Durham E-Theses
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Durham E-Theses The Metaphysics of Mental Representation DE-BLACQUIERE-CLARKSON, RICHARD How to cite: DE-BLACQUIERE-CLARKSON, RICHARD (2011) The Metaphysics of Mental Representation, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/833/ Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details. Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk Abstract The representational theory of mind (RTM) explains the phenomenon of intentionality in terms of the existence and nature of mental representations. Despite the typical characterisation of mental representations in terms of their semantics, RTM is best understood as a metaphysical – more specifically formal ontological – theory whose primary defining feature is stipulating the existence of a class of mental particulars called representations. In this regard it is false, since mental representations do not exist. My argument is primarily methodological. Using an extended analysis of mereology and its variants as paradigmatic examples of a formal ontological theory, I argue for a ‘synthetic’ approach to ontology which seeks to form a sound descriptive characterisation of the relevant phenomena from empirical data, to which philosophical analysis is applied to produce a rigorous theory. The value and necessity of this method is proved by example in our discussion of mereology which is shown to be defensible given certain assumptions, in particular perdurantism, but still inadequate as an account of parthood without considerable supplementation. We also see that there are viable alternatives which adopt a more synthetic approach and do not require the same assumptions. Having effectively demonstrated the value of a synthetic approach in ontology I critically examine the methodology employed by RTM and find it severely lacking. In the guise of ‘commonsense psychology’ RTM cavalierly imposes a theoretical framework without regard to empirical data, and this results in a severe distortion of the phenomenon of intentionality it purports to explain. RTM is methodologically unsound, and so its commitment to the existence of mental representations is utterly undermined. Furthermore the most attractive aspect of RTM – its semantics – can be separated from any commitment to mental representations existing. Even RTM’s strongest advocates lack motivation to believe that mental representations exist. 1 The Metaphysics of Mental Representation Richard de Blacquière-Clarkson PhD Thesis University of Durham Department of Philosophy 2010 The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without the prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged. 2 Contents Preface 8 1. What is Mental Representation? 10 1.1 The Problem of Intentionality 11 1.1.1 Commonsense Psychology and Mental Content 12 1.1.2 Mental Location: Content and Vehicle Externalism 17 1.1.3 Levels of Explanation 22 1.2 Representational Theories of Mind 23 1.2.1 Causal Semantics: Dretske, Millikan, Fodor 24 1.3 Dretske: Natural Information 26 1.3.1 Determining Content 28 1.3.2 Vertical and Horizontal Relations 30 1.3.3 Indeterminacy of Content? 32 1.4 Millikan – Biosemantics 34 1.4.1 Proper Functions 35 1.4.2 Function and Intentionality 36 1.4.3 Horizontal and Vertical Relations 36 1.4.4 Biosemantics and Misrepresentation 39 1.4.5 Problems for Millikan 39 1.5 Fodor – Asymmetric Dependency and the Language of Thought 40 1.5.1 Problems for Asymmetric Dependency 43 1.5.2 Horizontal Relations: Propositional Attitudes and the Language of Thought 44 1.5.3 Computation versus Association 46 3 1.5.4 Vertical Relations 47 1.6 Summary of Causal Theories of Mind 49 2. Metaphysics and Mental Representation 50 2.1 Ontological Commitment 51 2.1.1 Ontological Naturalism 52 2.2 Concerns and Methods in Ontology 54 2.3 Formal Ontology 56 2.3.1 Representation and Formal Ontology 58 2.4 Methods in Ontology, Again 60 3. Parts and Wholes: Classical Mereology 62 3.1 Historical Background 63 3.2 Classical Mereology and Formal Ontology 64 3.2.1 Formulating Classical Mereology 66 3.3 Reflexivity and Antisymmetry 69 3.4 Is Parthood Transitive? 71 3.4.1 The ‘Standard’ Account 73 3.4.2 The Standard Account: Example a 75 3.4.3 The Standard Account: Example b 77 3.5 Johansson on the Arity of Parthood 78 3.5.1 Large Spatial Parts 80 3.5.2 60%-Spatial Parts 82 3.6 The Standard Account Again 83 3.7 (Unrestricted) Parthood is Transitive 84 3.8 Mereological Extensionality: Is Parthood Structured? 85 4 3.9 Optical Isomerism as a Counterexample 88 3.9.1 Premise One 90 3.9.2 Premise Two 91 3.9.3 Evaluating the Argument 93 3.10 Endurance versus Perdurance 94 3.11 The Futility of Counterexamples to Extensionality 95 3.12 The 3D/4D Equivalence Thesis 97 3.13 3D/4D Translation 99 3.14 Structure in Composition 100 3.15 Unrestricted Composition 101 3.15.1 Exuberance 102 3.15.2 Extravagance 104 3.15.3 Unwelcome Entailments 107 3.16 Mereology and the Three Problem Cases 110 4. Topology and Non-mereological Composition 112 4.1 Topology for Philosophers 112 4.2 Mereotopology 115 4.2.1 Cairns and Connections 119 4.2.2 Cars, Connections and Misplaced Engines 122 4.2.3 Actual and Potential Parts 128 4.2.4 Fiat versus Bona Fide Boundaries 131 4.3 Countermereotopology 137 4.3.1 Lewis’ Counterpart Theory 138 4.3.2 Cresswell’s Semantic Arguments 141 4.3.3 A Temporal/Modal Analogy 142 4.3.4 Counterparts and Partial Counterparts 145 5 4.3.5 Undetached Parts, Counterparts and Partial Counterparts 148 4.3.6 Undetached Parts, Again 149 4.4 Is Parthood Univocal? 150 4.4.1 The ‘Aggregative’ and ‘Monster’ Objections 152 4.4.2 Intuitions versus Evidence 157 4.4.3 Rigid versus Variable Embodiments 160 4.4.4 Superabundance of Objects 164 4.5 Parts and Wholes: Mereology or Embodiment? 165 4.6 Concerns and Methods of Ontology, Yet Again 168 4.7 Metaphysics and Mental Representation, Again 170 5. Commonsense Psychology 174 5.1 What is ‘Commonsense’? 176 5.2 Are Ordinary People Aware of Commonsense Psychology? 181 5.3 Support for Commonsense Psychology 185 5.3.1 “It is so widely believed it is beyond question” 186 5.3.2 “It is so intuitive or obvious it is beyond question” 186 5.3.3 “It is widely used in cognitive psychology” 191 5.3.4 “It is widely supported by specific empirical studies” 192 5.4 Core Knowledge, Mirror Neurons, Body Image and Body Schema 195 5.4.1 The Core Knowledge Hypothesis 196 5.4.2 Inanimate Objects 198 5.4.3 Agents and Actions 199 5.4.4 Numerical Magnitudes and Geometrical Orientation 202 5.4.5 Core Knowledge: Key Findings 204 5.5 Body Image and Body Schema 204 5.6 Back to Commonsense Psychology 207 6 5.7 Commonsense Psychology and Mental Representation 211 6. Thought without Mental Representations 213 6.1 Biosemantics without Mental Representations 215 6.2 An Identity Theory 219 6.3 Fodorian Semantics without Representations 222 6.3.1 Asymmetric Dependence 223 6.3.2 LoT: Compositionality, Referentialism and Atomism 225 6.4 Thought without Mental Representations, Again 233 6.5 Standard Objections to Identity Theories 235 6.5.1 Multiple Realisability 235 6.5.2 Phenomenal Properties and Qualia 236 6.6 Summary 240 7. Conclusion 241 Bibliography 247 7 Preface This thesis began life several years ago with a vague sense of unease at a particular view of the mind, and no clear idea of what to do about it. It should not be too surprising, then, that a significant proportion of it is concerned with methodology. The overall aim, however, is also substantive. I aim to demonstrate that there are no such things as mental representations, and so a particular school of thought which uses them to explain how we think about things is mistaken. The study of mental representation has hitherto been almost exclusively concerned with their semantics – how these putative entities acquire meaning – so to the best of my knowledge the metaphysical (and, more specifically, ontological) approach I take to evaluating mental representation is both novel and unique. Hopefully this is a good thing. Chapter one characterises and explores the Representational Theory of Mind, using Millikan and Fodor’s varieties as exemplars of the general type. Chapter two diagnoses the theory’s ontological commitment to mental representations, and justifies the necessity of approaching it as an ontological theory. Chapter three begins our methodological discussion, using parthood as an extended example of how ontology should be carried out, while chapter four continues this discussion and draws out two methodological morals. Chapter five applies these to the Representational Theory of Mind, using them to argue that the theory should be rejected. Chapter six salvages Millikan and Fodor’s semantics from the rubble, in doing so demonstrating there never was any good reason to suppose mental representations exist.