University of Nebraska at Omaha DigitalCommons@UNO Student Work 4-1-1995 The firing of Admiral Denfeld: An early casualty of the military unification process David Bruce Dittmer University of Nebraska at Omaha Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork Recommended Citation Dittmer, David Bruce, "The firing of Admiral Denfeld: An early casualty of the military unification process" (1995). Student Work. 481. https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/481 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student Work by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE FIRING OF ADMIRAL DENFELD: AN EARLY CASUALTY OF THE MILITARY UNIFICATION PROCESS A Thesis Presented to the Department of History and the Faculty of the Graduate College University of Nebraska In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts University of Nebraska at Omaha by David Bruce Dittmer April 199.5 UMI Number: EP73119 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI EP73119 Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 THESIS ACCEPTANCE Acceptance for the faculty of the Graduate College, University of Nebraska, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts, University of Nebraska at Omaha. Committee Name Department/School Chairperson Date Yu I3 3 -5 " ABSTRACT The defense establishment of the United States underwent many changes after its magnificent victory in World War II. Budget cuts and a rapid demobilization that President Truman described as "disintegration" shrunk the Armed Forces to less than a quarter of their wartime strength in less than two years, just as the world's geopolitical landscape was hardening into the bi-polar relationship of the Cold War. Adding to the resulting confusion was Truman's successful effort to unify the three services in an overarching National Military Establishment which eventually became the Department of Defense. The resulting pressures on the three military services led to a prolonged, acrimonious inter-service squabble over position, mission, and funding which often appeared to be merely selfish survivalism. Actually, the arguments which surfaced in the late 1940s over the various proposals for employing nuclear and conventional forces arose out of sincere and rational concerns for the best interests of the Nation. Admiral Louis Denfeld served as the Chief of Naval Operations, the uniformed head of the Navy, from December 1947 through October 1949. He attempted to support the policies of President Truman in public statements, during congressional testimony, and in talks to his subordinates but was unable to satisfy all three groups. 1949 brought a new, economy-minded Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, to the Pentagon. Admiral Denfeld soon came into conflict with Johnson over the new Secretary's preference for the Air Force and strategic bombing over the Navy's aircraft carriers and tactical air operations. Johnson chose Francis P. Matthews, an Omaha lawyer, as Secretary of the Navy, making Denfeld'sposition even more difficult. Denfeld attempted to compromise and temporize his way through the resulting conflicts, but only succeeded in alienating both his superiors and his subordinates. The deep-seated bitterness in the Navy over budgetary cuts and seemingly arbitrary restrictions boiled over in the summer of 1949, leading to Congressional hearings on military unification and national strategy. This bitter episode has become known as the "Revolt of the Admirals." Denfeld did not lead the "revolt." He tried to maintain a sense of discipline, albeit ineffectively. Eventually, he sided with the rebels in his testimony, and was promptly removed by Matthews, Johnson, and the President. Congress, the media, and the public were divided on the removal of the Chief of Naval Operations. The House Armed Services Committee concluded that his firing had been a reprisal for his candid testimony before Congress and reacted angrily because this firing might discourage future military witnesses from providing honest and open testimony. The Senate Armed Services Committee also examined the firing of Admiral Denfeld but concluded that his testimony had not been the cause of his removal. This Committee agreed with Matthews' contention that many small matters over the course of several months had rendered the Admiral unsuitable for continued service as the Navy's senior officer. To date, no historical works about this incident have reconciled this difference of opinion. This thesis attempts to show that Admiral Denfeld's Congressional testimony was only a symptom of the real cause of his firing. His inability to communicate effectively with his civilian bosses and to unify his subordinates in support of the administration led to an intolerable situation in the Navy. Matthews never publicly explained his rationale for removing his subordinate, but the Admiral's testimony was not the only cause of the Secretary of the Navy's decision. Both Matthews and Denfeld have been neglected by historians, generally being dismissed as the Navy's leaders in an embarrassing "family feud." Nevertheless, they were both patriotic Americans and deserve a better legacy. Their principal shortcoming was their inability to work effectively together. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This thesis is the product of nearly two years of research and evaluation, and like all historical scholarship has been a collaborative effort. Archivists, librarians, historians, fellow officers, and many others helped to bring it to completion. I would like to acknowledge some of the individuals whose efforts helped me keep this project on track. The Harry S. Truman Library's outstanding staff and facilities made my research in Independence, Missouri a pleasure. Sam Rushay and the other archivists were always willing and able to help in any way possible. A generous research grant from the Truman Library Institute also very much facilitated my efforts. Washington, D C s Naval Historical Center provided a wealth of essential information and scholarly advice. Dr. Jeffrey Barlow's help was especially appreciated, as was the fact that he allowed me to examine the manuscript of his then-unpublished book, The Revolt of the Admirals. The Center's fine collection of Admiral Denfeld's personal and professional papers was easy to work with and of great value to my project. Various military organizations also deserve sincere thanks for their assistance. The staff of the U. S. Strategic Command in Omaha gave me the idea for this thesis and encouraged its development. The Command Historians, Dr. Robert Parks and Dr. Todd White, graciously led me through the archives of the Strategic Air Command and showed me the Air Force's side of the controversy. Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Holland, III, merits special thanks for granting me the time to complete this project. Ms. Carol Ramkey of the Army's Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas provided essential assistance and went well beyond the normal call of duty in supplying copies of many articles and documents not available in the Omaha area. The Special Collections staff at the U. S. Naval Academy's Nimitz Library were very iv helpful in guiding me through their extensive oral history collection and the Naval Academy's records. Dr. A1 Goldberg of the Secretary of Defense's History Office also made his Pentagon files available for review. My sincere thanks are due to Dr. Bruce Garver of the University of Nebraska at Omaha for agreeing to Serve as my thesis advisor and for his criticism and guidance as the thesis developed. His suggestions dramatically improved the paper. Lieutenant Commander Walter Luthiger also read the first draft of the thesis and provided many helpful comments. My biggest debt in this and all my other projects is to my loving wife Lauri and my forgiving children, Kathryn and Michael. They gave up their husband and father for many days to libraries, archives, and computers during the course of this project. Their love and patience was essential and will never be forgotten. V TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract i Acknowledgments iii Table of Contents v Introduction 1 Defense Unification to 1947 6 Admiral Denfeld Takes the Helm 18 Denfeld Battles for the Navy (December 1947 to March 1949) 26 Leadership Changes in the Department of Defense and the 49 Cancellation of the "Supercarrier" (March Through May 1949) Admiral Denfeld on the Defensive (June - October 1949) 71 The B-36 Investigation and the "Revolt of the Admirals" 88 The Hearings on Unification and Strategy 121 Louis Denfeld Gets "The Ax" 142 The Aftermath of the Firing 162 Congress Examines the Removal of the CNO 180 Conclusion 203 Department of Defense and Department of the Navy Organization 1-1 Charts - 1949 Drawing of the Proposed "Supercarrier" II-1 Matthews' and Truman's Letters on the Firing of Admiral Denfeld III-l Pictures IV-1 Chronology V-l Bibliography VI-1 INTRODUCTION "Admiral Denfeld was ousted because of'an accumulation of many small conflicts on policy making,' and not as the result of any one incident." (1950 news report of a statement by Senator Millard Tydings, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee)1 "The removal of Admiral Denfeld was a reprisal against him for giving testimony to the House Armed Services Committee." (1950 House Report)2 This stark contrast in Congressional opinions on the cause of the October 1949 firing of the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis E.