DOCSLIB.ORG

Estonia Political Briefing: a New Year with a New Government E-MAP Foundation MTÜ

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Estonia Political Briefing: a New Year with a New Government E-MAP Foundation MTÜ ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 36, No. 1 (EE) January 2021 Estonia political briefing: A new year with a new government E-MAP Foundation MTÜ 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: CHen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01 A new year with a new government When on 13 January 2021, very early in the morning, the country’s Prime Minister Jüri Ratas (Centre) was about to announce his resignation, he visibly seemed much happier than he used to look like during the previous one and a half years (in fact, a bit more than that). Since 29 April 2019, when Ratas was appointed by the Riigikogu to run his second cabinet, the Prime Minister’s political life was resembling a permanent nightmare, due to a range of different scandals, which, one after another, were preventing the Centre Party-led governmental coalition from establishing some sort of normality, daily routine wise. This is never to say that a liberal democracy has to be less turbulent in terms of generating fierce debates on complicated issues. No, not at all. However, the outgoing governmental coalition’s boisterousness had, objectively, nothing to do with classic political deliberations within a democracy – as extensively discussed in a number of 2020-bound briefs on Estonian politics, almost each of those setbacks was clearly associated with a mini- or a maxi-crisis of the entire Government. Therefore, the eventual resignation was, speculatively, some kind of a relief for Jüri Ratas – in the wake of a big scandal that was surrounding a property development project in Tallinn, the Prime Minister decided that he simply had enough1. Some more details on the actual crisis will definitely follow the most recent political shake-up, and, during February-March 2021, the society will learn plenty on what went dramatically wrong. In the meantime, what is known thus far, the Office of the Prosecutor General “declared five persons and the Centre Party suspects in the criminal investigation related to Porto Franco”, and those “include […] [the then] [S]ecretary [G]eneral of the Centre Party, [an] adviser to the Minister of Finance, and [a] businessman”2. On a concrete note, the businessman “is suspected of bribe-giving”, the adviser – “of influence peddling”, and the Centre Party’s top-official – “of a second-degree crime”3. Back in July 2020, it was reported that Porto Franco, “the largest development project in Estonia ever, with a total area of 150,000 m2”, consisting “of three underground floors with 1,170 parking spaces and commercial rental spaces, and five above-ground floors for a 1 ‘Jüri Ratas resigns as prime minister following loan scandal’ in ERR, 13 January 2021. Available from [https://news.err.ee/1608071542/juri-ratas-resigns-as-prime-minister-following-loan-scandal]. 2 ‘Prime Minister Jüri Ratas resigns amid property project financing scandal’ in Postimees, 13 January 2021. Available from [https://news.postimees.ee/7154566/prime-minister-juri-ratas-resigns-amid-property-project- financing-scandal]. 3 ‘Prime Minister Jüri Ratas resigns amid property project financing scandal’. 1 shopping centre, office centre and hotel”, got the news that the Government decided to finance it “with a bridge loan from KredEx”4. In January 2021, Taavi Pern, State Prosecutor, reported that the prosecuted businessman “who has ties to […] Porto Franco […] and Secretary General of the Centre Party […] agreed that the businessman would donate a total of almost one million euros to the party leading up to local elections this fall in exchange for [the politician] making sure an exit road could be built on city land”5. In addition, as Pern noted, the ‘centrists’ as a party are “suspected of influence peddling”, and they received EUR 120,000 in donations from the businessman in 20206. In short, it was too much for the then ruling governmental coalition to bear, and shortly after the Prime Minister’s resignation, the coalition of the Centre Party, EKRE, and Pro Patria had dramatically collapsed. With almost immediate effect, the country realised that the new year (and, most probably, the whole period until the next parliamentary elections in 2023) will be spent with a new Government. The ‘reformists’, who won the March 2019 elections but could not form a coalition then, got the second chance. President Kersti Kaljulaid decided to ask Kaja Kallas, the leader of the Reform Party, to have another go on forming a new cabinet, noting the following: We do not have time to wait for formal deadlines to come and go. There is no time for stalling. The government crisis needs to be solved as quickly as possible. The people of Estonia need functional administration.7 Despite the objective fact that the performance of Kaja Kallas as a leader of the country’s parliamentary opposition deserves to be more effective, – after all, it could be evidently argued, the only serious political force that was opposing the discrepancies within the Ratas-led coalition was the country’s President herself, – she accepted the presidential call and … asked8 the Centre Party to partner the ‘reformists’ in a new Government. ‘What a surprise!’, – a naïve outsider may scream, having heard the news. ‘Not at all!’, – a seasoned analyst from Estonia 4 ‘The government decided to finance Porto Franco with a bridge loan from KredEx / Porto Franco will be financed by a bridge loan from KredEx, the government decided’ in Porto Franco, 30 July 2020. Available from [https://portofranco.ee/en/2020/07/30/the-government-decided-to-finance-porto-franco-with-a-bridge-loan-from- kredex-porto-franco-will-be-financed-by-a-bridge-loan-from-kredex-the-government-decided/]. 5 Janno Riispapp, ‘Teder promised close to a million in return for favor’ in Postimees, 13 January 2021. Available from [https://news.postimees.ee/7154724/teder-promised-close-to-a-million-in-return-for-favor]. 6 Riispapp. 7 Kersti Kaljulaid as cited in Henry-Laur Allik, ‘Kaja Kallas’ second shot at becoming prime minister’, Postimees, 14 January 2021. Available from [https://news.postimees.ee/7155468/kaja-kallas-second-shot-at-becoming- prime-minister]. 8 Loora-Elisabet Lomp, ‘Reform and Center to hammer out coalition agreement over week and a half’ in Postimees, 15 January 2021. Available from [https://news.postimees.ee/7156385/reform-and-center-to-hammer-out- coalition-agreement-over-week-and-a-half]. 2 would reply to that. In 2002-2003, for example, Siim Kallas, the founding ‘father’ of the ‘reformists’ and the father of Kaja Kallas, had run a Government together with the Centre Party. Then, one of his capable successors, Andrus Ansip, also invited the ‘centrists’ into his first cabinet. Therefore, there is no surprises here – the new Government of Estonia will be based on the Reform-Centre coalition, which possess 59 seats in the current Riigikogu out of 101. Clearly, it is going to be a decisive majority, being composed by the two largest parliamentary parties in the country9. Of course, there is a certain lack of ‘political comfort’ for the Reform Party to be teaming up with the ‘centrists’ who objectively did not perform well enough in the previous Government (not to mention their perceived involvement in the latest crisis, which pushed Jüri Ratas ‘down the hill’). Even Andrus Ansip himself admitted that he “would have preferred a corruption-free coalition as a first option, which would comprise S[ocial] D[emocrats], [Pro Patria] and the Reform Party”, and that it seemed to him that “financial discipline has not received the slightest attention in the last four years”10. However, it is what it is, and with the EKRE (arguably, the main ‘newsmaker’ in the previous Government) going back to the opposition for quite some time, Kaja Kallas is about to become Estonia’s next Prime Minister. What does this all mean in analytical terms? In the most recent poll, the Reform-Centre pair is the electorate’s most preferable choice, being supposed by 35 per cent of the respondents11. This particular bit of data underlines the fact that nothing is seen as abnormal in this situational ‘union’ of a party that in opposition during the last two Governments and a party that was running the ‘show’ at the same time. What is already known – Kaja Kallas declared that the upcoming coalitional agreement will be of a general nature, and no specific ‘clashes’ over crucial political issues are expected to be discussed during the rounds of negotiations with the ‘centrists’. Speaking on the theme, she stated that there is a plan to “form the coalition on equal basis, decisions will be made by consensus”12. 9 ‘Estonian Reform Party Faction’ and ‘Estonian Centre Party Faction’ in Riigikogu. Available from [https://www.riigikogu.ee/en/parliament-of-estonia/factions/estonian-centre-party-faction/] and [https://www.riigikogu.ee/en/parliament-of-estonia/factions/estonian-reform-party-faction/]. 10 Andrus Ansip as cited in ‘Andrus Ansip: I would have preferred Reform-SDE-Isamaa coalition’, ERR, 14 January 2021. Available from [https://news.err.ee/1608073429/andrus-ansip-i-would-have-preferred-reform-sde- isamaa-coalition]. 11 ‘Norstat survey: Center, Reform coalition most popular’ in ERR, 15 January 2021. Available from [https://news.err.ee/1608074044/norstat-survey-center-reform-coalition-most-popular]. 12 Kaja Kallas as cited in ‘Kallas: Coalition agreement will be general], ERR, 15 January 2021. Available from [https://news.err.ee/1608073864/kallas-coalition-agreement-will-be-general]. 3 In a much broader sense, the situation needs to be analysed from an international perspective. As argued by Kristi Raik, “[d]uring the past year and eight months, Estonia experimented with a coalition including radical right-wing populists”, and this “experiment damaged Estonia’s international reputation and its relations with allies, put pressure on its democratic institutions, and increased polarisation within society”13.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • European Young Leaders (Eyl40) 21St Century Pioneers: Inter-Regional Cooperation for a New Generation
    SEPTEMBER 2017 EUROPEAN YOUNG LEADERS (EYL40) 21ST CENTURY PIONEERS: INTER-REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR A NEW GENERATION TALLINN SEMINAR Report of the three-day seminar EUROPEAN young L EADERS The European Young Leaders (EYL40) programme led by Friends of Europe is a unique, inventive and multi-stakeholder programme that aims to promote a European identity by engaging the continent’s most promising talents in initiatives that will shape Europe’s future. The European Commission support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents which reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsi ble for any use which may be made of the information contained therein. With the support of SEPTEMBER 2017 EUROPEAN YOUNG LEADERS (EYL40) 21ST CENTURY PIONEERS: INTER-REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR A NEW GENERATION TALLINN SEMINAR Report of the three-day seminar EUROPEAN young L EADERS EUROPEAN YOUNG LEADERS This report reflects the seminar rapporteur’s understanding of the views expressed by participants. These views are not necessarily those of the organisations that participants represent, nor of Friends of Europe, its board of trustees, members or partners. Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted, provided that full credit is given to Friends of Europe, and that any such reproduction, whether in whole or in part, is not sold unless incorporated in other works. Rapporteurs: Paul Ames Publisher: Geert Cami Director of Programmes & Operations: Nathalie Furrer Senior Events Manager:
    [Show full text]
  • Kersti KALJULAID Is a Global Leader Being 5Th President of the Republic of Estonia
    Kersti KALJULAID is a global leader being 5th President of the Republic of Estonia. As a firm believer in multilateralism she has spectacular experiences in the fields of economy and energy as well as in public sector, European institutions and international level. Since 2016 President of the Republic of Estonia 2004-2016 Member of the European Court of Auditors 2002-2004 CFO and CEO in Energy sector 1999-2002 Economic Advisor to Prime Minister mr Mart LAAR 1994-1999 different positions in Investment Banking and Telecom sectors INVOLVEMENT IN ORGANISATIONS Since 2018 co-chair of UN High-Level Steering Group „Every Woman Every Child“ 2016-2019 Leading Estonian campaign to UN Security Council 2020-2021 2012-2016 Chair of the Council of University of Tartu 2001-2004 Member of the Supervisory Board of the Estonian Genome Centre Kersti Kaljulaid is also a member of World Bank’s Advisory Panel for the World Development Report 2021 and member of the European Council on Foreign Relations Council. LANGUAGE SKILLS She is fluent in English and French and also speaks German, Finnish, Russian. EDUCATION She graduated from the University of Tartu in 1992 in the field of genetics in the Faculty of Natural Sciences and completed master's studies in the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration in 2001. „Estonia regained its independence in 1991. With 30 years we have gone through comprehensive, rapid and successful reforms, we have built the first truly digital society and developed one of the best education systems in the world according to OECD. These are the experiences I want to bring to the OECD in order to be prepared for the challenges we will face in the next decades.“ Kersti KALJULAID President of the Republic of Estonia .
    [Show full text]
  • 'Russia Is a Threat': Estonia Frets About Its Neighbor
    Opinions ‘Russia is a threat’: Estonia frets about its neighbor In an interview, President Kersti Kaljulaid says Trump must stand up to Moscow. By Lally Weymouth March 24 Lally Weymouth is a senior associate editor at The Washington Post. TALLINN, ESTONIA Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid is treading carefully. Sitting in her office this past week, she said she believes Vice President Pence’s assurances that, despite President Trump’s skepticism, the United States is committed to NATO. A NATO battalion just arrived to make this small and vulnerable Baltic nation feel safer from Russia, a powerful neighbor historically ambivalent about its independence. Kaljulaid, chosen last year as a compromise candidate, spoke to The Washington Post’s Lally Weymouth about Vladimir Putin, NATO and a childhood spent under Soviet occupation. Edited excerpts follow. Q. Is Russia a threat? Are you worried? A. Yes, I am worried. Russia is a threat. Not a physical threat to any NATO country but [a threat] to the international security architecture. In 2008, they moved on Georgia. Q. When Russia occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia? A. That was the first sign. It blew over very quickly — European countries went back to business and life continued. This, of course, taught President Putin a lesson: He could push a little more. Q. He got the message he could do whatever he wants? A. If he does it bit by bit, yes. When he went into Crimea, it stopped for a while because the European countries and America this time recognized that they needed to draw a red line.
    [Show full text]
  • Riigikogu Aastaraamat 2019/2020 Riigikogu Aastaraamat 2019/2020
    RIIGIKOGU AASTARAAMAT 2019/2020 AASTARAAMAT RIIGIKOGU RIIGIKOGU AASTARAAMAT 2019/2020 RIIGIKOGU AASTARAAMAT 2019/2020 Riigikogu Kantselei 2020 RIIGIKOGU AASTARAAMAT 2019/2020 1 Riigikogu aastaraamat 2019/2020 Aastaraamat koondab perioodi 30. märts 2019 – 13. september 2020 ning on valminud Riigikogu Kantselei ja Eesti Rahvusraamatukogu koostöös Peatoimetaja Tõnu Kaljumäe Koostanud ja toimetanud Rita Hillermaa, Piret Pärgma ja Piret Viljamaa Keeleliselt toimetanud Gerli Randjärv Kujundanud ja küljendanud Tuuli Aule Fotod: Erik Peinar, Riigikogu Kantselei ISSN 1736-776X (trükis) ISSN 2733-2020 (võrguväljaanne) Autoriõigus – Riigikogu Kantselei 2020, Eesti Rahvusraamatukogu 2020 2 RIIGIKOGU AASTARAAMAT 2019/2020 SISUKORD SAATESÕNA PARLAMENTAARNE Peep Jahilo 5 KONTROLL 46 Arupärimised 47 Kirjalikud küsimused 48 RIIGIKOGU XIV KOOSSEIS: Infotunniküsimused 49 VALIMISED, JUHATUS JA Umbusaldushääletused 51 FRAKTSIOONID 6 Muu kontrolltegevus 52 Valimised 7 Juhatus 11 Fraktsioonid 12 TEGEVUS MUUDES Koosseisu muudatused 16 VALDKONDADES 54 Fakte Riigikogu liikmete kohta 17 VÄLISSUHTLUS 60 RIIGIKOGU KOMISJONID: Riigikogu delegatsioonid 62 TEGEVUSE ÜLEVAADE 18 Riigikogu väliskülalised 63 Euroopa Liidu asjade komisjon 19 Riigikogu juhatuse välisvisiidid 67 Keskkonnakomisjon 20 Parlamendirühmad 67 Kultuurikomisjon 22 Maaelukomisjon 23 Majanduskomisjon 25 RIIGIKOGU Põhiseaduskomisjon 27 JA AVALIKKUS 68 Rahanduskomisjon 29 Riigikaitsekomisjon 31 Sotsiaalkomisjon 33 Väliskomisjon 35 Õiguskomisjon 37 Julgeolekuasutuste järelevalve erikomisjon 39 Korruptsioonivastane
    [Show full text]
  • Codebook Indiveu – Party Preferences
    Codebook InDivEU – party preferences European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies December 2020 Introduction The “InDivEU – party preferences” dataset provides data on the positions of more than 400 parties from 28 countries1 on questions of (differentiated) European integration. The dataset comprises a selection of party positions taken from two existing datasets: (1) The EU Profiler/euandi Trend File The EU Profiler/euandi Trend File contains party positions for three rounds of European Parliament elections (2009, 2014, and 2019). Party positions were determined in an iterative process of party self-placement and expert judgement. For more information: https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/65944 (2) The Chapel Hill Expert Survey The Chapel Hill Expert Survey contains party positions for the national elections most closely corresponding the European Parliament elections of 2009, 2014, 2019. Party positions were determined by expert judgement. For more information: https://www.chesdata.eu/ Three additional party positions, related to DI-specific questions, are included in the dataset. These positions were determined by experts involved in the 2019 edition of euandi after the elections took place. The inclusion of party positions in the “InDivEU – party preferences” is limited to the following issues: - General questions about the EU - Questions about EU policy - Questions about differentiated integration - Questions about party ideology 1 This includes all 27 member states of the European Union in 2020, plus the United Kingdom. How to Cite When using the ‘InDivEU – Party Preferences’ dataset, please cite all of the following three articles: 1. Reiljan, Andres, Frederico Ferreira da Silva, Lorenzo Cicchi, Diego Garzia, Alexander H.
    [Show full text]
  • ESS9 Appendix A3 Political Parties Ed
    APPENDIX A3 POLITICAL PARTIES, ESS9 - 2018 ed. 3.0 Austria 2 Belgium 4 Bulgaria 7 Croatia 8 Cyprus 10 Czechia 12 Denmark 14 Estonia 15 Finland 17 France 19 Germany 20 Hungary 21 Iceland 23 Ireland 25 Italy 26 Latvia 28 Lithuania 31 Montenegro 34 Netherlands 36 Norway 38 Poland 40 Portugal 44 Serbia 47 Slovakia 52 Slovenia 53 Spain 54 Sweden 57 Switzerland 58 United Kingdom 61 Version Notes, ESS9 Appendix A3 POLITICAL PARTIES ESS9 edition 3.0 (published 10.12.20): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Denmark, Iceland. ESS9 edition 2.0 (published 15.06.20): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden. Austria 1. Political parties Language used in data file: German Year of last election: 2017 Official party names, English 1. Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) - Social Democratic Party of Austria - 26.9 % names/translation, and size in last 2. Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) - Austrian People's Party - 31.5 % election: 3. Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) - Freedom Party of Austria - 26.0 % 4. Liste Peter Pilz (PILZ) - PILZ - 4.4 % 5. Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative (Grüne) - The Greens – The Green Alternative - 3.8 % 6. Kommunistische Partei Österreichs (KPÖ) - Communist Party of Austria - 0.8 % 7. NEOS – Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum (NEOS) - NEOS – The New Austria and Liberal Forum - 5.3 % 8. G!LT - Verein zur Förderung der Offenen Demokratie (GILT) - My Vote Counts! - 1.0 % Description of political parties listed 1. The Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, or SPÖ) is a social above democratic/center-left political party that was founded in 1888 as the Social Democratic Worker's Party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei, or SDAP), when Victor Adler managed to unite the various opposing factions.
    [Show full text]
  • State of Populism in Europe
    2018 State of Populism in Europe The past few years have seen a surge in the public support of populist, Eurosceptical and radical parties throughout almost the entire European Union. In several countries, their popularity matches or even exceeds the level of public support of the centre-left. Even though the centre-left parties, think tanks and researchers are aware of this challenge, there is still more OF POPULISM IN EUROPE – 2018 STATE that could be done in this fi eld. There is occasional research on individual populist parties in some countries, but there is no regular overview – updated every year – how the popularity of populist parties changes in the EU Member States, where new parties appear and old ones disappear. That is the reason why FEPS and Policy Solutions have launched this series of yearbooks, entitled “State of Populism in Europe”. *** FEPS is the fi rst progressive political foundation established at the European level. Created in 2007 and co-fi nanced by the European Parliament, it aims at establishing an intellectual crossroad between social democracy and the European project. Policy Solutions is a progressive political research institute based in Budapest. Among the pre-eminent areas of its research are the investigation of how the quality of democracy evolves, the analysis of factors driving populism, and election research. Contributors : Tamás BOROS, Maria FREITAS, Gergely LAKI, Ernst STETTER STATE OF POPULISM Tamás BOROS IN EUROPE Maria FREITAS • This book is edited by FEPS with the fi nancial support of the European
    [Show full text]
  • Eu Whoiswho Official Directory of the European Union
    EUROPEAN UNION EU WHOISWHO OFFICIAL DIRECTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION EUROPEAN COUNCIL 14/09/2021 Managed by the Publications Office © European Union, 2021 FOP engine ver:20180220 - Content: Anninter export. Root entity 1, all languages. - X15splt1,v170601 - X15splt2,v161129 - Just set reference language to EN (version 20160818) - Removing redondancy and photo for xml for pdf(ver 20201206,execution:2021-09-14T18:03:57.732+02:00 ) - convert to any LV (version 20170103) - NAL countries.xml ver (if no ver it means problem): 20210616-0 - execution of xslt to fo code: 2021-09-14T18:04:06.239+02:00- linguistic version EN - NAL countries.xml ver (if no ver it means problem):20210616-0 rootentity=EURCOU Note to the reader: The personal data in this directory are provided by the institutions, bodies and agencies of EU. The data are presented following the established order where there is one, otherwise by alphabetical order, barring errors or omissions. It is strictly forbidden to use these data for direct marketing purposes. If you detect any errors, please report them to: [email protected] Managed by the Publications Office © European Union, 2021 Reproduction is authorised. For any use or reproduction of individual photos, permission must be sought directly from the copyright holders. LIST OF BUILDINGS (CODES) Code City Adress DAIL Brussels Crèche Conseil Avenue de la Brabançonne 100 / Brabançonnelaan 100 JL Brussels Justus Lipsius Rue de la Loi 175 / Wetstraat 175 L145 Brussels Lex Rue de la Loi 145 / Wetstraat 145 EUROPEAN COUNCIL – 14/09/2021 – 3 BRUSSELS 4 – 14/09/2021 – OFFICIAL DIRECTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION BRUSSELS EUROPEAN COUNCIL – 14/09/2021 – 5 LUXEMBOURG – Kirchberg Plateau 6 – 14/09/2021 – OFFICIAL DIRECTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION LUXEMBOURG – Gare and Cloche d’or STRASBOURG EUROPEAN COUNCIL – 14/09/2021 – 7 European Council President 9 Members 9 Cabinet of the President 10 8 – 14/09/2021 – OFFICIAL DIRECTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION European Council Rue de la Loi 175 / Wetstraat 175 1048 Bruxelles / Brussel BELGIUM Tel.
    [Show full text]
  • Confronting Planetary Emergencies – Solving Human Problems
    NEW APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC CHALLENGES (NAEC) Confronting Planetary Emergencies – Solving Human Problems Biographies Opening Session Session 1: Economic Thinking and Acting after Covid-19 Session 2: Session 2: NAEC - Rejuvenating the Debate Session 3: Lessons from Covid-19 to Address Future Threats Session 4: Closing Session 9 October 2020 Virtual meeting at the OECD Conference Centre, Paris Further information: William Hynes – [email protected] NEW APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC CHALLENGES (NAEC) Angel Gurria Secretary General of the OECD As Secretary-General of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) since 2006, Angel Gurría has firmly established the Organisation as a pillar of the global economic governance architecture including the G7, G20 and APEC, and a reference point in the design and implementation of better policies for better lives. He has broadened OECD’s membership with the accession of Chile, Estonia, Israel, Latvia and Slovenia, and has made the Organisation more inclusive by strengthening its links with key emerging economies. Under his watch, the OECD is leading the effort to reform the international tax system, and to improve governance frameworks in anti-corruption and other fields. He has also heralded a new growth narrative that promotes the well-being of people, including women, gender and youth, and has scaled up the OECD contribution to the global agenda, including the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals Born in Mexico, Mr. Gurría came to the OECD following a distinguished career in public service in his country, including positions as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Finance and Public Credit in the 1990s.
    [Show full text]
  • Sovereignty 2.0
    Georgetown University Law Center Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 2021 Sovereignty 2.0 Anupam Chander Georgetown University Law Center, [email protected] Haochen Sun University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2404 https://ssrn.com/abstract=3904949 This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub Part of the Computer Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the International Law Commons Sovereignty 2.0 Anupam Chander* and Haochen Sun** Digital sovereignty—the exercise of control over the internet—is the ambition of the world’s leaders, from Australia to Zimbabwe, a bulwark against both foreign state and foreign corporation. Governments have resoundingly answered first-generation internet law questions of who if anyone should regulate the internet—they all will. We now confront second generation questions—not whether, but how to regulate the internet. We argue that digital sovereignty is simultaneously a necessary incident of democratic governance and democracy’s dreaded antagonist. As international law scholar Louis Henkin taught us, sovereignty can insulate a government’s worst ills from foreign intrusion. Assertions of digital sovereignty, in particular, are often double-edged—useful both to protect citizens and to control them. Digital sovereignty can magnify the government’s powers by making legible behaviors that were previously invisible to the state. Thus, the same rule can be used to safeguard or repress--a feature that legislators across the Global North and South should anticipate by careful checks and balances.
    [Show full text]
  • Parties, Voters, and Activists: Building Ideological
    PARTIES, VOTERS, AND ACTIVISTS: BUILDING IDEOLOGICAL LINKAGE IN DEVELOPING DEMOCRACIES A Dissertation by SE JIN KOO Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Chair of Committee, Robert Harmel Committee Members, Dan Wood Marisa Kellam Hoi-Eun Kim Head of Department, William Clark December 2014 Major Subject: Political Science Copyright 2014 Se Jin Koo ABSTRACT This study addresses the question of why ideological parties and party systems emerge in some democracies but not in others, with a special focus on developing democracies. In delving into this question, I highlight the functions of ideology as a multilevel phenomenon, and examined the party-voter linkage mechanism based on policy programs at various angles. I assume that a party has strong ideological linkage (a) when those in the electorate who support the party feel a close ideological affinity for the party, (b) when the party has a clearly defined and ideologically distinct program, and (c) when party activists are ideologically motivated and coherent within the party. Focusing on each dimension, each empirical chapter evaluates the effects of institutions, socio-economic conditions, and democratic conditions. The methodology used for this multilevel approach is ‘tripartite,’ combining statistical analysis (large-N cross-national comparison), content analysis (case study) and traditional surveys (inter- and intra- country comparisons). First, by examining ideological affinity between parties and voters in 46 democracies, I find that the extent of perceived ideological affinity is determined by the age, size, and ideological position of a party and that institutional and economic factors are more important than democratic conditions for the development of ideological congruence of a party system.
    [Show full text]
  • The New European Parliament: a Look Ahead
    THE NEW EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: A LOOK AHEAD JUNE 2019 THE NEW EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: A LOOK AHEAD More than 200 million EU citizens cast their votes between 23 and 26 May 2019 to choose the next cohort of MEPs. The new European Parliament is characterised by increased fragmentation and therefore a greater role for smaller parties. This briefing provides an overview of the The pro-European wave evidenced by the election results, explains what to expect rise of ALDE&R and the Greens coincided in the years to come and considers how with a sharp and unprecedented increase the new alignment of political groups will in voter engagement. Since the late 1970s, affect the EU’s balance of power. The turnout for the European elections had briefing also includes national steadily gone down, reaching a historic perspectives from Bulgaria, France, low of 43% in 2014. At 51%, this year’s Germany and the UK. In addition, we look turnout might be a significant outlier – or it at some of the key incoming and could show that, in an age of Brexit, outgoing MEPs and present a timeline of nationalism and climate change, the EU upcoming institutional changes. may yet have something unique to offer. The election results What to expect from the The 2019 elections marked the beginning 2019-2024 European of a new era: for the first time in the Parliament Parliament’s 40-year history, the two major A more collaborative Parliament parties have lost their majority. The centre- With the two biggest groups – the EPP right European People’s Party (EPP), and S&D – having shed seats and lost though still the largest group, saw the their combined absolute majority, the greatest reduction in seats, with the duopoly of power has been broken with centre-left Socialists and Democrats (S&D) smaller groups hoping this will be to their losing a similar number of MEPs.
    [Show full text]