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Context and Compositionality C ontext and C ompositionality : A n E ssay in M etasemantics Adrian Briciu A questa tesi doctoral està subjecta a la llicència Reco neixement 3.0. Espanya de Creative Commons . Esta tesis doctoral está sujeta a la licencia Reconocimi ento 3.0. España de Creative Commons . Th is doctoral thesis is licensed under the Creative Commons Att ribution 3.0. Spain License . University of Barcelona Faculty of Philosophy Department of Logic, History and Philosophy of Science CONTEXT AND COMPOSITIONALITY AN ESSAY IN METASEMANTICS ADRIAN BRICIU Program: Cognitive Science and Language (CCiL) Supervisor Max Kölbel 1 2 Contents Introduction...................................................................................................................................9 1.The Subject Matter ..............................................................................................................9 2.The Main Claims................................................................................................................13 3.Looking ahead....................................................................................................................14 CHAPTER 1: A General Framework..........................................................................................16 1. Semantic Theories: Aims, Data and Idealizations .............................................................16 2. Syntax ................................................................................................................................20 3. Semantics...........................................................................................................................25 3.1. Semantics and Syntax: Logical Form and Surface Form ..........................................25 3.2. Semantics: Total or Partial? .......................................................................................27 3.3 Assigning Meanings To Expressions: An Abstract Model .........................................30 4.What is Meaning?...............................................................................................................32 4.1 Context and Circumstances........................................................................................32 4.2. Benefits of Double Indexing.......................................................................................38 4.3.Predictions of Truth for Utterances.............................................................................42 4.4 Choice of Semantic Value ...........................................................................................44 4.5 Extending the Framework: Choices in Modeling Content..........................................46 5. Summing up.......................................................................................................................50 CHAPTER 2: Principles of Compositionality............................................................................55 1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................55 2. Formulating Compositionality .........................................................................................56 3. Compositionality and Semantic Values.............................................................................59 3.1 Compositionality for Linguistic Meaning (Character Compositionality)...................60 3.2 Compositionality for Content .....................................................................................62 4. Summing up.......................................................................................................................75 CHAPTER 3: Context Sensitivity and Compositionality...........................................................77 1.Introduction........................................................................................................................77 2.Semantic and Pragmatic Explanations...............................................................................78 3.Data....................................................................................................................................81 4.Underdetermination ...........................................................................................................82 5.Underdetermination and Compositionality........................................................................87 6. How to Account for the Data: A Brief Geography of Positions.........................................91 7. Truth Conditional Pragmatics ............................................................................................96 8. Pragmatic Intrusion and Weak Compositionality: The Model.........................................101 9. The Wrong Type of Arguments from Context Sensitivity................................................103 10. Summing up...................................................................................................................106 CHAPTER 4: Weak Compositionality and Systematicity........................................................108 1. Introduction: Systematicity and Derivation of Truth-Conditions ...................................108 2. Derivation of Truth-Conditions and Weak Compositionality...........................................111 3. Open Texture and Systematicity.......................................................................................113 4. Weak Compositionality and Systematicity ......................................................................117 3 5. Summing up....................................................................................................................132 CHAPTER 5:............................................................................................................................136 Weak Compositionality and The Productive Character of Natural Languages........................136 1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................136 2. Compositionality and Productivity Facts.........................................................................137 3. The Learnability Argument..............................................................................................138 4.The Explanatory Power of Compositionality...................................................................141 5. English and Inverted English...........................................................................................143 6.Weak Compositionality: Promises and Disappointments................................................147 7. Domestications.................................................................................................................153 8. The Semantic Significance of Syntactic Rules.................................................................156 9. Summing up.....................................................................................................................162 CHAPTER 6: Conclusions ......................................................................................................164 References.................................................................................................................................168 4 Acknowledgments There are many people and institutions to whom I have express thanks for providing help in the course of writing this dissertation. Institutionally, I have to thank the University of Barcelona and Agencia de Gestio D´Ajuts Universitaris I de Recerca (AGAUR) for funding my doctoral studies. There are many people whom I have to thank for teaching me what I know, and/or for offering support, advice or encouregments. First I would like to thank the entire collective of the LOGOS Research Group at the University of Barcelona. I have learned a tremendous amount of stuff from them. I'd like to thank my supervisor Max Kölbel for long and fruitful discussions over the years on various topics in philosophy of language, as well as for many detailed comments and criticisms of earlier drafts of this dissertation, and, not least, for encouraging me to keep going. I'm also indebted to my colleagues David Rey, Dan Zeman, Fiora Salis, Andrei Moldovan, Oscar Cabaco, Sana Hirvonen, John Horden, Bryan Pickel, Stephan Torre, István Aranyosi, Lucian Zagan, Romina Zuppone and Lucía Prieto Castrillo. Earlier drafts of some of the chapters were written while I was on two visiting Institut Jean Nicod in Paris and Stockholm University. I would like to thank Peter Pagin, François Recanati, Dag Westerståhl, Sara Packalén, Marie Guillot, Emma Wallin and Michael Murez for discussions on various subjects covered in this hesis, as well as for many useful suggestions. I would like to thank my partner, Lucía, not only for helpful discussions but also for all the support, encouragement, advice and comfort she provided, in the absence of which this dissertation wouldn't have taken shape. 5 Summary My general aim in this dissertation is to analyze two intersecting topics. One is what constraints the principle(s) of compositionality place on semantic theories, and the second is whether context-sensitivity endangers the project of formal semantics. More precisely I will look on what constraints different principles of compositionality place on the treatment of context-sensitivity and I will focus primarily on whether the claim that natural language sentences exhibit pervasive and radical context sensitivity (that allegedly
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