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On the Semantics of Propositional Attitude Reports

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On the Semantics of Propositional Attitude Reports GOTHENBURG MONOGRAPHS IN LINGUISTICS 13 ON THE SEMANTICS OF PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE REPORTS Mats DahllofÈ ¡¢ £ ¤ Department of Linguistics GoteborÈ g University, Sweden 1995 ABSTRACT This is a study on the truth-conditional semantics of propositional attitude attribution statements. It is suggested that attitude contents should be characterized in terms of abstract concepts, which are connected by way of a number of basic logical relations derived from a version of Quinean predicate-functor logic. This allows us to handle all logical relationships de®nable by ®rst-order predicate calculus in a way that does not exploit variable-like entities. Individual, predicate, and propositional concepts are recognized. These concepts provide the relata of various mental attitude relations and may denote (or may fail to denote) other kinds of object. The resulting framework is itself formalized in ®rst-order predicate calculus. This proposal is intended to give an account that is to a high degree independent of any particular view of the metaphysical, psychological or epistemological status of propositional attitude reports. An overview of different kinds of propositional and other conceptual attitude report constructions in English is given and it is suggested how the framework proposed can be applied to them. KEY WORDS: Meaning, Semantics, Logic, Propositional Attitudes, Truth Conditions, Intentions, Concepts, Reference, Predicate-Functor Logic, Intentionality Published by: The Department of Linguistics, GoteborÈ g University, 412 98 GoteborÈ g, Sweden. ¥ c 1995 Mats DahllofÈ ISBN 91-972408-7-7 CONTENTS PREFACE ¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦ vii 1 INTRODUCTION ¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦ 1 1.1 Language and Propositional Attitudes ¦ ¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦ 1 1.2 The Importance of Propositional Attitude Reports ¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦ 2 1.3 Goals ¦ ¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦ 3 1.4 Outline of the Thesis ¦ ¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦ 3 2 TRUTH-CONDITIONAL SEMANTICS ¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦ 4 2.1 Introduction ¦ ¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦ 4 2.2 Truth ¦ ¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦ 4 2.3 Ontology ¦ ¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦ 7 2.4 Goals of Linguistics ¦¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦ 10 2.5 Linguistic Analysis ¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦ 11 2.6 Language as a System ¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦ 13 2.7 Truth-Conditional Analysis ¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦ 14 2.7.1 The Justi®cation of Semantic Analyses ¦ ¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦ 17 2.7.2 The Principle of Charity ¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦ 18 2.7.3 Truth and Interpretation ¦ ¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦ 19 2.7.4 BTC-meaning ¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦ 20 2.7.5 Non-Declarative Discourse ¦ ¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦ 23 2.8 Concluding Remarks ¦¨¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦ 25 ii 3 APPROACHES TO PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE REPORT SEMANTICS ¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦ 26 3.1 Introduction ¦¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦ 26 3.2 Propositional Attitude Psychology ¦ ¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦ 27 3.3 Behaviourist Approaches to Propositional Attitude Attribution ¦¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦ 29 3.4 Propositional Attitudes as Involving Propositions ¦¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦ 30 3.4.1 Propositions ¦ ¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦ 30 3.4.2 The Impersonal Nature of Propositions ¦¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦ 32 3.4.3 Truth, Falsity and Logical Properties ¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦ 33 3.4.4 Propositions and Reference to Objects ¦ ¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦ 33 3.4.5 Propositions and Their Independence from Attitudes ¦ ¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦ 34 3.4.6 The Individuation of Propositions ¦ ¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦ 34 3.4.7 Different Conceptions of What a Proposition Is ¦ ¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦ 35 3.4.8 Non-Propositional Mental Attitudes ¦ ¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦ 36 3.5 The Semantic Features of Intensional Contexts ¦ ¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦ 36 3.5.1 Failures of Substitutivity ¦¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦ 37 3.5.2 Readings De Dicto and De Re ¦¨¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦ 38 3.5.3 Speci®city ¦ ¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦ 41 3.5.4 Other Sources of Ambiguity ¦ ¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦ 42 3.5.5 Internal and External Signi®cance of Content ¦ ¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦ 44 3.6 Non-Binary Analyses of Propositional Attitudes ¦ ¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦ 45 3.7 Frege's Gedanken ¦ ¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦ 48 3.7.1 Frege's Platonism ¦ ¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦ 49 3.7.2 Sinn and Bedeutung ¦ ¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦ 50 3.8 Sententialist Accounts of Propositional Attitudes ¦ ¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦ 57 3.8.1 Intensional Isomorphism and Structured Meanings ¦ ¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦ 62 3.9 Davidson's Paratactic Approach ¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦ 62 3.10 Facts and Situations ¦ ¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦ 66 3.11 Possible Worlds ¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦ 71 3.12 Reference and Propositional Attitudes ¦¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦ 75 3.12.1 Names and Descriptions ¦ ¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦ 76 3.12.2 Causality and Indexicality ¦ ¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦ 78 3.13 Concluding Remarks ¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦ 82 iii 4 DERIVING SYSTEMS OF CONCEPTS FROM PREDICATE-FUNCTOR LOGIC ¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦ 86 4.1 Introduction ¦¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦ 86 4.2 Quanti®cation ¦ ¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦ 91 4.3 Predicate-Functor Logic ¦ ¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦ 96 4.3.1 The Syntax of PFLST ¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦ 99 4.3.1.1 The Syntax of Singular Terms ¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦ 100 4.3.1.2 The Syntax of Predicate Terms ¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦ 100 4.3.1.3 The Syntax of Formulae ¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦ 101 4.3.2 The Semantics of PFLST ¦©¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦ 101 4.3.2.1 The Denotation of Predicate Terms ¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦ 101 4.3.2.2 The Denotation of Formulae ¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦ 102 4.3.3 The Elimination of Variables ¦§¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦ 103 4.4 The Concept System ¦©¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦ 107 4.4.1 A Truth Theory for Propositional Concepts ¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦ 111 4.4.1.1 Combinatorial Constraints ¦ ¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦ 111 4.4.1.2 De®nitions of Auxiliary Predicates ¦§¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦ 114 4.4.1.3 Denotation and Truth ¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦¨¦§¦§¦§¦§¦©¦§¦§¦§¦
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