UC San Diego UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Pluralism and Realism Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2n611357 Author Evpak, Matthew Publication Date 2018 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO Pluralism and Realism A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy by Matthew Evpak Committee in charge: Professor Gila Sher, Chair Professor Samuel Buss Professor Andrew Kehler Professor Donald Rutherford Professor Clinton Tolley 2018 The Dissertation of Matthew Evpak is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically: _____________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________ Chair University of California San Diego 2018 iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Signature Page ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ iii Table of Contents ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... iv Vita ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... v Abstract of the Dissertation ........................................................................................................................................................................... vi Chapter One: Realism and Antirealism: The Distinction and the Debate ...................................................... 1 1. Introduction................................................................................................................................................................................................ 1 2. Dimensions of Realism .................................................................................................................................................................. 7 3. Dummett’s Semantic Challenge to Realism ............................................................................................................. 24 4. Putnam’s Semantic Challenge to Realism .................................................................................................................. 65 5. The Benacerraf Dilemma .............................................................................................................................................................101 Chapter Two: Alethic Pluralism and Ontological Pluralism: Framing Realism- Antirealism Disputes ............................................................................................................................................................................................111 1. Introduction................................................................................................................................................................................................111 2. Minimalism, Alethic Pluralism, and the Realism-Antirealism Distinction ..............................115 3. Minimalism about Existence ....................................................................................................................................................124 4. Cruces for Existence: Some Examples from the Literature ......................................................................131 5. Assessing Minimalism: Merits and Objections .....................................................................................................142 Chapter Three: Combining Pluralisms through a Theory of Facts ........................................................................154 1. Introduction................................................................................................................................................................................................154 2. The Problem with Double Pluralism ................................................................................................................................155 3. The Minimalist Doctrine of Facts .......................................................................................................................................163 4. Realism-relevant Cruces for the Doctrine of Facts............................................................................................173 5. The Slingshot ...........................................................................................................................................................................................186 Conclusion: The Methodology in Retrospect; Directions for Future Research ........................................196 Works Cited ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................206 iv VITA 2009 Bachelor of Arts, California State University, Sacramento 2018 Ph.D., University of California San Diego v ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Pluralism and Realism by Matthew Evpak Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy University of California San Diego, 2018 Professor Gila Sher, Chair Two kinds of pluralism have recently come to the attention of metaphysicians. Ontological pluralism is the thesis that there are multiple ways in which things can exist; meanwhile, alethic pluralism is the thesis that the nature of truth varies from discourse to discourse. Though it has since taken on a life of its own, alethic pluralism originated with the efforts of Crispin Wright, who advances what he terms a minimalist conception of truth and truth-aptness. Wright’s purpose in developing a minimalist and thereby pluralist account of truth was to clarify the distinction between realist and antirealist commitments with regard to a given discourse. The purpose of the dissertation is, first, to articulate the usefulness of alethic pluralism in distinguishing between vi realism and antirealism concerning some subject matter and, second, to extend Wright’s minimalist approach further to encompass the notion of existence, so that ontological pluralism likewise becomes a means of casting ontological disputes as instances of realist-antirealist contention. Chapter One serves primarily as a review of predominant trends in the realism literature in Anglophone philosophy over the past half-century. The aim of the chapter is to clarify the idea of mind-independence or objectivity, which I take to be essential for the idea of realism as a metaphysical thesis. In Chapter Two I explain Wright’s minimalist conception of truth and use it as a model for the development of a corresponding minimalist conception of existence. I propose that the concept of existence is bound up with the concept of domain of discourse, along with the closely related concepts of quantification and predication. Then the specifically metaphysical question is whether items found in the domain of a given discourse have further realism-relevant features. Finally, Chapter Three deals with the question of the unification of the two pluralisms, as I’ve articulated them, into one coherent metaphysical position. A theory of facts, which is again inspired by Wright’s minimalist methodology but also borrows from the work of Kit Fine, fulfills this task. vii Chapter One Realism and Antirealism: The Distinction and the Debate 1. Introduction The term ‘realism’ has gained currency within an impressive number of the regions making up philosophy, characteristically as a label for belief in the reality of something germane to the region in which it appears.1 Of course, in the absence of any prior understanding of what ‘reality’ signifies, to say this much is just to draw an etymological connection, and not yet to confer any substance on the idea of something’s being real, or of believing something to be real. Nor, on the approach I’ll take here, would it be proper to try to clarify the notion of the reality of something by means of a prior understanding of the notion of realism concerning the thing. ‘Realism’ and ‘reality’ (and so ‘being real’) are cognate concepts. Thus the elucidation of one is the elucidation of the other; the two are to be expounded concurrently or not at all. And although the affiliation of the two notions is, as one might put it, merely analytic, making their affiliation explicit will prove helpful for recognizing the implications between realism and other metaphysical notions, like truth, existence, and objectivity. The purpose of this chapter is, first, to develop a conception of the dual notions of realism and antirealism as they’ve come to be understood in the past few decades of philosophical literature and, second, to canvass the nature of the debate that has recently taken place in view of the distinction between realism and antirealism. The