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1 21 of the war civil internationalised and ruinous violent most the been easily has in war The Introduction author’s own responsibility. own author’s the remain contents Its ). in University Beheshti Shahid at professor (assistant Azizi Hamidreza and Clingendael) at fellow (research Batrawi Samar by essay this of review the for grateful Iam Kingdom). (United Andrews St. of University the at (CSS) Studies Syrian for Centre the of Studies’ ‘Syria journal the of issue a2019 in special publication This policy brief is a cross-posting of its original original its of across-posting is brief policy This focused on the immediate interests of the regime, and Iran, with attendant attendant with and Iran, Russia regime, of the interests immediate the on focused and incomplete fragmented, be will of Syria reconstruction the that is result The regular . its pony of one-trick the than other influence political without itself finds also but reconstruction in Syria’s directly engage to going never was sidelines. the to it relegated has indecisiveness policy EU’s foreign the while scope, in its and limited partisan it have made that policy foreign in its shifts and radical turmoil domestic from point. suffers this at reconstruction in countrywide like Turkey engage not EU will and the intermediaries Potential Iran. with association country’s the given agendas irreconcilable to hostage of Syria reconstruction the makes Iran and Arabia Saudi between conflict regional the with side) its on Syria keeping status, power great (re-establishing and Russia anti-Iran) terror, on (war US the of interests global the misaligned of combination the final analysis, Inthe stability. future for Syria’s prospects the assess helps an examination Such gap. this increase or maintain close, to likely are Turkey, and Israel Iran, Union, Arabia Saudi European the States, United the Russia, whether examines essay This and volume. focus both in mismatched grossly is of Syria of, for, and demand supply reconstruction The the population, for Syria’s neighbours and beyond. neighbours for Syria’s population, Syrian for the regime, Syrian –for of play the state of this consequences long-term the explores that scenario-planning for detailed need an is urgent There term. medium to short in the of many prospects livelihood for the consequences negative a case of matryoshka Syria’s reconstruction: of geopolitics The 2019 APRIL st century so far. so century 1 Its estimated Its 2 claim, this underpin billion, bill of over US$250 reconstruction its with along (IDPs), Persons Displaced million Internally 6.6 and c. refugees million 5.6 c. casualties, 370,000–570,000 over- and underreporting. both to prone are they as unreliable notoriously are figures casualty 2017. conflict that WBG, Note DC: Syria in Conflict the of Consequences Group, syria en/ Data are taken from from taken are Data ; https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ (accessed 18 March 2019); World Bank Bank World 2019); 18 March (accessed Toll of War: The Economic and Social Social and Economic The War: of Toll The 2 http://www.syriahr.com/ as do credible narratives narratives credible do as , Washington , Washington

Erwin van Veen CRU Policy Brief CRU Policy Brief

describing the scale of abuse carried out Iran-affiliated forces on the other.6 Finally, by the Syrian regime against the country’s Syria’s location as an intersection between civilian population.3 While the Assad regime Africa, and and between tries to give the impression that normality Turkey, Israel, and Iran makes has returned to large parts of Syria,4 it will it both a participant in, and victim of, proxy actually be decades before the wounds warfare, refugees, radicalism and crime. All created by this conflict have ‘healed’ in terms of this ensures that any political settlement of trauma, frayed societal tissue and depleted emerging from its ruins will project a long social capital. shadow, commanding ongoing interest from its neighbours. Beyond such appalling carnage and destruction, the Syrian is also highly It is from this perspective that the essay relevant from a geopolitical perspective. explores how the interests of key foreign Not only is it a place where both the hope state actors in the Syrian conflict will help or and repression of the Arab Uprisings hinder the nature, comprehensiveness and continue to reverberate, it is also a (proxy) speed of reconstruction in those parts of battleground for various regional and global the country under the control of President power competitions that have superimposed Assad.7 Currently, the supply of and demand themselves on the drivers of local conflict. As for reconstruction are grossly mismatched a result, the conflict’s key drivers, as well as the possibilities for its resolution, lie largely outside of Syria. At the diplomatic level, there is the moribund, Syrian-focused Geneva peace process run by the UN and the faster- paced Astana and Sochi peace processes, which are Turkish/Iranian/Russian- operated.5 At the military level, there is the largely impotent Syrian Arab Army (SAA) on the one hand, and the Russian air force and

3 De Silva, D. et al. (2014), Report into the credibility 6 See for example: Keen, D., Syria: Playing into their of certain evidence with regard to torture and hands, London: Saferworld, 2017; Vatanka, A., Iran’s execution of persons incarcerated by the current use of Shi’i militant proxies, Washington DC: Middle Syrian regime (‘Caesar report’), London: online East Institute, Policy Paper 2018-5, 2018; Steinberg, (accessed 30 September 2018). G., Die shiitische internationale, Berlin: SWP, 2018. 4 For example, SANA (the ) Also consider, more specifically, the interventions reported the 2017 International Fair by (2012), Iran (2013), Russia (2015) and to ‘have succeeded beyond expectations’ to support from various Gulf countries (2011/12-2017), demonstrate that Syria ‘is open for business’. as well as interventions by Turkey (2016, 2017 and 5 While none of these peace processes have so 2018), (2016) and the US (2017). far been conclusive, the contrast between four 7 The essay considers ‘states’ in neo-realist fashion. Geneva conferences on the one hand and eight It does not examine different decision-making ‘Astana talks’ and one conference in Sochi on the centres within states but views them as unitary other, suggest that the Astana-Sochi track is more actors. This is an abstraction of reality permissible active. It is not necessarily more inclusive. Some of to the extent that it helps understand the main its meetings are tripartite consultations between motivations of the key state protagonists in the Russia, Iran and Turkey about Syria. Syrian civil war.

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in both focus and volume.8 A better fundamental misrepresentation of the understanding of the probable role of foreign situation. After all, the US has not been an state actors – in particular the US, Russia, effective party to the original Syrian conflict the EU, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel – (the uprising against President Assad), and in decreasing, maintaining or increasing this neither does it view Russia as a global peer.9 gap will help assess the prospects for Syria’s Instead, US interests have largely centred stability. In terms of closing the gap between on the defeat of Islamic State (IS) and supply and demand for reconstruction countering Iran’s growing influence in the efforts, foreign state actors can allocate Middle East.10 As a consequence, only part of funds directly to Syrian reconstruction in the US vs. Russia framework has analytical the form of aid and concessional lending, usefulness, namely the observation that or indirectly by providing incentives for Russia views and uses the conflict in Syria private businesses in their own jurisdictions as part of its strategy to reassert itself as a to engage. global power on a par with the US.11

Understanding the 2015 Russian intervention Syria as battlefield of global in the Syrian conflict requires a brief geopolitics examination of the gap that the previous 25 years created between the Kremlin’s self-perception as a great power and its It is commonplace to view the Syrian treatment as a second-rate power by most conflict at least in part as yet another site Western countries throughout the 1990s of US-Russian contestation, but this risks and 2000s.12 NATO security expansion, EU economic expansion and Western political marginalisation of Russia during a period political-economic upheaval and 8 Simply put, the sums needed for reconstruction weakness created a nationalist revanchism are large (upwards of US$250 billion), Syria’s that was further aggravated by NATO’s business elite is unable to mobilise this kind of perceived abuse of UN Security Council money in the face of current Western sanctions, Syria’s international allies (Russia, Iran) are also in Resolution No. 1973 to topple the Libyan all likelihood unable to contribute such resources regime of Colonel Kaddafi (2011) and the while Western countries are unwilling to do so. EU’s efforts to draw Ukraine firmly into its The Gulf countries are an alternative source of economic orbit through the EU-Ukraine funding and have been making tentative moves Association Agreement (2014). Throughout towards an accommodation with President Assad the same period, the Kremlin gradually (e.g. and the are re-established its control over the Russian at various stages of reopening their embassies state apparatus, modernised its military and in Damascus). Yet, the overarching Saudi- Iranian tensions make it unlikely that significant reconstruction finance will be forthcoming soon other than what is needed to normalise relations, 9 See: Hamidi, I., ‘Syria at a crossroads: ‘A peace or perhaps in economic sectors that are of strategic to end all peace?’, Turkish policy quarterly, Fall relevance to the Gulf. On the ‘old’ and ‘new’ guard 2017; Van Dam, N., Destroying a nation: The civil of Syria’s business elite see: Rabat, L., Who will war in Syria, London: IB Taurus, 2017; Price, B., rebuild Syria: Extremely loud and incredibly close, ‘Syria: A wicked problem for all’, CTC Sentinel, Modern Diplomacy, online, 2019. On Western Special Issue, Vol. 6, Issue 8, August 2013; Lo, B., attitudes towards reconstruction see: Russia and the new world disorder, London: https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2019/03/17/591288/ Chatham House, 2015. Syria-reconstruction-US-UK-France-statement 10 Alaaldin, R.; Fritz, J., S Heydemann et al, (accessed 18 March 2019). Also consider the A 10-degree shift in Syria strategy, Washington DC: ‘No Assistance to Assad Act’ that is under review in Brookings, 2018; Barnes-Dacey, J., E. Geranmayeh, the US Congress and Senate: H. Lovatt, The Middle East’s new battle lines, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/ London: ECFR, 2018. house-bill/4681 (accessed 18 March 2018). Finally: 11 Lo (2015), op.cit.; Rodkiewicz, ‘Russia’s Middle Batrawi, S. (2018), Drivers of urban reconstruction Eastern Policy: Regional ambitions, global in Syria: power, privilege and profit extraction, objections’, OSW Studies No. 71, 2017. The Hague: Clingendael. 12 Ibid.

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stabilised its economy through Kremlin- mostly a means to an end.16 Russia’s efforts centred crony capitalist networks, heavy since 2015 to detach Turkey as much as reliance on natural resources, and some possible from its Western moorings should economic diversification towards Asia.13 also be seen as an opportunistic move The result is a new Russian foreign policy that both plays into its global agenda and assertiveness that pursues two core strategic serves to increase its regional room for interests. First, if Russia cares about an issue, manoeuver.17 While the jury is still out on it expects to be part of the group of states this last stratagem, it is clear that Ankara politically deciding it. Second, it calls the has substantially increased its foreign policy shots in the former Soviet space, albeit on autonomy vis-à-vis the US on issues such the understanding that old-fashioned, total as the purchase of the S-400 air defence USSR dominance has been replaced by a system, the Syrian Kurds, and its relations more complex and variable web of economic, with Iran. The stated objective of Russia’s military and social ties.14 intervention in Syria ‘to defeat terrorism’ must, on inspection of the evidence, be From this perspective, the Syrian conflict almost wholly considered an international is at least in part a Russian gambit to smokescreen.18 re-establish its influence as a key player in the great power concert that manages In the pursuit of its ‘real’ objectives, today’s multipolarity.15 It is not necessarily Russia has consistently applied an adroit the case that Russia’s intervention was mix of classic foreign policy instruments, proactively planned with such an objective i.e. diplomatic pressure (initially via the UN in mind. In fact, it may well have been the Security Council and later via the Astana/ immediate threat against its access to the Sochi peace processes) and high-powered Mediterranean port of , the imminent expeditionary military force.19 This allowed overthrow of the Syrian regime as a Russian it to notch up two key political results: 1) ally, or even the Iranian request for help that veto power in determining the progress of triggered the involvement of Russia’s armed the conflict as Syrian regime offensives are forces in 2015. But all of this needs to be not possible without Russian (air) support, seen in the broader context of ‘revanchism’ and great power re-establishment outlined above. In short, the exact chain and sequence of motivations and actions 16 Trenin, D., ‘What drives Russia’s policy in the Middle arguably matters less than the underlying East?’, in: Popescu, N. and Secrieru S., ‘Russia’s foreign policy outlook. return to the Middle East: Building sandcastles?’, EU ISS Chaillot papers, No, 146, July 2018. If this assessment of Russia’s Syrian gambit 17 Rodwiezicz (2017), op.cit. Note that is correct, it makes ensuring the survival Turkey-EU relations were already troubled before of President Assad himself and blocking a the Syrian conflict. 18 See for instance: Gaub, F., ‘Russia’s non-war on more US-oriented resolution of the conflict Daesh’, in: Popescu and Secrieru (2018), op.cit.; online reporting on targets of Russian airstrikes (accessed 13 October 2018). While there is a connection in the form of Chechen fighters among Syria’s opposition, the Kremlin’s effective suppression of militant in the and Kadyrov’s iron fisted rule since 13 Judah, B., Fragile empire: How Russia fell in and out indicate that Russia has good domestic control over of love with , New Haven: YUP, 2014; its ‘terrorist challenges’, despite the continuation of Lo (2015), op.cit. a low-level insurgency in the northern Caucasus. 14 Ibid. 19 Kaim, M. and O. Tamminga, ‘Russia’s military 15 For a broader assessment of Russia’s foreign policy intervention in Syria’, SWP Comment, No. 48, 2015; objectives in the Middle East, which prominently Delanoë, I., What Russia gained from its military includes its quest for great power status in its intervention in Syria, Orient XXI, 2018, Online confrontation with the West: Kozhanov, N., Russian (accessed 13 October 2018). On its sustainability: policy across the Middle East: Motivation and Secrieru, S., ‘The real and hidden costs of Russia’s methods, London: Chatham House, 2018. foreign policy’, EU ISS Issue Briefs, No. 2, 2018.

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and 2) a new set of pragmatic relations with (regional pipeline politics, in particular, being Turkey, Iran and even Israel that puts Russia important).22 at the centre of regional diplomacy and, in consequence, of any conflict resolution In sum, Russia has an appreciable interest in framework for the Syrian civil war. Syria’s reconstruction, provided it is state- led and state-focused. It may be prepared While there is little evidence that Russia’s to negotiate with the Syrian regime to intervention has re-established it in the extract political concessions that fall short premier league of great powers, this of meaningful change in exchange for objective could still be satisfied by it being financial reconstruction contributions from a key player in delivering an internationally other countries. It should be kept in mind, accepted resolution to the Syrian conflict. however, that Russia’s ability to extract such While it is essential for the sustainability of concessions from the regime is limited and such a resolution that the reconstruction likely to decline once the guns fall silent and of Syria is taken in hand, this does not its use to the Syrian regime decreases.23 necessarily require a significant contribution from Russia. It would be enough if others From uninterested to weak: pick up the reconstruction bill, and this is an The US, the EU, and the Syrian area of focus for Russian at the moment.20 conflict This is because ensuring minimal stability in post-conflict Syria and maintaining The lack of US engagement with the a meaningful state-centric model of original Syrian conflict, its half-hearted Russian-Syrian cooperation requires the policies, and the complete absence of re-establishment of the Syrian state with at an effective EU approach to the conflict least core capabilities. This, in turn, demands enabled Russian successes and reduced some degree of state-led reconstruction for the West’s options for dealing with Syria’s which external funds are required. Secondly, reconstruction. Despite having a significant Western assistance for reconstruction interest in a stable and democratic Syria, would essentially prove Russia right and the EU is currently relegated to financing confer legitimacy on its intervention by a significant part of the cost of hosting recognising that President Assad was the Syria’s more than 5 million refugees in the only option to win the fight again ‘terrorism’. region through its compacts while at the It goes without saying that the Syrian-state- same time lacking political influence or even to-be-reconstituted would be centralised channels of diplomatic communication with in nature and revert to its pre-2011 crony capitalist practices, in line with the regime’s and Russia’s preferences.21 Any financial contribution of Russia itself is likely to be 22 In January 2018, President Assad gave Russia the limited to Syria’s oil and gas industry which, sole rights to oil and gas production in Syria. See: http://theconversation.com/armed-by-the-kremlin- as it happens, is also the only economic gazprom-could-be-the-new-force-in-syria-when- sector that can turn a profit in the short term the-troops-leave-101492 (accessed 18 March 2019). A sustained presence of Russian energy companies implies, incidentally, a permanent Russian military presence in the form of ‘company forces’ to protect key facilities. The trouble today is that a number of key oil and gas fields are located in areas occupied by the non-regime-aligned (SDF). 20 See for example Bloomberg Online on 12 October 23 The extent to which the many pro-regime militias 2018 (accessed 13 October 2018). will, or will not, be effectively integrated into 21 Batrawi, S. and N. Grinstead, Six scenarios for the SAA is an important indicator of Russian pro-regime militias in ‘post-war’ Syria, The Hague: leverage as such integration is a precondition Clingendael, 2019; see also: Khatib, L. and L. Sinjab, for re-establishing an effective state and runs Syria’s transactional state: How the conflict changed counter to Iran’s preferences for a more pluriform the Syrian state’s exercise of power, London: security sector akin to or . Batrawi and Chatham House, 2018. Grinstead (2019), op.cit.

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the Syrian regime.24 Its sanctions, support Paradoxically, the military focus on defeating for accountability-for-war-crimes initiatives IS caused the US to provide significant and feeble military actions – such as British support for the Syrian Kurds,26 with the and Dutch support for armed opposition side effect of facilitating Russia’s efforts groups and French forces active in northern to broaden the gap between Turkey and Syria – have meanwhile put it on the its Western allies (Turkey views the Syrian regime’s blacklist. That it is not completely Democratic Union Party (PYD) as part without influence is only because of the of the Turkish PKK ( Workers’ reconstruction finance it could potentially Party), and considers both terrorist contribute. Yet, given the Assad regime’s organisations). Despite President Trump’s re-entrenchment, which is already underway, recent announcement of the complete and its crony capitalist economic policies withdrawal of US troops from northeastern from before 2011, it is highly doubtful that Syria, the subsequent pushback from the a sufficiently fine-grained implementation US foreign policy establishment might modality can be found that prevents ensure a continuous US presence in the regime capture of European reconstruction area after all.27 Yet, as it has become clear support.25 that Turkey prioritises perceived regional security threats over its relations with the Successive US-administrations viewed US and its position in NATO, maintaining the Syrian conflict predominantly through even a diminished US-military footprint in the prism of the war-on-terror (after 2014) northeastern Syria will keep Turkey on edge and, later, as a regional conflict involving and nourish its new relationship with Russia. Iran (especially after January 2017 when In this sense, US policy towards northeastern President Trump was inaugurated). The war- Syria was, and remains, stuck between on-terror frame shifted the US focus from a rock and a hard place. Given the poor its limited efforts to oppose dictatorship to state of American-Turkish relations and the a military campaign aimed at eliminating current obsession of the US administration IS. While it is not exactly clear what core with Iran, it is conceivable that the US will US security interest IS threatened given its continue to engage in reconstruction-like focus on the ‘near enemy’, its presence in efforts in Syria’s northeast under the guise of Iraq, combined with the entrenched nature ‘stabilisation’. This might even happen in the of the 9/11 anti-terror paradigm in US framework of a deal between Damascus and political circles, proved sufficient. The US-led Syria’s Kurds.28 coalition has been effective in rolling back IS territorial control, but it has made little Meanwhile, US confrontation with Iran progress in addressing its root causes intensifies by the day and shows little sign such as Sunni marginalisation in Iraq and of abating. The scope and intrusiveness of dictatorship in Syria. US conditions for re-engagement29 are such that Iran is bound to feel vindicated about its

24 See for example the co-chair’s declaration of the Brussels III Conference on ‘Supporting the future 26 This mostly concerns the PYD and its associated of Syria and the region’, online, 14 March 2019; militias (YPG and YPJ). See also: Van Veen, E., Uzelac, A., O. Macharis and E. van Veen, It’s there ‘Uit de as herrijzend: Syrië en de Koerdische to stay: A big idea for a better response to Syrian kwestie [Rising from the ashes: Syria and the displacement, The Hague: Clingendael, online, 2019. Kurdish question]’, Clingendael Spectator, Vol. 72, 25 On the political-economic structure of the Assad Issue 5, 2018. regime: Hadidi, S., Z. Majed and F. Mardam-Bey, 27 Commentary abounds on President Trump’s Dans la tête de Bachar al-Assad, Paris: Actes Sud, decision. For instance: Pierini, M., The politics of 2018; for thoughts on how European reconstruction pandemonium, Carnegie Diwan, online, 2019. support could be organized: Decina, A., How should 28 Burcher, E., Has the US given up on stabilization the West play a weak hand in Syria reconstruction?, efforts in Syria?, Atlantic Council, online, 2018. War on the Rocks, online, 2019; on continuities and 29 For instance: Pompeo, M., After the deal: A new ruptures in regime methods of rule: Khatib and Iran strategy, Remarks at the Heritage Foundation, Sinjab (2018), op.cit. 21 May 2018.

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intervention in Syria as part of its so-called businesses to engage in the reconstruction ‘forward defence’ strategy.30 It is evident of Syria on commercial terms rather than that Iran seeks to maintain appreciable providing greater state resources for strategic influence in Syria via expansion of reconstruction efforts, thus expanding its its economic interests (e.g. transportation, influence and potentially recouping some railroads, housing) and by loosely integrating of its investments.34 To make this possible, some of the forces it sponsors into Syria’s the Iranian government could seek to entice reconfigured security sector.31 These greater Chinese investment in Iran, Iraq elements would both embody and enable a and Syria by offering to strengthen the regional approach that consolidates Iranian Middle Eastern corridor of the Belt and Road influence beyond purely military elements.32 Initiative towards Europe.35 In the medium term, such an approach could help Iran cope The US appears to be banking on Syria´s with the negative effects of US sanctions weakness and reconstruction needs further although BRI benefits present a double- draining Iranian resources. Should this edged sword to Iran as they would further increase the level of protest in Iran about increase its already significant economic the cost of its foreign policy actions while dependence on China.36 Moreover, the sanctions start to bite, the US would have growing caution about Chinese investment achieved one of the aims of its sanctions in Europe might yet throw a spanner in the policy. However, on balance this is unlikely works by closing parts of the EU market to as the growing anti-US stance of the Chinese business activity.37 Iranian population is likely to outweigh its dissatisfaction with its leadership’s economic policies. It should also be taken into account Syria as a pawn on the regional that the Iranian security services maintain a political chessboard firm grip on both society and the economy.33 It is more likely that Iran will stimulate its It is the combination of the global and regional dimensions of the Syrian conflict that makes it difficult to resolve via 30 For an excellent analysis of the evolution of Iran’s international diplomacy. The conflict’s Syria strategy and its underlying foreign policy regional dimension centres on Iranian- interests: Ahmadian, H. and P. Mohseni, ‘Iran’s Syria Saudi competition across the Middle East, strategy: The evolution of deterrence’, International including Syria, with Turkey and Israel acting Affairs, 95:2, 2019; also: International Crisis Group, Iran’s priorities in a turbulent Middle East, Brussels: ICG, 2018a. 31 Azizi, H., Iran eyes major role in Syria via 34 Note that Iran’s leaders were concerned about reconstruction, Al-Monitor, online, 2018; Batrawi mission creep from the onset of their involvement and Grinstead (2019), op.cit. in the Syrian conflict, which also makes it less 32 Azizi, H., What Rouhani´s visit to Iraq tells us about likely for state-funding for Syria’s reconstruction to Iran´s Syria policy, Al-Monitor, online, 2019. be forthcoming. ICG (2018a), op.cit. Furthermore, 33 See for instance: Wright, R., Iran celebrates the many Iranian enterprises have links with its Islamic revolution’s fortieth anniversary: Twelve blocks from Revolutionary Guard Corps. the White House, The New Yorker, online, 2019. 35 Azizi (2018), op.cit. This is not to say there are no risks to stability in 36 Shariatinia, M. and H. Azizi, ‘Iran and the Belt and Iran, such as the new sense of political agency of Road Initiative: Amid Hope and Fear’, Journal of Iran’s lower classes acquired through the protests Contemporary China, online, 2019. of December 2017/January 2018. On this topic: 37 Moreover, in a recent twitter exchange, Hamidreza Khian, A., La révolte des pauvres ébranle le régime Azizi (@HamidRezaAz) cogently pointed out en Iran, Orient XXI, online, 2018. Yet, several that the Chinese government may progress interviews by the author in Tehran in January BRI initiatives only in parallel with progress in 2019 suggested that the Iranian government is operationalizing the EU’s Special Purpose Vehicle capable of handling such protests without too (SPV), presumably to improve international much repression and that the middle classes fear coverage against a predictably hostile US response. the instability that would come with protracted In other words, more may ride on the EU’s SPV than protests. is commonly assumed.

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as bit players specific to the Syrian theatre. global astonishment at the meteoric rise For a brief moment, the regional powers of radical Sunni militancy, the sectarian perceived the Syrian conflict through the lens Sunni vs. Shi’a frame offered the Saudi of the Arab Uprisings. It is worth recalling monarchy a ‘get-out-of-jail-free-card’ of that significant parts of the Iranian foreign sorts. By shifting the focus of the conflict policy elite as well as its population initially towards Iranian hegemonial ambitions, sympathized with the in Saudi Arabia superseded discussions about their rebellion against President Assad’s how Sunni militant extremism could have autocracy in a situation not dissimilar from grown so rapidly, relegating the longstanding their own revolt against the Shah in 1979.38 observation to the background that Shi’a religious tenets and doctrine have seldom In contrast, the Saudis’ initially supported been a core driver of either Iranian strategy President Assad as fellow autocrat and out or extremist violence.41 As it failed on the of fear for further revolutionary change in battlefield, Saudi strategy shifted from the region. In parallel, the Saudi monarchy fighting Iran in Syria to bandwagoning had been concerned about growing Iranian with the Trump administration against Iran. dominance in Iraq since 2003. In 2011, Consequentially, it stands to reason that the these fears were deepened by US ‘betrayal’ Saudis have little interest in supporting the – as perceived by the House of Saud – of reconstruction of Syria.42 common allies such as ’s Mubarak and ’s Saleh. Once it became clear While Syria represents one of a number that the US let events run their course and of sites of confrontation with Iran to the prioritised its nuclear negotiations with Iran Saudis (others include Lebanon, Iraq, over maintaining the Saudi-led status quo in Yemen, and ), to Iran it is the Middle East, the initial Saudi framework more existential. Its core interests in the quickly gave way to one of conservative Syrian conflict were clear early on, namely realpolitik – disguised as sectarian strife.39 retaining a friendly, non-Sunni majority The remedy that the Saudi’s deployed in regime in Damascus to keep Syria in the response was a much more assertive middle ‘resistance’ camp and maintaining a direct eastern foreign policy.40 In Syria, this took link with Hezbollah. Preventing the spread the form of supporting a range of moderate of Sunni militant extremism (after 2014) and and not-so-moderate proxies to overthrow connecting its different platforms43 of regional President Assad, who was recast from fellow influence in Lebanon and Iraq (after 2015) autocrat into Iranian ally. The evolution of the became additional interests in due time. Syrian battlefield has by now demonstrated The Iranian government has pursued these the shortcomings of this strategy in the face interests rigorously and with ample resources of direct and large-scale Iranian and Russian – including financial infusions from Iran’s support for the Syrian regime. Central Bank, the deployment of thousands

As far as its involvement in Syria goes, the Saudi monarchy arguably scored a victory at the level of discourse rather than on the 41 Scholars already observed in the 1990s that the battlefield. Caught between accusations 1979 was influential because of that IS derived much of its theological its ideas and ideology rather than the actual export basis from Wahabi religious thought and of a Shi’a theology-based governance model via Shi’a populations throughout the region. Esposito, J. (ed.), The Iranian revolution: Its global impact, Miami: Florida University Press, 1990. 38 Ahmadian and Mohseni (2019), op.cit. 42 For the purpose of this essay, I assume that the 39 Lynch offers an accessible overview of some key other Gulf States (minus Qatar and Oman) will geopolitical and social developments in the Middle follow a Saudi lead in terms of their support – or East after 2011: Lynch, M., The new Arab wars: lack thereof – for reconstruction efforts of the Uprisings and anarchy in the Middle East, New York: Syrian regime. Public Affairs, 2016. 43 Such as Shi’a political parties and militias in 40 Van den Berg, W., Saudi Arabia’s strategic stalemate: Lebanon and Iraq, as well as Iran’s relationship with What is next?, The Hague: Clingendael, 2017. the Kurdish PUK.

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of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps • The recent hostile US, Israeli and (IRGC) personnel, and the mobilisation and Saudi rhetoric against Tehran will have deployment of Shi’a militias from Lebanon, encouraged Iranian steadfastness in Afghanistan and Iraq.44 Iran’s interests in Syria as it re-imprints the ‘’s’ Syria have a high intensity preference, regime change logic on the minds of which results from at least three sources: Iran’s leadership.47 The US’s recent cancellation of the Joint Comprehensive • The 1980–1988 Iran- still Plan of Action (JCPOA) will have further influences the collective views of much bolstered Iranian resolve to keep any fight of the Iranian leadership since many as far away from its frontiers as possible, current members lived through that war. despite any possible misgivings in Iranian While the war may have been instrumental foreign policy circles about its own role in in cementing conservative clerical power Syria.48 at home, it also brought about vast destruction and, ultimately, humiliation. Although the Syrian regime faltered Iran had to accept the pre-existing status towards the end of 2014, despite Iranian quo after a costly war initiated by an Iraq support, Russia’s intervention soon tilted supported by much of the West and the the balance back in Tehran’s favour and it Gulf.45 Preventing its recurrence puts a has since steadily increased its influence premium on securing the neighbourhood in Syria. Yet, while Russia appears keen to as best as possible, including Syria. re-establish at least the core capabilities of the Syrian state, it is widely inferred that • The US invasions of Afghanistan (2001) Iran – building on its practices in Lebanon and Iraq (2003) provided windows and Iraq – prefers to create a more hybrid of opportunity for Iran to expand its arrangement that includes parastatal influence in both countries as much as organisations, militias, population centres they produced clear warning signs that and even governance institutions that US invasion in the context of the ‘’ or the ‘war on terror’ was not just a hypothetical possibility. Iraq’s descent into chaos after 2003 and 2014 offered Iran the chance to establish a more 47 The common argument that Iran deploys a contiguous area of influence stretching resource-light, forward-defence concept because from Lebanon to Iran.46 of its comparatively poor capabilities must be caveated. While Iranian MILEX pales compared with the Gulf, the latter’s armies have traditionally been ‘procurement armies’ that exist to seal international alliances, 44 Steinberg guestimates a presence of 1,000-4,000 not to be deployed on the battlefield. Moreover, ICRG advisers, special forces and commanders in while formidable, the Israeli Defense Force is the Syrian conflict theatre. Alaaldinet al. estimate too small and alien to the region to engage Iran there are 10,000-35,000 fighters in transnational, in a sustained conventional war beyond Israel’s Iran-sponsored armed groups with Hezbollah immediate border areas. In short, US military contributing another 7,000–10,000 fighters. See: capabilities in the region are the key that makes or Alaaldin, R. et al., A 10-degree shift in Syria strategy, unmakes the argument. See: Roberts, D., The Gulf Washington DC: Brookings Policy Brief, 2018; monarchies’ armed forces at the crossroads, Paris: Steinberg (2018), op.cit. IFRI, 2018. For a more in-depth assessment of 45 Razoux, P., The Iran-Iraq war, Belknap Press: Iran’s deterrence strategy: Ahmadian and Mohseni Cambridge, 2015. Incidentally, the IRGC’s Quds (2019), op.cit. force was founded in the Iran-Iraq war to support 48 ICG (2018a), op.cit.; several interviews by the author the Kurdish Peshmerga in their fight against with Iranian policy makers in Tehran in January Hussein’s regime. 2019 showed good awareness of the reputational 46 Ironically, in terms of Iranian political influence in cost Iran has incurred in the by Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, it makes more sense to supporting the brutality and violence of President speak of a Shi’a crescent today than it did in 2004 Assad’s regime. This was generally seen as the when the notion was coined and made sense only regrettable price for keeping Syria in the ‘resistance in relation to demographic realities. camp’.

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are loosely associated with the state.49 self-rule of Syria’s Kurds.51 The concern of This would create a lever of influence the Turkish elite about the rise of Syria’s additional to its formal and cordial relations Kurds must primarily be considered in with the Syrian regime.50 the context of its own unresolved Kurdish question, which Turkey has traditionally Such an approach to ‘reconstruction’ must, viewed through an unvarnished lens however, balance two trade-offs. First, it will of narrowly-defined and not match the preferences of the Syrian assimilation.52 But Turkey’s anti-Kurdish focus regime (or those of Russia, for that matter). across Turkey, Syria and Iraq (excepting the The Syrian regime may have to tolerate it Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) will also in the short term due to its own weakness persist because it serves as a useful deflector but, given its memories and practices of away from its domestic economic turmoil and pre-2011 control, it will not necessarily poor relations with the US and EU. accept it in the long term. Despite its vastly reduced military and economic capabilities, For the purpose of this essay, three the regime is not without agency. Seen from observations on Turkey’s involvement in the this perspective, cleverly designed external Syrian civil war matter. First, the Turkish support for reconstruction via the Syrian occupation of Afrin, Jarablus, Al-Bab and state could actually increase its longer-term adjacent areas – which was initially seen as independence from Iran. Second, however a temporary measure to prevent and undo much Iran might wish, it will struggle to the creation of a Kurdish-dominated Turkish- maintain a sizeable non-military parallel Syrian border area – is starting to show signs sphere in a Sunni-dominated country. of permanence in terms of reconstruction, military presence and a cross-border link In brief, the Iranian view on the being established.53 Second, the failure of reconstruction of Syria deviates significantly Turkey’s anti-Assad strategy, coupled with from the standard, state-centred approach its occupation of Syrian territory, has put it of the international community or, for that on a future collision course with the Syrian matter, the preferences of the Syrian regime. regime. Interestingly, Russia greenlighted While Iran’s approach has its limitations, Turkish military moves against the wishes of establishing selected centres of social both the Syrian regime and Iran, presumably control/influence in towns like Qusair or with the intention of enhancing its own around the Sayyidah Zaynab shrine, as leverage vis-à-vis both actors. Third, Turkish well as maintaining a security sector-based companies are well placed to benefit insurance policy by retaining direct lines of commercially from engaging in Syria’s command to a number of militia forces, are reconstruction – especially in the within its reach. area – due to the large Syrian on Turkish territory and its geographic The bit-players of the Syrian proximity.54 conflict: Turkey and Israel On balance, this suggests that Turkey might Turkish interests in the Syrian civil war engage more deeply in reconstruction of narrowed considerably between 2012 and 2018 – from the overthrow of President Assad to reducing the territorial gains and 51 Van Veen, E. and E. Yüksel, Too big for its boots, Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East 2002-2018, The Hague: Clingendael, 2018. 52 Gunes, C. and R. Lowe, The impact of the Syrian war 49 Batrawi and Grinstead (2019), op.cit.; ICG (2018a), on Kurdish politics across the Middle East, London: op.cit. Chatham House, 2015. 50 For example: Mohseni, P. and H. Ahmadian, 53 See for example: Tastekin, F., Turkey wants its share What Iran really wants in Syria, Foreign Policy, of Syria’s reconstruction, Al-Monitor, 15 August 2018 10 May 2018, Online: (accessed 15 October 2018). https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/10/what-iran- 54 Turkey was also the main economic beneficiary of really-wants-in-syria/ (accessed 14 October 2018). the Iran-Iraq war. See: Razoux (2015), op.cit.

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the parts of Syria it currently occupies as Should Iran try to restart its earlier efforts to a hedge against the Syrian Kurds, as long establish a military presence in southwestern as it can maintain these areas as part of its Syria, it would put itself on a dangerous own sphere of influence. For example, it is collision course with Israel, and perhaps imaginable that its Syrian proxies will loosely even Russia. Yet, because this scenario does integrate with the SAA to police the area but not serve the Iranian short-term interest of retain substantial Turkish links. To this effect, consolidating its influence in Syria, it is more it could come to a practical arrangement with likely that the informal buffer zone already in the Syrian regime that also includes support place in the southwest will be maintained to for reconstruction in regime-held areas as defuse the situation – for now.56 Alternatively, long as this involves Turkish companies. Given should Israel decide to launch an all-out the antipathy between Assad and Erdogan, air campaign against Iranian military assets this may require a Russian-mediated deal that across Syria, the risks of confrontation also resolves the question and engages with Iran, as well as with Russia, would Turkey in efforts to remove the US military increase. Its recent strike patterns do not, presence from northeastern Syria altogether. however, support this scenario as they are concentrated on the Damascus area As to Israel, its initial stance of benign and military research facilities in western neglect towards the Syrian civil war under Syria.57 A mutually tolerated stalemate with the motto ‘where two dogs fight over a a respectful distance between them is the bone…’ has boomeranged now that it is more likely future for SAA-embedded Iranian faced with the specter of increasing Iranian militia forces and their Israeli Defense Forces influence and permanent, Iran-linked military counterparts. installations on Syrian soil. While this has significantly raised the stakes for Israel, the Overall, it is plausible to assume that country has little leverage over the politics of Israel will diplomatically and discretely the Syrian civil war other than the airstrikes support Russia’s efforts to enable the it regularly executes against SAA, Hezbollah re-establishment of the Syrian central state and Iran-affiliated forces. Although it used through state-led reconstruction efforts to to conduct these with impunity, the IL-20M counter Iranian influence while maintaining incident on 18 September 2018, subsequent its policy as long as it can. Russian rhetoric and Russia’s deployment of several S-300 missile batteries to the benefit of the SAA have made their continuation Implications for reconstruction somewhat more delicate.55 Despite Russian cooperation with Israel to remove Iran- This essay has addressed the question of affiliated forces from the direct vicinity of how the interests of key foreign state actors the Syrian-Israeli border area, the ongoing in the Syrian conflict will help or hinder process of integration of foreign and reconstruction of those parts of the country domestic pro-regime militias into the SAA under the control of President Assad. Its key could easily muddle the waters for Israeli findings and insights are summarised below. strike planners in the near future.

55 Suchov, M., Is Russia’s S-300 delivery to Syria a gamechanger?, Al-Monitor, 10 October 2018 (accessed 15 October 2018). Israel carried out roughly half as many air strikes in Syria in the 56 International Crisis Group, Israel, Hezbollah and six months after the IL-20M incident as in the six Iran: Preventing another war in Syria, Brussels: ICG, before (~20 vs 40). There was a two month absence 2018b; Ahmadian and Mohseni (2019), op.cit. of attacks after the IL-20M incident, but strikes 57 Murciano, G., Preventing a spillover of the Iran- picked up in recent months. The targets have been Israel conflict in Syria,SWP Comment, No. 27, 2018; pretty much the same: SAA, Iran-affiliated and Anderson, S. and Muaz, A., Israeli strikes in Syria: Hezbollah forces. Source: Email exchange with an Calculated messages to the regime and its allies, ACLED researcher on 20 March 2019. ACLED, Online (accessed 15 October 2018).

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Table 1: Overview of key interests of selected foreign state actors in the Syrian conflict and their implications for reconstruction efforts in Assad-held areas

State Key current Preference Assets Leverage Likely implications for actor interests in the intensity deployed on course reconstruction support Syrian conflict in Syria in Syria* of conflict US Eliminating IS Moderate Low Low - May support reconstruction framed as ‘stabilisation’ in Kurdish-controlled northeast Syria Weakening Iran Moderate - Refrains from all other reconstruction Russia Reasserting itself as High High High - Strives for internationally accepted a global power conflict resolution - Lobbies others to support ‘minimum Re-establishing a High reconstruction’ of Syrian state friendly Syrian state - Seeks commercial benefit Unmooring Turkey Low from the West EU Bringing a political Moderate Nil Low - No reconstruction support unless the transition about elusive political transition occurs - Focus by necessity on regional refugee situation - Weakening Iran is not a consideration Saudi Overthrow of Assad High Low Low None likely to be forthcoming Arabia as ally of Iran beyond bare minimum required for normalisation of relations Iran Retaining a friendly High High High - Support for ‘minimum reconstruction’ regime of Syrian regime - Reconstruction of a quasi-autono- Establishing a High mous sphere of influence parallel sphere of influence Connecting its Moderate areas of influence in the Middle East Turkey Undoing Kurdish High Moderate Low - Reconstruction of occupied bits of autonomy gains northern Syria to establish a zone of influence - May seek commercial benefit Israel Rollback of Iran- High Moderate Low - No direct reconstruction support linked military - May discretely support Russian fun- presence draising efforts as part of its anti-Iran strategy

* Excluding humanitarian aid and related efforts.

Based on Table 1, a few initial answers to the actors.58 Turkey may also work with Russia to main question of the essay can be outlined: some extent.

First, if the current military balance and presence of forces persist without a negotiated diplomatic breakthrough, Syria’s reconstruction is likely to be territorially 58 Such tensions are for example analyzed and fragmented, limited in nature and driven explored in: Hatahet, S., Russia and Iran: Economic influence in Syria, London: Chatham House, 2019; by Iran-Russia-Assad, Turkey and the US Khatib and Sinjab (2018), op.cit. For a longer-term in their respective areas of influence. Iran analysis beyond the Syrian conflict: Zandi, D. will work closely with the Syrian regime (ed.), Dynamics of Iran-Russia relations: Changing and Russia although significant tensions regional and international scenes and the necessity will continue to exist between these three of cooperation, IRS papers # 1/96, 2017.

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Second, reconstruction of regime-held areas Arabia and Iran makes the reconstruction of Syria is likely to be protracted and partial of Syria hostage to irreconcilable agendas as the demand for infrastructure, housing, given the country’s association with Iran. education and governance will outstrip the Potential intermediaries such as Turkey supply of available funds for the foreseeable and the EU will not engage in countrywide future. This observation will hold as long reconstruction at this point. Turkey suffers as the US, EU, key European countries and from domestic turmoil and radical shifts in Gulf countries maintain their current policies its foreign policy that have made it partisan towards the Syrian regime, which they are and limited in its scope, while the EU’s likely to do for the time being. foreign policy indecisiveness has relegated it to the sidelines. Israel was never going to Third, should any of the preceding actors engage directly in Syria’s reconstruction but change policy, support for reconstruction will also finds itself without political influence be implemented in a politically contentious other than the one-trick pony of its regular and commercially profiteering environment airstrikes. characterised by crony capitalism and nepotism in which Iranian, Russian and There is an urgent need for detailed Syrian interests compete to influence the scenario-planning that explores the long- shape, focus and functions of the Syrian term consequences of the fragmented, state as it is re-established. incremental and limited reconstruction that will result from the above state of play for the In the final analysis, the combination of the Syrian regime, the Syrian population, Syria’s misaligned global interests of the US (war on neighbours and beyond. terror, anti-Iran) and Russia (re-establishing great power status, keeping Syria on its side) with the regional conflict between Saudi

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About the author

Erwin van Veen is a senior research fellow with the Conflict Research Unit of the Clingendael Institute. His research focuses on the political- economy of conflict in the - Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Palestine/ Israel - in the context of Iranian, Turkish and Saudi foreign policy.