HOW BIG IS the MORAL UMBRELLA? (An Enquiry Concerning Moral Scope)
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HOW BIG IS THE MORAL UMBRELLA? (An Enquiry Concerning Moral Scope) by C. PERRATON MOUNTPORD B.A., The University of British Columbia, 1975 B.Ed., The University of British Columbia, 1993 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Philosophy) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA June 1995 copyright:(c) Perraton Mountford, 1995 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT The question What kinds of things are morally important in themselves? (People? All sentient creatures? Trees? All living things? Ecosystems? Mountains? Rivers? Pebbles? Old cans?) is pressing. Thanks to 'animal rights' activism, the abortion debate, environmentalism, and a sense that technology needs greater moral guidance, analytic philosophy now offers four broad answers: HUMANISM (all and only humans), SENTIENTISM (all creatures capable of 'affect'), VITALISM (all individual living organisms), and ECOSOPHISM (all living individuals plus some natural 'systems' and, perhaps, certain non• living natural entities). These answers are carefully developed and contain many persuasive elements. However, critical exploration of representative literature reveals that each answer is predicated on a distinct and different view of morality's purpose, and we are rationally free to reject any (or all) of those views. In consequence, debate stalls. Short of question-begging appeals to first principles, the positions fall back on touting their relative merits. The best we can say is that humanists extending consideration to all humans will face difficulty resisting sentientism, but even sentientism is not rationally incumbent. Once we look beyond life-forms to whom events can matter in some way, expansionist arguments clearly fail to speak to humanist (and sentientist) concerns. Because humanism (and, to a lesser extent, sentientism) is informed by longstanding tradition, a considerable burden of proof impedes expansionist ambitions. The expansionist programme requires finding common ground; ground ii which is not obviously in evidence. To conclude, I offer an explicitly tentative suggestion for beginning to resolve this impasse. All parties should agree that whatever else morality does (or does not) achieve, rational morality promotes human well-being. And it is abundantly clear that human well-being requires a healthy, sustainable environment. Thus, an instrumental, pragmatic, approach to framing moral requirements seems to offer grounds for moral expansion. But can this essentially anthropocentric view of morality and environmentalism be used to determine what kinds of things are morally important in themselves? Separating our reasoning about morality from situated moral reasoning per se, reveals reason to think the approach can and will support a vitalist, or even ecosophist, account of moral scope. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ii Table Of Contents iv Acknowledgements vi Dedication vii PROLEGOMENON 1 PART ONE: FRAMING AN ENQUIRY 3 Chapter One THE INITIAL QUESTION 3 SOURCES OF CONCERN 4 FOUR KINDS OF ANSWER 7 THE ORDER OF THEIR GOING 13 THE LANGUAGE OF CONSIDERATION 14 THE PROBLEM WITH RIGHTS 17 SEEKING A RAPPROCHEMENT 19 OBJECTIONS AND EXAMPLES 24 Chapter Two GOODPASTER'S DISTINCTIONS 28 DISTINCTION 2 (MORAL SIGNIFICANCE) 28 DISTINCTION 3 (INTELLIGIBILITY) 31 DISTINCTION 4 (REGULATIVE CONSIDERATION) 36 PART TWO: THE MOVEMENT FROM INTEREST 46 Chapter Three HUMANISM AND COMMUNITY 46 MELDEN'S MORAL HUMANISM 47 PUSHING AT THE BOUNDARIES 51 IS MELDEN REALLY A HUMANIST? 58 GENETIC HUMANISM 64 Chapter Four SENTIENTISM IN THE UTILITARIAN TRADITION 70 AN EVOLVING CRITERION 71 HEDONIC SENTIENTISM 73 INTEREST-BASED SENTIENTISM 79 SOFT (NON-PARTISAN) SENTIENTISM 88 Chapter Five SENTIENTISM WITHOUT AGGREGATION 95 CAN HUMAN LIFE BE LEGITIMATELY SACRIFICED? 96 TRIAL BY SHIPWRECK 99 THE INHERENT VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE 104 SEEKING A BASIS FOR HUMAN VALUE 107 AN UNFINISHED WORK? 110 MORALS AND CONCLUSIONS 114 PART THREE: THE MOVEMENT FROM ECOLOGY 121 Chapter Six LOOKING BEYOND AFFECT 121 THE MATTERING GAP 121 FEINBERG'S ARGUMENT 123 SUMNER'S VIA MEDIA 129 GOODPASTER'S ARGUMENT 133 CLEARING A PATH 138 Chapter Seven VITALISM: A DIFFERENT KIND OF STRATEGY 143 ROLSTON'S VITALISM 144 TAYLOR'S VITALISM 155 AN UNACKNOWLEDGED COHERENCE WITH TRADITION 161 Chapter Eight ECOSOPHISM 168 ECOSOPHISM BY STAGES 169 BRENNAN'S ARGUMENT 175 DEEP (AND TRANSPERSONAL) ECOLOGY 178 PART FOUR: THE MOVEMENT FROM PRAGMATISM (Possibilities Of A New Direction) 186 Chapter Nine TRANSCENDING INSTRUMENTALISM 186 TWO CHOICES 187 REVIEWING AND EXTENDING FINDINGS 189 THE ARGUMENT FROM PRAGMATISM 196 A COMPROMISE (IS ALWAYS) OPEN TO OBJECTIONS 201 Chapter Ten DEEP HUMANISM 211 A TENTATIVE AND CONSERVATIVE PROGRAMME 211 A REORGANISED MOVEMENT FROM ECOLOGY 213 A PLACE, AND A ROLE, FOR COMPASSION 222 CONFLICT AND OTHER CONSEQUENCES 227 NOTES 236 BIBLIOGRAPHY 270 v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS There are many to thank. First, Ava Perraton, for not only supporting me financially and emotionally while I completed the job, but for rising so well and so graciously to the tasks of proof-reader and jobbing-critic. Second, I thank my committee. This enquiry as a whole, and Part Four in particular, owe a great debt to the years of collaboration with my supervisor, Earl Winkler. That I stayed with this project for so long is in large part due to the sustained and tireless support of Roi Daniels; it is hard to imagine more loyal, positive, practical support. I also want to thank Jack Stewart for coming on board so near the end and yet being so positive and helpful regarding what are, after all, some quite controversial proposals. Third, I thank the friends and colleagues who have read and discussed parts of this work with me. In particular, Susan Collard helped me find my way to an outline of the early chapters, and to a fuller sense of what I wished to achieve; Joan Bryans read, and offered invaluable comments on, the penultimate draft; and Derek Cook has been tireless in his support, encouragement, and interest. Fourth, I thank Morgan, Amber, and Lucas — and Morgan in particular — for accepting the idiosyncracies, as well as the needs, of someone completing a dissertation in the next room. Fifth, and finally, I thank those many nonhuman friends who, it seems, have steadily and persistently been helping me set aside my anthropocentric preoccupations. vi DEDICATION To the memory of C. K. R. (Ken) Pierce — teacher, priest, and excellent friend — with whom I began this conversation. And for Morgan, who must inherit the mess. PROLEGOMENON For I will consider my cat Jeoffry. For he is the servant of the Living God, duly and daily serving him. For at the first glance of the glory of God in the East he worships in his way. For is this done by wreathing his body seven times round with elegant quickness. For then he leaps up to catch the musk, which is the blessing of God upon his prayer. For he rolls upon prank to work it in. For having done duty and received blessing he begins to consider himself. For this he performs in ten degrees. For first he looks upon his forepaws to see if they are clean. For secondly he kicks up behind to clear away there. For thirdly he works it upon stretch with the forepaws extended. For fourthly he sharpens his paws by wood. For fifthly he washes himself. For sixthly he rolls upon wash. For seventhly he fleas himself, that he may not be interrupted upon the beat. For eightly he rubs himself against a post. For ninthly he looks up for his instructions. For tenthly he goes in quest of food. For having considered God and himself he will consider his neighbour. For if he meets another cat he will kiss her in kindness. For when he takes his prey he plays with it to give it chance. For one mouse in seven escapes by his dallying. For when his day's work is done his business more properly begins. For he keeps the Lord's watch in the night against the adversary. For he counteracts the powers of darkness by his electrical skin and glaring eyes. For he counteracts the Devil, who is death, by brisking about the life. For in his morning orisons he loves the sun and the sun loves him. For he is of the tribe of Tiger. For the Cherub Cat is a term of the Angel Tiger. For he has the subtlety and hissing of a serpent, which in goodness he suppresses. For he will not do destruction, if he is well fed, neither will he spit without provocation. For he purrs in thankfulness, when God tell him he's a good Cat. For he is an instrument for the children to learn benevolence upon. For every house is incomplete without him and a blessing is lacking in the spirit. For the Lord commanded Moses concerning the cats at the departure of the Children of Israel from Egypt. For every family had one cat at least in the bag. For the English Cats are the best in Europe. For he is the cleanest in the use of his forepaws of any quadruped. For the dexterity of his defense is an instance of the love of God to him exceedingly.