Economical Unification As a Method of Philosophical Analysis
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
The Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies University of Helsinki Finland Economical Unification as a Method of Philosophical Analysis Avril Styrman ACADEMIC DISSERTATION To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Helsinki, for public examination in lecture room 13, University main building, on 17 December 2016, at 10 noon. Helsinki 2016 i Thesis Supervisor Professor Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Tallinn University of Technology Pre-Examiners Professor Simo Knuuttila, University of Helsinki Professor Sami Pihlström, University of Helsinki Custos Professor Gabriel Sandu, University of Helsinki Opponent Professor Sami Pihlström, University of Helsinki ISBN 978-951-51-2696-2 (paperback) ISBN 978-951-51-2697-9 (PDF) Unigrafia Helsinki 2016 ii 1 Introduction The method of economical unification resembles a production line with three inseparable elements that are interconnected in two stages: Economy → Economically unified ontology → Applications In the first stage an economically unified ontology is explicated by applying the principle of economy. In the second stage concepts are defined and disambiguated and problems are resolved in terms of the ontology. The central argument that is defended in this doctoral dissertation is that the method is more progressive than plain conceptual analysis that proceeds in the absence of an economically unified ontology and in the absence of the principle of economy as an evaluation criterion of alternative ontologies. Its progressiveness results from having a stable economically unified ontology that is the same for all derivative topics, and which enables defining and disambiguating meanings of concepts, thereby facilitating their gen- uine understanding and resolving problems around them, more efficiently than in plain conceptual analysis. This argument is substantiated by applying the method in defining and disambiguating some of the central concepts that are dealt with in contemporary philosophy and in resolving problems around them. The scope of this thesis is on con- cepts which are directly relevant and applicable in the domains of empirical science and human social behaviour, i.e., the scope is not on language or linguistic philosophy, and not on logic as such, as characterized in §3.5. The key concepts around the method, the central topics that will be handled in terms of it and some important sources are introduced in the following. The sources behind the method are all authors who have formulated versions of the principle of economy or expressed the preference for unified science, including Aristotle, Isaac Newton, Ernst Mach and many more, as cited in §3. theory as fusion of ontology and concepts defined in terms of it. An ontology is a system of interrelated ontological commitments or a world-view of a human being.1 An ontological commitment is a commitment to the existence of something, i.e., an ontology can be seen as a system of interrelated beliefs of a person about what exists. According to Quine [323, p. 11], ontological commitments of a theory are those entities 1The term ‘ontology’ denotes sometimes also a branch of philosophy. Ontology derives from the Greek logos peri ta onta. Logos stands for word, speech, reason; peri for around, about; ta onta for the beings. Ontology can thus be translated as the study of being and as the study of the things that exist. Aristotle used the term first philosophy in the book Metaphysics 1004a4. Metaphysics derives from the Greek ta meta ta fysika, which means what comes after physics/nature, which in turn derives from the cataloguing order of Aristotle’s works: “When Aristotle’s works were collected and catalogued by Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century BC, the collection of writings dealing with substance, causation, and other topics was placed after the book now known as the Physics” (Crane and Farkas [95, p. vii]). I used originally the Finnish translations of Aristotle’s Metaphysics [11], Physics [12], and Of The Heavens [13]. The English citations are from Ross [10], from Perseus Digital Library http://www.perseus.tufts.edu, and from The Internet Classics Archive http://classics.mit.edu. ‘Ontology’ and ‘metaphysics’ are used in this thesis with exactly the same meaning when these denote a branch of philosophy. ‘Ontology’ and ‘metaphysics’ have also been used with slightly different meanings when these denote a branch of philosophy. In Wolff’s [415] distinction of general metaphysics and special metaphysics, ontology denotes general metaphysics. According to Juti [192, p. 15], ontology as general metaphysics is the heart of metaphysics that precedes the questions of special metaphysics. However, as it is in many senses difficult to cleanly separate general and special metaphysics, this dichotomy is not used. 1 that the theory requires to exist in order for the theory to be true.2 As even a single ontological commitment can be called a theory, it is often indifferent whether ‘ontology’ or ‘theory’ is used.3 However, theory as a fusion of ontology and concepts defined in terms of it, is not exactly the same as ontology only. To illustrate, consider a theory of the Solar System. Its ontology covers all that exists according to the theory, including stellar objects such as the Sun and the planets, their orbits and the supposed interactions between the objects which are characterized by mathematical formulas. One may define e.g. the concept of one year in terms of the ontology of the theory of Solar System, as the period in which the Earth orbits once around the Sun. The ontology of a theory is thus not exactly the same as the theory, i.e., the ontology with the defined concepts. Figure 1: Theory as fusion of ontology and concepts defined in terms of it. Perceptions yield verified commitments. Metaphysics explains the verified commitments. Ontology consists of verified and metaphysical (unverified and unfalsified) commitments, which are classified in two on the right. As depicted on the bottom left of figure 1, perceptions yield verified commitments, i.e., verified beliefs in the existence of something. For instance, direct perception (§8.1) has yielded the commitments in the existence of trees, houses, people, the Moon, the Sun and the Earth. Beliefs yielded by direct perception are understood as not involved with interpretation in any significant sense, i.e., they are understood as not theory-laden. When you perceive a tree in front of you and thereby believe in its existence, this is not theory-laden, or it is theory-laden only on a very insignificant level. Likewise, perceiving the outside temperature indirectly by perceiving a thermometer reading of 5 Celsius and thereby believing that the temperature outside near the thermometer is about 5 Celsius is not theory-laden, or only on an insignificant level. In the end, not much can be said to hold with absolute certainty, but direct and indirect perceptions are accepted as certain- enough points of departure, for otherwise it would be practically impossible to proceed.4 As perceptions yield verified commitments, ‘verified commitment’ and ‘perception’ do 2According to Bricker [58]: “The ontological commitments of a theory are, roughly, what the theory says exists; a theory is ontologically committed to electrons, for example, if the truth of the theory requires that there be electrons.” According to Cameron [72, p. 250] “the ontological commitments of a theory are what must exist if it is true; the ontological commitments of a theory are what counts against it when judging it for ontological parsimony; the ontological commitments of a theory are those things whose existence its truth entails that have real being.” Cameron refers to parsimony which is central to the principle of economy, and which is applied in evaluating metaphysical complexities of theories. 3The theory-ontology dichotomy vanishes e.g. in the cases of the axioms of EUO, which are unfal- sifiable and unverifiable ontological commitments: presentism is a theory of temporal existence and a metaphysical commitment; ontological realism is a theory of mind-independence and a metaphysical commitment; finite divisibility is a theory of divisibility and a metaphysical commitment; causality is as a theory of interactions and a metaphysical commitment. 4What has been taken as certain-enough can always be scrutinised in the search for a higher degree of certainty. For instance, if a physicist says that dark energy is an ‘empirical fact,’ we are dealing with a fully theory-laden metaphysical commitment, not with a direct or indirect observation. See §§3.3,5.4. 2 not have the same meaning. However, for the sake of convenience ‘verified commitment’ is often replaced by ‘perception.’ This convention is analogous to the notion that seeing is believing and allows saying that metaphysics explains perceptions. While the verified commitments are not involved with interpretations, metaphysical com- mitments especially are interpretations of the verified commitments. The function of theories or the function of metaphysical commitments of a theory is to explain the veri- fied commitments, i.e., to explain perceptions, to save phenomena, to answer questions that result from perceptions, and to function as generalisations which are induced from perceptions. The structure of the ontology of a theory thus appears as a fusion of veri- fied commitments and metaphysical commitments, where the verified commitments are explained by metaphysical commitments which are themselves unfalsified and unveri- fied by perception. Metaphysical commitments have been called by many names such as unobservables, brute facts, primitives, axioms, first principles, premisses, postulates, hypothetical entities and unexplained explainers. Although metaphysical commitments have especially been deduced by reasoning from perceptions and in this sense could be seen as verified, they are best seen as unverified and unfalsified interpretations of per- ceptions. For, different people interpret the existence of different metaphysical entities from the same perceptions: the very same perceptions have been interpreted to indicate mutually incompatible answers e.g.