Yi Guangya shuyuan de chuangjian weili” (Zhang Zhidong and late Qing Confucianism: Taking the construction of Guangyang Academy as an example), in Songshan luntan wenji, ed. Du Weiming (Shanghai: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 2012), 283-305.

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at improving elementary education and promoting handicraft industry and forestry in the town. During the Spring Festival, the association organized several public lectures to propagate the reform agenda, which, according to the report, attracted a large audience.

The association also set up a newspaper reading room in the Temple of Literature. The funding of the reading room came from the rent income of the militia bureau. The report also mentioned that the idea of setting up the reading room in the temple had been objected by some conservative gentry. The organizers, however, were able to persuade the opponents by quoting Li Hongzhang’s remark that “newspaper reading should be encouraged everywhere.” 58 As in previous public activities, Li and He, as the representatives of the title holders from the Baigong market, tended to play a dominant role in the association. In the reports about the association, the names of Li and He always came before Huang. The plans and lectures, also, were always drafted by Li or He. In March

1904, the provincial government requested all counties to send literati to Guangzhou to receive training in the management of new-style schools. Li Chenruo successfully gained his son the chance to study in Guangzhou.59

However, the cooperation among the gentry from the two markets did not last long.

On April 2nd, the East Guangdong Daily published another report, disclosing that the

Education Association had almost dissolved. According to the report, Li and He decided to quit the Education Association in order to pursue personal careers in other new-style schools and thus lacked time to serve in the association. Paradoxically, the newspaper then introduced that Li and He had established a new association called the New Xiyang Town

58 Lingdong ribao, March 12, 1904, 3.

59 Lingdong ribao, July 6, 1904, 3.

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Association (新西陽學會 Xin Xiyang xuehui) in the Baigong market. The new association, claiming to promote the renovation of education, agriculture, industry, and business in

Xiyang, was quite similar to the previous Education Association. Although the new association was named the New Xiyang Town Association, it was headed primarily by the gentry of the Baigong market. The gentry of the Xiyang market did not participate in the new association at all.60 The newspaper published the full text of the opening remark delivered by He Bocheng in the opening ceremony of the new association:

China had been like a plate of sands for a long time. No matter whether in

the countryside or in the provincial capital, few people had public virtues or

the spirit of cooperation and even fewer of them were able to organize a

united association. … Last winter we established a newspaper reading room,

organized public lectures, and planned to build a new-style school. But it

turned out that few people were willing to participate in those activities. We

planned to build a new-style elementary school. But few elites made

donations to us. I felt so upset about this situation. … Why has China failed

in the competition with Westerners? This is because all the rising countries

have had associations to unite people while in China we do not have such

associations. Only if an association is organized, is it then possible to

coordinate the thoughts of different people and make them a collective. And

60 Lingdong ribao, April 2nd, 1904, 3; Lingdong ribao, April 23rd, 1904, 3.

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only if collectivism was widely spread, would people then actively

participate in public affairs mentioned above.61

The report suggests that the residents of the Xiyang market, where the original association was located, were not enthusiastic in the activities organized by the association.

The elites in the market also showed little willingness to fund the education reform. He

Bocheng ascribed the non-cooperation to the absence of collectivism and public virtues among the Chinese. This was a typical cliché that reform-minded elites tended to use to criticize those who refused to participate in the reform. But the fact that the elites of the

Xiyang market, mainly the leaders of the Huang lineage, after quitting the Education

Association, immediately embarked on the construction of a private new-style school, demonstrates that they were not indifferent to the reform.

Their later intense competition with the Baigong gentry over the leadership of local education affairs suggests that the contradiction among the two factions of the elites, rather than the shortage of popular support, was the primary reason behind the dissolution of the

Education association. As a social group which enjoyed much privilege in local public affairs, the gentry of the Baigong market still tried to play a leading role in the education reform. But the Huang lineage was not willing to submit to their leadership anymore. The reform, which aimed at establishing a set of new selection and evaluation standards, did provide the elites of the Huang lineage the opportunity to reshuffle the existing power structure and to claim leadership. Their later aggressive performance in the construction of a public new-style school further corroborates that their splitting with Li and He in the

61 Lingdong ribao, April 1st, 1904, 3. 112

Education Association was just the prelude for their attempt of establishing dominance in local society.

In November 1904, Li Chenruo, on behalf of the gentry in the town, submitted an application to the prefect for the construction of a new-style school. Though Li’s request was approved, he was unable to find a suitable site for the school. The Huang lineage of

Xiyang thus proposed to found an interim school in the Temple of Literature until Li picked a suitable location. In December, the interim school was opened and Lu Gengfu (盧耕甫

1870-1943), a native of Baigong and the son of an overseas merchant, was invited to preside over the school.

What happened in the following half year is unclear, but in May 1905 Lu Gengfu suddenly submitted a petition to the prefect, claiming that since the elites in the Xiyang market had donated more than 2000 yuan and two acres of land for the construction of the new-style school, the school should be formally established in Xiyang rather than Baigong.

In July, as a counterattack, Li Qiying (黎啓英), the son of Li Chenruo, requested that the government re-designate Baigong as the site for the new-style school. But, since the school in Xiyang had been opened for a while, the prefect declined Li Qiying’s request.62

Being in open conflict with the elites from Xiyang, Li Chenruo and his son decided to establish another new-style school in Baigong. To solve the problem of the shortage of funds, they proposed to levy a new commercial tax to subsidize the school. The government approved their application but the merchants in Baigong strongly resisted this proposal.

The merchants soon filed a lawsuit against Li, charging him for chasing private interests

62 Xiyang xiangzhi, “Xuexiao,” 42.

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under the name of establishing a public school. In March 1906 Li decided to open the school anyway. Unable to find a suitable building for the school, Li had to borrow a shop from one of his lineage members to use as the classroom. On the day of the school’s opening ceremony, however, the shop owner, suffering too much pressure from his peers in the market, fled the town. The lineage of the Zhong surname then looted the teachers’ office on purpose. Li Chenruo appealed to the prefect, but the prefect did not show any sympathy to him. Stressing that the opening of a new-style school would incur too many troubles if it was not supported by the majority of the local people, the prefect urged Li to shut down the school.63

In Xiyang, both traditional title holders and the commercial lineages showed strong interests in participating in the reform. Relying on his close relationship with the government, traditional gentry like Li Chenruo played a leading role in the beginning of the reform. Yet having little ability to mobilize resources to support the reform, Li was completely marginalized in the later stage of the reform. The Huang lineage had suffered from the absence of senior title-holders inside the lineage. The education reform provided them a chance to defy the cultural authority of the title holders. The lineage thus showed strong interest in supporting the reform at all costs. It not only provided space and funding for the Xiyang Public Elementary School, but also sold public properties and collected

40,000 taels to establish the largest private lineage school in the county.64 By generously investing in the reform, the Huang lineage obtained the trust of the government and became

63 Ibid.

64 Dongfang zazhi, 5 (1905), 6651; Huang Fangji, introduction, Jigong yiji (1924). In Zhong Jiahua, “Shishen, zongzu, zongjiao yu qingmo minchu chaojia diqu jiaoyu de fazhan” (Gentry, lineage, religion: The development of education in Chaozhou and Jiaying areas in the late Qing and early Republican periods), Kejia yanjiu jikan, 1 (2001): 31-57.

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the legitimate interpreter of the reform ideology. As the new agent of the government, the

Huang lineage successfully excluded the Baigong gentry from leadership positions in local public affairs. The lineage continued to enjoy the benefit from the investment in the education reform in the Republican period. Huang Fangji, the founder of the two new-style schools in Xiyang, seized the position of the head of the Division of Business in the first

Republican government. The offspring of the lineage, owing to the new-style education they received,65 made great achievements in commercial and military activities during the

Republican period. In the 1930s, the lineage produced three divisional commanders of the

Nationalist army, with one of them assuming the position of the garrison general in Jiaying prefecture.

The success of the Huang lineage was due to its flexibility and its ardent support of the reform. But it must be stressed that the Huang lineage had accumulated much wealth and established itself as an influential and populous lineage since the middle Qing.

Therefore, the reform just provided the lineage an opportunity to use new cultural resources to decorate its power and to consolidate its control of local communities. In the neighboring commercial town, Songkou, another group of elites from weak lineages were also actively engaging in the reform. Though they also gained the trust of the government by funding the reform, they did not successfully establish leadership over local society through the reform itself.

65 The lineage head Huang Fangji set up special trusts to fund lineage members who were admitted by new- style schools. Some of the students relied on lineage funds to purchase advanced degrees in metropolitan areas. See Zhong Jiahua, “Miaoyu, Zongzu, Shishen: Yi Meixian Xiyang diqu weili,” 212-258.

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V. Songkou Town – A Commercial Town with Migrants as the New Force

Songkou town was located at the junction of Mei River and Songyuan River (松源

河), a river that connects west Fujian with east Guangdong. As early as the Song dynasty, the two rivers had become an important water route for the smuggling of coastal salt to the mountain region. In the Jiajing period, to attack smuggling activities, the government legitimized the salt trading between West Fujian and East Guangdong and set up an inspection bureau in Songkou,66 making Songkou a prosperous commercial town since the late Ming. The Li lineage of Songkou benefited from the salt and timber trading along the

Mei River. As is discussed in Chapter I, the lineage produced a jinshi Li Shichun as early as 1628. Li had flexibly collaborated with different regimes in the Ming-Qing transition and well maintained the influence of his lineage during the political turbulence. It was said one powerful branch of the Li lineage had built ten grandiose round dragon houses and set up numerous lineage trusts during the dynastic transition.67 In the early Qing dynasty, the

Li lineage became the most populous lineage in the town. Moreover, the lineage produced another jinshi and six juren in the Qing dynasty,68 laying down a solid foundation for the lineage’s continuous influence on local society. The lineage was also successful in business activities. According to a survey done in the 1940s, the Li lineage controlled 364 shops in the Songkou market, which accounted for 34 percent of all the shops in the town.69 The second populous lineage in the town was the Liang lineage. The Liang lineage had also

66 Jiaying zhouzhi, vol. 15: “Bingfang” (Defense), 240.

67 Fang Xuejia, Weibuzhu de weilongwu: Yuedong guzhen songkou de shehui bianqian, 23-24, 57-58.

68 Fang Xuejia, Weibuzhu de weilongwu, 54.

69 Ibid., 182.

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produced several juren since the Qianlong period.70 Controlling 17 percent of all the shops in the town, the Liang lineage was next to the Li lineage in terms of power and influence in the Songkou market.71 By the end of the Qing dynasty, the Li and Liang lineages controlled the community school, the public granaries and most temples in the town.

From the late nineteenth century, however, the influence of another group of elites had greatly expanded in the town. They were overseas merchants who had migrated out of the town since the middle nineteenth century. Since Songkou town is near the junction of the Mei River and the Han River, the latter of which directly flows from east Guangdong to the sea, the residents in the town more frequently went overseas to make a living during times of difficulty. Since the middle nineteenth century, as bandits activities ravaged rural areas and also as Shantou became a treaty port, many people, especially those from poor families, chose to seek a better life overseas. According to Wen Zhonghe’s survey in the late 1890s, tens of thousands of Songkou people were making a living in Southeast Asia and at least a dozen of them became millionaires.72 Xie Rongguang and Zhang Yunan, mentioned in Chapter I, were the most successful Songkou merchants in Southeast Asia.

Xie Rongguang’s father Xie Shuangyu (謝雙玉) arrived in Pontianak in the 1840s and Xie

Rongguang himself was born in the Dutch East Indies. Zhang Yunan migrated to Batavia in the 1860s and benefited from the collaboration with other Hakka merchants like Xie

70 Liang Dexin, “Guangdong Meixian Songkou zhen Shankou cun, Taidong cun minsu diaocha” (Investigation of the popular culture in Shankou villiage and Taidong village of Songkou town) Accessed Jan 8, 2015. http://www.hakkaonline.com/thread-33647-1-1.html

71 Fang Xuejia, Weibuzhu de weilongwu, 182.

72 Wen Zhonghe, Qiuzaiwozhai ji, in Fang Xuejia, Xie Yiqiao, Xie Liangmu yu Sun Zhongshan lingdao de minzhu geming (Xie Yiqiao, Xie Liangmu and the democratic revolution led by Sun Yat-sen) (Guangzhou: Jinan daxue chubanshe, 1991), 2.

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Rongguang and Zhang Zhenxun. Both of the merchants made a great fortune by investing in plantations, banks, or mines. The unfriendly policies toward the Chinese in the Dutch

East Indies, however, pushed them to seek protection from the Chinese government, which happened to be actively attracting investment from overseas Chinese at the time. The arrival of Huang Zunxian in Singapore in 1892 further provided them an opportunity to strengthen their connection with the Chinese government. Through Huang’s recommendation, both Xie Rongguang and Zhang Yunan had served as the Qing consuls in Penang and vigorously invested in the reform projects in China. As early as 1898, Xie

Rongguang had planned to donate forty thousand taels to build a new-style school in

Songkou,73 though the school did not open because of the political turmoil in that year. In

1904, when the government openly appealed to overseas merchants to invest in new-style schools, the two merchants quickly responded to the call.

In January 1904, Xie Rongguang, Zhang Yunan, and Zhang Yunan’s younger brother each donated 5000 taels to support the construction of a new-style elementary school in Songkou.74 The construction was initiated by the gentry from the Rao, Li, Liang, and Wen lineages, with Rao Fushang (饒芙裳 1857-1941) as the leader of the project.75

Rao Fushang was a juren and a renowned scholar on the evidential study. Though possessing a title of juren, Rao Fushang came from a weak lineage which had limited influence in the town. What distinguished Rao from other gentry, however, was his close

73 Qiu Fengjia had heard of Xie Rongguang’s plan of funding a new-style school in 1898 and published the story of Xie on Tiannan xinbao, which was established by Qiu Shuyuan as a platform to propagandize reformist thoughts. Accessed Jan 8, 2015. http://kenglian46.blogspot.com/2012/05/blog-post_11.html

74 Lingdong ribao, January 16, 1904, 3.

75 Lingdong ribao, January 15, 1904, 3.

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relationship with Xie Guosheng (謝國生), the younger brother of the rich merchant Xie

Rongguang. Xie Guosheng’s father and brothers were all doing business in the Dutch East

Indies while Xie was left at home to take care of the lineage affairs. Xie Guosheng admired

Rao Fushang’s scholarship and invited Rao to teach his two sons, Xie Yiqiao (謝逸橋

1874-1926) and Xie Liangmu (謝良牧 1884-1931). After Xie Guosheng died, Rao

Fushang, as the instructor of the young Xie brothers, further strengthened his relationship with the Xie lineage. In 1900, the Xie brothers, after meeting the reformers in Hong Kong, decided to organize a militia in Songkou to prepare for the potential uprising. Rao Fushang had vigorously assisted the Xie brothers in relating affairs and assumed the position of the director of the militia.76 Relying on the close relationship with the Xie lineage, the major funder of the new-style school, Rao Fushang naturally became the leader of the education reform in Songkou.

The generous donation provided by overseas merchants reduced the economic burden caused by the reform and eased the potential tension among local gentry. However,

Rao Fushang and the leaders of the Li and Liang lineages soon ran into conflicts over the reallocation of local public resources during the reform. In a proposal to the prefect, Rao

Fushang requested to utilize the old academy established by the Li lineage as the site for the new-style school. His application was immediately approved, but Rao later found that the old academy was too narrow for a new-style school. He then sought the permission to expand the school from the academy to the neighboring Ningfeng Temple (寧豐寺

Ningfeng si). Ningfeng Temple, however, was a community temple that had been mainly

76 About the relationship between Rao Fushang and the Xie lineage, see Fang Xuejia, Xie Yiqiao, Xie Liangmu yu Sun Zhongshan lingdao de minzhu geming, 2-3, 10-11.

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under the control of the Liang lineage. The ancestral hall and the family tombs of the Liang lineage were all located near the temple.77 This proposal, unsurprisingly, was strongly opposed by the Liang lineage.78 Under the pressure from the Liang lineage, Rao finally gave up taking over the temple. In June 1904 Rao Fushang decided to begin the construction in the old academy. To prevent potential attacks from the Liang lineage, Rao sought official certification before he started the construction and requested the government send soldiers to provide protection.79 Rao’s circumspection soon proved to be necessary, as not long after the construction began, several local bullies, claiming that the construction would ruin the fengshui (風水 Geomantic omen) of the area, compelled workers to stop the project. The bullies retreated after the workers showed them the certification.80 The relationship between the school leaders and the Liang lineage, however, had started to deteriorate.

Another incident in 1905 led to the escalation of the conflicts among Songkou elites who had collaborated in the beginning of the reform. In the summer of 1905, Qiu Fengjia, who had became acquainted with Xie Rongguang when he visited Southeast Asia in 1900, specially visited the Xie lineage in Songkou on his way to Guangzhou. Relying on his connection with the prefect, Qiu then helped Rao Fushang organize the Songkou Bureau of Education Affairs, making Rao the official leader of the education reform. Rao Fushang

77 Chen Yangming, “Songkou zhongxue bashinian” (The eighty years of Songkou Middle School), in Meixian wenshi ziliao, vol. 6-10, ed. Guangdong sheng Meixian wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui (Meixian: Wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, 1993), 58-61.

78 Lingdong ribao, March 17, 1904, 3.

79 Lingdong ribao, June 30, 1904, 3.

80 Ibid.

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and his followers later made the Tianhou Temple (天後宮 Tianhou gong), another community temple under the control of the Li lineage, the office of the bureau.81 Their ignorance of the local established gentry severely provoked the leaders of the Li and Liang lineage, especially Liang Xin (梁鑫), a xiucai of the Liang lineage. Liang Xin was one of the initiators of the new-style school in Songkou and had received training in the management of new-style schools in Guangzhou. As both a renowned scholar and the leader of the major lineage, Liang could not accept being marginalized in the reform. With the reason that Rao occupied the public temple without gaining community consent, Liang then launched several lawsuits against Rao. Being dissatisfied with the partiality of the prefect toward Rao, Liang even appealed to the provincial government.82 In August, when

Rao Fushang tried to register the Songkou Bureau of Education Affairs, the provincial government declined his request, indicating that more new-style schools should be encouraged but more bureaus of education affairs at the town-level were not necessary.83

In December 1906, the construction of the elementary school was completed. The school was named Songkou Public School (松口公學 Songkou gongxue) and was open to all the lineages in the town. Upon Rao’s request, the prefect allowed the school to collect funding from two local associations, the Imperial Examination Association (科舉會 Keju hui) and the Security Bureau (安良局 Anliang ju), both of which had been under the collective control of the major lineages in the town. Since Rao’s two students and the two

81 Lingdong ribao, June 14, 1905, 3.

82 Lingdong ribao, August 1, 1905, 3. Lingdong ribao, August 23, 1905, 3.

83 Lingdong ribao, September 4, 1905, 3.

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sons of Xie Guosheng had just finished two-year training in pedagogy in Japan, Rao

Fushang appointed the four young men as the proctor and teachers of the school.84 The literati of the Liang and Li lineages, however, did not get any position in the school. This arrangement further offended the Liang and Li lineages and finally led to a tragedy in 1908.

At the end of 1907 the school borrowed the corridor of Ningfeng Temple as a lodge for school workers. On April 30th, 1908, when students were in a class, a fire suddenly started in the west part of the campus, which was just next to the Ningfeng Temple. Chaos ensued and the people who gathered around the temple broke into the school and set fire to both the campus and the Ningfeng Temple. The mob then beat the proctor and one instructor from the school, the latter of whom had his legs broken due to the incident. The main building of the school was also burned to the ground.85

The school suspected that the fire was deliberately started by the pilgrims to the

Ningfeng temple, though the pilgrims claimed that the fire was an accident caused by the incense in the temple. After a two-month investigation, the prefect caught the arsonists, who confessed to the crime but argued that the action was in response to students in the school who had destroyed the statues of gods in the temple.86 It was unclear if the students had really been the “iconoclasts,” but the fact that only the members of the Li and Liang lineages participated in the crime suggests that the contradiction between the school leaders and the two established lineages might be the real reason for the tragedy. To compensate for the school’s losses, the provincial government decided to confiscate the temple and

84 See Chen Yangming, “Songkou zhongxue bashinian,” 60-61.

85 Ibid.

86 Lingdong ribao, June 27, 1908, 3.

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granted it to the school. But the school did not reopen until overseas merchants made a new round of donation in the end of 1908.87

Although the school leaders finally won the lawsuit against the two lineages under the support of the provincial government, their attempt of establishing leadership by investing in the education reform was not as smooth as that of the Huang lineage in Xiyang.

From the construction to the operation of the school, Rao Fushang and the Xie lineage were constantly defied by the Li and Liang lineages in the town. Their awkward situation was determined by the weakness of the Xie lineage. Although the Xie lineage had accumulated a great fortune through its overseas trading activities, the lineage was still much smaller and weaker than the Li and Liang lineages. The population of the Xie lineage was only one tenth of the population of the Li lineage and one seventh of the Liang lineage.88 The

Xie lineage had not produced any title holders in their history, which made it difficult for them to play a siginificant role in local public affairs. By providing generous financial support to the new-style school, the lineage did distinguish itself in the education reform.

However, the Xie lineage could not easily transfer their economic advantage to the dominance over local labors and resources which were still under the strict control of the local powerful lineages. When the Xie lineage provided extra funding for the reform, the lineage were still able to maintain their collaboration with other major lineages. But when the Xie lineage tried to reallocate local public resources, such as the land of the Ningfeng

Temple, or claim their leadership through formal institutions, they would unavoidably face the challenge from those established lineages. Unless the Xie lineage found a solution to

87 See Chen Yangming, “Songkou zhongxue bashinian,” 61.

88 Fang Xuejia, Weibuzhu de weilongwu, 17, 26, 128. 123

break the dominance of the powerful lineages, they could not reshuffle local power structure merely by sponsoring the new ideology.

VI. The Association of the New Gentry versus the Alliance of the Traditional Gentry

In regards to the competition with local powerful lineages, the merchants in commercial towns did not enjoy much advantage. But by establishing an inclusive alliance which absorbed new elites all over the prefecture and relying on their strong ability to raise funds, the commercial town elites gained the recognition from the government and enhanced their political influence in the prefecture seat. The establishment of Wuben

Middle School (務本學堂 Wuben xuetang) in the prefecture seat is a best example of the strength of this alliance of the new elites.

As early as the spring of 1903, the elites from the major commercial towns along the Mei River, under the leadership of Qiu Fengjia, had tried to establish a new-style middle school in the prefecture seat. As outsiders, the commercial town elites should have had difficulty obtaining a foothold in the political center which had been dominated by the several leading lineages, with Huang Zunxian’s lineage as the head. However, by allying with some literati and merchants who had been marginalized by the established gentry, the commercial town elites quickly established a school in the summer of 1904. The middle school was transformed from a missionary school called the Wuben China-West School

(務本中西學堂 Wuben zhongxi xuetang), which was initiated in 1902 by the German

Basel Mission and funded by a Chinese merchant Wu Dengchu (吳登初), the owner of

Wuben China-West Department Store ( 務本中西百貨商店 Wuben zhongxibaihuo

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shangdian) that mainly sold foreign goods.89 Through his business, Wu got acquainted with the missionaries in the prefecture. When the missionaries proposed to build a new-style school, Wu offered to provide funds for it. Another Chinese gentry Huang Mocun (黃墨

村 1877-1925) also joined in the founding of the school. Although Huang possessed a title of xiucai, he came from a declining family and had converted to Christianity.90 The school was completed in 1902. The collaboration of the two gentry and foreigners, however, was not smooth and incurred strong suspicion from the established gentry. In the summer of

1903, when the commercial town elites suggested the two gentry to terminate their partnership with the Basel Mission on the reason that education should be separated from missionary activities, the two gentry accepted the advice and agreed to collaborate with the commercial town elites instead.91 It is unclear how the commercial town elites persuaded the two gentry, but for the two gentry who were in a strained relationship with the local established gentry, the support provided by a group of external elites was undoubtedly attractive, especially given that the external elites were backed by both senior reform- minded officials and overseas merchants.

In a pamphlet about the school edited for the purpose of fundraising, twenty-four gentry were listed as the sponsors of Wuben Middle School.92 The constitution of sponsors

89 Leyu China-West School, ed., Jiaying Leyu zhongxi xuetang (Jiaying Leyu China-West School) (1903), 2.

90 Liu Yihong, Xunyun Panguifang: Pindu kedu renwen shengdi de qianshi jinsheng (Searching the aroma of Panguifang: Reading the past and present of the historical site in the core region of the Hakka) (Guangzhou: Guangdong gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 2012), 114-115.

91 Huang Xiquan, “Jiaying gongli Wuben xuetang muzhu xuefei xu” (A fundraising letter for Jiaying Public Wuben School), in Jiaying gongli Wuben xuetang gailiang zhangcheng (The revised regulation for Jiaying Public Wuben School) (Jiaying: n.p., 1904) 1-3.

92 Ibid., 4. 125

suggests the inclusiveness of the alliance of commercial town elites. The twenty-four sponsors came from seven different towns along the Mei River. Although some sponsors owned senior titles, at least half of them did not possess any title. Moreover, the twenty- four gentry came from different family backgrounds and few of them were from the established lineages. The four gentry who were listed as the leaders, for example, all came from weak lineages. Qiu Fengjia, the primary leader, was a native of Taiwan and had been back to Jiaying for only eight years. The Qiu lineage attempted to expand its influence after

Qiu Fengjia came back. But the Chen and Yang lineages, the dominant lineages in Qiu’s hometown, frequently launched armed fights against the Qiu lineage. Wen Zhonghe (溫仲

和 1849-1904), Qiu’s colleague in Tongwen School, though possessing a title of jinshi, was from a small lineage in Songkou too. Rao Fushang, the representative of overseas merchants of Songkou, was not distinguished in local public affairs until he became associated with the overseas merchants. Wen Hao, a merchant of Bingcun town, had purchased a title of juren and was assuming the director of China Telegram Bureau in Hong

Kong. Though the Wen lineage was a powerful lineage in Bingcun, Wen Hao came from a weak branch of the lineage. The majority of the other twenty gentry had similar backgrounds.

Probably because these newly rising elites had no vested interests in the existing social system, they were more enthusiastic in promoting the reform. In the summer of 1903, when the governor-general Cen Chunxuan had just arrived in Guangdong, the well- informed reformers in the commercial towns immediately submitted a petition to Cen, requesting permission to formally take over the missionary school and transform it to a new-style school. Being eager to promote the education reform in Guangdong, Cen

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Chunxuan approved their application.93 In January 1904, this group of elites, taking one step in advance, proposed to use the Temple of Literature and the neighboring Chongshi

Academy as the new site for the Wuben Middle School. Both of the temple and the academy were constructed by the local established gentry after the Taiping rebellion.

Despite the strong opposition from the established gentry, the provincial government approved their proposal.94 To show the government’s support, Cen Chunxuan sent Liu

Shiji (劉士驥 1857-1909), the investigator of education affairs and also the friend of Qiu

Fengjia, to visit the school and provide suggestions to school leaders in person. The government’s strong endorsement enhanced the legitimacy of the school and also provided the commercial town elites a shield from the attack by the local established gentry. To express their support for the government, the commercial town elites also exerted much effort to collect funding and improve the quality of the school. Although this group of elites encountered much difficulty in mustering support in local communities, they successfully obtained support from overseas Chinese by resorting to the nationalist rhetoric which had become popular in Southeast Asia at the turn of the twentieth century.

In the summer of 1904, after the government permitted the commercial town elites to build the Wuben Middle School in the new site of the Chongshi Academy, the commercial town elites organized a fundraising adtivity. Their target were overseas

Jiaying emigrants. Upon Liu Shiji’s invitation, Huang Xiquan (黃錫銓 1852-1925), a gentry from Dali town (大立鎮) and a former ambassador assistant in Japan and Peru,

93 Ibid., 2.

94 Lingdong ribao, January 28, 1905, 3.

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wrote the fundraising letter.95 Being familiar with the situation of overseas Jiaying people,

Huang was clear about how to gain trust of them by strengthening their common identity as the Hakka and how to arouse sympathy among them by stressing the pain overseas

Chinese were suffering. In the letter Huang first reiterated the popular narrative about the

Hakka identity. The narrative, as is mentioned in Chapter I, emphasized that the ancestors of the Hakka came from north China and the Hakka had successfully preserved the language and customs of the ancient Chinese. This narrative became increasingly popular at the turn of the twentieth century upon the preaching of Hakka reformers who resided in metropolitan areas. 96 Scholars generally agree that the Hakka literati preached the narrative mainly for the purpose to compete with other dialect groups in Guangdong.97

Huang Xiquan, however, did not highlight the distinctiveness of the Hakka over other dialect groups but emphasized that the Hakka was a distinguish subgroup of the Chinese.

As a “distinguish” subgroup which had successfully preserved Chinese culture, Huang stressed, the Hakka had the obligation to further glorify Chinese culture, especially when it was in danger. Huang then related the danger of Chinese culture to the pains overseas

Chinese were suffering. According to Huang, this suffering was the result of the weakening of Chinese culture, which was partially due to the loss of traditional culture and partially due to the failure of the Chinese to renovate Chinese culture in time. He highly praised the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies, who were constructing Confucius temples

95 Huang Xiquan, “Jiaying gongli Wuben xuetang muzhu xuefei xu,” 1-3.

96 Xu Xuzeng might be the earliest Hakka scholar who wrote the Hakka origin myth down in the early nineteenth century. But according to Chen Chunsheng, Hakka literati did not openly preach the narrative about the Hakka origin until the beginning of the twentieth century. See chapter 1 for a detailed discussion over the formation of the narrative of the Hakka identity.

97 Chen Chunsheng, “Diyu renting yu zuqun fenlei,” 55-67; Cheng Meibao, Diyu wenhua yu guojia rentong: Wanqing yilai Guangdong wenhuaguan de xingcheng, 66-96. 128

and promoting new-style education at the same time. Huang then stressed that both overseas Chinese and the Chinese in the mainland were integrated parts of the Chinese nation. To promote the status of the Chinese nation, all Chinese should share the responsibility of preserving and renovating Chinese culture. Huang then indicated the difficulty of the people in mainland China in raising funding for the education reform.

Overseas Chinese, according to Huang, were obligated to provide assistance to their countymen inside China; otherwise, Huang warned that, the offspring of all the Chinese, including the overseas Hakka population, would be “left in darkness” in the competition with other nations and the Chinese would be regarded as an inferior race.

This letter, by attributing the suffering of overseas Hakka people to the weakness of Chinese culture and the absence of modern education, directly related the education reform in mainland China to the interests of the overseas Hakka people. In comparison to the Hakka in mainland China, overseas Hakka were suffering from deeper discrimination by the foreign rulers. For them, the enhancement of the status of the Chinese was indeed an urgent need rather than empty ideological propaganda. The letter sold well among overseas Hakka since the Wuben Middle School received generous donations from overseas Hakka. With abundant funding, the school was able to hire more qualified teachers. The school not only invited notable scholars with traditional title to teach Chinese, but also hired a teacher graduating from an American university to teach English.98 The regulations and curriculum of the school became the model for many other new-style schools in the prefecture and the quality of its graduates was also well recognized. In 1905, the Guangdong Provincial Military Academy (廣東武備學堂 Guangdong wubei xuetang)

98 Jiaying gongli Wuben xuetang gailiang zhangcheng, 5.

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recruited fifty students from Jiaying prefecture, with fourteen of them having studied in

Wuben. 99 Although the local gentry, as mentioned above, established another middle school upon the pressure of the prefect, it could hardly compete with Wuben in terms of quality or influence.

The commercial town elites, under the name of building a new-style school, secured a tight foothold in the prefecture seat upon which they aggressively expanded their influence. Their action, however, seriously provoked the established gentry who had dominated public affairs in the prefecture seat. The Chongshi Academy is one example of how both sides fought for power in the prefecture. Although the academy was built under the leadership of the gentry in the prefecture seat, the commercial town elites successfully obtained permission to build Wuben Middle School in the academy. Local gentry had appealed to the provincial government against the decision. However, the commercial town elites successfully won the lawsuits under the protection of the provincial government. The litigation seriously harmed the relationship between the two groups of elites. None of the gentry from the major lineages in the prefecture seat joined the alliance of commercial town elites or participated in the construction of Wuben Middle School. When the commercial town elites invited distinguished local figures to endorse their fundraising letter, Huang Zunxian’s name did not show up on the list, though Huang was ardently promoting the education reform and heading the Bureau of Education Affairs at the time.

The conflict between the established gentry and the commercial town elites further escalated after Huang Zunxian’s death in March 1905. In May, the members of the Bureau of Education Affairs gathered again to elect a new director. The commercial town elites

99 Lingdong ribao, September 20, 1905.

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tried to promote Qiu Fengjia as the new chair of the Bureau. The gentry from the prefectural town, who had controlled local public institutions since the middle nineteenth century, refused this proposal. The members of Huang Zunxian’s lineage were especially disgruntled given that they provided the space for the bureau and allocated the militia funding to facilitate the running of the bureau. It is unclear how the local established gentry and commercial town elites negotiated with each other in the following four months. But in September 1905, the Huang lineage forced the Bureau of Education Affairs to move out from the shop owned by the lineage and stopped to provide funding for the bureau. Some bureau members had planned to borrow the examination hall as the office, but their application was declined by the prefect. As a compromise, the prefect allowed them to use the Temple of Literature.100 In January 1906, Yang Yuan (楊沅), a jinshi from one of the five major lineages in the prefectural seat and also the founder of the reformist newspaper

East Guangdong Daily, was elected as the new bureau chair. 101 Having connections with both the traditional gentry and new elites, Yang was expected to better coordinate the interests of the two groups of elites. However, Qiu’s followers, especially some young students, were dissatisfied with the result of the election. To challenge the established gentry in the prefecture seat, Xie Yiqiao and Wen Jinghou (溫靖侯 1874-1916), both of whom were students of Rao Fushang in Songkou, openly requested Huang Zunmo (黃遵

謨), Huang Zunxian’s younger brother and the leader of local militia, to publicize the accounts of the militia. The two young men claimed that since the militia collected funding

100 Lingdong ribao, November 4, 1905.

101 Lingdong ribao, January 6, 1906.

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under the name of providing security to residents all over the prefecture, local people had the right to know how public funding was collected and allocated. Huang Zunmo disregarded their request and even refused to talk to them. The two young men had no way to make Huang submit. To retaliate Huang, they chose to beat Huang in the Lantern

Festival of 1906.102

The turmoil temporarily ended with Qiu Fengjia’s withdrawal from the political stage in Jiaying. In the spring of 1906, Qiu, accepting Cen Chunxuan’s invitation to assume the position of counselor in the Provincial Department of Education Affairs, left Jiaying.103

But the two factions of elites were not willing to take things lying down. In May 1906, the central government promulgated the Authorized Regulation on Promote Education Office

(奏定勸學所章程 Zouding quanxuesuo zhangcheng), requiring all counties to set up an office to take charge of the education reform. The Promote Education Office was more official than the previous Bureau of Education Affairs. The regulation stipulated that the director of the office, rather than being chosen through election, should be directly appointed by the county governor and be responsible to the provincial education inspector.104 This new regulation provided the commercial town elites an opportunity to seize control of the office. Rao Fushang, relying on his connection with the provincial

102 Fang Xuejia, Xie Yiqiao, Xie Liangmu yu Sun Zhongshan lingdao de minzhu geming, 32-34.

103 Zheng Xifu, Minguo Qiu Canghai xiansheng nianpu, 180.

104 “Zouding Quanxuesuo Zhangcheng” (Authorized regulation on Promote-Education-Offices), in Zhongguo jindai jiaoyushi ziliao huibian: Jiaoyu xingzheng jigou ji jiaoyu tuanti (Collection of the materials on Chinese early modern education: Education administrative institutions and education associations), ed. Zhu Youxian (Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 1993), 60. The regulation stipulated that the director of the office should be assumed by county school inspectors. Since school inspectors were all directly selected by county governments, it meant the office directors were directly appointed by county governments. About the nature of the office directors, see Liu Wei, “Guanzhi yu zizhi zhijian: Qingmo zhouxian Quanxuesuo shuping” (Between the official governance and self-governance: Research on prefecture and county Promo Education Office in late Qing), Jindaishi yanjiu 4 (2012): 103-106.

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government, replaced Yang Yuan and became the new director of the education institution in the prefecture.105 The gentry in the prefecture seat suffered from the administrative change. But the alliance of the commercial town elites, which had heavily relied on the protection of the reform-minded officials in the provincial government, was also quite vulnerable. In late 1906, Cen Chunxuan, the supporter of the new elites, was forced to leave his post as the governor-general after being defeated by Prince Yixin (恭親王奕訢 1833-

1898) and Yuan Shikai in the political struggle in the court. 106 The gentry from the prefectural seat regarded it as a great opportunity to take revenge on Qiu and his followers.

In early 1907, the gentry in the prefecture seat, uniting a group of senior gentry from the other four counties in the prefecture, submitted an appeal to the imperial court. All of these gentry possessed high-ranking titles and represented the established lineages in their own county. Huang Zunkai (黃遵楷 1858-1917), the youngest brother of Huang Zunxian, was the leader of this group of gentry.

Being clear that any connection with Kang Youwei would incur suspicion from the

Qing court, Huang Zunkai first charged Qiu Fengjia for colluding with Kang Youwei to launch the Self-independence Army (自立軍 Zilijun) Uprising in 1900 which was plotted to overthrow the rule of the dowager Cixi. Huang then indicated that Qiu’s enthusiasm in establishing schools was quite suspicious since new-style schools were usually the gathering place for revolutionaries. According to Huang, Qiu not only established two new- style schools in his hometown of Zhenping county, but also sent his relatives and students

105 Zhong Jiahua, “Shishen, Zongzu, Zongjiao yu Qingmo Minchu Chaojia diqu jiaoyu de fazhan,” 31-57.

106 Zhang Jian, “Dingwei zhengchao yu yubei lixian” (The political currents in 1907 and the preparation for the constitutional reform), Sichuan shifan daxue xuebao vol.21 no. 2 (1994): 123-127.

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to neighboring counties to setup numerous schools. Moreover, Qiu collected public funding to build the schools but named all the schools with his ancestor’s name “Chuangzhao” (創

兆) and attributed the honor he received to his own lineage. When Cen Chunxuan granted

Qiu a plaque to commend him for his contribution to the education reform, Qiu hung the honorable plaque in the ancestral hall of his own lineage. Based on Qiu’s activities, Huang concluded that it was highly possible that Qiu was recruiting rebels based on the academic network he had weaved.107 Besides submitting the appeal, the gentry published a pamphlet called Guangdong xuegun shuolue (廣東學棍說略 The Introduction of the Education-

Swindlers in Guangdong) to further attack Qiu and his allies. The book depicted Qiu and his followers as a group of crooks who used the education reform to chase private interests.108

The local gentry’s strong reaction suggests that the new elites did constitute a threat to the leadership of the established gentry. The commercial town elites, by establishing an inclusive alliance and receiving patronage from the government, gained an advantageous position in the education reform. But the forceful counterattack from the local established gentry demonstrates that they did not lose control of local society. They still strictly controlled local resources and maintained a close collaboration among each other in the face of the external threat.

107 Xu Bodong, “Yizong difang shishen mikong Qiu Fengjia zhongyao dangan shiliao de jieshao yu kaozheng” (The introduction and investigation of an important archive about the litigation between the local gentry and Qiu Fengjia), in Qiu Fengjia yanjiu 1984-1996 zhuanji (The collection of the studies on Qiu Fengjia, 1984-1996), ed. Wu Hongcong and Li Hongsheng (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1997), 316-329.

108 Qiyousheng, Guangdong xuegun shuolue (The Introduction of the education-swindlers in Guangdong) (1907). The introduction of the book is available on the Internet. Regretfully I did not get a chance to read the book. Accessed January 8, 2015. http://bbs.longmen.net/archiver/tid-60911.html

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Conclusion

The ideological conflict between the new elites and the traditional gentry had been regarded as the primary reason for the local resistance to the late Qing reform. The three cases in Jiaying prefecture, however, suggest that local leaders, no matter the traditional gentry or the new elites with commercial background, did not object the implementation of the late Qing reforms. Both groups showed willingness to participate in the reform in the hope of continuing their dominance or gaining recognition from the government.

However, as the reform moved forward, the conflict between different groups of elites was becoming increasingly acute.

As the three cases demonstrate, the evolution of the reform was to a great extent shaped by the power relationship in different settings. In all the three towns, the title- holders and merchants had closely collaborated in the beginning of the reform. However, the merchants demonstrated stronger ability in raising funds for new-style schools and thus received more trust from the government.

The endorsement from the government, nevertheless, not necessarily guaranteed the new elites an advantageous position in the competition with the traditional gentry. In

Xiyang, the merchant lineage, the Huang lineage under the leadership of Huang Fangji, was successful in the competition since the lineage, though producing few title-holders, had established itself as a populous and influential lineage since the middle Qing. The education reform just provided the lineage an opportunity to use cultural resources to decorate its power.

In Songkou, the merchants of the Xie lineage also vigorously supported the education reform. However, the lineage, with small population and producing no title-

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holder in its history, had never played a significant role in the public affairs of Songkou.

Though the Xie lineage was favored by the government in the competition with the local established lineages, the lineage could not easily transfer its economic advantage to the dominance over local labors and resources which were still under the strict control of the local powerful lineages.

This chapter, rather than investigating the education reform merely from the perspective of ideological conflicts, tries to provide a more profound explanation of the conflict caused by the reform through the lens of power competition. As the three cases disclose, gentry from different backgrounds might share common interests in the reform.

Yet, their political ideals were always intermingled with their concern for sectional interests and their competition over local leadership.

The traditional gentry, such as the Huang lineage of the prefectural seat or the Liang lineage of Songkou town, had no difficulty in adopting the new ideology in the changing political atmosphere. However, the reform, rather than contributing to their influence, often undermined their interests since the reform aimed at strengthening the state by extracting local resources. The traditional gentry thus tended to resist the reform as the concern over lineages’ interests overwhelmed their belief in the reform.

The performance of the Huang brothers is a great example of the complicated attitude of the traditional gentry in the education reform. Both Huang Zunxian and Huang’s youngest brother Huang Zunkai had been ardent supporters of the reform. Huang Zunxian was one of the leaders of the 1898 Reform and had initiated the education reform in his hometown. Huang Zunkai had studied in Japan with his brother and also vigorously participated in the reform after returning to China. He had helped to distribute the famous

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reformist newspaper The Chinese Progress (時務報 Shiwubao) in Shandong and submitted two reform suggestions to the Guangxu emperor during the 1898 Reform.109 When the

Huang brothers pursued careers overseas or in the court, they were primarily concerned with the issue of how to strengthen the state on the Western model. But when they came back to their hometown, they, as the leaders of their lineage, had to consider the interests of the whole lineage in order to maintain the dominant position of their lineage. This explains why the Huang lineage soon split with the reformers from the commercial towns and stood on the side of the alliance of the established gentry, which provided the foundation for the Huang lineage’s continuous control of local society.

In contrast, the new elites, who had accumulated wealth through business but had not obtained a chance to legitimize their leadership, actively supported the reform with an attempt to establish their cultural authority. The new elites who actively participated in the reform did not necessarily have a profound understanding of the “new-learning.” The

Huang lineage of Xiyang town under the leadership of Huang Fangji, for example, showed little sign of embracing the new ideology before the government formally promoted the reform. However, seeing the potential of expanding the lineage’s influence by controlling the new-style education institutions, the Huang lineage of Xiyang came to sponsor the education reform at all costs.

This chapter, by studying the relationship between the reform and local conflicts, also tries to make clear the role the modernizing state had played in dividing local elites.

The rise of the merchant class, as this chapter discloses, was closely related to the state’s new demand of state-strengthening. Being eager to promote national strength while having

109 Zheng Hailin, “Huang Zunkai yu Wuxu bianfa zhi guanxi” (The relationship between Huang Zunkai and the 1898 Reform), Jindai zhongguo (8) 1998: 125-137. 137

difficulty in mobilizing resources from traditional gentry, the state had to enlist support from the less established class, such as the merchants. The merchants also sought the chance to enhance their status by vigorously supporting the reforms initiated by the state.

The state thus developed a new patron-agent relationship with the merchants.

The reshuffling of patronage network which aimed at promoting the influence of merchants while weakening the authority of the traditional gentry, unsurprisingly, created conflicts between the two groups of elites in local society. However, as this chapter demonstrates, the late Qing government, though trying to deprive the cultural privilege of the traditional gentry, could not eliminate their power by abolishing their titles since the local gentry did not rely on the titles to maintain their control of local communities.

Likewise, the new elites, though gaining cultural privilege by sponsoring the reform, could not automatically gain access to local resources which were still under the control of the traditional gentry.

The new elites failed to fully realize their objectives through the reform, no matter the objective to renovate Chinese culture or to enhance personal authority in local public affairs. The setback the new elites encountered in the reform provided the social condition for the rise of radicalism in the second half of the 1900s. The new elites in local society, though not directly participating in the revolution, tended to stand on the side of the young revolutionaries. Did the revolution enable the new elites to achieve their goals?

This is the question Chapter III will answer.

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Chapter 3

Revolution: Metropolitan Enthusiasm and Local Indifference

Introduction

In the summer of 1906, 1 Qiu Fengjia, the leader of the new elites in Jiaying prefecture, left his hometown and accepted a position in the Provincial Department of

Education Affairs. According to his son Qiu Cong’s (丘琮 1894-1967) memoir, Qiu

Fengjia met the president of the Wuben Middle School before he left. During the meeting,

Qiu told the president: “The idea of constitutional monarchy had some truth in it. But the royalists had missed their best chance. The Qing court had lost the support of the majority of people. Even Kang Youwei could do nothing to improve the current situation.”2 It is unclear if Qiu Cong’s statement is accurate. However, Qiu Cong’s description coincided with many scholars’ understanding of the 1911 Revolution, that is, since the state failed to meet the people’s desire for a thorough reform, a revolution against the government was destined to happen. Joseph Esherick, for example, holds that the poor masses who were hurt by the reform were eager to overthrow the government and provided the social basis for the revolution.3 Edward Rhoads, in comparison, emphasizes that local gentry won

1 Qiu had tried to obtain a position in Guangzhou in the spring of 1906, but he failed to get the position in that spring. In summer he accepted another position and formally left Jiaying.

2 Zheng Xifu, Minguo Qiu Canghai xiansheng nianpu, 183.

3 Joseph Esherick, Reform and Revolution in China.

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tremendous power by organizing reform projects and thus gained the ability to oppose the regime when the central government refused to hasten the reform upon their request.4

Despite their disagreement over the protagonists in the revolution, both scholars hold that a truly revolutionary situation, mainly referring to the rise of popular power, did emerge on the eve of the revolution. This understanding of the 1911 Revolution was probably inspired by the explanation of the revolutions in early modern Europe, which were usually interpreted as “class-based revolts” aiming at fundamentally changing the existing socio- political institutions.5

However, as Chapter II shows, the late-Qing reform did not contribute much to the reshuffling of the local power structure. Although the authority of the established gentry was challenged in the reform, they continued their dominance in local society relying on their control of lineages. The established gentry were dissatisfied with the rise of the new elites, but since the reform did not bring substantial harm to their interests, they did not show the inclination to oppose the government or destroy the current social system. The new elites, by sponsoring the reform, quickly expanded their influence in local society. Yet the authority they obtained to a large extent was owed to the patronage of the government.

Although the new elites might be disappointed with the pace of the reform, they had no desire to oppose the government which was favorable to their interests. In short, there was no fundamental contradiction between the ruler and the majority of the ruled in local society in the early 1900s.

4 Edward Rhoads, China’s Republican Revolution: The Case of Guangdong, 1895-1913 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975).

5 Jack Goldstone, “Towards a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001): 139-87. 140

Radicalism, however, was quickly rising since the middle of the 1900s. It was in part the result of the impatience among a few frustrated reformers who were dissatisfied with the result of the reform, but a group of youths who had left their hometown and took activities in metropolitan cities like Shanghai and Tokyo played a more important role.

Being freed from both the control of the government and their lineages and having a deeper understanding of the importance of national strength, these students aspired to a thorough social change by overthrowing the Qing government. At the same time, the prevalence of new-style schools, the interests developed in pursuing a military career by joining the New

Army, and the emergence of newspapers and mass demonstrations in cities, all provided new political arenas for students to amplify their opinions. These students developed interests in revolution through their experience in the external world. When they returned to their hometown, how did they blend their ideal with local interests? How did the new elites, the funders of these students, understand their revolutionary ideal? And to what extent did the import of “revolution” challenge the dominance of the local established gentry and reshuffle the local power structure? Chapter III will focus on these questions.

I. The Sparks of Revolution in Japan

Although the reformers did not seek to overthrow the monarchy during the 1898

Reform, they did try to resort to military force to support the reform. According to Sang

Bing’s research, Kang Youwei had sought the assistance of the radicals in Hunan and developed connections with Sun Yat-sen before the 1898 Reform.6 After the reform failed

6 Sang Bing, “Gengzi qinwang qianhou de Cen Chunxuan yu Baohuanghui,” 61-63; Sang Bing, “Baohuanghui de zongzhi qibian yu zuzhi lihe” (The change of the guidance of the Save-the-emperor Association and the transformation of its organization), Jindaishi yanjiu 3(2002): 48-49.

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in September 1898, more reformers, especially the Hunan radicals, tended to use violence to overthrow the rule of the Dowager Cixi and sought to collaborate with revolutionaries.7

In the summer of 1900, when Beijing was besieged by the Eight-Nation Alliance, the reformers and revolutionaries, despite having differences in the attitude toward the emperor, tried to launch a large-scale uprising to overthrow the Qing court. Yet the uprising, before being formally started, had been brutally suppressed by the Qing court in August 1900.

The participants ascribed the failure of the uprising to the selfishness of Kang Youwei, who was said to have refused sending the donations collected from overseas merchants to the uprising leaders.8 Kang Youwei might have had his personal concerns over the uprising and treated the revolutionaries with reserve, but the failure of the uprising and the cruelty of the Qing court drove many reformers to the side of revolutionaries.9 Qin Lishan (秦力

山 1877-1906), the leader of the uprising army in Anhui, being extremely angry at Kang, went to Singapore to personally investigate the account of the Save the Emperor

Association (保皇會 Baohuanghui). After he found that Kang had embezzled part of the donation, he cut off his relationship with Kang. 10 Overseas merchants were also disappointed by Kang. They had donated a large sum of money to support Kang’s plan of

7 Sang Bing, “Baohuanghui de zongzhi qibian yu zuzhi lihe,” 48.

8 Tang Zhijun, “Sun Zhongshan he Zilijun” (Sun Yat-sen and the Self-independence Army), Lishi yanjiu 1 (1991): 35.

9 Ibid., 44-45.

10 Sang Bing, “Baohuanghui de zongzhi qibian yu zuzhi lihe,” 69.

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saving the emperor, but many of them lost confidence in Kang after the uprising and ceased to provide support to the reformers.11

Revolutionary ideas, which had been merely sporadically spread before the uprising, were openly propagated by the younger generation of reformers, especially those who had participated in the 1900 uprising and were forced to seek refuge in Japan after the uprising. In June 1901, Qin Lishan published the Citizen (國民報 Guomin bao) in Tokyo, criticizing Kang Youwei and openly opposing the Qing regime.12 Upon receiving the news that the Qing court might cede Guangdong to foreigners, Zheng Guanyi (鄭貫一 1881-

1906), the editor of the Opinions (清議報 Qingyi bao), the official newspaper of reformers in Japan, organized the Guangdong Independence Association (廣東獨立協會 Guangdong duli xiehui), claiming that Guangdong should declare independence from the Manchu rule.

Even Liang Qichao, the leader of the reformers, showed preference of revolution over reform at this point. In his letter to Kang Youwei written in May 1902, Liang told Kang he believed that the anti-Manchu movement, like the anti-bakufu movement which had successfully aroused nationalist fervor in Japan, would create strong nationalist sentiment in China and provide the precondition for the strengthening of the country.13

Although a few radicals had been actively preaching the idea of anti-Manchu revolution since 1901, the relationship between the Qing government and students did not

11 Sang Bing, “Baohuanghui Gang’ao zongju yu qinwang yundong” (The Hong Kong-Macau Headquarters of the Save-the-emperor Association and the Save-the-emperor Movement), Jindaishi yanjiu 5 (2003): 36- 37.

12 Sang Bing, “Sun Zhongshan yu liuri xuesheng ji Tongmenghui de chengli” (Sun Yat-sen, Chinese students in Japan, and the establishment of the Revolutionary Alliance), Zhongshan daxue xuebao 8 (1982): 46.

13 Sang Bing, “Baohuanghui de zongzhi qibian yu zuzhi lihe,” 72.

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deteriorate until the incident of the Enrollment in Chengcheng School (成城學校 Seijo

Gakkō) of Japan. In June 1902, Chinese ambassador Cai Jun (蔡鈞) refused some students’ request to study military science in Chengcheng School, a military preparation school in

Tokyo. When those students argued with Cai, Cai asked the Japanese police to arrest the students and expel them from Japan. The Chinese students regarded the incident as a national shame and ascribed the humiliation they suffered to the inability of the Qing rule and the corruption of Qing officials. Some students used the incident to rally support for the anti-Qing revolution and received good response.14 The increasing imperialist menace after 1902 further spurred the rise of nationalist sentiment among students. In the spring of

1903, students in Shanghai initiated two large-scale demonstrations to protest France and

Russia’s attempts of infringing China’s sovereignty.15 Students in Japan echoed their peers by organizing the Anti-Russian Volunteer Corps (拒俄義勇隊 Ju’e yiyong dui), vowing to fight with the Russians if the government did not decline Russia’s demand to station troops in northeast China.16 These student movements involved the majority of students in the metropolitan areas and changed the political inclination of the young generation in the

1900s.

The earliest Jiaying students arrived in Japan in this tide of revolution. The three earliest students, He Tianjiong (何天炯 1877-1925), Liu Weitao (劉維燾), and Rao

Jinghua (饒景華), arrived in Japan in May 1903. They had been the classmates in the

14 Sang Bing, “Sun Zhongshan yu liuri xuesheng ji Tongmenghui de chengli,” 46.

15 Rhoads, China’s Republican Revolution, 62.

16 Feng Ziyou, Geming yishi (The anecdote of the revolution) (1939), vol.1 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1956), 111.

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Tongwen School, which, as mentioned in Chapter II, taught students Japanese language and directly adopted Japanese textbooks. Yet before 1904 there were no more than five to six Jiaying students in Japan. A Jiaying student thus published an appeal in East

Guangdong Daily to encourage more students to come to Japan to “broaden their eyes.”17

After expressing his jealousy toward Jiangsu students who were usually well funded by the local gentry, he urged the gentry in east Guangdong to provide necessary support to students who were eager to study abroad. Yet the situation did not change much until the arrival of the new governor-general Cen Chunxuan, who formally promoted the new-style education in Guangdong and encouraged students to study abroad. Upon Cen’s call, some reformers began to send their children and students abroad.

In March 1904, four students from Songkou town, sponsored by the rich merchant

Xie Rongguang, arrived in Japan. In May, Huang Zunxian, the former ambassador assistant in Japan, also sent two of his students and three lineage members to Japan.18 Several other

Jiaying students fortunately received funds from the provincial government to sponsor their study in Japan. By November, according to a report in East Guangdong Daily, at least fifty

Jiaying students were studying in Japan.19 In 1905, Liang Shiwu (梁詩五 1843-1911),

Chinese ambassador in Nagasaki, told his friend that in Nagasaki alone there were more than forty Jiaying students.20

17 Lingdong ribao, May 4, 1903, 4.

18 Lingdong ribao, April 29, 1903, 4; Lingdong ribao, May 3, 1903, 4.

19 Lingdong ribao, November 12, 1904, 4.

20 Liang Shiwu’s personal leter to Chen Yuanzhuo. Accessed Jan 8, 2015. http://www.meizhou.cn/news/1302/04/13020400059.html

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Except a few students who won government scholarships, the majority of early overseas students were funded by the reformers in the prefecture. Xie Rongguang and

Huang Zunxian, as discussed in Chapter II, had both vigorously promoted the development of new-style schools in Jiaying. He Ziyuan (何子淵 1865-1941), who provided the economic support to He Tianjiong, was also a generous sponsor of the education reform in

Xingning County, which belonged to Jiaying prefecture. The He lineage of Xingning

County, like the Xie lineage of Songkou town, had made their wealth doing business but had been excluded from local public affairs. He Ziyuan had visited the United States in the

1880s and admired the development in the U.S. After the Qing court initiated the reform,

He became one of the most ardent supporters of the reform in Xingning County.21 By sponsoring the education reform and supporting the youth to study abroad, the reformers tried to establish an advantageous position in the new political atmosphere. The experience of studying in Japan, however, changed the political attitude of many young students.

When He Tianjiong arrived in Japan in May 1903, Chinese students in Japan were launching an anti-Russian movement to oppose Russia’s attempt to station troops in China.

Students organized multiple public lectures to criticize the cowardice and inability of the

Qing government. The nationalist ideal that regarded the Manchus as the national enemy, thanks to the propaganda of various students’ publications, was becoming increasingly popular among the students.22 He Tianjiong was deeply touched by the patriotic enthusiasm of the students and wrote several poems to express his excitement. The poems disclosed

21 Luo Guixiang, “Xingning diyi zhongxue jianjie” (A brief introduction of No.1 School of Xingning), in Xingning wenshi ziliao, vol. 15, ed. Guangdong sheng Xingning xian wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui (Xingning: Wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, 1991), 42-43.

22 Sang Bing, “Sun Zhongshan yu liuri xuesheng ji Tongmenghui de chengli,” 47.

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that He had gradually identified with the popular opinion among overseas radicals, that is, that the weakness of China should be ascribed to the cruelty and incompetence of the

Manchus.23

In November 1904, the students who had returned to China to organize the anti-

Qing uprising, with Huang Xing (黃興 1874-1916) as their leader, went back to Japan.24

He Tianjiong immediately made friends with Huang and became an active supporter of the anti-Qing revolution.25 At the end of 1904, He Tianjiong went back to Jiaying. Inspired by

Huang, who had recruited revolutionaries in his hometown, He Tianjiong also pushed his countymen to study in Japan.26 At least a dozen Xingning students went to Japan after He

Tianjiong. Together with his revolutionary fellows, He learned how to make pistols from

Toten Miyazaki (宮崎滔天 1871-1922), a Japanese friend of Sun Yat-sen. He also participated in publication of the journal Ershi shiji zhi zhina (二十世紀之支那 Twentieth-

Century China), which later was renamed Minbao (民報 People’s Journal), the official journal of the Revolutionary Alliance (同盟會 Tongmenghui). Two other earliest Jiaying

23 He Tianjiong, “Riben xing” (The trip to Japan), included in Wuhezhai shicao (Poetry anthology of Wuhezhai) (1939). See Xingning wenshi ziliao, vol. 10 (1988), 12.

24 In the end of 1903, Huang Xing sold his own property in Changsha and established the Huaxing Association to unite the anti-Qing students from Hunan and Hubei. The Association had plotted to launch an uprising in Changsha when the dowager Cixi celebrated her birthday in November 1904. However, the plan was leaked and the uprising miscarried.

25 Xuanye changzhi, Zhonghua minguo geming miji (The secret introduction of China’s republican revolution), (Dongjing: Diguo defang xingzheng xuehui, 1940), 84. See Li Changli, “He Tianjiong yu Tongmenghui Dongjing benbu” (He Tianjiong and the Headquarters of the Revolution Alliance in Tokyo), Jindaishi yanjiu 3 (2012): 74.

26 He Tianjiong, “Ti xingning liudong tongren liuying” (The poem written on the group photo of Xingning students in Japan), in Duan Yunzhang, “Shengying qiqiu de mengou: Huang Xing yu He Tianjiong” (The partners who shared same ideal: Huang Xiang and He Tianjiong), in Lingxiu yu qunlun: Huang Xing yu gefang renwu (Leaders and commoners: Huang Xing and other figures), ed. Xiao Zhizhi (Wuhan: Wuhan daxue chubanshe, 1991), 394.

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students, Liu Weitao and Rao Jinghua, encouraged by He Tianjiong, attended the Qingshan

Revolutionary Military School (青山革命軍事學校 Qingshan geming junshi xuexiao) established under the assistance of Sun Yat-sen during his brief visit to Japan in 1904.

The four Songkou overseas students arrived in Japan in March 1904. Two of them attended a normal school upon the request of Rao Fushang.27 The other two, the Xie brothers, attended Hongwen College (宏文學院 Hongwen xueyuan), which was the base for Chinese students in Japan. The Xie brothers had tried to establish connections with radical reformers in the 1900 Uprising.28 Though the uprising miscarried, the Xie brothers became active supporters of the radicals since then. Given the chance to take activities in

Japan, the Xie brothers soon restored the relationship with previous radical reformers, many of whom had been converted to revolutionaries after 1903. In 1904, Xie Liangmu joined the Yokohama Triads (橫濱三合會 Hengbin sanhehui) organized by Feng Ziyou

(馮自由 1882-1958).29 The association clearly declared that its purpose was to overthrow the Qing and to preach nationalist thoughts. Through this opportunity, Xie Liangmu joined the circle of revolutionaries in Japan.

As the enthusiasm in a thorough revolution surpassed the interests in a gradual reform, Sun Yat-sen also became increasingly popular among overseas students. A few radical students, who regarded Sun as the pioneer of the revolutionary movements,

27 Fang Xuejia, Xie Yiqiao, Xie Liangmu yu Sun Zhongshan lingdao de minzhu geming, 16.

28 In 1900, Xie Yiqiao had visited Hong Kong in person and met the reformers who were plotting the Save the Emperor Uprising. Upon the suggestion of Ou Qujia, the student of Kang Youwei, Xie then organized militia in Jiaying and made preparation for the uprising. Ibid., 9-12.

29 Ibid., 17.

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published a batch of pamphlets to propagandize his heroic deeds.30 Sun Yat-sen, who had primarily relied on overseas merchants and secret societies to launch anti-Qing revolts, also noticed the change among the students and visited Yokohama in the summer of 1903. After hearing that the Qing government did not allow students to enroll in military schools, Sun invited his friend Hino Kumazou (日野熊蔵 1878-1946) to establish a secret Qingshan

Revolutionary Military School to help students conduct military training.31 In the winter of

1904, Sun, upon the invitation from students in Brussels, visited Europe and decided to organize a revolutionary association among overseas students. In July 1905, Sun returned to Japan, which had the most Chinese overseas students at that time. Under the assistance of ardent followers like Toten Miyazaki and Huang Xing, Sun successfully established contacts with the leaders of various revolutionary associations in Japan and established the

Revolutionary Alliance within one month.32

Both He Tianjiong and Xie Liangmu were invited to attend the preparatory meeting for the establishment of the Alliance and became one of the first 72 Alliance members.33

In the formal founding conference held on August 20, Jiaying students also won important positions in the election for department directors. He Tianhan (何天瀚 1874-1911), He

Tianjiong’s older cousin, was elected as the secretary of the Department of Legal Affairs

30 “Guoxueshe gaobai” (The announcement of National Association), Jiangsu, vol.7 (October, 1903), in Sang Bing, “Sun Zhongshan yu liuri xuesheng ji Tongmenghui de chengli,” 48.

31 Feng Ziyou, “Dongjing geming junshi xuexiao bushu” (The supplementary introduction of Tokyo Revolutionary Military School), Geming yishi, vol.5, 40-42.

32 Sang Bing, “Sun Zhongshan yu liuri xuesheng ji Tongmenghui de chengli,” 51-53.

33 Feng Ziyou, “Ji Zhongguo Tongmenghui,” in Zhonghua Minguo kaiguo wushinian wenxian (The materials of the Republic of China in the past fifty years), ed. Zhonghua Minguo kaiguo wushinian wenxian, vol.1, no. 11 (Taibei: Zhongzheng shuju, 1963), 149.

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(司法部 Sifabu) as well as the director of the Guangdong branch of the Alliance. Liu

Weitao, one of the three earliest Jiaying students, was elected as the director of Department of Accounting (會計部 Kuaijibu). Since Liu had to receive military training in the Imperial

Japanese Army Academy (陸軍士官學校 Rikugun Shikan Gakkō),34 Xie Liangmu, a native of Songkou town, succeeded to the position.35

From 1905 to 1906, 50 Jiaying students joined the Alliance, accounting for nearly half of the 112 original Alliance members from Guangdong province. This number is disproportionally large given that the population of the prefecture merely accounts for 6 percent of the total population in the province. The Pearl River delta, which had more than half of Guangdong’s population, produced merely 48 original Alliance members.36 The family and fellow townsmen ties should have played an important role in bringing Jiaying students to the Alliance.

For example, under He Tianjiong’s influence, all the 15 Xingning students joined the Alliance. Xie Liangmu also persuaded all of his four brothers to join the Alliance.

Jiaying students’ close connection to overseas merchants and a deeper understanding of the strength of imperial powers also contributed to their strong nationalist sentiment. Xie

Yiqiao, for example, had lived with his uncles in the Dutch East Indies for four years and had a deeper understanding of the low status of the Chinese.37 He Tianjiong’s uncle He

34 Chen Shaobai, Chen Shaobai zishu (The autobiography of Chen Shaobai) (Beijing: Renmin ribao chubanshe, 2011), 215. Also see Rhoads, China’s Republican Revolution, 103.

35 Feng Ziyou, “Ji Zhongguo Tongmenghui,” 150.

36 Rhoads, China’s Republican Revolution, 102

37 Fang Xuejia, Xie Yiqiao, Xie Liangmu yu Sun Zhongshan lingdao de minzhu geming, 3-5.

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Ziyuan, after his trip to the United States, also frequently preached the new thoughts in his lineage and tried his best to sponsor the lineage members to study in Japan.38 Despite the increasing popularity of radicalism, it must be stressed not all Jiaying students were interested in the thoughts of revolution. The students sent by Huang Zunxian’s lineage, for example, rarely joined revolutionary associations.

In general, a considerable number of Hakka students in Japan, through contact with the young radicals from other parts of China, developed strong nationalist sentiment and were eager to change thoroughly China’s situation by launching an anti-Qing revolution.

These students travelled between the metropolitan areas and their hometowns and brought their revolutionary ideals back home, where they exerted much effort to put their ideal into practice. The political environment and popular concerns in their hometowns, however, were quite different from that in the metropolises. The students, unsurprisingly, encountered much difficulty in spreading nationalist and revolutionary thoughts in their hometowns.

II. Spreading Nationalist Ideas in Jiaying

The nationalist movement, including the anti-Russian movement and the protest against France’s infringement of China’s sovereignty in Guangxi, despite receiving active response in metropolitan cities like Shanghai and Tokyo, had little impact in east

Guangdong. Except for reprinting a speech delivered by Shanghai’s Guangdong merchants during the anti-Russian demonstration, people in east Guangdong contributed little to the

38 He Ziyuan jinian wenji (An anthology in memory of He Ziyuan), ed. Zhang Lei (Xingning: Guangdongsheng Xingningshi wenhuaju, 2011), 16-19.

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first large-scale nationalist movement.39 But in the middle of 1904, people in the area were involved into a conflict with the Japanese that was caused by the construction of the

Chaoshan Railway. Jiaying students in Japan, driven by the nationalist sentiment, rushed back to Guangdong and tried to organize a movement aiming at defending national sovereignty. Their ideal, however, deviated from the concern of the local people.

The Chaoshan Railway that connects Chaozhou and Shantou was funded and constructed by overseas Chinese merchants as a project to gain the recognition of the central government and to demonstrate Chinese ability in independently constructing a railway.40 The idea of constructing the railway was first put forward by Zhang Yunan, a native of Songkou town and a rich merchant in the Dutch East Indies. In September 1903,

Zhang Yunan, under the support of Sheng Xuanhuai (盛宣懷 1844-1916), the supervisor of Railway Affairs (督辦鐵路大臣 Duban tielu dacheng), formally obtained permission to build the railway. 41 Zhang’s initial plan was to raise one million taels of silver from

Southeast Asia. Zhang’s countyman Xie Rongguang soon agreed to invest half a million in the railway company. Later the Taiwan merchant Lin Lisheng (林麗生) and the Xiamen merchant Wu Liqing (吳理卿) joined in as major shareholders. In the end, the railway company raised two million taels of silver. 42 Yet Lin and Wu were not independent

39 Lingdong ribao, May 4, 1903, 4.

40 Mi Rucheng, Zhongguo jindai tielu shi ziliao (Materials of the history of China’s railway) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), 930.

41 Lung-Pao Tsai, “Rizhi shiqi Tanwan zongdufu tiedaobu de nanjin zhiyuan: Yi Chaoshan tielu de xingzhu weili” (The general Governor of Taiwan’s South-advanced Policy in Japanese-ruled period: A case study of Teochew-Swatow Railway), Furen lishi xuebao 28 (March, 2012), 241.

42 “Zhang Yunan shang shangbu bing” (The memorial to the board of commerce submitted by Zhang Yunan), Chaoshan tielu jikan, 1 (1933), in Chen Haizhong, “Cong minli dao guoquan: Lun 1904-1909 nian de chaoshan tielu fengbo” (From people’s interests to national right: the conflicts over the Chaoshan Railway from 1904 to 1909), Taipingyang xuebao 10 (2008): 86. 152

merchants but instead were compradors of a Japanese company which was attached to

Japanese colonial government in Taiwan. The funds Lin invested in the railway were actually provided by a Japanese company. The precondition for their investment was the employment of Japanese engineers and purchase of Japanese machines in the construction of the railway.43 The background of Lin and Wu, though protected by the railway company, later became a main reason that the Chinese students and merchants attacked the company.

In December 1903, after gaining the approval of the Qing court, Zhang Yunan invited Zhan Tianyou (詹天佑 1861-1919), the most prominent Chinese railway engineer of the time, to assume the position of chief engineer and design the route of the railway.44

Zhan determined that the railway should run along the Han River that flows from Chaozhou to Shantou. Yet, in early 1904, the Japanese, upon the secret support of Zaizhen (載振

1876-1947), the director of the Department of Commerce, reached an agreement with

Zhang Yunan to reemploy Japanese engineers.45 In June the Japanese resurveyed the area and designed another route that ran through several commercial towns. The new route was short, low-cost, and more convenient for passengers, but it would pass through many populous villages and fertile rice fields.46 Japanese engineers apparently underestimated the difficulty of purchasing land from local villagers. Before they formally declared the new route, the gentry from the eighteen villages along the route had received the news and

43 Lung-Pao Tsai, “Rizhi shiqi Tanwan zongdufu tiedaobu de nanjin zhiyuan,” 240.

44 Lingdong ribao, December 31, 1903, 4.

45 Lung-Pao Tsai, “Rizhi shiqi Tanwan zongdufu tiedaobu de nanjin zhiyuan,” 243-245.

46 Lingdong ribao, August 12, 1904.

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jointly published a protest statement in East Guangdong Daily for fifteen days, stressing that the railway would bring a disastrous impact on the local environment. The main reasons they gave were that the railway company would build a bridge on the main outlet of local rivers, which would highly possibly block the outlet and create floods in the area.

The local gentry thus demanded that the railway company change the route.47

The low acquisition price of the land set by the company also enraged the local gentry. Zhang Yunan had planned to follow the practice of the Guangzhou-Hankou

Railway (粵漢鐵路 Yuehan tielu), setting the price of the high quality land at 140 yuan per mu (畝 about 0.16 acre), mediocre land at 100 yuan per mu, and inferior land at 70 yuan per mu.48 Yet when the county magistrate tried to negotiate with the local gentry about the land price, the local gentry refused to meet the official. Despite the opposition from the locals, the railway company took a tough stance, declining the local gentry’s request and asking them to withdraw their lawsuits against the company.49 At the end of 1904, before the conflict over land purchases was settled, the company began to build work sheds and arranged Japanese engineers to reside in local villages. The friction between the company and the villagers thus further escalated. Some armed villagers deliberately destroyed the work sheds and claimed that they targeted their attacks at anyone who worked for the company, including both the Chinese and the Japanese.50 By this point, the dispute was merely over the route of the railway and the price of the land. The nationalist sentiment

47 Lingdong ribao, July 2, 1904, 3.

48 Huazi ribao, September 5, 1904; Huazi ribao, September 6, 1904.

49 Lingdong ribao, August 11, 1904.

50 Ibid.

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might have existed among some villagers who detested any foreign intruder, but it had not been used as a card by the local gentry to attack the company until the arrival of overseas students.

Chinese students in Japan received the news about the railway very early through the reports in Japan’s newspaper, though their concern was quite different from that of the gentry in east Guangdong. Most Japanese reports regarded the railway as the stepping stone for Japan to expand its influence in east Guangdong.51 Consequently, the students, rather than worrying about the potential damage the railway could bring, were primarily concerned that Japan’s participation in the railway would lead to its infringement of

Chinese sovereignty. Based on those reports, the students submitted a petition to the

Department of Commerce, trying to reveal the close relationship between the shareholder

Lin Lisheng and the Japanese. The students also requested the Department of Commerce to urge Zhang Yunan to purchase shares back from Lin Lisheng. Otherwise, the students warned, the government would have no method to redeem the concession of the railway as in the case of Canton-Hankow Railway.52

The Department of Commerce could not be ignorant of Japanese involvement in the company. As mentioned above, the reason why the Japanese had the monopoly over the construction of the railroad was just because of the support of the director of the

51 Beijing bao, February 27, 1905. Beijing bao, February 28, 1905.

52 The concession of Canton-Hankow Railroad had been let out to an American company with a provision prohibiting the American company from selling the shares to other countries. Yet the American company broke the agreement by selling half of its shares to the Belgians, which led to the protest against the company. Zhang Zhidong, the governor-general of Hubei province, supported the protesters and proposed to cancel the concession with the Americans. At this point, the Americans asked for a very high price for the shares they possessed. By January 1905, when students in east Guangdong submitted the petition about Chaoshan Railroad, the government still had not successfully reclaimed the shares of the Canton-Hankow Railroad. See Rhoads, China’s Republican Revolution, 91-94.

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department. Unsurprisingly, the department rebuffed the students’ petition and warned them not to believe rumors.

Despite the indifference of the Department of Commerce, the students still sent He

Tianjiong and another Chaozhou student back to negotiate with the company on behalf of the overseas students. After arriving in Shanghai in December 1904, the representatives of the overseas students immediately distributed pamphlets about the disputes to the

Guangdong gentry and merchants in Shanghai. 53 In the meeting with Guangdong merchants, the students proposed that the Guangdong people should purchase Lin

Lisheng’s shares back if Zhang Yunan refused to do so. According to students’ calculation,

Lin’s shares were worth 500,000 yuan. If one person purchases 50 yuan, then 10,000 people would be able to purchase all the shares back. The student representatives claimed that the overseas students had subscribed for 5000-yuan shares. The remaining shares, according to them, should not be too difficult for local people.54 Yet, this proposal, without identifying the sources of funds or indicating the potential return of the investment, did not arouse much interest among the local gentry. Though the students repeatedly emphasized the urgency of protecting national sovereignty, the local gentry seemingly had little desire to defend the national sovereignty at the cost of their own interests. After staying in

Guangdong for one month, He Tianjiong went back to Japan without achieving any significant result.

Although the local gentry were indifferent to the students’ proposal, they did not accept the plan put forward by the railroad company either. The conflict between the

53 Lingdong ribao, January 10, 1904, 3.

54 Huazi ribao, January 19, 1905.

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villagers and the railway company continued and finally led to a tragedy. On January 21,

1905, several villagers once again threw cobblestones at the Japanese engineers who were working on the field. The translator for the Japanese harshly scolded the villagers. Being enraged, several villagers soon called more than one thousand villagers together and besieged the Japanese. Most Japanese workers fled back to the house provided by a Chinese gentry, but two of them were shot dead by the villagers. Angry villagers then looted and burned the house of the Chinese gentry who had provided help to the Japanese. The incident shook the officials at different levels of government who were afraid that the Japanese would use the incident as an excuse to invade Guangdong. The governor-general Cen

Chunxuan immediately sent military troops to suppress the villagers. Two villagers were turned in by local lineages as perpetrators and quickly executed by the government. To appease the Japanese, the government also pushed the railway company and the involved lineages to pay 175,000 yuan to the Japanese as the compensation. Being satisfied with the redress, the Japanese agreed to make peace with the Chinese government.

After the incident, the local people’s appeal was paid more attention by the government. The local gentry also changed their strategy of negotiating with the government. In their new petition, the potential environmental damage was not listed as the primary reason for their opposition to the railway. Instead, they began to denounce the company for selling shares to foreigners and bringing disasters to local society. 55 The students’ investigation of the background of the company and their propaganda of the nationalist ideology also provided inspiration to the local gentry. Emphasizing the importance of protecting the railway sovereignty of China, the local gentry requested that

55 Lingdong ribao, March 16, 1905.

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the government revise the content of the contract and terminate the collaboration with the

Japanese.56 Under the pressure, the government pushed the railway company to increase the purchase price of the land to 1.5 times the original price. After gaining extra compensation for the land, the local gentry chose to accept the offer rather than to further pursue the relationship between the Japanese and the railway company.57 The Japanese thus continued to monopolize the construction and even the operation of the railway after it was completed in 1906.58

The final solution to the conflicts discloses the gap between the popular mentality and the concern of the overseas students. By disclosing the foreign background of the company and preaching the nationalist thoughts, the students tried to encourage the local population to contribute to the protection of national interests. But the unrealistic proposal the students put forward failed to gain an active response from the local merchants and gentry.

The locals, especially the villagers, probably did not have a profound understanding of the importance of defending national sovereignty. Their attack against the Japanese was more the result of the hatred toward external intruders and stirred by the railway company’s direct threat to their interests. This strong motivation of defending their home led to a tragedy but also played a critical role in changing the result of their negotiation with the railway company.

56 Shenbao, July 20, 1905.

57 Huazi ribao, September 5, 1905; Huazi ribao, September 6, 1905.

58 Lung-Pao Tsai, “Rizhi shiqi Tanwan zongdufu tiedaobu de nanjin zhiyuan,” 246. 158

The local gentry were flexible in adopting different ideologies, firstly environmental protection and later the defense of national sovereignty, to justify their defense of local interests. Though they ostensibly accepted the students’ nationalist propaganda, their practical choice suggests that they did not regard the national interests as their primary concern. The first anti-Japanese movement in east Guangdong quickly quieted down under the effort of different parts. The overseas students had tried to change the nature of the movement by instilling nationalist sentiment among local people.

However, the solution to the conflict shows that the students’ ideal of defending national sovereignty was neither appreciated nor achieved. Yet the students did not abandon their pursuit due to the failure. In the year after the incident, as mentioned above, many of them joined the Revolutionary Alliance. With a formal revolutionary organization as their back, they began to adopt some new strategies to expand their influence.

III. Recruiting Revolutionaries in New-Style Schools

After 1906, many Jiaying students, finishing two-year term of study in Japan, returned to their hometown. Before departing for China, many of them had been assigned the task of recruiting Alliance members in their hometown. In January 1906, Xie Yiqiao, together with his three brothers and two classmates, firstly returned to Jiaying. 59 He

Tianhan, who had been appointed the director of the Guangdong branch of the Alliance, also went back to Jiaying in late 1906. These young revolutionaries immediately contacted their friends, attempting to spread what they had learned in Japan. Xie Yiqiao, for example,

59 One of Xie Yiqiao’s younger brothers Xie Liangmu was travelling with Sun Yat-sen in Southeast Asia to raise funds for the Alliance. See Fang Xuejia, Xie Yiqiao, Xie Liangmu yu Sun Zhongshan lingdao de minzhu geming, 24.

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contacted his friends in the neighboring three counties and was invited to deliver a speech at a school presided by his classmate.60

But the political atmosphere in Jiaying was quite different from that in Japan and made the spread of the new ideology quite difficult. Actually some revolutionaries had been forced to abandon their belief in the anti-Qing revolution after coming back to China.

For example, Li Xiqing (李錫青), another Jiaying student who joined the Alliance, was kept in captivity by his family after his father, a senior official in Chinese navy, found out he joined an anti-government organization in Japan.61 Liu Weitao, who had been elected the director of the Department of Accounting of the Alliance, after knowing that he was listed on the list of the wanted by the Qing government, chose to hide in his hometown and later died from mental illness.62

To prevent the intervention by the government and the local gentry, the revolutionaries mainly worked within the network of classmates. According to Wen

Chongyuan’s (溫翀遠) memoir, Xie Yiqiao first contacted Zhang Gushan (張谷山) 63 of

Changle County, Lin Luchuan (林魯傳) of Pingyuan (平遠) County, and Xiao Huichang

60 Wen Chongyuan, “Tongmenghui zai Meizhou de huodong he Meicheng guangfu jingguo” (The activities of the Revolutionary Alliance in Meizhou and the experience of the “restoration” of the prefectural town of Meizhou), in Guangdong Xinhai geming shiliao (Materials of Guangdong 1911 Revolution), ed. Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Guangdong sheng weiyuanhui (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1981), 348.

61 Liu Yihong, “Jiazu chuanqi zheshe yiduan minzu kunanshi” (The national history reflected from the legend of a lineage). Accessed, Jan 9, 2015. http://hakka.meizhou.cn/hakkanews/1304/10/13041000079.html

62 Lin Junnan, “Xinhai geming qianhou Xingning ji Tongmenghui yuan jiqi shilue” (Revoluionary Alliance members from Xingning and their biographies), in Meizhou wenshi, vol. 5, ed. Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Guangdong sheng Meizhou shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui (Meizhou: Meizhoushi wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, 1991), 37.

63 Qin Zigao, “Shantou lingdong Tongwen xuetang yu xinhai geming” (Shantou East-Guangdong Tongwen School and the 1911 Revolution), Shantou tequ wanbao, October 9, 2011, 5.

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(蕭惠長) of Xingning County after he went back to Jiaying. All of these three young men had been the classmates of Xie in the Tongwen School of Shantou. Xiao Huichang and

Zhang Gushan, after graduating from Tongwen, had been teaching in Xingmin School (興

民學堂 Xingmin xuetang), the first new-style school in Xingning County.64 Upon Xie’s encouragement, both Xiao and Zhang joined the Alliance. In late 1906, another Alliance member He Tianhan also returned to Xingning and taught at the school. The school thus became an early hub of revolutionaries. In Pingyuan County, Xie Yiqiao visited another classmate Lin Luchuan, who was constructing a short-term teachers’ school in Pingyuan.

He expressed support to Xie but did not join the Alliance at that time.65 In Jiaying, Xie also maintained a close relationship with Xie Luqian (謝魯倩 1881-1920) and Jiang Bojian (江

柏堅 1870-1929) of Bingcun town. Similar to Xie Yiqiao, Xie Luqian was a son of an overseas merchant. Funded by his overseas relative and other Bingcun merchants, Xie

Luqian had also successfully established a new-style school in Bingcun. Many of Xie

Yiqiao’s classmates or friends showed interest in the revolutionary ideology. Yet except

Zhang Gushan and Xiao Huichang, none of the others formally joined the Alliance.66 Xie

Yiqiao’s experience suggests that the new-style schools could provide a useful network for revolutionaries to spread new thoughts and recruit like-minded fellows. But the limited

64 He Chuncai, “Xiao Huichang zhuanlue” (The biography of Xiao Huichang), in Xingning wenshi, ed. Xingning xian zhengxie wenshi weiyuanhui (Xingning: Wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, 1985), 124.

65 Yu Weiwen, “Lin Zhen zhuanlue” (The biography of Lin Zhen), in Meizhou Wenshi, vol. 5, 83-87.

66 Wen Chongyuan, “Tongmenghui zai Chao Jia diqu huodong de yixie huiyi” (The memoir of the activities of the Revolutionary Alliance in Chaozhou and Jiaying) in Guangzhou wenshi ziliao, vol. 19, ed. Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshanghuiyi Guangdong sheng Guangzhou shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1980), 35-36.

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success Xie achieved also suggests that the influence of one’s personal network was limited.

To recruit more members, Xie had to create some other trustable networks.

Inspired by his classmate Lin Luchuan, Xie Yiqiao also established a short-term teachers’ college in his hometown of Songkou. Under the assistance of Rao Fushang, the school was soon opened in February 1906. The school’s open target was to train teachers for new-style schools. Its curriculum was directly copied from Hongwen College in Japan.

Probably because of the distinguished education background of the founders, the school was very successful, enrolling 123 students all over the prefecture. Xie Yiqiao invited

Zhang Gushan to teach Chinese in the school. Except Zhang, all the other teachers had studied in Japan. According to the memoir of Wen Chongyuan, a graduate of the school, the teachers were all passionate and energetic young men who were not only enthusiastic in introducing the Western knowledge but also tried to instill nationalist thoughts into the students’ minds.67 The teachers also secretly distributed revolutionary pamphlets, like

Geming jun (革命軍 Revolutionary Army) written by Zou Rong (鄒容 1885-1905), among the students.68 But since the Revolutionary Alliance was still a secret organization, Xie

Yiqiao did not openly recruit revolutionaries among the students. Instead, he carefully selected some who showed clear interests in the revolution and invited them to join the

Alliance. By graduation, four students joined the Alliance. 69 To recruit potential revolutionaries through the teacher-student relationship was another strategy adopted by early revolutionaries. Schools provided a good niche for students to get rid of the

67 Ibid., 36.

68 Fang Xuejia, Xie Yiqiao, Xie Liangmu yu Sun Zhongshan lingdao de minzhu geming, 35.

69 Wen Chongyuan, “Tongmenghui zai Chao Jia diqu huodong de yixie huiyi,” 36.

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intervention from their families. Yet the fact that only 4 among the 123 students joined the

Alliance suggests that it was still difficult to introduce revolutionary thoughts in rural schools. After all, most students in the school were still staying in their hometown and restricted by their lineages, which could not tolerate that their members join an anti- government organization.

The limited success forced the revolutionaries to consider using force outside of the local society. At the end of 1906, Xie Yiqiao sent Zhang Gushan to Guangzhou to recruit revolutionaries from the Jiaying military students in Guangzhou. Zhang founded a Changle

Students Association to hide and secretly established connections with students in the two military schools, the Short-term Officers’ School (陸軍速成學堂 Lujun sucheng xuetang) and the Whampoa Military Primary School (陸軍小學 Lujun xiaoxue). 70 Given the high risk of preaching revolution at the time, Zhang was mainly engaged in the secret propaganda of revolutionary thoughts among students rather than to openly recruit Alliance members.

New-style schools, which gathered hundreds of students from different lineages and locations together, undoubtedly provided a new platform for revolutionaries to spread their ideas. However, the new-style schools in rural settings, different from those in Japan, could not provide a safe haven for students to avoid the control of the government or lineages. The young students in the school could be easily touched by the political propaganda. Wen Chongyuan, a graduate of Songkou Short-term Teachers’ School (松口

速成師範學校 Songkou sucheng shifan xuexiao), remembered that students in the school

70 Geming renwuzhi, vol.5, ed. Huang Jilu (Taibei: Zhongyang wenwu gongyingshe, 1969), 40-41.

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were all deeply impressed by the patriotic enthusiasm of their teachers.71 Yet embracing patriotism did not mean students would join an anti-government organization, which could incur the death penalty if captured by the government. The leaders of revolutionaries in the rural setting, receiving little direct support or instruction from the Revolutionary Alliance, could not provide any powerful backing to the students either. Except instigating students with nationalist propaganda, the revolutionaries apparently lacked effective methods to attract students to join the organization.

IV. Allying with Secret Societies

In 1907, as Sun Yat-sen was launching a set of uprisings in Guangdong, revolutionaries in Jiaying were assigned the new tasks of helping to reorganize secret societies and providing support for these uprisings. To make students and secret societies collaborate was a strategy adopted by Sun Yat-sen after the establishment of the

Revolutionary Alliance. Before 1905 Sun had mainly relied on secret societies to expand the revolutionary force and launch anti-Qing uprisings. But secret societies had their own axe to grind and were often out of the control of Sun. Students, in comparison, were highly educated and identified more with Sun. By arranging students to join secret societies, Sun hoped to keep a tight rein and enhance the fighting capability of secret societies. The

Huanggang Uprising (黃岡起義) was Sun’s first attempt in uniting the force of the two parties.

The initiator of the Huanggang Uprising was Xu Xueqiu (許雪秋 1875-1912), the son of a rich merchant in Singapore. As early as the autumn of 1904, Xu had colluded with

71 Wen Chongyuan, “Tongmenghui zai Chao Jia diqu huodong de yixie huiyi,” 37. 164

the leaders of the Triads in Chaozhou, his native place, to plot an uprising. Their scheme was leaked and Xu fled to Singapore. There he was introduced to Sun Yat-sen and joined the Alliance. Sun appreciated Xu’s connections with secret societies and granted him a title: the general of the East Army of Chinese Civil Army (中華國民軍東軍都督 Zhonghua guominjun dongjun dudu). In late 1906, Xu decided to launch an uprising in Chaozhou during the Chinese New Year holidays of 1907. Sun approved Xu’s request and sent more than ten overseas students and two Japanese friends to Chaozhou.72 At the same time, the

Revolutionary Alliance in Tokyo also notified Xie Yiqiao, asking him to dispatch several students to Chaozhou to provide assistance. The collaboration between the secret societies led by Xu and the students who followed Sun, however, did not go as smoothly as Sun expected. According to Sun and Xu’s plan, Xu would dispatch the force of secret societies to Chaozhou and the students sent by Sun would be in charge of commanding the battle.

Yet according to Wen Chongyuan’s memoir, Xie Yiqiao and Xu Xueqiu did not have any communication with each other before the uprising. Xie did not know the date of the uprising until he received a letter from the headquarters of the Alliance in Tokyo. Upon receiving the news, Xie Yiqiao hastily sent three students to Chaozhou to participate in the uprising. But when the three students arrived at the agreed place, they found that the troops had been dismissed. The three Jiaying students were totally at loss and fled with the masses.73 According to Xu Xueqiu’s later report, the time of the uprising was mistakenly transmitted, so the troops from different factions did not gather at the same time. He also

72 Zhao Liren, “Sun Zhongshan yu Xu Xueqiu” (Sun Zhongshan and Xu Xueqiu), Jindaishi yanjiu 1 (1995), 173.

73 Wen Chongyuan, “Tongmenghui zai Meizhou de huodong he Meicheng guangfu jingguo,” 348.

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claimed that the returned overseas students who were supposed to lead the force were scared by the situation and all fled away.74 The cause for the abortion of the uprising was complicated. What is obvious is that the students did not play any significant role in the uprising. They had little contact with the secret societies before the uprising. Nor did they participate in the disposition of the battle.

After the first attempt of uprising failed, students who had participated in the uprising were thrown into disarray. To avoid being arrested by the government, some of them fled to Shanghang (上杭) County of Fujian province. After the storm subsided, students either went back to their home town or sought positions in new-style schools.

Throughout the process, students did not receive any guidance or order from the Alliance.

In April 1907, Xie Yiqiao notified two students that Xu Xueqiu would rise up again in

Chaozhou and they were supposed to gather with Xu in Shantou. Yet when the two

Songkou students arrived in Shantou, they were told Xu had left for Chaozhou. Later students heard that the uprising had already broken out, so they waited in Shantou for further instruction. Yet the uprising was suppressed in five days, leaving no chance for students to participate in.75

Most other uprisings launched by Sun from 1907 to 1908 were similar to the two uprisings in Chaozhou. They were badly organized and involved little participation of the revolutionary students. The crushing defeat of those uprisings suggests that Sun’s ideal of

74 Zhang Yongfu, “Nanyang yu chuangli minguo” (Southeast Asia and the establishment of the republic), in Huaqiao yu Xinhai geming, ed. Rong Mengyuan (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1981), 126- 128; Lin Fengwen, “Nanyang huaqiao yu Huanggang geming zhanyi” (Chinese of Southeast Asia and the revolutionary uprising in Huanggang), in Shantou wenshi, vol. 10, 1991, 8-19.

75 Wen Chongyuan, “Tongmenghui zai Meizhou de huodong he Meicheng guangfu jingguo,” 348.

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merging the manpower of secret societies and the leadership of intellectuals was unrealistic.

Secret societies had their own leaders and strict organization, leaving no space for students to penetrate. Students might master modern military knowledge, but the more urgent need for the rebels was the manpower and economic resources which the students could not provide. The only role students played was to change the commoners’ perception of the uprising. The reports in contemporary newspapers, for example, held that the uprising was different from previous rebellions since it was led by student revolutionaries. They pointed out that the rebels showed high discipline, without looting any shop or harassing the residents after they occupied the town.76 The students’ participation might help to provide ideological justification for the uprising. Yet without the ability to transfer the ideological advantage to the power of mobilizing labor forces and resources necessary for the uprising, students were destined to be marginalized in the uprisings.

After the Huanggang Uprising failed, revolutionaries in Jiaying prefecture were aware that they must develop their own military force rather than relying on secret societies.

To recruit the force, Xie Yiqiao and Wen Jinghou established a military school in Songkou in the summer of 1907. To prevent the interference from the government, they named the school Songkou Physical Education School (松口體育學堂 Songkou tiyu xuetang) and successfully sought official approval.77 Wen Jinghou donated his father’s reading house as the building for the school. Xie Yiqiao successfully persuaded Zhang Gongshan (張公善), the son of the overseas merchant Zhang Zhenxun, to purchase the sports equipment for the school. Zhang Gushan’s propaganda in military schools of Guangzhou also proved to be

76 Shenbao, May 31, 1907; Dagongbao, June 11, 1907.

77 Shenbao, August 10, 1907. 167

useful at this point. In the spring of 1907, a group of students of Whampoa Military Primary

School quit the school since they were dissatisfied with the provincial arrangement of merging the school with the Short-term Officers’ School. Many of those students came from Jiaying prefecture. With the common hometown ties, Zhang Gushan contacted the students and persuaded them to join the Alliance. When the Songkou Physical Education

School was opened in the summer, Zhang invited them to teach in the school. These students accepted the invitation and made a great contribution to the school.

The school admitted more than one hundred students who were then divided to three classes. The advanced class was for students who were literate and interested in joining the Revolutionary Alliance. A middle-level class accepted students who wanted to be physical education teachers. And an entry-level class was designed for members of secret societies who mainly practiced the shooting skill in the school. Though the founders claimed that the school aimed at cultivating teachers for physical education, they mainly taught military knowledge and tactics in their classes.78 According to Wen Chongyuan’s memoir, the teachers all voluntarily taught in the school without requesting any payment.

And the students kept practicing even in the hottest days of summer. Wen emphasized that since the teachers and students in the school all had a strong sense of responsibility for the future fate of China, they were willing to sacrifice their own interests to sponsor the revolution. And as the revolutionary atmosphere grew after the uprising, Wen recalled that the teachers more openly preached revolutionary thoughts in the school and more than twenty students joined the Alliance before graduation.79

78 Yao Yuping, “Xinjun qiyi qianhou ji xinhai sanyue ershijiuri zhiyi de huiyi” (The memoir of the uprising on March 29, 1911), in Guangdong xinhai geming shiliao, 30.

79 Wen Chongyuan, “Tongmenghui zai Chao Jia diqu huodong de yixie huiyi,” 38. 168

The rising enthusiasm in the revolution among students, however, was soon extinguished by a heavy attack from the local established gentry led by Huang Zunmo. As discussed in Chapter II, this group of gentry had been in constant conflict with the commercial town elites since the implementation of the education reform in 1903. Songkou students’ involvement in the uprising provided the established gentry a good opportunity to attack the commercial town elites, who were closely associated with the students. After the Huanggang uprising, the local gentry discovered a revolutionary pamphlet edited by

Zhang Gushan, who was teaching in the Songkou Physical Education School. The local gentry immediately submitted the pamphlet to the provincial government as the evidence for the school’s involvement in the uprising. Although under the protection of Qiu Fengjia, students received the news about the investigation in advance and had time to change the content of the pamphlet, the school was shut down by the government.80 The setback made revolutionary students realize the importance of gaining the support of the local gentry.

According to the memoir of Wen Chongyuan, before students left the school, the director

Wen Jinghou summoned those who had joined the Alliance, asking them to cultivate a good relationship with the local gentry after going home.81

V. Preaching Revolution With the Pen

The repeated failures of uprisings and the tight political atmosphere frustrated many revolutionary students. In early 1908, a group of depressed students, led by Zhong Dong

80 Lin Yichang, Lin Yichang Riji (Lin Yichang Diary), ed. Li Jikui (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2012), 423.

81 Wen Chongyuan, “Tongmenghui zai Chao Jia diqu huodong de yixie huiyi,” 38.

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( 鐘動 1879-1943), a graduate of Waseda University, decided to establish a poetry association in the prefectural seat to “preach revolution through literature.” The association was named “cold garden” (冷圃詩社 Lengpu shishe), suggesting the gloomy mood of the students, though the leader Zhong Dong stressed that the name also had the implication that “after the endless ice and snow there would be a sunny spring.”82 The association had five members at the time of establishment. Three of them, including Zhong Dong and his two brothers-in-law Zeng Yongfu (曾勇甫 1890-1965) and Zeng Bo’e (曾伯諤), were classmates in Waseda University and had all joined the Revolutionary Alliance in Japan.

The other two members, Gu Zhi (古直 1885-1959) and Li Jizi (李季子), were friends of

Zhong Dong and had also joined the Alliance upon the recommendation of Zhong Dong.

The association claimed that its objective was to provide a platform for local revolutionaries to “preach revolution,” 83 but the association, rather than serving as a revolutionary propaganda organization, was more like a literary salon. Probably because of the tight atmosphere, the founders of the association had little inclination to recruit members from a broader scope. In the following two years, only twenty local literati joined the association, with most of them being the relatives and friends of the association founders. Zeng Yongfu, for instance, introduced all of his brothers to the association. Also, although the association claimed it aimed at propagandizing revolutionary ideal through literature, the form of the members’ writings was mainly classical poetry. Most of their

82 Gu Zhi, “Zhong Tianjing xiansheng shilue” (A brief introduction of Mr. Zhong Tianjing), in Guo Xuejia Guzhi (Gu Zhi, the master of Chinese classics), eds. Gu Xiaobin and Gu Xiangming (Hong Kong: Xianggang xinwen chubanshe, 2008), 234.

83 Ibid., 235.

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poems were written as responses to other members’ writings, rather than as propaganda materials for a broader audience. Their poems did show their concern toward the fate of the country and interests in changing current situation by pursuing a military career,84 but it is difficult to tell if there was any fundamental difference between their poems and those of the traditional literati.

Actually these revolutionary students did not deny that they were following the literati tradition of forming associations to express political dissent. In late 1909 all the members of the Cold Garden Poetry Association, upon the introduction of a Suzhou revolutionary, joined the Southern Society (南社 Nanshe).85 The Southern Society claimed it directly inherited the tradition of the Restoration Society (復社 Fushe) of the late Ming.

By uniting all the literati in southern China, it aimed at restoring the authentic Han culture which the Society believed had been polluted by the Manchus. The main activity of the

Southern Association was to organize the so-called “elegant gatherings” (雅集 Yaji) to have its members write poems together. The poems of the Jiaying revolutionaries were included in the anthology edited by the Society, though there was no evidence that they had participated in any of its formal gatherings. By organizing and participating in such literary salons, the students tried to imitate the literati of the late Ming who were regarded by the students as the loyal defenders of Han culture.86

84 Gu Zhi, “Lengpu qu ai Li Jizi,” in Guoxuejia Guzhi, 29.

85 The name, according to its founder Chen Qubing, means the revolutionaries in the south would not pledge loyalty to the regime in the north. Similar to the Restoration Society, the Southern Society aimed at restoring the authentic Han culture in history. But different from the Restoration Society which regarded the rise of the Neo-Confucianism as the reason for the corruption of literati culture, the Southern Society claimed that all the problems in China were caused by the pollution of the Han culture by the Manchus.

86 Chen Qubing, “Shenjiaoshe yaji xiaoqi” (The preface of the anthology of the Shenjiao Association), in Chen Qubing shiwen ji (The anthology of Chen Qubing), eds. Yin Anru and Liu Yingbai (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2009), 455. 171

Yet there was a fundamental distinction between the students and the late Ming literati. The students, though regarding themselves as social elites, were not guaranteed any official status or political privilege after the abolishment of the imperial examination. They were apparently not comparable to the members of the Restoration Society who could directly influence politics by seizing official positions. In general, these late Qing literati association, having neither connection with the powerful faction in the government nor interests in widely spreading their ideals, could only serve as a salon for students to exchange their opinions rather than as a platform on which popular support could be enlisted.

The influence of the poetry association was limited, but local revolutionaries, who were inspired by their overseas fellows, did create a new platform to spread their ideals.

The platform was newspaper. In the winter of 1907, Xie Yiqiao decided to publish a newspaper in the treaty port of Shantou. The newspaper was named China New Journal

(中華新報 Zhonghua xinbao) which indicates the revolutionaries’ aspiration to rejuvenate

China. The earliest patrons of the newspaper were all overseas merchants, though for unclear reason, Xie’s uncle Xie Rongguang did not provide any financial assistance to Xie

Yiqiao. Considering that Xie Rongguang was assuming China’s vice-consul in Penang at the time, it was understandable that he was reluctant to sponsor his nephew’s radical activities which could incur risk to his career. Actually before the China New Journal was formally published in 1908, for the sake of his nephew’s security, Xie Rongguang had arranged for Xie Yiqiao to leave for Penang to manage a herbal medicine shop owned by the family.

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Although the merchants who had cultivated a good relationship with the Qing government did not offer any assistance to the revolutionaries, the newspaper received generous support from another group of Hakka merchants in Batavia.87 The three major investors of the newspaper were Qiu Xieting, Liang Yingtang (梁映堂 b. 1848), and Liao

Yuguang (廖煜光), all of whom were influential Hakka merchants in Batavia. Qiu had been the director of the biggest Chinese association, the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan (中華會

館 Zhonghua huiguan), in the Dutch East Indies. Liang and Liao had co-founded the

Chinese Chamber of Commerce (中華總商會 Zhonghua shanghui) in Batavia.88 All three merchants had made generous donations to the education reform in their hometowns as well. Qiu Xieting, for example, was the primary funder of the Sanbao School (三堡學堂

Sanbao xuetang) of Bingcun town.

But different from the Hakka merchants in Penang, this group of merchants was less connected with the Qing government and did not gain the opportunity to invest in the modern industrial projects initiated by the government. Probably because of this reason, they did not hesitate to provide assistance to the revolutionaries. Meanwhile, Liang

Yingtang’s son Liang Mi’an (梁密庵 1881-1940) also contributed to the collaboration of the merchants and the Jiaying revolutionaries. In 1907, upon Xie Liangmu’s introduction,

Liang Mi’an met Sun Yat-sun and joined the Alliance. Liang then organized the Society of

Books and Newspapers (書報社 Shubaoshe) in Batavia, which served as the organ for the

87 “Guanyu Badaweiya huaqiao shubaoshe” (About the Chinese Books and Newspapers Society in Batavia), in Zhonghua minguo kaiguo wushinian wenxian, vol. 1, no. 11, 611.

88 Yinni huaqiao zhi (The history of the Chinese in Indonesia), ed. Huaqiaozhi bianzuan weiyuanhui (Taibei: Huaqiaozhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, 1961), 129-130.

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Revolutionary Alliance in Batavia.89 Besides making donations, the three merchants also helped to issue public shares of the newspaper to help collect more funds.90 According to an extant share certificate, the newspaper planned to issue 4000 shares, each worth 5 yuan.

Through this way the newspaper collected twenty thousand yuan altogether.91 The number was much greater than the amount most revolutionary newspapers could collect in mainland China. For example, Changchun Daily ( 長春日報 Changchun ribao), a revolutionary newspaper published in Jilin province, collected merely four thousand yuan at the time of its establishment.92

The circulation of the newspaper was successful because it had wide distribution channels in Southeast Asia. Since almost all the branches of the Revolutionary Alliance in

Southeast Asia were organized under the cover of books and newspapers societies, the

China New Journal had little difficulty in establishing a circulation network in migrant communities. 93 The newspaper had a circulation of four thousand as soon as it was published and the number reached thirteen thousand three years later,94 though among the thirteen thousand copies, seven to eight thousand were sold outside of China. Chen

Mengjian has made a comparison of the circulation of most popular newspapers in late

89 Zhonghua minguo kaiguo wushinian wenxian, 605-612.

90 Lin Yichang, Lin Yichang riji, 741.

91 The introduction and photo of the share is available on line. Accessed January 9, 2015. http://www.zghqwx.com/zjxs.asp?whichpage=134

92 Qu Xiaofan, “Qingmo Changchun ribao kanxing kao: Jianlun Tongmenghui Changchun zhibu de zaoqi huodong” (The research of the publication of Changchun Daily: And the discussion on the activities of the Revolutionary Alliance in Changchun), Changbai xuekan 1 (2006): 89.

93 Luo Yaojiu, “Yinni Huaqiao yu Xinhai geming” (Indonesian Chinese and the 1911 Revolution), Xiamen daxue xuebao 3 (1961): 56; Zhonghua minguo kaiguo wushinian wenxian, 611.

94 Lin Yichang, Lin Yichang riji, 742.

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Qing. According to his survey, the circulation of China New Journal in 1909 far exceeded the commercial newspaper Shenbao which only sold seven thousand per issue. Its circulation was also close to the Minbao, the official newspaper of the Revolutionary

Alliance, which had a circulation of twelve thousand copies at the same time.95

Before Xie Yiqiao left for Penang in the winter of 1907, he appointed several of his countymen to take charge of the newspaper. Liang Qianren (梁千仞), a returned student from Japan, was selected as the president of the newspaper. Chen Diyu (陳迪宇) and Lin

Yichang (林一廠 1882-1950), both of whom were the classmates of Xie Yiqiao in

Tongwen School, were separately appointed as the manager and editor-in-chief of the newspaper. 96 All of the early journalists of the newspaper were the native of east

Guangdong, though beginning in the summer of 1908, revolutionaries from the Yangzi

River delta area joined the newspaper. This group of revolutionaries were wanted by

Zhejiang government as they openly mourned Qiu Jin (秋瑾 1875-1907), a revolutionary martyr who was executed due to her participation in an assassination against a Manchu official. To evade the police, Chen Qubing (陳去病 1874-1933), the leader of the mourning activity and also the editor of Alarm Bell Daily (警鐘日報 Jingzhong ribao), accepted the invitation of the China New Journal to assume the position of the editor-in-chief. Chen’s participation helped to enhance the quality of the content on China New Journal.97

95 Chen Mengjian, Minbao yu Xinhai geming (People’s journal and the 1911 Revolution), vol.2 (Taibei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1986), 78-80.

96 Lin Yichang, Lin Yichang riji, 424, 741.

97 Yang Tianshi, Xinhai geming shiqi de Chen Qubing (Chen Qubing in the 1911 Revolution), Jindaishi yanjiu 6 (1984): 270-272.

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In early 1909 Chen resigned from the position due to illness and invited his countrymen Ye Chucang (葉楚伧 1887-1946) to replace him. Ye’s writing was even sharper than Chen’s and quickly helped the newspaper establish a high reputation.98 The close collaboration of the literati in the Yangzi River Delta area and east Guangdong demonstrates the revolutionaries’ ability in gaining support outside of their immediate regions.

The newspaper, though run by revolutionaries, did not dare to openly preach revolutionary thoughts at the time. In fact, the newspaper did not differ greatly from other newspapers published by the reformers. According to limited number of extant copies,99 the newspaper used one page to publish the court’s edicts, one page to report provincial government’s news, and only a half page to introduce what was happening in east

Guangdong. It did show strong interests in reporting the news relating to reform projects, like the establishment of new-style schools or the development of modern industry. The newspaper created a special column called “Industry News” (實業集聞 shiye jiwen), mainly introducing the setup of modern factories in the province. But other newspapers, like East Guangdong Daily, shared interests in this regard.

Relying on the first-hand information provided by Jiaying students in Japan, the newspaper often reported Japan’s political trend and new activities in China. For example, the newspaper had introduced Japan’s plan of rebuilding the Mukden-Antung Railway (安

98 Lin Yichang, Lin Yichang riji, 40-743, 892-893. Ye’s rich experience in political propaganda later gained him the position of the editor-in-chief of Republican Daily published by the Nationalists in 1916.

99 Only five copies are available in Zhongshan Library of Guangdong.

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奉鐵路 Anfeng tielu) in Manchuria in detail.100 If the newspaper had indeed expressed any political dissent, it lied in its reports of the official abuses and corruption. The newspaper frequently reported how lower-level clerks and soldiers harassed commoners. However, the source of most reports on political corruption came from government’s edicts rather than from the journalists’ investigation. In other words, the newspaper only dared to disclose the negative news that had been recognized by the government.

To ascribe the moderation of the newspaper to the cowardliness of the revolutionaries might be too harsh, especially given that the political atmosphere had become increasingly tight after 1907. The newspaper’s editor Lin Yichang recalled that the journalists had been very careful in choosing the content for the newspaper lest it be banned by the government. Students’ worries were not without reason. In 1908, Double Day

Pictorial (雙日畫報 Shuangri huabao), the earliest pictorial in Shantou, was shut down when it accused the Dowager Cixi of poisoning the Guangxu emperor. The editor-in-chief of the pictorial was also put in jail for one year.101 In fact, starting in 1908, many local revolutionaries began to abandon the effort of overthrowing the government with violence.

It was on one hand due to the tight political atmosphere and on the other hand due to the government’s promise to carry out the reform as soon as possible.

Except for doing limited propaganda work, revolutionary students were not active in their hometowns after 1907. And since the government accelerated the pace of the reform, many revolutionary students returned to the path of reformism. These students,

100 Zhonghua xinbao, January 29, 1909.

101 Xie Huiru, “Qingmo Mingchu de Shantou baoye jilue” (The record of the publishing industry in late Qing and early Republican periods), Chaozhou ribao, June 8, 2008, 5.

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together with the commercial town elites, actively engaged in various reform projects inaugurated by the government. These projects included the promotion of local self- government organizations, the establishment of chambers of commerce, both beginning in the autumn of 1907, and the constitutional reform initiated in October 1909. In Jiaying, though Qiu Fengjia was ousted from the position of the director of the Bureau of Education

Affairs by the local established gentry in 1906, the commercial town elites reseized and monopolized the position from 1907 to 1910. As discussed in Chapter II, in 1907 the central government requested that local gentry transform previous semi-autonomous education associations into the more official Promote Education Office and granted local government the power to appoint the office head. Rao Fushang, the Songkou merchants’ agent, relying on his distinguished performance in the education reform, successfully gained the position.

In 1908, Xie Luqian, who was backed by the Batavia merchants and founded the

Sanbao School of Bingcun town, succeeded to the position. Xie’s successor Jiang Bojian was the other founder of Sanbao School and the best friend of Xie Luqian.102 In 1908, these new-style school presidents established an allied association called the Jiaying Five

Counties Public School Association (五屬公學會 Wushu Gongxuehui), which later gained official recognition and was transferred to the Jiaying Education Association (教育會

Jiaoyuhui). Since then the Association had provided another platform for the leaders of new-style schools to establish collaboration and to compete with the traditional gentry.103

102 Zhong Jiahua, “Shishen, Zongzu, Zongjiao yu Qingmo Minchu Chaojia diqu jiaoyu de fazhan,” 42.

103 “Jiaying Jiaoyuhui zhi guaiwen” (The strange news about the Education Association in Jiaying), Jingye xunbao, 18 (1908), 34-35; “Guangdong Jiaying zhou xuejie laixin” (The letter from the education circle of Jiaying prefecture of Guangdong), Jingye xunbao, 25 (1908), 51-52.

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The reformers also controlled the newly established commercial organizations.

Since 1907, the provincial government called for the establishment of chambers of commerce. Before then, Jiaying merchants had founded an autonomous organization called the Thirty-six Guilds (三十六行 Sanshiliu hang) to seek cooperation and manage public affairs. The government, however, had a different expectation toward the chamber of commerce. According to the the government’s regulation, the chamber of commerce would help to deliver the government’ policies to merchants and also transmit merchants’ concerns to officials. In other words, it was expected to play the role of an intermediary between the government and the merchants rather than as a pure autonomous association.

At the same time, the government sanctioned the chamber of commerce with legislation. Being formally registered in the central government, the chamber of commerce shared the authority of the government.104 The semi-official nature of the chamber of commerce determined that the merchants who more closely collaborated with the government could more easily control the chamber. At the provincial level, Zhang Zhenxun, a Hakka merchant who had sponsored various modern industry projects, was selected as the director of Guangdong General Chamber of Commerce (廣東總商會 Guangdong zongshanghui). In Jiaying, the commercial town elites, benefiting from their close relationship with overseas merchants, also seized the position of the leader of the Jiaying

Chamber of Commerce.105 To compete with commercial town merchants, the Thirty-six

Guilds had proposed to establish another chamber of commerce, but their application was declined by the provincial government on the reason that the existence two chambers of

104 Rhoads, China’s Republican Revolution: The Case of Guangdong, 80.

105 Shenbao, August 25, 1910.

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commerce would create confusion among merchants and lead to the disunity of local merchants.106 The aggressive performance of the commercial town elites further offended the established gentry in the prefecture seat. As the government was turning more conservative after the death of the Dowager Cixi in November 1908, the traditional gentry also found a new opportunity to attack the commercial town elites.

VI. Metropolitan Support and Local Attack

Most revolutionary students in local society, by participating in the reform, were able to seize political power and thus showed less inclination to participate in the revolution.

Yet the radicals, especially those who were taking activities in metropolitan areas, did not totally give up. Zhang Gushan, as well as other three to four Jiaying revolutionaries, were still staying in Guangzhou to continue the propaganda work among the New Army soldiers.

Some well-to-do students, like Zeng Yongfu, the founder of the Cold Garden Poetry

Association, were setting up shops in Guangzhou to provide secret financial support to revolutionaries. 107 Those in Jiaying, though not directly participating in revolutionary activities, did not cut off their relationship with the revolutionaries in Guangzhou. In early

1909, the revolutionaries in Guangzhou believed that the time was ripe for a military revolt since they had successfully recruited Alliance members in almost all the regiments of the

New Army in Guangzhou. Besides seeking help from Sun Yat-sen and the Alliance in

Hong Kong, the revolutionaries asked their peers in Jiaying to help raise funds and train

106 Shenbao, November 20, 1907.

107 Yao Yuping, “Xinjun qiyi qianhou ji xinhai sanyue ershijiuri zhiyi de huiyi,” 32-33. Wen Chongyuan, “Tongmenghui zai Meizhou de huodong he Meicheng guangfu jingguo,” 349-350.

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spearhead troops (選鋒隊 xuanfengdui) as the supplementary force for the revolt.108 To prepare for the military revolt, revolutionaries in Jiaying were once again mobilized, though the action the revolutionaries launched suggests that after three years of propaganda, they still had little real ability in mobilizing resources or manpower in their hometowns.

The disorganization of their activities led to another tragedy and created a good excuse for the local established gentry to launch an attack against them.

The tragedy started from a robbery case. On May 27th, 1909, the house of a rich merchant in Jiaying prefecture was looted by several robbers and the merchant’s uncle was shot dead by the robbers. One of the robbers was soon arrested and confessed that he committed the crime together with Yao Zhuying (姚竹英), a teacher of the Qiyu School

(啓宇學堂 Qiyu xuetang) in Pingyuan County. Yao had tried to escape but surrendered himself under the threat of the local gentry. Yao confessed to the crime but claimed that he was instigated by Jiang Bojian, the director of the Promote Education Office and the president of Bingcun Sanbao School.

According to Yao’s confession, Jiang had secretly joined the Revolutionary

Alliance. Jiang also incited him to join the Alliance by providing him with many incentives.

Jiang told him that many local elites, including Xiao Huichang, the president of Xingmin

School of Xingning County, had joined the Alliance. If Yao agreed to follow him, Jiang promised he would help Yao find a wife in return. After providing the incentive, Jiang then told Yao that the student army in the provincial capital was in great demand of funding. To quickly obtain the money they need, Yao had to help him rob local rich men. Under Jiang’s

108 Yao Yuping, “Xinjun qiyi qianhou ji xinhai sanyue ershijiuri zhiyi de huiyi,” 31-32.

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arrangement, Yao committed the robbery with a helper introduced by Jiang. Yet Yao’s helper lost a particular bamboo stick at the crime scene, enabling the prefect to quickly crack the case. The prefect imprisoned Yao and listed Xiao Huichang and Jiang Bojian as wanted. The new-style schools that were involved in the case were also shut down under the command of the prefect.109

This case discloses the weakness of the revolutionaries in Jiaying. Although as early as 1906, the revolutionaries had begun to secretly propagandize their ideals among local students，they still had great difficulty in enlisting support from local society. In order to persuade local young men to join the Alliance, the revolutionaries had to promise them concrete benefits, rather than convincing them with revolutionary propaganda. It was also difficult for the revolutionaries to obtain financial support. Overseas merchants, like Xie

Yiqiao’s uncle, had generously supported students in the establishment of new-style schools. But after student’s connection with the revolutionary organization was exposed, many merchants removed their sponsorship to radical students. The commercial town elites, who were busily engaged in the various reform projects, were keeping radical revolutionaries at a distance as well. In brief, revolutionaries in Jiaying were isolated and helpless at the time, which explains why they chose to carry out robbery to collect funding for the revolution.

Although revolutionaries in Jiaying were excluded from local society, it did not mean they could not enlist support elsewhere. In overseas Chinese communities and metropolitan areas, revolutionaries had much more success in enlisting support. Through

109 Shenbao, October 12, 1909; Qiu Ranke, “Jiaying dangyu ganyan” (My feeling about the Revolutionary Party’s case), vol. 8 (April 1910), Minbao hedingben (Bound volume of People’s Journal), vol. 8, ed. Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi shiliao bianzuan weiyuanhui (Taibei: Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi shiliao bianzuan weiyuanhui, 1983), 4019-4024. 182

new-style voluntary associations and new political platforms, they did bring pressure to the government and provide assistance to their hometown peers who were trapped in the case.

As soon as the case was publicized, those who were directly connected to the revolutionaries immediately took actions. Qiu Xieting, the primary sponsor of the Bingcun

Sanbao School and also the leader of Hakka merchants in Batavia, instantly sent a telegram to the provincial government, requesting that the government retry the case. Wen Hao (溫

灝 1862-1921), another sponsor of the Sanbao School and the director of Hong Kong

Telegram Bureau, exerted pressure on the government too. 110 Qiu Fengjia, being an influential politician in the provincial government at the time, also pleaded for Xiao

Huichang and Jiang Bojian, both of whom were Qiu’s students in Tongwen School.111

Thanks to their efforts, the circuit intendant agreed to retry the case. Probably being aware that the situation was turning favorable to him, Yao Zhuying retracted his testimony after he was brought to the court in Shantou. He claimed that he confessed earlier merely because he could not bear the cruel torture the Jiaying prefect inflicted upon him. Being confused, the prefect urged Jiang Bojian and Xiao Huichang to deliver themselves to the government and confront Yao Zhuying. Yet Jiang and Xiao, who were afraid of being arrested, refused to show up and merely sent several reports to the provincial government to defend themselves.112

Before September 1909, the news of the case merely aroused attention among the natives of east Guangdong. Yet, since September, the newspapers in Guangzhou began to

110 Shenbao, October 15, 1909.

111 Lin Yichang, Lin Yichang riji, 423.

112 Shenbao, September 11, 1909.

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widely report the case. Many newly established voluntary associations, like the famous

Canton Merchants’ Self-government Society (粵商自治會 Yueshang zizhihui) and the

Public Opinion Association (輿論公會 Yulun gonghui), all spoke for the Jiaying students.

The arrival of the new governor-general Yuan Shuxun (袁樹勛 r. 1909-1910) in September further enhanced the expectation of the new elites in Guangdong. Yuan had established a good reputation for supporting constitutionalism when assuming the circuit intendant in

Shanghai. Before he arrived in Guangdong, local newspapers reported that Yuan had sent assistants to Guangdong in advance to investigate the established gentry who had deliberately obstructed the reform. The newspaper also stressed that Yuan Shuxun was well known for taking newspaper reports and popular opinions seriously.113

The news about Yuan gave confidence to the new elites in Guangdong. On

September 5th, the Association of Jiaying Fellows in Guangzhou (廣州嘉應同鄉會

Guangzhou Jiaying tongxianghui) first summoned a public meeting, which attracted more than two hundred attendees. During the meeting, the organizers tried to arouse public sympathy by stressing the harm the case brought to local education. The association leaders pointed out that more than one hundred schools were shut down due to the case. Many parents now refused to send their children to schools as the prefect was dispatching soldiers to search all the schools. If the natives of Jiaying did not take action on the case, the organizers warned that, the development of new-style education in Jiaying would be hindered and Jiaying would fall into decline. The association then urged all the attendees to submit petitions to the director-general of education, demanding that the government

113 Huazi ribao, August 10, August 18, August 19, 1909.

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immediately stop the search of new-style schools. The association also suggested the attendees to petition the government to send a representative to Shantou to retry the case since the association believed that the prefect, who had extorted a confession through torture, was not trustable anymore. The attendees then elected five representatives to organize the petitions.114 Upon the Association’s effort, Jiaying natives in Guangzhou bombarded the provincial government with letters and telegrams.

On September 28th, the Canton Merchants’ Self-Government Society (粵商自治會

Yueshang zizhihui),115 a radical merchant association that organized most anti-imperialist protests since 1907, discussed the issue in their regular meeting. A Jiaying representative attended the meeting and spread pamphlets about the case to the attendees. The merchants asked the representative why Jiang Bojian and Xiao Huichang refused to confront Yao

Zhuying if they were not revolutionaries. To gain the understanding of the merchants, the

Jiaying representative stressed that Jiang Bojian and Xiao Huichang were framed by Huang

Zunmo, a traditional gentry who had competed with Jiang over the allocation of local public funds. Since Huang meant to crush Jiang through the case, Jiang had no reason to put himself in danger. To further arouse sympathy from the merchants, the representative highlighted that Huang Zunmo was a conservative gentry who always “attacked merchants and destroyed education.”116

114 Huazi ribao, September 7, 1909.

115 Canton Merchants’ Self-Government Society was the most radical merchant association in Guangdong. In comparison to the other influential voluntary association, the Guangdong Association for the Study of Self-government (Guangdong zizhi yanjiuhui) founded by senior scholar-gentry, Canton Merchants’ Self- government Society was unauthorized by the government. Rhoads, China’s Republican Revolution: The Case of Guangdong, 148.

116 Huazi ribao, September 30, 1909.

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By transferring the focus of the case from Jiang’s involvement in the Revolutionary

Alliance to Jiang’s contradiction with the local established gentry, the Jiaying representative successfully aroused compassion from the merchants, many of whom had been caught in the struggle with the traditional gentry over the reallocation of local public resources as well. After the meeting, the Merchant association agreed to submit a petition for Jiang and Xiao. In the petition, they denounced Huang Zunmo for impeding the development of new-style education and urged the government to bring the case to the provincial level to avoid the interference of the local gentry.117

On September 29th, one day before the third trial of Yao Zhuying, the Public

Opinion Association invited all voluntary organizations in Guangzhou to hold a special meeting to express their support for the Jiaying students. The meeting was held in Hualin

Temple (華林寺 Hualinsi), a popular location for mass gatherings in Guangzhou. Shen

Xiaoze (沈孝則) and Ye Jingsheng (葉競生), the directors of the Education Association of Nanhai (南海) and Panyu (番禺) counties, were elected as the chair of the meeting. Shen had been the student of Qiu Fengjia when Qiu presided over the Guangzhou Advanced

Normal School (優級師範學堂 Youji shifan xuetang). Shen and Qiu had also co-organized a Students’ Self-government Society (學生自治會 Xuesheng zizhihui) in early 1909.118

Given the close relationship between Shen and Qiu, it was possible that the gathering was organized as a support to Qiu and his followers in Jiaying. During the meeting, the

117 Shenbao, October 12, 1909.

118 Bidi fengyun: Xinhai geming zai Guangdong baozhang shilu (The storm under the pen: A digest of Guangdong’s newspapers around the 1911 Revolution), ed. Guangdong shengli zhongshan tushuguan (Guangzhou: Guangdong keji chubanshe, 2011), 232.

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representatives from Jiaying delivered speeches in turn. The Huazi ribao (華字日報

Chinese Character Daily) in Hong Kong reported that they were “all deeply grieved and almost cried in the middle of the lectures. Their lectures were so touching that the audience responded with rounds of applause.” After the meeting, the representatives from the education associations across Guangdong co-signed a petition to once again request that the government retry the case immediately. An attendee also suggested that they should send the petition to their fellow townsmen in the central government since those high- ranking officials could bring more pressure to the governor-general. This proposal was applauded by all the representatives.119

The revolutionaries in Japan lacked the chance to directly participate in the public gatherings, but they published radical comments on newspapers to openly support the revolutionary activities. An author of Minbao, for example, tried to justify the robbery activity. The author admitted that the prefect might have some evidence for the robbery, though he emphasized that since the Qing government was the root of all evil, any endeavor aiming at overthrowing the government should be regarded lofty. 120 The underlying meaning was clear: robbery was acceptable as long as it was serving the purpose of eradicating the evil and strengthening the nation. This kind of argument, understandably, could only be published in Minbao, the official newspaper of the Revolutionary Alliance that was mainly circulated among overseas revolutionaries. Although the newspaper could not be published in mainland China, by widely spreading the news in overseas communities,

119 Shenbao, October 5, 1909.

120 Qiu Ranke, “Jiaying dangyu ganyan,” 4019-4024.

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the newspaper helped to foster the growing concern and maintain the momentum of the protest among overseas Chinese.

By enlisting support from overseas communities, spreading the news through mass media, mobilizing new-style voluntary associations, and organizing large-scale gatherings which attracted attendees from different regions, the supporters of the revolutionaries demonstrated a remarkable ability for launching collective actions and bringing pressure on the government. In the governor-general’s words, “the whole country was crazy about the case and threatened the government to meet their demand.”121 According to Edward

Rhoads, this kind of popular movement signifies the extent to which “the people had become politicized.”122

The revolutionaries, however, did not achieve their target through the movements.

No matter how many petitions they submitted to the governor-general Yuan Shuxun, Yuan stressed that the case could only be made clear after Jiang and Xiao deliver themselves to the court and confront Yao. Yuan also refused the petitioners’ request to bring the case to the provincial government by indicating that a case could only be brought to the upper level government after the district court finished the trial. Since Jiang and Xiao refused to show up in the district court, Yuan did not agree to retry the case in the provincial government.123

The negative response from the governor-general might be related to the change of political atmosphere since 1909. From 1902 to 1909, the Qing government had made strenuous efforts to meet the demands of the reform-minded officials. The death of the Dowager Cixi

121 Shenbao, October 15, 1909.

122 Rhoads, China’s Republican Revolution: The Case of Guangdong, 150.

123 Shenbao, October 15, 1909. 188

in late 1908, however, greatly weakened the power of the Manchu officials. To maintain the balance of power, the Manchu officials slowed the pace of the reform and tried to undermine the force of Chinese reform-minded officials. The most influential Chinese official Yuan Shikai, for example, lost power when the Manchu officials began to dominate the court. Although Yuan Shuxun had been an ardent supporter of the reform, in this tight atmosphere, he had to be meticulous in any case involving the anti-Qing force.

But the more fundamental reason for the failure of the revolutionaries lay in the weakness of their alliance. Although the petitions from various channels had almost bombarded the governor-general, most petitioners were students from new-style schools in the metropolitan area or radical merchants who were less connected to the government. In other words, the revolutionaries did not make much progress in expanding the scope of their alliance. The established gentry, either in the provincial capital or in Jiaying prefecture, rarely participated in their radical activities. The Guangdong Association for the Study of

Self-government ( 廣東地方自治研究社 Guangdong difangzizhi yanjiushe), an association dominated by senior title-holders, for example, did not participate in the protest at all. The majority of people, especially those in the non-metropolitan areas who were still bound by lineages, were beyond the access of urban radicals as well. In east Guangdong where the case was tried, the revolutionaries failed to organize any large-scale gathering to protest against the government. With limited strength, the urban radicals, though being dissatisfied with the government’s treatment to the case, could do little to change the result of the case. The governor-general Yuan Shuxun finally chose to leave the case unsettled.

He did not further investigate Jiang and Xiao, but he also refused to free Yao Zhuying, who died in prison after being locked up for two years.

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The new elites were heavily attacked in the case. Jiang Bojian, though being vindicated by the government, was suggested to resign from the position of the director of

Promote Education Office.124 The power base of the traditional gentry got even steadier after 1909 since the government expected them to maintain order.125 In 1911, when the government requested that the local gentry expand the force of local militia, the heads of the major lineages in the prefecture seat were still the undisputable leaders of the organization.126 In the last several years of the Qing dynasty, no matter whether they were reformers or revolutionaries, rather than becoming more politicized, they were rather quiet in local society. But the radicals did gain success through military activities in the metropolitan areas.

VII. The 1911 Revolution in Jiaying

In February 1910 and April 1911, the revolutionaries in Guangzhou organized two separate revolts. Different from the uprisings in 1906 and 1907 which were dominated by the secret societies, the main force of the 1910 revolt were the New Army soldiers and the participants of the 1911 revolt were revolutionary volunteers. Similar to previous uprisings, the revolutionaries in Guangzhou suffered disastrous defeats in both uprisings because of inadequate preparation. 127 Since 1910 the Revolutionary Alliance also split into two factions, the Yangzi faction and the Guangdong faction. It was the Yangzi faction of the

124 Shenbao, December 17, 1909.

125 Lingdong ribao, June 24, 1909;

126 Dongpingju zhangcheng (Regulation of Dongping Militia) (Jiaying: n.p., 1911). It is a pamphlet that introduces the regulation of the militia in the prefecture seat.

127 About the detailed introduction of the two revolts, see Rhoads, China’s Republican Revolution.

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Alliance which made the first significant success in military activities on October 10th,

1911. By co-opting Li Yuanhong (黎元洪 1864-1928), a senior general of the New Army, the revolutionaries established a military government and consolidated their success in

Hubei. Then like a domino effect, 14 of the 18 provinces seceded from the Qing government in the following 41 days.128

Guangdong, despite being a base for revolutionaries in the south, responded rather slowly to the revolution due to both the disorganization of revolutionaries after the two uprisings and the conservative nature of the senior gentry, who chose to stay neutral between the Qing court and the revolutionaries. The stand-off among different factions in

Guangdong ended in the end of October as the merchants could not bear the disorder anymore and favored negotiating with the revolutionaries. The revolutionaries, after a month of preparation, had also successfully recruited more than 100,000 volunteers from secret societies to besiege Guangzhou. On November 9th, Guangdong, as the 14th province of the 18 provinces, declared independence.

The Jiaying revolutionaries, most of whom were not in Jiaying at the time, like their leader Sun Yat-sen, rushed back to their hometown after receiving the news of the success of the Wuchang Uprising. Zhong Dong, who was studying in Japan, and Zeng Yongfu, who was conducting family business in Guangzhou and Hong Kong, arrived in Jiaying in late October. They had founded the Cold Garden Poetry Association in the prefecture seat

128 The reason for the quick crush of the Qing government was complicated. The direct reason for the military failure was that the court had dispatched Hubei New Army units to Sichuan to suppress the Railway Protection Movement. But the more fundamental reason was the increasing standoff between the Qing court and the senior governor-generals in the south, the latter of whom had greatly expanded their power through the late Qing reform and alienated from the government due to the government’s partiality toward the Manchu officials in the court. See, Zhang Jian, Dingwei zhengchao yu yubei lixian, 123-127; Guan Xiaohong, Cong mufu dao zhiguan: Qingji waiguan zhi de zhuanxing yu kunrao (From administrative assistants to formal officials: The transformation and perplexing impact of the external official system) (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2014). 191

in 1908 but left their hometown due to the tight atmosphere. After the revolutionaries in

Guangzhou declared independence on November 9th, Zhong and Zeng contacted revolutionaries in Songkou and planned to rise up together on November 13th. At the same time, Zhong Dong sent Huang Yuping (黃玉屏), a merchant from Xiyang town and also the chair of the Chamber of Commerce, to persuade the Qing defense commander to change sides. The commander refused Huang Yuping’s request but later was persuaded by Huang

Ganfu ( 黃干甫 1887-1970), a graduate of Waseda University. Zeng Yongfu also contributed to the smooth transition of the government by offering a large sum of compensation to the commander and his soldiers. Some soldiers agreed to answer Zeng’s order, who later constituted the main force for the revolutionaries in the prefectural seat.

Since Zhong Dong and Zeng Yongfu had successfully persuaded the prefect and the commander to surrender, they declared the independence of Jiaying on November 11th without informing the revolutionaries in Songkou. Their decision, however, offended

Songkou revolutionaries. After receiving the news that Zhong Dong had taken over the prefectural government by himself, Wen Chongyuan, the leader of the Revolutionary

Alliance in Songkou, immediately led three hundred volunteers he recruited from the

Freemasonry Society (洪門 Hongmen) to rush to the prefectural seat. In the darkness, the gatekeeper of the prefectural town shot a soldier of Wen’s army by mistake, which deepened the rift between the two factions of revolutionaries.

On November 14th, Xiong Yueshan ( 熊越山 1892-1913), a graduate of the

Songkou Physical Education School, leading twenty revolutionaries from Shantou, went to Jiaying to provide assistance to the Songkou revolutionaries. Xiong, without getting the approval from Zhong, killed the Manchu brigade commander and confiscated the property

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of the prefectural government. Xiong then transferred all the property to Songkou revolutionaries and left Jiaying. The revolutionaries of the prefecture seat were enraged by the reckless action of Xiong and thoroughly ceased the collaboration with the Songkou revolutionaries. After staying in the prefecture seat for several days, Wen Chongyuan led his troop back to Songkou. Wen’s departure, though preventing the escalation of conflict among revolutionaries, weakened the strength of the revolutionaries in the prefectural seat.129

In late December, the provincial government urged all the counties to establish a county assembly to take charge of administrative affairs. The assembly, according to the self-government rule, was given the right to elect county heads on its own. On January 1st,

1912, the thirty-six towns in Jiaying each sent two representatives to the prefectural seat to participate in the assembly meeting. Although the meeting was organized by the revolutionaries in the prefecture seat, the revolutionaries, rarely participating in local public affairs before the revolution, did not gain much advantage in the assembly election. Instead, the commercial town elites, who had played an active role in the late Qing reform and had established a trans-regional alliance, were the winners in the election.

Lu Gengfu, who had helped Xiyang and Bingcun reformers to establish new-style schools and assumed the position of the director of the Education Association, was elected the governor of Jiaying.130 Lu had never joined the Revolutionary Alliance, but he had established intimate relationships with two other revolutionaries, Jiang Bojian and Xie

129 Wen Chongyuan, “Tongmenghui zai Meizhou de huodong he Meicheng guangfu jingguo,” 350-352.

130 Huang Ganfu, “Meizhou guangfu huiyi” (The memoir of the independence of Meizhou), in Guangdong xinhai geming shiliao, ed. Zhongguo renmin zhengxie Guangdong weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1962), 357-359.

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Luqian, by cofounding the first middle school in Bingcun town. Lu’s success suggests that the effort of the commercial town elites in sponsoring the new ideology was rewarding. To demonstrate their anti-Qing attitude, the revolutionaries also changed the name of Jiaying to Meizhou, since Jiaying was named by the “apocryphal (Qing) dynasty” while Meizhou was “used by the Han Chinese in traditional times (the Song Dynasty).”131 In such an atmosphere, the local established gentry, who had antagonized with the commercial town elites and violently attacked revolutionaries, did not have much chance to gain any leadership position in the new government.

However, the revolutionaries, who rarely took activities in their hometown before the revolution, and the new elites, who had controlled new-style institutions during the late

Qing reform, could not get along after the new government was founded. As soon as the new governor Lu Gengfu took charge, he appointed his ally, Zhou Huifu (周輝甫 1872-

1942), as director of Chamber of Commerce. This arrangement infuriated the revolutionaries who had regarded the Chamber’s militia as their own force. At the same time, the revolutionaries could not control the forces they had temporarily recruited during the revolution either. Deng Shifu (鄧石甫 1881-1952), the leader of the Physical Education

Association, a militia organization, and the supporter of the revolutionaries, was not satisfied with their favor over the force of the Qing brigade. Deng later betrayed the revolutionaries and collaborated with the commercial town elites. To retaliate Deng, revolutionaries had launched a sudden attack against Deng Shifu’s army. Deng, together with the commercial town elites, occupying the Wuben Middle School as their base, also

131 Huazi ribao, December 15, 1911. Huang Ganfu, “Meizhou guangfu huiyi,” 358.

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launched several counterattacks against the revolutionaries. 132 Zhong Dong and Zeng

Yongfu were deeply frustrated by the escalation of conflicts among different factions. In order to maintain order in the prefectural town, Zhong Dong invited the Songkou revolutionaries to take charge of military affairs in the town. Zhong then left the prefecture with Zeng Yongfu. The Songkou revolutionaries, having no power base in the prefectural town, could do nothing but soon agreed to handover leadership back to Lu Gengfu and

Deng Shifu. From that point on, in Songkou revolutionary Wen Chongyuan’s words, “there was no revolution in the air of Jiaying anymore.”133

Conclusion

The revolutionary ideology, in comparison to the reformist ideology, had less influence and fewer supporters in local society. Most revolutionaries were young students who had acquired their political value in metropolitan areas, especially overseas cities, where they could get rid of the control of the Qing government and their families. The revolutionaries had tried to introduce the ideology in the new-style schools of their hometown, but they did not achieve much in mobilizing the local youth due to the tight political atmosphere and the intervention from the local lineages. They had even more difficulty in collaborating with the secret societies, even though Sun Yat-sen had ardently suggested them to do so. Students had tried to propagandize the revolutionary thoughts through publishing newspapers, but their publications were more popular in overseas communities than in mainland China. In the last several years of the Qing dynasty, most

132 Huang Ganfu, “Meizhou guangfu huiyi,” 358; Zhong Puguang, “Wufu nao Meizhou” (Five persons named “fu” disturbed Meizhou), Meixian wenshiziliao, vol. 6-10, 97-98.

133 Wen Chongyuan, “Tongmenghui zai Meizhou de huodong he Meicheng guangfu jingguo,” 353. 195

local revolutionaries abandoned the revolutionary ideal and returned to the path of reformism; while a few radical ones left their hometown and mainly took activities in the metropolitan cities, where the revolutionaries received more generous support from the urban residents.

The breakdown of the Qing government, rather than being brought on by the revolutionary activities, owed more to the military success of the New Army in Hubei and the estrangement of the Chinese officials from the Manchu court. Many revolutionaries rushed back to their hometowns after the outbreak of the revolution and took over the local government without bloodshed. However, their separation from their hometown determined that they could not easily establish their authority in the local society. The different factions of local revolutionaries had tried to temporarily collaborate during the revolution, but their lack of familiarity with each other and competition for power soon weakened their alliance. Therefore, although the revolutionaries played a leading role in overthrowing the local government, they were soon marginalized by the new elites in local society.

The real winners in the revolution were the new elites from the commercial towns, who through actively promoting the modernizing ideology, became the legitimate agent of the revolutionary government which claimed to be founded on the new ideology. Since the revolutionary government promoted self-rule in the transitional period, the new elites also gained formal administrative power by controlling the local government. The success of the 1911 Revolution thus enabled the new elites to consolidate themselves at the ideological and administrative level. As the new power-holders in local society, the new

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elites, however, were in constant tension with both the traditional gentry and the

Republican government.

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Chapter 4

Revolutionary Rule: Confronting Traditional Gentry and New Elites

In February 1912, the four existing middle schools in Mei County1 merged into one school upon the government’s call and were renamed Meizhou Middle School (梅州中學

Meizhou zhongxue). Two of the original four schools had been founded by the established gentry while the other two were founded by the new elites in the commercial towns. Wuben

Middle School, one of the two founded by the commercial town elites, was chosen as the main campus for the new school since it had the best buildings and equipment. The leaders of Wuben did not complain about the arrangement since they successfully gained the leadership position in the new school.

However, in early 1913, the provincial government, in order to strengthen control of new-style schools, decided to send a non-native individual to preside over Meizhou

Middle School. This decision enraged the previous leaders of Wuben. Supported by the commercial town elites, the previous Wuben teachers and students quit the new school and established their own private middle school named the Dongshan Middle School (東山中

學 Dongshan zhongxue). The school, from then on, became the base for the new elites to expand their influence and antagonize the traditional gentry.

1 As mentioned in last chapter, Jiaying prefecture had been renamed to Meizhou by the revolutionaries. In January 1913, the central government decided to abolish all the prefectures and changed the prefecture seats to counties. Meizhou thus was renamed Mei county which was equal to other four counties, Xingning, Pingyuan, Changle, and Zhenping, which had all belonged to Jiaying prefecture in the Qing dynasty. 198

This incident not only demonstrates the continual contradiction between the two groups of elites in the county. It also suggests a change in the relationship between the

“new elites” and the government. The new elites of the late Qing had actively invested in the government-initiated reform since they expected to expand their influence by leading the reform. The Qing government, being clear about the limitations on its ability, accepted the new elites as their agents and tolerated the indirect control of the reform. The fall of the

Qing government, however, marked the end of this reciprocal patron-client relationship between the central government and the new elites. The revolutionary government, eager to establish its own authority and implement its aggressive reform agenda, was not satisfied with indirect control of local society anymore. The new elites, after establishing control of local reform projects and obtaining ideological and administrative authority through the revolution, were not willing to sponsor the government’s expensive projects and intended to consolidate their vested interests through the independent control of the reform projects.

The changing expectation of both the government and the new elites led to their quick split not long after the establishment of the military government in 1911.

I. The Short Honeymoon

Under the assistance of the reform-minded gentry and merchants as well as being backed up by the People’s Army (民軍 minjun), revolutionaries did not encounter much difficulty in taking over the administration in Guangdong. Hu Hanmin (胡漢民 1879-1936), who had joined the Revolutionary Alliance in Tokyo and helped organize most uprisings launched by the Alliance from 1907 to 1910, was invited to come back from Hong Kong to assume the role of Guangdong military-governor (都督 dudu). Yet, one month later, Hu

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went to Nanjing to assist Sun Yat-sen to organize the central government. Chen Jiongming then took over as the acting governor in December 1912. Similar to Hu, Chen had both a traditional title and a degree from a new-style school. Chen became acquainted with the revolutionaries while attending the Guangdong College of Law and Administration (廣東

法政學堂 Guangdong fazheng xuetang), though he did not join the Alliance until

November 1909 when he participated in a collective petition for the summoning of an assembly and became frustrated by the conservative response from the Qing government.2

Chen helped to organize the two uprisings in Guangdong in 1910 and 1911 as well, though in comparison to Hu Hanmin who played a leading role in the Alliance, Chen’s influence derived more from his relationship with the senior reformers in Guangdong.

Under the leadership of Hu and Chen, the revolutionaries successfully seized important positions in the new government and established control over the provincial administration. The senior positions were held by a blend of revolutionaries and reformers.

Among the eight ministers, four were revolutionaries and four were reform-minded gentry who had supported the revolutionaries. The four revolutionaries were: Jiang Zungui (蔣尊

簋 1882-1931), a military leader of the New Army; Li Yutang (李煜堂 1851-1936), a Hong

Kong merchant who had supported the Hong Kong Revolutionary Alliance; Wang

Chonghui (王寵惠 1881-1958) and Wang Chongyou (王寵佑 1879-1958), both America- trained students. The four reform-minded gentry were: Wu Tingfang (伍廷芳 1842-1922), a Hong Kong lawyer who had assumed the role of Qing ambassador in America; Liang

2 Duan Yunzhang, “Chen Jiongming yu Xinhai geming” (Chen Jiongming and the 1911 Revolution), Zhongshan daxue xuebao, 6 (2001): 81; Rhoads, China’s Republican Revolution, 235.

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Ruhao (梁如浩 1863-1941), Yuan Shikai’s assistant who had been in charge of the railway construction; Li Guolian (黎國廉 1870-1940), a radical merchant who organized the protest against the takeover of the Guangzhou-Hankou railway; and Qiu Fengjia, the promoter of new-style education in Guangdong and supporter of Jiaying revolutionaries.3

After Qiu went to Nanjing to participate in the national parliament meeting, he left his position to his fellow countyman Rao Fushang, the leader of the education reform in

Songkou town.4 The Jiaying revolutionaries were well rewarded in the new government.

Three of them were appointed as the chief staff in the Privy Council (樞密院 Shumiyuan).

They were Xie Liangmu, the leader of Songkou revolutionaries and the assistant of Sun

Yan-sen in Southeast Asia; Xie Luqian, the founder of the Bingcun Sanbao School and the organizer of the 1911 Guangzhou Uprising; and Yao Yuping (姚雨平 1882-1974), a

Pingyuan revolutionary who took charge of propaganda in the New Army. In general, at the provincial level, the young revolutionaries successfully controlled many important positions in the government. In the meanwhile, to stabilize the rule, they also sought to collaborate with senior reformers who were influential in the late Qing reform and identified with the new ideology.

Revolutionaries also continued the trend of self-government that had been widely supported by the reformers during the late Qing. In December, according to a plan drawn on the eve of independence, the revolutionaries launched the organization of a provisional assembly as soon as they stabilized the rule. The assembly, different from its counterpart

3 Zhou Xingliang, “Minchu Guangdong junzhengfu jianli de gonghe zhidu jiqi shibai” (The republican system established by the Guangdong military government and its failure), Jindaishi yanjiu, 6 (1992): 106.

4 Huazi ribao, December 10, 1911.

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during the late Qing which was mainly constituted by senior gentry, tried to absorb representatives from a wide range of social groups. Among the 120 representative quotas, regional representatives were assigned 57, the Revolutionary Alliance members received

20, and the military Corps, overseas Chinese, college teachers and students, and even women all received various quotas.5

The provisional assembly also lowered the requirement for election. Anyone who had been a resident of Guangdong for five years, who was older than twenty years old, and who was not assuming a position in the government, was eligible to participate in the election.6 Since revolutionaries dominated the government and were given a special quota of 20, people who had joined or associated with the Alliance enjoyed an advantage in the election. Some traditional gentry, in order to enhance their competitiveness, joined the

Alliance just before the election.

However, the revolutionaries dominated but did not monopolize the assembly.

Among the 120 assemblymen, roughly 60 were Alliance members, with the rest being from various social groups.7 Jiaying reformers’ long-term support to revolutionaries earned them important spots in the assembly as well. Huang Xiquan, a Qing ambassador who had been

5 Huazi ribao, December 9, 1911.

6 Rhoads, China’s Republican Revolution, 247.

7 “Qian Zhongguo Tongmenghui yue zhibuzhang Xie Yingbo baogao Beijing benbu ji gesheng zhibu shu” (The report to the headquarter in Beijing and the branches in other provinces from Xie Yingbo, the former director of the Guangdong branch of the Alliance), Minyi, no. 2 (1912), see Zhou Xingliang, “Minchu Guangdong junzhengfu jianli de gonghe zhidu jiqi shibai,” 106.

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closely collaborating with Jiaying reformers and drafted the fundraising letter for the

Wuben Middle School, was elected the first president of the assembly.8

At the same time when the provincial provisional assembly was organized, the provincial government also commanded all counties to organize a similar county assembly.

This assembly was given both the right to elect a county governor and the authority to impeach the governor. Though there was no specific regulation about the composition of the county assembly, it appears that most counties equally distributed the quotas among all the towns. Therefore, both the traditional gentry and new elites had their power recognized in the new government, though the traditional gentry did not fare as well as the new elites, who, relying on their relationship with the revolutionaries, gained a more advantageous position in the assembly.9 In Jiaying, as discussed in Chapter III, Lu Gengfu, the founder of two new-style schools and the director of the Education Association, was elected the county governor. By dominating the county assemblies, the new elites also formalized their rule of local administrative affairs.

By respecting local autonomy, the Guangdong provisional government was largely supported by the local elites. Yet the strengthening of home-rule in Guangdong was to a large extent due to the support from Chen Jiongming. Chen had been an ardent promoter of constitutionalism and the self-government movement in the late Qing. After graduating from the Guangdong College of Law and Administration in 1908, Chen founded several

8 As mentioned in Chapter II, Huang had drafted the fundraising letter for Wuben School, the base of the commercial town elites in Mei county. After Qiu Fengjia died in February 1912, Huang became the main representative of the Hakka reformers in the provincial government.

9 Rhoads infers that local assemblies could be dominated by landed elites based on the evidence that many assemblymen possessed examination degrees. See Rhoads, China’s Republican Revolution, 249-250. But possessing examination degrees does not suggest that the elites were necessarily wealthy landed elites. In Jiaying, many assemblymen were degree-holders from weak lineages who did not possess much property.

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voluntary associations in his home town of Haifeng (海豐) County and published a newspaper, Haifeng Self-Government Journal (海豐自治報 Haifeng zizhibao), to promote self-rule.10 Chen was also one of the few revolutionaries who had joined the provincial assembly of the late Qing, 11 where he developed close connections with the native reformers of Guangdong. In fact, Chen did not turn to the path of revolution until he was frustrated by the slow pace of the constitutional reform in November 1909. Therefore, different from other radical revolutionaries, Chen preferred the rule of self-government and did not seek to directly penetrate local society. Chen’s policies helped him win the heart of the Guangdong gentry and merchants who repeatedly demanded that Sun Yat-sen appoint

Chen as the formal governor. However, since Guangdong was the only place Sun could possibly base himself, Sun refused to promote Chen because he was not familiar with Chen.

II. The Dominance of the Revolutionaries

On February 12, 1912, the last Qing emperor Xuantong (宣統 r. 1909-1912) abdicated. Sun, keeping his promise, resigned from presidency and returned to Guangzhou with Hu Hanmin. Merely two days after he arrived in Guangzhou, he ordered that the provisional assembly reelect Hu as the governor. Chen was forced to withdraw to Hong

Kong, though later he was invited back to assume the position of military general.12

10 Duan Yunzhang, “Chen Jiongming yu Xinhai geming,” 81. Chen Jiongming had been a radical assemblyman in the Qing government. He had ardently supported the ban of gambling and the punishment of corrupted officials when he served as the assemblyman.

11 Among the 1667 provincial assemblymen all over China, only 14 were the members of the Revolutionary Alliance. See Duan Yunzhang, “Chen Jiongming yu Xinhai geming,” 81.

12 About Guangdong gentry’s favor toward Chen Jiongming and their contradiction with Sun Yatsen, see Huazi ribao, December 26, 1911; January 13, 1912; January 23, 1912; Shenbao, May 4, 1912. About a detailed discussion on this issue, see Fu Jinzhu, “Minguo chunian Guangdong dudu xuanren fengchao: Sun Zhongshan yu Chen Jiongming fenqi shuoyuan” (The conflicts over the selection of Guangdong military 204

To establish the authority of the revolutionaries, Sun and Hu replaced all high- ranking officials with their trusted followers, almost all of whom were returned overseas students who joined the Alliance around 1905. The reformers and the senior gentry who had collaborated with the revolutionaries were all excluded from the government. Li

Guolian, the merchants’ leader, was squeezed out and replaced by Qian Shufen, a graduate of the University of Chicago. Liao Zhongkai, a graduate of Waseda University, took over the position of minister of finance. Rao Fushang, a Songkou reformer and the minister of education, was also replaced by Zhong Rongguang, the former president of an American missionary school.

In December 1912, the provincial government held a new election to replace the provisional assembly. To guarantee that the Revolutionary Alliance, which had been reorganized as the Nationalist Party (國民黨 Guomindang) in August 1912, obtained most positions in the assembly, Hu Hanmin appointed the Nationalists to be the supervisors of the election and commanded local Nationalist branches to designate candidates he supported.13 Through this method, the Nationalists won all the 120 seats in the provincial assembly.14 Huang Qiquan, the head of the provisional assembly, unsurprisingly, failed to be elected as the director of the new assembly. The provincial government also deprived the assemblies the right of electing governors. In Mei County, the elected county governor

Lu Gengfu was replaced by Tang Rixin, an Alliance member from Guangxi province who

governor: To trace the origin of the contradiction between Sun Zhongshan and Chen Jiongming), Zhejiang shehui kexue, 5 (2009): 65-75.

13 Shibao, December 14, 1912.

14 Shen Xiaomin, “Minchu sheng yihui lianhehui yu Guangdong” (The united conference of the provincial assembly in Guangdong), Xueshu yanjiu 5 (2001): 110. 205

was directly appointed by the provincial government. The revolutionary government’s new policies that aimed at establishing direct control of local society strained the relationship between the government and local reformers. In Mei County, their conflicts existed primarily over the control of education institutions, since these institutions had been the base on which the new elites accumulated their strength.

III. Aggressive Reform (1912-1913)

In May 1912, Zhong Rongguang, as other young revolutionaries who were eager to put what they had learned from abroad into practice, assumed the directorship of the

Department of Education.15 Though Zhong was not a returned overseas student, he was familiar with foreign education, especially American-style education. Zhong, with a title of juren, had been the principal Chinese teacher in Canton Christian College (嶺南學堂

Lingnan xuetang) which was established by the American Presbyterian Church. There

Zhong converted to Christianity and became accustomed to the American style of education.16

According to Zhong, the reform he initiated was modeled after both the American and French education systems, as in Zhong’s opinion, the democratic education system of

America would help to promote the diversity and vitality of education while the centralized system of France would enable the government to better control local educators who did

15 Zhong Rongguang, Guangdong ren zhi Guangdong (The Guangdong of the Guangdong people) (1913), reprinted in Sun Zhongshan yanjiu 3 (2010): 292.

16 Chen Xujing, “Youguan Zhong Rongguang xiaozhang de jidian huiyi” (The memoir of the president Zhong Rongguang), in Zhujiang yiyuan (Art garden along the Pearl River), ed. Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Guangzhou shi weiyuanhui (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1985), 1-2.

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not have much experience in new-style education.17 Zhong drafted an ambitious plan that covered all different types of education and planned to establish a School Inspection

Bureau (督學局 Duxueju) in every county to better transmit his order to local society.

According to his arrangement, the School Inspection Bureau would take charge of the establishment of different levels and types of schools in local society. The schools include kindergartens, elementary schools, middle schools, continuation schools, evening schools, normal schools, vocational schools, and women’s vocational schools. Moreover, Zhong prescribed that the bureau should also shoulder the responsibility of promoting cultural institutions, including movie theaters, community libraries, museums, playing grounds, auditoriums, mobile stages, debating society, academic society, and vernacular newspaper office.18

In June, Zhong first established a School Inspection Bureau in Guangzhou as a model for local counties. He allocated 1000 yuan to the Guangzhou bureau as its initial funding and granted the bureau the power to supervise all the elementary schools in

Guangzhou. The bureau, according to Zhong himself, was successful. 19 The bureau reorganized school districts and conducted surveys of school-age children. The bureau director also frequently visited elementary schools and provided suggestions in person. On

August 1, 1912, to show the achievements in Guangzhou and to urge local educators to establish a similar bureau in each county, Zhong organized an education conference and requested each county send one representative to attend the conference. During the

17 Zhong Rongguang, Guangdong ren zhi Guangdong, 292.

18 “Duxueju zhangcheng” (The regulation of School Inspection Bureau), Minsheng ribao, June 20, 1912.

19 Zhong Rongguang, Guangdong ren zhi Guangdong, 292-230.

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conference, Zhong devised various activities to show how school education, mass education, and vocational education should be organized in local society. In the school education part, Zhong invited the representatives to visit the exemplary school in

Guangzhou and introduced them to the latest textbooks and experimental supplies. In the mass education part, Zhong showed vernacular dramas, films, and slides to attendees and encouraged them to utilize new media to provide education to the masses. Though the

Department of Education did not require local counties to immediately organize vocational education, Zhong still invited local representatives to visit modern factories, such as paper mills and cement factories, to remind them of the importance of vocational education.20 To better communicate with local educators, Zhong announced in the Minsheng Daily (民生

日報 Minsheng ribao), an official newspaper of the provincial government, that he was willing to meet anyone who wanted to discuss the education reform with him.21 The efforts

Zhong made suggest that the government, under the leadership of a group of ambitious revolutionaries, were wholeheartedly promoting the reform according to their ideals.

However, when Zhong tried to reform local education according to his plan, he encountered a problem that almost all the other provincial departments were also finding: the government lacked abundant resources to support its ambitious plans. The Department of Education had inherited the property of the Office of Promoting Education (提學司

Tixuesi) of the Qing government and possessed a special funding through rent income. The provincial government, which was on the verge of bankruptcy, however, centralized the

20 Zhong Rongguang, Guangdong ren zhi Guangdong, 293.

21 Minsheng ribao, May 23, 1912; June 12, 1912.

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financial income of all the departments. The Department of Education thus was forced to submit all its income to the government but rarely had their budget approved by the government.22 Because of the shortage of funding, Zhong could only allocate one hundred yuan to each county for three months as the initial funding for the School Inspection Bureau.

After three months, the bureau had to be responsible for the outlay itself.23 Since the revolutionary government had abolished most miscellaneous taxes and levies, Zhong was clear that the education funding could only be extracted from local traditional academies and community degree lands (學田 xuetian)24 which were controlled by the established gentry.25 To compete with the local gentry over the allocation of these resources, the provincial government and the School Inspection Bureau adopted a series of aggressive methods to deprive the cultural and economic privileges of the traditional gentry.

To establish the authority of the new-style education, the provincial government first took efforts to deprive the gentry’s cultural privilege that was associated with the mastering of Confucian classics. Zhong Rongguang, in his proposal to the first National

Education Conference (國民教育大會 Guomin jiaoyu dahui), suggested that new-style schools should not teach the classics or venerate Confucius. The national conference did not approve Zhong’s bill but agreed that the veneration should not be compulsory in the future.26 Under the name of “equalizing classes,” the government also asked the local

22 Zhong Rongguang, Guangdong ren zhi Guangdong, 292, 299.

23 Ibid., 293.

24 The land was usually set up by a lineage to reward its members who had earned examination degrees.

25 Zhong Rongguang, Guangdong ren zhi Guangdong, 299.

26 Ibid., 301-302.

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gentry to destroy honorable plaques and flags issued by the Qing government, which had served as the symbols of the gentry’s identities.27 To further deprive the economic privilege of the local gentry, the Department of Education announced that gentry’s privileges in monopolizing the degree land and receiving double bonuses (雙胙 shuangzuo) in annual ceremonies should both be abolished.28 Both practices had been widely adopted by lineages as a mechanism to entice lineage members to earn official titles. The Department of

Education also stipulated that the income from the degree land should be turned in as the outlay for the School Inspection Bureau.29 In comparison to the reform of late Qing which merely required the local gentry to utilize public funding to invest in education, these policies directly hurt the interests of the established gentry. Yet the local gentry, who did not rely on the government to sustain these privileges, could not easily abandon these benefits solely because of the government’s urge or ideological propaganda. The Jiaoyu

Gongbao (教育公報 Education Communiqué) published in this period disclosed that most gentry refused to turn in the rent of their degree land to the School Inspection Bureau. Some gentry continued to occupy degree land relying on the diploma that their children obtained from the new-style schools. When bureau officials tried to levy an education tax in person, some gentry even organized local rogues to beat the officials.30 When Minsheng Daily

27 Minsheng ribao, June 21, 1912; June 22, 1912.

28 Minsheng ribao, May 26, 1913; September 3, 1912.

29 Guangdong jiaoyu gongbao (The education communique of Guangdong), no. 1 (October, 1912), in Minguo jiaoyu gongbao huibian, vol. 163, ed. Yin Mengxiang and Li Qiang (Beijing: Guojia tushuguan chubanshe, 2009), 441-442.

30 Chuan Yue Gui Dian sisheng jiaoyu baogao (The education report of Sichuan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan provinces), Box 50, Folder 1057, Nanjing Second Historical Archives of China, in Zhou Xinliang, “Minchu Guangdong jiaoyu gaige zhong de zhongxi wenhua chongtu” (The cultural conflicts in the education reform in the early republican period), 84.

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criticized a local leader who had bribed the county governor and occupied the community school land, the gentry wrote a letter to the newspaper, threatening to use bombs and guns to attack the journalists and let them know how powerful he was.31

By directly harming the interests of the local established gentry, the education reform did not receive their support. At the same time, the new elites, who had vigorously supported the education reform in the late Qing, also strongly opposed the reform initiated by the revolutionaries because the revolutionary government was attempting to establish direct control of the local new-style education institutions. In the late Qing, the new elites generously invested in the education reform since they could establish their authority by leading the education institutions. The revolutionary government, however, to fulfill its radical plan according to its revolutionary ideal, tried to deprive the authority of the new elites and establish direct control of the reform.

The first policy that offended local elites was the government’s attempt to deny them the right to take charge of the School Inspection Bureau. The Regulation of the School

Inspection Bureau stipulated that the director of the bureau must have four-year experience in managing new-style schools or had graduated from a new-style teachers’ college. This provision did not pose much challenge to the new elites. However, the regulation stressed that the local elites who were serving in the assembly or taking other positions in the government could not take the position of the director of the bureau.32 This regulation irritated local education leaders since most of them, through sponsoring the education reform in the late Qing, had gained official positions after the Republic was established. In

31 Minsheng ribao, October 1, 1912.

32 Minsheng ribao, June 19, 1912.

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Mei County, the director of the county assembly Lu Gengfu had been the director of the

Education Association and assumed principal of several new-style schools. Most of the other principals of the major new-style schools in Mei County gained seats in the provincial or county government as well. This regulation meant this group of elites could not utilize the new education institution to expand their influence anymore.

To ensure that local education developed according to the provincial design, Zhong preferred to employ new-style school graduates who did not have a deep root in local society. In Mei, Qiu Jianfeng (丘劍峰), a recent graduate of the Guangdong Advanced

Teachers’ College ( 廣東高等師範學校 Guangdong gaodeng shifan xuexiao), was appointed as the director of the School Inspection Bureau.33 Young graduates like Qiu did not have a solid base in local society but gained the position mainly through the appointment of the government. Consequently, the government treated these new hires as subordinates rather than the government’s allies. This superior-subordinate relationship contrasted sharply with the patron-agent relationship between the Qing government and the new elites and adversely affected the implementation of the education reform.

In the late Qing, the government, expecting the new elites to sponsor the education reform, had tried to enhance the authority of the new elites by providing them numerous support, which was not limited to the education realm. As discussed in Chapters II and III, when the Jiaying reformers competed with the local established gentry over the reallocation of public resources or sought help when local students were involved in cases of rebellion

33 “Bensipi Meixian duxueju chengjiao gexiao baogao biaoce” (The comments on the charts submitted by Mei County School Inspection Bureau), Guangdong jiaoyu gongbao, no. 4 (December, 1912), in Minguo jiaoyu gongbao huibian, vol. 163, 136-137.

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or robbery, the senior reform-minded officials often sent representatives to help the reformers to straighten the things out.

The revolutionary government, however, under the name of professionalism, refused to provide any extra support to the young educators. Zhong Rongguang, in his personal instructions to bureau directors, often highlighted the importance of professionalism and warned them not to interfere in affairs irrelevant to the education. Thus when the bureau director of Mei County requested the Department of Education rescue an elementary school principal who was kidnapped, Zhong Rongguang severely criticized the bureau director, stressing that the Department of Education had no obligation to guarantee the personal security of local educators and he would not respond to any request irrelevant to education in the future. 34 Zhong’s way of dealing with the issue, though being professional according to his standard, prevented young educators from establishing authority in local society. These educators, having neither the power base by themselves nor the support from the government, could not extract resources from the hands of the local gentry to support the development of education.

Merely three months after the wide establishment of the School Inspection Bureau, many bureau directors could not withstand the dual pressure from both the government and the local gentry. Some of them submitted the application of resignation, claiming that they could not raise enough funding to maintain the bureau and implement the reform. Zhong, except encouraging them to “do anything they could do with every penny they had,” could

34 “Bensi zhiling Mei xian duxueju zhang” (The instruction to the director of School Inspection Bureau of Mei county), Guangdong jioayu gongbao, no. 1 (October, 1912), in Minguo Jiaoyu gongbao huibian, vol. 163, 452.

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do nothing else to assist the bureau directors.35 Some bureau directors even asked their regional assemblymen to submit proposals to the provincial assembly, requesting the provincial government shut down all the School Inspection Bureaus.36 Most assemblymen agreed that the setup of the School Inspection Bureau was unnecessary and had created too many disputes.37 Since the Guangzhou Bureau was relying on the provincial government for funding, the assembly decided to first shut down the Guangzhou Bureau. The bureaus that had no financial difficulty were allowed to continue. In March 1913, some assemblymen further proposed to abolish all the bureaus. This time Zhong Rongguang compromised and accepted the proposal, merely adding the condition that every county must arrange one staff to specialize in education affairs.38

IV. Splitting with the New Elites

In addition to directly appointing directors of the School Inspection Bureau, the government also tried to directly control local middle schools. This attempt further enraged the new elites and incurred their reisistence. To achieve the target of centralizing control of middle schools, Zhong Rongguang firstly decided to replace all the existing school principals and presidents with non-native new-style school graduates. Zhong explained that this arrangement was necessary because most school principals did not have a profound

35 “Bensi zhiling Qujiang xian duxueju cheng xianzhang choukuan wuli jingfei wuzhuo qing cizhi” (The instruction to the director of the School Inspection Bureau of Qujiang county), no. 6 (March 1913), in Minguo Jiaoyu gongbao huibian, vol. 164, 43-44.

36 Zhong Rongguang, Guangdong ren zhi Guangdong, 293.

37 Minsheng ribao, November 4, 1912.

38 Zhong Rongguang, Guangdong ren zhi Guangdong, 293.

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understanding of new-style education and were usually too busy to focus on education affairs since many of them were taking other positions.39 To set up an example for local schools, Zhong first dismissed Huang Xiquan from the position of the president of

Guangdong Advanced Teachers’ College with the reason that Huang was assuming the director of provincial assembly and could not focus on the management of the school.

Zhong claimed that he had visited the school twice but had never met Huang there. Zhong then arranged Tang Xuan (唐萱), a graduate of Columbia University with a Master of

Education degree, to assume the position of the president of the school.40 Tang might have been more qualified than Huang in terms of professionalism, but he did not possess the network and resources Huang owned.

As the leader of the Hakka reformers, Huang developed an extensive network with both Hakka revolutionaries and reformers. This group of people, as mentioned above, were carrying considerable weight in the Republican government. Relying on this network,

Huang Xiquan and other Mei reformers launched forceful attacks against Zhong

Rongguang. They openly satirized in local newspapers that “to appoint a scholar without a penny to manage education affairs was like to ask a merchant without one cent to take charge of tax farming.” The gentry also alleged that the government’s interference in education affairs had been the primary reason for the slow development of the education reform.41 Moreover, the students who advocated Huang Xiquan threatened that they would

39 Ibid., 295.

40 Ibid.

41 “Yueren shengtao Zhong Rongguang feikong zhi gong’an” (Guangdong people’s attack against Zhong Rongguang over the abolishment of Confucianism), Kongjiaohui zazhi, vol. 1 no. 1 (1913): 3-5.

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organize a “bomb troop” (炸彈隊 zhadan dui) to kill Zhong if Zhong did not withdraw his order. Zhong stood up to the pressure, but the president he appointed could not withstand the hostile atmosphere in the school and resigned from the position within five months.

Zhong then appointed Jin Zengcheng (金曾澄 1879-1957), who had studied in the Tokyo

Advanced Teacher’s College, as the president,42 but Jin also soon left the school with the reason that he had to take care of his parents. The tumult finally subsided when Liao

Daochuan (廖道傳), a Mei reformer and student of Qiu Fengjia,43 took the position of the president.44 This case demonstrates the strength of the Hakka reformers, who, through the extensive network and new political platforms, constituted a political faction that dared to defy the authority of the new government.

In local society, the government’s attempt to control county middle schools incurred much stronger opposition since it directly violated the interests of the new elites.

In September 1912, the central government requested every province classify local schools and identify their nature for the convenience of management. Middle schools that had been subsidized by local taxes, according to the government’s guidance, should be defined as provincial public (省立 shengli) schools and under the direct control of the provincial

Department of Education. The provincial government would also bear the obligation to

42 Zhong Rongguang, Guangdong ren zhi Guangdong, 295.

43 Qiu Zhuchang, Qiu Fengjia jiaowang lu, 119.

44 Zhou Dingpei, “Zhongshan daxue gongzuo sanshijiunian jianwen” (My 39-year experience of working in Zhongshan University), in Guoqu de daxue (Universities in the past), eds. Zhong Shuhe and Zhu Chun (Wuhan: Changjiang wenyi chubanshe, 2005), 316.

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provide funding for the school with the provincial tax income.45 Zhong, according to the guidance, decided to divide the province into fourteen school zones and transfer at least one middle school in the zone to be a provincial public school.46 Nevertheless, almost all the middle schools in the province were funded by local donations rather than local taxes, which made the reclassification an issue. In Mei County, the debate over the nature of the

Meizhou Middle School was extremely heated and finally led to the split between the reformers and the provincial government.

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, four existing middle schools merged into the Meizhou Middle School in February 1912. Wuben Middle School was chosen as the new school’s location since its campus had been well funded by the commercial town elites and was the best. The previous leaders of Wuben also continued to preside over the

Meizhou Middle School. Yet, according to the new regulation, if a school was transformed into a “provincial public school,” the provincial government would have the right to directly appoint the principal of the school. Moreover, although the government promised to fund the school with provincial taxes in the future, it urged the school to provide a detailed list of the existing school income as a reference for future budget. The intention, according to the provincial government, was to provide appropriate funding in the future based on the schools’ current financial situation.47

45 “Zhongxuexiao shifan xuexiao li’an guize” (The regulation on the registration of middle schools and teachers’ schools), Guangdong jiaoyu gongbao, no. 7 (April, 1913), in Minguo Jiaoyu gongbao huibian, vol. 164, 155-157.

46 “Zhongxuexiao shifan xuexiao zanxing banfa” (The provisional regulation on middle schools and teachers’ schools), Ibid., 157.

47 “Diaocha shengli ge xuexiao shouru queshu” (To survey the exact number of income of provincial public school), Guangdong jioayu gongbao, no. 9 (June, 1913), in Minguo Jiaoyu gongbao huibian, vol. 164, 418- 419.

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In the eyes of the school leaders, however, the provincial government was trying to take advantage of local income to fund public schools.48 The teachers and students of the

Meizhou Middle School, especially those from the previous Wuben Middle School, were angered by the provincial arrangement and openly opposed the order. They argued that since all the funds of the Meizhou Middle School came from local society, the principal should also be elected by the local people. If the provincial government would like to establish another middle school with provincial funding, they would support the government. However, they would not allow the provincial government to take over the current school.

The provincial government disregarded their opposition and arranged for Huang

Daochun (黃道純), a native of the neighboring Xingning County, to assume the principal of the Meizhou Middle School in March 1913. The news created a tragic disturbance in the school. Deng Shaolou (鄧少樓), a former Wuben teacher, delivered a speech in a newly built building to express his dissatisfaction. Many students attended the speech. The building, due to overcrowding, collapsed. More than twenty students were injured in the accident. Yet the incident did not make the provincial government change its mind. Instead, the government requested that the school fire Deng and pushed the school leaders to confess that they were the instigators of the protest.49 The government’s arbitrary attitude infuriated the Wuben faction in the school, who decided to quit and establish another school

48 Zhong Guanlu, “Meizhou zhongxue jici fengchao de huiyi” (The memoir of several disturbances in the history of the Meizhou Middle School), Guangzhou wenshi ziliao, vol.17, 137.

49 “Xiaozhang dikang xiao gai shengli zhushi jiaoyuan yanshuo loufu yashang xuesheng duoren” (The president opposed to transform the school to provincial public school and instigated teachers to deliver speeches which led to the collapse of the building and the injury of students), Minguo jioayu gongbao xuanji, vol.164, 185.

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on their own. More than one hundred students from the commercial towns, including Ye

Jianying (葉劍英 1897-1986), the later Communist military leader, followed their teachers and quit the school as well.

Behind the Wuben faction stood the commercial town elites who supported the decision of the Wuben teachers. Upon receiving the news, Batavia merchant Qiu Xieting immediately sent money back to express his support. One month after the incident, the

Wuben teachers and students established a new school which was named Private Dongshan

Middle School (私立東山中學 Sili Dongshan zhongxue). Later overseas Mei merchants from the Dutch East Indies, Siam, and Singapore donated more than ten thousand yuan to help the school purchase equipment and renovate buildings. 50 The Dongshan Middle

School, after that, became the new headquarter for the commercial town elites in the prefecture seat.

Conclusion

Military action enabled the revolutionaries to take over Guangdong and to stabilize their rule through the support of the reformers. However, aspiring to implement their revolutionary agenda – to modernize China with Western civilization as the model – they tended to impose Western practices without considering China’s local environment. Also, being eager to establish their own authority, they not only attacked the established gentry, but also tried to weaken the influence of the new elites, who had been the most active supporters of the modernizing reform and sympathized with the revolutionaries. The

50 Zhang Qibiao and Rao Jinzhong, “Guangdong sheng Meixian dongshan zhongxue” (Dongshan Middle School of Guangdong province), Meixian wenshi ziliao, vol.6-10 (1993): 62. 219

powerless and inexperienced revolutionaries, however, were not actually rivals of the traditional gentry and new elites. The two groups of elites, relying on their control of lineages or new-style political platforms, effectively resisted the intrusion of the revolutionaries. Considering the deepened conflict between the revolutionaries and almost all the leading groups, it is unsurprising that the people of Guangdong welcomed the rule of Yuan Shikai in 1913.

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Chapter 5

A Period of Chaos: Collaboration and Self-Dependence

The revolutionaries, without a solid base, did not maintain their rule for a long time.

From 1913 to 1927, the political regimes shifted frequently in Guangdong. From 1913 to

1920, various warlords ruled Guangdong and established control through military force.

Neither the new elites nor the traditional gentry were able to expand their influence in the local administration. In 1921, the return of the revolutionaries, who had been reorganized into the Nationalist Party, reignited local elites’ interest in political participation. Since the rule of the Nationalist Party was still unstable at the time, they tended to co-opt the new elites and restored home rule. Through new political platforms and a close relationship with senior Nationalists, the new elites reestablished dominance in the local government and solidified their control of local administration.

From 1925 to 1927, the Nationalists collaborated with the Communists and retook

Guangdong from the hands of Chen Jiongming, with the Communists playing a major role in the reorganization of local administration. To further expand their influence, the new elites actively collaborated with the Communists and controlled local government and all the new voluntary associations. But the new elites, rather than serving as the loyal agents of the Communists, established themselves as local power holders whom the Communists had to rely on and compromise with. The traditional gentry, conversely, did not occupy an advantageous position under either republican regime, but the administrative power the new elites possessed was not enough to threaten their direct control of local society. The

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Nationalists unified the country in 1927, but by then, the two groups of elites had deeply entrenched their power in local society and made any social unification and penetration difficult.

I. A Period of Chaos

The rule of the revolutionary government lasted less than two years due to the antagonism between the President Yuan Shikai and the revolutionaries led by Sun Yat-sen.

In March 1913, the Nationalist Party, which was established on the foundation of the

Revolutionary Alliance in August 1912, successfully dominated the national parliament.

The party leader Song Jiaoren (宋教仁 1882-1913), however, was assassinated just before he was planning to form a cabinet. Popular opinions held that Yuan Shikai was the murderer though there was no solid evidence. In April, Yuan further irritated the

Nationalist Party by signing the Reorganization Loan Agreement (善後大借款 shanhou dajiekuan) with the five-power consortium of banks without obtaining the approval of the

Nationalist-dominated Parliament.

In June 1913, under the name of overthrowing Yuan Shikai, the Nationalists launched the Second Revolution (二次革命 erci geming). The merchants and reformers who had supported the Revolutionary Alliance during the 1911 Revolution, however, all opposed the Second Revolution. The merchants, according to Rhoads, despaired over the money crisis in Guangdong. To make up the budgetary deficit, the government issued a large amount of unsecured notes, depreciating the value of the notes greatly. Twenty days after the revolutionary government declared war, the value of the paper currency in

Guangdong had been discounted by 53 percent. The merchants had high hopes of the

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financial assistance promised by Yuan. Sun’s antagonistic relationship with the Beijing government undoubtedly plunged Guangdong merchants into despair.1 The city and county assemblies, which were dominated by reformers, also strongly opposed the declaration of war. They openly expressed that they advocated the central government in the north and did not want to see a separation between the south and the north.2

The Nationalist Party could not even unify opinions inside the party. Although the majority of the Nationalists in the parliament supported Sun, about one fourth of

Nationalist parliamentarians openly expressed their dissatisfaction toward the Nationalist

Party. It is noteworthy that the Mei Nationalists in parliament, including Huang Xiquan,

Rao Fushan, and Xie Liangmu, all opposed Sun’s decision. Huang Xiquan even organized an association called the Common Voice Society (同聲社 Tongshengshe) to criticize the

Nationalist Party.3 Losing the heart of merchants, reformers, and its own members, the

Nationalist Party lost the war in one month. Long Jiguang (龍濟光 1867-1925), a Yunnan warlord who had helped the revolutionaries maintain order in 1911, decided to follow the order of Yuan and entered Guangdong in August 1913.

From 1913 to 1920, warlords from Yunnan and Guangxi controlled Guangdong.

The radical reforms initiated by the revolutionaries were all abolished by the warlords. The former Qing rule of avoidance was resumed in the appointment of local officials. From

1913 to 1920, the thirteen county heads of Mei were all assumed by non-native officials

1 Rhoads, China’s Republic Revolution, 260.

2 Minli bao, May 13, 1913.

3 Fukamachi Hideo, Jindai Guangdong de zhengdang, shehui, guojia: Zhongguo Guomindang jiqi dangguo tizhi de xingcheng guocheng (Parties, society, and state: The Nationalist Party and the formation of its party-state system) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2003), 119.

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and of the thirteen heads, ten hailed from other provinces. These officials received their positions mainly through the recommendation of the warlords. The self-government movement that had been promoted by both the Qing and the revolutionary governments was also discontinued under the warlord regime. Although the new elites continued to dominate the existing platforms like the Education Association or Dongshan Middle

School, without the government’s support, the new elites could not exert much influence in local society. The lineage heads, relying on the entities of lineages, still firmly controlled the local people and resources, though the ideology of lineage, in David Faure’s words,

“had become irrelevant to the definition of the local to the center.”4 In this period, both the traditional gentry and new elites remained quiet in local society. The situation did not change much until the return of the Nationalists in 1920.5

II. Allying with Chen Jiongming (1920-1923)

In 1920, Sun Yat-sen, under the name of “protecting the constitution” (護法 hufa) which had been abolished by the Republican government in Beijing, commanded Chen

Jiongming to oust the Guangxi and Yunnan cliques from Guangdong. Chen, who had been developing a military force in Fujian for two years and raised 20 battalions there, successfully drove the two cliques away in October 1920. Chen then invited Sun back to establish the Chinese Republican Government in Guangzhou (廣州國民政府 Guangzhou guomin zhengfu) and elected Sun the “extraordinary president” (非常大總統 feichang

4 David Faure, Emperor and Ancestor, 341.

5 “Meixian dangpai douzheng shi” (The history of the conflicts among the parties in Mei county), Dangsheng (The voice of the party), 1 (August 1927): 3.

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dazongtong) in May 1921, though from October 1920 to April 1922, Chen was the governor and actual power-holder in Guangdong.

As mentioned in Chapter IV, Chen Jiongming had been an ardent supporter of the self-government and constitutionalist movements in the late Qing. After Chen assumed control of Guangdong in 1920, he immediately declared that he would resume home-rule and make Guangdong a province that was “possessed, ruled, and shared” (共有，共治，

共享 gongyou, gongzhi, gongxiang) by Guangdong people.6 Upon Chen’s call, the local self-government, after being interrupted for eight years, was once again promoted by the provincial government. Moreover, the government announced that it would select county heads through popular election, a practice Chen adopted when he ruled western Fujian in

1919.

Chen’s move excited the Guangdong elites, especially those who had been elected as assemblymen in the 1913 election but were not able to exercise their right due to the intrusion of the warlords. In December 1920, the members of the 1913 provincial assembly gathered in Guangzhou and requested that the government restore the aborted assembly.

However, out of concern that rule had not been stabilized in local society, the government declined their demand and refused the assemblymen’s request to openly discuss election rules.7 Instead, the government, after internal discussions, promulgated the draft of County

6 Chen Jiongming, “Gao Yue fulao xiongdi shu” (The letter to my elders and brothers in Guangdong) (November 4, 1920), in Duan Yunzhang and Ni Junming, eds., Chen Jiongmin ji (The anthology of Chen Jiongming) (Guangzhou: Zhongshan daxue chubanshe, 1998), 492.

7 Huazi ribao, December 12, 1920.

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Heads and County Assemblymen Election Ordinances (暫行縣長縣議員選舉條例

Zanxing xianzhang xian yiyuan xuanju tiaoli) on its own.

According to the Ordinances, any adult male (older than 20) who had either graduated from an elementary school or had a formal occupation would be granted suffrage.

Though women were not permitted to vote,8 the voting requirement, in comparison to those for the elections of 1909 and 1912, was rather low, especially given that there was no property qualification. There was, however, a limitation that eligible voters must provide three days’ labor on a public project before voting. Otherwise one had to pay six hao (毫), the equivalent of three day’s wages. The provincial government also determined that the election would not be a direct one. The voters would first elect three candidates, and then the provincial governor would select one as the formal county head.9 The Ordinances incurred heated debates among the Guangdong elites, who either disagreed with the provision or were dissatisfied with the indirect rule. In March 1921, uner the repeated urge of the elites and upon Chen Jiongming’s agreement, the provincial assembly was restored.

The assembly immediately held a conference to question the ordinances the government drafted. The assemblymen confirmed that the selection of county heads through popular election was a creative policy to institutionalize popular sovereignty. However, the assemblymen pointed out that the indirect election, which granted the provincial governor

8 Actually upon women’s petitions, the provincial government later granted them the voting right in the revised edition of the regulation. See Guangdong qunbao, April 29, 1921. Though with the excuse that women had to take the responsibility of reproduction and could not have abundant time to take charge of county affairs, the revised regulation still refused to grant women the right to be elected as county heads. See “Xianzhang ji xian yiyuan xuanju an qicao liyou” (The reason for the draft of the electoral regulation for county heads and county assemblymen), Guangdong qunbao, March 31, 1921.

9 Ibid., December 27-20, 1920.

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the power to make the final decision, would create contradiction between the local population and the provincial government and did not conform to the spirit of self- government. They thus suggested the government to directly appoint the top candidate.

The government, however, insisted on the original plan.10

According to contemporary newspapers, the election did not stimulate active responses among local people in the beginning, in part due to the various restrictions. A piece of news from June 15th discloses that the government had originally planned to organize the voting on August 1st, but since few people showed the desire to register as voters, the government had to postpone the voting to November 1st. The article pointed out that the requirement of three days’ labor or equivalent wages and the uncertainty of the campaign result were the primary reasons that discouraged local people from participating in the campaign. Since no one was willing to work on a public project just for the sake of gaining the right to vote, candidates had to pay the wages for their supporters. According to the estimation in the article, in small counties, a candidate needed 10,000 votes in order to win the election; while in big counties, at least 20,000 votes were needed. This meant that a candidate had to invest at least 600 to 1,200 yuan to pay his voters, not to mention other propaganda costs he had to shoulder in order to win the heart of his supporters.

Moreover, even if the candidate invested a large sum of money, the result was still uncertain since the provincial government had the arbitrary power to pick one from the top three candidates. To distinguish himself from the three finalists, a candidate must be able to establish connections with the officials in the provincial government. Because of these restrictions, the article concluded that the election would not be fair since people with

10 Ibid., March 2, 1921.

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economic power and political connections would gain an absolute advantage in the election.11 In order to stimulate local enthusiasm, the government declared in late June that the candidates who ranked the second and the third would be granted the title of alternate county governors. It was unclear if the strategy was successful or not. According to the provincial government’s report, about two million people registered as voters, who accounted for one tenth of the total population, or half of all adult males, in Guangdong.12

Although the government claimed that this was a “popular” election, 13 the restrictions set up by the government dictated that the economic and political resources, rather than the popular support from the local residents, were critical for the the election.

The new elites, in comparison to the traditional gentry, were more capable in gaining both the economic and political support and overwhelmed the traditional gentry in the election.

Among the 160 elected county heads, only forty possessed traditional titles, while the majority of them had graduated from new-style schools or led the local reform since the late Qing.14

11 Huazi ribao, June 15, 1921.

12 Hong Kong Times, April 28, 1921.

13 John Fitzgerald suggests that the 1921 election was a successful attempt to meet the expectation of “popular sovereignty” since the elected county leaders were generally native residents. Yet he does not investigate the body of the county heads and county assemblymen. As my dissertation demonstrates, the result of the election merely represented the will of the new elites who could better mobilize external resources rather than the will of the majority of local people who were under the control of traditional gentry. See John Fitzgerald, “From County Magistrate to County Head: The Role and Selection of Senior County Officials in Guangdong Province in the Transition from Empire to Republic,” Twentieth-Century China, vol. 38 no. 3 (October 2013): 278.

14 Lin Zhijun, Bi Lu, and Zhong Linzhi, “Chen Jiongming pan Sun, liansheng zizhi ji minxuan xianzhang” (Chen Jiongming’s betrayal of Sun, the united-province autonomy, and popular election of county heads), in Guangzhou wenshi ziliao, vol.9 (1963): 171.

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The result of the election in Mei County also attested to this point. The county first organized the election for county assemblymen, in which the new elites gained an overwhelming advantage in the election. Ye Junian (葉菊年 1861-1936), the founder of

Dongshan Middle School, was elected the director of the assembly. The vice director was also a teacher from Dongshan. The new elites from commercial towns controlled the majority seats in the assembly as well.15 In the election for county head, Xiong Li (熊理

1890-1953) successfully obtained the position. Xiong had studied in Guangdong and

Guangxi Language School (兩廣方言學堂 Liangguang fangyan xuetang) presided by Qiu

Fengjia and joined the Alliance around 1911. It was said he had established a bank with other Mei people in Southeast Asia to collect funding for the 1911 Revolution.16 Since

1916, he had stayed in Surabaya of Dutch East Indies and helped to publish the Sibin Daily

(泗濱日報 Sibin ribao), a newspaper owned by the revolutionaries since 1909. From 1918 to 1920, the Central Department of Education appointed Xiong Li as the education inspector in the west Dutch East Indies. Xiong developed intimate relationship with overseas Chinese leaders through the opportunity. In 1919 when a group of Chinese immigrants were persecuted by Indonesian natives but did not receive fair treatment from the colonial government, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in the Dutch East Indies, which was under the leadership of Mei merchants, dispatched Xiong Li to mainland China to seek help from the Chinese government. 17 As a senior Alliance member and the

15 Zhu Ming, “Meixian de xian canyihui gaikuang” (The introduction of the assembly in Mei county), Meixian wenshi ziliao, vol. 9 (1993): 90.

16 “Meizhou xinhai geming renwu lu” (The bibliography of Meizhou people who had participated in the 1911 Revolution), Meizhou wenshi, vol.15 (2001), 139.

17 “Xiugai Zhong He lingyue cankao wenjian huibian” (The collection of documents on the revision of China-Dutch consular treaty), Box 1039, Folder 101, Nanjing Second Historical Archives of China, in 229

representative of overseas Mei merchants, Xiong had connections with the Nationalist leaders and was fully supported by overseas rich merchants, it is unsurprising that he won the election in Mei.

The traditional gentry, as the actual controller of the majority of people in local society, should have gained more advantage in this “popular election.” But the traditional gentry did not have much chance in the election. It was not only because of the government’s preference for new elites, but also due to the mutually-exclusive relationship among lineages. As discussed in Chapter I, the lineage, as a kinship organization, was bound through the sacrifice to a common ancestor by a group of people who settled together in a certain area. This principle determines that lineages were fundamentally exclusive to each other and could not be merged with other lineages at will. They might collaborate with each other in local public projects or in the face of external threats, but because of the discouragement of the imperial government, trans-lineage alliances could not develop into an independent organization and gain legal recognition of the government in time of peace.

To gain the trust of the government, trans-lineage alliances were still managed in rotation like individual lineage and lacked a standing management committee.18 In other words, an alliance, though providing mutual assistance among lineages, failed to work out a new framework to fundamentally change the way by which local people and resources were organized. Moreover, lineages also often fell into fierce conflicts over the limited resources of water, land, and markets in a certain area. The cellularized structure of lineage society

Zhang Jian, Dongnanya huaqiao minzu zhuyi fazhan yanjiu (The research on the development of nationalism in Southeast Asia), (PhD. Diss., Xiamen University, 2002), 124.

18 Myron Cohen, “Shared Beliefs: Corporations, Community and Religion Among the South Taiwan Hakka During the Ch’ing,” Late Imperial China, vol.14, no. 1 (June 1994): 1-33. 230

and the mutually-exclusive relationship among lineages determined that traditional gentry could not easily mobilize people and resources beyond a lineage.

In comparison, the new-style voluntary associations established by the new elites had gained the legal protection from the day they were founded and thus had much more freedom of action. With law, rather than ancestor-sacrifice rituals as the foundation, the associations were more open to outsiders and could more easily recruit members from a broad range of localities. In Mei, the promotion of large-scale new-style schools provided the first opportunity for the new elites from all the commercial towns to gather in the prefecture seat. By organizing the Promote Education Office, the Education Association, and the Chamber of Commerce, the new elites further expanded the scope of their activities and institutionalized their rule of local public affairs. Some radical members of the new elites, by joining the Revolutionary Alliance and the Nationalist Party, became members of national organizations that spread across provinces. Relying on this extensive network that incorporated the Nationalists, overseas merchants, and local reformers, the new elites could more easily mobilize the political resources and economic resources. The new elites still had difficulty in getting access to the majority of local people who were controlled by lineages, but in an election that did not set the “popular support” but the political patronage and economic capability as the most important preconditions, the new elites were powerful enough to defeat the lineage-based traditional gentry.

Chen Jiongming was a distinctive Nationalist Party member who regarded the achievement of self-government as the precondition for state-strengthening and preferred the federal system over the centralized rule. His respect to self-rule provided the new elites a chance to regain their political platform which had been lost from 1913 to 1920. The new

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elites, seizing this opportunity and relying on their extensive network, directly controlled the local government and assembly, the highest administrative organs in the county.

Although Chen Jiongming soon broke with Sun Yat-sen because of different political ideals, the new elites dominated the county government in most years from 1921 to 1949.

Among the 40 county heads of this period, 30 were natives of Mei County and 26 of them were from the commercial towns of Mei.19

III. Collaborating with the Communists

Not long after Chen and Sun retook Guangdong, the contradiction between Chen

Jiongming and Sun Yat-sen deepened. Chen Jiongming preferred to lay a solid foundation in Guangdong before launching the Northern Expedition against the Beiyang government.

Yet Sun Yat-sen insisted on taking military actions as soon as possible. In May 1921, after pushing the “extraordinary Parliament” ( 非常國會 feichang guohui) of Guangzhou

Chinese Republican Government to elect him as the “extraordinary president,” Sun prepared to unite China by force. Chen, however, colluding with the warlords in southeast

China, decided to keep the peace and actively preached federalism. Being extremely dissatisfied at Chen, Sun dismissed Chen from the position of provincial governor in April

1922. In May, the Zhili (直隸) warlords in the north agreed to restore the constitution and the Beiyang Parliament in Beijing. Chen, holding that the objective of “protecting the constitution” had been achieved, urged Sun to resign from his post of president and

19 Yang Fen, ed., “1911-1949 Meixian liren xianzhang” (The previous county heads of Mei), Meixian wenshi ziliao, vol.5 (1984): 42-45.

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bombarded Sun’s residence with cannons. Sun was forced to flee to Shanghai but retook

Guangzhou in January 1923 with the help of the warlords from Yunnan and Guangxi.20

By 1923, Sun had incorporated new forces into his alliance. The forces were the

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Soviet Union which stood behind the CCP. As early as December 1921, the Third Communist International (Comintern) had sent Maring

(馬林, Ma Lin, or Henk Sneevliet 1883-1942) to contact Sun Yat-sen and discuss the potential of collaboration. Yet by then the Comintern still favored the more powerful warlords like Wu Peifu (吳佩孚 1874-1939) in the north and Chen Jiongming in the South.

Wu and Chen, eventually, turned against the Soviet Union out of the concern that other imperial countries would oppose the Soviet Union.21 Sun, after being betrayed by Chen, actively sought assistance from the Soviet Union.

In January 1923, Sun finally established connection with Adolph Joffe (越飛

Yuefei 1883-1927), a Soviet diplomat, and signed a Joint Statement with him. In the

Statement, Joffe declared that the Soviet Union would assist Sun to unite China. Upon

Sun’s insistence, Joffe also admitted that “the Communist organization and the Soviet system cannot be applied in China” since the social conditions in China were different from

20 About Chen’s clash with Sun, the Nationalists had explained it as Chen’s betrayal of Sun. See Lu Zhizhi, Xie Shengzhi, Li Shuixian, and Huang Huilong, Chen Jiongming panguo shi (The history of Chen Jiongming’s betrayal of the nation) (1922; reprint, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007). Yet recent scholars tend to explain it as the result of the differences of political ideals of the two persons. About the literature review of this topic, see Zhao Liren, “Keguan pingjia Chen Jiongming: Jianping Chen Jiongming ji de chuban” (Objective evaluation of Chen Jiongming: And the comments on the publication of the anthology of Chen Jiongming), Xueshu yanjiu 3 (1999): 61-63.

21 Huang Deyuan, “Xi gongchan guoji cong lianhe Wu Peifu, Chen Jiongming dao lianhe Sun Zhongshan de yanbian” (The analysis on the change of the strategy of the Comintern: From the alliance with Wu Peifu and Chen Jiongming to the alliance with Sun Zhongshan), Xueshujie 4 (1990): 29-35.

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those in the Soviet Union.22 Afterwards, the Soviet Union began providing material aid and organizational advice to the Nationalist Party. From 1923 to 1925 alone, the Soviet Union offered 11 million roubles to the Nationalist Party.23 The Russian assistance enabled the

Nationalist Party to survive after being almost eradicated by the warlords in the South.

At the same time, the Soviet Union, having recognized that the Communism was not suitable for China, was actively promoting cooperation between the Communists and the Nationalists. Upon the Comintern’s request, the Communists agreed to join the

Nationalist Party as individuals, with the attempt to make use of the influence of the

Nationalist Party to spread Communism and to develop its own organization in China. Sun

Yat-sen, after a series of failures, also tried to take advantage of the Communist force to make the Nationalist Party a more disciplined and powerful party like the Bolsheviks.24

In January 1924, the two parties declared to establish a United Front (統一戰線 tongyizhanxian). Despite their divergence in ideologies, the two parties agreed that their immediate common goal was to overthrow the warlords and imperialism. To help the two parties achieve their goal, the Soviet Union assisted them to establish the Whampoa

Military Academy (黃埔軍校 Huangpu juxiao), which proved to be critical for the military success of the Nationalists. Beginning in February 1925, after half-year military training, the Whampoa military students launched the first Eastern Expedition (東征 dongzheng)

22 “The Joint Statement of Dr. Sun Yatsen and A. A. Joffe,” Dalu bao, January 27, 1923; About the details of the negotiation between Sun and Joffe, see Li Yuzhen, “Sun Wen Yuefei huitan de muhou taiqian” (The information about the talk between Sun Yat-sen and Joffe), Guangdong shehui kexue 1 (2011): 110-121.

23 Li Yuzhen, “Sun Wen Yuefei huitan de muhou taiqian,” 111.

24 Liu Zhuang, “Cong Sun Wen Yuefei xuanyan dao guogong diyici hezuo” (From the Joint Statement of Sun Yat-sen and Joffe to the First United Front), Shanghai shehui zhuyi xueyuan xuebao 2 (2013): 57-58.

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with the goal of eliminating Chen Jiongming’s force in northern and eastern Guangdong.

Mei County, which was under the influence of Chen at the time, experienced dramatic changes after the army arrived.

In March 1925, after finishing preliminary training in the Whampoa Academy, the

Nationalists launched the first Eastern Expedition against Chen Jiongming. The army that occupied Mei County was led by Zhang Minda (張民達 1885-1925), a Malaysian-born

Mei native. Zhang, like many other overseas youth of the time, was attracted by Nationalist ideas and joined the Alliance before 1911. He gained the trust of Sun Yat-sen by attempting to assassinate Yuan Shikai, who had sent Long Jiguang to drive Sun’s force out of

Guangdong in 1913. In 1924, Zhang was appointed the commander of the second division of the National Revolutionary Army (國民革命軍 guomin gemingju).

Zhang’s staff officer Ye Jianying was a native of Mei. As mentioned in Chapter IV,

Ye was one of the earliest students in Dongshan Middle School. After graduating from

Dongshan, Ye attended the Yunnan Military Academy (講武堂 Jiangwu tang). He then joined the Nationalist Party upon the recommendation of He Ziyuan, who had funded many revolutionaries in Xingning County of Jiaying prefecture.25 Since both Zhang and Ye originated from the commercial towns of Mei, their arrival excited the commercial town elites, even if they had closely collaborated with Chen Jiongming before the arrival of the

Nationalists. The commercial town elites, especially those who had joined the Nationalist

25 Yang Xiangwei and Pan Cangshi, “Huangpu qianhou de Ye Jianying,” in Liangci dongzheng daiyu lai: Meixian diqu dangshi ziliao congkan (The two Eastern Expedition that brought rain here: The collection of the materials of the Communist Party in Mei county) (Meixian: Diwei dangshi bangongshi, 1986), 192-195.

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Party, rather than hiding from the war, gathered together upon the Nationalist call and actively made preparation for the arrival of the army.

However, the Nationalists, which had been aware of the importance of mass power under the influence of the Soviet Union, attempted to take a different strategy to collaborate with the local population.26 This new strategy focused on mobilizing the masses, rather than relying on a few elites, to support the revolution. With the assistance of the

Communists, the Nationalists began to implement this new strategy on the road of the first

Eastern Expedition. The military leader of the Expedition was Jiang Jieshi (蔣介石 1887-

1975), but the army set up a Political Department (政治部 Zhengzhi bu), with Zhou Enlai

(周恩來 1898-1976) as the director, to take charge of the propaganda of revolutionary thoughts and the establishment of local party branches. On the way of the first expedition

(Feb-May, 1925), Zhou began to establish the party branches of the Nationalists inside the army. During the second (Oct-Nov, 1925) expedition, the army adopted the commissar system introduced by the Russians. The commissar held equal rank with the military commander and was in charge of improving morale of the military force. Zhou was appointed as the chief commissar of the First Corps directed by Jiang Jieshi. All the five divisions of the army were assigned a commissar to take charge of the political propaganda.

Since the Communists played a major role in the political propaganda, four of the five commissarships were assumed by the Communists.27

26 Zhongguo guomindang zhongyang weiyuan hui dangshi weiyuan hui, ed., Guofu quanji (Complete works of the father of the nation), vol.2 (Taibei: Dangshi weiyuan hui, 1973) 524-31, 537-43.

27 Martin Wilbur, Missionaries of Revolution: Societ Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), 222.

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Under the effort of the Communists, the army did take on a new look. According to a soldier’s memoir, before the army approached the target town, Zhou would send two soldiers to the town to put up posts that stated: “The war’s purpose is to save the people;”

“We will not draft our soldiers;” “We will not collect money from you;” and so on.28 When the army entered a town after defeating the enemy, the commissar and the members of the

Political Department would walk in front of the troop and distribute handouts that introduced the goodwill of the army.29

Qingnian junren (青年軍人 Youth Soldier), a magazine published by the left-wing in the academy, believed that the propaganda was successful. According to the magazine’s report, local people no longer feared the army. Some of them even helped to ship the weapons for the army. Women and young students especially admired the army. An old woman even prayed in a temple for the safety of the army.30 It was unclear how accurate the information was, but the propaganda did indeed impress some young students, who had never participated in any revolutionary activity before the arrival of the army. Yan Zhizhi

(嚴植之), a student of the Wuhua Middle School (五華縣立中學校 Wuhua xianli zhongxuexiao), could still recite the content of the Bulletin of Whampo Military Academy

(黃埔軍校佈告 Huangpu junxiao bugao) 57 years after the war. He recalled that the post, written in verse and mainly introducing the non-disturbing policy of the army, had been

28 Chen Jincheng, “Guogong hezuo wujian bucui” (The collaboration of the Nationalists and Communists was invincible), in Diyici guogong hezuo shiqi de Huangpu junxiao (The Whampo Military Academy in the first United Front), ed. Zhonguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi quanguo weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (Beijing: Wenshi ziliao chubanshe, 1984), 295.

29 Chen Jincheng, “Guogong hezuo wujian bucui,” 297.

30 “Benbu dongzheng riji, February 15, 1925” (The diary of the Eastern Expedition) Qingnian junren 2 (1925), in Liangci dongzheng daiyu lai, 1.

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widely spread in local elementary and middle schools.31 Students also enjoyed singing the song with the lyrics “Overthrowing the warlord, in addition to powers.”

On April 12, 1925, the Political Department of the army, under the leadership of

Zhou Enlai, arrived in Mei after finishing the propaganda work in the neighboring

Xingning County. At the time, Mei County was temporarily ruled by Ye Jianying, whose division had occupied Mei in late March. As a graduate of Dongshan and a native of

Bingcun, Ye showed partiality toward the students of commercial towns. After taking over

Mei, he delivered two lectures, which were separately held in Dongshan and Bingcun

Middle Schools.32 The Political Department under the leadership of Zhou, however, tried to mobilize popular support as extensively as it could. The Department, rather than merely approaching schools which had connections with the Nationalists, launched propaganda activities in all the major schools, including the Meizhou Middle School, the opponent of

Dongshan Middle School.

The principal of the Meizhou Middle School, though in constant tension with

Dongshan leaders, agreed to lend the theater of the school to the army as the space for public performance. To more widely spread the Nationalist thoughts, the Political

Department organized a mass meeting in an outdoor square which targeted all the residents in Mei. More than one thousand people attended the meeting. 33 Because of both the military victory and the successful political propaganda, the party army did not encounter much difficulty in stabilizing its rule in eastern Guangdong.

31 Yan Zhizhi, “Diyici dongzhengjun zai Wuhua de diandi qingkuang” (Anecdote about the Eastern Expedition Army in Wuhua), Liangci dongzheng daiyu lai, 279.

32 Yang Xiangwei and Pan Cangshi, “Huangpu qianhou de Ye Jianying,” 204-205.

33 “Benbu dongzheng riji,” in Liangci dongzheng daiyu lai, 289.

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In May, however, the army was forced to go back to Guangzhou to put down the uprising of the Guangzhou Merchant Volunteers Corps (廣州商團起義 Guangzhou shangtuan qiyi). The officers of the Political Department also went back to Guangzhou with the army, but Zhou Enlai left some officers, almost all of whom were Communists, in local counties to continue the propaganda work.

The two officers who were left in Mei were not natives of Mei. One of them, Zhang

Wei (張維 b. 1906), was from the neighboring county Dabu (大埔). Zhang, funded by his grandfather’s student Zou Lu (鄒魯 1885-1954), the president of Guangdong University

(國立廣東大學 Guoli Guangdong daxue) at the time, gained the opportunity to study in

Guangdong University. In the university, Zhang, influenced by his classmates, joined the

New Student Society (新學生社 Xin xuesheng she), which was a pioneering student organization established by the leaders of the Chinese Socialist Youth League (中國社會

主義青年團 Zhongguo shehuizhuyi qingniantuan). Zhang came into contact with the

Communists after that and joined the Youth League in 1924. Since Zhang came from northeastern Guangdong and spoke Hakka, the Communist Party decided to send him to

Mei to spread revolutionary thoughts among students.34

The other officer, Hong Jianxiong (洪劍雄 1899-1926), a native of Hainan (海南) province, was a graduate of the Whampo Military Academy. He joined the Communist

Party in Whampo and assisted Zhou Enlai to do propaganda work on the road of the Eastern

Expedition. Although Hong did not speak Hakka, he was left in Mei due to his familiarity

34 Rao Weihua, “Wosuo renshi de Zhang Wei” (What I knew about Zhang Wei), in Liangci dongzheng daiyu lai, 229-232.

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with the method of propaganda. Since neither of the two officers had deep roots in Mei,

Zhou Enlai, through his connections with the new elites, arranged the two officers to teach in Xueyi Middle School (學藝中學 Xueyi zhongxue), which was split from a missionary school in 1924 in the tides of anti-imperialism and had allied with Dongshan in the competition with other local schools.35

Although Zhang Wei and Hong Jianxiong received teaching positions in the local school, the two officers, having little authority in local society, had to rely on the existing leaders of local schools to conduct the propaganda. The student leaders of Dongshan and

Xueyi were enthusiastic in collaborating with the two officers. For students, it provided a good opportunity to establish direct connections with the Nationalists. Many of them also believed that the anti-imperialist and anti-warlord ideology was much more “progressive” than the ideology of “saving the nation through studying hard” preached by school principals.36

In the summer of 1925, the students of Dongshan, under the assistance of Zhang

Wei, organized the Dongshan Students Save the Nation Group (東山學生救國運動團

Dongshan xuesheng jiuguo yundong tuan). Students performed vernacular dramas in major commercial towns to collect donations for the Guangzhou-Hong Kong Strike (省港大罷

工 Shenggang da bagong). The leader of the group recalled that at least 40 students joined the group and collected more than 800 yuan by performing 21 plays.37 In August, the group

35 Zhu Yangneng, “Wosuo zhidao de Meixian dageming qingkuang” (What I knw about the Great Revolution in Mei county), in Liangci dongzheng daiyu lai, 251-253.

36 Chen Qichang, “Dageming shidai Meixian geming douzheng de yidian huiyi” (The memoir of the Great Revolution in Mei county), in Liangci dongzheng daiyu lai, 218.

37 Ibid., 217; Hu Mingxuan, “Huiyi dongzhengjun lai Mei yu 5.12 baodong” (The memoir of the arrival of the Expedition Army and the uprising on May 12), in Liangci dongzheng daiyu lai, 234. 240

and the Anti-Religion Society (反宗教同志會 Fan zongjiao tongzhi hui) of Xueyi Middle

School merged and founded a Revolutionary Youth Society (革命青年團 Geming qingnian tuan). The society, raising funds from its members and receiving instructions from

Zhang Wei and Hong Jianxiong, often discussed Communism in their small circle and even published pamphlets to introduce Communism. Chen Qichang (陳啓昌), the chair of student union at Dongshan and the director of the Save the Nation Group, recalled that the students had published two pamphlets. One was the Marxist Historical Materialism (馬克

思主義唯物史觀 Makesi zhuyi weiwu shiguan), the content of which came from the

Supplement section of the Beijing Journal (京報 Jingbao); the other was Capitalism and

Communist Revolution (資本主義與共產革命 Ziben zhuyi yu gongchan geming), which was Chen Duxiu’s (陳獨秀 1879-1942) speech in the first convention of the Socialist

Youth League.

Although Zhang and Hong tried to spread Communism among students during this period, it must be pointed out that students did not know their identities as Communists. In the students’ mind, those political officers represented the authority of the Nationalist Party, and the collaboration with these officers would grant students a high ground in the propaganda of the most up-to-date ideology.38

In September 1925, the Nationalists launched the second Eastern Expedition to thoroughly eliminate Chen Jiongming’s force. By November the army had successfully occupied most towns in eastern Guangdong. Upon stabilizing the rule of the area, the

38 Chen Qichang, “Dageming shidai Meixian geming douzheng de yidian huiyi,” 218-220.

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Political Department took a set of more aggressive methods to extend the authority of the

Nationalist Party. On November 8th, 5 days after the army occupied the county, the

Nationalists declared that they would abolish the county assembly and adopt direct democracy.39 On November 10th, Zhou Enlai, who had been appointed as the special commissioner in the East River (東江) District, arranged Jiang Dongqin (江董琴 1888-

1933), a left-wing Nationalist, to assume the position of the county governor of Mei. Jiang came from Fujian province and was not a native of Mei. Since 1921, non-natives had never held the position of the county governor of Mei. The appointment of Jiang demonstrates the government’s desire in directly controlling the local administration. Yet Jiang, like

Zhang Wei and Hong Jianxiong, without the ready resource of cadres, had to rely on the local leaders to organize the administrative system and thus was subject to the disposition of local elites.

In Mei, the elites that had controlled the local administration were mainly from the

Dongshan faction. The reorganization, as a result, was to a large extent conducted according to the interests of the Dongshan faction rather than of the party. Before the arrival of Jiang, the principal of Dongshan Middle School had received the news about the dominance of the Communists in the East River area. The principal thus hastily appointed

Li Shian (李世安), a secret Socialist Youth League member, as the provost of the school.

After the new governor Jiang Dongqin arrived, Li Shian successfully received the position of the director of the Bureau of Education (教育部 Jiaoyubu).40 Chen Qichang,

39 “Benbu Zhengzhibu gongzuo baogao” (The report of the work of the Political Department), in Liangci dongzheng daiyu lai, 294.

40 “Meixian dangpai douzheng shi,” 8.

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the leader of the Dongshan Students Save the Nation Group, was also appointed as the director of the Propaganda and Work Departments.41 Though interacting more with the

Dongshan faction, the Nationalists did not thoroughly abandon the Meizhou faction. The county government also left some positions to the Meizhou faction. Yet, being suppressed by the Dongshan faction, the Meizhou faction merely obtained some insignificant positions, like the director of the Department of Women (婦女部 Funü bu).

Although the Nationalists were the nominal leaders in the Eastern Expedition, the

Communists took charge of most propaganda work and the reorganization of the local administration. The Communist Party thus took advantage of this opportunity to develop their own organizations. The party quickly expanded its force by allying with the Dongshan faction, but its close connection with Dongshan prevented the party from winning the support of the Meizhou faction.

During the first Eastern Expedition, the party only recruited the members of the

New Student Society, a left-wing society that was recognized by the Nationalists.42 Since the society was loosely organized and did not provide a framework for upward mobility, students were not very interested in the organization. According to a student’s memoir, anyone who subscribed to The Guide (嚮導 Xiangdao) would be automatically entitled the membership of the New Students Society. The members of the society had little interaction with each other and rarely took activities together.43

41 Ibid., 8; Chen Qichang, “Dageming shidai Meixian geming douzheng de yidian huiyi,” 219.

42 Hu Mingxuan, “Huiyi dongzhengjun lai Mei yu 5.12 baodong,” 234.

43 Qiu Kehui, “Qiu Kehui tongzhi de huiyi: Fangwen jilu,” 26.

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Students began to develop enthusiasm in Communism when the political officers formally recruited members of the Communist Party and the Socialist Youth League from the students. Chen Qichang, the first communist in the county, recalled that the two political officers Zhang Wei and Hong Jianxiong often discussed Communist thoughts with him after the first Eastern Expedition. The two officer, however, hided their identities until

November 1925, when the second Eastern Expedition had concluded and the left-wing had controlled the local government. The two officers then invited Chen to join the Communist

Party, telling him that they wanted Chen to lead the Communist Party Branch in the county.

Since Zhang and Hong were both officers of the government, Chen accepted their invitation without hesitation. It was also wise for the two officers to firstly recruit Chen to the party. Chen, as the chair of the Student Union of Dongshan, introduced more than eighty students to the CCP in one month.44 In early 1926, Peng Hanyuan (彭漢垣 1893-

1928), the older brother of Peng Pai (彭湃 1896-1929), the famous peasants’ rights activist, was appointed as the county governor of Mei by Zhou Enlai. Under Peng’s rule, the

Communist Youth League (共產主義青年團 Gongchan zhuyi qingniantuan), which was transformed from the previous Socialist Youth League, also expanded quickly in Mei. In less than one year, the Youth League recruited 652 members.45

The success of the Communists was directly linked to their control of the local government. Since the three successive county governors in this period were all

Communists, local students did not have any doubt about the legitimacy of the party. At

44 Chen Qichang, “Dageming shidai Meixian geming douzheng de yidian huiyi,” 221.

45 “Meixian dangpai douzheng shi,” 11.

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the same time, the Communists’ emphasis of its ideology as “progressive” and its attack of other revolutionary ideologies as “conservative” provided Dongshan students a useful tool to distinguish themselves in local competition, as the students could use this rhetoric to attack their long-term opponents, the Meizhou faction. According to a Youth League member’s memoir, the students’ interest in Communism was fully evoked when Dongshan students launched open debates with Meizhou students about which revolutionary thoughts were more progressive. In order to gain an upper hand in the debates, which were often published in two local newspapers separately controlled by the two factions, the Dongshan students read many books on the Communist theory. The journals published by the

Creation Society (創造社 Chuangzao she), a left-wing writers’ society, were also widely spread among students.46 By flexibly applying those new theories in the discussion, the

Dongshan faction often overwhelmed its opponents and portrayed itself as the “authentic revolutionaries” in local society.

For students of the Dongshan faction, the participation in the Communist organizations enabled them to gain political resources and ideological advantages. Relying on their connections with the Communists, the Dongshan faction also dominated the newly established Communist organizations. Among the 652 Communist Youth League members, about 500 came from Dongshan Middle School, Xueyi Middle School, and Jiaying

University (嘉應大學 Jiaying daxue), all of which were established by the commercial town elites. Another 100 came from various popular associations, like workers’ union and women’s union, organized by the Communists. While no more than twenty students from

46 Qiu Kehui, “Qiu Kehui tongzhi de huiyi: Fangwen jilu,” 27.

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the Meizhou Middle School and the County Teachers’ College (縣立師範 Xianli shifan), which were the base of the local established gentry, joined the League.47 To compete with the Dongshan faction, the Meizhou faction chose to join the Sun Yat-senism Society (孫

文主義學會 Sunwenzhuyi xuehui), which was founded by the rightist officers of

Whampoa Academy on the way of the first Eastern Expedition. The society, using Dai

Jitao’s (戴季陶 1891-1949) book Philosophical Foundations of Sun Yat-senism (孫文主

義的哲學基礎 Sunwenzhuyi de zhexuejichu) as its guidance, had been founded for the purpose of competing with the Communists over the control of the consciousness of soldiers.48 After the second Eastern Expedition, being fully surpassed by the Communists in propaganda, the Society also sent representatives to local society to preach Sun’s Three

Principles of the People (三民主義 Sanminzhuyi). 49 It is unclear how effective the propaganda of Sun Yat-senism was, but the students of the Meizhou Middle School, regarding the participation in the organization as a great opportunity to antagonize the

Dongshan faction, almost all joined the Society.50

Local students, according to their memoirs, had been moved by different ideologies.

However, the fact that the students of Dongshan all joined the Youth League while the students of Meizhou all joined the Sun Yat-senism Society suggests that the concern over

47 “Meixian dangpai douzheng shi,” 11.

48 Ibid., 9; Bao Huiseng, “Guanyu diyi er ci Dongzheng” (About the first and second Eastern Expeditions), in Liangci dongzheng daiyu lai, 179; Chen Jincheng, “Guogong hezuo wujian bucui,” in Liangci dongzheng daiyu lai, 181.

49 Peng E’ru, E’ru zizhuan (The autobiography of Eru) (1940) MS. Collection of Hakka Culture Center, Meizhou, 26; “Meixian dangpai douzheng shi,” 9.

50 “Meixian dangpai douzheng shi,” 9.

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the sectional intrests, rather than the individual ideas, was more important in determing the students’ political choices. The Communist political officers were dissatisfied with the open antagonism between the two factions in the county. The ambition of the political officers, as mentioned above, was to unite all the possible forces to support the revolution.

In March 1926, Zhou Enlai’s wife Deng Yingchao (鄧穎超 1904-1992), as the party representative of the Communists, specially visited Mei with the attempt to ease the tension between the two factions. Deng delivered a lecture in the Female Teachers’ College (女子

師範 Nüzi shifan) to preach the importance of the unification of students. During the lecture, Deng indicated that the existence of different factions would do harm to the revolutionary enterprise since the factions would divide the revolutionary force. She also criticized students’ inclination of attaching tags of “progressive” and “conservative” to different factions. Deng said she believed that the majority of students were progressive, no matter which faction they belonged to. And even if in “progressive” schools some students were not revolutionary at all. Deng thus requested that students disband the student union in each school and establish a united student union, which could serve as the foundation of the collective action of students.51

To penetrate the Meizhou faction, Deng Yingchao then tried to appoint a young communist Peng Chongxin (彭崇興) to be the principal of the Meizhou Middle School.

Peng joined the Communist Party when he attended Guangdong Advanced Normal School in Guangzhou. Yet before he went to Guangzhou, he had studied in the Meizhou Middle

51 Bu Xinghua, “Huiyi Deng Yingchao zai Dongshan zhongxue de yici yanjiang” (Memories of Deng Yingchao’s lecture in Dongshan Middle School), Meixian wenshi ziliao, vol.4 (1983): 1-3.

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School. The Communist leaders thus supposed that the Meizhou faction would not resist the appointment of Peng.52

Peng, after studying in Guangzhou for several years, might have identified more with the Party than with local factions, but local students, who had little direct contact with the external world and were still sheltered by the local established gentry, would not change their identification easily. Uniting with the two Teachers’ Colleges, they launched a large- scale protest against the appointment of Peng. Under the pressure, the Communists and the

Dongshan faction had to abandon their plan, though they did successfully change the president of the Female Teachers’ College which was smaller and weaker than the Meizhou

Middle School.

In addition to doing propaganda work among students, the Communists also tried to unite local workers and peasants. After the second Eastern Expedition, the Communists began to organize the workers’ unions across industries. More than ten professional unions, like the Barbers’ Union (理髮工會 Lifa gonghui), the Tailor Union (縫紉工會 Fengren gonghui), and the Construction Workers’ Union (建築工會 Jianzhu gonghui), were organized in three months. Some unions were newly established while most unions were founded on the foundation of the existing guilds. The most influential union, the

Construction Workers’ Union, was developed from the labor contractors’ guild (包工頭協

會 Baogongtou xiehui) which had existed in the prefecture seat since the 1910s. In the beginning of 1926, the Communists urged the different professional unions to organize a

United Union (總工會 Zong gonghui) to integrate workers in the area. Local unions, in

52 “Meixian dangpai douzheng shi,” 10. 248

response, summoned representatives and elected an executive committee. The leader of the

Construction Workers’ Union, relying on the influence of the labor contractors’ guild, was elected the chair of the United Union. However, in order to better control the workers’ movement, the Communist Party decided to arrange a Communist to lead the United Union.

In March 1926, a worker of the Barber’s Union was reelected as the chair of the United

Union. Under the instruction of the Communists, the United Union then organized various fights against the employers in different industries. The Shoe-industry Union (履業工會

Lvye gonghui), for example, first launched an eight-hour day movement and pushed employers to raise their salary. After going on strike for five to six days, the employers gave in to the workers’ demands. Many other unions followed suit and all achieved positive results.53 To enhance the class consciousness of the workers, the Communists also asked

Dongshan students to start a night school for workers. In addition to indoctrinating workers with the Communist ideology, students also taught workers how to read simple correspondence.54 These movements initiated by the Communists were beneficial to the local workers, but the United Union still failed to unite all the workers in Mei. The leader of the Construction Workers’ Union, who had been elected as the chair of the first United

Union, was apparently dissatisfied with the Communists’ intervention. Relying on the firm control of local construction workers, the Construction Workers’ Union split with the

Communists-controlled United Union and established an East Guangdong Labors’ Union

( 嶺東總工會 Lingdong zong gonghui) to antagonize the unions controlled by the

53 Qiu Guohua, “Meixian gongren yundong de fazhan” (The development of the workers’ movement in Mei county), in Liangci dongzheng daiyu lai, 256-257.

54 Ibid., 257-258; Hu Mingxuan, “Huiyi dongzhengjun lai Mei yu 5.12 baodong,” 235.

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Communists. To enhance its influence, the East Guangdong Labors’ Union actively sought collaboration with the Meizhou Middle School. Their alliance made the Communist penetration more difficult.

The mobilization of peasants, which had been regarded as a critical reason for the later success of the Communist Party, did not achieve much progress in Mei during the two

Eastern Expeditions. Upon the instruction of the Communists, students did visit rural areas to play vernacular dramas for peasants or distribute propaganda brochures. Some of them wrote songs to describe the hardship of peasants’ life and taught the local residents to sing the songs.55 However, the oral propaganda was the only work students had done since the students themselves did not identify with the policy on peasants drafted by the Communist

Party.

From the students’ perspective, Mei County was located in a mountainous area and had little arable land. Even if there had existed landlords, they did not possess too much land. The contradiction between landlords and peasants thus was not acute or even did not exist. Although the students had spread the slogan of “reducing the rent by 25 percent” (二

五減租 erwu jianzu), they did not mobilize peasants to fight with the landlords.56 In a formal report submitted to the CCP Guangdong Regional Committee, a Mei Communist indicated another problem that widely existed in rural China. He pointed out that a large portion of land in Mei was managed by lineage trusts and were regarded as the common property of all the members in a lineage. It made the struggle against the landlord class

55 Qiu Kehui, “Qiu Kehui tongzhi de huiyi: Fangwen jilu,” 26.

56 Chen Qichang, “Dageming shidai Meixian geming douzheng de yidian huiyi,” 222-223.

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meaningless since the landlord class could include everyone in a village, including poor peasants who also enjoyed a share of the lineage trusts. The commonly held land could be the primary source of peasants’ living, making the redistribution of such land meaningless.

In a region where the Communists implemented the land reform, the peasants of a village were starving because their tenants in another village refused to pay them any rent. The

Peasant Association (農會 Nonghui) thus had to ask the tenants to return the extra grain to the landowners.57 In general, the students, being familiar with local situation, refused to implement the policies that they believed to be improper in local society. Students had their reasons to make the choice. Their insistence, however, crippled the Communists’ attempt to mobilize the peasants. The failure of the peasant movement in Mei suggested that even local Communists would not always strictly carry out the order of the Party. Many people chose to ally with the Communist Party during the two Eastern Expeditions. However, before the Party devised an effective strategy to regulate local party branches, the local

Communists could only be the allies of the Party rather than the loyal cadres of the Party.

IV. Self-Reliance in the Party Conflict

By reorganizing local administration and establishing mass organizations, the

Nationalist government established its authority and deepened the control of local society.

Yet, as discussed above, the Communists played a major role in both the reorganization of

57 Though the report was written in 1929, the writer complained that he had submitted a report about this issue a long time ago. It can be speculated that local Communists had disagreed with the Communist Party about the form of land reform in Mei for a long time. “Meixian gongzuo qingxing de yipie” (A glimpse of the situation in Mei county), in Guangdong geming lishi wenjian huiji, 1928-1931 (Compilation of materials on the revolution in Guangdong), vol.31, eds. Zhongyang dang’an guan and Guangdong sheng dang’an guan (Beijing: Zhongyang dang’an guan, 1986), 192-193.

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local administration and the propaganda of revolutionary thoughts. The domination of local society by the Communists thus aroused strong suspicion among the Nationalists after 1926.

Some right-wing Nationalists worried that if the Communists continued to consolidate their influence in local administration, the Nationalists would run the risk of being replaced by the Communists at the local level and thoroughly lose their control of local society.58 Being fearful of the expansion of the Communists and the growth of the authority of the left-wing leaders, Jiang Jieshi decided to purge the Communists from the Nationalist Party. On April

12 and 15, 1927, the Nationalists launched massacres against the Communists in both

Shanghai and Guangzhou.

Although the “Party Purification” ( 清黨 Qingdang) movement brought a destructive influence to the Communist Party in the metropolitan areas, 59 the Mei

Communists, like the Communists in most rural areas, did not suffer much from the movement since they were more reliant on local power holders than on the Communist

Party. 60 Despite the violent clash between the two parties since late 1926, local

Communists knew little about the change of the political situation. A student Communist recalled that the local party branch did not receive the news about the massacre until a local bookstore boss mentioned the incident one week after the purge. Even after the students received the news, the political atmosphere in Mei did not change much since the local

58 About a detailed and profound discussion on this issue, see Wang Qisheng, Dangyuan, Dangquan yu Dangzheng: 1924-1949 nian Zhongguo Guomindang de zuzhi xingtai (Comrades, Control and Contention of the Kuomintang, 1924-1949) (Beijing: Huawen chubanshe, 2910), 52-94.

59 In Guangzhou, more than 1000 Communists were arrested on April 15th, when Li Jishen launched the purge of the Communists upon Jiang Jieshi’s call. Guangzhou minguo ribao (Guangzhou Republican Daily), April 19, 1927.

60 According to the reports on Guangzhou minguo ribao, most rural Communists successfully escaped from the arrest. See Liang Shangxian, Guomindang yu Guangdong nongmin yundong (The Nationalists and the peasants’ movement in Guangdong) (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2004), 872. 252

administration was still firmly controlled by the Dongshan faction who had allied with the

Communists. Students then received a telegram from the party’s regional committee, which did not provide any specific instruction but merely asked the Communists to organize armed struggles if the local situation permitted.

In Mei County, local Communists were given enough time to prepare for the struggle. On May 1st, the Dongshan students, as well as the workers of the United Union, first organized a mass demonstration to express their opposition to the massacre. Then after full preparation, local Communists, recruiting 80 workers and students, took over the county government on May 12th. Since most officials of the county government, including the county governor, were from the Dongshan faction, the government did not organize any resistance. The overthrown county governor, whose younger brother was also a

Communist, even blamed students for not notifying him in advance.

The students then invited the teachers from Dongshan and the leaders of the United

Union to establish a new People’s Government. However, in the eyes of local people, the government, still under the control of the Dongshan faction, did not experience any fundamental change. The rule of the new government did not last long. Six days later the

Nationalists sent a division to suppress the uprising. Students immediately withdrew from the county seat to the neighboring countryside. Having no clue about what to do next, students fell in despair. In this process, sixty of the eighty uprisers fled. The remaining twenty persons had expected the left-wing government in Wuhan to send military troops to retake Mei, but after waiting for several days they gave up and all left Mei. The

Nationalists listed all the uprisers as wanted. However, all of them, under the protection of their families or overseas relatives, were able to leave Mei safely. Several of them tried to

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reestablish connection with the Communist Party in Wuhan while some left for Southeast

Asia to seek refuge. And most of them came back to Mei after the tumult quieted down.61

After the Communists withdrew from Mei, the County Security Corps (縣保安隊

Xian baoandui), which was established based on the militia of the late Qing and still under the control of the local established gentry, immediately reseized the county government and shut down the institutions controlled by the Communists.62 The three schools that had closely collaborated with the Communist were also forced to close down. In June, the principal of the Meizhou Middle School was appointed the new county governor.

It was the first time since 1911 that the local established gentry gained a leading position in local government. The Meizhou faction then arranged their men to restructure the Nationalist Party Branch (黨部 dangbu), the United Union, and the Chamber of

Commerce. They also petitioned the government to transform Dongshan Middle School to a county public school with the reason that the leaders of the school were all “local bullies and evil gentry” who had colluded with the Communists.63

Facing the severe attack from the Meizhou faction, the Dongshan faction, though temporarily losing the favor of the government since they sided with the Communists, still demonstrated a strong ability in maintaining its position relying on its extensive network.

61 Chen Qichang, “Dageming shidai Meixian geming douzheng de yidian huiyi,” 223-226; Hu Mingxuan, “Huiyi dongzhengjun lai Mei yu 5.12 baodong,” 236-239; Lu Qixin, “Wo dui Meixian dageming douzheng lishi de huiyi” (My memories of the Great Revolution in Mei county), in Liangci dongzheng daiyu lai, 249- 250. In 1928, several Communists were sent back to Mei to reestablish the party branch in Mei. Two Communists who had participated in the 1927 Uprising were arrested and executed at that time. See Meixian diqu yinglie zhuan (The biographies of the martyrs in Mei county), ed., Zhonggong Meixian diwei dangshi bangongshi (Meixian: Diqu xingshu mingzhengchu, 1986), 60-62.

62 Chen Qichang, “Dageming shidai Meixian geming douzheng de yidian huiyi,” 225.

63 Xiangchuan, “Meixian gongdang panbian shi” (The history of the Communists’ betrayal in Mei county), Dangsheng, 29-31.

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Like in previous conflicts with the local established gentry, overseas Hakka merchants and students all sent telegrams to the provincial government, pushing the government to reopen the school.64 In a telegram, Dongshan graduates in Japan denied that Dongshan Middle

School had associated with the Communists. They argued that the Meizhou Middle School was just utilizing the purge to retaliate against Dongshan because of the long-term conflicts between the two schools. They also falsely emphasized that, in comparison to the conservative Meizhou students, students in Dongshan had always been the loyal followers of the Nationalists.65 Ye Jianying, as a graduate of Dongshan, also directly exerted pressure on the provincial government. The Dongshan faction’s attempt of disassociating from the

Communists infuriated the Meizhou faction. They published a pamphlet to introduce the close relationship between Dongshan and the Communist Party. Yet, Dongshan Middle

School, with strong connections with the senior Nationalists and the extensive support from

Dongshan graduates, was allowed to reopen in October 1927.

Conclusion

The period from 1913 to 1927 is notoriously messy for historians. Without a powerful central government, different political factions or military leaders tried to reorganize local society according to their distinctive political agendas. While most political leaders aspired to unite the country and establish centralized rule, some warlords, with Chen Jiongming as a representative, being aware of their limited ability, respected the

64 Aiwei, “Shanyi bianhua de ren you hao jifu miankong” (A capricious person has several different faces), Dangsheng, 14-19; Zhang Qibiao and Rao Jinzhong, “Guangdong sheng Meixian dongshan zhongxue,” 65- 66.

65 Xian dangbu zhijian weiyuanhui (Executive committee of county party branch), “Yifeng kuaiyou daidian” (A telegram), Dangsheng, 25-26. 255

rule of self-government and provided local elites the chance to directly control the local administration. The collaboration of the Nationalists and the Communists, however, suggests the popularity of statism in contemporary China. The two parties, though being guided by different ideologies, shared the common goal of creating a united and strong

China. As we will see in the next chapter, in order to rally popular support to serve their ends, the two parties, with the Communist Party playing a major role, established various new-style mass organizations to mobilize local people. However, without the ability to establish an organizational framework that was independent from the local power structure, the two parties could only rely on existing local elites to build their new political platforms.

The two parties thus could not escape the fate of being taken advantage of local elites.

Local elites, especially the new elites who had occupied a dominant position in local administration, utilized the new platforms that covered all aspects of local affairs to further extend their authority. With these platforms, the new elites had made themselves entrenched power-holders when the Nationalists reestablished the centralized rule in

Nanjing in late 1927.

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Chapter 6

The Nationalist Regime: From Collaborators to Accomplices

Introduction

In September 1927, the two rival governments in Wuhan and Nanjing, set up by the different factions of the Nationalists, agreed to merge. In February 1928, the Nationalists held the Fourth Plenary Session of the Second Party Congress (二屆四中全會 Erjie sizhong quanhui, 1928.2.2-7) in Nanjing. At this meeting, the Nationalists reached consensus that the Nationalist Party would thoroughly abandon the policy of uniting with the Soviet Union and the Communists. The party also announced that they would disband the five departments of peasants, workers, merchants, youth, and women which had been established for the purpose of mobilizing the masses.

However, the Nationalist Party claimed that it still regarded the masses as the foundation of the party. How to enlist popular support while keeping people’s force under the party’s control thus became a heated topic among the Nationalists.1 In the following meetings, specifically the Fifth Plenary Session of the Second Central Executive

Conference (二屆五中全會 Erjie wuzhong quanhui, 1928.8.8-15) and the Third Central

1 About the debate among the Nationalists, see Wang Qisheng, Dangyuan, Dangquan yu Dangzheng: 1924- 1949 nian Zhongguo Guomindang de zuzhi xingtai (Comrades, Control and Contention of the Kuomintang, 1924-1949) (Beijing: Huawen chubanshe, 2910), 156-157.

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Executive Conference (第三屆中央執行委員會 Disan jie zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui,

1929.3.15-28), the party generalized two rules to guide its relationship with the people.2

On one hand, to gain access to the people, the party determined that they would continue to organize local party branches and popular associations. On the other hand, the party stressed that it would mainly communicate its ideologies and policies through propaganda and education, rather than through instigation which the party believed would create class conflicts among the local population. Moreover, the party devised a set of methods to ensure that the mass mobilization was done under the strict instruction of the party.

From 1927 to 1936, the Nationalist government reorganized the local party branches in an attempt to recruit more loyal party members. The government also tried to establish an alliance with the non-elite groups like workers and small merchants by supporting their professional associations. In rural society, although the government discontinued the organization of peasant associations, the government tried to establish more effective control by incorporating local informal power-holders into its formal administrative structure. And to improve the livelihood and win the heart of the people, the government also inaugurated a series of construction projects, specifically the construction of infrastructure in rural areas. In brief, the Nationalist government tried to mobilize a broader social group to participate in its state-strengthening program. In this regard, the

2 The representatives of the Nationalists had proposed different suggestions about how to reorganize mass movements during these conference. The majority of the representatives held that to instigate conflicts among people would directly harm the unification of the society and violate the Nationalists’ ideal of working for the interests of different classes of people. Ge Zhijing, “Zhongguo Guomindang dierjie zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui disici quanti huiyi ji” (The minutes of the fourth meeting of the second central conferent), Zhongyang ribao, February 12, 1928. 258

Nationalist government differentiated itself from the late Qing government which attempted to reconstruct China through the support of a small group of new elites.

However, as this chapter will show, the conflicts between the state and local population, like in previous periods, persisted or even intensified when the government tried to penetrate local society. Although the government widely built new political platforms and provided channels for local people to establish direct connections with the state, the concerns of the state and the interests of the majority did not coincide with each other. The Nationalist government, to force the traditional gentry and local people to accept its policies, still had to collaborate with the new elites, who, though, tried to maximize its interests by colluding with the state.

I. Reorganizing the Party Branch

After the Nationalist Revolutionary Army left Guangdong, the Guangxi warlord Li

Jishen (李濟深 1885-1959) gained control of Guangdong and expressed allegiance to Jiang

Jieshi by actively supporting Jiang’s purge of the Communists. Although the succeeding rulers of Guangdong, including Chen Mingshu (陳銘樞 1889-1965) and Chen Jitang (陳

濟棠 1890-1954), tried to keep the arm of the central government at bay, they still nominally declared allegiance to Jiang and implemented most policies drafted by the central government in Nanjing.

The first order the Guangdong government carried out was to reorganize the

Nationalist party branches. The reorganization had been initiated by Li Jishen in July 1927, with the goal of eliminating all the Communists from the party branch. In Mei, the 259

elimination of the Communists was equal to the elimination of the Dongshan faction. In

February 1928, the central government in Nanjing, still dissatisfied with the infiltration of

“evil elements” (惡劣分子 elie fenzi) in local party branches, urged local governments to reorganize the party once more. In the Fourth Plenary Session, Chen Guofu personally drafted a Reorganization Plan and proposed it together with Jiang Jieshi. This plan aimed to establish a team of party officials who were relatively independent from local society and were directly responsible to the government.

According to the plan, the central government would first establish a Central

Examination Committee (中央考查委員會 Zhongyang kaocha weiyuanhui), which would select provincial “party affairs instructors” (黨務指導委員 Dangwu zhidao weiyuan) through both examinations and the recommendation from “loyal party members.”3 The main responsibility of the provincial instructors was to select and supervise county party instructors, which were also chosen through examination and recommendation. The government then would dispatch those county instructors to supervise the reorganization of local party branches. Though the Central Executive Committee did not prescribe the form of the examination, it highlighted the importance of the professionalization of party instructors. The committee indicated that the previous failure of the Nationalist Party lay in that most party leaders had never received training in organizing a party and did not understand the recent changes of the society, the state, and the world. The party members under the leadership of these directors thus could only be “undisciplined mob” who would

3 The draft defined the loyal party members as persons who had participated in the Sun Yat-sen-led revolution for more than twenty years. 260

contribute little to the communication between the party and the people. Before the party completed the training of party members, the committee demanded that the local governments give preference to the candidates who had organized party affairs before.4

Upon the central government’s call, the Guangdong government embarked on the reorganization of the party in March 1928. In June, the provincial government had finished the examination of all the county party instructors and held a mobilization meeting before dispatching the instructors to local counties. During the conference, the provincial instructors pointed out the problems in the party organization in Guangdong and urged the county party instructors to correct these problems. The main problem, according to almost all the provincial instructors, was the deep-rooted factionalism in local society. Some local leaders controlled local party branches and only recruited party members of their own faction. “These people joined the party not for the sake of the interests of the party but merely for the purpose of expanding their own influence.”5 Lineages were also regarded as the obstacle to the party’s penetration into local society since people of the same lineage always tended to exclude other lineage members from local party branches. 6 Yet the provincial instructors seemingly had no specific countermeasure to solve this problem but counted on the loyalty and selflessness of party instructors. Chen Jibo (陳季博 1888-1953), a provincial instructor and also a native of Mei County, in his speech, admitted that a party

4 “Jiang Zhongzheng deng zhengli dangwu jihua an” (The Party Reorganization Plan proposed by Jiang Zhongzheng), Xingqi Pinglun 39 (1928): 7-10.

5 Chen Jibo, “Duiyu ge xianshi dangwu zhidao weiyuan de xiwang” (My expectation toward the county party instructors), Dangwu zhoubao 2 (1928): 5.

6 Liu Jianshan, “Bendang tongzhi yingyou de juewu” (The consciousness our party members should bear), Dangwu zhoubao 2 (1928): 7. 261

should have been organized through bottom-up efforts: “Ideally, a party was formed when a group of people who shared common belief would like to establish alliance with each other.” In this case, since “the common belief had existed before the formation of the party,” the factionalism would not be a serious problem. “Yet, in the case of the Nationalist Party, a few senior leaders formed the party and then sent representatives to local society to recruit party members.” “So the improvement of local party branches totally depended on the performance of party representatives.” 7 Chen and other provincial instructors thus reiterated that party instructors should regard the party’s belief – “save the nation and save the people” – as their own belief. In their daily work, they should be altruistic and put the national interests in front of their personal interests.

For the recruiting of party members and the mobilization of the local people, the provincial party instructors warned that the party leaders should not attract followers by instigating class conflicts or providing baits to the locals. They should also pay more attention to the quality rather than the quantity of the party members.8 Zeng Jikuan (曾濟

寬 1883-1950), in his speech, stressed that since the party had entered the stage of political tutelage, the popular movement should be put under the leadership of the party. The radical movement, like the workers’ and students’ strike, could run the risk of creating conflicts among people and thus should be strictly forbidden. The anti-imperialism movement could still be organized under the instruction of the party, but all the other “evil forces” that could

7 Chen Jibo, “Duiyu ge xianshi dangwu zhidao weiyuan de xiwang,” 4.

8 Ibid., 5.

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harm the interests of the people should only be eliminated through political power. 9

Another instructor added that the abandonment of popular movements did not mean the party members should ignore the suffering of the commoners. They should sympathize with local people in their misfortune, but “they should not directly use the force of the people,” which would aggravate the contradiction among people and deepen their suffering.10 In general, by imposing an independent supervising system, strictly restricting popular movement, and controlling the quality and quantity of party members, the central

Nationalist government was attempting to put local party branches under its direct leadership and prevent the self-organization of local people.

The plan drafted by the Central Executive Committee and the guidance issued by the provincial party instructors would have been feasible if they had been implemented by a powerful state which had the necessary economic or cadre resources. Yet the Nationalist government overestimated its ability in reconstructing local society merely through the party. The case in Mei County suggests that even the selection of county party instructors had far deviated from the government’s original plan. The two instructors sent to Mei were

Xie Dafu and Li Liuya, both the natives of the commercial towns of Mei County. Xie was a native of Songkou and had graduated from Waseda University. Since February 1924, he had been a teacher in the Law School of Guangdong University. Before Xie took the

9 Zeng Jikuan, “Shishi minzhong xunnian de wojian” (My advice on the implementation of mass training), Dangwu zhoubao 2 (1928): 1-2.

10 Feng Zhuwan, “Jianshiyuan zhi xunci” (The admonishment of the supervisor of the oath-taking ceremony), Dangwu zhoubao 2 (1928): 10. 263

position of the party instructor, Xie had never been associated with the Nationalist Party.

Xie’s assistant Li Liuya was the president of an elementary school in Bingcun town.

Xie and Li, while qualified in terms of intellectual level, did not have any experience in the organization of party affairs before. Li Liuya did not join the Nationalist

Party until the Nationalist army arrived in Mei during the first Eastern Expedition. And Li seemingly knew little about the doctrine of the Nationalist Party. According to a local student’s memoir, Li had participated in a test held for everyone who wanted to join the party. When the examiner asked him what the Three Principals (三民主義 Sanmin zhuyi) were, he answered that they were about how to fight (作奮鬥論 zuo fendou lun). When he was asked what the National Reconstruction Plan (建國大綱 Jianguo dagang) for China was, Li answered that it was about how to make efforts (作努力論 zuo nuli lun). The student examiners felt that the answers were too absurd, but Li was recruited anyway since the Nationalist Party was eager to expand at that time.11 These two men who had rarely participated in party affairs before apparently did not meet the requirements drafted by the

Central Executive Committee. Their performance in the reorganization of local party branches further demonstrates that they deviated far from the government’s expectation and were just utilizing the party to serve for their sectional interests.

The registration of new party members in Mei County, under the guidance of the two instructors, also turned out to be a farce that not only further deteriorated the

11 Qiu Kehui, “Qiu Kehui tongzhi de huiyi: Fangwen jilu” (The memories of Qiu Kehui: The record of the interview), Meixian shi dangshi ziliao 14 (1984): 27.

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relationship between the two factions in the county but also destroyed the central and provincial government’s hope of enlisting excellent party members based on their quality rather than on faction. The instructors, through the opportunity to control the party branch, devised various strategies to prevent the people not in their faction – mainly those who had allied with the Meizhou Middle School – from reregistering as the party members.

The Nationalists of the Meizhou faction were angry at the party instructors’ manipulation and published a pamphlet to denounce the instructors.12 According to the

Meizhou faction’s charge, Mei County was divided into three districts and each district should set up one party branch. The party instructors, for the convenience of their fellow townsmen, located two of the party branches in their hometown, Songkou and Bingcun.

Moreover, both of the towns were located in the east of the county. All the other party members in western and southern Mei had to register in the third party branch which was located in the county seat. It meant that many party members had to walk 90 li (about 28 miles) to the county seat to participate in the branch meeting.13 The disgruntled party members further pointed out this arrangement did not meet the regulation drafted by the

Central Executive Committee which stipulates that the district party branches should be small-scale and convenient for the gathering and training of party members.14

12 The pamphlet includes their record of the procedure of the party-member registration, their open letters to denounce the party instructors, and the telegrams they sent to the central and provincial government. Hudang jiuguo: To Zhongyang zhijian weiyuanhui, Guangdong sheng dangwu zhidao weiyuanhui (Protect the party, save the nation: To the Central Executive Committee and Provincial Party Instruction Committee), (Meixian: n.p., 1928).

13 “Meixian dangwu jiufen jingguo zhi jizai” (A record of the conflicts in the organization of party branches in Mei county), in Hudang jiuguo, 1-2.

14 “A telegram,” in Hudang jiuguo, 53-54.

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The party instructors also gave priority to the needs of the party members in their hometowns during the registration process. For instance, they sent the registration papers to the members in Songkou and Bingcun two weeks before the party representative elections, while many members in west Mei did not receive their papers until the day of the election and thus lost the chance to participate in the election.15 Although the party instructors promised that the party members could still register after the election, the affected members felt that the proposal was ridiculous since in their opinions the representative election should be held after all the party members finished registration and participated in the election.16

On the day of the election, about five hundred angry party members who were excluded from the registration broke into the conference hall and urged the instructors to suspend the conference. The instructors agreed under the pressure but immediately held a secret conference the next morning without notifying the demonstrators. After discovering the truth, the angry party members besieged the house of the instructors. The instructors, to the party members’ astonishment, fired shots to disperse the crowd.

Within twenty days, the furious party members published an eighty-page pamphlet called Hudang jiuguo (護黨救國 Protect the party, save the nation), in which they depicted themselves as loyal party members who tried to protect the party from the harm of a few dirty politicians who took advantage of the party to promote self-interests. The pamphlet

15 “A telegram,” in Hudang jiuguo, 44; “A telegram,” in Hudang jiuguo, 49-50.

16 “Yifeng zhiwen xian zhiwei de gongkaixin” (An open letter to denounce the county party instruction committee), Hudang jiuguo, 38-40.

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was also immediately sent to both the Central Executive Committee (中央執監委員會

Zhongyang zhijian weiyuanhui) and Provincial Party Affairs Instruction Committee (省黨

務指導委員會 Sheng dangwu zhidao weiyuanhui) on December 8th, 1928. The efforts of the Meizhou faction, however, proved futile. The provincial government refused to nullify the result of the secret election. Instead, they criticized the petitioners, regarding their complaints as the result of factionalism which would run the risk of splitting the party and weakening the party’s control of local society.

A conference note from the Provincial Executive Committee discloses that the election in Mei was not the only one which was afflicted by factionalism. Similar complaints from local party members were so prevalent that the conference was occupied by the topic. The Nationalist leaders, probably inspired by the Communists’ ability to strengthen of the party, stressed that “although the party members had the freedom of discussing party policies, they should unconditionally uphold the policy once the consensus had been reached.”17

The emphasis on the absolute obedience of the party members should have contributed to the party’s control of local party members. Yet, the provincial government’s defense of local party leaders, as the case in Mei County suggests, rather than helping to protect the authority and interests of the party, merely served the interests of local party leaders who did not consider the party’s interests at all. These local party leaders, as the

Meizhou faction’s pamphlet discloses, were merely concerned about the interests of their

17 “Guangdong sheng zhixing weiyuanhui diwuci huiyi lu” (The minutes of the fifth conference of Guangdong Provincial Executive Committee), Guangdong dangwu (Party affairs of Guangdong), 5 (1929), 10-11. 267

own faction since their power stemmed from the protection of their faction. Under the leadership of these self-serving party leaders, the reregistration of party members, which was supposed to be organized for the purpose of recruiting loyal party members, became a tool for local elites to strengthen factionalism.

The Dongshan faction, through the party reorganization, regained the leadership position in local administration which they had temporarily lost in the “Party Purification” movement. In June 1929, Xie Dafu, who had been promoted to be the county governor, tried to use the “political power” he possessed to change the presidents of the three middle schools within the Meizhou factions. In 1926 when the Communist-backed county governor did the same thing, the Meizhou Middle School had successfully crippled the governor’s attempt by organizing various protests. This time, the students of the Meizhou faction organized a large-scale demonstration again. Yet the county governor, rather than succumbing to the pressure, directly sent the county police force, which was newly set up and directly responsible to the county governor,18 to put down the demonstration. In the chaos, two students to killed. After the tragedy took place, the county governor, rather than confessing his guilt, denounced the leaders of the Meizhou faction for creating the disturbance among students. He also shut down a local newspaper Riri xinwen (Daily News) which disclosed the details of the tragedy.19 To pacify the residents in the prefecture seat,

18 “Jingwei ganshi baogao” (The report of county police officers), Riri xinwen (Daily news), April 5, 1929.

19 “Women gai ruhe chuli canju” (How should we deal with the tragedy?), Meixian minguo ribao (Mei county Republican Daily), July 9, 1929; “Xianshi fengchao” (The students’ of County Teachers’ College launched a demonstration), Meixian minguo ribao, July 9, 1929; “Xie Dafu diaosheng” (Xie Dafu accepted a position in provincial government), Meixian minguo ribao, July 13, 2929.

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the provincial government asked Xie to resign from his position. Xie, however, did not receive any punishment but simply took another position in Guangzhou.20

This case discloses the further expansion of the power of the commercial town elites, who, by dominating the local government and party branches, had becoming increasingly aggressive in the competition with the local established gentry. And this group of swollen power-holders, as their performance in local administrative reorganization suggests, apparently did not regard the state’s interests as their primary concern.

II. Reorganizing Labor Unions and Merchant Associations

The establishment of party branches at the sub-county level was just one part of the

Nationalists’ effort to enlist popular support. During the Fourth Plenary Session (四中全

會 Sizhong quanhui, 1928.2.2-7), the Nationalists disbanded the five departments of peasants, workers, merchants, youth, and women. Yet the party immediately established a

“Mass Training Committee” (民眾訓練委員會 Minzhong xunlian weiyuanhui) with the attempt to tame and utilize the force of the people. In August 1928, the Nationalists issued the “Mass Movement Guidance” (民眾運動案 Minzhong yundong an), recognizing that

“all the people had the freedom to organize popular associations,” though the party stressed that “the associations must be under the instruction and supervision of the party and the government.”

20 “7.6 can’an huoshou Xie Dafu panjue bu qisu chufen” (The government decided not to prosecute the chief culprit of the 7.6 tragedy) Riri xinwen, June 16, 1932. 269

To distinguish themselves from the Communists, the party also emphasized that it would mainly communicate its ideologies and policies through propaganda and education, rather than through instigating conflicts among the people.21 In the “Plan for the Training of the People” (民眾訓練計劃大綱 Minzhong xunlian jihua dagang), the party further indicated that it expected to train the “thoughts, organization, and actions” of the masses by directly leading popular associations. By doing so, the party would “make the commoners develop the habit of obeying the decision of an organization.”

Obviously, the Nationalists did not want to abandon the force of the majority of people. By “instructing” the masses to establish new-style organizations like labor unions or merchant associations which were supposed to serve the interests of the majority of people, the Nationalists tried to penetrate these associations and gain the support and allegiance of the people. However, as discussed in previous chapters, the majority of people had been organized into various autonomous associations which were under the control of entrenched power-holders. Merely by providing “instructions” to the associations rather than destroying the associations, the Nationalists could not penetrated their existing power structures.

Since late 1928, upon the call of the central government, the Guangdong provincial government urged the existing popular associations to reregister in the government. Local party branches were also requested to establish Reorganization Committees (改組委員會

Gaizu weiyuanhui) to help reorganize these popular associations. The party instructors who

21 Rong Mengyuan, Zhongguo Guomindang lici daibiao dahui ji zhongyang quanhui ziliao (The materials of the representative conference and party congress of the Nationalist Party) (Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 1985), 534. 270

had been selected for the purpose of supervising party reorganization were also assigned the task of supervising the restructuring of these popular associations. According to the

Regulation of the Reorganization Committee, the committee shouldered the responsibility of assisting the popular associations to register in the government, to provide instructions to the associations, to correct the mistakes of the associations, and to urge the associations to carry out the party’s order. 22 Since the reorganization committee did not really aim to

“reorganize” the existing associations, the associations had no difficulty in cooperating with the committee.

In Mei County, the collaboration between the committee and the labor unions was quite smooth. Most labor unions had been established on the foundation of professional guilds during the second Eastern Expedition. In 1926, when the Communists dominated the local government, the party had tried to combine the force of different unions by establishing a United Labor Union (總工會). Though the United Union failed to integrate all the guilds in the county, it helped to enhance the interests of some workers by organizing strikes against their employers. Yet the Union was disbanded due to the close connection with the Communist Party. So when the Nationalist Party tried to reorganize the local unions, it had to work with numerous small guilds rather than a united union. The details about how the reorganization committee conducted the instruction were unclear, but a local newspaper suggested that the leaders of the unions were often more than willing to register and have the party instructors participate in their activities. Within two months, almost all

22 “Geji minzhong tuanti zhengli weiyuanhui banshi tongze” (The general regulation of the reorganization committees) Dangwu zhoubao 2 (1928): 38.

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the labor unions established during the Eastern Expeditions were restored. These unions then established a new United Labor Union (工人總會 Gongren zonghui) and made themselves the branches of the United Union. Many branches voluntarily invited the instructors to deliver a talk in their branch conferences.23 The Construction Worker Union

(建築工會 Jianzhu gonghui), before its yearly representative conference, had “specially invited the party instructor to stay in the Union’s office so that the instructor could provide guidance to their work at any time.”24 The newspaper did no illustrate why the restoration of the union went so smooth, but the interaction between the committee and the union suggests that the intervention of the government was helpful for the branch union to expand its own authority.

Almost all the branch unions, as discussed above, were developed from professional guilds. Though granted a new name – “union,” these “unions” were fundamentally different from the unions in industrial countries which had a large group of industrial workers as its base. The reason for the difference was simple: modern industry had barely developed in rural China. Most workers who registered in the union were merely artisans who did not have much common ground with the artisans of other trades. Lacking common interests, these artisans did not have the need or enthusiasm to collaborate with other artisans. The existence of the United Union was thus meaningless to those artisans.

Instead, they still relied on their separate guilds to protect their interests. The existing leaders of guilds thus easily sustained their control of the artisans. Although the

23 Riri xinwen, April 2, 1929.

24 Riri xinwen, April 5, 1929. 272

government requested local party branches to participate in the reorganization of the unions, in reality, the party instructors just occasionally attended the meeting of the unions rather than directly led the daily affairs of the unions. The participation of party leaders in the unions thus did not change the nature of the guild-based unions.

Although the artisans did not benefit much from the organization of the unions, the union leaders fully took advantage of the endorsement of the government to enhance their own authority. The Construction Worker Union, for example, had been the most active one in seeking “instruction” from the party leaders and also received most protection from the party. The Union had tried to help a constructor to collect his debt from a tailor through the assistance of the party instructor. The sewer, under the union’s pressure, had agreed to pay off the debt by a certain date. Yet he failed to do so after the deadline. Upon receiving the complaint from the constructor, the Constructors Union immediately asked a policeman to seize the sewer’s sewing machine as indemnity for the constructor. In response, the tailor complained to a police officer, who did not approve the union’s action and tried to impose a fine on the union. The angry leader of the Constructors Union immediately sought assistance from the director of the Party Reorganization Committee.25 On the next day, the

Reorganization Committee organized a special meeting to discuss the issue. Upon the suggestion of the committee, the United Labor union decided to punish the tailor by abolishing the tailor’s registration right, which meant the tailor could not legally run his business in the county anymore.26 When the union leaders utilized their enhanced power

25 Meixian minguo ribao, December 5, 1928.

26 Meixian minguo ribao, December 6, 1928.

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to protect certain members, they could also use the power to coerce the members of the union. The reports in local newspapers showed that the unions became quite assertive in the relationship with their members. The Union of Textile Workers, for example, requested that all the textile workers in the county pay off their membership fees and register in the

Union before a certain date. If the workers did not register by then, the Union claimed that it would expel them from the county.27 When the Constructors Union found that a worker who had been deprived the right of registration was still working on a construction site, it immediately forced the worker to stop all the jobs. And when the unions could not get their orders smoothly implemented, they just “sent letters to the party branch and asked the branch to help them impose the order.”28

By gaining the recognition of the government, some union leaders were becoming more powerful and assertive. However, since their power did not stem from the collective force of the workers, the unions did not show a strong ability in defending the collective interest of the workers. The experience of the Incense Maker Union (香業工會 Xiangye gonghui) in bargaining over the wages with the incense dealers discloses that the unions were still rather weak in negotiating the interests of the workers. The incense makers, feeling that their income could not support their lives, demanded that the incense dealers increase the purchasing price of the incense. To increase their bargaining chips in the negotiation, they invited the leaders of the party branch to be the arbitrator. But the party branch had little ability in restraining the dealers with the “political power.” After several

27 Riri xinwen, November 25, 1928.

28 Riri xinwen, April 2, 1929. 274

rounds of negotiations, the dealers still refused to meet the workers’ demand. The workers ultimately had to seek help from a local notable who was influential in the local market.

Upon the notable’s mediation, the dealers only agreed to moderately compensate the incense makers.29 This incident suggests that the unions, lacking the collective force of workers as the base of power and being discouraged to take violent actions to strive for their interests, could do little to enhance the interests of the workers. By providing

“instructions” to the unions, the Nationalist Party tried to grant the unions legitimacy and enhance their social recognition. Yet the unions, limited by the social condition in rural

China and receiving little substantial assistance from the party, failed to serve as a new platform for the workers to enhance their interests and develop allegiance to the party.

In addition to providing instructions to labor unions, the Nationalists also engaged in the reorganization of merchant associations. Before 1928 there had existed two merchant associations in the county. One was the chamber of commerce (商會 Shanghui), which was established in 1908 by the new elites and had attracted more than five hundred shops all over the county to join in. During the Eastern Expedition, the Nationalists, to win the heart of merchants, encouraged local “medium and small merchants” to organize a “small merchant association” (小商民協會 xiao shangmin xiehui).30 To differentiate between chambers of commerce and merchant associations, the Nationalists defined the former as

29 Riri xinwen, November 12, 1930.

30 Feng Xiaocai holds that the uprising launched by Guangzhou Merchants’ Corps during the East Expedition made the KMT be aware of the importance of uniting the force of merchants. The merchant associations were just promoted against this background. See Feng Xiaocai, Beifa qianhou de shangmin yundong (The merchants’ movement in the period of the Northern Expedition) (Taipei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2004), 17-44.

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counterrevolutionary organizations controlled by compradors and capitalists while highlighting the revolutionary nature of small merchant associations.31 This differentiation, however, was meaningless in Mei since almost all the merchants in the county were

“medium and small merchants.” The so-called “eight great guilds” (八大行 ba da hang) in

Mei included the guilds of cloth, general merchandise, grain, oil and bean, cookie, medicine, hardware, and pawn shops. None of these businesses required huge capital or involved the participation of foreigners. Some merchants ran modern business like the electric-light factory or the movie theater, but the scale of their business was not larger than that of traditional shops.32 Consequently, the imposition of two associations, rather than providing a platform for small merchants to unite, just offered a chance for different factions of merchants to compete with each other. In Mei, the competition was between the merchants who allied with the Dongshan faction and the merchant who chose the Meizhou faction. The Dongshan faction, with the commercial town elites as the main force, had controlled the chamber of commerce since the late Qing. The Meizhou faction, grasping the chance of the promotion of the small merchant association, gained a legitimate platform to compete with the chamber of commerce.

Although the small merchant associations had had numerous conflicts with chambers of commerce all over the country after they were founded in 1926, the

Nationalists still allowed the two associations to coexist when the party reorganized the

31 Zhu Ying, Shangmin yundong yanjiu, 1924-1930 (Research of the merchants’ movement) (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2011), 258.

32 Ouyang ying, “Meixian shanghui bufen shiliao” (Some materials of the Chamber of Commerce in Mei county), Meixian wenshi ziliao, vol. 7 no. 2 (1993): 88-89. 276

local self-government associations in late 1928. The party stressed that while chambers of commerce provided the economic foundation of the party, merchant associations provided the revolutionary foundation of the party. 33 Although the Dongshan faction regained dominance in the county government after 1928, the merchant association established by the Meizhou faction survived with the support of the central government. According to the

Regulation of Small Merchant associations, the main responsibilities of the associations were to mobilize merchants to participate in the nationalist revolution and to alleviate the pain of small merchants by protecting their interests.34 In reality, the merchant association, relying on the government to gain its legitimacy, mainly played the role as the speaker for the government. To more efficiently communicate the government’s policies to merchants, the provincial government often directly sent orders to the small merchant associations and urged the associations to communicate the policies to merchants. The small merchant association also spared no effort to preach and implement the government’s policies, even if the policies contributed little or even contradicted with the interests of the merchants.

For instance, in a regular conference held in Mei on September 13, 1928, the merchant association discussed seven issues, four of which were about how to implement the government’s new orders. One of the orders stipulated that merchants in the future should clean all the coins with soda before they circulated them. The merchant association decided that they would set September 30 as the deadline for the cleaning. After then they would send officials to conduct a selective examination. If they found dirty coins, they would

33 See Zhu Ying, Shangmin yundong yanjiu, 304; Feng Xiaocai, Beifa qianhou de shangmin yundong, 210.

34 Tianjin shi dang’anguan, ed., Tianjin shanghui dang’an huibian (The compilation of the materials of the Chamber of Commerce in Tianjin), vol.1 (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1996), 439. 277

confiscate one third of the dirty ones as the fine. The provincial government also often asked the merchant association to organize nationalist propaganda which was of little interest to the local merchants. In the meeting, the provincial government requested that the association mobilize merchants to make preparation for the war against Russia. The association leader did not elaborate on this topic during the conference, though they decided to organize a mass gathering to propagandize the topic.35

Although the small merchant association was established primarily for the purpose to protect the interests of the merchants, the association, established by a group of marginalized merchants and receiving little support from the government, did not contribute much to the enhancement of merchants’ interests. The association had appealed twice to the county government not to impose levies on small-scale shops. In the petition letter, the association, almost in a tone of begging, described the pain the county police levies brought to poor merchants and asked the government to reconsider the decision. Yet after repeated petitions, the county government still did not show any willingness to negotiate with the association. 36 The result was unsurprising considering that the association, except submitting petitions, could do nothing to restrain the activities of the county government. The association, though claiming to be the representative of the majority of merchants, merely represented the merchants of a few marginalized merchants.

The weakness of the association per se made their petition less convincing. On the other hand, the central government, regarding the stabilization of local society as its primary goal,

35 Meixian minguo ribao, September 14, 1930.

36 Meixian minguo ribao, September 7, 1930; September 14, 1930. 278

did not dare to encourage any protest against excessive taxes. The central government was clear local officials and garrison commanders often arbitrarily imposed new levies or collected more tax than what the government had asked for. However, since the government still had to rely on those officials to collect tax and maintain order, it could not fully support the merchants in the anti-tax activities. This paradox made the association’s aim of alleviating the pain of merchants an empty slogan.

Since the merchant association could not provide any substantial protection or benefits to local merchants, the association, like the labor unions, failed to serve as a platform to integrate the local merchants. Most shops or trade associations, though having no dissent in registering with the merchant association, refused to collaborate with the association or fulfill their obligation as members. In its fourth county representative conference, the association discussed its difficulty in raising the administrative fee, which was supposed to be covered by the membership fee turned in by the branches of the association. According to the association’s report, the paper branch association had refused to turn in its membership fee for ten months. The manager of the branch always ignored the order of the small merchant association and refused to send any representative to attend the association conference either. The cloth association, the largest association, similarly, had owed six-month membership fees and threatened to withdraw from the association once being pushed to pay for the fee. The reporter complained that because of the non- cooperation of those shops, the association could not even afford the board expense for its clerks. The attendees of the conference agreed to strip the two branches of their voting right

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if they did not pay off the arrearage in the coming week.37 There was no follow-up report on the reaction of merchants who owned the membership fee, but their attitude, as was shown in the reporters’ complaints, suggests that they did not care about the relationship with the small merchant association. The indifference of local merchants was understandable, given that they could not enjoy any benefit by associating with the merchant association.

Failing to serve as a platform for all the merchants, the small merchant association became an institution for the once marginalized Meizhou faction to enhance their own interests. Relying on the patronage of the provincial government, the small merchant associations frequently challenged their opponent, the chamber of commerce, and created numerous conflicts in local society. In early 1929, when the government granted the small merchant association the power to supervise all the other merchants’ organizations, the association grasped the opportunity to seize the leadership of the fire brigade which had been founded by the chamber of commerce. Though the chamber of commerce, supported by the county government, crippled the plan, the association still successfully dispatched its men to participate in the affairs of the brigade.38 The association also tended to utilize its power to attack the tax farmers who were associated with the chamber of commerce.

One of the leaders of the chamber of commerce was also the tax farmer of joss paper. To attack the chamber of commerce, the merchant association denounced that the tax farmer had arbitrarily extorted weak and poor sellers. Under the name of protecting small

37 Meixian minguo ribao, January 9, 1930.

38 Meixian minguo ribao, April 2, 1929.

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merchants, the association requested the chamber of commerce to dismiss the tax farmer from the leadership position in the chamber.39

The farces created by the chamber of commerce and the merchant association were staged many times, not only in Mei County but also all over the country.40 The central government had not expected that the association which had been founded for the purpose of integrating local merchants would become the source of conflicts among merchants. In late 1930 the Nationalist Party, therefore, decided to merge the two associations.41 Rather than keeping the merchant associations, the Nationalists decided to retain chambers of commerce, which were usually more influential in local society and represented the interests of the powerful merchants. Although the government requested chambers of commerce to conduct the reorganization together with the leaders of the merchant association,42 in Mei, the chamber, being in constant tension with the merchant association, refused to recruit the leaders of the merchant association. The merchant association, out of revenge, murdered one of the leaders of the chamber of commerce.43

Eliminating its opponents and regaining the support of the government, the chamber of commerce also became a new dominating force in local society. Most tax farmers in the county were assumed by the leaders of the chamber of commerce. These tax

39 Meixian minguo ribao, January 9, 1930.

40 Zhu Ying, Shangmin yundong yanjiu, 352-422.

41 Feng Xiaocai, Beifa qianhou de shangmin yundong, 228.

42 Ibid.

43 “Jiejue Meixian shanghui gaizu jiufen” (To solve the disputes arising from the reorganization of the chamber of commerce in Mei), Guangdong zhengfu gongbao 142 (1931), 182-186.

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farmers, backed by the chamber and colluding with the government, often randomly increased the rate local taxes. A leader of the chamber of commerce, for example, proposed to levy tax on banquet merchants to provide funding for the county police office. Without gaining the agreement of banquet merchants or local residents, the government approved the proposal. The banquet merchants, the merchants who provided banquet service to villagers, organized a strike to protest against the government’s decision. 44 Under the pressure, the government agreed to increase the tax bracket.45 Yet the tax farmers often extorted an extra charge when they collected the tax in person.46 They also often brought police officer with them to ensure that the tax was collected. Some banquet merchants could not turn in all the tax on time. Backed by the county police office, the tax farmer often directly arrested the banquet merchants.47

By promoting mass organizations like labor unions and merchant associations, the

Nationalists tried to establish an alliance with broader social groups. The party assumed that by assisting or instructing workers or merchants to get organized, the party would naturally penetrate those associations and gain the allegiance of the masses. However, before the intrusion of the Nationalist Party, local people had been organized into various guilds or associations and controlled by existing power-holders. Since the Nationalist had no ability or desire to thoroughly abolish existing organizations or weaken the authority of

44 Riri xinwen, October 20, 1932.

45 Meixian minguo ribao, January 7, 1933.

46 Meixian minguo ribao, December 27, 1932; Meixian minguo ribao, December 29, 1932.

47 Riri xinwen, November 22, 1932. 282

local power-holders, it could not establish direct access to local people. And since the new associations promoted by the Nationalists, such as the labor union and small merchant association, did not suit the rural environment and could not enhance the intrests of the association members, the government could not win the allegiance of local people by promoting those associations.

III. Penetrating the Sub-county Society

The indirect control of sub-county society had been the rule for all the late imperial dynasties which could not afford the direct control of every corner of the big empire. Yet the ambitious Nationalist government, which was eager to mobilze local people to construct a powerful country, were not satisfied with the indirect control of sub-county society. During the Eastern Expedition, the Nationalists had set up peasant associations in rural society with the attempt to establish direct connections with peasants. The pervasive and violent resistance from local communities, however, convinced the Nationalists that the preservation of the gentry’s leadership was necessary for the stabilization of local society.48 After taking power, the Nationalists did not abandon the effort to penetrate local society. Rather than restoring the peasant associations, the party resorted to a traditional surveillance system, the baojia (保甲) system, to extend control to every household. The system had been firstly adopted by the emperors during the Ming dynasty as a strategy to monitor local local population. The Qing government, limited by its administrative ability,

48 John Fitzgerald, “The Misconceived Revolution: State and Society in China’s Nationalist Revolution, 1923-26,” Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 49, no. 2 (May 1990), 336.

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acquiesced the merging of the baojia system with lineages for the convenience of tax- collection. Since the Taiping rebellion, however, as the government encouraged lineages to train militias for the purpose of self-defense, lineages were increasingly out of the control of the government and became the obstacles for the government to mobilize local labors and resources. The re-promotion of the baojia system, therefore, was for the purpose of overcoming this obstacle. The system initiated in Guangdong, similar to that promulgated in the early Ming dynasty, counted ten families as a jia (甲), ten jia as a li (里), and ten li as a bao (保). Every family in the jia was restrained by a collective punishment system called lianzuo, which meant crime committed by a family would bring punishment to all the families in the jia. 49 And being clear that local militias had contributed to the intractability of local communities, the provincial government planned to replace local militias with formal police corps which were supposed to be under the direct control of the government. According to the plan, the government would set up security committees and police corps at three levels of local society, which included the county (縣 xian), ward (區 qu), and village (鄉 xiang) levels separately. The successful organization of police corps, in Chen Jitang’s words, was the precondition for the implementation of all the future policies including the population census and the imposition of the baojia system. Moreover, after order was totally restored, these semi-military organizations could be easily transformed to ward and village governments.50

49 Li Luo, “Guangdong sheng bianban baojia shikuang” (The record of the organization of baojia in Guangdong) (1937), Box 3, Folder 1-42, Guangdong Provincial Archives, Guangzhou.

50 Chen Jitang, “Zai xiqu shanhou huiyi bimu shi de jianghua” (The talk in the closing ceremony of the rehabilitation of the west district), Junsheng zhoukan vol.144 and 145 (July 1928), in Chen Jitang yanjiu 284

In Mei, the county governor Xie Dafu, who was also assuming the position of the party instructor, embarked on the organization of security committees (治安委員會 zhi’an weiyuanhui) and police corps (警衛隊 jingwei dui) as soon as he took the position in

September 1928. According to his report to the provincial government, there had been thirty two militias in the thirty six towns before 1928. He the divided the county into fourteen wards and fifty one villages according to the Regulation on County Security

Committees.51 Theoretically, the chair of county governor had the power to appoint ward committee chairs, who, similarly, was authorized to appoint village chairs. Through this way, the county government was supposed to be able to keep a tight rein on sub-county institutions. Yet the provincial government, except promulgating the regulation, did not provide any substantial support to local governments. Instead, the provincial government transferred the burden to local communities, stipulating that the county, ward, and village should raise funds and recruit soldiers by themselves. The county government, without economic resources to recruit new soldiers, urged the local gentry to transform the existing militia to police corps. According to the regulation drafted by the county government, the militia leader, after turning in his seal of the militia, would be granted a formal title and accordant seals in the formal administrative system.52 In the meanwhile, the government would assist the community leaders to purchase weapons. Every village was allocated a

shiliao (The research material of Chen Jitang), ed. Guangdong Provincial Archives (Guangzhou: Guangdong Provincial Archives, 1985), 12-13.

51 Meixian xian zhengfu, ed., Meixian xianzheng zhounian huikan (Mei county administration, anniversary compilation) (Meixian: Meixian xian zhengfu, 1931), 5.

52 Ibid., 39-40; Meixian minguo ribao, December 2, 1928.

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quota of ten guns,53 to be sure, which were paid for by the villagers themselves. Finally and most importantly, the county government would grant local security committees the power to collect new levies to support the operation of the security committee.54 This regulation, rather than depriving the local gentry the right in controlling local militias, granted them more power in local administration. Although some gentry declined the official appointment due to the concern over the increased burden, the majority of the local gentry accepted the offer, regarding it as a chance to gain official recognition of their de facto control over local society. In three months, most wards and villages successfully organized a security committee. The committee leaders also regularly attended the joint conference held in the county town. The smooth collaboration between the county government and the sub-county power holders at this stage suggests that most local leaders, rather than stubbornly resisting any intrusion, were trying to take advantage of the direct connections with the government to consolidate their rule.

The security committees and the police corps were widely established by the end of 1928, though it was doubtful those sub-county administrative institutions, as Chen Jitang expected, had facilitated the government to penetrate local society. A primary task for the county governors was to conduct a census of local population and register local people in the baojia system. In November 1928, two month after the security committees were inaugurated, Xie Dafu had started the census of the population. Yet one month later, he still could not obtain the complete data of the county town, not to mention the other 35

53 Riri xinwen, April 5, 1929.

54 Meixian minguo ribao, December 6, 1928. 286

towns in the county.55 Five months later, on April 2, 1929, pushed by the provincial government, the county government finally obtained the data of six wards among the fourteen in the county and published the data in the local newspaper. But there was no further information on the other eight wards since then. The census was suspended in late

1929 when the county was raided by bandits and the Red Army from Jiangxi province. In

May 1930, the new county governor resumed the census and according to his original plan, the census should be finished by June 1930. However, until May 1931, when the governor published a book to brag his achievements in the county construction, he still merely possessed the information for only the six wards collected by Xie Dafu.56 In a united conference of all the security committees, an official pointed out that local security committee members who were supposed to complete the census before the conference “had never reported how they conducted the census, not to mention to report the detailed number.” 57 The difficulty in conducting the census was highly possibly due to the unwillingness of the community leaders in reporting the information to the government, since the population and household information provided the foundation for tax levying.

For community leaders who were still responsible for the tax collection, the number of the population determined the accordant burden they had to shoulder. The villagers’ successful hiding from the census suggests the difficulty of extortion in local society, even if what the government wanted to extort was just information.

55 Riri xinwen, November 15, 1928.

56 Meixian xian zhengfu, ed., Meixian xianzheng zhounian huikan, 7-8, 51-52.

57 Ibid., “Zhuanzai” (Special publication), 18. 287

If the survey of the population had been so difficult, it is imaginable how arduous the tax levying could be in the sub-county society. The tax local society had to pay both provincial taxes and local taxes. Although the Nationalist regime was notorious for the numerous levies, the provincial tax, at least in Guangdong, was not too heavy for local society. The county government, as in the Qing dynasty, merely had to pay the land tax and deed tax to the provincial government. The rate of the land tax and the quota of the deed tax, by 1931, did not change much from those of the late Qing. The county governor, though complaining about the difficulty of levying the taxes, could still collect the full amount on time. In 1931, the land tax (地稅 dishui) collected by the government was 65345 yuan and the deed tax (契稅 qishui) was 40000 yuan. 58 The government increased the rate of land tax by twenty five percent in 1931 because of the war against the Guangxi warlord.

Yet after Chen Jitang gained the leadership of Guangdong in 1932, Chen decreased the tax rate to the pre-war level and abolished assorted local levies.59 Mei County, like most counties at the time, could not always submit the provincial tax on time but did not owe much to the government.60 However, the Nationalist government indeed create a new heavy burden, which was caused by the forced sale of treasury notes and military bonds

(軍事國庫券 Junshi guokuquan). From 1924 to 1927, the Nationalist government, backed by the Nationalist Revolution Army, had forced people in Guangdong to purchase a large

58 Ibid., 52.

59 Chen Jitang, “Zhengli yu jianshe yao tongshi bingzhong: Zai Guangdong sheng xingzheng huiyi shang de jianghua” (We should pay equal attention to reorganization and construction: The talk in the Provincial Administrative Conference), in Chen Jitang yanjiu shiliao, 201.

60 Meixian xian zhengfu, ed., Meixian xianzheng zhounian huikan, 51-52.

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amount of government bonds. Yet after uniting the county, the Nanjing government showed little inclination to repay the debt.61 Though the Guangdong government began to repay a small portion of the debt since 1928, local people did not regard the government as a creditable borrower. In the winter of 1929, the provincial government once again tried to hard sell military bonds. Mei County was assigned the quota of 20000 yuan and was required to clear the payment in three months. Both the county governor and the local people were indifferent to the provincial requirement. The county government was only able to sell 4787 yuan in five months. In May 1930 when the new governor assumed office, he immediately asked the Department of Finance to reduce the quota to 10,000 yuan under the pretense that the county had just been raided by the Communist army.62 In August 1930, the provincial government once again asked the county to sell 60000 yuan treasury notes

(金融國庫券 Jinrong guomkuquan) in two months. This time the locals turned a deaf ear on the provincial government. The county government failed to sell a single bond before the due date. In November, the provincial government dispatched a commissioner to the county to supervise the sales, but commissioner could do nothing to change the situation.

Finally upon the repeated appeal of the county governor, the provincial government agreed to decrease the quota to 20000 yuan.63 Even if the quota had been decreased greatly, the

61 Guangdong caizheng ting, ed., Guangdong caizheng, vol. 1, 56-58, 65, in John Fitzgerald, “Increased Disunity: The Politics and Finance of Guangdong Separatism, 1926-1936,” Modern Asian Studies, vol. 24, no. 4 (Oct., 1990): 758.

62 Meixian xian zhengfu, ed., Meixian xianzheng zhounian huikan, 53.

63 Meixian xian zhengfu, ed., Meixian xianzheng zhounian huikan, 20, 54.

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local newspapers still frequently reported that “the ward and village officials always ignored their duty” and “little achievement had been made so far.”64

The county tax, in comparison to the provincial tax, was indeed greatly increased because of the expansion of the county government and the creation of sub-county administrative institutions. Most of the new levies were created and collected by the governments at these lower levels. Yet a careful investigation of the sources of local government income discloses that the majority of the levies were imposed on merchants and public institutions rather than on rural households. Below are the charts of the yearly income of Songkou Ward Security Committee and Likeng ( 里坑) Village Security

Committee:

64 Meixian minguo ribao, June 18, 1931; Meixian minguo ribao, September 11, 1931. 290

Categories Amount Collectors (yuan) Fees on Shops 9600 Ward Security Committee Fees on Shop Rents 4800 Ward Security Committee Marriage Certification Fees 1200 Ward Security Committee Fees on Banquets 2760 Ward Security Committee Surcharge on Paper and Charcoal Sellers 144 Ward Security Committee Fees on Opium Houses 480 Ward Security Committee Fees on Property Agents 100 Ward Security Committee Fees on Shop Rents 2760 Police Corps Fees on Paper and Charcoal Sellers of 744 Police Corps Songren Village Total Income 24628 Table 1 Self Government Income of Songkou Town (1929) 65

Categories Amount Collectors (yuan) Pudu Temple Property Rents 180 Likeng Public School Fees on Red Flower Association 30 Likeng Public School Fees on Taoist Sacrifice Association 30 Likeng Public School Fees on Temples 30 Likeng Public School Marriage Certification Fees 30 Likeng Public School Surcharge on Security Affairs 50 Likeng Public School Fees on Tobacco Sellers 10 Likeng Public School Fees on Pig Slaughters 30 Likeng Public School Fees on Cattle Slaughters 10 Likeng Public School Fees on Fish sellers 30 Likeng Public School Fees on Lantern Show of Wenci Temple 18 Likeng Public School Fees on Shops 40 Village Security Committee Fees on Gambling Houses 50 Village Security Committee Fees on Slaughters 65 Village Security Committee Fees on Fruit Sellers 20 Village Security Committee Fees on Temples 20 Village Security Committee Total Income 595 Table 2 Self-government Income of Likeng Village (1929)66

65 “Guangdong sheng Meixian difang quanshu zhengzhi jingfei diaochabiao” (The survey of local administrative fees of Mei county), Guangdong minzheng gongbao, no. 31 (1929), 77.

66 Ibid., 82-83. 291

Songkou was the most prosperous commercial town while Likeng was a rural village. Chart

I shows that in Songkou, except for the fees on marriage certifications and banquets, which accounted for sixteen percent of all the taxes, all the other levies were imposed on commercial activities. In Likeng where commerce was not thriving, the community leaders successfully transferred half of the tax burden to local temples and religious associations.

Only the marriage certification fee and the surcharge on security affairs, which accounted for thirteen percent of the total tax income, were directly imposed on households. And even the marriage certification fees and the banquet fees, obviously, were not imposed on every household. The levy on banquet holders was the only tax that looked excessive. Yet this new tax was also mostly frequently questioned by both banquet merchants and holders.

When the county government approved the levy of this new tax, local restaurants and banquet merchants had organized a collective strike to oppose the tax.67 Under the pressure, the government revised the term and stipulated that banquets that had less than five tables could have the fee waived.68 Although the banquet holders still constantly ran into conflicts with tax farmers, they were not thoroughly powerless and could still take actions against the tax farmers.69

When the county government encountered financial difficulty or was assigned unexpected tasks, the government would levy one-time taxes which could be burdensome.

67 Riri xinwen, October 20, 1932.

68 Meixian xianzhengfu, ed., Meixian xianzhengfu diyici xingzheng huiyi huikan (The compilation of the first administrative conference of Mei county) (Meixian: Meixian xianzhengfu, 1932), 17.

69 Riri xinwen, October 20, 1932. Meixian minguo ribao, December 27, 1932. 292

In such situation, the leaders of ward and village officers adopted various strategies to oppose the government’s order. When the levy was not far beyond the ability of the villagers, the ward leaders could push local public institutions, like temples or charity association, to assume the burden. For example, when the fourth ward was forced to pay for the installation fee of telephone lines, the ward leaders, after summoning a public meeting, decided to sell one charity hall in the village to cover the cost.70 When the village leaders felt that the levies were excessive or unreasonable, they often directly declined the order. When the head of the fourth ward police corps asked a local temple to pay 200 yuan as the ward security fee, the village leaders, pointing out that the income of the temple had been used to cover the fees of the local elementary school, refused to pay the fees twice.71

Villagers did not always dare to directly oppose the government. But to avoid the levies by procrastinating was common. In May 1933, the head of the county police corps decided to levy one-time land tax (一次過田畝捐 Yiciguo tianmu juan) since the office had a deficit of 5000 yuan. Yet the report on June 9th suggests that few ward and village office chairs had paid the tax when the deadline had passed. The government thus extended the deadline to the end of June. On June 14, Republican Daily reported that many tax collectors dispatched by the government had resigned because of the difficulty of collection. The reporter ascribed it to the drought of that summer which had made lives more difficult. On

July 14, half month after the deadline, the report disclosed that the government still did not

70 Riri xinwen, June 11, 1933.

71 Riri xinwen, November 11, 1930.

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make any progress. The county police office thus organized a meeting to discuss the countermeasure. The leaders of the police corps decided that the collectors who had been separately dispatched to the fourteen wards should gather together and finish the collection in one village before they go to the next. 72 Yet, the display of manpower did not look very useful. On August 22, the newspaper reported that except the first ward none of the other thirteen wards had finished the collection.73

In the worst situation, small-scale violent resistance to the government could also break out, especially after all the village security committees were allowed to legally possess guns. When the collector of the Road Construction Committee (公路建設委員會

Gonglu jianshe weiyuanhui) pushed Chaihuang villagers to pay off the 40 yuan they owed to the committee, the leader of the security committee of Chaihuang village, uniting his fellow villagers, detained the collector with guns. The villagers then forced the collectors to buy them a banquet and firecrackers. Otherwise, the villagers threatened, they would tie up the collector and paraded him through streets.74 The collector tried to seek help from the ward office, but the officers, claiming that the policemen were not on duty, refused to provide any help. The collector therefore had to meet the demand of the villagers. This incident vividly illustrates how the leaders of village security committees could utilize the military force to defy the authority of the county government. The government, for sure, still had advantage in terms of military power. The county and ward officers often brought

72 Meixian minguo ribao, July 14, 1933.

73 Meixian minguo ribao, August 22, 1933.

74 Meixian minguo ribao, December 2, 1928.

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soldiers when they collected payments in villages. Yet the fact that the government had to resort to violence to collect levies suggests that the government failed to establish effective control of villagers with administrative power.

The government had probably anticipated this situation, as they specifically created the ward office, which was between the county and village level offices. The ward office was supposed to help communicate the county government’s orders to villagers, to take charge of the levying of taxes, and to supervise the work of village office chairs.75 Although ward officers were granted the power to supervise village leaders, the position of ward officers was awkward since the ward office had to rely on villages for funding. Since the funding was always provided by rich and powerful villages, the leaders of the powerful villages either monopolized the position of ward office chair or challenge the authority of the ward office. When the ward chair occasionally quarreled with the village leaders, the powerful village leaders could always find ways to bypass the ward chair. In Bingcun, a prosperous town, the leader of the town office directly requested the county governor to grant the right of levying shop rents to the town office rather than the ward office. Since most shops in the ward were located in Bingcun, the county governor accepted the proposal.76 Without independent source of funding, the ward office could do nothing to constrain local power-holders.

75 “Qu gongsuo choubei weiyuanhui banshi xize” (The detailed regulation on the preparation of ward office), in Xian difang zizhi fagui huibian (The compilation of the laws on county self-government), ed. Guangdong minzheng ting (Meixian: Meixian xianzhengfu, 1931), 10-11; Li Sanglin, “Quxiang baojia gongzuo renyuan yingyou zhi renshi” (The views that ward and village baojia officials should have), Quwu huikan 1 (1931): 2.

76 Meixian minguo ribao, July 11, 1932.

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The government was aware that the setup of police office and security committees had consolidated the gentry’s rule rather than weakening it. In September 1929, as soon as the Communist force was driven out of northeasterrn Guangdong, the provincial government requested that all the counties dismiss security committees and reduce the size of the police corps. In Mei, the head of the county police corps, upon receiving the order, had tried to confiscate local weapons from the hands of local police corps. The local gentry, especially those in Songkou and Bingcun, were irritated by the decision. They, relying on their connections with local garrison generals, county party branches, and senior officials in provincial government, immediately took action to resist the government’s order. They firstly utilized the Minguo ribao (民國日報 Republican Daily), which had always been controlled by the commercial town elites, to denounce the impropriety of the government’s actions. They argued that all the weapons were purchased by local people for the purpose of maintaining local order. The government had no reason to confiscate local people’s property.77 In Songkou, the leaders of the chamber of commerce, the ward party branch, the education association, and the security committee, with the assistance of the county party branch and garrison officers, met the county governor and brought pressure to him.

The governor assured them that the government would properly handle the issue.78 In

Bingcun, similar groups of gentry jointly petitioned the provincial government to withdraw the order. It was unclear how the provincial government dealt with their petition, but the

77 Meixian minguo ribao, September 10, 1929.

78 Meixian minguo ribao, September 14, 1929.

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intrusion of the Communist army in October upset the government’s plan of dismissing local police corps. In May 1930, when the new governor, a native of Songkou town, assumed office, the police corps were immediately restored and even expanded in local society.79

The government had expected the sub-county administrative institutions to serve as a platform for the government to incorporate local power-holders and achieve effective control of the sub-county society. Yet, the government, which had neither financial ability nor military force to support the institutions, still had to rely on the local gentry to provide funding and resources for those institutions. It is thus of little surprise that the new administrative institutions became a platform for the local gentry to sustain their rule of local communities. The local gentry, through the ways of procrastinating, transferring the burden to public and religious institutions, and small-scale violent resistance, to some extent withstood the extortion of the government. However, as the agenda drafted by the government was becoming more aggressive, the local communities still suffered and failed to organize effective resistance against the government.

IV. Economic Construction

The Guangdong provincial government not only tried to obtain the allegiance of the sub-county elites by expanding administrative institutions, but also attempted to win the heart of the local population by improving the livelihood of the people. The only way to enhance the interests of the masses, in Chen Jitang’s words, was to “actively promote

79 Meixian xian zhengfu, ed., Meixian xianzheng zhounian huikan, 39-42. 297

the political and economic construction.”80 In the winter of 1932, Chen Jitang personally drafted the Three-year Administrative Plan of Guangdong (三年施政計劃 Sannian shizheng jihua). The economic and infrastructure construction was set as priority in the plan. The objective of the plan, according to Chen, was to “save the loss of the past, meet the requirement of the people, and enhance the interests of the people.”81 Mei County, upon the government’s call and under the leadership of an ambitious governor Peng Jingyi, the previous president of Dongshan Middle School, indeed made great achievement in rural construction. As a book Meixian daguan (梅縣大觀 A grand view of Mei County) published by the county government demonstrated, the county remolded its markets, installed telephone lines, and established nursery houses. The greatest achievement was in transportation. The county successfully built eight motor roads in three years from 1932 to

1935. The accomplishment was remarkable. However, the economic construction, though being initiated under the name of improving the livelihood of the people, incurred strong dissatisfaction and resistance from local people. It was not only because the projects brought heavy economic burden to local people, but also because most projects did not suit the need of the people.

To take the road construction as the example, the construction plan, rather than being devised out based on local need, was drafted according to the experience of the West.

80 Chen Jitang, “Zhengli yu jianshe yao tongshi bingzhong,” 198.

81 Chen Jitang, “Huanqi minzhong xiezhu zhengfu tuixing sannian jihua: Zai huanying sheng canyihui daibiaoxi shang de jianghua” (To urge local people to assist the government to implement the three-year plan: A talk in the banquet of provincial assemblymen), in Chen Jitang yanjiu shiliao, 231.

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According to the logic used by the government, why the road construction was important was because “all the developed countries had paid much attention to the development of roads.”82 Officials who were familiar with the economic situation in the West also pointed out that roads could be convenient for “the transportation of workers, the concentration of raw materials, and the circulation of capitals.”83 Few people had discussed, however, how motor roads would benefit the people in the countryside. Even in Meixian gonglu (梅縣公

路 Mei County roads), a monthly periodical edited by the Mei County government, local authors tended to discuss the interests the roads would bring to the nation rather than to the community. One author of the periodical, for example, stressed that the development of roads was the symbol of a civilized nation. If the Chinese do not want to be looked down by foreigners, then the Chinese must take great efforts to build roads as much as they could.

The author also appealed in the book that if all the people could try their best to fulfill the plans drafted by Premier Sun, who had proposed that China should build at least one million miles of roads, then China would become the first-class country in East Asia in less than ten years.84 The book also included a translated article that compared the advantages and disadvantages of the roads in six countries of Europe. The translator, at the end of the article, indicated that China should set those European countries as models and catch up

82 Lin Yungai, “Zai lianhe jinianzhou zuo guanyu Guangdongsheng sannian shizheng jihua de baogao, January 2, 1933” (The talk about the Three-year Administrative Plan of Guangdong), in Chen Jitang yanjiu shiliao, 167.

83 Li Xiyu, “Gonglu yu gezhong shiye zhi guanxi” (The relationship between the railroad and other enterprises), Guangdong jianshe yuekan 7 (1933): 15-17.

84 Lin Xuexiang, “Zhulu tonglun” (The general discussion of road construction), Meixian gonglu yuekan (Meixian road monthly) (April 1929): 2.

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with them as soon as possible.85 Though some authors generally mentioned that the roads would bring “convenience” to local people, most authors, probably having no idea about the specific benefits the roads could bring, could not clearly identify how the road construction could be related to the enhancement of the interests of the people.

Also, the road construction, before bringing any predictable benefits to the people, imposed a heavy burden on the people. Each road, according to the estimation of the county governor, cost 100,000 yuan to 150,000 yuan to finish, which was almost twice of the total land tax of the county.86 Before 1931, the provincial government, except urging county governors to embark on the construction, did not propose any feasible plan to solve the problem of funding. Unsurprisingly, the road construction did not make any progress before then. In Mei, as early as the end of 1927, the county governor had inaugurated the construction of Meixian-Songkou Road ( 梅松公路 Meisong gonglu) upon the government’s call. Yet the governor was afflicted by the problem of the shortage of funding since the beginning of the project. In April 1928, the County Road Committee decided to raise 100,000 yuan by selling lottery tickets. And as a tradition of fund-raising in the county, the committee dispatched commissioners to Southeast Asia to promote sales. 87 Yet probably because the amount needed for the road construction was much higher than that

85 Wu Huayuan, “Ouzhou gonglu shichaji” (My investigation of European roads), Meixian gonglu yuekan (April 1929) 4-8.

86 Jiang Xuan, “Bugao tanpai lukuan shiwanyuan wancheng Mei-Song gonglu” (To levy 100,000 yuan to construct the Mei-Song road), Meixian xianzheng zhounian huikan, 19-20.

87 Lin Xuexiang, “Mugu weiyuan nuli de yipie” (A glimpse of the effort of share-raising officials), Meixian gonglu yuekan (April 1929): 1-4.

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required by the school building, the tickets did not sell well no matter in Mei or in Southeast

Asia. Though the committee extended the deadline for two months, only twenty percent of the tickets were sold.88 In February 1930, the Road Committee invited county officials and notables to discuss new strategies to raise funding. Yet except pushing county officials and local temples to purchase more shares, the committee was unable to develop any good idea.

And all the attenders agreed that it was improper to collect funding by imposing surcharges on land tax. Because of the general lack of interests, the construction of Meixian-Songkou road did make any progress in four years.

To solve the shortage of funding, the provincial government took steps to stimulate the local interests in the road construction. The government drafted a new Road

Construction Regulation in 1932, which required people who lived along the planned road to organize construction companies by themselves. The company would assume the responsibility of collecting funds and recruiting labors along the road. Upon completion, the company would be granted the charter of providing transportation service on the road for twenty years.89 This plan, by granting local people the monopoly of the road, took one important step in connecting the state’s interests to local people’s interests. Yet, the plan was much easier to be drafted than to be conducted. As indicated above, roads were different from schools. The initial investment was huge which required the investment from a large group of people. Moreover, the design of the route and the requisition of lands

88 “Youjiang jigu kaijiang xiangqing” (The detailed introduction of the drawing of stock-lottery), Meixian gonglu yuekan (April 1929): n.p.

89 “Mei-Bing gonglu limin zhulu xingche gongsi zhangcheng” (The Article of Limin Road-construction and Transportation Company over Meixian-Bingcun Road), Feb 26, 1934, Box Jianshe ke (Construction section), Folder 33, Mei County Archives, Meizhou. 301

required all the households along the road to coordinate with each other. The government had tried to make the coordination easier by urging local people to organize a shareholding company together. Yet local people, especially those from different communities, still had reservation in cofounding a company. To be sure, local people were not strange to the form of shareholding companies. Lineage trusts were just similar organizations established by incorporating investable assets from different branches of a lineage. Non-kin corporations which were often formed under the name of sacrificing a community god or establishing a charity hall were also quite common. Yet, without the kinship or religious ties, people of different communities could not easily establish mutual trust which made the trans- community collaboration difficult. Although the Company Law, which was first promulgated in 1904, had provided protection to strangers who wanted to pool their capitals together, the precondition of such collaboration was that the investment would bring common interests to the investors. In the case of the rural road construction, the potential interest of the road was apparently uncertain for the majority of the residents who had little chance to use the road. In brief, local people lacked a common ground to unite with each other and did not see the common interests in the road. If there was a common cause, then it was the order from the government. But if the government did not use force to impose the order, it could not expect local lineages to smoothly organize the company by themselves.

The attempt to push local residents to organize road companies on their own, unsurprisingly, was not successful. The residents along the Meizhou-Bingcun road, for

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example, did not reach an agreement after four months of disputes.90 The county governor, to accelerate the speed of the construction, granted the construction rights to a few merchants who were then authorized to raise funds and recruit labors along the road.

Different from the powerful overseas investors, these merchants did not have to possess much capital by themselves. What they did was to use the official authorization to tap resources from local society. These merchants were usually connected to county officials but had no close ties with the communities along the road. Consequently, they tended to push local communities to pay the levies or relinquish the lands disregarding local people’s ability or willingness. The Article of Meixian-Bingcun Road Company (梅丙築路公司

Mei Bing zhulu gongsi) disclosed their way of collecting funds and recruiting labors. The company planned to raise 120,000 yuan as the capital. Of the 120000 yuan, 37,000 yuan was supposed to cover the cost of purchasing lands from local residents. Rather than paying the residents with cash, the company granted the residents stocks valued 37000 yuan. It means that the residents who relinquished their lands would not get any immediate compensation. The article also stipulated that every adult man between eighteen and fifty had to purchase stock valued one yuan. Otherwise they had to dig two cubic meters of earth.

Through this way the company expected to collect 13000 yuan. The remaining 70000 yuan would be raised by selling stocks to local residents. The purchasing, according to the article, was purely voluntary.91 This article stipulated how, theoretically, the funds should be raised.

90 “Xianfu guanyu kance kaifa Mei-Bing gonglu laiwang wenjian” (The correspondence over the survey and construction of Mei-Bing road), 1930-1931, Box Jianshe ke, Folder 6, Mei County Archives, Meizhou.

91 “Mei-Bing gonglu limin zhulu xingche gongsi zhangcheng.”

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However, in practice, the company often arbitrarily forced local people to purchase the shares. Local people’s charges against the company suggest that the company usually imposed a quota of shares on every lineage along the road. If a lineage could not bear the burden or refused to purchase the shares, the company often directly threatened the lineage with violence or occupied the land of the lineage without paying any compensation. In the construction of Mei-Bing road, for example, the manager of the road company urged the three lineages along the road to each purchase 1000-yuan shares. Two lineages could not afford the large sum of money and refuse to make the payment. The company thus chose to build the road on the lime mines belonging to the two lineages. The rerouting, according to a secret investigator sent by the provincial government, cost more time and brought a destructive impact to the mine. Yet the road company insisted on its decision, even if the provincial government requested it to finish the project as soon as possible. 92 Local lineages, through passive resistance, had to some extent withstood the government’s extortion of extra tax. Yet in the face of the intrusion of the new elites, who were neither restricted by the provincial government nor responsible to local residents, the lineages suffered.

The performance of the residents of Nankou town vividly demonstrates how local lineages wrestled with the Mei-Yao Road Company (梅瑤築路公司) over the property right of local land. In early 1932, three merchants, none of whom were the natives of

Nankou, established a company to contract for the road that passed Nankou. According to

92 “Pai Chen keyuan qianwang chaxun” (Dispatching the section member to investigate the Mei-Bing road), September 20, 1932, Box Jianshe ke, Folder 24, Mei County Archives, Meizhou. 304

local people’s charge, the company, rather than utilizing the existing county road built in the Qing as the foundation for the new road, chose to rebuild a road which would pass through the paddy fields of the town. The Pan lineage, the biggest lineage in the town, was dissatisfied with this arrangement. When the Pan lineage tried to negotiate with the road company, the company asked the Pan lineage to pay a large sum of money as the “revision” fee. The Pan lineage was angry at the company’s extortion. Uniting with other lineages in the town, the Pan lineage submitted a petition to the provincial government, requesting the government to urge the company to use the old road. Though not all the lineages would get harmed by the road construction, they coordinated in the face of the external threat. Eleven representatives from seven different family names cosigned the petition. The petitioners argued that the route devised by the company crossed too many paddy fields. In a mountainous area like Mei, the paddy fields were precious and indispensible to poor families who did not have any sideline income. The villagers also tried to defend their interests by taking advantage of the government’s propaganda, which often preached that the government represented the interests of the majority of people. The petitioners pointed out that “the Nationalist Revolutionary Army had been organized under the name of saving the interests of the majority of people.” “The Eastern District Road Committee was also founded for the purpose of protecting the transportation interests of the majority of people.”

Now that the majority of people would suffer because of the unreasonable route, “would not the governors break their original promise of protecting the people?”93 Being bombed

93 “Liu Fuyuan deng yi weifa zhulu kong Yongjie gongsi” (Liu Fuyuan charged Yongjie company over the illegal construction of roads), September 22, 1932, Box Jianshe ke, Folder 45, Mei County Archives, Meizhou.

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by the repeated petitions, the provincial government agreed to send commissioners to resurvey the route. Yet, facing the provincial investigation, the road company insisted that the expansion of the old road would destroy many tombs and intensify the conflicts between the government and the people. The commissioners left without coordinating the relationship between the company and local people. The negotiation seemingly reached an impasse at the point, though the company soon gained an upper hand due to the breakup of the lineages’ alliance.

The collaboration of lineages had achieved some success in the first stage. Yet in the following petitions, the lineages which had stood together became divided because of their long-term conflicts over the control of local public lands. Since the petitioners did not receive any clear reply from the government for several months, the Pan lineage, which owned most paddy fields in the village, appealed again to the provincial government. This time, the Pan lineage added that although the expansion of the old road would bring damage to some tombs, it was much better than destroying people’s houses and paddy fields.94 This petition irritated the Liu lineage which was the owner of most of the tombs. The Liu lineage immediately submitted a petition to local garrison which also had power in interfering with local affairs, claiming that they did not want the government to change the route anymore.

They indicated that the Pan lineage had cast covetous eyes on their tomb land which was close to the new house of the Pan lineage. Since the Liu lineage refused to sell the land to the Pan lineage, the Pan lineage schemed to redirect the route to go through Liu’s tombs

94 “Meixian nankou gongmin daibiao cheng Guangdong sheng jiansheting” (Nankou citizens’ petition to the Department of Construction), October 12, 1932, Box Jianshe ke, Folder 45, Mei County Archives, Meizhou.

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by requesting the government to change the route.95 A member of the Liu lineage who had cosigned the second petition with the Pan lineage also submitted a statement, claiming that he did not participate in the second petition and his signature on the petition was fake.96

Since the Liu lineage agreed to drop the case, the county governor, in his reply to the provincial government, declared that the case did not involve the “public interests” (公益 gongyi) of the community anymore. The Pan lineage’s insistence, according to the county governor, was just out of their selfish concern over the lineage’s “private interests.” The provincial government accepted the county governor’s response and permitted the company to resume construction without changing the route.97

The government tried to win the heart of local people by promoting the economic and infrastructure construction in rural society. Many of these projects, however, did not meet the actual need of local society and received cold response from local people. Even worse, these projects, being controlled by the elites who colluded with local officials, became the tool for the elites to extort resources for their own sake. The lineages, in the face of the increasing threat, had taken collective actions against the intrusion. Yet without a solid common ground to unite each other, the alliance of lineages was too weak to

95 “Nankou bao Liu zu daibiao cheng” (The petition of the representative of the Liu lineage), September 24, 1932, Box Jianshe ke, Folder 45, Mei County Archives, Meizhou.

96 It was unclear if the county government had colluded with the Liu lineage to change the litigation. It was possible since the Liu lineage, rather than petitioning to the provincial government as they had done in the first litigation, submitted their second petition to local garrison general who had closely collaborated with the county governor.

97 “Chengfu Mei-Yao gonglu xianhou jiufen ge’an” (The reply about the conflicts over Mei-Yao road), September 26, 1933, Box Jianshe ke, Folder 45, Mei County Archives, Meizhou. 307

withstand the new elites who had dominated local administrative institutions and gained the trust of the central government.

Conclusion

The Nationalist party, following the footsteps of the reformers and the revolutionaries, launched a series of ambitious plans that the state regarded beneficial to both the state and the local population. Yet the plans, often a blind imitation of Western experience, did not meet the actual demand of local people and were often beyond the capacity of the people. The government, without a group of trusted cadres to carry out the plan, had to rely on existing local leaders, including both the new elites and traditional gentry, to implement its plans. The new elites, however, by monopolizing the new political platforms like party branches or labor unions while receiving little restriction from the government, maximized their own interests at the cost of both the state and local communities. The traditional gentry, relying on their direct control of local communities, often undermined the government’s attempt of penetrating into local society, though their resistance was increasingly feeble as the new elites were becoming more aggressive.

Losing the control of the new elites and the support of local communities, the Nationalist government could not effectively mobilize local people to engage in its state-strengthening program.

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Conclusion: State Penetration and Local Autonomy

This conclusion consists of four parts. In part I, by generalizing the arguments of different chapters, I discuss how the deep-rooted local autonomy forced the state to strengthen its penetration of local society. In part II, I try to present a more accurate definition of the new elites and the traditional gentry by having conversations with previous scholars who worked on the rural leadership. I then briefly engage in the discussion over the comparison between the state-strengthening in China and Europe. In the last part, I discuss how the concern over regional interests lasted until the early 1950s and forced the

Communist Party to wipe out all the existing power holders in local society.

I. State Penetration and Local Autonomy

Late imperial China is known for the harmonious coexistence of the integration of the empire and the great extent of self-governance in local society. Yet modern China was always criticized for its authoritarian rule. Why did local society, which had developed a consensual relationship with the state, lose its autonomy and suffer greatly from the penetration of the state? This question has intrigued many scholars of Chinese history.

Historians have approached this question from various perspectives. Some of them, such as Richard Solomon and Lucian Pye, ascribed the state’s deepening penetration to the

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authoritarian tradition in Chinese politics.1 According to them, Chinese political culture – which emphasizes submissiveness in a hierarchical structure and was marred by corruption, factionalism, and authoritarianism – crippled Chinese revolution and led to the rise of the authoritarian rule.

Some other scholars tried to relate the political authoritarianism to the radical turn of Chinese political elites in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Benjamin

Schwartz, for example, explored how a generation of Chinese scholars of the 1890s embraced the Darwinism introduced by Yan Fu, especially the idea of “survival of the fittest among nations,” whicn spurred the rise of Chinese nationalism.2 Michael Gasster further pointed out that the elites of the 1900s, in order to search for a total solution of

China’s problems, thoroughly rejected tradition and sought quick reform.3 John Fitzgerald, by studying the propaganda strategies of the Nationalist and Communist parties, investigated how modern parties took a Machiavellian way to “awaken the masses” and instill the nationalist ideology with their propaganda apparatus. In their discourses,

Fitzgerald noticed that, national interests were gradually placed in front of personal

1 Richard Solomon, Mao’s Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Lucian Pye, Warloard Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Modernization of Republican China (New York: Praeger, 1971).

2 Benjamin I. Schwartz, In search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964).

3 Michael Gasster, Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911: The Birth of Modern Chinese Radicalism (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1969).

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interests. This narrative justified the arrival of a single-party state that was believed to be able to best serve the interests of the nation.4

While all the above arguments have their merit, to ascribe the shift of state-society relationship to a set of fixed traits of Chinese culture sounds essentialism. Also, to attribute the state’s reorientation to the radical choice of a few political elites only tells half of the story from a top-down perspective. This dissertation, instead, argues that the reformers’ turn to authoritarianism and the government’s tendency to deeply penetrate local society were reactions to the deep-rooted local autonomy in China rather than merely out of their radical choice of ideologies.

People in northern Guangdong, as discussed in chapter I, had been beyond the control of the central government until the sixteenth century. As the Ming government deepened its penetration in the area, local people began to adopt official cultural norms, such as Confucianism and lineages, to legitimize their status and to get organized. From the late seventeenth century, the popularization of the imperial examinations and the promotion of lineages as the tax-paying units enabled more commoners to dress up their communities under the cover of lineages. By doing so, the local population gained the trust of the government and legitimized their possession of lands and resources. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Qing government, being incapable to cope with the endless wars and rebellions, further granted local gentry the power to organize militias.

Although the government tried to suppress the militias as soon as the rebellions were put

4 John Fitzgerald, Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution (Stanford: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

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down, the militias were either retained or transformed to Rehabiliation Bureaus, which possessed the power of both managing public affairs and raising public funds. Local established gentry, by presiding over the bureaus, consolidated their leadership of local society.

As the local gentry deepened and institutionalized their control of local communities, the government gradually lost its leverage in the negotiation with the local gentry. As early as the Taiping Rebellion, when the war exhausted the Qing government’s financial resources, the government had found that it could not arbitrarily raise the land tax to meet its increasing demand for resources. Encountering difficulty in conscripting resources from the landlords, the government was forced to turn to merchants and to count on the lijin tax, a commercial tax imposed on merchandise to internal transit, to meet its expanding requirement for resources.

From the 1870s, the government, stimulated by the pressures from both foreigners and senior officals, initiated the self-strengthening movement that centered on economic and military modernization. The modernization movement required huge capital which was beyond the capability of the Qing government, which, once again, turned to merchants, especially those in the metropolises and foreign countries, for assistance. Merchants, as well as the literati who failed to gain a leadership position in the preexisting power structure, vigorously supported the reform with the attempt to obtain the government’s trust and expand their influence. Since merchants provided the new economic foundation for the government, the government also initiated a series of reforms, from the promulgation of

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the Company Law in 1904 to the abolishment of the imperial examination in 1905, to elevate the status of merchants and to weaken the authority of the traditional gentry.

The merchants and reform-minded literati, who I define as the new elites in this dissertation, by controlling new-style self-government platforms, such as schools, education associations, and chambers of commerce, played a more important role in local public affairs. Yet when the new elites tried to seize the resources controlled by the traditional gentry, such as the community temples or the funding of local militias, they were crushingly defeated by the traditional gentry who had dominated local communities and established an absolute advantage in the allocation of local resources.

The traditional gentry’s forceful defense of their vested interests crippled the government and the new elites’ attempt to extract local resources for the state’s end. The conservative turn of the Manchu officials and the rising national crisis further upset some radical youth, especially the students who took activities in the metropolitan areas. They, driven by the sense of crisis, openly expressed their support to a thorough revolution and established alliance with each other in the metropolises like Tokyo and Shanghai. Their ideal of defending national interests, however, was not widely appreciated by the local population in eastern Guangdong. Their plan of spreading revolution in their hometowns was also ruthlessly attacked by the traditional gentry who had confronted with the new elites, the protectors of the revolutionaries, since the late Qing reform.

Owing to the military victory of the New Army uprisers, revolutionaries in eastern

Guangdong did not encounter much difficulty in overthrowing the local government in the

1911 Revolution. However, the revolutionaries, most of whom had rarely taken activities

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in their hometowns before the outbreak of the revolution, were soon marginalized by the new elites in the Republican government.

In order to establish their authority and implement the aggressive reform agenda, the revolutionaries in the Guangdong Military Government (1911-1913) refused to rely on the new elites as their agents anymore. Instead, they tried to weaken the authority of both the traditional gentry and the new elites and established the direct control of local society by arranging new-style school graduates who did not have a deep root in local society to assume the leadership positions. Their plans, unsurprisingly, were strongly opposed by both the traditional gentry and the new elites. The former group, relying on the local militias and lineage organizations, directly opposed the government’s order of conscripting resources. The latter group, who had established their ideological and administrative authority after the 1911 Revolution, also refused to sponsor the new reform agenda at the cost of their own interests and made every effort to maintain the independent control of the existing reform projects. Due to the estrangement of both the traditional and the new elites, the revolutionaries lost support in Guangdong and were soon defeated in the competition with the president Yuan Shikai in 1913.

In the 1920s, the Nationalists retook Guangdong with the support of the Soviet

Union and the Communists. Being aware of the importance of mass power under the influence of the Soviet Union, the Nationalists established various mass organizations with the purpose to gain direct access to the local population. The Communists, as the actual administrators in eastern Guangdong of the time, also played an active role in propagandizing both the Nationalist and Communist ideas. However, the two parties,

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without the ability to establish an independant institutional framework by themselves, still had to rely on the existing local leaders to build their political platforms and conduct propaganda work. The parties thus had to compromise with the different local factions and suffered from their contradiction. To illustrate, when the Communist Party tried to preach communism among the students in the two middle schools, the party found that it could only achieve success in the Dongshan Middle School. Students of the Meizhou Middle

School, to antagonize Dongshan students who allied with the Communists, all joined the

Sun Yat-senism Association organized by the Nationalists.

After the Nationalist Party united China in 1928, the party, in order to establish more effective control of local society, tried to incorporate local informal power holders into its formal administrative structure. At the same time, the party also attempted to mobilize a broader social group to participate in its state-strengthening programs by organizing mass organizations like party branches, labor unions, and small merchant associations. However, before the arrival of the Nationalists, both the new elites and the traditional gentry, relying on distinctive platforms, had established themselves as entrenched power-holders in local society. The new elites, relying on a political network independent from the central government’s control, successfully excluded the local youth of the Meizhou faction from joining the Nationalist Party and maintained their dominance over local administration. Relying on the political power they possessed, they controlled most reform projects and more aggressively extorted the local population. And in this process, their sectional interests, rather than the national interests, had always been their primary concern.

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The traditional gentry and the local population sheltered by the gentry suffered from the new elites’ dominance in local administration. However, local people, relying on the protection of their lineages and the use of military power, to a large extent withstood the extortion of the new elites-led government. For example, because of the non-cooperation of the local communities, the county government could not finish the census of the local population in three years. The tax levying was even more difficult. When local people felt that the levy was excessive or unreasonable, they chose to either transfer the tax burden to local temples or avoid the levy by procrastination. Through these methods, they successfully turned down the sale of most treasury and military notes. Moreover, relying on the military power of the communities, some villagers directly resisted the government’s order with violence. To prevent the potential attack from the local people, county officials had to bring soldiers with them or acted collectively when they collected payments in villages.

The frequent use of violence by both the county government and local communities suggests that the Nationalist regime, despite its attempt to deepen the penetration of local society, failed to establish effective control of local communities with its administrative power. The traditional gentry and the new elites strictly controlled their distinctive domains until the early 1950s, when the Communists thoroughly wiped out all the existing power holders, which I will discuss in detail in part IV.

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II. The New Elites and the Traditional Gentry

Scholars who work on social history from the late Qing to the Republican periods have held contrasting views about how local elites responded to state penetration. The majority insist that the imperialist threat, the modernizing reform, and the state’s attempt to extract local resources for the state’s purposes destroyed rural communities and delegitimized the gentry’s role in local society. In northern Hebei, according to Duara’s research, traditional gentry who lost their cultural authority and tax privileges migrated to towns and exposed unprotected peasants to various external threats. Village bullies became the new rural leaders and chased private interests at the expense of the welfare of local communities. The corruption of rural leaders, according to Duara, eventually delegitimized the rule of the Nationalist governments and eased the Communist conquest of rural communities.5 In eastern Zhejiang, according to Schoppa’s research, the elites from the economically prosperous central zone more frequently enganged in national political affairs and took leadership polistions in local government. The traditional gentry in the rural hinterland, in contrast, still relied on lineages to maintain parochial control over community affairs and grually submitted to the leadership of the elites in the central zone.

Both of the works disclose an important characteristic of local leadership in the early twentieth century, that is, the rise a group of new elites and their dominance of local politics. Both of their arguments, however, depart from an assumption that the traditional gentry had relied on official titles and Confucian norms to achieve dominance over local

5 Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).

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communities. Traditional cultural resources had been important for local gentry to establish their authority and justify their dominant positions in local society. However, from the late nineteenth century, by organizing militias and Rehabilitation Bureaus during the Taiping

Rebellion and the post-rebellion reconstruction, the traditional gentry had institutionalized their rule of local communities and established absolute control of local population through the direct use of military power. In other words, the traditional gentry were increasingly less reliant on the cultural resources to establish dominance. Once the modernizing state delegitimized traditional cultural symbols, the local gentry lost the state’s recognition of themselves as the legitimate agents in local society, but they did not lose control of local people and resources which they had firmly dominated through the institutions such as militias and public bureaus.

Although the traditional gentry，like what Duara and Schoppa discovered, were gradually marginalized in the formal administrative platforms and did not frequently engage in national politics, they did not lose their foothold in the competition with the new elites. As this dissertation demonstrates, the traditional gentry failed to gain an upper hand in the competition with the new elites over the leadership position in the new-style self- government associations, but they successfully prevented the new elites from seizing the local public resources such as community temples or public funding. In the period of the first United Front (1925-1927), the students who allied with the traditional gentry also refused to submit to the leadership of the new elites who had controlled the county government by allying with the Communists. Under the Nationalist rule after 1927, the

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new elites gained an overwhelming advantage in local governments, but they still encountered great difficulty in extracting resources from the traditional gentry.

Some other scholars, such as Huaiyin Li, stress that the traditional gentry in prosperous areas adapted well to the social changes in this period. Based on the evidence that new-style schools were widely established in the education reform in southern Hebei,

Li concludes that the traditional gentry actively supported the reform since they realized that the reform could advance their interests.6 This judgment oversimplifies local responses to the reform, especially the responses in the south. As this dissertation demonstrates, not all people benefitted equally from reform. Their attitudes to reform, thus, varied greatly from each other.

In Mei County, as in southern Hebei, new-style schools were quickly established after the government inaugurated the education reform. Yet if one compares the quality of different schools, one would find that the schools established by the new elites were always better equipped and more influential than the schools established by the traditional gentry.

The new elites were more enthusiastic in investing in those schools since they benefitted more from the education reform. The new elites, in comparison to the traditional gentry, did not possess much cultural authority in the existing power structure. By funding the expensive modernizing projects, the new elites gained the recognition of the government and established their own authority in local society. The new elites, unsurprisingly, more vigorously sponsored the reforms. As soon as the governor-general Cen Chunxuan initiated

6 Huaiyin Li, Village Governance in North China: Huailu County, 1875-1936 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 264-265. 319

the education reform in June 1904, the new elites from the commercial towns of Mei

County immediately proposed to establish a middle school in the county seat and actively raised funds for the school.

The new elites, having more opportunities to study or work in the metropolitan areas and suffered more from the national humiliation, also identified more with the nationalist ideals and more frequently joined new-style voluntary organizations. The Mei youth who studied in Japan, for example, almost all joined in the Revolutionary Alliance in 1905. Being eager to promote national strength by themselves, some radical youth not only sponsored the revolutionary enterprise at a high cost, but even dovoted their lives to the uprisings organized by the Revolutionary Alliance.

In comparison, the traditional gentry were not enthusiastic about the late Qing reforms and did not embark on the construction of a middle school until being repeatedly urged by the county governor in early 1905. They also lacked interest in making generous donations to the school but chose to raise funds by selling lotteries. In comparison to the new elites, the traditional gentry could not benefit much from the reform. They had legitimized their leadership of local society by controlling lineages since the late Ming dynasty and further consolidated their rule by controlling militias since the Taiping

Rebellion. They had also established cultural authority in local communities by earning traditional titles. The traditional gentry thus had no urgency to use the new ideology to enhance their authority. The traditional gentry would not refuse to follow the command of the government, but they had little desire to patronize the reform at a high cost.

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III. State-strengthening in China and Europe

Duara, in writing about northern China, ascribes the failure of state-making in

China to the state’s ignorance of the traditional cultural nexus and its attempt to build a political system outside of the existing nexus. In Europe, Duara points out, the success of the modernizing state lay in successfully establishing a mutually beneficial alliance between the state and rural elites.7 However, the distinctive social structure in China and the inorganic content of the reform determined that the Chinese state had to break the traditional cultural nexus and turn to radical ways to mobilize people and resources.

In Europe, lineages did not constitute the basic cell of society. Without the kinship relationship as the dominant social bond, local people were not closely allied with traditional gentry and their native communities. According to Charles Tilly, this provided the king a chance to break up the population into discrete groups and rally popular support by offering guarantees against local bosses. In Europe, the expansion of trade and industry also transferred a large number of the rural population to cities and enabled the new industrial elites to divert people and resources to their own purposes. The state’s attempt to extend control of local society by forming alliances with the new elites thus was much easier to realize since both the state and the new elites possessed the ability to mobilize a large number of people and resources. As the state deepened its penetration into local society, the state also tried to meet the demand of people by providing them with political

7 Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power, and the State, 247.

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rights and welfare, which made the relationship between the state and the masses reciprocal and sustainable.8

In China, conversely, the traditional gentry maintained a tight control of land and labor through the lineage organization. The majority of people, living on the land rather than on commercial activities, also had to rely on their lineages for protection. It is thus extremely difficult for the state to shift coalitions in local society and obtain the support of the masses.

Also, the modernization programs promoted by the various Chinese regimes from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, rather than being devised out of the actual need of local people, were drafted following Western experience and imposed into local society without considering the local reality. Since the content of the programs often far deviated from the concerns of local people, the state could not develop a reciprocal relationship with local people in the process of the reform. For example, the plan of constructing motor roads in rural society, rather than drawn out of people’s demands for driving automobiles, was mainly devised due to the state’s desire to catch up with the West.

The result was that on most roads in Mei County, there were only two to three cars running at most time.9 The residents who lived along the roads, however, had to pay a large sum of money to support the construction.

8 Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” in The Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975), 20-32.

9 “Pai Chen keyuan qianwang chaxun Mei Bing gonglu” (Dispatching the officer Chen to investigate the Mei-Bing road), September 20, 1932, Box Jianshe ke, Folder 24, Mei County Archives, Meizhou. 322

To hard sell these unpopular programs, the modernizing state could only build a new independent political system and turned to a group of new elites. In Guangdong, this group of elites were to some extent similar to the new elites in the European context rather than the pure bullies described by Duara. They had commercial backgrounds and mainly undertook activities in cities or foreign countries. Yet, in the beginning of the twentieth century when the level of urbanization and industrialization was still quite low in China, the new elites only accounted for a tiny portion of the whole population and their business did not involve the participation of the majority of peasants in rural society. They might be able to mobilize workers or traders in cities, but when they went back to their rural hometown, they could not mobilize local people and resources who did not rely on them for living. At the same time, as Duara also notices, this group of elites, having their independent base of power, was often beyond the control of the central government. The

Republican regimes thus encountered double obstacles created by both the traditional gentry and new elites in the process of state-making.

Duara proposed that the state, in order to meet the simultaneous demands of modernization, nation building, and state making while maintaining its legitimacy, should have developed a group of loyal cadres before traditional forms of authority was destroyed.10 Yet, as the interests of the state did not coincide with local interests and brought an onerous burden to local communities, the state could not expect to establish legitimacy by collaborating with the local power holders. The Nationalists had been aware of this fundamental contradiction between the state and local society and had tried to

10 Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power, and the State, 4. 323

weaken both the traditional gentry and the new elites by supporting the new elites who were relatively independent from local society. Yet, as analyzed above, the new elites, who were beyond the control of the government, refuted to serve as the loyal supporters of the state. The Communists, by recruiting party cadres and flexibly utilizing the language of class struggle against landlords, are believed to be successful in getting access to local people. Yet, until the party undertook radical methods in late 1952, the party had not been very successful in reshuffling the existing power structure in Guangdong even after it had launched the land reform in late 1950.

IV. Regionalism and Anti-regionalism in the Land Reform

By the spring of 1949, the Communists had achieved an overwhelming victory in their battles with the Nationalists in northern China. The guerrilla forces in northeast

Guangdong had also destroyed several garrisons of the Nationalist Army in the area.

Starting in the spring of 1949, some Nationalist officials in Mei began to establish secret connections with the Communists and showed willingness to collaborate with the party.

On May 17, the county governor and the leader of the local garrison declared they would surrender to the Communists. Mei County thus became one of the first counties in

Guangdong that expressed allegiance to the Communists. Yet in the period when the situation remained fluid, the Nationalist government and troops were not disbanded immediately. The county governor still maintained control of the government and the troops were still stationed in the important military fortresses. Several troops who disagreed with the decision of defection had even tried to overthrow the rule of the Communists.

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To stabilize order in the area and gain the support of local people, the Communists established a United Committee (聯合委員會 Lianhe weiyuanhui), recruiting members from different sections in local society who sympathized with the Communists. Local guerrilla forces, which had acted independently for a long time before 1949, played a leading role in the committee. The party had dispatched Chen Zhongping (陳仲平 1913-

1993), a native of neighboring Fujian province and the leader of the Meizhou Regional

Party Committee (梅州地區委員會 Meizhou diqu weiyuanhui), to serve as the first county governor. But to gain the support of the local guerrilla forces, the party soon arranged Wang

Zhian (王志安), a native of Mei who had organized local Communist activities since 1938, to replace Chen.11 The new elites, who had controlled most important positions in the local administration, also actively collaborated with the Communists. Under the assistance of the United Committee, the Communists formally took over the county government on June

11. Gu Zhi (古直 1885-1959), one of the earliest revolutionaries in the county and the founder of the Cold Poetry Association, wrote a couplet to celebrate the establishment of the new government.12

The new Communist government immediately established a Meizhou Public

School (梅州公學) to train cadres for the new government. The school waived tuition for all students and provided free board and lodging. It also promised to grant students

11 Meixian dangshi bangongshi, “Wang Zhian,” Meixian wenshi ziliao vol.19 (1991): 135-136.

12 Liu Tianyuan, “Meixian jiefangshi xian renmin zhengfu de menlian” (The couplet of Mei County people’s government at the time of liberation) Meizhou wenshi vol.16 (2003): 282-283.

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positions in the local government in the future according to students’ interests. More than three hundred local youths attended the school.13 The government also provided several short-term training courses to local officials who had served in the Nationalist government.

Since the government merely provided the officials with necessities rather than directly paying them money, some officials refused to serve the Communists. But quite a few of them were willing to take the opportunities offered by the new government. The

Communists also took over the publishing house of Zhongshan Daily ( 中山日報

Zhongshan ribao), a newspaper which had been issued by the Nationalists, and published

Renmin Bao (人民報 People’s Journal) to propagandize the advantage of the Communists over the Nationalists. But the government allowed another local newspaper, Shanbao (汕

報 Shan Daily), to continue its business.14 In general, the handover of the local regime, led by the local guerrilla force and assisted by existing leaders of the local government, was smooth.15

13 “Zhonggong Meixian Meizhou gongxue diyiqi zhaosheng jianzhang” (The admission requirement of Meizhou Public School), in Meixian jiefang dangshi ziliao huibian (The collected materials of the party’s history in the period of liberation), ed. Zhonggong Meixian xian dangshi ziliao zhengji yanjiu weiyuanhui bangongshi (Meixian: Xian dangshi ziliao zhengji yanjiu weiyuanhui bangongshi, 1989), 15.

14 Senlin and Tianye, “Senlin Tianye zhi Huanan fenju dian: Guanyu jiefang Meixian de jieshou jingyan” (The report to the South China Bureau by Senlin and Tianye: About the experience in taking over Mei), in Guangdong geming lishi wenjian huiji, 1949.6-1949.12 (Compilation of materials on the revolution in Guangdong), vol.100, eds. Zhongyang dang’an guan and Guangdong sheng dang’an guan (Beijing: Zhongyang dang’an guan, 1986), 163.

15 Chen Bingquan, “Meixian de liangci jiefang” (The twice liberation of Mei County), Meizhou shi dangshi ziliao no.12 (September 1983): 61-78.

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Nevertheless, in July 1949, a division of the Nationalists reoccupied Mei County.

The Communists did not expect the attack and were forced to withdraw from Mei. The performance of local elites in the incident, however, suggests that they were not loyal to the Communists. Some of them, especially those who had associated with the established gentry, turned back to the Nationalists and assumed the role of county governor for the

Nationalists. Shanbao, the newspaper controlled by the local new elites, openly criticized the Communists in this period.16 The Communists did not retake Mei until October 1949, when the main force of the People’s Liberation Army led by Chen Geng (陳賡 1903-1961) entered Guangdong. The Communists did not launch any radical reform in this period but followed the policies they had implemented in June. The guerilla leaders and the new elites thus continued to control the local government.

At the provincial level, the majority of leaders were also the natives of Guangdong.

The provincial chairman Ye Jianying (葉劍英 1897-1986) was a native of Mei and also a graduate of Dongshan Middle School. Ye’s two deputies Gu Dacun (古大存 1896-1966) and Fang Fang (方方 1904-1971) separately came from Changle (長樂) county and Puning

(普寧) county, the former of which neighbored Mei County and the latter was not far from

Shantou. This group of local officials, being familiar with the local situation and having numerous connections in local society, tended to adopt a mild approach to implement the reform. In the first political campaign, the land reform, the South China Branch of the

Central Committee under the leadership of Ye had openly supported gradualism over

16 Senlin and Tianye, “Senlin Tianye zhi Huanan fenju dian,” 163.

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radicalism. The provincial leaders stressed that commercial activities constituted the foundation of Guangdong’s economy. The cadres thus should carefully differentiate commercial interests from feudal exploitation. The property of merchants was protected by the government. If a merchant was also a landlord, then the cadres could “cut his feudal tail.” But if the merchants lived on business, then the cadres were forbidden to confiscate the properties of the merchants. 17 Ye Jianying also paid special attention to returned overseas Chinese. Ye pointed out that their lands and houses were paid with the money that they had earned through industrious work in foreign countries. The government thus should also distinguish them from landlords and protect their interests.18

Guangdong officials’ emphasis on the special characteristic of Guangdong and the importance of protecting commercial interests, however, raised suspicions from the South

Central Bureau, especially after November 1950 when 毛澤東 (1893-1976) was determined to deepen the land reform. 19 The Guangdong provincial government had planned to conduct land reform in three counties. Upon Mao’s instruction, the government

17 “Fangfang fuzhuxi zai Guangdongsheng diyijie rendaihui shang guanyu Guangdong tudi gaige wenti de baogao” (Fang Fang’s speech in the first Provincial People’s Congress about the land reform), in Guangdong tudi gaige faling huibian (Collected materials on land reform in Guangdong), ed. Guangdong sheng tudi gaige weiyuanhui (Guangzhou: Xinhua shudian huanan fendian, 1950), 27-37.

18 “Guangdong sheng tudi gaige zhong huaqiao tudi chuli banfa” (Policies for the handling of the lands of overseas Chinese), in Guangdong tudi gaige faling huibian, 16-17; Ye Fei, “Ye Jianying tongzhi yongyuan huozai qiaobao xinzong” (Comrade Ye Jianying will live in the heart of overseas Chinese forever), Renmin ribao, November 2, 1986.

19 According to Yang Kuisong’s research, Mao’s interests in deepening the land reform was closely related to the outbreak of the Korean War. Mao had been concerned that the radical reform would incur opposition from different sections of society and interfere with the unification of the country. Since the war occupied people’s attention, Mao held that it is the perfect time to purge the people who had opposed the Communists and establish the authority of the party. Yang Kuisong, “Xin Zhongguo zhenya fangeming yanjiu” (The research on the suppression of counterrevolutionaries), Shixue yuekan 1 (2006), 48. 328

designated eight more counties as the experimental counties. To more efficiently implement the policy, the provincial government organized a work team consisting of the students of Nanfang University (南方大學 1950-1952), which had been established by the

Communists in Guangzhou for the purpose of training party cadres. From March 1951, the officers of the People’s Liberation Army in the area also joined the working team.

The experiment of the land reform was finished in April 1951. It was estimated that the lands possessed by poor peasants doubled after the land reform. Since the cadres paid attention to the coordination of interests of different classes, the reform did not create too much conflict in local society. The Guangdong provincial government was satisfied with the pace of the reform. 20 However, the leaders of the Central China Bureau harshly criticized the reform in Guangdong for being “peaceful land reform” which failed to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses.21 The protection of returned overseas Chinese was also considered to be a policy which lacked class attitude and ignored the feeling of peasants.22

The South Central Bureau ascribed the problem in Guangdong to the “regionalist inclination” (地方主義傾向 Difang zhuyi qingxiang) of Guangdong cadres. An editorial of Changjiang Daily further indicated that the party in south China had been infiltrated by evil elements since 1938 and local cadres, especially those at the county and ward levels,

20 “Fang Fang tongzhi jiancha Xingning, Jieyang, Longchuan sanxian tugai baogao” (Fang Fang’s report on the progress of the land reform in Xingning, Jieyang, and Longchuan) (1951), in Huang Xunba, “Guangdong de tudi gaige” (The land reform in Guangdong), Dangdai Zhongguoshi yanjiu 1 (1995): 43.

21 Li Jianzhen, Li Jianzhen huiyilu (The memoire of Li Jianzhen) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1991), 213.

22 Li Xuefeng, “Guanyu nongmin yundong zhong de jige wenti” (Some problems in the peasants’ movement), Changjiang ribao, April 19, 1951.

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were not trustable.23 The opinions of the South Central Bureau were echoed by Chairman

Mao. In December 1951, the central government arranged Tao Zhu (陶鑄 1908-1969), the provincial chairman of Guangxi province, and Zhao Ziyang (趙紫陽 1919-2005), the district secretary of Nanyang (南陽), Henan Province, to take charge of the land reform in

Guangdong. In June 1952, Chairman Mao summoned the leaders of southern provinces and held a small conference in Beijing to criticize Guangdong’s performance in the reform.

Mao said there had been three tortoises in the land reform. They were Guangdong, Fujian, and Guangxi. Now Fujian and Guangxi had caught up but Guangdong was still crawling slowly. 24 Fang Fang and Ye Jianying then resigned from important positions in

Guangdong. The land reform, under Tao Zhu’s leadership, quickly turned radical.

In Mei County, the political campaigns started from 1950. The target of the first round of the campaign was elimination of counterrevolutionaries who had served the

Nationalists. At the time, the government was still under the control of local guerilla forces who had allied with the new elites. The county governor Lai Yunru (賴運如) was the fellow townsman of Ye Jianying and had been a technician for the underground radio station of the Communist Party. The new elites also occupied some important positions in the new government. The vice president of the People’s Congress, for example, was assumed by

23 Changjiang ribao, July 7, 1951.

24 Tao Zhu, “Zai fenju kuoda huiyi shang de fayan”, July 6, 1952, Box 22, Folder 1-7, Zhanjiang City Archives. In Mo Hongwei, Xin Zhongguo chengli chuqi de Guangdong tudi gaige yanjiu (The research on the land reform in the beginning of the establishment of People’s Republic of China) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2011), 173.

330

Feng Yinshi (馮引士 1898-1969), the president of the Dongshan Middle School.25 Because of the close connection with the Communist cadres, the new elites, though having performed actively in the Nationalist government, did not suffer much in the first round of the reform. In comparison, the Meizhou faction, which had been supported by local established gentry, were the first victims of the campaign. Two presidents of Meizhou

Middle School and a county governor who had graduated from Meizhou were executed in the campaign.26

Yet as Tao Zhu quickened the pace of the reform and sent more outside cadres to local society to lead the campaign, the situation was turning against the new elites too. In

February 1952, the provincial government inaugurated the “reorganization” ( 整隊 zhengdui) movement which aimed at cleaning up local governments. A senior cadre from

Henan province was sent to Mei to lead the movement. About 1200 local cadres were ordered to participate in the reorganization. Since many local cadres were intellectuals from rich families, their class background was suspected by the cadre dispatched by the provincial government. Even the previous members of the guerrilla force were also suspected since they had little connection with the central party committee and had always acted independently before liberation. As a result, 65 percent of local cadres were criticized or attacked in the reorganization movement. 20 percent were punished by the government.

25 Meizhou shizhi, vol. 17: “Zhengxie” (Political consultative conference), 758.

26 Qin Yuanbang, “Huifu dongshan xueyi yu fandongpai douzheng de jingguo” (The fight with the counter revolutionaries in the restoration of Dongshan and Xueyi middle schools), in Meixian Wuyier wuzhuang baodong ziliao huibian (Collected materials of the May 12 uprising in Mei), ed. Zhonggong Meixian xian dangshi ziliao zhengji yanjiu weiyuanhui bangongshi (Meixian: Xian dangshi ziliao zhengji yanjiu weiyuanhui bangongshi, 1987), 62.

331

Among the six members of the county standing committee, two were dismissed. And among the ten ward leaders, seven were dismissed. In the meantime, the poor peasants whose class backgrounds were deemed trustworthy were recruited to lead local administrative affairs. 27 This movement deeply discouraged existing cadres who had actively served the Communists. But by arranging the poorest who had little influence in local society to assume the role of cadres, the provincial government was able to strengthen their control of the local administration.

From late 1952, the situation turned increasingly against the new elites. In August

1952, Ye Jianying resigned from the position of the chair of the Guangdong provincial government. In Mei, his fellow townsman Lai Yunru was removed from the position of county governor. Feng Yinshi, the vice chair of the congress, was also dismissed and categorized as the “counterrevolutionary” ( 反革命 fan geming) 28 A cadre of Hebei province was dispatched to Mei to be the new governor. The movement was further intensified in Mei. Not only local cadres, but almost all the well-to-do families, no matter how they had accumulated their wealth, were violently attacked in the movement. Some senior leaders of the new elites, like Deng Shifu (鄧石甫 1881-1952), the leader of the

1911 Revolution in Mei, and Liao Jianchen (廖建宸 d. 1952), the director of the Chamber of Commerce which had supported the Communists in the Eastern Expedition, were all

27 Zhang Jian, “Meizhou diqu jiefang tou sannian de jingji huifu gongzuo” (The recovery of economy in the first three years after Meizhou got liberated), in Guangdong dangshi ziliao, vol. 43, ed. Zhonggong Guangdong shengwei dangshi yanjiushi (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2007), 105-106, 108.

28 Liu Jianlin and Yang Ying, “Feng Yinshi,” in Meixian wenshi ziliao, vol. 23 (1992): 160-161.

332

executed in late 1952.29 The emigrant families suffered most in the movement. Most of these families consisted of women and children who could not do much farm work and had to live on the rent of the properties. They were pushed to ask for money from their overseas relatives to pay fines for the “exploitation” they were alleged to have committed.

After several rounds of the campaign, the government almost eliminated all the power-holders who had prevented the government from getting access to local people. By this time, the government had also taken over the local administration in every aspect.

However, the government still failed to cut off people’s loyalty to their lineages. Since people did not have opportunities to move out of local society during the period, they were more closely tied with their lineages than they had been before 1949. William Parish and

Martin Whyte, in their 1978 study of rural society, discovered that after the collectivization in the mid-1950s, lineages actually became the base of the production team, though the operation of production teams was quite different from that of lineages. They were more egalitarian and democratic, according to Parish and Whyte.30 The Communist government successfully penetrated local society, but it is hard to say to what extent it had changed the social structure of local society and prevented people from defending the local interests, that were believed to be in contradiction with national interests by several generations of political leaders since the late Qing.

29 Liu Yihong, “1952 nian qianhou fei zhengchang siwang de Meixian zhiming renshi” (The county notables who died abnormally around 1952). Accessed April 4, 2015. http://www.mzsky.cc/home.php?mod=space&uid=96067&do=blog&id=207448

30 William Parish and Martin Whyte, Village and Family in Contemporary China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 333

From the 1980s, the central government had recognized the importance of developing a market economy and protecting commercial interests. Peasants are also encouraged to leave their hometowns and work in commercial sections in metropolitan areas. It is since then that rural residents, like the new elites in the beginning of the twentieth century, have begun to weaken the link with their lineages and identify more with the various new associations outside of their hometowns.

334

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