DOCSLIB.ORG

2010 Arhat Virdi What Is Truth

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
2010 Arhat Virdi What Is Truth WHAT IS TRUTH ? Arhat S ingh V irdi Submitted For Degree of Ph.D. in Philosophy London School of Economics and Political Science Houghton Street, London WC 2A 2AE 2010 I declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own. 1 The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotations from it are permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without prior written consent of the author. I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. Word Count (including footnotes but excluding bibliography and appendices): 57, 919 2 ABSTRACT I defend the correspondence theory of truth, according to which a statement’s truth consists in a relation of correspondence with extralinguistic fact. There are well-known objections to this view, which I consider and rebut, and also important rival accounts, principal among which are so-called deflationist theories and epistemic theories. Epistemic theories relate the concept of truth to our state of knowledge, but fail, I argue, to respect the crucial distinction between a criterion of truth and the meaning of truth: the view that one cannot do semantics, or metaphysics, without addressing epistemic issues is rejected by this work. Against epistemic theories, I illustrate how truth is independent of epistemic considerations. Deflationism is the more popular of the rival accounts and has gained considerable momentum over the past two decades. It is therefore dealt with in greater detail by this work. Deflationist theories exploit the paradigmatic ‘“Snow is white” is true iff snow is white’ biconditional to argue for an insubstantialist account, according to which truth is conservative with respect to non-semantical facts. On this view, truth’s raison d’être is merely to perform the useful expressive function of generalising over possibly infinite sets of assertions. Against deflationist theories, I claim that the work done by Jeffrey Ketland and Stewart Shapiro conclusively demonstrates how truth is informationally additive over non-semantic facts, while deflationism itself is also an excessively impoverishing theory, inadequate to the tasks it purports to accomplish. This work also defends the thesis that Alfred Tarski’s well-known theory of truth is an authentic correspondence theory. To say this is to say that the clauses of a Tarskian truth-definition can be interpreted in terms of a relation of correspondence that holds between true sentences and the states of affairs they describe. I provide a precise account of what the correspondence in question consists in, claiming that true sentences are homomorphic images of facts, i.e. a true sentence represents, in a form-preserving manner, the truth-making facts in it. This gives precise expression to Wittgenstein’s thesis that true sentences picture the world. 3 CONTENTS ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………………………….3 CONTENTS………………………………………………………………………………………….4 PREFACE……………………………………………………………………………………………7 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………...8 CHAPTER 2. EPISTEMICISM………………………………………...…………………………16 2.1 Motivating Epistemicism about Truth 2.2 Coherentism 2.3 Peircean Pragmaticism 2.4 Jamesean Instrumentalism 2.5 The Non-Viability of Epistemic Theories of Truth 2.6 Appendix CHAPTER 3. CORRESPONDENTISM……………………………………………………….…36 3.1 The Primal Attraction of the Correspondence Theory 3.2 The Correspondence Relation 3.2.1 Deflationism and the Correspondence Relation 3.3 What are Facts? 3.3.1 The Slingshot Argument 3.3.2 Is Correspondentism the View of Metaphysical Realism? 3.3.3 Taking Stock 3.4 Ramsey’s Ladder 3.5 Dr. Tarski, Or: How Truth Theorists Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Semantics 3.5.1 Correspondentist Aims 3.5.2 Truth is Relational 3.5.3 Satisfaction 4 3.5.4 Truth-in-a-Model 3.5.5 Tarskian Truth and Facts 3.5.6 Addressing Three Popular Objections 3.6 Closing Remarks 3.7 Appendix CHAPTER 4. DEFLATIONISM………………………………………………………….………79 4.1 Introductory Remarks 4.2 Deflationary Theory Not Committed to the T-scheme 4.2.1 Strawson’s Illocutionary Theory 4.2.2 C.J.F. Williams’ Redundancy Theory 4.2.3 Prosententialism 4.3 T-scheme Based Deflationism 4.3.1 Redundantism 4.3.2 The Central Objection to Redundantism 4.3.3 Disquotationalism 4.3.4 Minimalism 4.3.5 Objections CHAPTER 5. DEFLATIONISM AND CONSERVATIVENESS………………………………120 5.1 The Conservativeness Implication 5.1.1 An Analogy with Hilbert’s Programme 5.2 Is Deflationary Truth Conservative? 5.2.1 Tennant’s Rebuttal 5.3 Appendix CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………….…..136 BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………………………143 5 6 PREFACE I would like to thank Colin Howson for his careful supervision of my thesis, for reading (uncountably) many drafts of each chapter and for guiding my style. His advice has been invaluable. I would also like to thank Hannes Leitgeb for his charitable help and patience in allowing me to see ways in which the thesis presented can be improved. Naturally, I would like to thank my brother, Adipat, and my sister, Arhan, for their unfailing love, support and inspiration. Gurcharan Kaur, my mother, passed away 6 th November 2002 just after my third year as a PhD student at the LSE had begun. My mother suffered severe hardships throughout her life, yet her spirit remained unbroken as she remaining firmly wedded to the virtues of forgiveness, love and tenderness toward others. Whosoever came into contact with her could not walk away without being greatly impressed by my mother’s gentility and magnanimity. Lamenting her lack of education 1 – citing her not possessing a university degree and her sufferance as evidence – my mother persevered to ensure her children’s educational well-being. All caring parents wish the best for their children. In my mother’s case, this was everything. I have often thought about this. My mother taught English to non-native speakers and organized and administered courses for a highly successful London college for adult learners (in her honour that college annually awards a prize to the student who overcomes the greatest difficulties in winning an ESOL certificate). My mother singly raised, nurtured and schooled three children while maintaining a home, its finance and under painfully difficult circumstances. These are feats (my experience of) people schooled even in the very top universities would be unequal to. They serve as a testimony to my mother’s very unique fortitude and conviction. They also served to strengthen my own resolve in continuing with this effort when all was lost that autumnal day. Contrary to what she herself thought, my mother’s life is a beacon of light. My mother is the only angel I shall ever know; she is my sine qua non . I dedicate this effort to my mother. 1 My mother studied for an MSc in Education (at the Institute of Education, University of London) but the need for her to be hospitalized from the cancer very sadly prevented her from completing the degree. 7 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Logic, like any science, has as its business, the pursuit of truth. What are true are certain statements; and the pursuit of truth is the endeavour to sort out the true statements from the others, which are false. W.V.O. Quine, Methods of Logic When entering upon the study of a science, we need to have some idea, if only a provisional one, of its nature. We want to have in sight a goal to strive towards; we want some point to aim at that will guide our steps in the right direction. The word ‘true’ can be used to indicate such a goal for logic, just as can ‘good’ for ethics and ‘beautiful’ for aesthetics. Of course all the sciences have truth as their goal, but logic is concerned with the predicate ‘true’ in quite a special way, namely in a way analogous to that in which physics has to do with the predicates ‘heavy’ and ‘warm’ or chemistry with the predicates ‘acid’ and ‘alkaline’. There is, however, the difference that these sciences have to take into account other properties besides these we have mentioned, and that there is no one property by which their nature is so completely characterized as logic is by the word ‘true’. Gottlob Frege, Logic This work seeks to defend the twin claims that truth is, in nature, a substantial notion and, in meaning, correctly articulated by the correspondence theory of truth. To understand what these claims are, and why they are considered correct, one must undergo a sort of propaedeutic of what a philosophical investigation of truth consists in. Let us begin by making clear that the thesis defended here does not hinge on how we are to understand the medium through which truths get conveyed: our truth-vehicles could be beliefs, ideas, judgements, propositions, statements, sentences, other forms of linguistic representation. For the sake of argument, let us here take propositions to be our truth bearers. Consider, now, the question ‘What is truth?’ What exactly is this thing, truth, that propositions are endowed with an ability to carry? Common amongst the philosophical community is an expression of bafflement concerning truth. This might be a consequence of the Fregean view expressed above that there is no one property characterizing any science so completely as ‘true’ does logic. Thus, no other pieces of information seem available, as one might expect in the other sciences, to help illuminate the concept. 2 Quine, however, did not share this view. He thought the concept of truth is unambiguous : There are philosophers who stoutly maintain that ‘true’ said of logical and mathematical laws and ‘true’ said of weather predictions and suspects’ confessions are two usages of an ambiguous term ‘true’…3 What mainly baffles me is the stoutness of their maintenance. What can they possibly count as evidence? Why not view ‘true’ as unambiguous but very general, and recognize the difference merely between logical laws and confessions? 2 This is part of Frege’s reason for holding truth to be indefinable .
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Comments on “Facts About the Slingshot” by Gregory Landini Valia Allori
    Comments on “Facts about the Slingshot” by Gregory Landini Valia Allori This paper is very technical, so I will start my comments with a reconstruction of the arguments presented. Only at the end of this I will say what I think. I apologize in advance for any misinterpretation that I might have done. If I did, it was, of course, entirely unintentional. There is an argument against the correspondence theory of truth that, because of its combined simplicity and devastation, has been named the slingshot argument. According to the correspondence theory of truth a sentence is true iff there is a fact corresponding to it. In order to make sense, it seems that this theory must be able to differentiate between facts. The slingshot arguments, if sound, establish that every true sentence corresponds to the same fact, and therefore the corresponding theory of truth is doomed to failure. In his paper, Gregory argues that the slingshot argument is unsound. Let me just recapitulate what the argument says and my understanding of Gregory's argument against it. I will talk only about Davidson’s first version, for simplicity. The comments I will make will nonetheless apply to both versions. Let [p] be a shortcut for the locution “the fact that p”. Then it seems reasonable to assume that: 1) if to sentences p and q are identical, then [p]=[q] 2) if p and q describe the same thing (are co-denoting), then [p]=[q] for example: given S= “Cicero wrote Philippicae Oratione” and R=“Tully wrote Philippicae Oratione”, then [Cicero wrote Philippicae Oratione]=[Tully wrote Philippicae Oratione] 3) if p ad q are logically equivalent sentences, then [p]=[q] for example: S'= “ Plato=x: (x=Plato & S)” is logically equivalent to S, so [S]=[S'] Assumption number 2) is what Gregory calls the assumption of “constitution”: it amounts to say that the facts containing an object do not depend on the description provided.
    [Show full text]
  • UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations
    UC San Diego UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Pluralism and Realism Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2n611357 Author Evpak, Matthew Publication Date 2018 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO Pluralism and Realism A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy by Matthew Evpak Committee in charge: Professor Gila Sher, Chair Professor Samuel Buss Professor Andrew Kehler Professor Donald Rutherford Professor Clinton Tolley 2018 The Dissertation of Matthew Evpak is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically: _____________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________ Chair University of California San Diego 2018 iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Signature Page ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ iii Table of Contents ....................................................................................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Slingshot Argument, Godel's Hesitation and Tarskian Semantics
    Arhat Virdi The slingshot argument, Godel’s hesitation and Tarskian semantics Article (Accepted version) (Refereed) Original citation: Virdi, Arhat (2009) The slingshot argument, Godel's hesitation and Tarskian semantics. Prolegomena, 8 (2). pp. 233-241. ISSN 1333-4395 © 2009 © 2009 Society for the Advancement of Philosophy, Zagreb This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/27063/ Available in LSE Research Online: Feb 2010 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. This document is the author’s final manuscript accepted version of the journal article, incorporating any revisions agreed during the peer review process. Some differences between this version and the published version may remain. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. The slingshot argument, Gödel’s hesitation and Tarskian semantics ARHAT VIRDI The slingshot argument is a reductio purporting to show that if there are facts at all there is only one to which all true statements correspond. If facts are not non-trivially individuable then this presumably must render the notion of fact and, by implication, theories such as the correspondence theory of truth incoherent.
    [Show full text]
  • Metaphysics and Natural Kinds: Slingshots, Fundamentality, and Causal Structure
    METAPHYSICS AND NATURAL KINDS: SLINGSHOTS, FUNDAMENTALITY, AND CAUSAL STRUCTURE By ANDREW LEE MCFARLAND Submitted to the graduate degree program in the Department of Philosophy and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. ________________________________ Chair: John Symons ________________________________ John Bricke ________________________________ Armin Schulz ________________________________ Clif Pye ________________________________ Philippe Huneman Date Defended: May 16, 2014 The Dissertation Committee for Andrew Lee McFarland certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: METAPHYSICS AND NATURAL KINDS: SLINGSHOTS, FUNDAMENTALITY, AND CAUSAL STRUCTURE ________________________________ JOHN SYMONS Date approved: May 16, 2014 ii DISSERTATION ABSTRACT Metaphysics and Natural Kinds: Slingshots, Fundamentality, and Causal Structure Andrew Lee McFarland My dissertation addresses a question relevant to metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science: What are natural kinds? I explore a view that holds that natural kinds are complex, structural properties that involve causal structure. Causal structure describes the idea that for the many properties associated with natural kinds, these properties are nomically linked – that is causally connected – in such a way that the properties of non-natural kinds are not. After criticizing arguments in favor of a nominalist theory of kinds – one that holds that a natural kind just is to be identified with its class of instances – and after defending the notion of a complex structural property from several prominent objections posed by David Lewis, I apply a causal account of natural kinds to a set of problematic cases, paying special attention to isomeric kinds from chemistry. iii Dedication I dedicate this doctoral thesis to my family and to the tireless support they have given me over the years.
    [Show full text]
  • Overview the Slingshot Argument
    Branden Fitelson Philosophy 125 Lecture 1 Branden Fitelson Philosophy 125 Lecture 2 ' $ ' Philosophy 125 — Day 17: Overview $ The Slingshot Argument — Diagnosis and Lessons Learned 1 • I’ve posted a handout, which goes over (in detail) two renditions of the • First Papers and SQ’s should be returned by 10/30/03 slingshot argument due to Davidson and Godel.¨ Last time, I sketched Davidson’s argument. Today, I’ll discuss the key assumptions and steps. • A handout + more links on the “slingshot” argument posted • Davidson assumes that it is OK to substitute any logically equivalent • Agenda: Facts, States of Affairs, and Events statements into definite descriptions of the form “the fact that . ”. Godel¨ – The slingshot – Diagnosis and Lessons Learned does not assume this. But, both arguments assume two key things: – The Russellian Theory of Facts and Descriptions 1. Definite descriptions pthe x such that φq [p(x ˆ)φq] refer (to the unique – Facts as “Truth-Makers”? thing that satisfies φ, where φ can be a complex expression). E.g., this implies that “(x ˆ)(x = Socrates and snow is white)” refers to Socrates. – Facts as “Actualized” States of Affairs? 2. The referent of a complex expression depends only on the referents of its – States of Affairs subexpressions, and not on the manner in which these things are referred – Chisholm’s 1970’s Views on States of Affairs and Events to. E.g., this implies “the fact that a = (x ˆ)(x = a and snow is white)” has – Events: Two Recent Theories (Davidson and Kim) the same referent as “the fact that a = (x ˆ)(x = a and grass is green)”, since “(x ˆ)(x = a and snow is white)” and “(x ˆ)(x = a and grass is green)” have • Next Unit: The Possible and The Actual the same referent (a).
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction
    Introduction Smiles, talks, runs, arrivals and departures, births and deaths, thunder and lightning: the va- riety of the world seems to lie not only in the assortment of its ordinary and less ordinary inhabitants—animals and physical objects, or perhaps minds, sets, atoms—but also in the sort of things that happen to or are performed by them. In the last three decades this view has been a focus of considerable debate in philosophy, with implications reaching far into the concern of other disciplines as well (above all linguistics and cognitive science). It is a view that many authors have accepted, mostly on account of the prominent role played by the concept of event in the formulation and analysis of a wide variety of philosophical is- sues. However, there has not been much agreement as to the precise nature of such entities, and a range of alternative theories (along with a corresponding variety of identity and indi- viduation criteria for events) have been put forward. This volume brings together a selection of essays that have deeply influenced this debate, paving the way to an understanding of the role played by events in our representation of the world. The material is organized in five sections: (i) the role of events in the logical analysis of natural language; (ii) the metaphysical status of events; (iii) their identity and individua- tion criteria; (iv) their role in the analysis of space, time and causality; and (v) the distinction and classification of various types of events and event-like entities (such as processes and states).
    [Show full text]
  • On Why the Slingshot Against the Correspondence Theory of Truth Misfires
    ISSN 1393-614X Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 10 (2006): 28-34 ____________________________________________________ On Why the Slingshot against the Correspondence Theory of Truth Misfires Arhat Virdi Abstract According to the correspondence theory of truth, a statement is true just in case it corresponds to the facts. The slingshot argument demonstrating that there can be only one fact is understood by some philosophers to deliver a coup de grâce to the correspondence theory. Others, however, seek to deflect the slingshot by appealling to Russell’s non-referential theory of definite descriptions. I argue that the slingshot argument is immune to semantical considerations concerning definite descriptions. The slingshot argument is valid. However, I also argue that this fails to demonstrate the untenability of the correspondence theory of truth. According to the correspondence theory of truth, a statement is true just in case it corresponds to the facts. For instance, the statement that snow is white is true just in case it corresponds to the fact that snow is white. The theory has invited a number of criticisms and counter-arguments. Among them is the so-called ‘slingshot argument’. This demonstrates that (at most) there can be only one fact. In rendering the notion of fact redundant, the argument is thereby taken to cripple the correspondence thesis in positing entia non grata. Given that the mechanics of the argument rest on minimal logical machinery and appears to cripple a venerable philosophical thesis in one fell swoop, one sees why the David and Goliath metaphor has been employed. Donald Davidson, for example, has long been convinced by all this, advocating ‘[t]here is good reason, then, to be skeptical about the importance of the correspondence theory of truth.’ (Davidson 1999: 106).
    [Show full text]
  • MISFIRED SLINGSHOTS: a CASE STUDY on the CONFUSION of METAPHYSICAL and SEMANTIC CONSIDERATIONS Andrew Mcfarland
    MISFIRED SLINGSHOTS: A CASE STUDY ON THE CONFUSION OF METAPHYSICAL AND SEMANTIC CONSIDERATIONS Andrew McFARLAND ABSTRACT: Most philosophers today will acknowledge the pitfalls of confusing metaphysical and semantic issues. Many are also familiar with the classic semi-formal argument that has come to be known as ‘the Slingshot’ and the various philosophical ends to which this argument has been deployed. The combination of the argument’s relatively simple theoretical machinery and its wide range of applications make it ripe for abuse. The slingshot was originally conceived as a semantic argument about designation; what it suggests, but does not prove, is that the closest analogue to singular term reference for any expression is that expression’s semantic extension. In order to derive more metaphysically robust conclusions, however, many classical deployments of the argument make use of several methodologically suspicious tactics. By cataloguing the more frequent abuses of the argument, we may remind ourselves of a valuable philosophical lesson. KEYWORDS: the Slingshot argument, facts, common nouns, semantic extension, referent, metaphysics 1. Introduction There is a familiar argument whose formal presentation is due originally to Alonzo Church1 and independently to Kurt Gödel2 that has been used for a number of philosophical purposes. In its first form, in his review of Carnap’s Introduction to Semantics,3 Church presented the argument as a rigorous proof against the view that sentences refer to propositions.4 Others, like Donald Davidson5 and W.V. 1 Alonzo Church, “Review of Introduction to Semantics by Rudolf Carnap,” Philosophical Review 52 (1943): 298–304, Alonzo Church, Introduction to Mathematical Logic: Volume 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 24–25.
    [Show full text]
  • Causal Slingshots
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Bern Open Repository and Information System (BORIS) Erkenn (2010) 72:111–133 DOI 10.1007/s10670-009-9190-x ORIGINAL ARTICLE Causal Slingshots Michael Baumgartner Received: 1 June 2008 / Accepted: 7 August 2009 / Published online: 14 November 2009 Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 Abstract Causal slingshots are formal arguments advanced by proponents of an event ontology of token-level causation which, in the end, are intended to show two things: (i) The logical form of statements expressing causal dependencies on token level features a binary predicate ‘‘… causes …’’ and (ii) that predicate takes events as arguments. Even though formalisms are only revealing with respect to the logical form of natural language statements, if the latter are shown to be adequately cap- tured within a corresponding formalism, proponents of slingshots usually take the adequacy of their formalizations for granted without justifying it. The first part of this paper argues that the most discussed version of a causal slingshot, viz. the one e.g. presented by Davidson (Essays on actions and events. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980), can indeed be refuted for relying on an inadequate formal apparatus. In contrast, the formal means of Go¨del’s (The philosophy of Betrand Russell. New York, Tudor, 1944) often neglected slingshot are shown to stand on solid ground in the second part of the paper. Nonetheless, I contend that Go¨del’s slingshot does only half the work friends of event causation would like it to do.
    [Show full text]
  • Economical Unification As a Method of Philosophical Analysis
    The Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies University of Helsinki Finland Economical Unification as a Method of Philosophical Analysis Avril Styrman ACADEMIC DISSERTATION To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Helsinki, for public examination in lecture room 13, University main building, on 17 December 2016, at 10 noon. Helsinki 2016 i Thesis Supervisor Professor Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Tallinn University of Technology Pre-Examiners Professor Simo Knuuttila, University of Helsinki Professor Sami Pihlström, University of Helsinki Custos Professor Gabriel Sandu, University of Helsinki Opponent Professor Sami Pihlström, University of Helsinki ISBN 978-951-51-2696-2 (paperback) ISBN 978-951-51-2697-9 (PDF) Unigrafia Helsinki 2016 ii 1 Introduction The method of economical unification resembles a production line with three inseparable elements that are interconnected in two stages: Economy → Economically unified ontology → Applications In the first stage an economically unified ontology is explicated by applying the principle of economy. In the second stage concepts are defined and disambiguated and problems are resolved in terms of the ontology. The central argument that is defended in this doctoral dissertation is that the method is more progressive than plain conceptual analysis that proceeds in the absence of an economically unified ontology and in the absence of the principle of economy as an evaluation criterion of alternative ontologies. Its progressiveness results from having a stable economically unified ontology that is the same for all derivative topics, and which enables defining and disambiguating meanings of concepts, thereby facilitating their gen- uine understanding and resolving problems around them, more efficiently than in plain conceptual analysis.
    [Show full text]
  • MIT Malpasdialogues 12652.Indb
    Index Actions, xvii, xxii, 7, 32, 66, 320n21 Agreement, 168–169, 177, 197. See also attitudes and, 338 Disagreement causality and, 291, 298 internalized, 260, 265, 266, 270, 275 commonality and, 267, 268 interpretation of anomalous details defi ned, 310 and, 228–229 as entities, 77 understanding and, 260, 261–262, events distinguished from, 291 265–270, 271–272, 274–276 explanations of, 302, 306, 341n16 American Philosophical Association interpretation of, 330 (APA), 241 in life-world, 21 Analytic (Anglo-American) philosophy, ontology of, 311, 313, 314 xx, 7, 64, 129, 132, 265 philosophy of, xviii, xxi, 284, 292 divide with continental thought, 149, primitive, 312–313 159, 183 rationalization of, 46, 285 epistemology paramount in, 175 reasons as cause of, 298, 301, 303, 318 logical empiricism, 29 “standard story” of, 297, 303, 304, “postphilosophical” development in, 306, 310, 311, 318 xix understanding of, 286 Analytic–synthetic distinction, 63, 118, unifi ed theory of meaning and action, 155, 222, 348 326, 328–330, 338 Anderson, Elizabeth, 414, 418–419 utterances and, 131 Animals, 77, 110n17, 251–252, 273, 396 “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” (David- Anomalousness, 48, 49, 51, 192 son), ix, 45, 286 Anscombe, Elizabeth, 297, 312, 314, Action theory, 372 320n21 Agency, human, 42, 45, 48 on interpretation “under a descrip- beliefs and, 331–332 tion,” 350 causality and, 46, 47, 303–304 on “knowledge without observation,” internal monologue and, 286 332 privileged knowledge of action and, on practical vs. theoretical knowledge, 332–333 316–317
    [Show full text]
  • Perspectives on Russell
    Society for the Advancement of Philosophy University of Zagreb – Center for Croatian Studies INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL CONFERENCE Perspectives on Russell PROGRAM & BOOK OF ABSTRACTS November 24–26, 2008 Borongaj Campus • Center for Croatian Studies Borongajska cesta 83d, 1st floor • Zagreb • Croatia http://www.hrstud.hr/russell Contents 5 Welcome Address 7 Conference Program 13 Abstracts 31 Organizing Committee 33 Our Previous Conferences 35 Prolegomena – Journal of Philosophy Welcome Address On behalf of the Society for the Advancement of Philosophy and the Center for Croatian Studies of the University of Zagreb, we would like to extend a warm welcome to all of you attending the “Perspectives on Russell” Conference in Za­ greb. We are happy to announce that 22 papers will be presented at the conference, by philosophers coming from Austria, China, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, United Kingdom and Croatia. It seems safe to say that the international character of this conference is obvious. What will also become obvious, as we are more than sure, is the good quality of the papers we are about to hear over the next three days. Both organizing institutions of this conference are relatively young. The Center for Croatian Studies (with the Philosophy Department as one among its eight departments) was founded in 1992, and the Society for the Advancement of Philosophy was founded in 2002, with the particular aim of promoting good philosophical work and scholarly cooperation not only within Croatia’s boundaries, but also at a more international level. This is why, in addition to the philosophical importance of the papers to be presented and subse­ quent discussions of them, one of the main ideas behind organizing this conference was to foster communication among scholars from different countries who share similar theoretical interests and approaches to doing philosophy.
    [Show full text]