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Two-Dimensionalism: and Metasemantics

YEUNG, \y,ang -tag">C-hun ...:' . '",~ ... ~ ..

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of In Philosophy

The Chinese University of Hong Kong January 2010

Abstract of thesis entitled:

Two-Dimensionalism: Semantics and Metasemantics

Submitted by

YEUNG, Wang Chun

for the degree of Master of Philosophy at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in July 2009

This ,thesis investigates problems surrounding the lively debate about how Kripke's examples of necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori truths should be explained. Two-dimensionalism is a recent development that offers a non-reductive of such truths. The semantic of two-dimensionalism, proposed

by Jackson and Chalmers, has certain 'descriptive' elements, which can be articulated

in terms of the following three claims: (a) and natural kind terms are

-fixed by some associated properties, (b) these properties are known a priori

by every competent speaker, and (c) these properties reflect the cognitive significance

of sentences containing such terms. In this thesis, I argue against two

directed at such 'descriptive' elements, namely, The from Ignorance and

Error ('AlE'), and The Argument from Variability ('AV'). I thereby suggest that

reference-fixing properties belong to the semantics of names and natural kind terms,

and not to their metasemantics.

Chapter 1 is a survey of some central notions related to the debate between

descriptivism and direct reference , e.g. sense, reference, and rigidity. Chapter 2

outlines the two-dimensional approach and introduces the va~ieties of interpretations

11 of the two-dimensional framework. Chapter 3 critically 'evaluates AlV: names and natural kind terms are reference-fixed by properties that may not be known by speakers. I argue that, contrary to what AlE claims, these expressions are reference-fixed by metalinguistic properties that are implicitly known by speakers. I go further to show that a special kind of arguments known as the methods of cases-including AlE-can be blocked by the a priori argument. Chapter 4 examines the force of AV: reference-fixing properties do not play significant roles in and , as different speakers may associate different reference-fixing properties with the same . I show that AV fails because it is

insensitive to the influence of on the content competent speakers must know when they learn a and the content communicated among them.

HI 摘要

怎樣解釋克里普克 (s . Kripke) 所提出的後驗必然真理 (nece ssary a posteriOli s) 以

及先驗偶然真理 (contingent a priori truths) 一直眾說紛耘。其中，二維語意論提出的

r 不可化約的解釋 J (non-reductlve analysis) 被某些人認為最有希望解決這個難

題 。 傑克遜(F. Jackson) 及查路瑪斯 (D. Chalmers) 對此理論提出的語意論的理解

(semantic interpretation) ， 有相當描述理論 (descripti vism) 的元素 (a) 所有名稱及自

然類項 (natural kind terms) 的指謂 () 是由 一些屬性決定、 (b) 講者能先驗地知

道這些屬性 、 (c) 這些屬性代表句子的認知意義 (cognitive significancε) 。本論文駁

斥兩個對有關這些描述理論元素的批評，分別是「無知及錯誤的批評 J ( and Error, ‘AIV' ) 及「可變性的批評 J (Argument from Variability,

‘AV' )。 筆者嘗試從中論証指謂屬性的ference - fixing properties) 是名稱及自然類

項的意義 ( semantic s) ，而不是它們的「 後設意義 J (metasemantics) 。

第一章 旨在解釋一些有關描述理論及直接指涉理論 () 之間的

爭議的重要概念 ，例如 意義 (sense ) 、指稱 (reference) 及嚴僅指涉 (rigidity) 等。第 二

章介紹二維語意論及各種對二維語意論的理解 。 第三章主要探討 AIV 0 AIV 指出

名稱及自然類項的指謂是被一些講者所不知的屬性決定。我不同意這個立場 ， 因

為我們有理由相信名稱及自然類項的指謂是由一些講者約略 (implicitly) 知道的

「後設語言的屬性 J (metalinguistic properties) 決定。 此外，此章証明一類句括 AIV

在內的「情況方法 J (methods of cases) 的論証均被「先驗論証 J (a priori argument)

駁倒 。第 四章考察 AV o AV 稱由於不同的講者有可能給予 同一個名稱或自然類

項不同的指謂屬性，故這些屬性既不是每個講者均要知道，也不會是人們溝通時

傳達的內容 ( communicated content ) 。 我在此章，駁斥 AV' 因為 AV 忽略了情境 (context)

對講者所要知道的指涉屬性以及他們溝通時傳遞的內容的影響 。

lV Acknowledgements!

1 The following is the totality of my thanks to people who have contributed either

directly or indirectly to this study.

2 I owe more thanks than I can say to my primary supervisor, Professor Kai-Yee

Wong.

2.1 In the course of my this thesis, Professor Wong was never hesitant

about reminding me, from time to time, how inadequate of my

thesis-in-progress was, both in terms of its content and writing. During

several occasions when I had long dry spells, he always took the trouble to

help me bound back.

2.2 It goes without saying how much I owe intellectual debts to him.

2.3 Most importantly: contrary to countless people I have encountered, he sets

an example of how one should live, instead of how one should NOT live.

3 I would also like to thank my secondary supervisor, Professor Chris Fraser, for

his valuable comments on my early of this thesis.

4 I am also grateful to Professor Chong-Fok Lau, Professor Hon-Lam Li, Professor

Xiaogan Liu, and Professor Kwong-Loi Shun.

5 Thanks are also due to fellow students Thomas Cham, Pengbo Liu, Issac Lowe,

Brian Wong, and in particular, Hong-Ting Li and Calista Lam, for all the

1 It should be transparent to readers that this acknowledgement mimics the.structure of the book Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus written by Wittgenstein.

v enjoyable discussions over the last two years.

5.1 It is a pleasure to discuss ideas with Hong-Ting Li, who is always ready for

a lengthy discussion about direct reference, possible-world semantics, and

the like, regardless of his background.

5.2 Calista Lam has given many constructive comments on the early drafts that

led to improvements.

6 This thesis is dedicated, if it is worth being dedicated, to my parents, sister, and

brother, without whom I might not have learnt the of unconditional

devotion.

7 When one is not truly talented, his thesis can, at best, offer nothing but some modest contribution.

VI Table of Contents

Declarations Acknowledgements Table of Contents

Introduction 1

PART I FROM MIXED TRUTHS TO TWO-DIMENSIONALISM Chapter One: Rigidity, Descriptivism, and Direct Reference 1. 1. Meaning and Reference 7 1. 2. Rigidity and the Dusk of Descriptivism 13 1. 3. Different of Reference 22 1. 4. Apriority and Necessity 32

Chapter Two: Two-Dimensionalism 2. 1. Possible-World Semantics 38 2.2. Two-Dimensional Semantics 43 2.3. of Two-Dimensionalism 48

PART 11 TWO-DIMENSIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS Chapter Three: The Argument from Ignorance and Error 3. 1. A- and Associated Properties 59 3. 2. The Argument from Ignorance and Error 65 3. 3. The a Priori Argument 73

Chapter Four: The Argument from Variabil ity 4.1. Associated Properties and Meanings 88 4.2. A-Intension and Understanding 90 4.3. A-Intension and Communication 97

CONCLUDING REMARKS 109

BIBLOGRAPHY 112

vu Introduction:

Names and Reference-fixing Properties

'' and 'Phosphorus' are the names for the same celestial body, namely Venus.

The 'being the evening star' is known as the reference-fixing description for 'Hesperus'. This thesis can be considered as part of the project studying the relation between names (also natural kind terms) and reference-fixing properties described by the associated .

What is the meaning of names? Descriptivism, a theory of naming ins'pired by

Russell and Frege, holds that the meaning of names is their associated descriptions that specify the individuating properties of the bearers. Accordingly, names and associated reference-fixing properties cannot be more strongly linked.

Descriptivism is widely believed to be demolished nearly single-handedly by

Kripke, who has famously argued that since names are rigid designators while descriptions are not, they are not . As Kripke has also argued, in general names are not reference-fixed by the descriptions known by speakers.

Direct theory, Kripke and Putnam being its most well-known advocates, holds that the meaning of names is exhausted by their referents. Some may think that this theory entails that names and reference-fixing properties are totally unrelated.

This is a rash conclusion. Even though Kripke rejects the that descriptions give

the semantic values of names, he would agree that reference-fixing properties, be it

the descriptions about the relevant causal chain or the descriptions said by the Baptists,

belong to the metasemantics of names. The distinction between semantics and

metasemantics is suggested by David Kaplan. Semantics says what semantic values of

expressions are in a given language; metasemantics is an account of what the are

in virtue of which expressions have the semantic values they have.

1 As I understood, Kripke's discussion about 'epistemic might' hints that, contrary to the general of him, he thinks names and associated properties are more interconnected tha~ the picture presented by direct reference theorists. Talking about the possibility that Hesperus might not have been Phosphorus, Kripke stresses that the

'might' is purely 'epistemic'. Although it is necessary that Hesperus is Phosphorus, we can still ask sensibly whether Hesperus is Phosphorus. It is because in that case, we are only considering the 'epistemic duplicates' of Hesperus and Phosphorus, which concern about the way we conceive the objects in some qualitative epistemic situation, where things only appear qualitatively to us. As it is possible that the evening star is not identical to the morning star, it is possible, in the epistemic sense, that Hesperus is not Phosphorus. This is a supportive argument for the claim that it is a posteriori that Hesperus is Phosphorus.

Some philosophers, notably lackson and Chalmers, have proposed a two-dimensional semantic framework that they argue can clarify Kripke's distinction between and epistemic necessity. Two-dimensionalism holds that names, or expreSSIons In general, are associated with two -A-intension and C-intension-which can be construed as functions from possible worlds to referents. The A-intension of 'Hesperus' is a from each w, given the supposition that w is the actual world, to its at w.

The C-intension of 'Hesperus' is a function from each possible world, considered as a counterfactual world, to its extension at w. According to lackson and Chalmers, the

A-intension associated with a can be used to explicate Kripke's idea of

'epistemic might', as for example, the referents of 'Hesperus' in world w is fixed by which satisfies the individuating 'being the evening star' in w, under the supposition that w is the actual world.

Promising as it may seem to many in explicating Kripke's ideas, many people are

2 skeptical about two-dimensional ism, as they think it is no more than a revival of descriptivism, the grand old, refuted theory. Two-dimensionalism, in the of lackson and Chalmers, holds that (~) names generally are reference-fixed by some actualized causal-descriptions. Besides, (b) competent speakers must know the relevant descriptions when they understand , and (c) these descriptions are the communicated content. Claims (a) to (c) can be treated as the descriptive elements of two-dimensionalism.

Some of the critics argue that names are not reference-fixed by properties known by competent speakers. Call this the Argument from Ignorance and Error. Others argue that the reference-fixing properties are not the communicated content, as different competent speakers may associate different properties with the same name.

Call this the Argument from Variability. I shall argue against these two arguments. I try to establish two claims: (1) Names and natural kind terms are reference-fixed by some associated properties known by the speakers. (2) The A-intensions people must know to be competent speakers of names and natural kind terms, and the communicated content of sentences containing names and natural kind terms, both depend on context.

Here is my plan:

Chapter 1 mainly serves to the stage. I believe that in order to understand the

motivation of two-dimensionalism, one must be put into the context of the

longstanding debate about the meaning of names, which is dominated by two camps,

i.e. descriptivism and direct reference theory. The notion of rigidity, together with the

distinctions between meaning and reference, descriptivism and direct referent, and

apriority and necessity are the themes of this chapter. At the end of this chapter, I

present and discuss Kripke's examples of 'mixed truths', truths that are necessary a

3 posteriori and truths that are contingent a priori.

Chapter 2 first outlines possible-world semantics that treat as sets of possible worlds. It then shows how advocates o~ the possible-world account of propositions introduce the second '' of meaning in light of Kripkean mixed truths. I use Stalnaker's early interpretation of the framework to illustrate how the framework explains such truths. A survey of the varieties of interpretations of the framework is given at the end of this chapter.

Chapter 3 discusses Argument from Ignorance and Error, which argues that names and natural kind terms are not reference-fixed by properties known by speakers, or in words, speakers' being reference-competent does not guarantee their knowing some individuating properties of the referents. This line of argument fails as it overlooks some plausible candidates of individuating properties. I show that generally these terms are reference-fixed by metalinguistic properties that are known implicitly by speakers. Not only that, I go further to argue that a special kind of arguments against two-dimensionalism known as the methods of cases-including the

argument from ignorance and error--can be blocked by the a priori argument, which

states that given our knowing what refers to what in various situation, it is granted a

priori that there must be some associated reference-fixing properties/ A-intensions.

Chapter 4 deals with the Argument from Variability. This argument begins with

the observation that it is possible, and it is often the case, that speakers associate

different A-intensions with the same . Such variability of A-intensions, so the

argument goes, shows that A-intensions are not what speakers must know when they

understand an expression, and that A-intensions are not the communicated content.

My reply to this argument consists two parts. First, I show that whether someone is

counted as understanding a depends on context, as what is required to know in

order to be a competent user of terms say 'quarks', in daily life differs

4 from that in semInar on atomic . Second, given that an audience tries to understand the speaker's words during communication, what is communicated among them also depends on context. Successful communication occurs wh~n the audience and speaker associate the same A-intension with words they use. The ins and outs of the contextual account of communication involve several complications that will be articulated at the end of Chapter 4.

5 PART I

FROM MIXED TRUTHS TO TWO-DIMENSIONALISM

6 Chapter One

Rigidity, Descriptivism, and Direct Reference

1.1. Meaning and Reference

The distinction between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung) of expressions is an influential contribution made by Frege, mainly in his "On "

(1892).1 This distinction, together with Russell's contribution made in "On Denoting"

(1905), inspires a theory of naming known as descriptivism. The rival of descriptivism

is known as Milliariism. In this section, I first outline the four problems Millianism

encountered. I then show how descriptivism comes in to solve these problems. At the

end, I make a remark concerning the distinction between semantic reference and

speaker's reference.

From Mills to Frege

Probably the simplest theory of reference of naming is the Millian view, 2 which states

that a name designates 3 an object directly, without the mediation of a sense or

meaning. To put it another way, the referent of a name exhausts its meaning. Mills'

analysis of names can be recapped by his slogan that names "have but not

". Regarding to the non-connotative character of proper names, he says

"these [names] have, strictly speaking, no signification" and that "a is

but an unmeaning mark" (1843: 36-37). This does not entail that names play no role

1 Frege's theory of names is introduced in "On Sense and Reference" mostly to solve the difficult problem in intensional contexts. For more on his view of names, see his "The : A Logical " (1918). 2 It may also be called the naive theory of name (Salmon: 1982), theory of direct reference, or the new theory of reference. Some nuance between these different names is ignored here, e.g. Salmon prefer to reserve the name 'theory of direct reference' for the view that reference is not descriptively determined, while if it is descriptively determined, he calls it 'Millianism'. 3 I use 'designates', 'refers' and 'denotes' as synonyms through out this thesis.

7 in language: they permit us to identify the denoted objects and so "we may connect them with previously possessed" (1834: 37). The Millian view of naming entails a simple name-world relation-names are used to talk about individuals because the former refers to the latter.

Coarse theories are prone to counterexamples. Millianism is no exception.

Generally, the counterexamples it suffers from can be categorized as four puzzles:

(1) Reference to N onexistents

The 'Pegasus is faithful' is meaningful. But it is clear that 'Pegasus' does not refer to any individual in the world. It is only a vacuous name. If the meaning of

'Pegasus' is only its referent, 'Pegasus' lacks meaning, which is inconsistent with the previous claim that' Pegasus is faithful' is meaningful. 4

(2) The Problem of Negative Existentials

You may ask why 'Pegasus' has no meaning. I reply" 'Pegasus' does not exist". My reply is true, because Pegasus does not exist. It seems that I refer to Pegasus and attribute the property of being a nonexistent to it. But it is obvious that' Pegasus' does not refer to any individual in the world.

(3) Frege's Puzzle

The statement 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is informative. It is not trifling to be told that

'Hesperus is Phosphorus'. 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are the names for the same planet, Venus. If the meanings of names are only their referents, 'Hesperus' and

'Phosphorus' should have no in meaning. This implies that 'Hesperus is

Phosphorus' is not informative, which is inconsistent to what I early said.

(4) The Problem of Substitutivity

It seems that

4 Here, following the tradition, I adopt the view that meanings are compositional.

8 (a) Yeung that Hesperus is exquisite,

and

(b) Yeung believes that Phosphorus is exquisite

can differ in . The only difference between (a) and (b) is the object of

Yeung's beliefs: 'Hesperus' in (a) and 'Phosphorus' in (b). 'Hesperus' and

'Phosphorus' are co-referential, implying that they have the same meaning. Granted a 's meaning determine its truth value, since (a) and (b) have the same meaning, they must have the same truth value. This, however, is counter-intuitive.

Frege Puzzle and Descriptivism

Frege introduced the notion of sense to explain hqw there can be non-trivial but true statements. Granted a and b both name the same object, there are two identity statements, namely 'a=a' and 'a=b', which are true. But it is obvious that they can

differ in cognitive significance-statement of the former sort is not cognitive

significant, but that of the latter often 'extend' our (Frege 1892:157).

If a and b have the same referent, it is natural, according to Frege, to think that

there is a further aspect of the semantics of expressions that explains the difference of

cognitive value between 'a=b' and 'a=a'. This aspect is the sense of expressions. The

sense of an expression accounts for its cognitive significance-it is the way by which

one conceives of the denotation of the term. Also, the sense of an expression provides

a criterion for identifying the referent of the expression, thereby determining who or

what the referent of the expression is to be. The names 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'

9 have the same referent but express different senses. The descriptions 'the founder of ' and 'the teacher of Alexander the Great' refer to , but express different ways of conceiving of Aristotle and so have different senses. The name 'Pegasus' and the description 'the most powerful Greek god' both have a sense (and their senses are distinct), but neither has a denotation.

There can be many different senses with one referent. For example, the phrase

'the president of the US when I am writing this thesis,5 designates the same thing as

'the president of the US in 2009', which also has the same referent as 'the first

African American president of the US'. This leads to Russell's famous slogan: "There is no backward road from to meanings", or as we would put it, "there is no backward road from referents to senses.

Using the distinction between sense and reference, Frege can account for the difference in cognitive significance between 'a=a' and 'a=b'. Since the sense of a can differ from the sense of b, 'a=a' and' a=b' can have different sense. Thereby the two identity statements can differ in cognitive significance.

Contrary to expectations, Frege did not give an explicit of sense.

Neither did he tell us how to identify sense. Nonetheless, it is not hard to discern what

functions that Frege's of sense was designed to fill. According to Salmon

(1981), the notion of sense has three functions in Frege's theory. The three senses of

, sense' are:

Sense}: The purely conceptual of an object which a fully

competent speaker associates in a particular way with his or her use of the

term. Sense1 is a psychological or conceptual notion. The sense1 of a term is

something that a "grasps." It includes only purely qualitative

5 Uttered by me today, which is 4th April, 2009

10 properties; external things cannot "occur as constituents" of sensel. Instead

there are only conceptual representations thereof.

Sense2: The mechanism by which the reference of the term (with respect to a

possible world and a time) is secured and semantically determined. Sense2 is a

semantical notion.

Sense3: The information value of the term; the contribution made by the term

to the information content of sentences containing the term. Sense3 is a

cognitive or epistemic notion. The sense3 of a term forms a part of any

expressed by means of the term, and is relevant t6 the epistemological status

(a priori, posteriori, trivial, informative) of sentences containing the term.

In Frege's , these three attributes of terms are conflated. For any meaningful expressions, it is assumed that the sense! of the expression is the sense2 of the expression is the sense3 of the expression.

Frege's distinction between sense and reference provides the general framework for descriptivism. Being a theory of naming, descriptivism states that names are disguised descriptions. 6 In other words, names are synonymous to descriptions.

Accordingly, 'Aristotle' is synonymous to the description 'the founder of logic', or to some other unique description. 'Aristotle' picks out its referent as the one that uniquely satisfies the condition of being the founder of logic. Competent speakers of

'Aristotle' should know a priori that the name is associated with the description 'the founder of logic' .

Semantic Reference and Speaker's Reference

6 I will use 'description' sometimes to mean , sometimes to mean description unless the context of my use of 'description' would not allow reader to recognize what I mean by 'description' .

11 So far our talk mainly focuses on the meaning of names. In what follows, I would like to make a remark concerning the notion of reference. In his "Reference and Definite

Description" (1966), Donnellan draws a distinction between the semantic reference and speaker's reference of definite descriptions. 7 If one is a descriptivist, which treats names as disguised descriptions, this distinction can be extended to names.

Donnellan makes a distinction between two uses of definite descriptions, namely, the 'attributive' use and the 'referential' use. In the 'attributive' use, a speaker says something about whoever or whatever is thus and so. Here the description occurs

'essentially', as the speaker is addressing something that fits the description. The description determines its referent via the unique satisfaction of the associated property expressed by the description. The referent picked out by the attributive description is the semantic reference. In the 'referential' use, a speaker uses the description to allow the audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states something about the person or thing. Here the person or thing referred by the speaker need not fit the description, as the description is only used to direct the audience's attention to the referent intended by the speaker. The referent picked out by the referential description is the speaker s reference.

Here is a simple example that highlights the difference of the two uses of descriptions. 8 Suppose in a party, Peter saw a happy man (who was Martin) holding a

Martini glass filled with some transparent liquid. Peter, looking at this man, told his partner

(i) "The man drinking Martini in the party is happy tonight"

7 See also Donnellan (1967), Kripke (1979), Linsky (1967), Martinich (1979), and Searle (1979). 8 This example is given by Donnellan (1966).

12 Suppose that Peter was under a impression. Martin was an abstainer and he was drinking mineral water with a Martini glass. And, he was happy. There was a man called Tom w.ho was drinking Martini in the party, but unnoticed by Peter. Tom was drinking Martini out of his misery because of the recent breakup of his marriage.

Used referentially, (i) is true as it refers to Martin, who was the one to whom

Peter was intended to refer. Used attributively, (i) is false as it refers to Tom, who was the one drinking Martini in the party.

In this thesis, unless otherwise indicated, when I talk about reference, I mean

semantic reference.

1.2. Rigidity and the Dusk of Descriptivism

Even though descriptivism was popular for a considerable period of time, it is not an

exaggeration to say that it is out of fashion in contemporary literature. There is a wide

agreement that descriptivism has some undesirable consequences. The most

well-known argument against descriptivism is that descriptions and names behave

differently in modal context. Since names are rigid designators and descriptions are

not, so the argument goes, it is incorrect to say that they are synonyms.

In this section, I will first introduce the concept of rigidity and show why names

are rigid designators. Then I summarize three arguments that Kripke uses to argue

against descriptivism. The distinction between meaning-giving and reference-fixing is

addressed at the end.

Rigid Designator

Perhaps the simplest characterization of rigidity is this: a designates

13 the same thing in all possible words. 9 Two crucial involved in the definition call for . First, what are possible worlds? The ontology of possible worlds is controversial. On the one ha!ld there is about possible worlds, Lewis being the leading advocate (1986). On the other hand, there are various accounts which treat the possible-world framework as only a conceptual tool for thinking and talking about the necessary and the possible. Representatives of these accounts are

Kripke (1980) and Stalnaker (1984). To forestall unnecessary confusion, 'possible world' in this thesis should be understood as the possible state of the world. A possible

world so understood does not necessarily force one to be a realist about it. 10 I shall

bypass the dispute whether we can utilize possible-worlds semantics without being

'realistic' about possible worlds; I just assume we can.

The second point deserves our attention concerns the concept of 'rigidly

designating'. Two separate issues need to be dealt with. One is about what would a

designator refer to at worlds in which the object does not exist; another is about in

what way the designator refers to the object.

Kaplan-Rigidity, Kripke-Rigidity, and the Neutral

In a letter from Kripke to Kaplan, Kripke says that any rigid designator, as he

intended in Naming and Necessity,

" ... [a rigid designator] designates object x with respect to all possible worlds where x exists, and never designates an object other than x with respect to any possible world" (Kaplan 1989: 569).

9 This characterization is adapted from Gendler and Hawthorne (2002:27). The definition of rigid designator used here uses the jargon of possible world semantics which will be fully elaborated in Chapter 2. 10 See Stalnaker (1999: 79).

14 This characterization of rigidity is neutral on the issue of what a rigid designator would designate at worlds in which x does not exist. On the neutral reading, there are three possibilities left open for a designator's re.ferent, x, at worlds in which x does not exist:

(1) It designates nothing in these worlds (at which x does not exist, same below),

(2) It designates x in all these worlds,

(3) It designates x in some of these worlds, designate nothing in other worlds

I will only on the first two possibilities.

The attitude towards these possibilities leads to two kinds of rigidity. If one endorses (1), then he would think that

a rigid designator of x designates x with respect to all possible worlds in which x exists, and designates NOTHING with respect to possible worlds in which x does not exists.

Let us call this characterization Kripke-rigidity. 11

If one endorses (2), he would think that

a rigid designator of x designates x with respect to all possible worlds in which x exists, and also designates x with respect to all possible worlds in which x does not exists.

Simply put, the designator designates x with respect to ALL possible worlds. Let us

11 Salmon calls the same thing persistent rigidity (1982:4), in to what he calls obstinate rigidity (and what I call Kaplan-rigidity). Salmon's terminology is popular, but I find it not ' catchy'. This is why I stick to my terminology ofKripke-rigidity and Kaplan-rigidity. Whether Kripke endorses Kripke-rigidity is not my concern.

15 call this characterization Kaplan-rigidify.

The preference for Kaplan-rigidity over Kripke-rigidity is not hard to find in the literature. 12 The most powerful argument in favor of Kaplan-r~gidity is the

Kaplan makes between the formal semantics for quantified tensed and modal languages (Kaplan 1973). The argument runs like this. It is sensible to ask whether Yeung would be dead 200 years later. It is also sensible to ask whether Yeung might not have existed in other possible worlds. Kaplan-rigidity, not Kripke-rigidity,

allows us to ask sensibly the second because 'Yeung', as a Kaplan-rigid

designator, refers to Yeung at worlds in which he does not exist.

Which characterization of rigidity is correct is still under debate. But I think the

difficulty of deciding which characterization is correct does not hold back my

following discussion on rigidity. I will stick to the neutral reading on rigidity, and will

not touch on issues or examples where the Kripke-rigidity/ Kaplan rigidity distinction

matters.

So why should I talk about Kaplan-rigidity and Kripke-rigidity, when after all the

neutral reading is adopted? My aim is mainly about 'economy of space'. Consider

"Hesperus is Phosphorus". Some have argued that it is not a necessary truth because

Hesperus might not exist in some possible world. With my preference for the neutral

reading on rigidity made clear, I can ignore this kind of arguments. Also, when talking

about object that is a contingent existent, I need not add some qualification such as

" .. .if it exist.." in the sentence containing the name for that object.

De Jure and De Facto Rigidity

Another distinction concerning rigidity is the de jure/ de facto distinction. It concerns

12 See McGinn (1982), Saarinen (1982), and Baker (1982). Steinman (1985) is one of the most prominent advocates ofKripke-rigidity.

16 how a rigid designator refers to an object. A rigid designator is de jure rigid just in case it refers without the mediation of description or property. Rigid designators that are not de jure rigid are de facto rigid. A de facto rigid designator refers vi~ the mediation of some associated description or property. Figuratively speaking, a de facto rigid designator carries a bill listing some properties and searches for an object in the world that fits the bill.

The most prominent examples for de jure rigidity are proper names, notably defended by Kripke (1980) and Kaplan (1989). Other examples for de jure rigidity are natural kind terms (e.g. water) and phenomenon tenns (e.g. heat).

For de facto rigidity, the often cited example is the description 'the smallest prime'. It is a mathematical that 'the smallest prime' refers to number 2 in every possible world because number 2 necessarily meets the condition of being the smallest prime.

Another kind of de facto rigidity is actualized descriptions. For example, 'the actual founder of logic' refers to the founder of logic in actual world, which is

Aristotle, and it refers to him in every possible world. Since the rigidified description picks out Aristotle in every possible world via the mediation of the property "being the actual founder of logic", it is a de facto rigid designator. If the 'actual' is crossed out, the description may refer to different persons in different possible worlds.

Actualized descriptions are closely related to another kind of de facto rigidity, names that are stipulated to refer via the mediation of descriptions. To illustrate this,

let us look at Evans' Julius example (1985). Suppose a certain person invented the zip,

but we do not know who he was. Despite our ignorance, we can give this person a

name, say, 'Julius'. Since Judson is the one who invented the zip, Judson is Julius. As

'Julius' is a rigid designator, it refers to Judson in every possible world. By the

stipulation we have made, 'Julius' refers to Judson via the mediation of the

17 description 'the person who actually invented the zip'. Names like 'Julius' are known as descriptive names. 13

Names are Rigid Designators

It is an empirical discovery that proper names in natural (English) language are rigid designators. This discovery is of great philosophical significance as it threatens

descriptivism. In what follows I shall first explain why names are rigid designators.

Then I will present Kripke's three arguments against descriptivism, namely the modal

argument, the epistemic argument, and the semantic argument.

In Naming and Necessity (1980) and "Identity and Necessity" (1972), Kripke

provides an intuitive test for rigidity. The test can be reformulated as the following.

First, we have seen that a designator D is a rigid designator of x if D designates x at

worlds in which x exists, and designates nothing other than x in all worlds. If a name

N is a rigid designator of x, the following conditions should obtain: •

(a) There is not a world in which x exists, but is not designated by N.

(b) There is not a world in which x exists, but N designates something else.

(c) There is not a world in which x does not exist, and D designates something other

than X.14

Given that proper name only refers to at most one object in each world, if (a) obtains,

than (b) obtains. It is because for any situation in which x exists, and N designates x

will be a situation in which N does not designate something else. Therefore, to show

13 Actualized descriptions should not be confused with descriptive names as in the case of descriptive names, the associated descriptions are only used to fix the reference of the name, not meaning giving (more about this distinction in the next section). 14 This reformulation Kripke's test for rigidity is adapted form Stanley (1997a: 565-6).

18 that (a) obtains for N implies that (b) also obtains. Our task is, then, to see whether (a) and (c) obtain.

Let us use 'Aristotle' as an example. (a) obtains ifN is 'Aristotle'. Why? Simply because if not, we are forced to accept the intuitively false statement that 'there is someone who is Aristotle but he could exist without being identical with Aristotle' .15

(c) also obtains if N is 'Aristotle'. The reasoning is similar. If (c) is not obtained, we are forced to accept the intuitively false statement that 'there is someone who is

Aristotle but Aristotle could exist without being him' .

Since all the three conditions obtains if N is 'Aristotle', 'Aristotle' is a rigid designator. The same argument can be applied to other names as well. Thus names are rigid designators.

It is obvious that most definite descriptions are not rigid designators. Let us consider 'the founder of logic' and see how (a) does not obtain. Aristotle is the founder of logic. It is possible that Aristotle might not have studied in the Academy and might have stayed away from Logic and Philosophy. So there is someone who is

Aristotle but he could exist without being the founder of logic. Therefore, 'the founder of logic' is not a rigid designator. The similar argument can be easily applied to other descriptions.

General Terms as Rigid Designators?

Besides names, Kripke also argues that some kinds of general terms-natural kind

terms, phenomenon terms, and color terms-are also rigid designators. However, how

to characterize natural kind terms as rigid designators is highly debatable. According

to Soames, how to extend the concept of rigidity from singular terms to natural kind

15 Of course the argument exploits speaker's about the truth value of the statement, i.e. whether there is someone who is Aristotle but he could exist without being identical with Aristotle.

19 terms is "the second main piece of unfinished business left to us by Naming 'and

Necessity" (2002: preface iv). Several plausible suggestions have been made, the most noteworthy being Soames' characterization that a general term is rigid if it expresses a property that is essential to anything that has it at all (2002).16 Due to the limited space, I cannot but follow the majority to assume that the kinds of general terms mentioned above are all rigid designators that behave like proper name in modal context, whatever that may mean.

Against Descriptivism

Three arguments are raised, most famously by Kripke (1980: 71-89), to argue against

descriptivism:

(A) Modal Argument

Descriptivism holds that 'Aristotle' simply means "the founder of logic". If

descriptivism is correct, it will be necessary that someone is Aristotle iffhe is the

founder of logic. But this is false. On the one hand, Aristotle might have never

come to write his works in Logic. Aristotle might have been elected to be a

politician instead of becoming a logician. On the other hand, had Aristotle become

a politician, someone other than him, say Alexander the Great, could have been

the founder of logic. This is a possibility. Therefore, it is not necessary that

someone is Aristotle if he is the founder of logic, and it is not necessary that

someone is the founder of logic is Aristotle. The modal argument makes use of the

intuition that' Aristotle' is a rigid designator. It then shows that Aristotle in some

worlds might not have processed the properties we normally attributed to him.

(B) Epistemic Argument

Descriptivism implies that competent speakers of 'Aristotle' must know a priori

16 Salmon argues strongly against this characterization in his Are General Term Rigid (2005) .

20 that Aristotle is the founder of logic. But it is obvious that "Aristotle is the

founder of logic" is only knowable a posteriori. We acquire this knowledge by ., ways such as reading a book that lists out the famous deems done by Aristotle. 17

Besides, as said before, it could have come to pass that Aristotle did not write

anything about Logic. This possibility is not precluded by reflection on the

concepts about Aristotle. Thus it seems we have to check empirically.18 This

observation further undermines descriptivists' claim that competent speakers of

'Aristotle' should know a priori that Aristotle is the founder of logic.

(C) Semantic Argument

Descriptivism entails that the referent of 'Aristotle' is determined by the

individual uniquely satisfying the description 'being the founder of logic'.

Suppose we were fooled by historians and philosophers to think that Aristotle is

the founder of logic. Indeed it is , not Aristotle, who is the founder of logic.

Aristotle actually was a fraud that stole Plato's work Prior Analytics and claimed

it was his own work. If this circumstance obtained, to which of these two

philosophers would our name 'Aristotle' refer? This is a question that comes with

a clear answer. The name would refer to Aristotle, not Plato.

Semantic argument concerns with the nonmodal question that to whom a name

would actually donate if some circumstances obtained. It is not related to the issue

about what a name denotes with respect to another possible world. 19 The

difference between these two issues-what a name actually denotes, and what a

name denotes with respect to another possible world-will be amplified in

chapter 2 in which we talk about two-dimensionalism.

17 In her The Epistemological Argument against Descriptivism (2002), leshion points out that there are three forms of epistemic argument available in the literature. That we cannot know Aristotle is the founder of logic without empirical investigation is what she calls the Direct Rationale (2002: 340-2). 18 This is what leshion calls the Argument from Epistemic Possibility (2002: 329-34). 19 On the contrary, modal argument and epistemic argument are related to the issue about what a name denotes with respect to another possible world.

21 Reference-fixing and Meaning-giving

Although the three arguments show that descriptions and names are not synonymous, it does not automatically follow that names are not semantically associated with descriptions in any way. Descriptivists use the famous-deed descriptions to give the meaning of names. There is a second way, however, that a description could be associated with a name: the description could be used to fix the referent of the name.

Descriptive names, e.g. Evans' Julius, are names of this sort. A descriptive name picks out its referent by finding whoever or whatever in actual world fits the associated description. As a rigid designator, the name picks out the same object in every possible world. As we shall see shortly, the relation between names and descriptions

(or properties) is much more intricate than we have seen so far.

1.3. Different Theories of Reference

The emphasis of the notion of rigidity In the last seSSion may give readers the

impression that the difference between names and descriptions is mere their modal

status. This picture is incomplete. Although actualized descriptions are rigid

designators, Millians will not thereby accept that names are synonymous to actualized

descriptions. The heart of the debate between Millianism and descriptivism should be

considered as to what propositional content, referents or descriptions, names

contribute. Therefore here I should introduce the distinction between direct reference

theory and descriptivism. 20 Direct reference theory and descriptivism give different

answer to the question "what is the propositional contribution of names?".

In this section, I will first outline the structured account of propositions. This

20 The notion of direct reference theory IS believed to be first proposed by Kaplan In his "Demonstrative" (1989a).

22 account of propositions can make clear the difference between direct reference theory and descriptivism. Then I will provide an overview on the varieties of direct reference theories and descriptivism.

Structured Propositions

There are two main approaches to propositions in the literature, namely the possible world account of propositions and the structured account of propositions. Before gOing into the structured account of propositions, I shall say something about propositions first.

What is a ? Or, why do we need to talk about propositions? It is universally acknowledged that two people can say the same 'thing' by uttering two

different sentences. For example, when a German speaker utters 'Schnee ist weiss'

and an English speaker utters 'Snow is white', they said the same 'thing' . 21

Proponents of propositions would say that the two speakers are talking about the same

non-linguistic thing-a proposition-by uttering what they said. Propositions are

generally considered as the primary bearers of truth value. Thus, to say a sentence is

true is to say that the sentence expresses a true proposition. Propositions are also

considered as the objects of what people believe in belief contexts.

The structured proposition theorists hold that propositions are complex entities

(most of) whose constituents are the semantic values of expressions occurring in the

sentence, where these constituents are bound together by some structure-inducing

bond that renders the structure of the proposition similar to the structure of the

sentence expressing it.

21 This example is adapted from the entry "Structured Propositions" in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

23 Content of names

Linguistic meaning, or in short, meaning, is a property of expressions types rather then tok~ns. Generally speaking, meaning is what is fixed by the conventions for the use of expressions that we learn when we learn a language. In contrast, content is a property of individual utterances. Content is tied to truth-conditions. The content of a statement is a proposition that embodies its truth-conditions. The content of a name is the contribution it makes to truth-condition. The crux of the difference between direct reference theory and descriptivism can be spelled out as which entity, referent or description, is assigned as the content of a name. 22

Direct reference theory holds that the sole contribution names make to proposition is their referents. Or, to use Burge's words, "names make no other contribution to a proposition (what is said or believed) than to import their denotation into it" (1977: fn344). According to direct reference theory, names refer directly without the mediation of a Fregean Sense as meaning. 23 The proposition containing a directly referential term would involve an individual directly rather than any

description or attribute of the individual. Descriptivism holds that the sole

propositional contribution of names is the descriptions associated with names.

Consider,

(1) Aristotle hated Plato.

According to direct reference theory, one could think of the proposition expressed by

22 This distinction between direct reference theory and descriptivism can be applied to terms other than names as well. 23 Kaplan offers two characterizations of directly referential terms, one negative one positive. In the preface of "Demonstrative", he says directly referential terms "refer directly without the mediation of a Fregean Sinn" as meaning (l989a:483). Elsewhere in "Demonstrative", he offers a positive characterization of directly referential terms accordIng to which that the "designatum (referent) determines the propositional component [content] rather than the propositional component, along with a circumstance, determining the designaturm" (1989: 497).

24 (1) as an of a sequence of objects and a condition:

(2) «x: Aristotle, y:.Plato>, x hated y>

(2) is a singular proposition, a proposition that is about Aristotle himself and Plato himself. In that way, Aristotle himself and Plato himself are the direct constituents of the proposition.

According to descriptivism, the proposition expressed by (1) is an ordered pair of a sequence of modes of presentation and a ~ondition:

(3)< , x hated y>

(3) is a general proposition, a proposition that is not specifically about Aristotle and

Plato, but about being the founder of logic, and being the founder of the Academy.

Rigidity and direct reference are two distinct notions. The former is a modal oriented notion. The latter concerns what an expression contribute to the proposition expressed by the sentence containing it. Kripke's intuitive rigidity test shows that names are rigid designators. The semantic argument shows that names are directly

referential, as names do not refer via the mediation of descriptive sense. Thus, names

are rigid designators and directly referential. As we shall see later, all directly

referential terms are rigid designators. Even though descriptions are not directly

referential, some are rigid designators. For example, 'the smallest prime' refers to

number two in all possible worlds. So, though all directly referential expressions are

rigid designators, some rigid designators are not directly referential.

Now the difference between the two camps of theory of reference made clear. I

will then conduct a survey of the varieties of direct reference theories and

25 descriptivism, with the help of Kripke's meaning-giving/ reference-fixing distinction.

A word of caution before proceeding: it is not necessary to suppose that there is any 'unified' theory of reference. Someo~e may hold a particular theory of reference

. for names, while consistently holding other theory of reference for, say, indexicals.

Descriptivism

(A) The orthodox descriptivism:

According to descriptivism, descriptions gIve the meanIng of names and fix the

reference of names. The orthodox descriptivism, inspired by Russell and Frege, states

that names are synonymous with descriptions that are about the famous deeds done by

the bearers. Under this analysis, 'Aristotle' means something like "the founder of

logic", and 'Shakespeare' means something like "the best playwright in the 16th

century". The referent of a name is determined by which individual uniquely satisfies

the properties told by the associated description.

Why descriptivism? Probably because it can save us from several semantic

puzzles about names. If referents exhaust the meaning of names, as a Millian says,

empty names will be rendered meaningless. Descriptivism saves us from analyzing

empty names into meaningless , as accordingly, the meaning of names is

governed by their associated descriptions. Other puzzles which are believed to be

solved by descriptivism include Frege's puzzle and the acquaintance problem of

names, etc. 24

An immediate rebuttal to the orthodox descriptivism is that the individual picked

out might not have possessed the property told by the description or the conjunction

of descriptions. Aristotle might have been just a mediocre philosopher and made no

contribution to logic. Worse is the case that he might not have studied philosophy at

24 See Kripke (1980: 28-30) for the details of how descriptivism solves these problems.

26 all. In response of this challenge, Searle purposes a cluster theory of descriptivism that equates names with clusters of descriptions (1958). Therefore, the meaning of

'Aristotle' is "the individual who satisfies most of the descriptions associated with it".

Since the cluster descriptivism shares the same spirit with the orthodox descriptivism, the former is usually treated as the refinement of the latter.

The cluster descriptivists' analysis is consistent with the possibility that Aristotle might have failed to be the founder of logic. But the details of the cluster descriptivism are hard to be worked out. For instance, are the descriptions in the cluster equally weighed? Nonetheless, the problem of how to fill in the details is not the chief why the cluster descriptivism has lost its appeal.

Descriptivism, be it the orthodox descriptivism or the cluster descriptivism, faces three objections, namely the modal argument, the epistemic argument, and the semantic argument. Two descriptivists' replies to these arguments are available: The rigidified descriptivist response to the modal argument and the causal descriptivist

. 2526 response to t h e semantlc argument.

(B) Actualized Descriptivism

So far the descriptions mentioned in the variants of descriptivism are only purely qualitative descriptions-descriptions that are free of names, indexical etc. If someone holds that names are synonymous to some non-purely qualitative descriptions, we have another kind of descriptivism. The most famous version for this is to equate names with actualized descriptions. Under this analysis, 'Aristotle' would mean something like "the actual founder of Logic". It will be transparent that whenever

25 There are two lines of descriptivist response to the modal argument: by appealing to rigidified description and by appealing to wide reading of description. Dummett (1981) provides classic materials to the wide scope response. See also Sosa (2001), Stanley (1997a, 1997b), to name a few. 26 Unlike the reaction to Kripke's semantic argument and his modal argument, descriptivism does not result to another form of descriptivism in order to reply to Kripke's epistemic argument. Nonetheless I think leshion has made some satisfactory reply to the epistemic argument (2002).

27 "Aristotle is the founder of Logic" is true, "Aristotle is the actual found of Logic" is necessarily true.

This kind of descriptivism makes a satisfactory reply to the mod.al argument. As we all know, Aristotle is the founder of logic in actual world. The actual operator in

"the actual founder of Logic" allows the description to keep referring back to Aristotle when evaluated in any possible world. Thus, the actualized description, which is a rigid designator, refers to Aristotle even in the possible world where Aristotle is not the founder of logic in that world. If 'Aristotle' is synonymous to "the actual founder of logic", it is not contradictory to say that Aristotle might have failed to be the founder of logic.

(C) Causal Descriptivism:

Causal .descriptivism is suggested by Lewis (1984), Kroon (1987), and lackson

(1998b). 27 It states that the descriptions that specify the relevant sorts of causal-historical chain are synonymous with names. The causal chain, which is suggested initially by Kripke to fix the reference of names, as we shall see shortly, is now used to give the meaning of names. As a consequence, a name used by me will mean something like "the individual who lies at the other end of the historical chain that brought this token to me". Causal descriptivists thereby express complete agreement with the used in the semantic argument that causal history determines the reference of names. They agree with the , but still they think that the best explanation for the evidence is a kind of descriptivism.

Causal descriptivism has difficulty to explain the reference-competence of

27 Of course many others suggest something like causal descriptivism. See also Fumerton (1989), Loar (1980), Searle (1982). Bach (1981) suggests a view known as Description Theory, which states that a name n means something like "the bearer of 'n"'. Katz (1977) presents an account he calls Purely Metalinguistic Theory, which is quite similar to Bach's account. Both theories of naming bear similarities to causal descriptivism.

28 ordinary users of names. Most of us refer to Aristotle when we use the name

'Aristotle' . But only those speakers who have mastered a complex theory of reference can come up with the relevant causal description when asked, 'Who is Aristotle?,?8

Besides, causal descriptivism is argued, most famously by Soames, to be failed to handle belief ascriptions. There is some indexical ( ... "that brought his token to me") in any causal description. Thus when I attribute to an ancient Babylonian a belief about Venus, an absurd consequence would follow: I would be attributing to him a belief about my certain uses of the name 'Venus', including the causal-historical chains that connect my uses of 'Venus' to Venus. 29

Direct Reference Theory

(A) The Causal Theory of Names

Enough for descriptivism. Now let us turn to its rival-the direct reference theory.

Under Mills' analysis, names contribute to propositions their referents, and nothing else. How do speakers successfully use names to refer? To this Mills seems to give no answer.30 Kripke makes a proposal that is known as the causal theory of naming. 31

According to Kripke, a speaker could use a name to refer to someone because there is a causal chain that reaches from the speaker to the referent. Here the causal chain is an external property that need not be present in the 'head' of the speaker. The casual theory goes something like this. A speaker, using a name N on a particular occasion will refer to something x if there is a causal chain of reference-preserving links

28 See Kripke (1980: 162), also Devitt and Sterelny (1999: 61). 29 See Soames (1998: n22). Nelson makes a plausible reply to this challenge (2002). 30 Kroon will disagree with that. He argues in various places that Mills talks about how a speaker successfully uses a name to refer. According to Kroon's reading on Mills, it is the association with a particular idea that fixes the reference of the name when a speaker uses it. That is perhaps why Kroon thinks Mills' analysis on names can be viewed as a kind of descriptivism. See Kroon (2004a) and (2004b). 31 Perhaps it is misleading for me to call such a proposal the causal 'theory'. Kripke holds back from presenting his ideas as a theory. In his own words, "my characterization has been far less specific than a real set of necessary and sufficient conditions for reference would be" (1980: 93).

29 leading back from his use on that occaSIon ultimately to the thing x itself being involved in a name-acquiring transaction such as an initial baptism. 32 I mention the notion of reference-preserving link to incorporate Kripke's idea that the receiver of the name must intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it (Kripke 1980: 96).

Putnam suggests a similar causal account for natural kind terms in his "Meaning and Reference" (1973), with the specification of the causal chain as the means of a

"division of linguistic labor" and a "structured cooperation between experts and nonexperts" (Salmon 1982: 31). When a natural kind term is subject to the division of linguistic labor, a layman who acquires it does not acquire anything that fixes its referent. In particular, his individual psychological state certainly does not fix its referent; it is only the experts in the community to which the speaker belongs that fixes the referent.

(B) Descriptive Names

An alternative account of direct reference theory states that the propositional contribution of names is their referents, but the referents are fixed by stipulated descriptions, not by causal linkages. 33 This theory is best exemplified by the descriptive name 'Julius'. The descriptive name searches for its referent by finding out which object uniquely satisfies the description in the world. 34

32 This formulation is suggested by Evans (1973: 191). 33Kripke calls this theory as a description theory, which implies that, according to my reading, he think it is not a direct reference theory. I am skeptical on this. What is characteristic of a directly referential term is that the referent of the term exhausts its content. Kaplan argues that it is allowable for some directly referential terms to have a limited kind of 'descriptive meaning', given that such descriptive meaning is no part of the content. Salmon offers a similar account saying that "direct reference theory allow[s] that some nondescriptional terms [e.g. names] may be 'defined,' ... by way of expressions having this sort of descriptional sense" (1982:31). The referent of 'Julius' is the content, while the description "the inventor of the zip" is only used to fix the reference. 34 Of course, the reference-fixing property involved in descriptive names need not be simple description; it can be a cluster of properties. The referent of a name is then fixed by the individual who satisfies the most of the cluster, whatever it means.

30 A crucial remark: descriptive names should not be confused with descriptivism that treats names as disguised actualized descriptions. For the former, the content of the name is exhausted by its referent, whereas for the latter, the actualized description is the content of the name. That both theories give the same answer as to how the referent is fixed does not automatically render them to be the same theory.

(C) Indexicals

Other directly referential terms which are similar to 'Julius' are indexicals. The standard list of indexicals includes the personal '!', 'you', 'my', 'he', 'she',

'it', the demonstrative pronouns 'this' and 'that', the adverbs 'here', 'now', 'today' and 'yesterday' and the 'actual' and 'present' .35 What distinguish indexicals among other linguistic expressions are two features: they are context-dependent and to k en-reJ"eXlves>17· 36 .

There is a specific sort of 'descriptive meaning' for each indexical to fix the referent of the indexical in different contexts of utterance. Let us take'!, as an example. Any competent speaker of'!, knows that it refers to the speaker, even though he may not know who the utterer is. What is said (the content expressed) in using a given indexical in different contexts maybe different. If I say,

I am happy37

and you say the same words, what is said is different. I said something about me, the author of this thesis, and you said something about you, the reader of this thesis. In

35 This list of indexicals is from Kaplan (1989a). 36 The idea that indexicals are token-reflexives is usually attributed to Reichenbach (1947). 37 Here I ignore tense.

31 this case, the content of'!' is its referent. 38

1.4. Apriority and Necessity

The debate between direct reference theory and descriptivism is mainly about the semantic value of expressions. But in that debate, it is almost inevitable to touch on topics concerning and , particular the nature of apriority and necessity, and also the relation between them.

Not until Naming and Necessity did people cast doubt on whether the distinction between 'a priori' and 'a posteriori' coincided with the distinction between 'necessary' and 'contingent'. Kripke argues against the traditional view that assimilates 'a priori' to 'necessary'. "The terms 'necessary' and 'a priori"', says Kripke, "as applied to statements, are not obvious synonyms ... they are not even coextensive" (1980: 38).

This section introduces the notions of 'a priori' and 'necessary' through clarification of this line of thought from Kripke.

A Priori and Necessary are not Synonymous

One plausible explanation for the traditional assimilation of metaphysical modality

and is that 'a priori' and 'necessary' are synonymous. Kripke

argues that these notions are two distinct concepts that concerns different domains.

The notion of a priori has something to do with knowledge, with what can be known

in certain ways about the world. The notion of necessary has to do with ,

how the world could have been (1980: 39).

How we should understand the notion of 'a priori' of course is a large issue. My

38 Kaplan's 'dthat' tenns are similar to indexicals. A dthat tenn functions like a demonstrative with its demonstration completed by, not by actual pointing at something, but by the description following from 'dthat'. To use Kaplan's own example, "dthat [the person who utters this token]" refers to the person who utters the token in the actual world. Thus it is synonymous with the indexical 'I'.

32 aim is to offer a rough account on the notion that most of us are happy to accept and sufficient for our discussions. A priori is a concept primarily about justification. An is a priori justified in believing p iff his justification in believing p does not depend on experience.

This is not to say that we did not need to have the experience of learning the words or concepts required to have a priori justification. A priori justification

generally comes from conceptual understanding, rational intuition or deductive

. Some experience, say, learning a language, may be necessary for the

acquisition of a belief, without contributing to the force of the justification. Here we

must distinguish between the experience required to acquire the concepts in the

propositions and the experience involved in justification. The former experience is

compatible with a priori justification.

The notion of a priori knowledge comes only derivatively from the above

characterization of a priori justification. An agent knows a priori that p iff he knows

that p and is a priori justified in believing p. A sentence is said to be a priori iff it can

be known a priori. Paradigms of a priori truths are '2+2=4', 'bachelors are unmarried

men', 'no square is a pentagon' etc. A sentence is said to be a posteriori iffit cannot be

known a priori. 'Aristotle is the founder of logic', 'snow is white', etc, are all a

posteriori truths.

One does not have to learn a priori truths independently of experience; one can

know some a priori truths by experience, such as knowing the answer of some

mathematics involving successive additions of many multi-digit numbers from a

reliable computer. The lesson here is that a priori truths should be understood as "can

be known independently of experience", but not "must be known independently of

33 experience".39 The notion of a priori does not entail that something known a priori must be known a priori. Besides, it does not entailed that something known a posteriori must be a piece of a posteriori truth.

The notion of necessary does not concern the nature of the rational support for an attitude. A detailed analysis of necessity will be given in Chapter 2. Here I only offer some preliminary on the relevant concepts. To say that a sentence IS necessarily true is to say that it is true in every possible world; a sentence IS necessarily false if it is false in every possible world. To say that a sentence IS contingent is to say that it is true at some possible world but not at all.

A Priori and Necessary are not Coextensive

The traditional belief concerning a priori truths and necessary truths consists of two

independent claims:

(1 )All a priori truths are necessary

and

(2)All necessary truths are a priori

They together form the thesis that necessary truths and a priori truths are extensionally

equivalent-a statement is necessary if! it can be known a priori. This thesis captures

the intuitive idea that in order to know such necessary truths, say, every mother is a

39 This paraphrase of a priori truths is not exactly correct. It is a truism that any mathematical is a priori. But is the computer-proved Four-Color a piece of a priori knowledge? In the case of multi-digit additions, we can still prove by ourselves. But the full proof of the Four-Color Theorem could be checked only by computers. Thus, we cannot prove it. Nevertheless, nearly all mathematicians thought that the theorem has been proved. For an insightful discussion of the epistemological status of the Four-Color Theorem proof, see Burge (1998).

34 woman, one need not resort to ; or, what sort of empirical evidence one is searching for? Contrarily, since it is contingent that it is raining outside now, we have to open the window to check whether it is so.

It is not surprising for people to think that necessary truths and a priori truths are extensionally equivalent. If p is true in all possible worlds, then by just running through all the possible worlds in our head, we know that p is necessary, without any empirical confirmation. Conversely, if p is known a priori, it must be the case that p is necessary, as only in this case, we do not have to investigate empirically whether we are in the world in which p is true. If something is only contingent, it is not possible for us to know whether it is true by a priori ratiocination.

Extremely appealing as it sounds, this well-cherished view is nevertheless tom apart almost single-handedly by Kripke.

In Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke has shown us that necessity and apriority do not always come together. There are 'mixed truths', i.e. truths that are necessary but a posteriori, and truths that are contingent but a priori. Paradigms for the former are identity statements between proper names ('Hesperus is Phosphorus') and theoretical identifications (,Water is H20'). They are identity statements between two rigid designators. Paradigms for the latter are identity statements between a special kind of names and descriptions (,The Standard Meter is one meter long').

They are identity statements between rigid designators and non-rigid designators.

In order to appreciate the rationale behind these examples, let us take a look at how these examples work. We found out empirically that the astrological terms

'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' designate the same celestial body, namely Venus. Since the names 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are both rigid designators, and as identity relation is an internal relation, we know, though from the a posteriori finding that

Hesperus is Phosphorus, it is necessarily that Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus. In

35 that case, there would not be any possible worlds In which Hesperus IS not

Phosphorus.

Q F or conti~gent a priori truths, Kripke offers two kinds of examples. 4o The first

kind of example is Kripke's Neptune example (1980: 79n). Upon noticing such and

such discrepancies in the orbit of Uranus, Le Verrier introduced 'Neptune' as a name

for whatever planet was perturbing the orbit of Uranus. At this time he was unable to

see the planet. The reference of 'Neptune' is fixed by description, not by ostension.

Despite our ignorance of what planet had been perturbing the orbit of Uranus, granted

we have grasped the 'definition' of 'Neptune', which is neither an abbreviative nor

synonymous definition, we know a priori it is true that Neptune is the cause of the

perturbations in the orbit of Uranus. Since the description is used to fix the reference

of 'Neptune' rather than to give the meaning, some other object might have caused the

perturbations. Thus though we know a priori that Neptune caused the perturbations, it

is only a contingent truth.

Now let us turn to the second kind of contingent a priori truths, which is Kripke's

standard meter example (1980: 54-6). Suppose someone sees a stick (call it stick S)

somewhere in Paris. We can fix the reference of 'one meter' by saying "stick S is one

meter long at time t". We know automatically and without empirical justification that

S is one meter long. The stick, however, might have expended or shrank. Thus it is

contingent that the stick is one meter long.

The relationship between the one who fixes the reference (hereafter,

'reference-fixer') and the referent is different in these two kinds of examples. In the

standard meter example, there is a causal relationship between the stick and the

40 Beside these two kinds of examples, there are other kinds of a contingent a priori truths. For example, 'I am here now' uttered by anyone is contingent but can be known a priori. But most of those examples should be viewed as expansions, or modifications ofKripke's examples.

36 reference-fixer. 41 The reference-fixer has certain idea of the stick, and have a de re belief of it. Thus, the reference-fixer is en rapport with what is being named

(Geirsson 1991: 196). Such a ~elationship does not apply to the Neptune example.

Even though the reference-fixer, namely Le Verrier, stipulates 'Neptune' as the name that uniquely refers to something, he has no similar causal relationship with Neptune as the reference-fixer with stick S in the standard meter example. 42 Thus, the reference-fixer of 'Neptune' does not have de re belief of Neptune, although it is possible for him to have de dicta belief of Neptune. These two different kinds of reference-fixing, as some may argue, will lead to different kinds of contingent a priori truths that require separate treatment. 43 But we should not be bothered by this line of argument for present discussion.

Kripke makes a convincing case that there are contingent a priori truths and

necessary a posteriori truths. The attempt to equate necessary with a priori is doomed

to be a failure.

41 Soames calls this kind of reference-fixing the 'restricted reference-fixing' (2005 :403-4). 42 Soames calls this kind of reference-fixing the 'unrestricted reference-fixing' (Ibid: 404-6). 43 See Geirsson's The Contingent A Priori: Kripke's Two Types of Examples (1 991).

37 Chapter 2

1\vo-Dimensionalism

Two-dimensional semantics, as its name hints, recognIzes that there are two

'' of semantic values. It is rooted in possible-world semantics that treat propositions as sets of possible worlds. In this chapter, my plan is to first introduce possible-world semantics. After that, using Stalnaker's early two-dimensional

framework proposed in "Assertion" (1978) as an example, I show how

two-dimensionalism explains Kripkean mixed truths. I close this chapter with an

overview of the varieties of different interpretations on the framework.

2.1. Possible-world Semantics

In possible-world semantics, linguistic expressions are assigned extensions at possible

worlds. The object a singular term designates, the set of objects a applies to

as well as the truth-value a sentence has are the extension of the singular term,

predicate, and sentence, respectively. In this·section, the explication of possible-world

semantics mainly focuses on its analysis of sentences. Generalization of similar

analysis to names is obvious to see.

Intuitively, possible worlds are thought of as ways the world could have been.

We know that snow is white is true in the (actual) world. But there are many ways that

the world could have been. If the world had been some of those ways, ways such that

snow is white, then snow is white. If the world had been others of those ways, ways

such that snow is not white, then snow is not white. This shows that the truth values of

sentences vary from possible worlds to possible worlds (at least in some cases).

Possible-world semantics captures this observation by treating sentences as

38 functions from possible worlds to truth values. A proposition is just a rule for determining a truth value as a function of the facts-of the way the world is. The motivations behind the possible-world analysis of proposition ~re plenty. In what follows are three of them:

(1) Pr()positions represent the world

Intuitively, propositions represent the world as being in certain ways. For example,

the proposition "Aristotle is the founder of logic" represents that the world is in

such a way that Aristotle is the founder of logic. For any given representation of

the world, there will be a set of possible world( s) that is in accord with the

representation. In the Aristotle example, all the possible worlds in which Aristotle

is the founder of logic accord with the representation given by the proposition. It

follows that every proposition determines a set of possible worlds. For instance,

the proposition "Aristotle is the founder of logic" determines a set of possible

worlds in which Aristotle is the founder of logic. Thus it seems intuitive to define

propositions as functions from possible worlds to truth values.

(2) Possible worlds and understanding

It is a truism that a speaker understands a sentence just in cases he grasps the

proposition expressed by the sentence. It is also a truism that for someone who

understands a sentence, he must know in what situations the sentence is true. The

analysis of propositions as functions from possible worlds to truth values explains

what it is that speakers grasp when they understand sentences. Accordingly, for

someone who understands a sentence, he must be able to tell with respect to which

possible worlds the sentence would be true.

(3) Possible worlds and

39 Propositions are also the objects of propositional attitudes. 44 Propositional attitude

reports concern the cognitive relations people bear to propositions. Such reports

typically contain a propositional attitude like 'believes, 'wants', 'hopes' ~nd

'desires', followed by a clause that includes a full sentence expressing a

proposition (a that-clause).

Take belief ascription as an example. For someone to believe something involves

excluding some possible worlds. Or, to put in a positive way, it involves locating

the actual world in a certain set of possible worlds. So, when someone believes a

proposition p expressed 1?y a sentence S, he excludes possible worlds where S is

false. He also maintains that the actual world is one of the possible worlds which

are not excluded. Thus what one believes can be represented as a set of possible

worlds. 45

Given the above , it seems reasonable to use sets of possible worlds to play the role of propositions in our theory.

Possible-world semantics is anchored in the idea that extensions and intensions are both compositional. First, extensions are compositional. 'Aristotle is the founder of logic' is true in our world because the individual' Aristotle' designates is the only member of the set the predicate 'the founder of Logic' applies to. The truth value of a statement in a possible world is determined by the reference of its constituent terms in that world. Second, intensions are compositional. The truth-conditions of a statement are determined by the reference its constituent terms have across possible worlds.

44 The context of propositional attitude is only one among many different kinds of intensional contexts. Intensional contexts are opposed to extensional contexts. Contexts in which extensions of the appropriate sorts are all that matter are known as extensional. In extensional contexts, of expressions with the same extensions preserves the truth value. Contexts that are not extensional are intensional. Typically, a context is recognized as intensional if substitution of expressions with the same extensions fails to preserve the truth value. 45 There are some other advantages of this account of propositions suggested by Stalnaker. For example, it defines propositions independently of language. See Stalnaker (1976).

40 That 'Aristotle is the founder of logic' has the truth-conditions it has results from the fact that 'Aristotle' refers to an individual in every possible world, and that 'the founder of logic' determines a (varying) set of object in every possible world. The intensions of all sentences are determined by the intensions of the terms they contain.

When we define propositions as sets of possible worlds, the characterizations of necessary truths and contingent truths follow naturally. A proposition is said to be necessarily true if it is true in all possible worlds. A proposition is said to be necessarily false if it is false in all possible worlds. A proposition is said to be contingent if it is true in some but not all possible worlds.

'Ordinary' Truths

The possible-world account of propositions gives a satisfactory account of pre-Kripke

'ordinary' truths, i.e. truths that are not mixed truths. When I say 'snow is white', I

say something true if snow is in fact white; 46 I say something false if snow is not in

fact white. Suppose that there are only three possible worlds, i.e., i, j, and k, we can

represent the proposition expressed by the utterance of 'snow is white' as the

following matrix:

j k

T T F

A

Matrix A depicts the truth values of what is said by the utterance of 'snow is white'.

World i and world j are possible worlds in which snow is white, while in k, snow is

46 I assume that truth simpliciter is truth at the actual world.

41 black.47 For someone who understands the sentence, given any world i, j, or k, he knows that it is true in i and j, but false in k. But to know whether it is in fact true that snow is white, he needs to locate the actual world among these three possible worlds.

He could only do that on the basis of experience. This is in keep with the traditional view that all contingent truths are a posteriori, and vice versa.

The necessary statement 'all bachelors are unmarried' can be represented as the following matrix:

J k

T T T

B

There is no possible world in which 'all bachelors are unmarried' is not true. For

anyone who understands this statement, he knows that the sentence is true in all

possible worlds. As the actual world belongs to the set of possible worlds where the

statement is true, we know, without empirical investigation that the statement must be

true in the actual world. This reflects the rationale behind the traditional belief that all

necessary truths can be known a priori, and vice versa.

Necessary a Posteriori Truths

It seems, at least prima facia, the possible-world analysis of propositions cannot

handle Kripkean mixed truths. According to Kripke, 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is true

in every possible world but can only be known a posteriori. Accordingly, a speaker

understands the sentence if he knows that the sentence is true in every possible world.

47 Of course, there could be many differences between worlds i, j, and k, but in present context, we need not make trouble for ourselves to spell out all the differences among them.

42 Thus, he would be irrational to doubt whether Hesperus is Phosphorus. But, the discovery that Hesperus is Phosphorus was empirical, and could not have been made by a priori reflection. This is inconsistent with the possible world analysis of necessary propositions. Necessary truths are true in all possible worlds. Thus

'Hesperus is Phosphorus' does not divide possible worlds into two sets; it is true in every possible world. However, to find things out empirically means locating the actual world out of two sets of possible worlds. The upshot is: the possible world account of propositions cannot handle mixed truths. Should we abandon this account of propositions?

2.2. Two-dimensional Semantics

In the last section, we see how unsatisfactory the possible world account of propositions is in dealing with mixed truths. Stalnaker, however, thinks this problem can be handled by introducing a second dimension of semantic values to expressions.

This approach is known as two-dimensionalism.

Truth Value Evaluation and What is Said

Two-dimensionalism is based on the idea that there are two ways possible worlds enter into the determination of the truth value of what is expressed in an utterance-(a) to determine what is said by the utterance, and (b) to determine the truth values of

what is said by the utterance. What is said might have been different had some facts

been different. For example, 'Hesperus' might have referred to Mars if the evening

star was actually Mars. Of course, we could use the sentence 'Hesperus is

Phosphorus' to mean something like 'orange is sour'. No one could prohibit us from

doing that. In that case, what is said is different due to some linguistic facts, that

words are stipulated to say something different. But there are some interesting cases

43 about how non-linguistic facts determine what is said. Sentences containing Indexical are the best example to illustrate this point.

Consider an example 'I am frustrated today'. Competent speakers of'!' know the token of'!' refers to the one who utters this token. 48 But he must know the context in which the utterance is used in order to grasp what is said by it. Supposed I utter' I am frustrated today' now. The content expressed would be "Yeung is frustrated on 18th

March, 2009". If it is uttered by my supervisor, who is reading this thesis before my submission of it, the content expressed would be "Wong is frustrated on 8th June,

2009". This example shows how some non-linguistic facts, i.e. someone rather than another utters the sentence '1 am frustrated today', determines the content expressed by sentences.

Content, Diagonal Proposition, Propositional Concept

Below let us see how Stalnaker's two-dimensional account handle mixed truths like

'Hesperus is Phosphorus' .

Let us suppose, for convenience's sake, there are only two worlds i and}: i is the actual state of the world, and} is identical with i except that the morning star is

Mars. 49 The following matrix represents the proposition expressed by 'Hesperus is

Phosphorus' :

i }

T T c

48 '1' refers not to people who utter the word'!, in general. The property of indexicals that refers to the speaker of a particular token is known as token-reflexive (Reichenbach, 1947, para, 50) 49 Here I use 'actual state' as the of 'actual world', and 'alternative state' as the synonym of 'alternative world'. This is due to fact that I, following Stalnaker, take the notion of 'possible world' can be understood as 'possib le state of the world' .

44 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' both refer to Venus in i. Therefore 'Hesperus is

Phosphorus' is true in i. Since 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are both rigid designators,

'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is true in j as well.

Had the facts been different, what is said by 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' could have

been different. It could have turned out that our actual world was j. In that case, what

is said by the utterance of 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' would be about the identity

relation between Venus and Mars. Thus what is said would be false. We can represent

this by the fo Howing matrix:

i }

i T T

} F F

D

Matrix B represents what Stalnaker calls a propositional concept. A propositional

concept is a function from possible worlds into propositions, or, equivalently, a

function from an ordered pair of possible worlds into a truth value. The vertical axis

represents possible worlds in their role as context-as what determines what is said.

The horizontal axis represents possible worlds in their role as the arguments of the

functions which are the propositions expressed (Stalnaker 1979: 81). The rows in the

matrix represent what is said in the utterance in various different possible contexts.

A propositional concept can be taken to involve two kinds of propositions. The

first is the proposition as it has been commonly understood, which is represented by

any row in Matrix D. This kind of propositions is also known as the content expressed

45 by an utterance of a sentence. There is another proposition, the diagonal proposition, which is, as its name suggests, represented by the diagonal in Matrix D (from top left to the bottom right). Although not expressed in any of the contexts, diagonal proposition is represented in the matrix. This is the proposition that is true at w for any w if! what is expressed in the utterance at w is true at w.

Diagonal propositions play a significant role to explain a priori truths:

"An a priori truth is a statement that, while perhaps not expressing a necessary proposition, expresses a truth in every context. This will be the case if and only if the diagonal proposition is necessary ... " ( Stalnaker 1978: 83)

If we can identify a priori truth with the necessity of the diagonal proposition,

Stalnaker's two-dimensional framework can be used to give an explanation of

Kripkean mixed truths, as it can capture the distinction emphasized in the work of

Kripke between a priori and necessary truth. Every sentence is associated with two

propositions-content and a diagonal proposition. One of the propositions determines

whether the sentence that expresses it is necessary or contingent; the diagonal

proposition determines whether the sentence is a priori or a posteriori.

Through the example of 'Hesperus is Phosphorus', I have shown how Stalnaker's

two-dimensional approach can explain necessary a posteriori truths. It is a short step

to see how the framework handles three other kinds of truths. I leave this task for the

diligent readers. Here I just list out the relation between different kinds of truths and

their associated propositions:

46 Truth Content Diagonal Proposition

A Priori Necessary Necessary Necessary

" A Priori Contingent Contingent Necessary

A Posteriori Necessary Necessary Contingent

A Posteriori Contingent Contingent Contingent

From the table, we can see that for 'ordinary' truths (a priori necessary truths and a posteriori contingent truths), if the content is necessary, so is its diagonal proposition; if the content is contingent, so is its diagonal proposition. It is the for mixed truths. A priori contingent truths are associated with contingent content and necessary diagonal proposition; a posteriori necessary truths are associated with necessary content and contingent diagonal proposition.

By adopting the two-dimensional approach, the long-standing problem of how to explain away modal illusions can be tackled. Modal illusions occur when truths that are in fact necessary appear to be contingent, or vice versa. We have seen that it is nec~ssary that Hesperus is Phosphorus. Although it seems we could conceive that

Hesperus might not be Phosphorus, Kripke argues that this conceivability is only about the non-identity of the 'epistemic duplicates' of Hesperus and Phosphorus, that the evening star might not be the morning star; to equal this possibility with the possibility that "Hesperus might not be Phosphorus" is trapped by a modal illusion.

According to two-dimensionalism, modal illusion occurs when we mix up the two propositions associated with a sentence. 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is a necessary truth as it expresses necessary content. But it is associated with a contingent diagonal proposition as the evening star might not have been identical to the morning star. We must not be tempted to deem that' Hesperus is Phosphorus' express a contingent truth

47 just because it is associated with a contingent diagonal proposition.

The two-dimensional approach adopts what we might call the associated-proposition st-:ategy.50 Accordingly, there are no irreducible necessary contingent truths. Such truths are statements that express necessary ordinary propositions, but are associated with contingent diagonal propositions. 51

2.3. Varieties of Two-Dimensionalism

In the last section we see how Stalnaker uses the two-d imensional framework to

explain necessary a posteriori truths. The next step, naturally, is to scrutinize whether

such an explanation is plausible. But the issue is much complicated. A number of

interpretations on the two dimensional framework have been developed in the

literature, among others by Kaplan (1979), Stalnaker (1978,2001), Chalmers (1996),

and lackson (1998a). 52

This section is devoted to offer an overvIew of different interpretations on

two-dimensionalism. We have already looked at the two-dimensional approach

developed by Stalnaker in Assertion. To promote a better overvIew of other

two-dimensional approaches, in what follows, I shall first outline the formal

characteristics shared by all of the interpretations. After that, I will sketch out the

two-dimensional approaches proposed by Kaplan, late-Stalnaker, lackson, and

Chalmers. These four interpretations on the framework are highly relevant in later

discussion.

50 The terminology of 'associated-proposition strategy' is borrowed from Wong (2006). The associated-proposition strategy is suffered from the dual-proposition problem which is discussed in details in Wong (2006). 51 Similarly, there are no irreducible contingent a priori truths. 52 Also some closely related two-dimensional analysis are put forward by Evans (1977) and by Davies and Humberstone (1981).

48 Core of Two-dimensionalism 53

There are some formal characteristics shared by all interpretations on the

two-dimensional framework. To begin wit~ , a two-dimensional matrix is assigned to

.an expression. The cells in the matrix are filled with extensions of the expression that

are under consideration-singular objects if it is a singular term, sets of objects if it is

a mass term, and truth values if it is a sentence.

I shall label the top of the matrix, which is the horizontal aXIS, as points of

evaluation. For most kinds of interpretation on two-dimensional ism, these will be

metaphysically possible worlds. Down the side of the matrix, the vertical axis, I shall

label it as settings. Different kinds of interpretation on two-dimensionalism give quite

different stories about what the settings are. Each setting' generates' a partial mapping

from points of evaluation to the respective extensions; that will be the relevant row in

the matrix.

To better illustrate the formal characteristics of all two-dimensional matrices, let

us have a look at the matrix for an expression E:

Point of evaluation 1 Point of Evaluation 2 ... Truth value if E is a Singular object if E Setting 1 . sentence is a singular term A of object if E Setting 2 is a mass term ...

Core Matrix

The diagonal of the matrix (which IS shaded In Core Matrix) has an interesting

53 The materials presented in this part is largely inspired by Pryor (2003).

49 property-· the settings on the matrix diagonal the extensions from the same point of evaluation, e.g. setting 1 from point of evaluation 1, setting 2 from point of evaluation 2, etc. Let us call it matrix diagonal. As w~ shall see shortly, many

advocates of two-dimensionalism attempt to identify a priori truth with the necessity

of matrix diagonal.

The first row of the matrix usually receIves more attention than other rows.

Perhaps it is because setting 1 and also point of evaluation 1 are generally interpreted

as our actual world. I will call the rows in Core Matrix matrix rows.

We are now ready to look at different interpretations on the two-dimensional

framework. The survey principally focuses on how they interpret the settings and

points of evaluation, and what kind( s) of expressions is associated with

two-dimensional matrixes.

Kaplan: Character and Content

Kaplan's analysis of the character and content of indexicals can be treated as a

two-dimensional approach. According to Kaplan, his work is inspired by work in

tense logic by Kamp (1971) and Vlach (1973). Kaplan applies his analysis to pure

indexicals like'!', 'here', and 'now', as well as to true demonstratives such as 'this'

and 'that'. 54

We may treat Kaplan as interpreting the settings as contexts of utterance 55 which

54 Pure indexicals and true demonstratives differ in how the referents are determined. Some of the indexicals, known as true demonstratives, require some associated demonstration to be complete demonstratives (Kaplan 1989a: 490). The most typical kind of demonstration is a visual presentation of a local object discriminated by a pointing. True demonstratives without appropriate demonstrations are incomplete, i.e. the referents cannot be determined. Indexicals require no associated demonstration to be complete are known as pure indexicals. Among them are'!', 'here' and 'now'. 55 Complication involves in characterizing Kaplan's interpretation on the settings as the context of utterance. Kaplan purposes a similar notion of utterance-occurrence-which requires no utterance from speakers. Utterances take time, and are produced one at a time. An example like "I say nothing" can highlight the difference between these two notions. The occurrence of "I say nothing" expresses a truth in certain contexts, but not if uttered (Kaplan 1989a: 584). A more faithful reading on Kaplan's

50 usually involve the specification of a speaker and a time and place of utterance. The contexts of utterance determine what is said by an utterance. Besides, we may treat

Kaplan as interpreting the points of evaluation as the circumstances of e1!aluation.

These are possible worlds at which the truth value of an utterance is evaluated.

The notion of character and the notion of content are keys to Kaplan's theory of indexicals. Let us the example 'I am frustrated today' discussed in the last section. When this sentence is uttered by me now, it express a proposition that is true at a world ijJYeung is frustrated on 18th March, 2009 in that world. Kaplan calls this kind of meaning content (also known as what is said). In a different context-say, my supervisor utters this sentence when he is reading this thesis-an utterance of the same sentence will have a different content. The content would be a proposition that is true at a world ijJWong is frustrated on 8th May, 2009 in that world. Thus content is a function from circumstances of evaluation to truth values.

The character of an expression is a function from contexts to contents, mapping a context of utterance to the content in that context. For example, the character of'!' maps any context into the speaker in that context. Thus, '1' refers to Yeung when uttered by me, and it refers to Wong when uttered by my supervisor. Character is the second kind of meaning every indexical has. Since it is governed by linguistic conventions, it is "natural to think of it as meaning in the sense of what is known by the competent language user" (Kaplan 1989a: 505). In general, character is associated with an expression type rather than with an expression token. Character, together with content, can be known as the two dimensions of meaning.

An expression is said to have a fixed character if the same content is invoked in all contexts. Kaplan holds that names, uttered in any contexts, refer to the same analysis should be treating his interpretation on the settings as the contexts of occurrence, not contexts of utterance. But as the examples we are going to investigate in this thesis do not touch on this difference between these two notions, I should follow the tradition to stick to the notion of 'utterance' .

51 individual. Thus, names have fixed character. He also holds that natural kind terms such as 'water' refer to the same chemical molecules in any context of utterance.

Under Kaplan's analysis, the character of indexicals reflects their cognitive significance. To illustrate this point, let us take a look at 'I am here now'. Intuitively,

'I am here now' can be known a priori. Its character yields a proposition that is true in all contexts of utterance. Other a priori truths like 'I am speaking " 'I am that tall

(pointing to the height of oneself)' also have fixed characters. Thus it seems, at least in the case of sentences containing indexicals, we can identify a priori truth with fixed characters.

Late-Stalnaker: Diagonal Proposition and Infonnativeness

We see in the last session that Stalnaker's early interpretation on the two-dimensional framework identify a priori truth with the necessity of diagonal proposition. In his recent works (2001, 2003, 2006), however, Stalnaker proposes a new interpretation, known as the metasemantic interpretation, in which the connection between a priori truths and necessary diagonal propositions is broken.

The metasemantic interpretation shares virtually all features with his early

interpretation: the points of evaluation are interpreted as metaphysical possible worlds, while the settings are interpreted as the contexts of utterance. The matrix diagonal is

known as diagonal proposition.

The most significance difference between the two interpretations is whether

different meanings are assigned to the expression used. In "Assertion", 'Hesperus' is

reference-fixed by the property "being the evening star". Because of this, 'Hesperus is

the evening star' is associated with a necessary diagonal proposition. In the

metasemantic interpretation, the rows of the matrix represent the content that an

utterance of 'Hesperus' would have with different meanings assigned to 'Hesperus'.

52 Therefore, Stalnaker allows that there are contexts in which 'tiger' refers to pieces of

furniture, or virtually to anything, as long as 'tiger' in these contexts are pronounced

in the same way as we do.

Kaplan and Stalnaker's framework can be seen as capturing a certain way in

which the content of an utterance depends on the context in which it is uttered.

Kaplan's analysis is restricted to contexts in which the expression retains its original

meaning. For example, '1' is used with the meaning "the speaker of this token" in

every context. Stalnaker's analysis ranges over contexts in which the expression is

used with entirely different meanings.

The motivation of Stalnaker's two-dimensional ism IS to explain the

informativeness conveyed by Kripkean mixed truths. If we start from the truism that

to convey information is to rule out certain possibilities, there should not be any

informative but necessary statement. Why? Because being informative is to rule out

certain possibilities, but being necessary excludes no possibilities. Stalnaker explains

this phenomenon by suggesting that the informativeness conveyed by these necessary

statements is to rule out possibilities on the diagonal propositions. This

two-dimensional explanation for informativeness can be extended to mathematical

truths. Take as an example the context in which a 8-year-old student is doubtful

whether '7+5=12' is (necessarily) true. His teacher, by telling him that '7+5=12',

helps him to rule out the possibility that we are in the context, say, number '12' is

used to mean what we mean by number ' 10' .

Jackson: A-intension and C-intension

Jackson's two-dimensional ism is inspired by the idea that we can think about possible

worlds in two ways: (1) to consider possible worlds as actual, or (2) to consider

53 possible worlds as counterfactual. 56 lackson interprets the settings as the ' ''possible worlds considered as actual" and the points of evaluation as the ''possible worlds considered as counterfactual".

This interpretation on the two-dimensional framework reflects his thought that worlds can be thought of in two ways. In one way, we may consider, for each world w, what the expression applies to in w, given the supposition that w is the actual world. lackson calls this the A-extension of an expression E in world w-'A' for actual-and call the function assigning to each world the A-extension of E in that world, the

A-intension of E. Such an interpretation on A-intension validates the core thesis as ·

suggested by Chalmers (to be discussed later in this section).

In another way, we may consider, given whatever world is in fact the actual world, the extension of E in a counterfactual world w. lackson calls this the

C-extension of E in w-' C' for counterfactual-and calls the function assigning to

each world the C-extension ofE in that world, the C-intension ofE.

The key motivation for lackson to adopt the two-dimensional approach is to

defend conceptual analysis (1998a). Doing conceptual analysis was once believed,

especially by ordinary language philosophers, to be the primary objective in doing

. While scientists have to conduct experiments in laboratories,

philosophers have the privilege to do conceptual analysis in armchairs. Without

having to look at the external world, armchair philosophers can produce striking

results. Why there is such a difference among them? It is because truths that are

obtained by doing conceptual analysis are a priori truths. However, conceptual

analysis had lost its appeal since Quine's severe attack on the analytic-synthetic

distinction in his seminal paper "Two Dogmas of " (1961). Post-Quine,

56 My understanding of Jackson's two-dimensional framework is based on Jackson (1 998a), (1998b) and (2004).

54 Jackson tries to revive conceptual analysis. A crucial part of his project is to explain a priori truths by necessary A-intensions.

Chalmers: Primary Intension and Secondary Intension

Chalmers first purposed a two-dimensional account in The Conscious : In Search of a Fundamental Theory (1996, 56-65).57 He interprets the points of evaluation as metaphysical possible worlds. Unlike Jackson's interpretation, Chalmers interpret the settings as epistemic possible worlds: hypotheses about the details of our world that are not ruled out a priori. Thus Chalmers' two-dimensionalism is characterized in epistemic terms from the start. This is why Pryor says "Chalmers defines a kind of matrix that has this epistemological property [explaining a priori truth by matrix

diagonal] by design" (2003).

An expression, such as 'water', is associated with two functions from possible

worlds to extensions. One function, known as the primary intension, assigns the

extension in world w if w turned out to be actual. Although it is an a posteriori matter

that which possible world is actual, the primary intension for any expression should

be known a priori for competent speakers. It is because

"given that we have the ability to know what our concepts refer to when we know how the actual world turns out, then we have the ability to know what our concepts would refer to if the actual world turned out in various ways (1996: 59-60)"

It involves two key notions to understand what pnmary intensions are, namely

canonical specification and epistemic necessitation. The primary intension of a

sentence S is true at an epistemic possible world (or scenario) w iff a canonical

57 See also Chalmers (2002), (2005), and (2006a).

55 specification epistemically necessitates S. The way different epistemic possibilities presented to speaker is via a canonical specification which is based on a qualitative (or canonical vocabulary) that is free of terms like names and natural kind terms that give rise to Kripkean mixed truths. Chalmers and lackson argue that PQTI, a conjunction of microphysical, phenomenal, and indexical truths along with a "that's all" truth, can be the basis of such a vocabulary (2001). To say that a canonical specification epistemically necessitates a sentence S is to say that accepting such a canonical specification should lead one to rationally endorse S.

Another function, known as the secondary intension, specifies the extension of the expression in other possible worlds given its extension in the actual world.

Chalmers identifies a priori truth with the necessity of primary intension. He defends that his two-dimensional ism can validate the core thesis:

For any sentence S, S is a priori iff S has a necessary primary intension (2006:64) here S should be understood as a sentence token rather than a sentence type. 58

58 The different between types and tokens will be discussed in section 4.3 .

56 PARTII

TWO-DIMENSIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS

57 Chapter 3

The Argument from Ignorance and Error

In the first part of this thesis, our journey covers several crucial semantic notions. We also make an overview on the two-dimensional approach. The second part of this thesis is devoted to examine several challenges against the framework. These challenges could be understood as inspired by the observation that the framework is heavily loaded with the old-fashioned descriptive semantics.

Two-dimensionalism could be considered as a sophisticated revival of descriptivism. There are many elements in common between them. " ... it is probably better to see two-dimensional ism" says Chalmers, "as a way of achieving many of the benefits of descriptivism without many of the costs" (2006). Can the advocates of the two-dimensional framework get what they want? Can two-dimensionalism benefit

from the descriptive picture while being consistent with Kripke's intuition? These are

the crucial that this chapter and the following deal with.

My discussion focuses on two arguments against two-dimensionalism, viz. the

argument from ignorance and error, and the argument from variability. Roughly

speaking, the first argument argues that names and natural kind terms are not

reference-fixed by associated properties; instead they are fixed by something speakers

need know nothing about-for instance, a certain causal link. The second argument

argues that A -intensions are not the meaning every competent speaker required to

know nor the content communicated among speakers.

In this chapter, I first clarify the nature of A-intension, particularly its relation

with associated properties. Then I scrutinize the argument from ignorance and error.

58 3.1. A-intension and Associated Properties

Different interpretations on two-dimensionalism are available, out of which the interpretations sugg~sted by lackson and Chalmers are what I am going to defend.

This version of two-dimensionalism can validate, as characterized by Chalmers, the core thesis,

For any sentence S, S is a priori iff S has a necessary I-intension [matrix diagonal] (Chalmers

2006: 64)

The association between a priori truths and necessary A-intension 59 makes the framework promising in explaining Kripkean mixed truths.

Admittedly there are some differences between Chalmers' and lackson's interpretations, e.g. Chalmers interprets the settings as epistemic possibilities while lackson interprets them as metaphysical possibilities. As Pryor and Byme say, "In fact,

Chalmers argues that the metaphysical possibilities and the epistemic possibilities are the same (minor qualifications aside)" (2003: 41). In my view, the difference could be put aside in the present context. What matters is both interpretations entail that (a) names and natural kind terms are reference-fixed by some associated properties, and

(b) competent speakers are accessible, whatever it means, to these properties. These two features of A-intensions are believed to be what contribute to the descriptive character of their interpretations of the framework.

Up till now, the details of their interpretations are not clearly spelt out yet; it will be explicated through the in what follows. I adopt this strategy because I

find several points made by Chalmers and lackson can be best understood as

59 I prefer Iackson's 'A-intension' to Chalmers' 'primary intension'. From now on, I will stick to using 'A-intension' instead of 'primary intension'.

59 responses to challenges against their interpretations of the framework.

A remark on terminology: starting from now on, by 'two-dimensionalism',

'interpretation of two-dimensionalism' etc., I mean the interpretation of the framework proposed by lackson and Chalmers.

Two-dimensionalism and Descriptivism

Kripke has convinced most of us that the orthodox descriptivism is false and should be replaced by direct reference theory. Post-Kripke, people may find any theory having a flavor of descriptivism suspicious. Two-:dimensionalism is a semantic theory generally considered as a sophisticated revival of descriptivism. People may find it is false simply because of the reasons Kripke and Putnam already given thirty years ago.

Talking about our attitude towards descriptivism, Kroon says,

It was not hard for the victors [direct reference theorists] to display generosity ... for example, followed in pointing out that criticisms of descriptivism were sometimes overstated' (Kroon 2004:279 my emphasis).

I will show that the criticisms against the 'descriptive' elements In two-dimensionalism are overstated. But I do not attempt to defend any version of descriptivism that is not entailed by the framework. An obvious example for this is the orthodox descriptivism that, minor details aside, takes names as abbreviations of purely qualitative definite descriptions. This view is neither endorsed by lackson nor

Chalmers. Besides, I am not trying to prove, in a positive sense, that the

'descriptivism' employed by two-dimensionalism is the correct theory of reference. To argue that in details is the work of a book, not a chapter. My goal is modest: to reply to criticisms directed at two-dimensionalism's descriptive elements.

60 Indexical-like Treatment

Two-dimensionalism treats names as indexical-like t~rms. But it is incorrect to say that two-dimensionalism treats names as indexicals. 6o Several similarities can be found between two-dimensionalist's treatment of names and Kaplan's treatment of indexicals:

(a) Names and indexicals are rigid designators

Names are rigid designators. For example, being a rigid designator, 'Hesperus'

refers to Venus in all counterfactual worlds. This is parallel to the analysis that'!',

spoken by me, refers to Yeung in all counterfactual worlds (or 'circumstances of

evaluation' in Kaplan's terminology). In a two-dimensional way of talking, names

and indexicals are associated with necessary C-intensions, i.e. they have the same

referents across any matrix row.

(b) Names and indexicals are reference-fixed by some associated properties

In every world w considered as actual, the morning star in w is the referent of

'Hesperus'. In other words, the property "being the morning star" governs what

the referent of 'Hesperus' is in every world considered as actual. Similarly, there

are properties that fix the referent of an indexical in every suitable context. For

example, in every context, the speaker of the 'I' is the person who has uttered the

word.

This observation implies that the referents of names depend systemically on the

worlds considered as actual. This is similar to the case that the referents of

indexicals depend systematically on the contexts of utterance.

60 As argued by Chalmers in his ' Two Dimensionalism (2006b). We will see how two-dimensionalists' treatment of names differs from Kaplan's treatment of indexicals in the next chapter.

61 It is obvious that names are not reference-fixed by associated properties In

Stalnaker's later interpretation of two-dimensionalism (2001). The utterance of

'Hesperus' might have meant to refer to tiger, or anything, in some ~ontext.

(c) Associated properties belong to semantics

I shall begin with the semantic/ metasemantic distinction that is suggested in

Kaplan (1989b). Semantics is about what semantic values of expressions are in a

given language. Notions like 'meaning', 'content' are generally related to

semantics. Metasemantics is about what the facts are in virtue of which

expressions have the semantic values they have (2001). An illustration about this

distinction: the causal theory of reference can be understood as either (i) to state

the semantic values of names, or (ii) to tell us the basis for determining the

semantic values of names. Those who believe that names mean something like

"the individual who lies at the end of the causal chain" take the causal chain

properties as a part of semantics. Others who believe that such properties are only

used to explain why names have their referents take these properties as part of

metasemantics.

It is more reasonable to hold that the rule telling us how the referents of an

indexical depend systematically on the contexts of utterance is part of the meaning

of the indexical. To argue that it belongs to metasemantics leads to two absurd

consequences. First, one would have to regard that indexicals are systematically

ambiguous in different contexts of use. Second, one has to accept that indexicals

are meaningless outside a particular context of utterance. 61

Two-dimensionalists think reference-fixing properties are part of the meaning of

names. To be a competent user of a name is to know what reference-fixing

61 Supportive arguments for the claim that the relevant reference-fixing properties of indexicals belong to semantics are found in Kaplan (1989b: 574-5), also Perry (1999: 596-9).

62 properties are associated with it This is why A-intension is closely related to

understanding (more about this later). These properties also allow us to say how

things are, independently of how they actually are.

As we have seen, there is a close tie between ·two-dimensionalist's treatment of names and Kaplan's treatment of indexicals. It is not an exaggeration to say that the semantic interpretation of A-intensions is inspired by Kaplan's notion of character. This is perhaps why Stalnaker has called lackson's and Chalmers' interpretation of two-dimensionalism "Generalized Kaplan Interpretation" (2006) .

The Nature of Associated Properties

So far we see that there is a close relation between associated properties and

A-intensions. But how close? It is obvious that two speakers associating the same properties with a name would associate the same A-intension with the name. To facilitate discussion, I will make a controversial assumption concerning the relation between associated properties and A-intensions: two speakers associating the same

A-intension with a name will also associate the same properties with the name (this assumption will be challenged in the section where I discuss the argument from variability).62 Thus two speakers would associate the same properties with a name if! they associate the same A-intension with the name. The closeness between

A-intension and associated properties naturally leads us to look at the nature of the associated properties.

Sometimes a speaker may not be able to express the associated properties in linguistic expressions.63 But this will not be a problem for two-dimensional ism. It is

62 Here for I only talk about names. But what I have talked about names here applies, mutatis mutandis, to natural kind tenns. 63 In What are Proper Names For (2005), lackson makes this point clear. He says "The core idea is that a proper name refers to that which has certain properties. Whether or not there are linguistic expressions for the properties is neither here nor there (2005: 3). Chalmers expresses the similar idea in

63 not an essential part of the theory that we should have words for these properties. This point is worth making. When Kripke argues that speaker's associated descriptions cannot fix the referent of the name, he always means linguistic descriptions, not properties. Two-dimensionalism rejects the idea that the associated properties must correspond to linguistic expressions. 64

The emphasis on properties, not descriptions, saves two-dimensionalism from the

'passing the buck objection'. Devitt argues that description theories pass the buck, where the buck goes on forever (1996: 159). A description theory explains the reference of a word by appealing to the reference of other words. The reference of those other words is explained by the description theory too. This leads to a never-ending process of reference borrowing. Two-dimensionalism is immune from this objection. It explains the reference of a word by its associated properties, not descriptions. The referents of these properties are not parasitic on those of others. The focus on properties distinguishes two-dimensionalism sharply from the orthodox descriptivism.

Jackson and Chalmers have not provided a general scheme as to what kind of properties is associated to every expression. On the contrary, the orthodox descriptivism often equates names with the bearers' famous deeds. his On Sense and Intension. He says " ... the intensional framework [two-dimensionalism] is not committed to the idea that descriptions always correspond to linguistic expressions" (2002: 169). See also Chalmers (2002:160-1), lackson (1998b: 202), (2004: 269). 64 This distinction is a bit tricky. Some may wonder: if we have settled on a set of associated properties, then-to the extent that we have a way to talk about those properties-we can articulate the relevant associated descriptions. This is a fair challenge. The distinction between associated properties and descriptions is worth making because two-dimensionalists endorse the claim that, as we shall see shortly, associated properties usually are only known implicitly by speakers. From speakers' success in talking about a vast range of possible situations, we know they are guided by some properties. But when they are asked "on which properties you are relying", they may get perplexed. They somehow know they are relying on some properties, but they cannot spell them out clearly in linguistic expressions. However, I agree that there is no difference between talking about associated properties and descriptions IF something like "Smith is the one I thought it is the tallest person in my class ... or the one lack was talking to me about, or whoever it was that used the name 'Smith' in my presence last month, or maybe even longer", "The properties governing the A-intension", or "The associated properties known by me implicitly" are counted as descriptions.

64 Two-dimensionalism claims that associated properties sometimes can be expressed in terms of actualized descriptions, like "being the kind that actually is the water-like kind ... " for 'water' (lackson 1998a: 213). They can also be expressed by some causal-chain descriptions like" ... who [whom] I met as I was finishing the bottJe [at a party]" for someone you met at the party (Jackson 1998a: 209). Other examples are descriptions about deferring to other users of the name, such as "the person called

'Peynman' by those from whom I acquired the name" (Chalmers 2002: 170) and descriptions about our acquaintance like "the water-like kind we are acquainted with"

(Jackson 1998a: 213). These associated properties may vary among speakers, but not to the extent that communication fails between them. 65 All in all, it is obvious that lackson and Chalmers do not aim at generalizing what kind of properties is associated with every expression. The nature of the associated properties varies on a case-by-case basis among expressions.

3.2. Argument from Ignorance and Error

In this section we discuss the argument from ignorance and error, which could be understood as a fusion of the semantic argument and the epistemic argument. The

argument challenges that the referents of names and natural kind terms is not fixed in the way as suggested by two-dimensionalism. I argue that two available replies from

two-dimensionalists, namely the metalinguistic approach and the implicit knowledge

argument, are satisfactory to dismiss this line of argument. It is established that

referent is probably fixed by some associated metalinguistic properties and these

properties sometimes are known implicitly by competent speakers.

The Metalinguistic Approach

65 See Chalmers (2005) and Jackson (1998b).

65 Two-dimensionalism assumes that with every name and natural kind term, a competent speaker associates certain reference-fixing properties that are sufficient enough to uniquely fix the referent. The argument from ignorance and error argues that it is not always the case, since it is possible, and sometimes it is the case that, (a) the speaker knows nothing that would individuate the object he refers to, and (b) the speaker's knowledge about the object is false. 66

One representative of the argument from ignorance and error is Putnam's famous

Elm and Beech example (1975). Putnam cannot tell an elm from a beech tree. When asked how he would fix the referent of elm, Putnam would be puzzled. Probably he would say "I do not know what the individuating property is for elm, but anyhow I can refer to it when I use the word". In this case, reference occurs even though no individuating properties, for either 'elm' or 'beech', are available to Putnam.

Not surprisingly, two-dimensionalists would agree that Putnam successfully refers to elm. 67 A possible explanation is to provide possible candidates of individuating properties that have been overlooked by Putnam. Such properties are plenty. First, there are properties that involve deference to experts in someone's language communities. For example, the property that "something called 'elms' by the experts in my language community" for the word 'elm'.oThis kind of properties can explain why Putnam has successfully referred to elm. Second, there are properties that appeal to some causal chain that brings the referent to speaker's current use of the term. This approach is known as the metalinguistic approach. It seems that ordinary people knows only that Feynman is a famous physicist and that Gell-Mann is a famous physicist. How do they distinguish the referents of 'Feynman' and that of

66 Some of the authors discussed may not have intended to use their arguments as an attack against two-dimensionalism. But they can be so understood. 67 More carefully put, two-dimensionalists would agree that Putnam successfully refers to elms in most of the contexts.

66 ' Gell-Mann'? The answer is to look at other users of the name. To a first approximation, the individuating property for 'Feynman' would be something like

"the person called 'Feynman' by those from whom I acquired the name" (Chalmers

2002: 170). The metalinguistic approach is very similar to the 'deferring to expert' approach; indeed, the latter approach can be seen as a subordinate of the former.

The metalinguistic approach is claimed to be suffering from the 'no explicit knowledge' argument, which I am going to examine in what follows. The argument runs like this: the metalinguistic description is sophisticated enough to fix the reference, but it is too sophisticated and indeed somewhat fancy. When we ask ordinary people how they would identify Feynman from Gell-Mann, it is not very plausible for them to come up with the metalinguistic description. The metalinguistic approach, anticipated by Kripke, "would occur only to those speakers who have mastered a complex theory of reference" (1980: 162).

Implicit Knowledge Reply

lackson has replied to the 'no explicit knowledge' argument, and I think it is a

satisfactory reply. He acknowledges that generally associated properties are "implicit

or tacit rather than explicit" (1998b:211). The association is something we can extract

in principle from speakers' patterns of using the words; it is not necessary something

explicit in his mind.

lackson draws an analogy between speakers' implicit knowledge of associated

properties and logic students' implicit knowledge of the definition of well-formed

formula (1998b: 211). A good logic student (indeed, a so-so logic student will suffice)

can reliably classify formulae into wffs and non-wffs. But when a logic professor asks

the student to give a recursive definition of wffs, he would properly get perplexed.

This is parallel to the observation that when different situations are described to a

67 speaker, he could reliably tell you what refers to what, but probably he could not tell you exactly what the reference-fixing properties are.

The ability for a good logic student to recognize wffs and the ability for chicken sexers to distinguish the sex of the chicken, as noted by lackson, should not be confused. For most chicken sexers, they have no idea which property triggers their reliable classification. By contrast, a good logic student not only can classify formulae into wjJs and non-wjJs, but also say what triggers their judgment that some formulae are ill-formed. He can tell you where has gone wrong, and how to fix it. Chances are, however, he does not know the recursive definition of wffs that can cover the whole story. Chicken sexers know how to classify the sex of chicken; competent speakers know what the associated properties are. lackson uses the observation that a logic student having' implicit' knowledge of wjJs as an analogy. Parallel to the case of logic

student, a competent speaker can tell what a word would refer to in various possible

worlds. They can also tell why it is so.

Chalmers makes a similar point which may lead to some confusion. He thinks a

competent speaker has some 'conditional ability' to determine the referent when

different worlds are described to him (2005). Conclusions about reference are within

reach of reason, given idealized rational reflection. 68 Chalmers admits that speakers

may have some tacit knowledge of the associated properties, but having such

knowledge is not necessary. What matters the most is only the 'conditional ability'.

Here it seems Chalmers would count chicken sexers as having the relevant conditional

ability. This is hardly what lackson would agree with.

I think this inconsistency is due to their different interpretations on what count as

68 The qualification of "given idealized rational reflection" aims to answer a possible criticism that every child is not a competent speaker. With this qualification added, even if a child with limited cognitive faculty cannot identify the referent of a word in different worlds, there "may still be idealized inferential norms on how they [the child] should update their relevant beliefs" (Chalmers: 2005).

68 implicit knowledge. For Chalmers, speaker's ability to determine what refers to what in possible cases are driven by the canonical descriptions of those cases. Part of the reason that chicken sexers knowing how, but not knowing what, to classify chicken into male and female is that they can no longer classify chicken reliabily when the only information they have are descriptions about the chicken. It is very hard to

believe that speakers have the conditional ability to determine the referent in various possible cases merely by hearing or seeing words about the relevant canonical

descriptions. The plausible explanation is that the speakers already have certain kind

of knowledge of the properties that grants their conditional ability.

Violating the Non-circularity Principle

It may be argued that the metalinguistic approach has violated the non-circularity

principle mentioned by Kripke. The suggested metalinguistic properties involve the

notion of 'reference'. To say that the properties are only implicit knowledge does not

help save them from violating the condition. This is a fair challenge to

two-dimensionalism. Let us review the non-circularity condition first.

After listing out the six theses of the description theory, Kripke adds a condition

that he calls the non-circularity condition:

(C) For any successful theory, the account must not be circular. The properties which are used in the vote must not themselves involve the notion of reference in a way that it is ultimately impossible to eliminate.

A remark concerning the non-circularity condition is worth making: The notion of

reference involved in the property is harmful only if it is ultimately impossible to

eliminate. Strawson's suggestion that the identifying description can be something

that borrows the reference from other people does not necessarily violate the

69 condition. The reference borrowed, when traced back to the origin, can be eliminated, e.g. by ostension in an initial baptism ceremony. If an individual associates the identifying pr~perty "the one I refer to" with a name, say, '', then the condition is violated. If he is questioned to whom he refers to as mentioned in the property, he could not figure out the referent himself. The condition is also violated if no particular member in the chain can provide independent criteria to secure the reference. To give a simple illustration, supposed there are only two members in the

causal chain, person a and person b, if for the name 'Socrates', a associates the

description "the one b refers to"; and b associates the description "the one a refers to",

then the condition is violated. It is because after all, neither a nor b can tell you how

they fix the reference of 'Socrates' .69

Two-Stage Theory of Reference Reply

In "Reference and Description Revisited", 1ackson admits that the 'deferring to

experts' approach "suggests an implicit circularity", because the reference-fixing

properties involve the very notion of 'reference' (1998b:21 0). However, he thinks "the

circularity is not vicious", since we can spell out the properties without explicitly

mentioning the notion of reference. For example, we can say 'beech' is associated

with the property "that the experts associated with the word 'beech"'. The property

ensures that 'beech' in the mouths of the ignorant has the same reference as it has in

the mouth of the experts, without involving the notion of reference.

lackson's reply is plausible, but I think it is not needed, plainly because no

circularity is involved. The metalinguistic approach is supposed to be a two-stage

69 To help illustrate the role the condition plays, Kripke describes a description theory held by Kneale that claims that the meaning of' Socrates' is "the one called Socrates". This theory can be generalized to every proper name that to any name N, N has the same meaning of the definite description 'the individual called N'. Kripke argues that this account violates the condition because according to this account, when one uses' Socrates', he refers to the man to whom he refers.

70 approach to the theory of reference. 70 The first stage of the account describes how the referent of a name used by non-experts depends on the experts 71 in the community.

The second stage of the accoun~ describes how the experts in the community fix the referent of the name. The metalinguistic approach accounts for a certain sort of reference, (e.g. the reference of the name 'Elms' as used by Putnam) in terms of another sort of reference (e.g. how the experts fix the reference of 'Elms').

Metalinguistic properties are only intended as a partial theory of reference. The properties only partially determine the referents of names. They must be supplemented by other theory of reference, e.g. the Baptist view of names, to provide a complete picture of reference. If the metalinguistic approached per se was understood as a of reference, it is justified to say such an account is circular, or empty, for the notion of reference is not ultimately eliminable.

To appreciate why the metalinguistic approach, as a partial theory of reference, does not violate the non-circular principle, we must see what happens in the second

stage, and how the reference is traced back from the first stage to the second stage.

Suppose the associated property of 'beech' is "the thing being referred to by

those from whom I acquired the name 'beech'''. Then what 'beech' refers to in my

mouth depends on what other people refer to, and so on. But this is only a recursive

situation, not a circular one. This is the first stage. It maybe that the one from whom I

acquired the name also acquired it from others. Further buck-passing is needed. The

second stage of referent-fixing is reached once the causal chain finally reaches one of

the botanic experts. He is able to give an independent account of how the referent of

'beech' is fixed, without further passing the buck to other people. A parallel situation

is that the buck-passing eventually reaches the initial Baptist. Either way the notion of

70 The tenninology 'two-stage approach' is borrowed fann Recanati (1993). 71 Here my use of 'experts' not only includes experts in the ordinary sense, such as physicists, but also names experts.

71 reference involved in the metalinguistic property is 'eliminated'.

The recursive nature of how the metalinguistic approach works helps solve the

'unknown expert' problem raised by Devitt and .Sterelny (1987: 50). It seems that a speaker of 'quarks' is required to identify the expert of 'quarks' in the causal chain.

Otherwise, there is a danger of circularity here, as the laymen may just pass the buck among themselves. If what is said about the recursive nature of reference borrowing is correct, speaker's knowledge about who the experts are is not needed. It is because the metalinguistic approach is not supposed to be a complete theory of reference.

Figuratively speaking, the metalinguistic properties are programmed to search for the expert, or the initial Baptist. The ignorant users can just let the 'reference-borrowing' runs by itself until it reaches the end of the causal chain.

A possible objection is that why we should adopt the two-stage theory of reference, if the second stage alone can fix the referent? My reply is that two-dimensionalists perhaps assume that there is a division of linguistic labor. This

sociolinguistic , made famous by Putnam (1973: 704), draws a distinction

between folks' reference-competence and experts' knowledge that fixes the referent.

The lesson we have learnt from Putnam is that usually folks need not acquire experts'

knowledge to refer. They could successfully refer because they could rely on other

people in the community, ultimately the experts, who know the full story about how

the referent is fixed. To say that the two-stage theory of reference is redundant is to

neglect the observation about the division of linguistic labor.

An Unsolvable Case?

The metalinguistic approach still faces the challenge of some further counterexamples.

72 One of them is ' what I call the 'forgetful Baptist case' .72 Suppose a speaker baptizes

Feynman with the name 'Feynman', and thus does not acquire the name from

someone else. Further, suppose he forgets that this is so. His us~ of 'Feynman' still

refers to Feynman. If the property 'the thing being referred to by those from whom I

acquired the name "Feynman'" fixes the referent, then-since he never acquired

'Feynman' from anyone-his use of 'Feynman' fails to refer. Byme and Pryor think

this is a powerful counterexample to the metalinguistic account. I do not think so.

This counterexample can, at best, show that the approximation of the

referential-fixing properties is false. Like other counter-examples, it motivates

two-dimensionalists to refine the approximation. In this case, there should be an

addition " ... and/ or the thing being baptized by me if I am the Baptist" to the

originally suggested metalinguistic property. 73

3.3. The a Priori Argument

The argument from ignorance and error argues that names in generally are not

associated with reference-fixing descriptions by describing possible cases where a

name is not reference-fixed by descriptions. I have shown how lackson and Chalmers

reject this line of argument. However, it is possible for the critics to come up with

further counterexamples. Here we have a not uncommon situation in philosophical

debate: for each objection there is a reply, and for each reply there is a response to it.

Is there any way out of this situation? lackson thinks there is.

In this section, we examine an argument from lackson known as the a priori

72 A similar example of this is mentioned in Byrne and Pryor (2005: 52) and Soames (2005: 300). 73 The opponent may still ask, did not he forget that he is the Baptist? I think we need not worry that the Baptist might momentarily have forgotten that he is the Baptist. The spirit of the argument is that what the metalinguistic account can do for those who forget that they didn't acquire the name from someone else. Indeed, the current knowledge for the Baptist should not be a concern for the deferring to Baptist approach. Would not it be absurd that whether the reference succeeds or not depends on whether the Baptist remembers he is the Baptist at the time when he is deferred?

73 argulnent that hopes to end the 'unending' debate between two-dimensional ists and 74 their critics. In my , the a priori argument has been overlooked in the literature and it should be given more attention.

In response to the argument from ignorance and error, lackson writes:

Our ability to answer questions about what various words refer to in various possible worlds, it should be emphasized, is common ground with critics of the description theory. The critics' writings are full of descriptions of possible worlds and claims about what refers, or fails to refer, to what in these possible worlds. Indeed, their impact has derived precisely from the intuitive plausibility of many of their claims about what refers, or fai Is to refer, to what in various possible worlds. But if speakers can say what refers to what when various possible worlds are described to them, description theorists can identify the property associated in their with, for example, the word 'water': it is the disjunction of the properties that guide the speakers in each particular possible world when they say which stuff, if any, in each world counts as water. (1998b: 212 my emphasis)75

This passage best represents lackson's a priori argument. The critics' argument against descriptivism contains descriptions about what refers to what in various possible worlds. Even though critics' argument may prove that the reference-fixing properties initially suggested by descriptivists are wrong, it hardly proves that there is no reference-fixing property. Indeed, from our knowledge about what refers to what in various possible worlds, we can extract the reference-fixing properties. The approximated properties maybe complicated, such as a disjunction of many different

74 As we will see, it is exaggerated to say that Jackson's a priori argument can really end the debate between two-dimensioanlists and their critics. 7S The a priori argument appears in various writings from Jackson. See Jackson (1998a: 28-9, 32-8), (1998b: 212), (2004: 272-3), (2005, 8-9), and (2007, 24-5).

74 properties, but we are sure that there are reference-fixing properties. Towards this argument, Soames thinks

This [the a priori argument] is a remarkable defense. If correct, it might seem to suggest that descriptive theories of reference are virtually guaranteed, apiriori, to be irrefutable... (2005: 36 my emphasis)

In what follows I shall elaborate on lackson's passage and defend his a pnon argument by considering the following questions: (a) in what sense does two-dimensionalism is a priori irrefutable, (b) what is the common ground between two-dimensionalism and its critics, and (c) how two-dimensionalism parts with its critics on how to explain the 'common ground' between them?

A Priori Irrefutability

The a priori argument does not claim that two-dimensionalism is irrefutable by any argument. The message from lackson is that two-dimensional ism is immune from a special kind of arguments that relies on our intuition on what refers to what in different possible worlds. Chalmers calls this kind of arguments the method of cases-arguing that "names are inequivalent to descriptions by citing possible cases where names and descriptions give different results" (2006b).

lackson talks about the method of cases in his From Metaphysics to in which he defends conceptual analysis (1998a: 27-42). He thinks the analysis of knowledge as "justified true belief', given by Chisholm and Ayer, is a piece of conceptual analysis that was "intended to survive the method of possible cases". 76

Gettier argues against their analysis of knowledge by the method of cases. He

76 See Ayer (1956) and Chisholm (1957).

75 describes certain possible cases of justified belief which is true by . Then, he invited us to share his intuition that they should not be counted as cases of knowledge.

Similarly, Putnam and Kripke refuted some version of descriptivism by the method of cases. They describe possible cases where the descriptions required for .a term t to refer to 0 according to certain versions of descriptivism were satisfied by 0, but intuitively 0 was not referred by t (Jackson 1998a: 29).

It is obvious that, for example, the semantic argument belongs to the method of cases. It argues that 'Godel' is not equivalent to the description 'the one who proved the incompleteness theorem'. Had Schmidt proven the incompleteness theorem,

'Godel' would refer to Godel while 'the one who proved the incompleteness theorem' would refer to Schmidt.

Two-dimensionalism is immune from the method of cases principally because it is a 'weaker' form of descriptivism. Two-dimensionalism entails that speakers have the implicit knowledge of the associated properties. Besides, these associated properties could involve deference to experts in their language communities, or be the object of our acquaintance, etc. It will not be a surprise that two-dimensionalism is immune from the method of cases, which mostly focuses on a descriptivism formulated in terms of the kind of salient, first-come-to-mind, properties that speakers are inclined to list in answer to the question 'Who or what is X?'(Kroon 2004: 282).

Contrary to two-dimensionalism, the orthodox descriptivism requires that competent speakers explicitly associate descriptions with words. Thus, compared to two-dimensionalism, it sets a 'higher' standard of the associated properties: (1) a speaker must be accessible to the reference-fixing property, (2) he must be able to articulate it in linguistic expressions, and (3) the description must be purely qualitative.

An opponent could refute the orthodox descriptivism by method of cases by showing that these three conditions are not jointly met.

76 That said, two-dimensionalism is refutable. An opponent could construct counterexamples to show that associated properties do not serve all the roles suggested by two-dimensionalists. Indeed, the argument from variability, which will be examined in the next session, is such a kind of argument. This argument is based on the assumption that two-dimensionalism entails that (a) the associated properties are the meanings of words and (b) speakers know these properties when they understand the words. The argument then argues that conditions (a) and (b) are not met in some cases.

Data and Moral

Two-dimensionalism and its critics agree over the data-the intuitions about what refers to what in various situations. They agree that names are rigid designators; that

XYZ on twin earth is not 'water'; that causal history very often determines the referents of names; that reference-fixing properties mostly are not known explicitly by speakers. But the two parties disagree over what moral we should draw from these data. More often than not the same data are taken by the critics to make out a case against two-dimensionalism, but by two-dimensionalists to elucidate the nature of associated properties.

Kripke's arguments against descriptivism should not be understood as showing that descriptivism, in whatever forms, is false. He, indeed, admits that his arguments

"show that the description must be one of a completely different sort from that supposed by Frege, Russell, Searie, Strawson and other advocates of the description theory" (1980: 88fn). The use of method of cases as a way to show that the appropriate sort of properties suggested by two-dimensionalism is unavailable is wrong-headed.

At this point, it is worth looking at a similar situation concerning our concept of

77 knowledge. 77 The orthodox account of knowledge is that knowledge is "justified true belief'. Argument against this account often involves intuitions about what counts as knowledge in various situations. After decades of struggling with the , someone may conclude that knowledge cannot be reduced to any set of conditions.

But this is a rash conclusion. What has been shown is merely that that the concept of

'knowledge' is not equivalent to any of the analyses previously suggested. But our failure to provide an acceptable analysis so far does not entail that 'knowledge' is not equivalent to any analysis. Similarly, the method of cases show that 'water' is not associated with the properties as we have previously thought. But our failure to provide an accurate analysis of the concept of water does not show that it is not associated with any set of properties.

How Two-Dimensionalists Accommodate the Data?

Anti-descriptivists argue against two-dimensionalism by constructing numerous counterexamples. These counterexamples could be just part of the exercise of making explicit our implicit knowledge of the properties. In what follows I shall show how two-dimensionalism accommodates the data used by its critics through an imagined dialogue between these two parties:

Direct Reference Theorist (hereafter 'DR'): it is intuitive that names are rigid designators that refer to the same individuals in every possible world. So names are not synonymous with descriptions. For example, 'Aristotle' is not synonymous with

'the founder of logic'.

Two-DimensionaIist (hereafter '2D'): Yes, names are rigid designators. This, however, shows that names are synonymous with actualized descriptions. Thus, 'Aristotle' is

77 This analogy is from Chalmers (2006b).

78 synonymous to 'the actual founder of logic'.

DR: But it is not a priori that competent speakers of 'Aristotle' know that he is the actual founder of logic. They learn this fact by experience. Besides, it is intuitive that

'Aristotle' refers to Aristotle in some possible world, considered as actual, where

Plato is the founder of logic. But according to your analysis, 'Aristotle' should refer to

Plato.

2D: Yes, I agree that nearly most of the competent speakers of 'Aristotle' do not know a priori that he is the actual founder of logic. And I agree that in that situation you have mentioned, 'Aristotle' would have referred to Aristotle. You show that a version of descriptivism in which the descriptions were supposed to be a matter of famous deeds is refuted. A better version of descriptivism may survive your attack. Your observation points out the importance of causal history. We learn from that; the description associated with 'Aristotle' maybe, for instance, the individual who lies at the end ofthe causal chain of this token: (Aristotle '.

DR: But how does this work? Admittedly, for causal descriptivists to give a set of necessary and sufficient conditions is a tough job, not to mention the laymen. Also, as

Soames points out, causal descriptivism suffer from the problem that sometimes a speaker acquires a name not through a causal-historical chain of reference transmission (2005: 300-1).

2D: I agree that so far we could not provide all the details concerning causal-chain descriptions. But this is also a problem for a direct reference theorist, like you. The problems Soames raises are also problems for you. If you could answer them, chances are we could incorporate the relevant idea into the form of descriptions.

DR: Descriptivism, in whatever form, implies competent speakers associate the relevant sort of descriptions to names. It is plausible that a philosopher like you could spell out the descriptions when asked why names refer to this and that. But it is next

79 to impossible that laymen can do the same. Clearly they are no inferior than you in using names to refer to individuals.

2D: I agree with your observation. Indeed, our association of descriptions to names is only implicit. It is similar to the case of our implicit knowledge of grammar ...

From the dialogue, we see how two-dimensionalists accommodate the data used by the critics to argue against them. The two parties share almost every intuition about what refers to what in various situations. But they draw different morals from the same data. Direct reference theorists say that reference is not fixed by properties known by the speakers; two-dimensionalists say that reference is fixed by properties known implicitly by the speakers.

A-intensions and Associated Properties Revisited

In section 3.1, I have made the assumption that "two speakers would associate the same property with a name iffthey associate the same A-intension with the name". We have seen how two-dimensionalism accommodates the intuitions used by its critics.

Here we are ready to take a closer look at the relation between A-intensions and associated properties.

The properties associated with a name by a speaker guide him as to what refers to what in various cases. Although speaker's knowledge of the associated properties is often implicit in nature, we know there are suitable properties with which to construct the required A-intensions. The implicit properties are something we can extract in principle from speakers' patterns of word usage, not something actually explicitly

before their mind when they use the words. The 'extraction' can be done deliberately

by continuously questioning the speaker about what refers to what in imagined cases.

Thus, intuitions about what counts as water in various possible cases hardly used

80 to argue against two-dimensionalism; instead, as lackson says, "they are part of the exercise of making explicit our in part implicit knowledge of the property" (2004b:

273). The J?rocess of making explicit our implicit knowledge of the property is fallible.

There are two ways thing may go wrong.

(1) We are lazy

We consider what counts as water in only a small number of possible cases, or the

cases we consider are not representative. Putnam's classic twin-earth example

shows that we had long neglected important possible cases that reveal the nature

of the properties water are associated with. We did not think about cases whether

the watery stuff in other possible world having different chemical structure should

be called 'water'. 78 Anyone who first heard of Putnam's twin-earth example

usually immediately agreed with Putnam's intuition (or at least it seemed to me

from my experience in the seminars on ). Their admiration

of Putnam's example is accompanied by the disappointment that they have

neglected these important possible cases before.

(2) We are not capable

From our intuitions about what counts as water in various possible cases, we may

extract the wrong properties. Thanks to Kripke's semantic argument, now we are

clear that we do not reference-fix 'Godel' by the description "who proved the

incompleteness theorem". Not only that, we know in most cases, we do not

reference-fix names by the descriptions about their bearer's famous deeds. It is not

difficult to find people who are not totally convinced by Kripke's argument that

'Godel' refers to Godel in the imagined scenario. Some may insist that 'Godel'

78 And cases where the watery stuff having different chemical structure is in our world, though we have never encountered it

81 refers to Schmidt in that case. These people are not impressed by Kripke's

imagined cases. They may have thought about such cases before, but they have

different opinion on wh.at properties with which 'Godel' is associated' .

It is a matter for further discussion how we should characterize the A-intensions for names or natural kind terms. The suggestion that 'water' is associated with 'the actual watery stuff' is only an approximation. What is important is not the detail.

Surprisingly, being one of the most well-known anti-descriptivists, Soames offers his own account on 'watery':

... an otherwise competent English speaker is counted as a competent user of the word, if he or she knows that water is a term that stands for some natural kind that determines its extension at different world-states-even if one doesn't have any reliable way of describing that kind, other than the kind that the word stands for in English. Perhaps one also has to have some idea of what type of kind it is - i.e. that it has something to do with physically constitutive characteristics-and that the stuff in question sometimes comes in liquid form (Soames 2005: 183-4, my emphasis ).

From the intuition about what counts as water in various possible cases, Soames extracts the properties that water is "some natural kind that determines its extension at different world states.. . [water] has something to do with physically constitutive characteristics. .. sometimes comes in liquid form". It is astonishing that, Soames, who thinks he has successfully argues against so many sophisticated approximations of 'watery stuff', has himself suggests such a loose and coarse approximation of the properties associated with 'water'.

82 Why This, Not That?

Of course the a priori argument does not establish that two-dimensionalism is correct.

But it does block some argument against tw?-dimensionalism, arguments that rely on different behavior of names and reference-fixing properties in possible cases. These arguments could, at best, show that the approximations of associated properties need some refinement.

Someone may argue: is there any reason for two-dimensionalists to choose the way they react to the observation made by the opponents? My answer is that two-dimensionalists are motivated-to interpret the data differently from the direct reference theorists, as have seen in Chapter 2. Chalmers hopes to restore a golden triangle of connections between reason, possibility, and meaning. This could be done if two-dimensionalism could validate the core thesis. lackson adopts the two-dimensional framework principally to explain in what sense conceptual analysis gives a priori results.

Another reason is that lackson and direct reference theorists hold different views on what counts as a competent speaker. A direct referent theorist holds that speakers have to know what a name refer to and how to use the name. They do not have to know why the name can successfully refer to the individual. lackson insists that someone who does not understand the causal informational role of names does not understand their role in English (2007: 21). I agree with lackson that a competent

speaker have to know some properties (depends on the approximations and context)

associated with names. I have two reasons. First, speakers are usually aware of causal

historical facts in daily life situations. Suppose someone is going to America to study.

He knows he should go to a place called' America'. He also knows that various other

sentences containing 'America' are reliable source of information about America.

When he purchases a ticket on which it is printed 'arriving at America on ... ', he

83 knows' America' on the ticket refers to America where he wants to go because there is an information-preserving causal chains running from America to the token of

'America' print on the ticket. Second, speakers are aware. of some relevant causal historical facts when asked to what a name would refer in various possible cases.

When asked to what 'Godel' would refer if it turned out the incompleteness theorem was proven by Schmidt, people would probably answer basing on the information about the relevant causal chain. 79 If it was Godel, then 'Godel' referred to Godel. This

IS certainly not an intuition shared only among philosophers, but among most competent speakers of Godel. If someone has not the slightest idea of to what' Godel' would refer in such possible cases, my view is that he is not a competent speaker of

'Godel' . I believe this represents the commonsensical view on the same issue. 8o

Does the a priori argument beg the question? Someone may argue that the a priori argument, while trying to prove that there must be some properties associated with names, has already assumed that names refer via the mediation of properties.

To answer this, it is important to notice th~ 'prescriptive' nature of how we use names. The following passage from Kripke illustrates this point:

. .. one determines the reference for himself by saying-' By Godel I shall mean the man, whoever he is, who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic'. Now you can do this if you want to. There's nothing really preventing it. You can just stick to that determination. If that's what you do, then if Schmidt discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic you do refer to him when you say, 'Godel did such and such'. (Kripke 1980: 91, my emphasis)

79 Of course, folks generally would not use the words 'causal chain', but they would probably express a thought similar to what philosopher means by 'causal chain'. 80 Indeed, I seriously doubt whether any direct reference theorist would say that speakers need not know anything about the bearers of the names they use. As Soames says, " ... competent English speaker is counted as a competent user of the word, if he or she knows that water is a term that stands for some ... " (Soames 2005: 183-4, my emphasis). It seems in Soames eyes, competent speakers still have to know something about the referents.

84 Kripke warns us that 'Godel' could be used to refer to whoever proved the incompleteness of arithmetic; it just so happened that we implicitly decided n?t to use

'Godel' in that way. The intuitions .that dominate the debate on theory of reference are relevant because they represent how we use names.

Two-dimensionalists do not stipulate that the reference of names are fixed by some properties, and then conclude that names are reference-fixed by these properties.

Two-dimensionalists 'extract' the properties not from their stipulated two-dimensionalists' intuition, but from our intuitions, including Kripke s intuitions and Putnam s intuitions. Therefore, Kripke, Putnam, and other direct referent theorists who argues against two-dimensionalism, can be treated as the unexpected allies of two-dimensionalists. They have pointed out some important, often neglected, intuitions about what refers to what in various possible cases for two-dimensionalists to make explicit what are implicit in speakers' minds.

The 'prescriptive' nature of how we use names shows that we are the masters of our meanings. We have already seen how we could extract the wrong properties from our intuition. Once we have eliminated the sources of error, is it possible that we are wrong in the final instance? I think not. It is because after all, the widely shared agreement that 'water' should refer to H20 on twin earth is only an empirical matter.

We might, for example, have used 'water' in such a way that it would refer to XYZ on twin earth. What is our evidence that we do not? It is because this is not the way most of us do when we use 'water'. We are interested in the theory of reference because we want to know how WE refer to things by our language, not how we must refer to things or how we should refer to things.

85 Chapter 4

The Argument from Variability

This chapter examines arguments that are of different nature from those discussed in the last chapter. The method of cases argues that names are not equivalent to descriptions by citing possible cases where names and descriptions give different results. The argument we will examine adopts a different strategy: given that an expression is reference-fixed by associated properties, it is possible, and it is often the case, that different speakers may associate different properties with the same expression. The variability of the associated properties among speakers is argued to undermine the role A-intension plays in understanding and communication. We see in the last two sections that words are reference-fixed by associated properties. But two-dimensionalists want more than this. According to them, to understand an expression is to know the A-intension associated with it. Besides, A-intensions are communicated content, the sort of content that an audience is supposed to grasp when they contemplate the speaker's utterance of a sentence. It is argued that A-intensions do not play such a significant role. Call this the argument from variability.

The argument from variability cannot be dismissed by the a priori argument we discussed in last section. The a priori argument argues that there must be some reference-fixing properties, whatever they are, associated with words. But does every speaker associate the same properties with the same word? The argument from variability says no. There are at least two ways to reply to the argument from variability: to show that there is no variability of properties among speakers, or to argue that such variability is not a problem at all. As we will see, two-dimensionalists employ the second strategy.

86 Stalnaker argues that two-dimensionalism sets too high a standard in what one has to know in order to understand a name (2001). I shall argue that he neglects the role contexts play in the account of understanding. Whether one is counted as understanding a name depends on context. When we are talking about quarks in daily situation, knowing that we are talking about what the relevant physicists mean by

'quarks' is sufficient for us to be counted as the competent speaker of 'quarks' . But if that is only what we know about quarks, then we do not understand 'quarks' in the context where physicists are discussing the properties of quarks in a seminar.

Kroon argues forcefully that reference-fixing properties are not the communicated content that an audience is supposed to grasp when they contemplate the speaker's utterance of a sentence (2004a). Kroon agrees with lackson to return to a descriptivist account of reference-fixing, but he resists lackson's move to extend the descriptive story to communicated content. Kroon's chief worry is that, more often than not, the reference-fixing properties associated with words are inaccessible to the conversational parties, or to either one of them. If lackson is suggesting that communication is successful when the hearer picks up the speaker's associated properties, then successful communication should be rare. I shall argue against Kroon on that. My reason is this. Kroon oversees lackson's emphasis on the influence of . contexts on lackson's account of communicated content. Different properties maybe associated with the same word. But with the guideline of convention, the conversational parties can usually guess what the properties are associated by each other, which makes the hearer successfully grasp what is told by the speaker's utterance of a sentence.

In this chapter, I first point out that the problem whether associated properties are meaning is largely terminological. Then I present my argument against Stalnaker's

challenge that two-dimensionalism sets too high a standard on the account of

87 understanding. At the end of this chapter, I elaborate on Kroon's challenge on lackson's account of communicated content and argue that his challenge can be answered by the contextual account of communicated content, which is implicit in lackson's writing.

4.1. Associated Properties and Meanings

There are cases that the properties are assigned to expression types. Examples like these are indexicals. Obviously, every competent speaker of 'I' associates the word with the same property, namely the speaker in the context of utterance. However, in . general, reference-fixing properties are assigned to tokens rather than types. This is an important difference between two-dimensional analysis of names and Kaplan's analysis of indexicals. To illustrate this point, let us look at the example of Le

Verrier's introduction of the term 'Neptune'. Suppose Le Verrier, after some serious calculations, introduced 'Neptune' as a name for whatever planet was perturbing the orbit of Uranus. Suppose also that he did not tell his wife about his stipulative definition of 'Neptune', though occasionally he mentioned to her that he was undertaking a on 'Neptune. Thus, she only knew that Neptune is an astronomical object that her husband was searching for. In this case, Le Verrier and his wife associated different properties with 'Neptune'. The story was not finished yet.

Other users of 'Neptune' might have known nothing about Le Verrier's stipulation.

They just used the name. Therefore, some of them associated with 'Neptune' the property that involves deference to the experts. These three parties, i.e. Le Verrier, his wife, and other users, associated different properties with 'Neptune'. Thus different

speakers may associate different properties with the same expression.

The same speaker may associate different properties with the same expression

over time. At first, when Le Verrier's wife used 'Neptune', the property she associated

88 with it was "the astronomical object that my husband is searching for". It could be the case that after several years, Le Verrier told his wife that 'Neptune' is just the name stipulated for whatever planet was perturbing the orbit of Uranus. After this, Le

Verrier and Le Verrier's wife may have associated the same property with

'Neptune,.81

Here comes the question-are associated properties of words part of their meaning? I think this is largely a terminological issue. If the meaning of an expression type is stipulated to be constant across all its tokens, then the associated properties are not meaning. Sometimes, the issues about the meaning of expressions touch on the issue about language sharing. Some people may think that people sharing a language must give words the same meaning. If the associated properties are supposed to give meaning to words, then the divergent sets of associated properties entails the absurd consequence that few people share a language. In response, lackson says" ... if that is the criterion for sharing a language, we should say that few people share a language"

(1998b: 215). It is clear that lackson thinks what counts as language sharing is also terminological.

Both Chalmers and lackson think it is not a challenge to two-dimensionalism that the associated properties are not the meanings of expressions. A look at Chalmers' view on the relation between semantic values and expressions would explain why this is so. Chalmers adopts the approach of semantic pluralism. 82 According to this pluralist's position, expressions can be associated with semantic values in many different ways. Different semantic values include, for examples, extensions, intensions, implied contents, structured propositions. These semantic values can be associated with expression types or expression tokens. This approach does not imply

81 Chalmers is well aware that the tokens of the same type of expression maybe associated with different properties. See Chalmers (2002: 173-4) and (2006: 95-8). 82 See Chalmers (2006a: 65), Chalmers (2006b)

89 that any semantic value is exhaustive. Indeed, it is very often the case that it is not plausible to find any semantic value that exhausts the meaning of an expression.

Adopting the approach of semantic pluralism, Chalmers is not interested to search whether a given semantic value is THE meaning of an expression. Other two-dimensionalists do not explicitly endorse semantic pluralism. But from their lack of talk about whether associated properties are the meanings of expressions, it is reasonable to believe that they hold a similar position like semantic pluralism.

In my view, whether the associated properties are part of the meaning of words per se is mainly terminological. But there are many substantive questions lying ahead.

It makes sense to ask whether expressions are associated with semantic values that play certain roles. The force of the argument from variability is that it asks whether

A-intension is related to understanding and communication in the way suggested by two-dimensional ism.

4.2. A-intension and Understanding

We have seen that in some cases, A-intensions are associated with tokens of an expression. This may lead to an undesirable consequence for the account of understanding suggested by two-dimensionalism. When a term's A-intension is

different from its C-intension, there is a crucial difference between their epistemic

statuses. On the one hand, to know the C-intension of a term one needs to know

something about the actual world. In order to know what 'water' refers to in other

counterfactual worlds, we need to know what it refers to in the actual world. On the

other hand, it is the A-intension we know in virtue of understanding an expression

(Jackson 1998a: 76). We know the A-intension of 'water' independently of knowing

how things actually are. Traditionally, one is said to be a competent speaker of a word

ifhe understands the word. According to Jackson's analysis, it seems every competent

90 speaker of a word must know the same A-intension associated with the word. But if

A-intensions are associated with the tokens of a word, not every competent speaker knows the same A-intension!

Stalnaker's Challenge

In various places (2001, 2003), Stalnaker argues that the interpretation of two-dimensionalism I have been defending, known as the semantic interpretation, suffers from several problems. One of them is related to understanding. He argues that the semantic interpretation wrongly considers someone who is thought to be a competent user of a word in an intuitive sense fails to understand the word.

Semantics says what semantic values of expressions are in a given language; metasemantics is an account of what the facts are in virtue of which expressions have the semantic values they have. The semantic interpretation of two-dimensionalism endorsed by lackson and Chalmers begins by noting that there is a kind of meaning that determines an expression's contribution to content as a function of the contingent facts about the context of use. On the semantic interpretation, A-intension is the meaning of an expression that a competent speaker must know. For example, someone may understand the sentence 'he is frustrated' without knowing who is being addressed, given he knows how to move from the appropriate contextual information-the information that determines who is being spoken of-to the proposition expressed.

A-intension, on the metasemantic interpretation, is not a kind of meaning that the expression has. It has nothing to do with understanding. It only represents what meanings the expression has in different contexts of use. The A-extensions of the different tokens of the expression are tokens of the same type that there is no on their and grapheme.

91 Adopting the metasemantic interpretation implies that two-dimensionalism cannot validate the core thesis (any sentence S is a priori truth if! S has necessary

A-intension). On the one hand, it is obvious that there are some possible tokens of every orthographic type that express a falsehood, including any type that can be use to express a paradigmatic a priori truth, such as a mathematical truth. On the other hand, to say that the A-intension associated with a sentence is necessary is to say that the sentence would express a truth whatever it meant, which is clearly of no application to explain a priori truths.

No doubt it is free for anyone to choose how to interpret the two-dimensional framework. But Stalnaker goes further to argue that semantic interpretation leads to some unsatisfactory consequences. One of them is that semantic interpretation sets an unreasonably high standard on understanding.

Stalnaker uses Evans' 'Julius' to help illustrate his point. Being a descriptive name, 'Julius' is associated with the description 'the person who invented the zip'.

According to the semantic interpretation, this property belongs to the semantic story of the name. Every competent speaker must know it. After reading Evan's works, I know that 'Julius' is stipulated to be the one who invented the zip. Suppose someone-call him Jack-picks up the name from me without knowing Evans' stipulation. I just 'pass' the referent of 'Julius' to Jack. He therefore does not necessarily know how 'Julius' was first introduced into the language. Thus, he does not know a priori that Julius invented the zip.

If the semantic interpretation is correct, so the argument runs, then Jack does .not understand any of my statement about Julius, simply because he does not know the semantic value of 'Julius'. And when he uses 'Julius' subsequently, he means something different. Or at least his use of the name means differently from my use of the name. He probably associates with' Julius' some property such as "the person

92 Yeung was referring to with the name 'lulius' on such and such an occasion", which is not the same as what I associate with the same name. Since intuitively both lack and I are cOlnpetent speakers of 'lulius, Stalnaker argues that Evans' stipulation belongs only to the metasemantic story.

Understanding and Context-relativity

It seems Stalnaker makes out a strong case against two-dimensionalism. What he finds congenial is that the stipulated description of 'lulius' fixes the referent. But, as we have known, two-dimensionalists want more than this. They want the description to be the sort of content that every competent speaker must know. Stalnaker finds such a relation between names and the properties suggested by them too closely linked. His argument has a great deal of force. But I find it not persuasive, principally because he neglects the role contexts play in lackson's account of understanding.

Before I begin to outline the contextual account of understanding, I want to make a remark concerning my use of 'properties' and 'A-intensions. As we see in section

3.3, we can 'extract' the properties that guide a speaker as to what refers to what in possible cases. If the 'extraction' process is correct, it does not make any significant difference whether we are talking about the associated properties or the A-intension.

Since most of the literature to be discussed uses the notion of 'properties' instead of

'A-intension' , I will try to stick to the former to facilitate discussion.

According to two-dimensionalism, to understand a name or a natural kind term, one must know the properties that fix the reference of the name or the natural kind term. For brevity's sake, I will focus on natural kind terms. 83 Consider the example of elms and beeches. Let us call what fixes the reference of 'elms' 'elm-properties', and that of 'beeches' 'beech-properties'. Elm-properties are properties about the inner

83 And of course, everything I argue applies to names.

93 structure, shape of leaves, color, etc, of elms that can uniquely pick out elms. The same applies to beech-properties. Since to what 'elms' refer differs from to what

'" 'beeches: refer (at least in the actual world), 'elm-properties' differs from

'beech-properties'. Botanists, by definition, know elm-properties and beech-properties.

It is uncontroversial to say that they understand 'elms' and 'beeches'.

Putnam has famously argued that to understand 'elms' and 'beeches', one need not know their associated properties, i.e. elm-properties and beech-properties (1973:

704). According to Putnam:

1. He cannot distinguish elms from beeches

2. He understands the terms 'elms' and 'beeches'

If he knows elm-properties and beech-properties, he can distinguish elms from beeches, like what a botanist can do. From what Putnam has said about gold and gold experts (1988: 23), I guess Putnam would say that a botanist does not have a better knowledge of the meaning of the word 'elm'; a botanist simply knows more about elms. Putnam would say that both of them are competent speakers of' elms' .

When we are discussing the argument from ignorance and error in section 3.2, we see, indeed, Putnam can distinguish elms from beeches. It is by the property that defers to the experts of elms and beeches. Under this analysis, Putnam and a botanist both understand 'elms' and 'beeches', but they associate different properties with these two terms. This observation implies that people associating different properties with the same word can be described as understanding equally well the word. I shall argue against this view.

Suppose some of us are like Putnam who does not know how to distinguish elms

94 from beeches. We can still talk sensibly about elms and beeches, because we can defer to experts. But consider a context in which botanists are discussing the distinctions

between different kinds of elms, which probably involves discussion about to which kind of elms some imagined species of trees may belong. Not surprisingly, Putnam

cannot engage in such discussion. In this context, it is counter-intuitive to say that

Putnam understands 'elm' and 'beech'. Or, at least he does not understand these terms

as well as the botanists.

I think this imagined scenario reveals something important about the nature of

the ascription of understanding-whether someone understands a term depends upon

context. This idea IS made explicit In Stanley's paper "Understanding,

Context-relativity, and the Description Theory" (2000). The view that contexts can

influence what properties are associated with terms is implicit in lackson's writing

(1998b: 215-6). He notices that when glass-experts are discussing among themselves,

they would associate the property "liquid' with the word 'glass', while folks would

associate the property "solid" with the word. Similarly, what counts as square in

geometry is very different from daily life situation. Regrettably, lackson does not go

further to explain this observation. This is where Stanley's idea comes in.

Context- re lati vi ty 0 f Understanding

The traditional answer to under what conditions someone understands the term 'elms'

properly includes that one know what elms are. In the context of the seminar about

elms and beeches, Putnam counts as not knowing what elms are. Here I presume that

it is nearly uncontroversial that ascriptions of knowledge-what are highly

context-dependent. Since ascriptions of understanding require knowledge-what, they

inherit the context-dependency (Stanley 2000: 16). In that context (botanists seminar),

Putnam does not understand what the botanists are talking about, as he does not

95 understand 'elms'. Of course, Putnam understands 'elms' in certain contexts, e.g. in

the context where he talks about elms with some non-expert like him. But it does not

follow that he understands 'elms' in all ~ontexts. Stanley proposes that there is full

. understanding-understanding in all contexts. For someone to fully understand a term

is for him to associate the same properties with the term as experts do.

As I see the matter, Putnam tends to equate reference-competence with

understanding. Here by 'reference-competence', I mean speaker's ability to

successfully refer to a thing with the use of a term. In some cases, being

reference-competent grants your understanding of the expression in almost every

context. The most prominent examples of this type I can think of are ordinary proper

names. To be a competent user of a name is to successfully refer to the individual. 84

But natural kind terms like 'water' require something more than mere

reference-competence to fully understand the terms in every context.

Let us go back to Stalnaker's challenge, that the semantic interpretation requires

too high a standard of understanding. He thinks both Jack and I are competent users of

'Julius', even though Jack does not know Evans' stipulation. Granted I have

successfully argued that understanding depends upon context, I think Stalnaker does

not have a case against two-dimensionalism. Suppose someone does not know Julius

is a person, and asks Jack who Julius is. Then in such a context, Jack counts as a

competent speaker of 'Julius'. But consider a context in which Jack participates in a

philosophy of language seminar where the postgraduates are discussing how we

should understand Evans' stipulation. In such a context, it is not surprising if the

postgraduates complain to their professor that Jack does not understand 'Julius'.

84 Here I am not suggesting a direct reference theory account for ordinary names. There maybe name-expert that can fix the reference of a certain name without deferring to other people. Ordinary folks can fix the reference of the name by passing the buck to such experts. Both of them are regarded as the competent users of the name.

96 4.3. A-intension and Communication

On lackson's analysis, a competent speaker must kno~ the A-intension of an expressIon. Besides being representational content, A-intensions are also communicated content, the sort of content that an audience is supposed to grasp when they contemplate the speaker's utterance of a sentence. We saw how the contextual account of understanding replies to critics of two-dimensionalism. Some other critics, particularly Kroon, ask whether 'expressions are associated with properties that play certain communication roles. 85 In "A-intension and Communication" (2004), Kroon complains that the associated properties of a word are generally not part of what the utterance of the word communicates, since a speaker and a hearer may associate different properties with the same word. And, more often than not, either the speaker cannot articulate the properties, or the hearer is not able to pick up the properties. 86

In order to fully appreciate Kroon's argument, we need to know the picture of language and representation endorsed by 1ackson, and why he thinks we need

A-intension as communicated content. In various occasions lackson declares that his descriptive view of language is based on the Lockean account of language. 87 This account holds that language users have implicit agreement to use words on representing how they take things to be. The representational properties are also reference-fixing properties. When I communicate with you, I want to let you know how I represent the world. So, the representational properties better be the

communicated content, which is the A-intension.

The relation between representational properties and communicated content

85 See Kroon (2004), also Stalnaker (2001). 86 This argument is usually directed at Jackson. It is not a concern for Chalmers' two-dimensional account, as the associated properties do not play any significant role in communication (Chalmers 2002: 175). But it makes sense to ask whether Cha]mers' two-dimensional implies A-intensions to be the communicated content. 87 See Jackson (1998b: 201-3), (2000: 321-3), (2004: 265-7), and (2006: 1-3).

97 involves some complications. Why lackson thinks we need A-intensions as the communicated content? I shall answer this through elaborating three claims endorsed by him:

(1) Language gIves information about our world; In other words, language

represents the world.

(2) To use sentence S to represent the world is to divide the possibilities our world

might be into two sets: (a) the set in which S is true and (b) the set in which S

is false.

(3) A-intension delivers the representational content and communicated content

Language is a of representation. Sentences convey putative information about what our world is like; they narrow the possibilities for how things are. The sentence

'snow is white' informs us that in the world, snow is white. Representational content is the division among possible worlds. As lackson quips, "no division, no representation" (2001 :323).

According to two-dimensionalism, every sentence IS associated with two intensions. Both A-intension and C-intension are about division among possible worlds. Which of them is the representational content? 1ackson argues that it is the

A -intension, due to two reasons.

First, the presence or absence of the word 'actually' makes no difference to the representational content of a sentence. When I say "Actually, there is water", I represent the world in the same way as when I say "There is water". But the set of worlds at which the first sentence is true is different from that of the second sentence.

In other words, the C-intension associated with the first sentence is different from that with the second sentence. This pair of sentences about water, which represent the

98 world in the same way, share the same A-intension, which makes us think A-intension is the representational content.

Second, "There is water" represents the world differently from "There is H20".

This point is clear enough: it will not be a discovery that water is H20 if the two sentences have the same representational content. Since 'water' and 'H20' are both rigid designators that have the same referent, these two sentences are true at the same worlds. The C-intensions associated with these two sentences are the same. But the

A-intensions associated with them are different. Thus, it is nature to think that the

A-intension delivers the representational content. Granted when we communicate, we want to inform other people about how we take the world to be, A-intensions deliver communicated content.

Kroon thinks lackson's account of communicated content entails that, if communication involving two people succeeds,

(1) The speaker and the hearer associate the same properties with the same word,

(2) The speaker is able to articulate these properties

(3) The hearer is able to pick up these properties

Kroon argues that seldom is the case that (1) - (3) are jointly met in situations where people successfully communicate. Out of these conditions, he thinks (3) is the most problematic. It is because a hearer is often mistaken or ignorant about how a speaker reference-fixes a word.

If lackson is suggesting that the communicated content is the associated properties, and successful communication occurs when the hearer successfully pick up the speaker's properties, then I think Kroon's argument is persuasive. It is obvious that the associated properties for the same word vary with person and time, changes

99 with conversational context, and so on. If the communicated content is the associated properties, and communication requires the identification of such properties between the speaker and the hearer, successful communication must be rare in daily life.

Laymen and experts would associate different properties to words like' quarks' .

The experts rely on specialist properties that few others have heard about.

Laymen will defer: quarks are whatever has the properties that the people from whom they learned the word associate with the name 'quark', a chain of borrowings that leads back to the physicists' specialist properties. When a layman tells an expert

'quarks are mysterious', it is intuitive that the expert can grasp what the layman means. But lackson must think that communication fails in this situation.

lackson confesses that only in the case that "the properties associated by speaker and hearer will be the same", and "in practice this is often far from the case"

(1998b: 214). So how lackson's account deals with the situations in daily life communication? In one occasion, he says

It would be a nuisance if the city that had the properties I associate with 'Paris' was a different city from the one that has the properties you associate with the word 'Paris' ... As long as we can bring the properties associated by speakers and hearers into line when it matters, no great harm results from divergences from the ideal ... (1998b: 214)

In this passage, lackson seems to suggest that variation among representational properties does not matter as long as there is co-reference. But lackson must resist this move, since it implies an undesirable consequence that the communicated contents of

'There is water' and 'There is H20' will be the same. If this is the case, why do we need A-intension from the beginning?

Defenders of lackson may say that it IS the A-intension that delivers the

100 communicated content, not the associated properties. Although there is a close relation between the associated properties and A-intension, the defenders may protest that they are not exactly the same thing. In various occasions Jackson seems to say that the associated properties are the communicated content. This is also Kroon:s interpretation on Jackson. But talking about how we should understand the notion of

"representational content", Jackson says "it makes good intuitive sense that

A-intensions should deliver content [representative content] in our sense" (2004: 261).

When someone communicates how things are using a sentence, he is communicating that the world we are in belonging to the set of worlds, when considered as actual that the sentence expresses a truth. 88

If Things were Easy

It is tempting to offer the following kind of response to Kroon's challenge: although ultimately the associated properties are not the communicated content, there is a close tie between associated properties and A-intensions. From a speaker's decision on what the word would refer to what in various possible worlds (A-intension), we may extract what properties are guiding his decision. If two speakers associate the same properties with the same word, the A-intension of the word would be the same for both of them. But it is not the other way round. Difference of associated properties, as some may say, does not guarantee the difference of A-intension. Consider the

A-intension associated with the term' Julius' as used by Jack and me as discussed before. Since I have read Evans, I associate the stipulative description with 'Julius', while Jack associates the property deferring to my use of the name. However, some may argue that Jack and I associate the same A-intension with 'Julius' . Since Jack is

88 That A-intensions deliver the communicated content is made explicit in lackson's paper Why We Need A-Intension? See also lackson (2007).

101 deferring to my identifying knowledge, the term as used by us would pick out the same referent in possible worlds when considered as actual. If A-intension, not the associated properties, is the communicated content, communication succeeds between

Jack and me when we use sentence involving the name 'Julius'.

This line of argument for two-dimensionalism fails, simply because it overlook that A-intensions are compositional. Let us recall that the semantic interpretation of two-dimensionalism identifies a priori truths to the necessity of A-intension. Having read Evans' stipulative definition of 'Julius', I associate the sentence' Julius invented the zip' with necessary A-intensions. I know a priori that "Julius invented the zip". If, as the defenders suggest, the A-intension associated with 'Julius' by Jack and me is the same, then since A-intensions are compositional, the A-intension associated with

'Julius invented the zip' by Jack and me will be the same, too. The identification of the A-intension implies that we have the same epistemic status of the sentence. But it is obvious that I know a priori that Julius invented the zip, while Jack knows a posteriori. Thus two-dimensionalists have to accept that either we (Jack and I) associate different A-intensions with' Julius', or A-intensions do not reflect cognitive significance. To accept the latter is the last resort for Jackson. But to accept the former means communication related to 'Julius' fails between Jack and I, which is counter-intuitive. Here it seems Kroon's argument applies to Jackson's communication account, no matter which, associated properties or A-intensions, are the communicated content.

A-intension is the Communicated Content

Is Jackson expecting too much of A-intension? I think not. I think what is communicated is dependent partly on contextual factors, e.g. of

speaker and hearer, the purpose of the speaker. As we have seen, in order to make

102 sense of lackson's account on understanding, we have to accept that understanding is context-relative. The idea of context-relativity also applies to his account of communicated content. This is what, as I take it, implicit in lackson's writings .

. My idea is that participants in a communication 'select' the appropriate associated properties according to context. Context can shift the property associated with a word. The famous example for this is 'heavy'. lust as the phenomenon of suggests that we have to decide what is meant in a particular context, the phenomenon of different levels of understanding suggests that properties associated with the same word vary among speakers. What can we do? We select, fallibly but with some success, using context, principles of charity and humanity, and so on, or the one that is right on a given occasion. Exactly how we do the 'selection' process is a highly complicated issue. Perhaps we would never work out the details. But we have spotted some patterns in the midst of all complexity.

In what follows I will focus on some examples of successful communication to illustrate the contextual account of communicated content.

What is Expressed and What is Communicated

Let us go back to a problematic passage from lackson:

" ... as long as we can bring the properties associated by speakers and hearers into line when it matters, no great harm results from divergences from the ideal [identical associations of properties/A-intensions], especially when the focus is more on getting our paths to cross than on the nature of the place where our paths cross." (1998b: 214 my emphasis)

lackson seems to suggest that getting our paths to cross-obtaining co-reference-is

good enough for successful communication. The nature of the place where our paths

103 cross, which should mean the identification of A-intensions, only matters in ideal situation. A-intension allows us to say how things are independently of how they

actually are. But in some context, we like to talk about how things actually are. That is, the focus is more on "getting our paths to cross".

In some occasions, 'There is water' and 'There is H20' will communicate the

same information. Maybe we can say that long before Lavoisier's discovery, people

were communicating information about H20 when they used the 'water' despite not

knowing that water is H20. But it is obvious that we were not knowingly

communicating information about H20 by then. This is not the kind of cases we are

interested in.

There are some interesting cases when the pair of sentences communicates the

same thing. Consider a situation in which it is commonly known that water is actually

H20. I take the assumption that the information commonly presupposed in a context

often enriches what is communicated. 89 Then there is an interesting sense in which

participants in that situation would, by uttering (1), communicate the same

information as they would by uttering (2).

(1) There is water

(2) There is H20

Both utterances represents that there is H20. In such a context, even though the

participants may associate different properties with 'water', they should know that the

utterance of (1) is about H20. The speaker and the hearers know that they co-refer to

H20.

89 I follow Stanley to take that assumption in (2002:327).

104 B ut sometimes, we want to talk about things independently of how they actually are. Or, maybe due to the lack of the kind of 'water is actually H20' presupposition, we ?annot but talk about things independently of how they actually are. In this kind of cases, difference of properties associated with speakers and hearers would seem to be a problem. In what follows we should see how the contextual account of communicated content comes in to handle this problem.

Consider a context (again) in which Jack and I are talking about Julius. Suppose

Jack asks me whether Julius invented the ZIp. It is intuitive that I can fully comprehend what Jack's question is about. If communication succeeds only if Jack and I associate the same A-intension with 'Julius', I shall be shocked when I hear such a question. Why? Because as I understand the name, 'Julius' is stipulated to be the person who invented the zip. On the one hand, if Jack understands the name in the same way, he should not ask such a question. On the other hand, if we associate different A-intensions with 'Julius', communication should fail. That the representational properties of a word for different members of a given language community are different also applies to natural kind terms. My representational property for the word 'quark' is very different from that of a leading physicist.

Physicists are communicating information about the Quark-property itself, whereas I am communicating information about the objects having the representational property physicists use' quark' for.

Since our understanding of words are of different levels, and seldom we have full

understanding, it is crucial to explain how communication is possible among different

speakers. I suggest that participants in a communication context will try to

synchronize their properties associated with words. One possible way to achieve this

goal is by mutual quizzing what other participants has associated with the words. For

example, I can ask sensibly whether Jack, by using 'lulius', is talking about the

105 referent of the name mentioned by me days before. If the answer is affirmative, then I know, more-or-Iess, what A-intension he associates with 'Julius'. In that context, communication about 'Julius' succeeds because we associate the same A-intension with 'Julius'. The same point applies to 'quarks' as well. An expert can ask sensibly whether the layman is talking about the 'quarks' as used by physicists. Then, according to his answer, the expert can adjust, in that context, what property is associated with his use of 'quarks' .

I have been assuming something like an ideal communicative situation, in which the A-intensions associated with the name by the communication partners are open to view. 9o But usually, the communication partners do not bother to mutually quiz about

what A-intensions are associated with the name. Why? I think probably because they

can guess under the guideline of convention. This is based on the observation that

speakers usually plan what they say with their audience in mind. Besides, an audience

interprets a speaker on the basis of assumptions which are manifested in the

conversational context or convention, including assumptions about the speaker.

Jackson holds the Lockean picture that we enter into implicit agreement of what

properties are associated with words. But that is not the whole story about our implicit

agreement. I think we also implicitly agree with what properties are associated with

words in different levels of understanding. Indeed, the effect of the context of

conversation is implicit in Jackson's writing:

Famously, context can shift the property the word "flat" is associated with; the property "nice" is associated with has changed over the years; and the phenomenon of ambiguity means that many words have a range of associated properties and we select, fallibly but with some success, using context, principles of charity and

90 For the details of when a communication situation courts as open to view, see Bezuidenhourt (1997).

106 humanity, and so on, the one that is right on some given occasion. (Jackson 2004: 268)

We agree that usually for ordinary users of names, we only associate the relevant sort of causal chain properties with names. Similarly, we agree that when we use scientific terms like' quarks', we usually associate them with properties that are about deferring to the experts. But when we are discussing these terms in a context requiring a high

level of understanding, we usually associate with the term properties that are similar to what an expert would do.

Competent speakers of a language should be aware, at least implicitly, of these

variations. Consider a context where a layman ask a physicist what quarks are,

communication is successful because the physicist can guess that the layman, by

'quarks', he means something he heard from the experts. But in a context of a

conference about atomic physics, the layman would know that communication

between the experts and him about quarks fails because these two parties associate

different A -intensions with 'quarks'.

It must be emphasized that even under the guidance of implicit convention,

speakers and hearers may fail to associate the same A-intension with the same word,

particularly when either one of them, or both, is not very sensitive to the effect of

implicit convention. Far from being a drawback to the contextual account of

communication, this explains why prefect understanding between conversational

parties is rare in daily life situations. After all, an implicit convention is by definition

not explicit. This is why sometimes we may fail to synchronize reference-fixing

properties for the same word. But for contexts that require precise definition of words,

such as seminars, the failure of synchronization of reference-fixing properties is less

often, as conversational parties are more likely to mutual quiz each other once they

107 are not sure about what properties others associate with the same word.

Admittedly, it is a difficult task to work out the details of how the speaker and the hearer select the appropriate A-intension associat.ed with the words in different contexts. Bl:lt I hope my account has shown that what is communicated depends upon context.

108 Concluding Remarks

In this thesis, I hope I have defended two claims: (1). Names and nat~ral kind terms are reference-fixed by some associated properties known by the speakers. (2). The

A-intensions people must know to be competent speakers of names and natural kind terms, and the communicated content of sentences containing names and natural kind terms, both depend on context.

It is superfluous for me to say that I have yet to prove that two-dimensionalism is the correct theory. What I have done, at best, is to argue that two-dimensionalism is immune from the argument from ignorance and error, and the argument from variability. In the remaining space of this concluding session, I want to clarify something about contextual account on understanding and communicated content I have advanced. Also I want to mention some important issues that I am not allowed to

deal with in this thesis.

I have advanced that ascriptions of understanding and the content being

communicated both depend on context. Whether my account belongs to the semantics

or is a highly debatable issue. At this moment, I believe, without any

strong arguments I can give, it belongs to the semantics of expressions. My current

view is that names and natural kind terms are semantically ambiguous in various

contexts. For examples, there are "expert' elms" and there are "folks' elms". It

becomes very difficult to say what THE meaning of 'elms' is. Or, in other words, my

contextual account will render the question "what is the meaning of 'elms'" quite

meaningless. To ask sensibly, one must state clearly whose use of 'elms' his question

is about.

In multiplying the contents of expreSSIons, I risk making my theory less

109 interesting. It starts asking "what is the content every competent speaker must know" and "what is the content communicated among speakers". It is now claimed by me that we can only fix the content according to context. In this case, I sacrifice theoretical elegance for a theory with better e~planatory power.

In this thesis, I can not spare myself dealing with the 'passing the metasemantic buck'

.argument put forward by Stalnaker. The heart of this argument is that the semantic

interpretation of the two-dimensional framework passes the metasemantic buck from the reference of all our terms to some general-terms about the general features of

things. But how would the reference of these general terms be fixed? An obvious

candidate is Lewis' Global Descriptivism. However, as Stalnaker argues in various

places, global descriptivism suffers from serious challenges that no satisfactory reply

IS. avaI·1 a bl e. 91

My preliminary reply to this line of argument is this. The semantic interpretation

of the two-dimensional framework explains the reference of all our terms by

reference-fixing properties, or A-intensions, which are not necessary in the form of

linguistic expressions, as argued in chapter 3. The metasemantic question will be

about what facts in virtue of .which the expressions are associated with the

reference-fixing properties. This is a question with a clear answer. The established

association is due to our entering into implicit agreement to use words to represent in

the way we do. 92 However, I am not sure whether such an account holds when

, instead of words, are associated with A-intensions. It seems not very

plausible that we can enter into a convention to use the words of mentalese. 93

91 See, for examples, Stalnaker (2003: 210-3) and (2004: 305-8). Braddon-Mitchell (2004: 143-5) and Pettit (2004: 330-6) made some plausible replies to Stalnaker. 92 Here I ignore the effect of context on what A-intensions are associated with words. 93 This is also the position endorsed by Jackson. See (l989b: 204).

110 Some reader may wonder why I have left out Soames' challenge that two-dimensionalism cannot handle belief ascriptions (2005). I have two reasons for

that First, surprisingly, two-dimensionalists seldom address~d the issue of belief

ascriptions. Perhaps they did that in purpose, as they might have known

two-dimensionalism would encounter some serious problems when dealing with

·belief ascriptions. Nonetheless they should have the benefit of the doubt. Second, it

seems Soames' understanding on two-dimensionalism deviates considerably from my

understanding, which, in my opinion, is a more faithful understanding. In order to do

full justice to Soames' challenges and two-dimensionalists, I have to spend a

substantial amount of space not only to anticipate how two-dimensionalists would

handle belief-ascriptions, but also to make some amendments to Soames' challenges

so that he is not attacking the . Given that a large part of this thesis has been

devoted to the discussion of the argument from ignorance and error, and the argument

from variability, I could not but leave aside Soames' challenges.

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