Issue 68, 1st Quarter 2013
INNOVATION Under Austerity
European Missile Defense Military Values
Joint Force Quarterly Inside Issue 68, 1st Quarter 2013
Editor Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D. JFQ Dialogue Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D. Supervisory Editor George C. Maerz 2 Letters Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr. From the Chairman Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley 4 Copy Editor/Office Manager John J. Church, D.M.A 6 Bridging the Basics By Bryan B. Battaglia Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich Director, NDU Press Frank G. Hoffman Forum Design Chris Dunham, Guy Tom, and Jessica Reynolds U.S. Government Printing Office 8 Executive Summary Printed in St. Louis, Missouri by 10 Russia and European Missile Defenses: Reflexive Reset? By Stephen J. Cimbala 18 Military Wisdom and Nuclear Weapons By Ward Wilson NDU Press is the National Defense University’s Managing Foreign Assistance in a CBRN Emergency: The U.S. Government cross-component, professional military and 25 academic publishing house. It publishes books, Response to Japan’s “Triple Disaster” By Suzanne Basalla, William Berger, journals, policy briefs, occasional papers, and C. Spencer Abbot monographs, and special reports on national security strategy, defense policy, interagency 32 Operationalizing Mission Command: Leveraging Theory to Achieve cooperation, national military strategy, regional Capability By Kathleen Conley security affairs, and global strategic problems. Special Feature This is the official U.S. Department of Defense edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions of this The 600-pound Gorilla: Why We Need a Smaller Defense Department journal may not be reproduced or extracted without 36 permission of the copyright proprietors. Joint By Ryan P. Allen Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted from or based on its content. 43 The Case for Military Pension Reform By Jon P. Sunderland 48 Napoleon’s Shadow: Facing Organizational Design Challenges COMMUNICATIONS in the U.S. Military By John F. Price, Jr. Please visit NDU Press and Joint Force Quarterly online at ndupress.ndu.edu for more 53 Cyber Operations: Bridging from Concept to Cyber Superiority on upcoming issues, an electronic archive of By Jan Kallberg and Bhavani Thuraisingham JFQ articles, and access to many other useful NDU Press publications. Constructive com- Commentary ments and contributions are important to us. Please direct editorial communications to the 59 Values Statements and the Profession of Arms: A Reevaluation link on the NDU Press Web site or write to: By John Mark Mattox Editor, Joint Force Quarterly National Defense University Press 64 Reconsidering The Armed Forces Officer of 1950: Democracy, Dialogue, 260 Fifth Avenue, S.W. (Building 64, Room 2504) the Humanities, and the Military Profession By Reed R. Bonadonna Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, DC 20319 70 Controversial Contrails: The Costs of Remotely Piloted Foreign Policy Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 By Houston R. Cantwell FAX: (202) 685-4219/DSN 325 Email: [email protected] 73 Logistics Support “Seams” During Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu Protector By W.A. Brown and Brent Coryell
1st Quarter, January 2013 ISSN 1070-0692 PUBLISHER Features GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA Afghanistan: The Challenges of Attaining a Regional Solution President, NDU 78 MG Gregg F. Martin, USA By John F. O’Connell Advisory Committee On Strengthening Extended Deterrence for the ROK-U.S. Alliance Maj Gen Joseph D. Brown IV, USAF Dwight D. Eisenhower 84 School for National Security and Resource Strategy By Chang Kwoun Park and Victor A. Utgoff RADM John N. Christenson, USN Naval War College Brig Gen Thomas H. Deale, USAF Air Command and 91 The Effects of 9/11 on China’s Strategic Environment: Illusive Gains and Staff College Tangible Setbacks By Marc Koehler LtGen George J. Flynn, USMC The Joint Staff Maj Gen Scott M. Hanson, USAF Air War College Col Jay L. Hatton, USMC Marine Corps War College Recall RADM Douglas J. McAneny, USN National War College Col Mark Desens, USMC Marine Corps Command Kitona Operation: Rwanda’s Gamble to Capture Kinshasa and the and Staff College 99 LTG David G. Perkins, USA U.S. Army Command and Misreading of an “Ally” By James Stejskal General Staff College LTG Curtis M. Scaparrotti, USA The Joint Staff ADM James G. Stavridis, USN U.S. European Command Book Reviews Maj Gen Joseph S. Ward, Jr., USAF Joint Forces Staff College The Last Three Feet Reviewed by Brian E. Carlson 105 Editorial Board Richard K. Betts Columbia University Storming the World Stage Reviewed by Benjamin Fernandes 106 Stephen D. Chiabotti School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University Withdrawing Under Fire Reviewed by Todd M. Manyx 107 COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.) National War College Mark J. Conversino Air War College Joint Doctrine Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University Col Thomas C. Greenwood, USMC (Ret.) Office of the Secretary of Defense 108 Operational Design and the Center of Gravity: Two Steps Forward, Douglas N. Hime Naval War College One Step Back By Dale C. Eikmeier Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College Daniel T. Kuehl Information Resources Management College Col David Lapan, USMC The Joint Staff Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.) The Joint Staff Thomas L. McNaugher Georgetown University Kathleen Mahoney-Norris Air Command and Staff College Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.) National War College About the covers James A. Schear Office of the Secretary of Defense LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) Front cover: Marine CH-53E Super Stallion crew chief makes way toward helicopter’s ramp edge while flying CONTRIBUTIONS over Helmand Province (U.S. Marine Corps/Alejandro Joint Force Quarterly welcomes submission of scholarly, independent Pena). Table of contents shows (left to right) Airman research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers takes oil sample from A-10 Thunderbolt II engine (Air and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians National Guard/David Kujawa); Soldier watches firing from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration lane for targets during U.S. Army 10th annual Best Warrior to the address on the opposite page or by email to [email protected] Competition (U.S. Army); Sailors work on engine of EA-6B “Attention A&R Editor” in the subject line. For further information, see the guidelines on the NDU Press Web site at ndupress.ndu.edu. Prowler (U.S. Navy/Carla Ocampo); and military working dog handler stationed in Okinawa, Japan, and his K-9 Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the partner take part in night operations training (U.S. Marine Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal Corps/Aaron Diamant). designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; and developments in training and joint professional military education to transform America’s military and security apparatus to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting freedom today. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government.
ndupress.ndu.edu Letters
To the Editor—In JFQ 65, Air Force The unification story, however, is purpose than to gain control of the sea—not historian Phillip S. Meilinger wrote a pro- somewhat peripheral to the main point of as an end in itself, but so that national power vocative and informative article (“Admirals the article—which presents a fairly objective could be exerted against the enemy.2 Run Amok: The Danger of Inter-Service account of the “Revolt of the Admirals” until Rivalry,” 2nd Quarter 2012) about the Navy’s about page 94. Meilinger’s language subtly Denfeld’s final sentence here makes institutional response during the unification and then not-so-subtly changes as he begins a point many miss—the application of efforts of the Truman administration and to make his real argument in the piece—that national power from the sea in all scenarios, airpower advocates after World War II. This Navy resistance to unification reflected to include conventional scenarios. Denfeld hastened a trend that resulted in the bulk of “insubordination” that fundamentally and many of the officers in the Navy were the defense budget going to the new U.S. Air established an environment of inter-Service concerned that the very survival of capa- Force by the end of the Korean War. One is rivalry (“serious blot”) and “distrust” that is bilities essential to the Republic were at always tempted to ask, “Why this topic, why still with us today—despite a lengthy history stake—capabilities unrelated to nuclear this time?” of Defense reforms to fix it (p. 96). Cer- warfare. Moreover, Denfeld threw a strike Andrew Bacevich argues that honest tainly Meilinger is correct in claiming that directly at the new Service’s conception of study of the past should inform the impera- some in the Navy completely bought into its own identity in questioning the reputedly tives of the present—Meilinger’s article fits the unproven concept that the Service was demonstrable efficacy of airpower when the bill.1 But we are still left asking “why practically irrelevant (a bad word in times of armed with the right weapons (nuclear now?” On the face of it, as the last paragraph declining budgets) if it did not have a piece weapons and long-range bombers). Truman of the article makes clear, the occasion of the nuclear strategic bombing mission. bought into these ideas because they offered is the upcoming cutbacks in the Defense He also does an objective and fair job of a savings on defense—he trusted the profes- budget based on economic factors related showing that there were those in the Navy sionals to steer him correctly. Those profes- to the Federal budget deficit. If the past is who were dishonest about the problems of sionals were the generals of the Army and any guide, this dynamic tends to lead to a the B-36; they were misguided and even the Air Force—for most part they were from Service scramble over roles and missions unethical—but their fundamental claims the European theater of operations, where to maintain capabilities that all honestly about the B-36, as General George Kenney airpower had proved less than efficacious on believe serve the national security and inter- admitted (p. 93), had some merit. However, a number of occasions. est. However, a closer look reveals that the in using less-than-honorable methods these Meilinger brings up the inconvenient uniformed and civilian leadership of the Navy partisans poisoned the atmosphere truth of the Korean War and implies that Navy and Air Force seem institutionally and for a reasonable debate on Navy roles and it supports his case of poisoned Service strategically aligned with a concept entitled missions in the post–World War II security relationships: “The Revolt of the Admirals Air-Sea Battle. If the Air Force and Navy environment for the United States. But there caused a lingering ill will . . . the baleful (and maybe the Marine Corps) have found were other issues at stake as well. maladies that unification of the armed common cause, why introduce dissonance Nuclear strategic bombing did not forces was designed to correct. Worse still, into the “alliance”? allow for a range of responses across the less than a year later, the United States The real issue here is the narrative spectrum of war, and Admirals Chester would be at war in Korea.” To the contrary, over “unification.” This narrative has two Nimitz and Louis Denfeld both knew this Korea proved an education and validation primary versions, although it is the one being and trumpeted it in the period after World of what Denfeld and others had to say about addressed by Meilinger that most folks know War II. In his testimony, Denfeld clearly the roles and missions of the Navy. At the about or subscribe to. This first narrative made the case for spending on the Navy, not outbreak of the Korean War, the Navy sees unification of the Services as it was only based on a strategic bombing mission, had only one active aircraft carrier in the initiated by the Truman administration as but also for the following reasons: Western Pacific and only two other large a blessing—not an unmixed blessing, but a carriers available for the long deployment blessing nonetheless. After all, who can really As a result, there is a steady campaign to across the seas to the theater of operations.3 argue with the merits of Jominian unity of relegate the Navy to a convoy and antisubma- This theater comprised a peninsula jutting command, or unity of effort, or whatever? rine service, on the grounds that any probable between the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan that There is another school of thought, and I am enemy possesses only negligible fleet strength. lent itself particularly well to all the benefits clearly on record in this very journal as being This campaign results from a misunderstand- that “control of the sea—not as an end in a part of that school, that instead finds unifi- ing of the functions and capabilities of navies itself, but” as “national power [that] could be cation a mixed blessing at best—and perhaps and from the erroneous principle of the self- exerted against the enemy” could give. a curse (“Abolish the Office of Secretary of sufficiency of air power. . . . Fleets have never So why the article? Perhaps Meilinger’s Defense?” 4th Quarter 2007). in history met opposing fleets for any other goal here is to avoid having the U.S. Army
2 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu become the “odd man out” much in the way of another Service, and the Secretary of Unification was designed to smooth that happened to the U.S. Navy and Marine Defense. There is absolutely no excuse for relations between the Services and introduce Corps after World War II. If so, he has a that insubordination. None. It is irrelevant if nascent concepts of jointness—although that peculiar strategy using history as a case later events would seem to support some of term was not then used. In an effort to save study for doing it. If not, then what is his their contentions: there were other methods, scarce funds, duplication and overlap were purpose in conjuring up these “old ghosts”? less reprehensible, than spreading libelous to be eliminated. Modern war—as proved rumors against senior civilian and military abundantly in World War II—demanded —John T. Kuehn, Ph.D. leaders to make their case. That is the main joint command and cooperation. My Assistant Professor of Military argument of my article. comment (that is, the negative effect the History Regarding the B-36: it was not a great Revolt would have on the Korean War, U.S. Army Command and General airplane, but it was the best heavy bomber erupting less than a year after this unfortu- Staff College in the world at the time. Thankfully, it was nate public brawl) was that the two Services never needed for a war against the Soviet were extremely distrustful and leery of each Union, but those who flew it—and there are other. That is not the attitude one should notes countless testimonials from them—believed have when going off to war when coopera- that it would get through to its targets in tion and jointness in both deed and spirit are 1 Andrew J. Bacevich, “The Revisionist enemy territory with acceptable losses and so essential. Again, unification was intended Imperative: Rethinking Twentieth Century Wars,” The Journal of Military History 76, no. 2 fulfill the dictates of the national war plans. to avoid such divisiveness, but the Revolt (April 2012), 333–342. Its combination of speed, altitude, and elec- poisoned the waters. Even a cursory history 2 Jeffery G. Barlow, The Revolt of the Admi- tronic countermeasures—the last being of of the Korean War will show that the Navy rals (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, tremendous importance—convinced those and Air Force had difficulty cooperating 1994), 253 (emphasis in original). veterans that the B-36 would do the job. during the war, especially in air operations, 3 Jeffrey G. Barlow, From Hot War to Cold: Because it never went to war, the contentions and a large part of that difficulty was the The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, for and against the big bomber’s combat hangover resulting from the congressional 1945–1955 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, capabilities must remain conjecture. hearings. 2009), 257–258 and chapter 14, passim. Incidentally, small point, the Air Finally, regarding Professor Kuehn’s Force did not receive the bulk of Defense reference to the argument that minor Department funds in 1949 as Professor redundancies can sometimes be beneficial is Kuehn argues. That situation did not occur something that I have argued for quite some The author’s response to Dr. Kuehn—I until after the Korean War when President time. In my view, redundancy is the true thank Professor Kuehn for writing such a Dwight Eisenhower announced his stra- American way of war, or, put more cynically, serious letter regarding my article on the tegic policy of massive retaliation. I would indecision is the key to flexibility. Since the Revolt of the Admirals. His main concern note that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 1950s, all administrations have been unable seems to be the timing of the piece and of Staff at that time was Admiral Arthur to make tough decisions regarding priorities implies that there is some sort of agenda Radford. in national defense, so we buy everything. present on my part due to the recent rap- The claim that the Navy was later Fortunately, the United States has been prochement between the Navy and Air proved correct (the importance of seapower wealthy enough that it can afford to have Force. He implies that I am trying to scuttle in Korea) is the true non sequitur here. the world’s best Army, Navy, Marine Corps, that cooperation. Not at all. The timing No naval witnesses in the congressional Air Force, and special operations forces. is simply coincidental. The Naval History hearings that I can recall ever pushed the What a nightmare of capabilities that pres- Office sent me some material on the Revolt, concept of the Navy using its carriers to ents to a potential adversary! Saying that, and the idea had been rattling around in my carry out tactical airstrikes in a conven- however, is not the same thing as saying that head for some time before I finally was able tional, peripheral war. The argument that such redundancy is a blessing. Given our to sit down and write. If there is an issue Denfeld saw seapower as “national power astonishing deficit situation, spending $700 of timing involved, it concerns upcoming exerted against the enemy” is far too vague billion on defense each year might not be the Defense budget cuts; as noted, that is when to qualify as a prediction for naval/marine best use of taxpayer dollars. inter-Service rivalry most often rears its tactical airpower. The Sailors were no more Again, thanks to Professor Kuehn for ugly head. I hope that does not occur and prescient than Soldiers or Airmen when it his excellent letter. intended the piece as a warning against it. came to predicting what the next war would Thankfully, Professor Kuehn does not look like. I would note here that the B-29s —Phillip S. Meilinger try to defend the indefensible. The Navy of the Strategic Air Command played a hierarchy was outrageously out of bounds in significant role in Korea—a role that neither 1949, and no attempt at “push back” or talk General Curtis LeMay nor anyone else in the of fairness in the budget debates of the time military hierarchy anticipated. Necessity is can excuse their behavior. Some within the indeed the mother of invention—for all the Navy deliberately and maliciously slandered Services. the chief of another Service, the secretary ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 3 From the Chairman Sustaining Our Edge
he United States is the world’s acquisition paced to the challenge. It means place. If you want to get somewhere else, you preeminent military power, that we have to out-learn and out-think our must run at least twice as fast as that!” and we have a responsibility to adversaries. Theorists have used this story to illus- T maintain this decisive advan- To explore this context, I like British trate that a species, evolving alongside its tage. It’s good for us, and, frankly, I believe author Lewis Carroll’s 1871 classic Through competitors, must continually adapt just to it’s good for the world. But staying dominant the Looking-Glass. The Red Queen, a living maintain its relative fitness. doesn’t just happen. What we do today—and chess piece, discusses with Alice what it takes Today, in an increasingly connected and how we do it—may not be as successful in the to advance in the game. Alice runs alongside competitive global security environment, a context of tomorrow. To keep our edge, we the Queen faster and faster until exhausted. nation—and its military—must do the same. must place more emphasis on adapting the Stopping to rest, Alice is startled to find that That’s not to say that our force hasn’t force, investing in innovation, and getting the she is right where she started: “Why, I do been learning and adapting over the last people right. believe we’ve been under this tree all the time! decade—far from it. As members of the Everything’s just as it was!” profession of arms, we’re adaptable by nature. Adapting the Force “Of course it is,” said the Queen, “What We always find ways to accomplish the Adaptation is an institutional impera- would you have it?” mission. In a broader sense, our military has tive for the joint force. Military power in The exchange between Alice and been quite introspective about its perfor- the last century was defined largely by the Red Queen concludes: “Well, in our mance through 10 years of conflict and has numbers—artillery pieces, tanks, carri- country,” said Alice, still panting a little, continuously applied its hard-won lessons. ers, and warheads. Materiel will remain “you’d generally get to somewhere else if you However, the pace of change around the globe important, but our ability to adapt smartly ran very fast for a long time, as we’ve been is accelerating. Technology and capability from the military we have to the military doing.” are cascading to a wider set of middleweight we need will determine our future success. “A slow sort of country!” said the actors. The operational environment is That means focusing on agile organizational Queen. “Now, here, you see, it takes all the increasingly complex, competitive, and often frameworks, people over platforms, and running you can do, to keep in the same unpredictable. In response, we have to be agile enough to see ourselves within this new context, and adapt on a tighter cycle than ever before, in order to, as the Red Queen would say, “get somewhere else.” This requires us to sharpen the dis- DOD (D. Myles Cullen) course on our emerging concepts, doctrine, training, and leader development—under- scoring adaptation as an imperative across the board.
Investing in Innovation “The real use of gunpowder,” essayist Thomas Carlyle wrote, “is it makes all men tall.” As far as innovations go, few in previ- ous eras had as equalizing an effect. So I ask, what’s the next gunpowder? Wherever the next advances occur, we know the effects won’t be clearly predictable. To account for this uncertainty, we need to expand our concept of what innovation U.S. Airman speaks with Chairman at Naval Air Station Pensacola means. Innovation is about new stuff and new
4 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu DOD (D. Myles Cullen)
Chairman receives brief on capabilities of Apache Block III aircraft during visit to Fort Riley, Kansas
ideas. We must prioritize innovation not only a wider plane—that we think beyond and and training across the force. As a learn- in our material solutions, but also in our war through traditional dividing lines. This means ing institution, we also need to push to do fighting concepts, organizational constructs, deeper relationships and collaboration among it better, smarter, and faster in relevant and and relationships. the Services, academia, the interagency com- realistic ways. It’s particularly important that Historically, advances in these areas munity, industry, and partner nations around we get it right as our men and women spend during interwar and drawdown eras were the world. longer times in the home station environment. possible because we were obligated to iden- Getting the people right also means tify clear needs, prioritize resources, and Getting the People Right supporting those who support our force. Our leverage emergent technologies. A period The Red Queen coached Alice by military families and communities sustain of transition and tighter resources doesn’t running alongside her and understood, the strength and readiness of the all-volunteer signal the end of innovation. Rather, it can instinctively perhaps, that people matter most. force. How we take care of them and how we and should promote creative and collabora- If there is a single dimension in which we honor our commitments say much about what tive thinking. must prevail to sustain our edge, it’s getting we stand for as a profession and as a nation. America is built on innovation. We the people right. People are the strength of We should remember that our future force is must reinforce a military culture that reflects our military and our nation’s greatest strategic watching. They will have a big part to play in and taps into this dynamic society—one that asset. Their leadership is what will enable us sustaining our edge, too. fosters and rewards innovation at all levels, to adapt and innovate effectively. Alice never finished her race. We have a and leverages private-sector networks in We must continue to trust our men responsibility to the American people, and to mutually reinforcing ways. and women at the edge of our formations, to the world, to continue running ours—twice as Along these lines, we must choose challenge them, and to leverage their talents fast. JFQ resource strategies that are not only innovative and experiences. We must make sure they and collaborative but also affordable. In my continue to be the best led, best trained, and MARTIN E. DEMPSEY view, strategy insensitive to resources is rheto- best equipped in the world. General, U.S. Army ric. Global responsibilities, ongoing conflicts, This means we need to make sure our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and aging weapons systems—coupled with leaders can effectively reconcile context, tighter budgets—only reinforce that reality. uncertainty, and surprise. It requires us to This further underscores that we lean develop our Servicemembers with an unprec- forward in how we invest in and cultivate edented degree of versatility. relationships. The future of global security We need to promote and emphasize requires us to approach our challenges on these characteristics in leader development
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 5 Bridging the Basics
By Bryan B. Battaglia
n the last issue of JFQ, I provided some ronment similar to the one that we are about Operation Iraqi Freedom and post–Opera- thoughts and observations on the ebb to return to—a moderately concentrated tion Enduring Freedom) in a similar garrison and flow of the bands of readiness and regimented garrison way of life. Back to environment that we, in some cases, have (individual and unit). It described some basics is used to employ the return of some already reentered. I Before we jump back in time, let us differences with soldiering in a predominantly “old school” methods of operating, leader- garrison environment compared to a decade ship 101, basic training principles, practices, take a quick look through a different lens, the of military life in a back-and-forth deployed behaviors, and a culture that we know receiving end—that is, a young enlisted force. or combat/field setting—a lifestyle and envi- works—because it worked for us (that is, the For example, when I told a noncommissioned ronment that a large majority of our force has older generation). We had basics instilled into officer, “Sergeant, we’re going to go back to been shouldering since the winter of 2001. It is our daily regimen and way of soldiering that the basics,” his reply was, “Sergeant Major, no secret that our enduring deployment cycle were effective then and, in some cases, can whose basics are you referring to? Back to your and focus on current conflicts have caused still be effective today. During the 1980s and basics? I have no idea what those basics are. some degradation and receding of core com- 1990s, our military became extremely profi- Are my ways that jacked up that we need to go petencies and skill sets, impacting traditional cient in garrison survival (daily operations), back to yours?” roles, missions, and even methods of operat- field exercises, and rotational peacetime-like As we throw around this phrase, what ing. Said another way, the heavy emphasis deployments. Quite frankly, garrison life does it imply? First, it implies that the older on prepping for the next deployment has enabled us to rebuild on a solid foundation ways, methods, practices, and leadership provided misalignment to some of the simple through persistent repetition of what I would were much more effective in that era than tenets of soldiering and survival in an other- describe as key tenets of soldiering and fine- today. It implies, too, that the basics, practices, wise extended garrison or unit setting. tuning within a disciplined military lifestyle. methods of operating, and soldiering used These realities, along with our ongoing Over time, these old school basics by today’s generation of Servicemembers challenges of military life, equate to a buzz developed and shaped a fighting force in are falling short of the mark. It implies that phrase that has recently resonated across the proficiencies such as advanced tactics, law we are returning a younger generation (the force. I suspect you have heard it already: back of land warfare, code of conduct, field craft, majority of our force) to a place that they have to the basics. Coined by someone, the phrase barracks/dormitory inspections, march- already been, but in reality they have not been has taken on several meanings with regard to ing, weapons-handling, gear accountability and they cannot go. As a 33-year military reintegration, readiness, military standards, drills, knee-to-knee counseling, physical professional, there are some basics that I and so forth. I will be the first to admit that fitness, professional development, drill and grew up with that were in fact quite effective, it is certainly a catchy phrase. And since its ceremonies, and other fundamental areas but I certainly would not reintroduce them beginning, it has indeed taken on momentum. that are crucial to maintaining relevancy, as applicable methods now. Indeed, we can However, I would like to inject through every resiliency, proficiency, and good order and return our troops to the basics, but it must be Servicemember, command, and military discipline. Actually, I believe that on the blended with their version, their style. Words family that merely going “back to the basics” heels of the Vietnam War, the garrison do mean something, and while I do not com- does not accurately or totally offer a holistic (military/unit/daily) life we maintained pletely disagree that there is value in going glide path to retuning our all-volunteer force. paid significant dividends in preparation back to basics, the concept in general is linear and readiness for our military to defend the and half-baked. “Back to the Basics” Is an Incomplete Nation today. Concept So no argument there—the basics “Bridging the Basics” Makes More Like me, a significant number of senior did work for us during that time, yet that Sense leaders in uniform today grew up in an envi- was a time and place practically devoid of There are many methods, practices, technology. Some remain convinced that if and technologies used by today’s military we simply return to the basics in the areas professionals that we, an older generation, are Sergeant Major Bryan B. Battaglia, USMC, is the I describe above—basics that we lived and still attempting to catch up to. Today’s basics Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman of the Joint breathed during the post–Vietnam era—we can streamline efforts, stimulate innovative Chiefs of Staff and Senior Noncommissioned Officer could effectively ride on the crest of the wave thought, produce savings, offer quicker access in the U.S. Armed Forces. in this forthcoming enduring life (post– inside enemy decision cycles, save lives, create
6 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu rapid reach back, and in many cases generate we are back in the garrison at home station/ to a higher probability of saving life, limb, and better results. We cannot afford to replace port, any free time is precious, and to some eyesight of our wounded Servicemembers. today’s basics with yesterday’s more primitive it should not be wasted on items that can be Moreover, with today’s medics and doctors, ones. We would be consistently challenged in accomplished with the touch of a button on their innovative thinking, coupled with keeping pace with soldierly advancement and the computer. We should remind ourselves, technology, has allowed us to advance the res- adversarial threats. however, that leadership and the welfare of toration of life from the first responder at the I think examples help to define the the force is more about problem preventing point of injury to the stateside medical treat- message, so what follows are administra- than it is about problem solving. Review of the ment facility. Again, this is a prime example of tive and operational examples that should LES allowed leaders to help shape and make bridging the basics. explain where older methods still hold value decisions rather than just react to them, all I do agree that we should bring back and, when bridged with today, can be made in the best interest of the Servicemember and some of the shelved garrison-shaped methods better and more relevant. During the 1980s, his or her family. Regardless of the environ- and basics of soldiering to bridge our force our Leave and Earnings Statement (LES) ment, this is leader engagement; it worked in this postconflict period. Warfare does was delivered in hardcopy through the back then and can work now—and it can remain fundamentally a human endeavor. chain of command down to the individual work even better using today’s technology of Technology and its gravitational pull cannot owner. Monthly and timed with the section/ the online LES. Therefore, you see this is not be viewed as a panacea, so in deterring and company training schedule, before anyone just back to the basics as much as it is bridging defeating our adversaries, we must remain was given his LES, the sergeant or first ser- the basics. leader-centric, technology-enabled and -fos- geant, as a normal obligation in his duties and An operational example is combat casu- tered through decentralization of command, responsibilities, sat down with each member alty care. Medical and field triage practices control, and execution. So let’s focus our of the unit and went through the LES, line by and casualty care used decades ago are still efforts more on bridging the basics of yes- line. This was common practice for everyone. applicable and in use today. For instance, terday with today to make a better force of It empowered the noncommissioned officer/ something as basic as the four lifesaving tomorrow—Joint Force 2020. Everyone, from section leader in leadership abilities, practi- steps—start the breathing, stop the bleeding, the E-1 to O-10, in this profession of arms has cal training, and gave him insights into the protect the wound, treat for shock—remain ownership and responsibility in how our force lives of those who worked for him. It gave us unchanged. Yet today’s medical profession- sustains itself. This makes us all a part of the subordinates lessons in budget and finance. als—our corpsmen, doctors, and medics— challenge, but, more importantly, it makes us This basic practice provided an invaluable have developed practices and policies leading all part of the solution. JFQ skill of deciphering arguably one of the most important pieces of paper I ever received as I grew through the ranks. Moreover, the practice happened systemically as it was built into the training schedule. The LES was merely the tool that provided the face-to-face engagement, but that piece of paper created active leadership engagement, which ended in U.S. Army (D. Myles Cullen) financial education, knee-to-knee counsel- ing, and leader confirmation that troops were tracking okay or needed assistance. There was no group setting or even communication through electrons for that meeting—it was face to face. As you know, Servicemembers now receive an electronic LES, courtesy of tech- nology that saves time and money, but this advancement has led to the degradation of leader to subordinate face-to-face interaction. In fact, since this basic leadership practice has been shelved, we find many of today’s Servicemembers disapproving in discussing their personal finances with their supervi- sors, considering it nothing short of an egregious invasion of privacy. The basic skill of reading one’s LES is no longer considered a priority, lost in the battle for free time and privacy during those “down times” or periods Program manager for Center for the Intrepid explains how CAREN, the Computer-Assisted Rehabilitation of platoon sergeants time. Of course, while Environment simulator, works to General George W. Casey, Jr., at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 7 Executive Summary
s the often quoted Chinese often difficult but necessary. To make these the seemingly emotionally charged discus- proverb says, we do indeed hard choices, I am networked with a large sion of missile defense in Europe where he live in interesting times. As number of experts in a wide range of fields explores Russian thinking and presents an Athis edition goes to press, the who readily offer their opinions and advice important data analysis on this strategic fiscal difficulties of the government remain on what issues to keep an eye on. From our issue. In a time when everything related to unresolved, along with the question of how faculty, students, and researchers here at the national security is being viewed through the this situation will impact the Armed Forces. National Defense University to our Editorial lens of shrinking budgets, Ward Wilson next A number of senior military officer mistakes Board members and experts from across aca- offers an alternative historical interpreta- have grabbed the headlines. A brief but demia and the U.S. Government, we receive tion of the events at the end of the war in the violent exchange of lethal fires between Israel world-class support identifying and deliver- Pacific: the decision to drop atomic weapons and Hamas resulted in death and destruction ing the best available writing on issues that on Japan and the resulting logic that placed on both sides. A ceasefire negotiated by the matter to the joint force. nuclear weapons at the center of the inter- participants with involvement by the United One solid indicator of the quality of national security system. Mr. Wilson asks States seems to be holding. The People’s our articles is that Google Scholar recently the reader to reconsider the value of nuclear Republic of China held its once-a-decade identified JFQ as the 13th most quoted weapons to our security. In a different time swap out of national leadership. These are national security journal in the last 5 years. and circumstance in Japan, the United States indeed interesting times. At the heart of this journal is our team here was on scene to help our ally respond to a As editor of JFQ, I find myself well at NDU Press. While we may be “resource different kind of mass casualty event. Cap- positioned to help readers sort through these challenged” in the months and years ahead, turing significant lessons for future disaster events and other related issues. We receive the dedication and professionalism of the relief efforts, Suzanne Basalla, William a fairly large amount of submissions for folks you see on our masthead will not fail to Berger, and C. Spencer Abbot provide a review. Given that these authors have taken produce the Chairman’s journal, JFQ. detailed look into how security assistance the time to discuss both well-known and This issue’s Forum offers four impor- was used to respond to Japan’s needs follow- not-so-well-known issues, selecting the best tant topics at the strategic level. Returning ing the 2010 “triple disaster” of an earth- work both in terms of writing and content is contributor Stephen Cimbala goes beyond quake, tsunami, and catastrophic failure of
U.S. Coastguardsman with Hurricane Sandy Pollution Response Unified Command assesses environmental effects of hurricane DOD (Andrew Ksenzulak) DOD (Andrew
8 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu a nuclear facility. Responding to the Chair- man’s White Paper on Mission Command, Kathleen Conley lastly suggests how the military can effectively shape this theory into actual capability focusing on command and control issues. Our Special Feature presents a group of articles that highlights potential options to U.S. Marine Corps (David A. Perez) deal with defense reform in light of ongoing budgetary challenges and suggests how best to adapt to emerging innovative capabilities in cyber and human terrain intelligence. Placing second in the 2012 Secretary of Defense National Security Essay competi- tion, Ryan Allen identifies the need to reduce the Department of Defense (DOD) to balance national elements of power and to prevent strategic overreach. Continuing the theme of how to address austerity going forward (echoing 2011 Defense Business Board recommendations), Jon Sunderland Marine with Combined Anti-Armor Team looks through rifle combat optic during satellite patrol along poppy discusses the need to reform military pen- field in Marjah, Afghanistan. sions. With reduced resources, military staffs—which John Price next suggests have seen little change from Napoleon’s time— Three ongoing challenges in the strate- Operation Planning. Along with this doctrine will have to seek improvements in how they gic environment are examined in Features. discussion, we offer three valuable book are organized to deal with future challenges As the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghani- reviews that should help enhance your pro- effectively. Adding to our continuing discus- stan approaches, John O’Connell outlines fessional reading and education. sion on cyber, Jan Kallberg and Bhavani the issues that need to be analyzed in order One of the enduring lessons I have from Thuraisingham then provide an interesting to achieve a regional solution to the conflict my early military career is the fact that every suggestion on how our universities can better after more than a decade of U.S. operations. issue or challenge, whether new or enduring, support the national security challenge of Helping us widen our global scan of secu- presents an opportunity to overcome and cyber defense. rity issues, Chang Kwoun Park and Victor move ahead. Each new or enduring challenge In Commentary, John Mattox offers Utgoff reaffirm the value and outline steps will be interesting until it is overcome. JFQ a means to critically evaluate DOD and to enhance U.S. extended deterrence for the will do its best to continue to identify both Service value statements and their continu- Republic of Korea. Taking second place in challenges and potential solutions as long as ing importance. Reed Bonadonna then takes the 2012 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of we live in interesting times. JFQ us back to one of the seminal military profes- Staff Strategic Research Paper competition, sional handbooks for the post–World War Marc Koehler provides an in-depth review —William T. Eliason, Editor II era, the 1950 version of The Armed Forces of the impact of the events and aftermath of Officer. He wrote his review far in advance 9/11 on the People’s Republic of China. of several high-profile senior officer ethical In examining a particular episode in falls from grace, but now provides a useful what is probably the largest conflict in terms discussion of the basic “rules of the road” for of loss of life and displaced populations military professionals. Next, placing second since 1945, this issue’s Recall takes us to in the 2012 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 1998 Africa. Detailing military operations Staff Strategic Article competition, Houston some 4 years after the horrendous events Cantwell draws a line from reduced risks we all remember in Rwanda, James Stejskal of traditional lethal force that drone strikes recounts the initial successes and even- offer through the negative impact that the tual failure of a bold operation led by the strikes have on U.S. foreign policy. Looking Rwandan army aimed at regime change in back on the conflict in Libya that ousted neighboring Congo. Muammar Qadhafi, W.A. Brown and Brent To close out this issue, we have an Coryell detail important aspects of the logis- interesting article on joint planning. Dale tics support from both U.S. and international Eikmeier revisits operational design and allies and partners that made the operation the problematic concept of center of gravity successful. as presented in Joint Publication 5-0, Joint ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 9 NATO (Thorsten Bohlman) NATO
SACEUR and Chairman of NATO military committee visit missile defense exhibition Russia and European Missile Defenses Reflexive Reset?
By Stephen J. Cimbala
he U.S.-Russian “reset” the Russian government and military leader- reach agreement with the United States and appeared to be in free fall in ship on missile defenses and nuclear arms NATO over the future of missile defenses in December 2011 as a result of control is driven by realistic fears and/or Europe.1 Accusing the United States and the T both foreign and domestic resistant forces in Russian domestic politics. Alliance of undermining Russia’s security, policy issues that had dampened enthusiasm It then discusses the possibility that aspects Medvedev censured Washington for its for further momentum. Among the forces of Russian public diplomacy on missile unwillingness to provide a legal guarantee resisting progress on nuclear arms control defenses consist of a “reflexive control” or that the Obama administration’s European was the issue of missile defenses. The fol- other influence operation, directed at both Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to Euro- lowing discussion examines European (and foreign and domestic audiences. The article pean missile defenses would not be directed other) missile defenses from the Russian then performs data analysis to determine the against Russia.2 The outgoing Russian presi- perspective, with obvious implications for viability of Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear dent presumably spoke with the approval current and future U.S. and North Atlantic deterrents, including scenarios that assume of the current prime minister and probable Treaty Organization (NATO) policies. The antimissile defenses are available. future president Vladimir Putin. article first considers whether the outlook of Facing an imminent election in Russia Russian Rethinking that might have prompted his tougher line Medvedev Stokes Fears. On November with respect to national security issues, Dr. Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor 23, 2011, then–Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev outlined a number of responsive of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State Medvedev issued a somber address in which measures that Russia would take if the United University–Brandywine. he declared that Russia had been unable to States and NATO continued to stiff Russia
10 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu CIMBALA on missile defense talks. First, Russia would to meet exigent and prospective threats to include use of the media and other sources develop capabilities for “the destruction of its security from conflicts near or within its to influence public and leadership opinion information and control means of the missile borders, including terrorist attacks.8 Besides in other countries and in one’s own state. defense system” deployed in Europe, meaning, growing a more professional military for low- In addition to these two major categories of in plain English, cyberwar. Second, the protec- and mid-intensity wars, Russia must prepare information operations, one might argue tion of Russian facilities for strategic nuclear for a world in which major powers and others for a separate and specifically “cyber” aspect weapons and launchers would be increased. can exploit the information highway for mili- including “the use of military and surrogate Third, nuclear strategic ballistic missiles tary purposes.9 As Jacob W. Kipp has noted: computers to disrupt command and control” would be equipped with new countermea- in countries in conflict with Russia.15 Timothy sures to overcome U.S. and NATO ballistic If the strategic nuclear arsenals have been the L. Thomas, U.S. expert on Russian informa- missile defenses. Fourth, Russia might deploy backbone of deterrence and strategic stability tion warfare, explains: advanced attack systems in its western and for the last half century, it appears that they southern districts capable of striking elements are no longer sufficient to set the general line If an information warfare element under con- of the U.S. and NATO missile defense system, of relations in part because of the reduced sideration is a machine-driven, data-proces- including Iskander ground-to-ground missiles threat perceptions of each side, but also sor component (computers, sensors, satellites, in the Kaliningrad exclave.3 Fifth, Russia might because other military capabilities have taken reconnaissance-strike systems, etc.) then the suspend further cooperation on arms control on greater importance.10 category under consideration is information- and disarmament, and, according to Medve- technical. Electronic warfare would also be dev, “There might be grounds for our country These other military capabilities an element in this field. If the IO element to withdraw from the New START [Strategic include, according to Dr. Kipp, nonstrategic is a human-based, data processor compo- Arms Reduction Treaty].”4 As Medvedev nuclear weapons, missile defenses, con- nent (the brain, which can be influenced or spoke, doubtless the Russian General Staff was ventional systems for prompt, long-range manipulated by propaganda, psychotronics, loading his PowerPoint file with even more offensive strikes, and military transformation nonlethal weapons, or special pharmaceuti- talking points for future briefings. in conventional armed forces driven by devel- cals according to the Russian paradigm), then Although it was apparent that some opments in C4ISR (command, control, com- the issue under consideration is information- of Medvedev’s rhetoric was intended for munications, computers, intelligence, surveil- psychological. Thus, psychological operations domestic political consumption, it would lance, and reconnaissance).11 The United (PSYOPS) are an element of this field.16 be mistaken to infer that his démarche was States, having mastered the information tech- mainly or entirely campaign fodder. Russia’s nology revolution and applied it to military Of course, the actual conduct of military political and military leaders have, from their affairs in the most comprehensive manner, operations or the prewar management of perspective, genuine security needs and con- has arguably provided its commanders the crises can involve both aspects of informa- cerns that are evoked by the U.S. and NATO military-strategic equivalent of a trump card tion operations as defined above. The point missile defense plans.5 For example, although in information-based warfare. The Russian is to understand why and how Russia might the Duma had previously cautioned against military leadership has also sought to exploit be using what the United States would call jettisoning the entire reset process over the electronic spectrum and cyberspace for “influence operations” or the Russians missile defenses, the first deputy chairman of military advantage, as Russia’s war against information-psychological operations to com- the Duma’s foreign affairs committee, Leonid Georgia in August 2008 demonstrated. In that pensate for military-technical deficiencies in Slutsky, warned of inevitable connections: conflict, attacks on Georgian government and hardware, software, and command-control- other Web sites appeared to have been well communications “connectivity.” The biggest success of this new chapter in coordinated with Russian kinetic force opera- If Russia is sincerely concerned about Russian-U.S. relations was the signing of tions, including suspiciously coincidental the possibility of U.S. full-spectrum domi- the New START treaty. But this treaty links timing of starts and stops in activity.12 nance by means of offensive and defensive strategic offensive weapons to missile defense. In addition, Russian military thinking force modernization, network-centric warfare, But the American administration, acting in about information operations (IO) and infor- and enhanced C4ISR, then it follows that Rus- circumvention of all agreements, is now trying mation warfare is quite sophisticated and has sia’s better strategic moves include both dip- to deploy systems near Russian borders that roots in Soviet-era discussions of topics such lomatic forestalling and manipulation, as well threaten our strategic nuclear deterrence as electronic warfare, reconnaissance-strike as substantial investment in military modern- forces.6 complexes, and camouflage and concealment, ization. However, Russia needs to nest these among other subjects.13 Russian military forestalling-manipulation and modernization Additional Challenges for Russia. In writers distinguish between the information- initiatives within a broader geostrategic and addition to the relationship between nuclear technical and the information-psychological diplomatic strategy that fits into present, and offensive retaliatory forces and antimis- aspects of warfare and military operations.14 arguably future, reality. sile strategic defenses, there is the fact that Information-technical aspects have to do with Reflexive Control? An undiplomatic strategic nuclear deterrence per se is but one equipping the force with digital products and finger-pointing by Putin against Secretary element in the Russian geopolitical security neutralizing the enemy’s information systems of State Hillary Clinton over demonstrations calculus.7 Russia faces the need to modern- by means of electronic, cybernetic, or kinetic in Russia in December 2011 was an obvious ize its conventional military forces in order attacks. Information-psychological aspects effort at distraction and buck-passing.17 But it ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 11 Forum | Russia and European Missile Defenses also contained elements of disinformation and the conclusion of the New START treaty on detection, threat assessment, and choice of misdirection familiar to students of Cold War strategic nuclear arms reductions signed by response. NATO has demurred at this pro- Soviet military and intelligence practice. The Medvedev and President Barack Obama, posal, preferring to have separately operated concept of reflexive control appeared in Soviet European missile defenses have remained a and maintained U.S.-NATO and Russian military literature decades ago, referring to a serious bone of contention since 2007. This is BMD systems that cooperate in selected means of conveying to another actor specially so regardless of the uncertain technological areas, including a joint data center and shared prepared information that would induce him capabilities of the proposed European missile information about missile warning. Russia “to voluntarily make the predetermined deci- defenses as first proposed by George W. Bush has responded that, unless satisfied on this sion desired by the initiator of the action.”18 and then revised by President Obama.21 issue of joint participation in BMD, and According to Thomas, reflexive control can The reflexive control aspects of Medve- unless reassured that planned NATO BMD be used against either human-mental or dev’s and others’ opposition to U.S. and NATO interceptors are no prospective threat to its computer-based decisionmaking processors. European missile defenses include efforts to nuclear deterrent, Russia will take responsive Reflexive control is similar to the U.S. concept influence their government leaderships and measures unfriendly to the United States and of “perceptions management” although it public opinions in favor of either delaying or NATO (as enumerated previously). emphasizes control more than management of reconsidering the European missile defenses. Russia’s demand for a legal guarantee the target audience.19 A form of this message directed at Europeans that the European PAA missile defenses Putin’s placement of blame on Secretary partakes of intimidation. Russia threatens to system is not aimed at Russia seems to con- Clinton for demonstrations in Russia, unusu- move nuclear-capable missile strike forces tradict its expressed desire to share in the ally personal by normal diplomatic standards, closer to the locations of proposed missile management and operation of a European- had a reflexive control aspect for not only defense installations. In addition, Russia might wide BMD system. The apparent contradic- domestic but also foreign audiences, includ- withdraw from the Intermediate Nuclear tion is reduced if we assume that both the ing Americans. The Russian prime minister Forces Treaty and be free to deploy longer- demand for legal guarantees and the demand was raising the cacophony bar, but in support range missiles pointed at NATO Europe for for shared operation of the European BMD of a familiar theme for his administration: the first time since the 1980s. Russia’s threat of system together constitute an example of Russian sovereignty imperiled by foreign possible withdrawal from New START and fol- “nested” reflexive control—one pointed at the sources, including nongovernmental organi- low-on negotiations spikes the blood pressure diplomatic level and the other at the military- zations working in Russia and international of not only U.S. advocates for nuclear arms technical level of U.S. and NATO decision- media stories unsympathetic to Russia or to reductions but also Europeans who might feel making. As to the first, at the diplomatic Putin. The sensitivity of Russian leaders on this point has been especially pronounced since the Rose and Orange revolutions in Russia’s concept of shared operations and control over European Georgia and Ukraine, respectively, and, more missile defenses differs markedly from the NATO version recently, Russia’s war with Georgia in 2008. Putin’s managed democracy or authoritarian capitalism, however one prefers to define it, unprotected in the midst of a revived U.S.- level, the Obama administration has already is threatened by the very existence of grass- Russia nuclear arms race. These and other indicated its willingness to provide reassur- roots dissidence on a large scale, especially messages about nuclear arms control and ing political statements to Russian leaders, if it escalates into an Arab Spring in Russia missile defenses are intended to separate ranks indicating that the European missile defense per the 2011 uprisings in North Africa and within NATO as to the desirability or feasibil- system is intended to deflect attacks from the Middle East. Thus, Putin’s pointer at ity of missile defenses and further nuclear so-called rogue states such as Iran and North Secretary Clinton was also a warning to arms reductions, including proposals for Korea, not from Russia. More than this, the domestic opponents not to push too far reducing the numbers of Russian and NATO United States has also invited Russia to send against the regime, despite its oligarchic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe. observers to missile test launches to verify authoritarian tendencies. The Russian prime In addition to sticks with respect that SM-3 interceptor missiles lack the perfor- minister reiterated the same theme during his to Russian messages on missile defenses, mance envelopes to threaten Russia’s strategic televised call-in show marathon of December the Kremlin has offered carrots. The most nuclear deterrent. Reportedly, U.S. officials 15, 2011, during which he noted that color obvious carrot was Russia’s expressed inter- have indicated a willingness to share some of revolutions “are special schemes to destabilize est in joining NATO in the construction and the technical specifications of the SM-3 with society” and added that Russian opposition operation of an all-European missile defense Russia, although Republicans in Congress activists were trained under Viktor Yush- system, a principle endorsed by NATO at its have threatened to oppose this idea.22 chenko, former president of Ukraine.20 Lisbon summit in 2010. However, Russia’s Despite these apparent overtures of U.S. In the same fashion, Russian political concept of shared operations and control over cooperation, Russia has insisted on legal guar- leaders’ fulminations against U.S. missile European missile defenses differs markedly antees against the European missile shield defense plans for Europe have a reflexive from the NATO version. Russia wants an inte- being pointed at Russia, although: control quality for domestic and international grated ballistic missile defense (BMD) system audiences, including the United States and with overlapping Russian and NATO compo- ■■ such a legal guarantee would be mean- NATO. Despite the U.S.-Russian reset and nents and shared control over missile launch ingless in the face of uncertain technology
12 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu CIMBALA developments in missile defenses, including the possible improvement in interceptor that, if the United States should decide to Nevertheless, worst cases have a way velocities, sensors, and battle management and field missile defense systems against Russian of becoming standard talking points in command and control nuclear weapons, those defenses would be the Kremlin, depending on the prevail- ■■ Russia would be shooting itself in deployed in the United States, not in Europe, ing winds in domestic politics. Just now, the foot if it withdrew from the New START on account of the physical principles of missile these winds are pushing in the direction agreement over disagreements about missile interception that make it “easier and better to of more open political discontent against defenses, since New START enables Russia to approach an incoming missile from the oppo- Putin as an icon and against Putin’s form preserve an image of nuclear-strategic parity site side than it is to try to chase it down.”24 of managed democracy combined with with the United States without the expense of However, the command-control and oligarchic capitalism. This is not a sup- an open-ended offensive nuclear arms race political decisionmaking aspects of PAA are portive political milieu for NATO-Russia ■■ departing New START and declaring more complicated than that. EPAA capa- rapprochement over nuclear arms control, arms control dead because of BMD would bilities will support U.S. obligations to the nonproliferation, or missile defenses. Both deprive Russia of important diplomatic defense of NATO as required under Article Russian and American political establish- and military-technical windows into U.S. 5. But these capabilities will also be used to ments will be tempted toward hunker- policy planning and defense modernization, support U.S. forces deployed overseas and, down, bunker-down reflexes in which they including performance enhancements in with respect to the fourth phase of EPAA will be controlling themselves and their missile defense and offensive nuclear force evolution, U.S. homeland defense. As Daniel domestic political opponents more than modernization. Goure has explained: they will succeed in controlling or influ- encing others. The other aspect of Russian participa- This means that in some instances the EPAA Notwithstanding these toxic political tion with NATO in a European-wide missile will operate under NATO’s direction and waters, analysis can contribute to the modi- defense system is the suspicion on the part rules of engagement but in others will be fication of excesses in political prognostica- of Russia that the European PAA system is under direct U.S. command and control. tion and in military forecasting. merely a part of the eventual, and perhaps When—or if—phase four capabilities are inevitable, U.S. global missile defense system deployed to Europe, for the first time since Analysis that would be capable of nullifying Russia’s ballistic missile defenses were deployed in the In the analysis that follows, we gener- nuclear deterrent. Therefore, Russia wants 1960s, the defense of the homeland against ate hypothetical, but not unreasonable, to monitor the technical characteristics of ballistic missile attack will rely, at least in strategic nuclear forces for the United States the NATO European missile shield in order part, on interceptors fired from outside the and for Russia that are within New START to devise countermeasures, when and if the United States.25 guidelines and counting rules for deployed system evolves into something approaching a weapons and launchers, circa 2018–2020.27 global Leviathan that would give the United Russia’s need for reassurances against In the figures that follow, we summarize the States a preclusive first-strike capability against U.S. and NATO missile defenses is based on results of nuclear force exchanges between Russia or any other nuclear weapons state. This fear of evolving U.S. offensive and defen- sive force modernization combining to estab- Russia fears that conventional prompt global strike systems lish an American departure from U.S.-Russian could be used as first strike weapons against other states’ nuclear-strategic parity, or the impression of nuclear or conventional forces nuclear-strategic parity, is as much a politi- cal as a military-technical preoccupation for Russia. The same concern motivates Russia’s worst-case analysis relative to the ability of the United States and Russia under four objections to U.S. conventional prompt global Russia to maintain its image as a great power. operational conditions for New START strike systems: Russia fears that conventional The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has compliant forces with a peacetime deploy- prompt global strike systems could be used acknowledged many technical challenges ment limit of 1,550 nuclear warheads on as first strike weapons against other states’ standing in the way of completing all four intercontinental launchers and for a smaller nuclear or conventional forces, backed up by phases of the EPAA plan, including the pos- force with a maximum limit of 1,000 war- expanded and improved American continental sibility that the MDA will have to design an heads. The four operational conditions for and worldwide missile defenses. entirely new missile for the SM-3 IIB variant, second strike retaliation are: U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder together with a new launch system. And each indicated in December 2011 that U.S. and phase of EPAA will require improvements ■■forces are on generated alert and NATO plans for European missile defenses in space-based and airborne sensors as well launched on warning (Gen/LOW) would go forward with or without Russia. as in battle management and command and ■■forces are on generated alert and According to Ambassador Daalder, Russian control systems.26 Progress in technology riding out the attack (Gen/RO) concerns were not as important as the development also assumes consistent funding ■■forces are on day-to-day alert and accelerating Iranian missile threat: “We’re from Congress, an uncertainty within the launched on warning (Day/LOW) deploying all four phases [of the EPAA] in prevailing U.S. political climate of reducing ■■forces are on day-to-day alert and order to deal with that threat.”23 He added deficits and shrinking defense budgets. riding out the attack (Day/RO). ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 13 62_Cimbala Fig 1
Forum | Russia and European Missile Defenses Figure 1: U.S.-Russia Surviving and Retaliating Warheads New START Deployments Figure 1. U.S.-Russia Surviving and Retaliating Warheads New START Deployments
Russian Balance Triad 1,550
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Figure 2. U.S.-Russia Surviving and Retaliating Warheads 1,000 Deployment Limit Figure 2. U.S.-Russia Surviving and Retaliating Warheads 1,000 Deployment Limit
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14 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu 62_Cimbala Fig. 3
CIMBALA
Figure 3. U.S.-Russia Surviving and Retaliating Warheads vs. Defenses New START Deployments Figure 3. U.S.-Russia Surviving and Retaliating Warheads vs. Defenses New START Deployment
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0.00 Phase IV Phase III Phase II Phase I Phase IV Phase III Phase II Phase I U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Russian Russian Russian Russian Defenses Defenses Defenses Defenses Defenses Defenses Defenses Defenses Series1 81.05 162.10 243.15 324.20 122.29 244.58 366.87 489.17 Figure 4. U.S.-Russia Surviving and REtaliating Warheads vs. Defenses 1,000 Deployment Limit
Figure 4. U.S.-Russia Surviving and Retaliating Warheads vs. Defenses 1,000 Deployment Limit
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0.00 Phase IV Phase III Phase II Phase I Phase IV Phase III Phase II Phase I U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Russian Russian Russian Russian Defenses Defenses Defenses Defenses Defenses Defenses Defenses Defenses Series1 73.12 146.24 219.37 292.49 73.67 147.34 221.02 294.69 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 15 Forum | Russia and European Missile Defenses
Figure 1 summarizes the outcomes for out the attack are limited to several tens ping the New START ceilings on deployed the 1,550 weapon deployment limit. Figure of surviving and retaliating weapons, but warheads from 1,550 to 1,000 for each state 2 provides similar information for the 1,000 Russian forces in a crisis will be alerted so this creates a behavior space for launching a warhead limit.28 For the sake of complete- finding is an improbable worst case for them. tiered multilateral nonproliferation regime ness in analysis, the results for U.S. and On the other hand, if either the United States among existing nuclear powers.31 Russian balanced triad force structures are or Russia deployed advanced missile defenses As for missile defenses, allowing compared with the outcomes for alternative in sufficient numbers to shift this equation, regional or continental missile defenses to force structures for each state.29 stable deterrence could be placed at risk—or, become incubators of distrust or gridlock, as The results summarized in figures 1 at least, the political perception of it.30 between Russian and U.S. or NATO negotia- and 2 show that the United States and Russia tors, is politically shortsighted and militarily can fulfill the requirements for stable deter- Conclusions unjustified. The performances of future rence based on assured retaliation at, or even There is nothing necessary or inevi- missile defenses are guesswork on a good below, New START deployment ceilings. In table about the backsliding in the reset in day (including in this article). Their political either case, sufficient numbers of surviving U.S.-Russia relations, including the poten- effects are at least two-sided. First, they can and retaliating warheads exist to destroy tial for additional strategic nuclear arms support deterrence by denial by making it unacceptable numbers of the first striker’s reductions. The United States and Russia more difficult for attackers with small arse- major cities and/or national infrastructure. could maintain stable deterrence based on nals to accomplish their objectives. Second, The 1,000 deployment ceiling limits the assured retaliation at New START or lower to the contrary, as more states acquire missile options for attacking nuclear counterforce levels, even in the face of highly competent defenses, their rivals or enemies may be moti- targets in retaliation more than does the defenses deployed by either state or by both vated to pursue countermeasures—including 1,550 deployment limit, but especially in states. Another reason for restarting the more offensive weapons. In this second sce- the most likely retaliatory postures during reset in U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control is nario, missile defenses can contribute to an a crisis (generated alert and launch on warning, or generated alert and riding out the attack). Surviving and retaliating land- and sea-based forces and bomber delivered weapons provide some leverage against that target class. In addition, since the model is following New START counting U.S. Department of State rules that count each heavy bomber as only one weapon, it understates the number of surviving and retaliating weapons for each state, but especially for the better equipped U.S. bomber force. Would missile defenses deployed by either or both sides change the outcomes depicted in figures 1 and 2? In figures 3 and 4, we examine the impact of antimissile defenses on retaliating U.S. and Russian second strike forces assuming an overall penetration capa- bility for each side against opposed defenses of 40 percent (60 percent of the retaliators are intercepted or otherwise deflected away from Secretary of State Clinton meets with Russian president outside Moscow their intended targets). This is a generous assumption for the effectiveness of missile to create additional momentum for NATO- eventual arms race even if they provide more defenses given present and foreseeable tech- Russia negotiations on reducing or eliminat- reassurance against an imminent threat of nologies. Figure 3 summarizes these results ing nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployed nuclear first strike. Whether missile defenses for the larger peacetime deployment limit of in Europe. Nonstrategic nuclear weapons become positives or negatives in U.S.-Russia 1,550 warheads and figure 4 for the smaller talks need to get moving before Russia relations therefore depends upon politics— peacetime deployment limit of 1,000 weapons. is tempted to abrogate the Intermediate including the vagaries of domestic politics in The results summarized in figures 3 Nuclear Forces Treaty and redeploy interme- the United States and Russia. JFQ and 4 show that even the smaller (1,000 limit) diate- and shorter-range missiles in Europe of the two forces for each state can provide and in Asia. A third reason for post–New for numerous retaliating and arriving second START reductions is to establish the United strike warheads against opposed defenses States and Russia as reliable leaders for of high competency by today’s standards. multilateral nuclear arms reductions among Russian forces on day-to-day alert and riding the remaining nuclear weapons states. Drop-
16 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu CIMBALA
11 Ibid. 25 Daniel Goure, “The Obama Administration’s Grateful acknowledgment is made to Stephen 12 Ariel Cohen and Robert E. Hamilton, The Phased Adaptive Architecture: Technological, Blank, Andrew Futter, Daniel Goure, Jacob Kipp, Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Operational and Political Issues,” unpublished Timothy Thomas, and Mikhail Tsypkin for insights Implications (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, paper, December 2011, 15. Dr. Goure is not respon- June 2011), esp. 44–48. See also Thomas, Recasting sible for its use here, nor for any arguments or into the topic of this study. None is responsible for the Red Star, 221–261; and Timothy L. Thomas, opinions in this study. any analysis or arguments here. “Russian Information Warfare Theory: The Con- 26 Ibid., 11, passim. See also Unclassified State- sequences of August 2008,” in The Russian Military ment of Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, Today and Tomorrow, 265–300. Director, Missile Defense Agency, Before the House 13 For an especially ambitious example, see V.V. Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Druzhinin and D.S. Kontorov, Concept, algorithm, Strategic Forces, Regarding the Fiscal Year 2011 Notes decision: Decision making and automation (a Soviet Missile Defense Programs, Washington, DC, April view) (Moscow: Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 15, 2010. 1 “Russia Warns of Response to U.S. 1972), trans. and published under the auspices of 27 Forces are notional and not necessarily Missile Shield,” VOA News, November 23, the U.S. Air Force. See also Thomas, Recasting the predictive of actual deployments. For expert projec- 2011, available at
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 17 Military Wisdom and
Nuclear Weapons By Ward Wilson
he original mindset developed war is still (and hopefully will remain) so of the Cold War, a thorough review of the for thinking about nuclear far from our experience that it is difficult facts has thrown a new, more critical light on weapons was theoretical. to reason from, or illustrate arguments by, nuclear weapons. It seems that Cold War fear T Herman Kahn, one of a group analogies from history. Thus, many of our and tension led a number of nuclear weapons of civilians who eventually came to be called concepts and doctrines must be based on thinkers to overlook what should have been “nuclear strategists” and played an important abstract and analytical considerations.1 obvious. Military officers were always some- role in shaping ideas about nuclear weapons, what skeptical of nuclear weapons. It now described the justification for this theoretical Military wisdom grows out of pragma- appears that much of that skepticism was approach in 1965: tism, which is, in some ways, the opposite justified. of the theoretical and abstract approach Despite the fact that nuclear weapons have advocated by Kahn. Pragmatism is founded already been used twice, and the nuclear on experience. It takes the facts of history Ward Wilson is a Senior Fellow in the James Martin sword has been rattled many times, one can seriously and is tied to events rather than Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey argue that for all practical purposes nuclear high concepts. In the 20 years since the end Institute for International Studies. U.S. Marine Corps (Lynn P. Walker, Jr.) Walker, P. U.S. Marine Corps (Lynn
Battered religious figures stand watch above tattered valley, Nagasaki, September 24, 1945
18 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu WILSON
Hiroshima States, and Russia, as well as reevaluations of perspective, the most important day of that In the run-up to Hiroshima, there were old evidence, shows that Japan surrendered week was not August 6, but August 9. That varying opinions inside the U.S. Government because of the Soviet Union’s decision to was the first day of the entire war—the about what impact nuclear weapons would renounce its neutrality and join the war. The first time in 14 years of conflict—that the have. President Harry Truman’s friend and atomic bombings apparently had little to do Japanese government sat down to discuss colleague from the Senate, James “Jimmy” with the decision.2 surrender. What motivated them to finally Byrnes (D-SC), soon to replace Edward Stet- Four sets of evidence are crucial in take such a drastic step? It was not Nagasaki, tinius as Secretary of State, had high hopes. overturning the long-held view that nuclear which was bombed later in the day. It prob- The Bomb, he told Truman, “might well put weapons delivered a decisive shock to Japan’s ably was not Hiroshima. That had been 3 full us in a position to dictate our own terms at leadership. First, the timing of events does days earlier, and they had already considered the end of the war.” Byrnes and Truman both not support the assertion that Hiroshima whether to have a meeting to discuss its expressed the hope that the Bomb would be coerced surrender. Hiroshima was bombed implications and rejected the notion. There able to force Japan to surrender before the at 0815 on August 6, 1945. Word of the attack is, however, an event that was both proximate Russians came into the war. began to reach Tokyo from various sources and portentous that might have motivated Professional military men were less within half an hour, and by the afternoon, them to think about surrender: the decision enthusiastic. Planners in the Bomb project the governor of Hiroshima reported that by the Soviet Union to join the war at mid- itself called for the speedy completion of up one-third of the population had been killed night on August 8. Based on timing alone, to 10 more bombs by November 1, 1945. They and about two-thirds of the city destroyed. the traditional interpretation of Hiroshima clearly were not counting on two nuclear Early in the morning hours of August 7— seems doubtful. weapons alone to end the war. This judgment because of the international dateline and The second problem is one of scale. One was ratified by Secretary of the Army George delays associated with translation—Truman’s would imagine, based on the way Hiroshima Marshall’s G2 (Intelligence), whose written press statement, declaring that the attack is described in the literature, that such a report on August 8—2 days after the bombing was carried out with an atomic bomb and devastating attack must have made a strong of Hiroshima—flatly stated that the “atomic threatening a “rain of ruin” if Japan did not impact. It is difficult to detect a single drop bomb will not have a decisive effect in the next 30 days.” Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal clearly agreed. new evidence from archives shows that Japan surrendered On the same day that Marshall’s G2 because of the Soviet Union’s decision to renounce its neutrality turned in his estimate to Marshall, Forrestal and join the war sent a letter to President Truman calling for the removal of Army General Douglas MacArthur as commander of the forthcom- surrender, arrived in Tokyo. On the morning of rain, however, in the midst of a rainstorm. ing invasion of Japan. Forrestal suggested that of August 8, Togo Shigenori, the foreign In the summer of 1945, the U.S. Army Air Admiral Chester Nimitz replace MacArthur. minister and advocate of a diplomatic solu- Force carried out one of the most intense Such a request was sure to ignite inter-Service tion to end the war, urged Premier Suzuki and devastating bombing campaigns in the rivalry and cause tremendous controversy. An Kantaro to call a meeting of Japan’s Supreme history of warfare against the cities of Japan. experienced Washington insider such as For- Council—the effective ruling body of Japan Sixty-eight cities were bombed and on average restal would not have risked such a showdown at that point in the war. Suzuki checked with 50 percent destroyed; 300,000 civilians were if he believed that the second atomic bombing members of the Supreme Council (which was killed and over 1 million made homeless. would cause Japan’s leaders to sue for peace dominated by military men) and determined For 5 months from March until August, a 2 days later. Finally, even Secretary of War that there was insufficient interest to have a Japanese city was turned into a smoking ruin Henry Stimson, who guided the Bomb project meeting to discuss the implications of Hiro- every other day on average. We might imagine from its inception and knew the most about shima. At midnight on August 8, the Soviet that Hiroshima would be the worst of these it, was taken off guard by the sudden Japanese Union, which had signed a neutrality pact attacks by a wide margin. But that is not the offer to surrender. Stimson was on his way with Japan in 1941, renounced the pact and case. If we graph the number of civilians out of town for a long weekend at his vaca- declared war. Soviet forces began attacking killed in all 68 cities, according to the United tion home in Maryland when the Japanese Japanese holdings in Manchuria, Sakhalin States Strategic Bombing Survey, Hiroshima offer arrived. He would not have been leaving Island, and elsewhere. By 0430, word of the was second. Tokyo, in a conventional attack, Washington if he had thought that just two nature and scope of the attacks had begun to lost more people. If we graph the square miles bombs would bring an offer to surrender. So reach Tokyo. Within 6 hours—by 1030—the destroyed, Hiroshima was sixth. If we graph the top military men in Washington were Supreme Council was meeting to discuss the percentage of the city destroyed, Hiro- skeptical that nuclear weapons could coerce unconditional surrender. shima was seventeenth. Japan to capitulate after only two attacks on When historians of the Bomb describe Although the attack on Hiroshima is cities. the events of this crucial week, they naturally often presented as horrifying and shocking, It now seems that the military apprais- put the dramatic focus on August 6 and the the actual scale of the attack was not outside als were right and Byrnes was wrong. New bombing of Hiroshima. It is, for them, a the scope of what Japan had been experienc- evidence from archives in Japan, the United story about the Bomb. But from the Japanese ing all summer. In fact, Minister of War ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 19 Forum | Military Wisdom and Nuclear Weapons
Anami Korechika, by this point probably that Japan’s leaders took are more telling. poised to attack from the north, where Japan’s the most powerful man in the government On the morning the Soviets entered the war, defenses were weakest. Fighting one super- (including the Emperor), stated that the army officers met to discuss their strategy power attacking from one direction might just atomic bombings were no more menac- for the upcoming Supreme Council meeting. have been possible, but fighting two invading ing than the fire bombings that Japan had General Kawabe suggested that martial law from opposite directions was clearly beyond endured for months. If Japan’s leaders were be imposed, the Emperor captured, and Japan’s limited military capability at that stage shocked by Hiroshima, why did they not sur- military rule imposed. No such emergency of the war. render after any of the other city attacks? meetings were held, and no such extreme The Soviet invasion also drastically The third set of evidence is the reac- measures were considered on the morning changed the timescale of decisionmaking. tions of Japan’s leaders to the two events. Hiroshima was bombed. Examine the reac- Japan’s leaders correctly assessed that the U.S. A close examination of meeting minutes, tions to the two sets of events and the contrast invasion would not occur for some months. actions, and diary entries at the time shows is plain: Hiroshima was a serious problem, The Soviet 16th army, however, had orders to that while Hiroshima was recognized as a one of a number of problems, but the Soviet quickly conquer the southern half of Sakhalin problem, it did not seem to change the equa- entry into the war was a crisis. Island and then be ready to invade Hok- tion of the war.3 The Soviet declaration of war Finally, the most important evidence has kaido—the northernmost of Japan’s Home and invasion, however, touched off a crisis. to do with the strategic importance of the two Islands—within 10 to 14 days. Suddenly the When Army Deputy Chief of Staff Kawabe events. With more than a million men still timescale for invasion had gone from months Toroshiro realized that an atomic bomb had under arms on the Japanese Home Islands, to days. And Japan’s leaders had already rec- been dropped on Hiroshima, he wrote in his military leaders could reasonably have ognized the strategic significance of the Soviet diary that it gave him a “serious jolt.” But, he imagined that they could make an invasion Union’s role. In a Supreme Council meeting in opined philosophically, “we must fight on.” costly enough that the United States would June discussing long-term prospects, they had When Cabinet Secretary Sakamizu Hisatsune offer better surrender terms. They had been agreed that Soviet entry into the war would was woken in the early morning hours of steadily and laboriously shifting men into “determine the fate of the Empire.” In that August 9 and told that Russia had declared position in the south for this very purpose. same meeting, General Kawabe asserted, “The war, he was so angry he “felt as if all the blood Now more than a million and a half new absolute maintenance of peace in our relations in [his] body ran backwards.” The actions adversaries had joined the fight, and they were U.S. Navy
USS Essex–based TBMs and SB2Cs bomb Hakodate, Japan, July 1945
20 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu WILSON with the Soviet Union is one of the fundamen- Surrender party in Manila, 1945 tal conditions for continuing the war.” The declaration of war by the Soviet Union was strategically decisive. The bombing of Hiroshima was not. Claim- ing that Japan surrendered because of the bombing of Hiroshima is, in part, a claim that the military men who were leading Japan did not know their business. Their job was to evaluate which factors impacted the overall strategic calculation and which did not. Hiroshima clearly did not. How could Japan’s military have agreed to surrender as a result of an event that was strategically unimportant? In the years after the war, believing that the bombing of Hiroshima coerced Japan was natural because Japan’s Emperor had declared that the bombing was the cause of the surrender. But two facts throw doubt on the Emperor’s claim. First, the announce- ment that prominently mentioned the atomic bomb was in a radio broadcast to civilians. Tellingly, the announcement that was sent out 2 days later to the members of the military made no mention of the Bomb but focused on the entry of the Soviet Union into the war. It seems as if the Emperor was using the U.S. Coast Guard arguments that each audience would find to coerce and deter is based on the experi- Military conceptions of nuclear war tend persuasive. With civilians, who cared about ence of Hiroshima. The new evidence about to be quite realistic. Declassified war plans city bombing, he talked about bombing. With the end of the war now throws doubt on this from the late 1940s and early 1950s show a military men, who cared about the military assertion. The new interpretation of Hiro- clear and pragmatic vision of what such a war situation, he talked about Russia. shima is surprising because we are used to would be like. Fleetwood, the original war Secondly, the Bomb made the perfect the old one. But it would not have surprised plan drawn up in 1948, called for the use of explanation for losing the war. Instead of the senior military leaders in the U.S. Gov- the full U.S. nuclear arsenal at the outset of having to admit grievous errors of judgment ernment at the time: they were all already the war. A total of 133 bombs would be used that led to enormous loss of life and destruc- skeptical of the bomb’s ability to influence against some 70 Soviet cities, resulting in tion, Japan’s leaders could blame defeat on a events. several million casualties and the destruc- sudden scientific breakthrough by the enemy tion of 30 to 40 percent of Soviet industrial that no one could have predicted. At a single Nuclear War capacity. The plan’s authors, however, did stroke, they were no longer responsible for One of the most important constructs not confuse this enormous devastation with having lost the war. in the field of nuclear weapons is our image victory. They estimated that Soviet forces The story of why Hiroshima was of what a nuclear war would be like. Much of would then launch an invasion of Europe and identified as the cause of surrender rather our national political debate has been shaped that the United States would have to prepare than the Soviet declaration of war has yet to by perceptions of nuclear war, and nuclear itself for a traditional conventional land war be written. Obviously, complex motives of deterrence depends, in part, on conceptions of in Europe. The men who drew up this plan national pride and influence played central nuclear war. Nuclear deterrence is supposed had just finished fighting a global war against roles. The important point is not, however, as to work this way: a leader takes an aggressive Germany and Japan. They were some of the some historians would have it, whether the action, his adversary warns him of the risk most experienced military leaders in the United States was wrong to drop the Bomb of nuclear war, the leader sees an image of a United States at that time. Their judgments on Hiroshima. Attacking cities was, at that nuclear war in his mind’s eye, and he then are worth taking seriously. point, an established part of the war. The thinks better of his aggression. The image As nuclear forces evolved and Soviet important question is whether bombing a of nuclear war is critical. It is discouraging, nuclear forces became more capable, estimates city with a nuclear weapon works—whether therefore, to consider that most civilians and of the likely first round of any war with the it will reliably coerce an adversary into sur- political leaders think about nuclear war Soviet Union changed. But the presumption rendering. Much of the claim that nuclear based on cultural myths and religious proph- that the initial nuclear phase of a war would weapons have a special psychological ability esies that are thousands of years old. not be decisive remained the same. Here ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 21 Forum | Military Wisdom and Nuclear Weapons is Admiral Robert B. Carney, U.S. Chief of writing occurs across cultures and eras. There than basing our thinking on the facts on the Naval Operations, describing what such a war is, of course, the apocalyptic book of Revela- ground?5 One of the most disturbing aspects might be like to an audience in Cincinnati, tion in the Christian Bible. The book of Daniel of the nuclear weapons debate is that given the Ohio, in 1955: “Presumably massive blows in the Hebrew Bible is also apocalyptic. There choice between trying to think realistically would continue as long as either side retained are apocalyptic suras in the Koran. Scores and factually about nuclear war or thinking the capability. . . . With the passing of the of other religious traditions—from ancient in terms of familiar religious prophesy and initial phase, and if the issue is still unre- Persian Zoroastrianism to the Norse sagas cultural myth, most people grabbed apoca- solved, tough people would carry on across of Scandinavia—have apocalyptic stories. lypse with both hands. If serious and sensible the radioactive ashes and water, with what Apocalypse figures in writing in Europe from policies are to be formulated, it is necessary weapons are left.” Similarly, a British white the third through fifth centuries in the Sibyl- to at least begin our analysis with a pragmatic paper from 1954 described a war with initial line Oracles. The apocalyptic Shangquing military frame of mind rather than religious devastation that did not resolve the dispute. scripture of Taoism was produced in China thinking.
Nuclear Deterrence much of our national political debate has been shaped by The standard claim for nuclear weapons perceptions of nuclear war and nuclear deterrence depends, in is that they are not really intended to be used part, on conceptions of nuclear war on the battlefield; their chief value is as psy- chological tools. One way to define nuclear deterrence is “manipulating the fear of nuclear In what one strategist called a “broken-backed in the fourth century. Nostradamus wrote in war for political ends.” Nuclear deterrence, war,” it was presumed that both sides would the 1500s. Apocalyptic writings led to politi- it is sometimes claimed, is a special form of unleash significant salvos on each other but cal uprisings in Germany and England in the deterrence that operates largely outside the that neither would surrender as a result. These 16th and 17th centuries. At the turn of the 19th rules of other forms of deterrence (deterrence are serious attempts to estimate what would century, millennialists predicted the end of with conventional weapons, for example, or happen in a novel situation. It is true that time and the coming of the Lord at midnight deterring lawbreakers, and so on). One impor- when the bombers of these early scenarios December 31. Many eras and cultures proph- tant proof of this special status was the unbro- were replaced with missiles, the nature of the esy apocalypse. ken string of successes that nuclear deterrence war changed. But these early plans and pre- When we stop to consider it, the biblical enjoyed during the Cold War crises in the late dictions are useful reminders that a nuclear elements in the language used about nuclear 1950s, early 1960s, and intermittently there- attack might not be immediately decisive. weapons is striking. Not only did the original after until the fall of the Soviet Union. Even Nuclear war could play out in a number of observers of the first test reach for biblical the first Gulf War was supposed to illustrate different ways.4 language (“A great blinding light lit up the the power of nuclear deterrence. Because of Compare these military appreciations sky and earth as if God himself had appeared its unique status and the fact that it appar- with the typical civilian vision of nuclear war. among us . . . there came the report of an ently operated under a special set of rules, Politicians and civilians could draw on declas- explosion, sudden and sharp as if the skies the standard lessons and wisdom of military sified studies such as these to shape a picture had cracked . . . a vision from the Book of experience were often set aside when dealing of what nuclear war might be like. They could Revelations”), but even the alternate name for with nuclear deterrence in favor of specialized take military thinking as a starting point nuclear war evokes the Bible. We could refer theories of nuclear threat. The problem is that and try to reason from these estimates to a to nuclear war as “super science war,” since the unbroken string of successes seems largely likely outcome. But civilian thinking about it involves remarkable and advanced science. illusory. nuclear war ignores military judgment and We could call it “megadeath war,” since it The first crisis of the Cold War period experience. would likely lead to millions of people killed. occurred when Soviet forces cut off access to In the popular imagination, nuclear war We could even call it “wargasm,” the flippant the western sectors of Berlin in 1948. Each of is most often thought about as an apocalypse. coinage of Herman Kahn. But we do not call the four Allies had been allocated a sector of When people talk about nuclear war being it any of these names. When we do not call Germany to administer and the capital city, “the end of everything” or “the destruction nuclear war apocalypse, we refer to it by the Berlin, located deep in the eastern, Soviet of all life on earth,” they clearly have in mind name of a hill in Israel that is the site, in the sector of Germany, had also been divided into an image based on apocalypse. Apocalypse Bible, of the Last Battle at the End of Days— four sectors. Unhappy over plans for reinte- occurs so often in the public debate about we call it Armageddon. grating Germany based on a Western model, nuclear war that it almost passes unnoticed. All of these biblical allusions and Josef Stalin ordered Russian troops to close But apocalypse is a very specific phenomenon. apocalyptic descriptions raise the question of all roadways and rail lines to supplies from It is the story of a world mired in sin, in which why we talk about a 21st-century military phe- the West. Without supplies the people of West a small sect remains true to a set of values nomenon in terms of 2,000 years of religious Berlin would starve. (usually by living according to a very strict prophesies. If we are going to try to develop President Harry Truman ordered B-29 code), a gigantic cataclysmic event or war pragmatic and sober policies for handling bombers redeployed to England. The B-29 wipes out much of the Earth, and the small nuclear weapons, how can it make sense to was the bomber that had dropped nuclear sect survives because of its faith. Apocalyptic think about them using religious ideas rather weapons on Japan, and although these
22 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu WILSON bombers had not been modified to allow them The President’s handling of the crisis Baker sent a letter to the Iraqi government to drop nuclear weapons, when word of the was, in retrospect, masterful, and there is little prior to the outbreak of hostilities warning redeployment was leaked to the press, it was doubt that he chose the least aggressive of the that if chemical or biological weapons were widely assumed that the United States had action options presented to him. But he could used, the United States would respond with clear and available capacity to use nuclear also have chosen to do nothing. The reputa- the “full measure of force” against Iraq. weapons against the Soviet Union. Although tion and standing of the Soviet Union had The threat was widely viewed as a nuclear some historians have been skeptical that the not collapsed after the U.S. introduction of threat. Iraq did not use chemical or biological redeployment had much impact on the crisis, nuclear missiles into Italy and Turkey in 1961. weapons, and, therefore, it is often asserted, in Washington in the years that followed, it There is good reason to suspect that Kennedy the power of nuclear deterrence was once was widely believed that Truman’s “nuclear might have lost the election of 1964 had he again demonstrated. But the facts in full are threat” was important in resolving the crisis.6 not taken action on the missiles in Cuba. not so reassuring. Secretary Baker actually What is rarely asked about this crisis But should a President place the lives of 100 drew three red lines in the sand: Iraq had to is what Stalin was thinking. He ordered the million U.S. civilians at risk (the estimated forgo using chemical or biological weapons, blockade at a time when the United States number who might have died in an all-out setting the Kuwaiti oil wells on fire, and had a monopoly on nuclear weapons. One nuclear war in 1962) to prevent personal and making terrorist attacks against U.S. allies. of the options considered in Washington for political humiliation? In any case, the ques- As is well known, the Iraqis crossed two of relieving the blockade was forcing an armored tion is not whether Kennedy was an admi- those three lines: they set the oil wells alight column up the autobahn to Berlin. Stalin rable President, or whether his actions were and launched Scud missile attacks against initiated a crisis that could have led to war justified. The question is whether nuclear Israeli civilians. How is it possible to call a despite the U.S. nuclear monopoly. deterrence works reliably. And here the facts threat that was only one-third successful real Although this episode is not entirely are indisputable: a leader was faced with the support for the theory of nuclear deterrence? persuasive regarding the failure of nuclear prospect of an uncontrollable crisis where the Admittedly, a batter who gets a hit one out of deterrence (there was, for example, no explicit risks of nuclear war were high and he was not every three trips to the plate is judged a suc- threat made), what is troubling is that so little deterred from escalating the crisis. The Cuban cessful baseball player, but nuclear deterrence investigation has gone into the facts of the Missile Crisis provides clear evidence that is not baseball. Because of the catastrophic case. When planes crash, the Federal Aviation nuclear deterrence can fail in alarming ways. consequences that could result from an all-out Administration takes extraordinary steps to It is often asserted that the Gulf War nuclear war, nuclear deterrence has to be understand exactly what went wrong. Given provides further confirmation that nuclear perfect or at least vanishingly close to perfect. the stakes involved, should not the same deterrence works. Secretary of State James As these three examples illustrate, however, standard apply to potential failures of nuclear deterrence? Should not each potential failure be pored over carefully until the exact details are completely understood? U.S. Navy A far more disturbing failure of nuclear deterrence occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviet attempt to sneak ballistic missiles into Cuba in 1962 is often cited as clear proof that nuclear deterrence works. After all, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, when confronted with the danger of nuclear war, withdrew the missiles. But this overlooks the failure of the danger of nuclear war to deter President John F. Kennedy. Kennedy’s actions could have caused the crisis to spiral out of control to nuclear war. After the crisis President Kennedy’s brother Robert wrote that although the President had initiated the course of events, “he no longer had control over them,” and Kennedy himself told aide Theodore Sorensen that the odds of war had been “somewhere between one and three and even.” During the discussions that led to the choice of a blockade of Cuba, the danger of nuclear war was mentioned 60 times. Kennedy clearly knew that blockading Cuba carried with it the risk of nuclear war. Mount Fujiyama as seen from USS South Dakota in Tokyo Bay, August 1945 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 23 Forum | Military Wisdom and Nuclear Weapons there are a number of cases that appear to be his retirement) about the serviceability of 162, National Security Archive, August 5, 2005, nuclear deterrence failures. nuclear weapons over the long run. The words available at
24 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Managing Foreign Assistance in a CBRN Emergency The U.S. Government Response to Japan’s “Triple Disaster”
By Suzanne Basalla, esponding to a major disaster is invariably time-critical, complex, and difficult. Supporting a foreign government engaged in a disaster response adds an additional William Berger, and layer of logistical, linguistic, cultural, and organizational challenges. The tsunami caused by the March 11, 2011, earthquake in Japan killed more than 19,000 people C. Spencer Abbot R and destroyed coastal settlements along a massive swath of Japan’s eastern coast. Responding to a natural disaster of such magnitude would prove a monumental task for any country. Japan, through its extensive community level training and significant investment in disaster preparedness, is as experienced and capable as any nation in coping with nature’s hazards. However, as the grave situ- ation at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant unfolded in the days following the tsunami, the Japanese government confronted a crisis of unprecedented and daunting complexity.
Suzanne Basalla is Senior Advisor to U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Roos. William Berger is a Principal Regional Advisor in the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance at the U.S. Agency for International Development and headed the Disaster Assistance Response Team in Japan. Commander C. Spencer Abbot, USN, served at U.S. Embassy Tokyo as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow. U.S. Marine Corps (Brennan O’Lowney) U.S. Marine Corps (Brennan
Commanding generals of III Marine Expeditionary Force and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force discuss progress of disaster relief mission at Uranohama Port
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 25 Forum | Managing Foreign Assistance in a CBRN Emergency
To understand the threats to Japan The U.S. Government Approach to provides a standardized approach to manag- posed by the cascading sequence of break- Disaster Assistance ing on-scene activities, with staffing support downs at the plant, and to undertake the The U.S. Government possesses a concentrated in five central areas: command, actions required to halt the disaster’s pro- well-developed and proven system for operations, planning, logistics, and finance/ gression, the Japanese government had to responding to natural disasters abroad, with administration.4 The ICS organizational knit together information, assessments, and the U.S. Agency for International Develop- structure is not unlike the staffing model capabilities from a wide array of government ment (USAID) and its Office of U.S. Foreign used by the U.S. military and is designed to and private sector actors, many of whom do Disaster Assistance (OFDA) playing the be put in place rapidly when required, as well not normally work together. To support Japan lead role. The Foreign Assistance Act of as to integrate a broad spectrum of outside in its efforts to respond to the complex and 1961 created USAID and delegated disaster agencies and organizations. The Department rapidly unfolding crisis, the U.S. Government assistance authority to the USAID adminis- of Homeland Security has incorporated the similarly required disparate agencies that do trator. Yet OFDA’s predecessor office was not ICS construct under NIMS as the founda- not often interact to quickly establish a close, created until 1964–1965 after clear failures in tional structure used in its National Response collaborative working relationship in the interagency coordination during a disaster Framework (NRF), the primary document midst of an emergency. response in Macedonia drove congressional guiding U.S. domestic disaster response plan- This first large-scale U.S. response to pressure for a more robust coordinative ning and execution. The NRF seeks to provide a complex disaster including a chemical, structure. Consideration was given within “scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) Congress at the time to assigning the lead structures” for use in responses ranging from element required a number of organizational adaptations over the course of the crisis. The U.S. Government has established detailed U.S. officials engaged in the response within Japan found that procedures for responding to such incidents existing guidance was vague and undefined with respect to under the rubric of Foreign Consequence interagency organizational processes and structures Management (FCM). Yet in managing the situation, U.S. officials engaged in the response within Japan found that exist- role to the Department of Defense (DOD); those at the local level “to large-scale terrorist ing guidance was vague and undefined however, by assigning the role of lead Federal attacks or catastrophic natural disasters.”5 with respect to interagency organizational agency in an international disaster response The DART team model used by OFDA processes and structures needed to absorb to USAID and OFDA, the United States has represents a similar organizational logic additional personnel sent forward and to maintained a primarily civilian face for its distilled over time through lessons learned execute the foreign assistance aspect of disaster assistance efforts and has provided during DART-led responses to many disasters the FCM function. The government of the a mechanism for coordination of DOD and abroad. The organizational commonality affected state has primary responsibility for other governmental and nongovernmental between the U.S. systems for domestic and responding to CBRN events within its ter- actors involved in disaster relief.2 Given the international disaster response has proved ritory. Some indeterminacy exists, however, wide array of actors involved in a disaster useful, as several recent major disasters within the U.S. Government as to the lead response—a number that only continues to have led the U.S Government to draw on agency role during a foreign assistance effort grow in present day emergencies—effective significant domestic disaster response capac- in response to a CBRN emergency.1 Within disaster relief coordination poses a constant ity to augment response efforts overseas. For the affected country, responsibility falls to challenge for OFDA and for the humanitarian example, Federal Emergency Management the Chief of Mission, in this case U.S. Ambas- relief community, especially when significant Agency (FEMA) Administrator Craig Fugate sador to Japan John Roos, to coordinate the numbers of military or other Federal Govern- traveled with USAID Administrator Rajiv activities of the various agencies involved in ment personnel are involved. Shah to Port-au-Prince soon after the January the disaster response. Over time, both the OFDA drew on the very successful 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and FEMA person- Japanese and the U.S. governments’ organiza- “incident management system” concept devel- nel were deployed to the U.S. Embassy in Port- tional mechanisms evolved in response to the oped by the U.S. Forest Service to create its au-Prince to work alongside colleagues from complex demands of supporting the Japanese Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) OFDA who led the response under a DART government through its management of the model, through which OFDA organizes structure. The DART also coordinated the nuclear emergency. The lessons of the crisis responses to the most serious disasters abroad. activities of several Department of Health and response warrant review and consideration, Domestically, the Department of Homeland Human Services Disaster Medical Assistance as future responses to a natural or manmade Security’s National Incident Management Teams that were deployed to Haiti, but pri- disaster abroad that include a CBRN System (NIMS) provides a well-understood marily focuses on domestic disaster response.6 aspect—whether an epidemic; an attack with organizational structure that readily incor- DARTs are often led by OFDA regional a radiological dispersal device, or “dirty porates contributions from external actors, is advisors who live and work in their areas of bomb”; or a terrorist attack with a biological tailored in size to the situation at hand, and responsibility, and are thus familiar with the agent—would also necessitate rapid integra- can be replicated at the local, state, or national geography, governments, and issues that affect tion of disparate but vital capabilities from level.3 A key mechanism within NIMS is the disaster responses in those regions. Richard both inside and outside government. Incident Command System (ICS), which Stuart Olson, in studying the OFDA DART
26 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BASALLA, BERGER, and ABBOT system, noted that “One of the singular advan- the March 11 Great East Japan Earthquake to include representatives from the NRC in tages of deploying a DART is that it automati- represents the largest cooperative military the original composition of the DART. This cally clarifies who is in charge, which avoids the undertaking in the history of the U.S.-Japan decision ensured that U.S. nuclear power usual problem of leadership and reporting con- alliance. To confront the crisis, the Japan Self- expertise, and reachback to U.S.-based col- fusion when multiple [U.S.] agencies go into Defense Forces (JSDF) mobilized more than leagues, was available from the early days of the field. This clarity even extends to the U.S. 100,000 personnel, establishing the first joint the unfolding crisis. The ability to rapidly military when [it is] involved in a response.”7 task force in its history and calling up reserve fund and support interagency colleagues from Substantial progress has been made over the forces to active duty for the first time. More relevant agencies is one of the key advantages past decade in clarifying and systematizing than 24,000 U.S. troops supported Japan’s of the DART construct, and the short-notice coordination between USAID and DOD in disaster response through Operation Tomo- deployment of these experts reflects the particular. USAID development advisors and dachi, working closely with USAID, the U.S. value of close interagency consultation and OFDA humanitarian assistance advisors have Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the information-sharing in the immediate wake been stationed in each of the DOD geographic U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and a host of a major disaster. combatant commands, and an Office of Mili- of other U.S. Government agencies. Indeed, OFDA maintains agreements with tary Affairs (now the Office of Civilian-Mili- the response to the March 11 “triple disaster” Fairfax County (Virginia) and Los Angeles tary Cooperation) was created within USAID represented an unprecedented whole-of- County (California) to provide rapidly in 2005. While occurring in very different con- government effort by both Japan and the deployable Urban Search-and-Rescue (USAR) texts, both the 2010 U.S. disaster response in United States. teams. On March 13, USAR teams arrived Haiti and the 2011 response in Japan involved Immediately after receiving reports of in Japan aboard a commercial aircraft char- substantial numbers of military personnel, the massive damage and loss of life caused by tered by OFDA, and the equipment cache placing a premium on both interagency and the tsunami, USAID mobilized and deployed arrived via U.S. Air Force C-17s, pursuant to multinational coordination. a DART to coordinate U.S. assistance to the a formal USAID request for DOD support. Japanese government. USAID Administrator With Misawa Air Base providing invaluable The Initial Response to Japan’s Shah, after assessing reports from the region logistics, mapping, and other support, these Humanitarian Crisis in consultation with senior officials from USAR teams focused their efforts on the The collaborative effort between across the U.S. Government, made a timely areas of Ofunato and Kamaishi on the heavily Japan and the United States in the wake of decision, within 24 hours of the earthquake, damaged Iwate coast. The DART quickly U.S. Air Force (Shane A. Cuomo) U.S. Air Force
U.S. military and Japanese officials discuss deployment of water pumping station for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant during Operation Tomodachi
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 27 Forum | Managing Foreign Assistance in a CBRN Emergency assigned a humanitarian assistance advisor Because the Japanese government disaster environment. Military officers on to the military at the headquarters of U.S. organizes its disaster relief efforts at the pre- both sides who could work in both Japanese Forces–Japan (USFJ) at Yokota Air Base to fectural level—roughly analogous to that of and English were especially valuable to the assist with civil-military coordination and the a U.S. state—it does not maintain a national disaster response effort and in high demand vetting of requests for U.S. military assistance civilian agency specifically focused on disaster to facilitate communication and coordination received from the Japanese government. relief, as FEMA does in the United States. The at all levels, from boots-on-the-ground roles OFDA uses a system called the Mission JSDF thus plays an especially important role to policy-level coordination in Tokyo. These Tasking Matrix (MITAM) to receive, assess, in large-scale disaster relief within Japan. As included foreign area officers in various validate, and prioritize requests for military such, the close working relationship and long U.S. commands within Japan, officers with assistance during a disaster. This system history of combined exercises between the language training stationed at the Embassy, has been successfully used to facilitate civil- U.S. and Japanese militaries proved extremely as well as others, such as officers enrolled in military coordination in numerous disaster valuable throughout the course of Operation foreign war college and exchange billets with response efforts, and the MITAM system is Tomodachi and in the disaster response more the JSDF. A large number of outside augmentees from a variety of organizations joined perma- nently stationed USFJ personnel. Augmenta- tion of existing U.S. military capacity in Japan included the deployment of a joint task force led by Admiral Patrick Walsh, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Admiral Walsh served
U.S. Navy (Matthew M. Bradley) during his forward deployment to Japan as overall joint task force commander at the augmented headquarters and led what was designated the Joint Support Force (JSF). Command of the JSF was then passed to Lieu- tenant General Burton Field, USAF, the USFJ commander. The military’s joint task force construct is a key mechanism through which a staff can be built or augmented in response to the needs of a particular situation and represents a well-understood and frequently exercised process that can quickly absorb and channel the activities of supplementary per- sonnel arriving during a contingency or crisis. Marine Corps CBRN specialists remove This process was key to enhancing USFJ’s radioactive contamination from Army generator capacity to cope with the massive demands of during Operation Tomodachi executing Operation Tomodachi, coordinating with other U.S. agencies, and supporting the thoroughly briefed to U.S. military partici- broadly. Through Operation Tomodachi, the JSDF in their crisis response efforts. pants in the Joint Humanitarian Operations U.S. military delivered approximately 189 Course taught by OFDA personnel. During tons of food, 87 tons of relief materials, and Confronting the Nuclear Emergency the Operation Tomodachi relief effort, USFJ 2 million gallons of potable water to support U.S. Embassy Tokyo and civilian U.S. successfully used a related process named the Japan’s relief efforts. Government agencies involved in the disaster Joint Requirements Review Board to assess After consultations with the Japanese response faced similar challenges and the requests brought forward by the MITAM government, U.S. forces cleared the debris- need for additional staff and resources as the system and to determine whether those covered runway at Sendai Airport sufficiently severity of the crisis became clear. As DART requests could be supported based on the to allow a C-130 aircraft to land on March 16, personnel were arriving to carry out the U.S. joint task force commander’s priorities and only 5 days after the tsunami. The opening humanitarian response in the days following the resources available. USFJ also positioned of the airport allowed the Japanese govern- the earthquake and tsunami, the situation Bilateral Crisis Action Teams with the ment and relief agencies to fly massive at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Japanese government at the Japanese joint quantities of supplies into the area. The rapid became a prime focus of U.S. officials as they task force headquarters in Sendai and at the opening of the airport was accomplished by sought to support the Japanese government Ministry of Defense headquarters in Ichigaya, hard-working men and women of the U.S. and safeguard the well-being of the large where the USFJ deputy was stationed. USFJ military and made possible by close com- community of American citizens living and also hosted a JSDF general officer and numer- munication and cooperation between U.S. working in Japan. ous other JSDF officers at USFJ headquarters commanders and the JSDF. Communication The NRC personnel who initially at Yokota Air Base. is of paramount importance in a post- deployed with the DART team were soon
28 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BASALLA, BERGER, and ABBOT augmented by senior NRC management and fisheries management during the Deepwater Japanese government inquiries regarding additional NRC staff. The NRC team set its Horizon oil spill crisis to help inform officials potential U.S. assistance. A government in base of operations within the Embassy and engaged in managing the crisis in Japan. the throes of managing such a complex crisis worked closely with senior Embassy staff, The U.S. Civilian Response Corps deployed has limited capacity for addressing requests USFJ, and officials from other agencies who personnel to Embassy Tokyo via the USAID for information and other inquiries amid the arrived to assist the response effort. The Office of Civilian Response to augment civil- many other activities involved in managing DOE augmented the Energy Attaché’s office ian capacity in support of the response effort. the crisis. Recognizing the large number of in the Embassy with officials from the DOE Ultimately, some 145 additional person- information channels between the U.S. and National Nuclear Security Administration nel arrived at U.S. Embassy Tokyo to augment Japanese governments, the Japanese govern- and other DOE personnel to advise on the the 270 direct-hire personnel normally sta- ment, in consultation with U.S. officials, response to radiological contamination, tioned there. This number does not include established an effective mechanism for the status of the accident as it progressed, the many U.S. military augmentees who were centralizing intergovernmental dialogue and subsequent stabilization and cleanup assigned to USFJ headquarters in Yokota and under the oversight of Goshi Hosono, then activities. DOE soon partnered with U.S. other locations throughout Japan and the special advisor to Prime Minister Naoto Pacific Command (USPACOM) and USFJ to undertake airborne measurements of ground social media proved an especially useful tool for engaging with deposition of radioactive elements and shared the results of those assessments with the the community of U.S. citizens in Japan Japanese government. This capacity was later transferred to the Japanese government, and numerous U.S. officials who visited Japan for Kan, and later designated the minister in the measuring equipment was then flown on shorter periods for meetings with Japanese charge of managing the nuclear crisis. This aircraft operated by the JSDF. officials and Embassy colleagues. Thus, the mechanism, formally known as the Joint One of the most critical challenges faced U.S. Ambassador and U.S. officials support- Crisis Management Coordination Group, by Ambassador Roos and Embassy staff was ing the Japanese government faced two key but generally referred to by U.S. officials communicating with the substantial com- challenges: to structure and facilitate dialogue as the “Hosono Process,” structured and munity of U.S. citizens in Japan regarding with the Japanese government through the enhanced communication between the two the rapidly evolving emergency at the nuclear course of the disaster response, and to effec- governments on issues related to the crisis, plant. Ultimately, social media proved an tively organize and manage the additional particularly regarding U.S. support to the especially useful tool for engaging with the U.S. civilian personnel arriving in support of Japanese government. Furthermore, the community of U.S. citizens in Japan, and the the response effort. focused dialogue at the Hosono Process Embassy Public Affairs staff used Twitter, meetings spurred interagency coordina- YouTube, and Facebook to provide updates on Structuring Bilateral Dialogue tion on both sides. On the U.S. side, a need the situation and to distribute information on A broad array of information channels, became increasingly apparent as the crisis response measures, such as recommendations often directly from offices in Washington, continued into April for an interagency orga- on protective measures including evacuation DC, to Japanese counterparts and vice versa, nization internal to the Embassy, specifically zones around the plant. presented a challenge to those on the ground focused on supporting U.S. engagement in One of the core challenges in manag- in Japan seeking to grasp the breadth of U.S. the Hosono Process, and capable of absorb- ing a CBRN emergency is to understand and Government activities associated with the ing and integrating the efforts of additional acknowledge the uncertainty and fear that unfolding crisis. In contrast to the longstand- personnel sent to the Embassy from various arises among potentially affected citizens and ing communication paths between USFJ and agencies in response to the crisis. to address public concerns through timely the Ministry of Defense/JSDF, the ad hoc The DART served this role in part and transparent communication. A risk dialogues between the many other U.S. agen- through the end of April, as the NRC repre- communication expert from the Centers for cies involved and relevant Japanese ministries sentatives were themselves members of the Disease Control, along with subject matter reflected the intensity and risk presented by DART, and the DART coordinated closely experts from multiple agencies, engaged the crisis, the sheer number of agencies and with the Embassy’s Emergency Action Com- directly with the community of U.S. citizens actors involved within both governments, and mittee, the Joint Support Force, and other in several forums to answer questions and the dauntingly complex nature of the chal- organizations involved in supporting the help explain the practical effects of some of lenges being faced. The Japanese and U.S. gov- Japanese government. The DART concept is the complex technical issues associated with ernments both grappled with the herculean a well-honed method for deploying civilian the crisis. Visiting experts from the Food and task of managing information flows between capacity to a foreign country to assist local Drug Administration helped assess the effects agencies and offices inside and outside of gov- crisis-affected citizens, typically basing opera- of the radiological release on the food chain, a ernment, many of whom do not often interact tions in the U.S. Embassy, and coordinating radiation oncologist from the National Cancer under normal circumstances.8 U.S. Government relief efforts with the host Institute provided expert views on potential The conversations occurring between country government under the authority of health effects on the population, and officials U.S. and Japanese government agencies the U.S. Chief of Mission. Yet while the mili- from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric frequently involved U.S. requests for infor- tary joint task force construct serves to orga- Administration drew lessons learned from mation on the evolving situation and the nize and manage personnel and resources in ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 29 Forum | Managing Foreign Assistance in a CBRN Emergency U.S. Marine Corps (Vernon T. Meekins) T. U.S. Marine Corps (Vernon
Members of USAID and Fairfax County Urban Search and Rescue team meet in Ofunato, Japan, after earthquake and tsunami support of a military contingency operation, engagement in the Hosono Process. The BACC Secretariat and U.S. Embassy. The BACC no analogous coordination mechanism exists included representatives from OFDA and all of tasking matrix essentially applied to bilat- to absorb and structure civilian personnel the relevant Embassy offices, as well as other eral coordination of nuclear-related foreign sent to a U.S. Embassy to support crisis man- stakeholder organizations such as the NRC, assistance the proven MITAM system used agement in the case of a CBRN emergency DOE, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, by the DART for civil-military coordination, that affects Americans abroad and/or has USPACOM, and USFJ. The BACC reached providing a single tool for listing all requests domestic impacts.9 back to parent agencies in Washington as for U.S. assistance, tracking progress toward well as to the private sector through the U.S. their accomplishment, and recording the U.S. Organizing for Interagency Department of Commerce’s Foreign Com- and Japanese personnel responsible for vetting Collaboration mercial Service. NRC also facilitated technical and responding to the requests. As the humanitarian needs in the region dialogue with the Institute of Nuclear Power Using the shared matrix, members of the affected by the tsunami became less acute Operators on behalf of the BACC. BACC team were able to interact effectively toward the latter part of April, the DART The BACC received requests for assis- with Japanese counterparts in a working-level assessed that an appropriate time had been tance from the Japanese government via the support group that was established to inform reached to stand down its humanitarian Hosono Process at multiple venues: in higher and implement decisions reached through response function. Yet because of the ongoing level meetings, at action officer–level working the Hosono Process. Formal requests for need for support and bilateral dialogue on groups chaired by the Japanese Cabinet material assistance were categorized as to matters relating to the nuclear emergency, a fol- Secretariat, and in a radiological monitoring their priority, and requests for information low-on body was needed to help bring together subworking group hosted by the Japanese and technical assistance were included in the various stakeholders involved in providing Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, a separate section. As requests were either support to the Japanese government in the Science, and Technology. Each of these meet- completed or withdrawn, they were moved to consequence management sphere. In coopera- ings involved representatives from numerous the end of the BACC matrix. The matrix was tion with DART leadership, and in consulta- Japanese and U.S. organizations involved in exchanged between the U.S. and the Japanese tion with involved offices in Washington, DC, supporting the crisis response. Assistance prior to Hosono Process meetings, with addi- Ambassador Roos convened an organizational requests were added to a tracking matrix that tions and modifications made collaboratively mechanism entitled the Bilateral Assistance was developed by the DART and managed in advance. This collaborative system proved Coordination Cell (BACC) to support U.S. bilaterally between the Japanese Cabinet extremely useful in enabling timely and
30 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BASALLA, BERGER, and ABBOT efficient responses to requests for assistance in a complex disaster response, an approach 5 Department of Homeland Security, “National by the Japanese government, created a single, that may also prove useful in the unfortunate Reponse Framework,” available at
By Kathleen Conley
s the U.S. military emerges The paper asserts that, although Mission shift is that in the future, leaders must focus from more than a decade of Command is found in current doctrine, more on adapting their preferences and style not combat experience, two factors must be done to cope with an “increasingly only to the mission but also to the situation. A hold particular promise for complex and uncertain operating environ- In other words, the situation itself—not leader meeting future military needs. First, the ment” and that the “conduct of Mission preferences—may become the overriding joint force has developed a cadre of strong Command requires adaptable leaders at all factor in determining an organization’s C2 leaders who have successfully adapted in levels.”4 In addition to presenting his Mission approach. the face of a bewilderingly complex array of Command leadership philosophy, General This expansion of an approach with an challenges.1 Second, it has compiled a record Dempsey seems to be calling for a paradigm honorable history in U.S. military lore—par- of enhanced mission achievement associated shift in the manner in which military leaders ticularly as applied by irregular forces—is with dramatic increases in networking and relate to their organizations and to the operat- broadly consistent with the findings of a information processing capability.2 These ing environment. body of research known as C2 Agility. In factors provide the basis for shaping a better In today’s military, leaders typically do general, a military unit is deemed to be “agile” integrated and more effective joint force, one not adapt their preferences and style to the if it can successfully respond to changed that draws inspiration not only from exist- organization—rather, the organization adapts circumstances; Mission Command supports ing doctrine, field experience, and academic to the leader. Leader preferences stem from C2 Agility by encouraging decentralized deci- research, but especially from key leaders who a collective set of personal experiences, and sionmaking fully informed by commander’s advocate fundamental change. they reflect informed judgments as to what intent. Furthermore, as General Dempsey spe- Significantly, General Martin Dempsey, methods work best. The result has normally cifically states, “Mission Command is not a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently been a hierarchical command and control mechanical process.”5 This statement implies published a Mission Command White Paper.3 (C2) system. General Dempsey’s paradigm that Mission Command is not a process that commanders can simply inspect and expect to achieve based upon a checklist of do’s and don’ts. Rather, Mission Command, we suggest, is more dynamic, first requiring feed- back on the effectiveness of the organization’s current C2 approach. Based on this feedback, organizations and their leaders should be able to recognize the need for adjustments
U.S. Army (Michael M. Novogradac) to the C2 approach. By making these needed changes, U.S. forces would be empowered to retain, regain, or improve effectiveness due to actual, perceived, or anticipated changes to the situation. Viewed in this manner, Mission Command becomes less a static state of being, and more the adoption of a dynamic process
Soldiers discuss training sustainment units for deployments to Afghanistan during First Army Sustainment Unit Logistics Training Symposium Kathleen Conley is a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
32 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu CONLEY for managing change as necessary, a key tool approach has important advantages in some 595’s C2 element to communicate directly for adaptive leaders. situations. Its attractiveness largely stems with the Combined Air Operations Center In fact, in calling for widespread adop- from the fact that authority and information and Airborne Warning and Control System tion of the attributes of Mission Command, travel along predictable pathways. These (AWACS) aircraft. Lastly, creative distribution General Dempsey is doing something the pathways are straightforward and direct. Both of information between these nonstandard joint force is familiar with in a leader: he command relationships and accountability formations and their supporting logistics ele- is setting forth a new agenda, and he is are simplified: among commanders and staffs, ments enabled a 21st-century logistics system providing insights on why his agenda is the critical relationships are between superior to deliver needed saddles, horse feed, and important. What may be less clear to many and subordinate; among units, the connec- blankets to special operations forces and to is that General Dempsey is asking the entire tions are between supported and supporting provide AK-47s and 7.62mm ammunition to force—both commanders and those they organizations. Northern Alliance fighters.6 command—to continue adapting, not directly Beyond this typical approach, however, As this illustrates, and as General to him and his preferences as a commander, the history of warfare as well as recent Dempsey points out, the security environ- but to a diverse, uncertain future operational operations are replete with examples of ment is becoming increasingly dynamic and environment. alternate, often ad hoc, command and control complex. This will stress the hierarchical Mission Command cannot be embraced approaches that diverge from this single approach along all three dimensions of the C2 and applied blindly. Operationalizing the standard. A vivid example of a C2 approach approach space or “cube.” Mission Command new Mission Command vision requires that that occupies the box labeled “Edge” in responds by advocating decentralized leaders across the force—and the organiza- figure 1 comes from the battle of Mazar-e execution based upon mission type orders, tions they command—be able to do three Sharif, Afghanistan, in 2001. Special Forces increased sharing of information both hori- things both dynamically and routinely: Operational Detachment A (SFODA) 595 zontally and laterally, and networked interac- shared certain decision rights with entities not tion with a greater number and variety of all ■■ understand their organization’s current under U.S. command, notably the Northern types of organizations—any of which can C2 approach Alliance Force, led by Afghan General Abdul support or be supported by any other. ■■ detect significant changes in the Rashid Dostum. In addition, highly vari- General Dempsey describes three key environment or mission that indicate a new able patterns of interaction enabled SFODA attributes of this approach—understanding, approach is needed ■■ adapt the C2 approach appropriately Figure 1. and in a timely manner.
Developing and employing these capa- bilities will drive changes in doctrine, educa- distribution broad tion, training, and operations throughout of information the joint force. However, there is currently no none among entities roadmap for making such sweeping changes across the board. This article aims to facili- unconstrained tate this important force-wide transition by sketching out the contours of such a map. Edge
What Is a Command and Control Approach? Collaborative The concept of an “approach” to C2 is foreign to many, largely because a single approach is prevalent throughout the U.S. Coordinated military. Students of C2 describe this familiar tightly constrained approach as hierarchical—one characterized Deconflicted by centralized decisionmaking authority, none limited ability to share information, and limited ability to interact laterally and across of decisionallocation rights to the collective organizational boundaries. Developed across a series of multinational research forums, figure 1 depicts these attributes graphically, with each component of the C2 approach falling on a separate axis. broad The traditional hierarchical C2 approach falls near the origin of all three Source: David S. Alberts, Reiner K. Huber, and James Mo at, NATO NEC C2 Maturity Model (Washington, axes; C2 Agility theory postulates that this DC: CCRP, 2010), 66, available at
34 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu CONLEY
Soldier explains mitigation strategy to members of Joint Task Force 71 during command and control training U.S. Army (Melissa Bright)
fluidity (developing ever greater adaptability, appropriate moment. These procedures could 4 Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations critical thinking, and independent, rapid be validated in operational experiments that (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 11, 2011), decisionmaking). would serve to translate C2 Agility theory defines Mission Command as “the conduct of mili- Many leaders and organizations are into Mission Command practice. Lessons tary operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders.” using the principles of Mission Command in learned from these experiments would enable 5 Dempsey, 4. current combat and other activities. Unfortu- the tenets of Mission Command to be incul- 6 William Knarr and Robert Richbourg, nately, such applications are unique to units cated into doctrine, education, and training, Learning from the First Victory of the 21st Century: and have not been institutionalized in joint including exercises at all levels. Only then Mazar-e Sharif: An Educational/Training Resource doctrine and training. General Dempsey and will General Dempsey’s ambitious vision Guide (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense others clearly see the need to refine these become a reality. JFQ Analyses, 2008). successful principles into Mission Command 7 Dempsey, 4. and have them pervade leader development 8 Ibid. and organizational design. By visualizing the Notes C2 approach space, Agile C2 theory, when 1 Nathan Minami et al., “Beyond Reconcilia- operationalized, would enable joint forces tion: Developing Faith, Hope, Trust, and Unity in to systematically characterize their current Iraq,” Military Review 91, no. 2 (March–April 2011), C2 approach within the range of approaches 52–59. covered by Mission Command; issue 2 Daniel Gonzales et al., Network-Centric enabling directions for the selected approach; Operations Case Study: The Stryker Brigade Combat and, if necessary, choose which dimension(s) Team (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), avail- along which to alter the current approach. In able at
Where does an 800-pound gorilla sit? Wherever it wants.
By Ryan P. Allen he largest gorillas found in the not need that much mass when 700 or even wild weigh around 500 pounds, 600 pounds would be enough weight and and gorillas living in captivity power to have its way in any situation and sit Tcan weigh over 600 pounds.1 where it wants. One can say the same for the The 800-pound gorilla of the classic riddle Department of Defense (DOD). The Depart- gets whatever it wants by virtue of its exag- ment is too large, and a smaller DOD is in the gerated size. There are no smaller creatures best interest of the United States. or other large gorillas that could stop it, so it The current DOD is a liability in some dominates without competition. While the respects, which runs counter to the security 800-pound gorilla’s size is beneficial to him, and stability that U.S. citizens expect. Of it is unnecessarily large. The gorilla does course, it provides the necessary national Combat Camera (Richard Norris) Combat Camera (Richard th 55
Soldiers provide security during Operation Southern Strike II, Afghanistan
36 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu allen defense, but at its current size, it also comes sarily exercise military power consistent The idea of legitimacy naturally arises with unintended effects. Overreliance on with the idea of national defense as held by during discussions of national sovereignty. military force instead of utilization of other many citizens. Samuel Huntington wrote Although legitimacy in the eyes of the world is forms of national power is an unintended but about the gap between American ideals and something most governments desire, it has not natural result of an overly large and extremely the institutional practice of those ideals by proven to be a roadblock to military action. capable organization. The DOD budget is government. Huntington suggested that Although not required, internationally per- too large to remain at its current level, and throughout the political and governmental ceived legitimacy does have its place in plan- the amount that the U.S. Government spends processes, American institutions are incon- ning for military action. Embarking only upon on defense is unsustainable if the Nation sistent in practice with the people’s ideas.3 In “just” military actions that are perceived as wishes to regain economic viability. Finally, the defense environment, one can see this in legitimate by the world at large helps provide the excessive size of DOD results in strategic the form of defense commitments that are balance and stability to international relations. overreach, does not match realistic threat pro- not essential to the defense of the Nation. Nations that upset this international balance jections, and, ironically, weakens the United Rather than using military force to defend through unaccepted military use degrade that States over time. vital security interests, the U.S. Government international system, no matter how powerful The United States can reverse these often uses it electively in support of lesser the acting nation may be. Political scientist unintended consequences with a sound plan interests. Washington conducted military Andrew Hurrell writes that legitimacy in this for reduction of DOD manpower and budget. operations in Bosnia, Iraq, and Libya with context is “the existence of an international Of course, any reduction must be in harmony tenuous connections to actual defense of the order reflecting unequal power and involving with national security, defense, and military United States.4 The use of military power in the use of coercive force that creates the need strategies to be effective. Military strategy areas that may be better suited to other forms for legitimization in the first place,” and it is nests in the President’s National Security Strat- of power unnecessarily raises the stakes in “as much a part of the messy world of politics egy and the Secretary of Defense’s National the international community. as of the idealized world of legal or moral Defense Strategy. Reduction measures that do The use of U.S. military power often debate.”8 An overreliance on the military not account for elements of these strategies comes with media and popular discus- aspect of national power tends to erode this are ill-advised and reckless. Therefore, sound sions, domestically and abroad, of national international system, which is a stabilizing military strategy that addresses current and sovereignty and legitimacy. The use of dip- force in most cases. Military force is only one future threats must be the starting point.2 With lomatic, economic, and informational forms instrument of power and its overuse comes at a National Military Strategy that addresses these threats, and a realistic approach toward what it will take to safeguard the Nation in light rather than using military force to defend vital security of these threats, the United States can maintain interests, the U.S. Government often uses it electively a military that allows for the use of other forms in support of lesser interests of power, is economically sustainable, and does not encourage overreach. of power rarely triggers such discussions. the expense of the nation as a whole, weaken- Overemphasis on Military Sovereignty is a term without a concrete, ing the potential impact of the other forms of There are many ways to organize and globally accepted definition, but for most it power.9 distinguish forms of national power. One generally means the right and responsibility Diplomatic relations guarantee little, common organization is its division into of a nation’s government to govern within as they rely on relationships in which both four categories: diplomatic, informational, its borders without external infringement.5 nations tend to vie for their own interests. The military, and economic. Naturally, nations While many people around the world share result of the bargaining is likely a combination most often use those elements of national this concept, historically a realistic if some- of the two interests, a compromise that is not power best suited to their strengths and their what Hobbesian view is that a nation is only what either nation desires in total but is more cultural and traditional norms. The way dif- as sovereign as stronger nations or groups palatable than the alternatives.10 Members ferent forms of national power are used forms of nations allow.6 Sovereignty of weaker of powerful governments, or the citizens of an identity for each nation in the international nations may or may not be important to those nations, often take exception to this community. This combination shifts over stronger nations based on current events uncertainty. Militarily powerful nations may time as national interests evolve, the nation’s and circumstances, and has not been a fixed be tempted to use force to get exactly what strengths and weaknesses change, and the principle throughout American history.7 they want rather than having to accept the social and political climates in a nation or This cynical but realistic view of sovereignty compromise of diplomacy. This assumes, region transform. does not mean, however, that it is in the however, that force gives a more predictable DOD carries out the mission of interest of stronger nations to violate the and intended outcome, which history shows national defense today but does not neces- sovereignty of weaker nations. to be untrue. The cumulative result of the use of force wears on a nation’s credibility in the international scene, and ultimately weakens Major Ryan P. Allen, USMC, is with Marine Air Control Group-18, Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, Okinawa, future attempts at applying diplomatic power. Japan; he wrote this article while a student at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College.
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In U.S. history, we can see the ebb and security threats, and only after all other imple- through a combination of tax increases, cuts in flow in favor of diplomatic versus military ments of national power are exhausted. domestic program spending, and borrowing.22 forms of national power. Individual person- The past decade has seen quite a different alities, external threats, and other factors Economic Impact of an Oversized approach to paying for defense and war. The have combined, resulting in administrations DOD conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan mark the and leaders who have tended toward either The U.S. economy is staggering in scale first time in U.S. history that the government diplomacy or military force. Diplomacy in and complexity. In 2011, total Federal revenue cut taxes and did not cut nondefense spend- the Cold War between the United States was $2.2 trillion, and Federal spending was ing while engaged in major wars.23 Seemingly, and Soviet Union was unique, at times $3.8 trillion. It does not take an economist to the United States and its citizens are having nonexistent, and usually combined heavily see that in 2011 the United States ran a deficit; their cake and eating it, too. It should come as with military posturing.11 Indeed, the very it spent (outlays) more money than it took no surprise that fighting wars costs money, a appointment of some personalities, such in (receipts), and it has done that every year dilemma that typically triggers the so-called as John Foster Dulles in the Eisenhower since 2001. Annual deficits, which in turn guns-versus-butter debate. The U.S. Govern- administration, ensured that diplomacy with add to the total national debt, have been the ment seemingly avoided this controversy in the Soviets was not an option.12 Throughout norm since World War II. In the past 5 years, America’s most recent wars, but the short-term the 1970s and 1980s, the United States cut the United States amassed about one-third avoidance comes with a long-term cost. the State Department budget by 20 percent, ($4.6 trillion) of the current total national Political scientist Alex Mintz correctly resulting in the closure of over 30 Embassies deficit ($16 trillion).16 Economists expect that concludes that there has not been a “defense- and consulates and elimination of 22 percent after 2015, national debt will outpace gross welfare tradeoff” in post–World War II of the department’s employees.13 The cuts in domestic product (GDP) growth, resulting in America.24 Increased defense spending does the State Department resulted in increased the reduced possibility of being able to “grow not result in reduced domestic programs—it results in debt. Until recently, the government offset this increase in defense spending with as long as there is a force large and capable enough there revenue increases (bonds and/or taxes). A will be a temptation to use that force without the perceived dangerous reality now faces Americans who uncertainty or compromise of diplomacy are willing to look at the numbers: guns and butter and reduced revenue equal mountains of debt. How did the United States arrive at operations for the Defense Department, and out of debt.”17 There is no doubt that these this point? A large part of the answer is that the missions were not always a good match. trends over the past decade are hazardous and there is simply too much money involved The Defense Department chafed as the unsustainable, and we cannot attribute the in defense and too much influence over a Clinton administration grew accustomed to source of the deficits to one area alone. While Congress that naturally seeks constituent using it to cover the types of missions that defense spending is not the only large budget approval. The power of the purse held by could have been better addressed through category for the United States, it is one of the Congress necessitates close ties with the diplomacy. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of consistently largest areas of spending.18 defense industry where the appropriated Staff Colin Powell was seen as “obstructive” Defense amounts to 17 percent of money is spent. President Dwight Eisenhower by the Clinton administration officials who Federal spending in the President’s 2013 publicly warned of the dangers of what wished to resolve the situation in Bosnia with budget proposal.19 The size of annual defense has become widely known as the military- military force.14 The situation resulted in the expenditures, to which the U.S. people have industrial complex. Privately though, and famous statement from Secretary of State grown accustomed for the most part, are with more accuracy, Eisenhower included Madeleine Albright: “What are you saving this typically presented in such a way as to under- the Congress and labeled the relationship the superb military for . . . if we can’t use it?”15 This emphasize the actual dollars being spent. “delta of power.”25 civilian tendency to use military force either For example, citing defense expenditures The delta of power more accurately without clear political goals or as a substitute as a percentage of GDP is misleading in its describes a tripartite relationship where one for other implements of national power, which own right. Americans would not think twice party allocates the money, one party spends was embraced by both political parties, dem- about paying 4 cents out of every dollar (as a the money, and one party receives the money. onstrates the danger of maintaining an over- percentage of GDP) for their security.20 Con- Congress does not always allot money based sized military force. As long as there is a force versely, if Americans knew that 17 cents out of on a threat, as many Members of Congress see large and capable enough at the disposal of the every dollar the government spends went to military programs for the benefit they provide Government, there will be a temptation and DOD, or 32 cents out of every dollar received to their constituents in the form of jobs and tendency to use that force as a quick problem in taxes, the reaction could be quite different.21 state revenue. The defense those programs solver to get the desired outcome without the Americans must realize that too much provide is nearly an afterthought. Every year, perceived uncertainty or compromise of diplo- defense, more specifically the money it costs the DOD budget contains unrequested funds macy. To resolve this issue, it is imperative that to provide that much capability, is nearly as for programs that mean jobs and happy con- the United States maintain a DOD sized and hazardous to a nation in the long term as stituents for Congress and industry, but not structured to respond only to true national having too small a defense capability. His- necessarily military utility. For example, the torically, the United States pays for its wars 1996 Defense Authorization Bill contained $8
38 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu allen billion in unrequested spending, 80 percent and may face in the near future. Today’s DOD this threat, we must ask what role DOD is of which went to states with lawmakers sitting structure remains based on Cold War require- expected to play against that threat. Indeed, on the Armed Services and National Security ments and threats. That basic structure drives that task falls not only on DOD but also on committees or the Appropriations Defense policy and political strategy, causing overreach the Department of Homeland Security and subcommittees.26 The purpose of spending and eventually resulting in a weaker United other agencies. The Defense Department this unrequested money is not for defense; it is States. We must examine realistic current and may have a role in reaction to a terrorist to bring money and jobs to home districts and future threats to arrive at a proper match of attack depending on the attack’s scale and constituents. Money spent on defense should defense capabilities and resources. origin, and would certainly have a role in be for just that, defense, not for a stimulus for We can organize current and near-term preventing some types of actions originating congressional district economies.27 America threats to the United States into two general outside of U.S. borders. However, current is paying an unnecessarily large sum for categories: threats from nonstate groups DOD organization and structure would be defense, due in part to Congress’s incentive to and those from competitor nation-states. of little use in directly preventing another funnel defense dollars and jobs home to their The former became a very real issue for the 9/11-type attack. If we accept this logic, the districts—but what is the solution? United States on 9/11. Since those attacks, only choices are to change the Department The American military is the most the United States has been fighting nonstate to provide this defense or to expect that effective and capable in the world, but it is not groups around the globe, but from a military defense to come from other departments worth the increasing amount it costs. Man- standpoint primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan. and agencies. If DOD should not be orga- power expenses alone are growing at a rapid The latter threat, of competitor nation-states, nized and tasked to prevent such an attack, rate. The annual cost for pay and training of has always been a factor in national security we must then look at what reaction the an Active-duty Soldier rose from $75,000 in and always will be. The complex and impor- Department could have to such an attack as 2001 to $120,000 in 2006, excluding indirect tant questions relating to nation-state threats part of the defense strategy. costs such as family housing.28 The United States pays too much for too much defense capability and could spend significantly less America is paying an unnecessarily large sum for defense, and defend itself nearly as well. Politicians due in part to Congress’s incentive to funnel defense propose defense spending reductions with dollars and jobs home to their districts great trepidation if they are bold enough to propose them at all. A recent speech by Presi- dent Barack Obama, for example, calls on remain: how much of a threat do certain The U.S. reaction to the 9/11 attacks was Americans to understand that “we can keep countries pose, and how will that threat mani- primarily military. Examining this reaction our military strong and our nation secure fest itself? These threat groups must be the is important in determining if the military with a defense budget that continues to be starting point in determining defense posture is a good choice for terrorist attack response. larger than roughly the next ten countries and organization. Whether the U.S. Government expected it or combined.”29 This is a clear demonstra- Nonstate groups such as al Qaeda have not, the response to the 9/11 attacks continues tion of an inferiority complex thrust on the used terrorism and irregular tactics against to this day. Depending on whether we include American people by Congress, DOD, and the larger and more powerful entities such as the Operation Iraqi Freedom in that response, defense industry: a call for ever-increasing United States. Understandably frustrating the 9/11 attacks resulted in 19 years (nearly defense spending based more on economic to many Americans, it is the natural tactical 9 in Iraq and over 10 in Afghanistan) of and political desires than on real-world choice for nonstate groups, who wisely do military action for DOD. The United States threats to national security. not wish to fight U.S. strengths. Competi- does not have the money or national will for tor nation-states pose a different challenge. that type of response to become the norm.31 The Resulting Weakening of the Nation-states may engage in acts as benign If adversaries see that scale of response as a United States as economic competition and as malicious prediction of future U.S. strategy, nonstate On the surface, it is counterintuitive as full-scale conventional war or any point and state actors alike will choose that tactic to propose that a strong and large DOD will in between. Historically, Americans worry and watch the United States fall on the sword weaken the United States over time. To mili- most about this conventional threat when of overreach. In this respect, the war on terror tarists, hegemonists, and the defense industry, thinking about national defense. The U.S. serves as an opportunity for rival states such the military cannot be strong enough. In defense industry has long been postured as China and Iran.32 their view, there will always be critical threats to battle rival conventional forces, and Many envision conflict with competitor to national security that are on the verge of parting from that mindset proves difficult. nation-states in terms of head-to-head con- destroying the United States. The Nation does Rather than deriving defense strategy and ventional military action and speculate that indeed face threats and that will continue, but structure based on threats to U.S. national China is a potential foe. The U.S. Govern- this does not mean that it structures its defense security, strategy is in danger of being con- ment must shape defense strategy; therefore, apparatus appropriately to counter those structed based on current organization and it must organize and size its forces around threats. The current size and structure of the capabilities.30 this type of threat. In doing so, it must avoid U.S. military is ill-suited to address challenges It is likely that nonstate groups will the conventional approach in favor of a the United States has faced in the past 10 years attack the United States again. To address realistic look at how such a conflict would
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 39 Special Feature | Why We Need a Smaller Defense Department occur. Economic competition and occasional Recommended Future for DOD Officially, according to the 2011 National disputes between Beijing and Washington The current defense approach results Military Strategy, we face an “evolution to a are much more likely than conventional in overuse at the expense of other forms of ‘multi-nodal’ world characterized by more war.33 A strategy of proxy war and entice- national power, costs too much, and results in shifting, interest-driven coalitions based on ment will probably remain more appropriate strategic overreach. To remedy this, Washing- diplomatic, military, and economic power, in dealing with competitor nations such as ton must change why and how it uses DOD than by a rigid competition between oppos- China.34 Thus, the United States must care- and change its size and composition as well. ing blocs.”43 The 2010 Quadrennial Defense fully measure potential military involvement The appropriate starting point must be a top- Review (QDR) describes the current and in such conflicts and decide whether it is down review of the U.S. strategic framework.39 near-future defense environment by stating, necessary to maintain a 1.4 million-strong P.H. Liotta and Richmond Lloyd recommend “not since the fall of the Soviet Union or the standing force to address such threats. beginning the strategic framework review end of World War II has the international Since the end of the Cold War, the with a series of questions: What do we want terrain been affected by . . . the rise of new United States has used its military might in to do? How do we plan to do it? What are we powers, the growing influence of nonstate conflicts that are arguably not strictly national up against? What is available to do it? What actors, the spread of weapons of mass defense missions. Militarists advocate the use are the mismatches? Most importantly we destruction and other destructive enabling of force to influence and shape the world in must ask, “Why do we want to do this?”40 The technologies.”44 The same document details terms of U.S. interests, which is starkly dif- answer to that question matters. Aggressively the force required to meet these “far-reaching ferent than use of force for national defense.35 promoting American ideals and democratic and consequential shifts” but does not rec- The American public will generally embrace systems of government, even without military ommend significant change to current force the use of the military for those situations that force, can create animosity and spark the structure.45 The congressionally mandated are genuinely national defense, while its use kinds of conflict the United States seeks to independent QDR review panel report notes to further other interests is far more difficult avoid in the first place.41 This dynamic is exac- that QDR reports have “become a mirror to justify.36 Superpowers usually do not fight erbated by the type of constant military activ- of the current budget process rather than a small wars to defend themselves but rather ity seen following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.42 strategic guide to the future that drives the to establish stability or exert control.37 The It is noteworthy that the first questions Liotta budget process.”46 United States must carefully weigh which situ- and Lloyd ask are not the ones asked in prac- Finding a solution to the economic ations constitute a genuine threat and which tice, which often start with, “What are we up aspect of decreasing the size of DOD is merely influence U.S. interests. The lack of against?” challenging but achievable. It is rational discrimination between the two results in We can find myriad answers concern- for Members of Congress to seek and pass military overreach.38 ing what the United States is up against. legislation bringing defense dollars to their districts. The reward is reelection, and there is no penalty for that at present. Detailed con- gressional reform is beyond the scope of this article, but a simple solution exists. Eliminat- ing unrequested money in the defense budget is a start, but overall budget cutting is required DOD (Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo) as well. Congress could model future defense budget reduction on the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) program. BRAC legislation was designed to “give top cover and distance to politicians . . . who might otherwise want to do the right thing” but seek to avoid the blame and political fallout.47 Eliminating the political disincentive associated with defense cuts makes room for real change. One must recognize the fact that more money involved in defense spending means more incentive to take advantage of the system. Extra defense dollars result in extra corruption. To be sure, a reduction in the size of DOD in terms of manpower is a conten- tious issue. Many analysts use the size of a nation’s military synonymously with its capability. Political scientist Peter Feaver warns, “It serves no purpose to establish a protection force and then to vitiate it to the Chairman takes questions during testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee point where it can no longer protect. Indeed,
40 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu allen an inadequate military institution may be in a Cold War–style massive conventional Notes worse than none at all.”48 Feaver is correct, war, is more aligned with current and future but many analysts today incorrectly surmise security threats without wholesale loss of 1 Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s.v. that defense reduction equals “vitiation.” capability. “gorilla,” available at
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15 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary (New Defense Planning: Colliding RMAs Necessitate a (Washington, DC: Congressional Research York: Miramax Books, 2003), 182. New Strategy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011), Service, January 31, 2012), 18, available at
42 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu The Case for Military Pension Reform U.S. Navy (Greg Vojtko) U.S. Navy (Greg
Survivors attend commemoration of 70th anniversary of Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor
By Jon P. Sunderland needs no alteration. For service in the line of duty, it recognizes individuals who have f the Department of Defense (DOD) declined. As a result, morale in the workforce given 20 or more years of honorable service fails to reform its military retirement declined and a sense of corporate responsibil- and recognizes their personal sacrifice in system, it will find itself in the same ity was never asserted by leadership. In effect, holding up their end of their contract with Iplace as General Motors (GM) during GM was unable to keep up because it was the Federal Government. The current system the last decade. With GM management unwilling to change. Rather than act on the is supported in strong conviction by retired focused on maintaining the status quo, stag- financial inequities clearly present in early and Active-duty Servicemembers alike. gering legacy costs provided health care and analysis, leadership chose to pass the buck to However, the financial numbers tell a dif- pensions to millions of retirees totaling nearly consumers, contributing to a declaration of ferent story and hint that the current model $2,000 per vehicle.1 A cumbersome and bankruptcy in 2009 and one of the greatest will be unsustainable in the future. Left unresponsive bureaucracy suggests a man- downfalls in corporate American history. untouched, it could endanger the military’s agement failure in organization that lasted Military advocates have long argued ability to reward the performance of our over decades as market share consistently that the current military retirement system future career force. The central question in the debate on military retirement is therefore how an individual who spends a career in a Lieutenant Commander Jon P. Sunderland, USN, is assigned to Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron One, Naval profession where the risk is the ultimate sac- Air Station Whidbey Island, WA. Previously he was a student at the Naval War College. rifice should be compensated in retirement.
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had taken care of them in the greatest time of need.5 Periodic reassessments of the military retirement package have caused considerable tension. Since 1976, seven different panels have been charged with evaluating changes U.S. Air Force (David H. Lipp) U.S. Air Force to the retirement system.6 The focus has always remained the same: how should Con- gress and the Services continue to offer a fair benefits package at a reasonable cost? This is the central problem in military retirement reform. The difficulty is not in acknowledg- ing the value of Servicemember contribu- tions, but in converting it to a valuation. Both Active-duty and retired military react emotionally to suggestions of changing the system, and the magnitude of the reaction has been significant enough to deter any significant reform. As a result, proposals in these commissions have never been wholly received and have resulted in small-scale changes only. The strong military sentiment suggests tremendous value in the object to those who serve, yet the relatively small compromises over the years have allowed North Dakota National Guard adjutant general pins Meritorious Service Medal on Air Force chief master financial expenditures to increase more sergeant during retirement ceremony rapidly. Pensions for over 2.2 million retired military personnel are a $1.3 trillion liability It is legitimate for citizens to consider and their families even before the Nation was (of which $385 billion is funded) and are the value of military service as sacred. founded. In 1636, the first law granting ben- projected to grow to $2.8 trillion by 2034.7 The value of military service itself and the efits was passed during the conflict between These are unsustainable costs even in the contributions of members are priceless, but the Plymouth Pilgrims and Pequot Indians present time and remain projected to grow. the question of retirement compensation is where “any man set forth as a soldier and different. Any valuation must be based on returned maimed should be maintained by The Present criteria that must be reasonable in context. the colony for life.”2 The system has evolved The criteria that collectively make up The current benefits offered in the U.S. since then, but giving consideration to military the military retirement system are based military are based on historical assump- retirees has remained. The current retirement on a different time and place. Longevity, tions of a century ago. Therefore, military plan took shape in the early 1900s, where after generational values, emphasis on work-life retirement reform should not impact current 20 years of honorable service a member was balance, and technology are all markedly retiree, Active, or Reserve personnel, but granted a percentage of basic pay, medical different compared to societal attributes over should be enacted for the future force. The care, and indirect benefits such as commissary a century ago. In 2011, life expectancy in the preservation of benefits to recruit and retain and exchange privileges for life.3 Lawmakers United States was 78 years, with millennium the most qualified personnel and to incentiv- approved these benefits as a fair deal based generational values centered on confidence, ize honorable and dedicated service within on longevity, generational values, and fiscal achievement, diversity, and competition.8 the characteristics of the current generation approach. In 1910, life expectancy in the According to Thomas Friedman, this is a should be implemented now. Both the Under United States was 51 years, and significant population that lives in the age of a flattening Secretary of Defense for Personnel and events such as World War I, World War II, and world where traditional structures are being Readiness and Assistant Secretary of Defense the Great Depression shaped traditionalist transformed by globalization in ways that for Military Personnel Policy should consider values centered on discipline, conformity, and state-centric organizations are ill-equipped alternatives to preserve retirement options delaying rewards to oneself or one’s family.4 to deal with.9 This is the age of informa- for future career military members. The focus was on service to country because tion and networking where greater control the country had given so much to its citizens. is placed in the hands of the individual. The Past When these values were translated into work Military requirements are changing, too. Military retirement holds a longstand- requirements, it showed that dedication, The operational tempo is increasing, mission ing value for Servicemembers. Service in diligent effort, and respect for authority were sets are diversifying, and recruiting remains arms was a respected profession because of the driving factors in employment, especially keenly competitive. Coming out of multiple the extraordinary sacrifices of both warriors in the government because citizens believed it wars, America is also tending to have more
44 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu sunderland wounded warriors than ever.10 Many roles are be flexible in order to preserve a benefit for Recognizing a graying workforce that fundamentally changing for both the officer future generations. Recognizing a Marine’s will work longer, retirement eligibility should and enlisted ranks, which will demand an sacrifices is not the issue. The issue, rather, is be a factor of age and years of service. The even more highly competent force. to what end. “Rule of 80” (see table 2) has been used by The financial environment is dramati- If DOD considers people to be its criti- various groups such as local governments, cally different. DOD is the focal point of the cal strength in executing the defense of the Federal judges, and school districts. By current budget reductions as wars conclude Nation, it needs to remake a retirement policy making the sum of age and service equal in Iraq and Afghanistan and looming foreign to conform to 21st-century realities. Retire- 80, it is possible to maintain an Active-duty debts come due. Billions have already been ment reform should be evaluated on five cri- force predominantly between the ages of 18 slashed from budgets in recent years. With teria: retirement eligibility, the direct benefit, and 60. With the physical nature of military the failure of the Joint Select Committee on type of contribution benefit plan, indirect work, a greater majority will likely continue Deficit Reduction (the “Supercommittee”), benefits, and vesting. Table 1 outlines a pro- to enter at younger ages, but this system an additional $1.2 trillion in cuts will be posed alternative based on these measures. would allow multiple on- and off-ramps and spread among various government programs The proposed alternative is meant not keep personnel in service until their late 40s with Defense expected to assume $600 only to preserve the value of a military retire- to early 50s on average. The current retire- billion of the total.11 The size of the DOD ment but also to promote performance and ment system does not facilitate force man- budget should not be targeted simply for its active ownership of retirement savings. It is agement or encourage longer careers, a key size, but in this era it is important to realize based on two central tenets: earn your keep opportunity since the retirement age usually greater efficiencies for the sake of future and pay yourself first. The current generation allows personnel to move on to second force planning. has demonstrated incredible skill in access- careers.13 This alternative would retain more What is valued in the current retirement ing and applying information but seems to senior personnel who provide critical leader- model? It offers an exceptionally generous lack the discipline to plan for the long term. ship, corporate knowledge, and mentorship defined contribution benefit, medical care for This core incentive capitalizes on the high to younger generations, a key factor bridging members and their families, and exchange degree of individuality but stems the “earn to the gap. and commissary privileges for life. It is often spend” mentality by regularly contributing The direct benefit should be a base not considered an incentive until a member to future savings. salary that recognizes a combination of two passes 10 years of service due to its cliff vesting nature, but it is heavily prioritized afterward. Table 1. Current and Proposed Retirement Numerically, base pay is a significant financial incentive alone. For example, in 2012 an O5 retiring at 20 years of service can expect to Attribute Current Proposed alternative earn $3.028 million in retirement income over a 40-year timeframe.12 An E7 would earn Eligibility 20 years Age + Years of service (YOS) = 80 $1.615 million over the same period. Retiring from the Service normally happens between ■■ ■■ 38 and 45 years of age, so by being relatively Direct Incentivized by Incentivized by performance young with significant experience and proven benefit YOS ■■ Minimum pension (lesser discipline, many transition their talents to ■■ Percentage of base percentage of base pay) + second careers. pay performance base (compe- tency weighted by individual The Future personnel tempo) With the sheer size of DOD cuts approaching nearly one trillion dollars, this Contribution ■■ Noncontributory ■■ Contributory financial reality is well beyond a cost-cutting benefit plan ■■ Government ■■ Privately managed exercise. This is a critical time for the mili- managed ■■ Mandatory tary to restructure programs now instead ■■ Government matching of incurring a greater risk later through (above minimum indiscriminate across-the-board cuts. This decade will be characterized by a shift from contribution levels) ■■ effectiveness to efficiency. Resources will Transferrable be adjusted to fit the needs of future con- tingencies. Personnel policies should not Indirect ■■ Medical (100%) ■■ Medical (to be determined) be excluded from consideration. Policy is benefits ■■ Exchange ■■ Exchange not etched in stone and remains flexible if ■■ Commissary ■■ Commissary stakeholders are. Although fiscal arguments have been rebuffed for decades, military Vesting 20 years 10 years retirement is not a sacred cow, and it must
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 45 Special Feature | The Case for Military Pension Reform
Table 2. Retirement Eligibility Under the “Rule of 80” chooses to separate before being retirement eligible. Currently, only 17 percent of total military personnel perform 20 years and Starting age Years of service Retirement age therefore qualify for vesting, allowing a select few who complete service to benefit.17 18 31 49 The “all or nothing” system results in a mix of personnel who are dedicated performers 20 30 50 or are waiting out their time. Reducing the 25 27.5 52.5 time required to gain a transferrable benefit 30 25 55 acknowledges Sailors’ contributions and 35 22.5 57.5 gives them the flexibility to pursue another 40 20 60 career path, providing a force that is com- mitted to the military profession. Finally, the payout date should remain factors: years of service and type of duty. By ing should be effected in a similar manner unchanged from the date of retirement. If we creating a formula for retirement compensa- to promote the sound, long-term financial assumed the majority of retirements would tion that factors job field (signified by, for habits of Servicemembers. Matching should be occurring between 49 and 53 years of age, example, Navy enlisted classification or be allowed at any pay grade. For example, payouts would last 25 to 30 years on average, military occupational specialty) and weights using Chile’s 10 percent as a base, a one-for- thereby reducing the current obligation, it by risk incurred (measured by individual one match up to 6 percent would allow a which pays for 40 years of retirement. This personnel tempo or time spent deployed), the Soldier to save up to 22 percent of a base pay would effectively reduce retirement incomes retirement system could recognize a more for the price of 16 percent. Given the quality by 25 to 38 percent. Immediate payout is realistic measure of hardship. This model of entitlements to today’s Servicemember, it deserved and recognizes the unique value in reflects performance in duties assigned as a is feasible for them to save in this fashion. military service and sacrifice. measure of the risk they assume, including Healthcare benefits are extremely how often they are subject to those condi- important to the quality of life for military Conclusion tions. For example, this framework would beneficiaries and have a profound impact There is no comparative retirement recognize that a Navy special operator on a Service’s ability to recruit and retain compensation system in the private sector (SEAL) performs markedly different tasks quality personnel. However, medical benefits that can match the military’s benefit. In this than a yeoman (administrative assistant). should be reserved for a separate discussion. time of change, it is crucial to preserve an Multiple variables could actually be consid- This is a complex issue and there is signifi- honorable recognition of service but within ered in this equation, too. Competency-based cant uncertainty on how to best assign the fair economic reason. In our present time, knowledge and job risk are just two factors. cost of care. Providing affordable and acces- the current system is unfair, unaffordable, A mandatory contribution benefit plan sible care for uniformed members and retir- and inflexible.18 This issue is not about would complement the direct benefit and ees who have served is a national tradition emotion, defending a longstanding benefit, reward Servicemembers for saving. The gov- ernment of Chile, for instance, instituted a mandatory, privately managed defined con- if DOD does not reform military retirement now, the alternative tribution plan of this type. Instead of having case is precisely what GM experienced a government-run social security system (which went bankrupt in Chile during the 1980s), everyone earning a paycheck contrib- and responsibility, but just as in the civilian or dishonoring a group of well-qualified utes a mandatory 10 percent that is bank- sector, costs are out of control. Health care individuals. It is an issue of financial respon- rolled into a privately managed account that unaffordability in the status quo must lead to sibility and planning to effectively recruit, remains under the control of the citizen.14 numerous alternatives that will be discussed retain, and offer a retirement benefit to a It is termed an enhanced defined contribu- further. Care for military personnel and future career soldier. tion because of a discretionary government retirees needs to remain mandatory, but the There are numerous proposals cur- match on contributions above the minimum level of care and expenditures needs contin- rently available on how to accomplish level. Interestingly, some have questioned ued debate. military retirement reform, but few focus why that matching has not incentivized more Flexibility can be built into the retire- on generational values and demographic citizens to save since most do not contribute ment system by reducing the vesting period. information. Revising a program based on above the minimum.15 However, the pension It is unrealistic to wait 20 years to receive any characteristics from the current population returns speak for themselves. The privately benefit. If vesting is offered after a 10-year (not from the 1900s) can be accomplished managed fund has posted gains of 10.3 initial term, an Airman will have fulfilled while preserving the benefit of honest and percent on average since 1981 as citizens a military obligation. The individual is faithful service. In other words, this should maintain control over their asset alloca- incentivized to remain within the force but not be an exercise in older policymakers tions.16 In the U.S. case, government match- will have a transferrable benefit if he or she telling younger Servicemembers what they
46 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu sunderland want or what they are entitled to. Neither their nest eggs. This preserves the value of staynavytools.bol.navy.mil/RetCalc/Default. knows what the other wants, but collectively military retirement but adjusts the benefits aspx>. 13 it is critical for both to have the dialogue to package in line with the current generation Charles Henning, Military Retirement Reform: A Review of Proposals and Options for discern those items of value. Findings from and plans for the warriors of our future force. Congress, R42087 (Washington, DC: Congressio- other reports have confirmed that there are JFQ nal Research Service, November 17, 2011), avail- opportunities to make retirement compensa- able at ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 47 Napoleon’s Shadow Facing Organizational Design Challenges in the U.S. Military By John F. Price, Jr. n the world of competitive triathlons, that impede flexibility, adaptability, and and creating more direct communications. there is a saying: “You might not win creativity and undermine the execution Our staff organization must be fixed.”3 the race in the swim, but you can cer- of its operations in an increasingly chal- Despite this acknowledgment of the Itainly lose it there.” The maxim empha- lenging environment. In 2001, Major Eric problems generated by outdated structure, sizes how initial actions lay the foundation Mellinger, USMC, wrote, “The modern the military has continued to resist change in for success or failure. For leaders, decisions military staff embodies the industrial age most sectors. This resistance is grounded in on organizational structure are similar to precepts of hierarchical, vertical flows of the daunting size of DOD, the natural inertia the triathlon swim; it may not be the key to work and supervision.”2 This critique echoed of the organization, and its accustomed use of organizational success, but failure to recog- the indictment leveled by General Anthony the “vertical flow of control, facilitating dis- nize the importance of structure selection Zinni, USMC, the former commander of semination of orders from top to bottom and and maintenance—and the impact it has on U.S. Central Command. He stated, “Napo- ensuring compliance from bottom to top in employee performance—could easily be the leon could reappear today and recognize my a rapid efficient manner.”4 Since this empha- source of downfall. Central Command staff organization: J-1, sis is unlikely to change, the key to getting Next to choosing the organization’s administrative stovepipe; J-2, intelligence leaders to adopt a new structure depends on strategy, the selection of organizational stovepipe—you get the idea. The antiquated showing the adverse impacts of the current structure is arguably the next most impor- organization is at odds with what everyone structure on organizational performance tant decision leaders make. In Designing else in the world is doing; flattening organi- and employee behavior and how both will Organizations, Jay Galbraith points out, zation structure, decentralizing operations, improve through structural change. As a “By choosing who decides and by designing processes influencing how things are decided, the executive shapes every decision made in the unit.”1 In today’s fast-paced, competitive environment, organizations can ill afford to neglect the advantages that come from U.S. Navy (Spike Call) organizational design. Despite this reality, large traditional organizations such as the Department of Defense (DOD) continue to maintain stifling, rigid bureaucracies that hamstring talent and place the organization at a disadvantage. Defensive Structures While still the premier fighting force in the world, the U.S. military stub- bornly retains organizational structures Army lieutenant colonel briefs commanding general Joint Task Colonel John F. Price, Jr., USAF, is Vice Wing Force–Haiti on internally displaced persons camps in Port-au- th Commander for 375 Air Mobility Wing and recently Prince during Operation Unified Response completed a tour on the Joint Staff. 48 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu price RAND study pointed out, “The challenge for navigational choices are addressed only by Napoleon’s shadow and improve organi- the U.S. military is to develop new organiza- the most entrenched in the organization. zational design. However, in most cases, tional structures that achieve the efficiencies Furthermore, the functional stovepipes that the structural adjustments were temporary and creativity businesses have gained in the comprise the central columns of the orga- fixtures stood up to address a specific con- virtual and reengineered environments, nizational structure only serve to fracture tingency operation, acquisition program, while at the same time retaining the elements teamwork, collaboration, and knowledge or other “hot topic.” Interestingly, in many of the traditional, hierarchical, command distribution. It is no surprise that then- cases, these ad hoc organizations are cross- and control system (for example, discipline, Brigadier General Zinni and others argued, functional or matrixed structures specifically morale, tradition) essential for operations in “In a crisis, the dusty wire diagram sitting designed to cut through the day-to-day the combat arena.”5 atop most of our desks does not spring into bureaucracy. Somehow, we have realized action as one amorphous mass.”8 these reliable structures are preferred for Beyond the Org Chart The current structure undermines the crisis scenarios when speed, accuracy, and To appreciate the impact of structural amazing talents of officer and enlisted Ser- creative thinking are at a premium, but when decisions, we must comprehend the multiple vicemembers by burying them under excess the crisis ends, we return to the sluggish, components of the structural dimension. layers of supervision and constructing stovepiped hierarchy. According to recent research by Joseph barriers to information exchange. Instead One aspect that makes this more dif- Krasman, a comprehensive look at structure of creating opportunities, the oppressive ficult is the challenge of transitioning the requires consideration of routinization, stan- structure stifles initiative and slowly drains entire military structure. Instead of reform- dardization, span of control, formalization, talent from the organization. As Arno ing one or even a set of organizational and centralization.6 Taken together, these Penzia, Bell Laboratory’s chief scientist, charts, adaptation for DOD would require components provide a significantly expanded states, “The problem with hierarchies is that the near simultaneous transition of thou- concept of organizational structure, and it people at every level have the power to say sands of organizational charts. The reality becomes easier to see how structure deci- sions have so much influence on employee behavior. despite the problems generated by outdated structure, the Leaders must also contend with the military has continued to resist change in most sectors fact that organizational design is a continual process. As Galbraith points out, “Leaders must learn to think of organize as a verb, no.”9 The unfortunate reality in the military of this obstacle was seen in the recent efforts an active verb. Organizing is a continuous is that most of those people telling you “no” of U.S. Southern Command to reform its management task, like budgeting, scheduling do not have the authority to tell you “yes,” organizational structure. In a progressive or communicating.”7 Unfortunately, some but are still able to clog the arteries of the attempt to depart from the Napoleonic organizations, especially large ones, continue organization. stovepipes, Admiral James Stavridis created to view organizational structure as a one- In a terrible irony, the effort by senior a matrixed organization focused on its time, foundational decision that they are military leaders to smooth decisionmaking primary mission areas. However, as soon as reluctant to revisit because of the extensive and improve control only results in slowing the Haitian earthquake crisis hit and exten- repercussions of organizational structure down the organization and stifling its ability sive coordination was required with external changes. However, the dangers of failing to to react to opportunities and threats. Instead agencies, the command reverted to the adapt are much more significant than the of helping the organization, the structure traditional J-structure mid-crisis primar- inconveniences of structural change, even in fosters dependence and a greater need for ily because of the structural misalignment a large hierarchical bureaucracy. direction from senior leadership. As Martin with other DOD organizations. While some van Creveld states, “An organization with would use this example to derail future Impact of Inaction a high decision threshold—that is, one in restructuring efforts, the real lesson lies in While effective in the dissemination which only senior officials are authorized the need for a coordinated overhaul of the of top-down direction, the current military to make decisions of any importance—will entire system, and that overhaul needs to structure has numerous adverse impacts on require a larger and more continuous infor- start now. the military members currently serving. At mation flow than one in which the threshold Radical steps are required by defense the individual level, the military’s hierarchi- is low.”10 It is time for senior defense leaders to leaders. In Leading the Revolution, Gary cal bureaucratic structure undermines cre- recognize the impediment that the organiza- Hamel points out that “Nonlinear innova- ativity, hinders empowerment and sense of tional structure has become and consider the tion requires a company to escape the shack- ownership, and fosters cynicism. The same consequences of failing to change in the face les of precedent and imagine entirely novel organization that rapidly responds around of difficult economic pressures and myriad solutions.”11 For DOD, the novel solution is the globe to the directions of senior officers military threats. an adaptive organizational structure that provides almost no voice to the hundreds of flattens the hierarchy, empowers the mem- thousands in the lower ranks. As a result, Leaving Napoleon Behind bership, and fosters flexibility and creativity. the organization’s adaptability and flex- Over the last decade, the military has This organizational design should consist ibility are significantly impaired because made a few feeble attempts to step out of of the following characteristics identified by ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 49 Special Feature | Napoleon’s Shadow William Fulmer in his Shaping the Adaptive organizations and promote a DOD-wide the combatant commands occupy the execu- Organization: shift driven by the natural tendency of mili- tion role as they employ today’s force, while tary organizations to seek alignment. the Services are charged with the preparation ■■ decentralization If we know it is time to restructure— role of generating tomorrow’s force while ■■ high spans of control and it appears the logical starting point is sustaining today’s. However, when we look ■■ extensive use of temporary structures the Joint Staff—the question remains: what at each organization’s staff arrangement, we ■■ powerful information systems should the new structure look like? By fol- typically see execution centered on the J3 ■■ constantly evolving structure.12 lowing Louis Sullivan’s maxim “form ever but also distributed across the staff, while follows function,” we find our structural preparation roles are scattered across the Decentralization removes the barriers answer by looking at the core purpose of functional stovepipes. to creativity and freedom of action, while our military enterprise.14 If we filter through The temporal dividing line must be the wide spans of control reduce the layers of all of the creative language in the national driving force in the staff reorganization effort bureaucracy and keep senior officials more in strategy documents and observe how the instead of attempting to organize around touch with operations.13 Increasing the use of organization is resourced, it is apparent that the competing demands of geography and temporary structures enables adaptation and DOD is focused on two desired outcomes: functional capabilities. The current system flexibility and indirectly provides a forum win the current fight (in whatever form that disperses parts of execution and preparation for structural experimentation within the may be), and prevent/ prepare to win the next throughout the organization and desynchro- organization. Information systems enable conflict—in order to secure America’s global nizes the efforts. Even worse, because the networking and collaboration in virtual position. This description of the military’s system has aspects of execution laced across structures and allow members to escape core purpose can be condensed down to two the organization, it results in every functional geographical or functional barriers. Finally, foundational concepts that form the basis area gravitating to current operations, which the establishment of structure as a variable for a new military structure: execution and causes the entire organization to dive to the instead of a fixed entity fosters a learning preparation. tactical level. To avoid this reality, temporal organization culture, which is vital in today’s These two pillars are the major separation, instead of functional “cylinders of environment. operating lanes on every staff and in every excellence,” must be the basis for staff design. functional area. They represent the tempo- This simple bifurcation would significantly Act Now ral separation we see between operational compress the staff structure to reflect priority While some would have us wait for planning and execution, between procur- of effort—again, execution and preparation. the elusive “time of peace” to implement ing capabilities and employing them, and It would also reduce the problems of duplica- change, now is the perfect time to execute between recruiting and training personnel tion of effort and information fratricide by needed structural change in DOD. Budgetary and deploying and employing personnel. If eliminating the artificial barriers formed by contractions and impending personnel draw- we look at DOD on a grand scale, it becomes the functional arrangement. downs demand increased efficiency and place clear that this preparation/execution divide is The implementation of this construct a great deal of stress on the existing structure. the primary separation between the Services would result in the elimination of functional Congressional pressure to reduce the bloat of and combatant commands. For the most part, hierarchies on the military staffs. Instead the general/flag officer corps creates oppor- tunities to eliminate excess structural layers. Decentralized, Cross-functional Staff Concept It is time to stop renting extra office space in Northern Virginia because the Pentagon Director of Staff Synchronization manages work flow and staffs long ago outgrew one of the world’s spans current-future transition largest office buildings and start organizing st for 21 -century operations. Director of Staff Synchronization ✯✯✯✯ While a comprehensive reform effort will involve all of DOD, the proper starting Operational Processes point for the process must be with the Joint (Plans, Programs, Budgets, Posture, Risk/Readiness) Staff. As an extension of the Chairman, this Directors of Execution staff serves as the interface with both the Operational Enablers Service staffs collocated in Washington and and Preparation (Intelligence, Logistics, C4ISR, Personnel, Legal, Medical) the combatant command staffs distributed integrate all aspects of EXECUTION around the world. The Joint Staff helps to PREPARATION current and future Operational Areas (Africa, Europe, Asia, Americas, Pacific, Space) facilitate the interchange between the Ser- operations vices’ organize, train, and equip missions; ✯✯✯ the combatant command’s regional engage- Operational Domains / Capabilities ✯✯✯ (Land, Naval, Air, Space, Cyber, Nuclear, SOF) ment operations; and the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s guidance and policy. Organizational change efforts at this critical Cross-functional Teams juncture will cascade into the partnering (Crisis Action, Operational Planning, Working Groups, etc.) 50 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu price or collectively in crisis. While this structure may seem foreign on initial review, there are numerous examples of it already residing in our staffs. The Pakistan-Afghanistan Coor- U.S. Navy (Spike Call) dination Cell is a perfect example of a highly effective cross-functional team that existed independently on the staff before recently being absorbed by the J5. Another example common to many staffs is the commander’s action group. These multifunctional minia- ture think tanks, designed to tackle issues for senior commanders, are perfect examples of how a standing, matrixed team concept could be employed. Senior functional area experts would still be resident in the staff to assist with developmental and assignment issues, but the elimination of the functional direc- torates would remove barriers to collabora- tion and improve staff integration. Transitioning the Joint Staff and com- batant command staffs to this model would not be easy because it would remove numer- ous layers of the hierarchy and deal a serious blow to the functional stovepipes. However, the improvements in agility, collaboration, and end-to-end process management would be significant. Shifting our major staffs to focus on operational execution and prepara- tion helps ensure unity of effort and continu- ity in plans, programs, and budgets. While significant detail would need to be added to make this concept a reality, it is clear that this approach could provide several key benefits. First, it ensures the entire staff is focused on the core DOD mission and not divided by functional allegiances. Secondly, it ensures the return of a strategically focused staff by devoting a large portion of the staff Army colonel briefs commander of United to focus on future strategic development. Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti The intentional temporal separation would be complemented by the consolidation of of having directorates focused on person- tions would be the present out to 6 months, the staff, which would ensure sufficient nel, intelligence, logistics, and so forth, the where future operations would take the lead. connections to current operations to enable revised staff would matrix each of these The word operations in this construct has continuity of thought in concepts, planning, functions into the core areas of execution a greatly expanded meaning to include all and lessons learned. Third, the consolidation and preparation depending on its role. While aspects of military operations from budget- of the staff into a single current and future functional leadership would still exist, the ary planning and platform procurement to operations group would enable the elimina- overall coordination of effort across the staff kinetic operations in a combat zone. tion of numerous general/flag officer posi- would be greatly simplified. The combatant This staff is not intended to operate tions that were previously required to lead commander or Chairman would be able to in functional areas. Instead, it is designed the numerous directorates. Instead of serving focus attention on two primary channels: to operate like a joint task force or a cross- as stovepipe chieftains, the remaining senior current operations and future operations. functional team that pulls together the officers would be true generalists charged The dividing line between current and future desired expertise to address specific issues as with facilitating the efforts of the cross- operations in this construct would differ they arise. Instead of continuing the current functional teams. Fourth, the removal of significantly from present models. While process of creating ad hoc groups every time bureaucratic layers and duplication of effort some fluctuation would be needed to balance an issue arises, team members are aligned combined with improved coordination would workloads, the baseline for current opera- in cells capable of working independently provide increased staff efficiency in the face ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 51 Special Feature | Napoleon’s Shadow of impending personnel cuts. Finally, and 4 Arthur Huber et al., The Virtual Combat most importantly, the “practice like you play” Air Staff: The Promise of Information Technologies NEW maxim would finally be realized in the head- (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 2. 5 Ibid., xiii. quarters staffs as the agility, creativity, and from NDU Press 6 Joseph Krasman, “Taking Feedback-Seeking expertise of the cross-functional teams seen for the to the Next ‘Level’: Organizational Structure and during crisis response become the normal Center for Technology and National Feedback-Seeking Behavior,” Journal of Manage- mode of operations. Security Policy rial Issues 23, no. 1 (April 2001), 10. 7 Institute for National Strategic Studies Galbraith, 154. Closing Thoughts 8 Anthony C. Zinni, Jack W. Ellertson, and As this article is being written, the most Robert Allardice, “Scrapping the Napoleonic Staff substantial cuts in military spending in the Model,” Military Review 72, no. 7 (1992), 84. last several decades are being considered, 9 William Fulmer, Shaping the Adaptive Orga- and the recent Quadrennial Defense Review nization (New York: AMACOM, 2000), 184. 10 stated that one of its two goals was “to further Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 236. reform the Department’s institutions and 11 Gary Hamel, Leading the Revolution processes to better support the urgent needs (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2000), 14. 15 of the warfighter.” The need for structural 12 Fulmer, 179. reform combined with the fiscal demand 13 Mellinger, 25. for efficiencies, taken together, should 14 Steven Bradley, “Does Form Follow Func- provide sufficient motivation for leadership tion?” Smashing Magazine, March 23, 2010, avail- to consider resuming their responsibilities able at 52 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Cyber Operations Bridging from Concept to Cyber Superiority By Jan Kallberg and Bhavani Thuraisingham able conduct of operations by U.S. forces and related land, sea, air, and space forces at a given time and sphere of operations without prohibitive interference by an adversary.4 Universities are instrumental in bridg- ing from concept to methodology, tools, and implementation. They are the force multiplier U.S. Air Force (Daniel J. Rohan, Jr.) U.S. Air Force of the cyber defense doctrine as research hubs, educating thousands in the civilian and military-contractor workforces, and as a pro- vider of technical solutions to ensure mission success. It is pivotal for cyber superiority that institutions of higher learning are aligned with the strategic goals of our national cyber defense strategy and clearly understand its doctrinal underpinnings. Put differently, if cyber security research is driving in a differ- ent direction than the national cyber strategy, we are getting in trouble by creating a gap and Chief of Cyber Defense Center for Brazilian army participates in international cyber a weakness that can be exploited by hostile collaboration panel at 2011 U.S. Strategic Command Cyber and Space Symposium parties. Not only do we lose the opportunity to acquire cyber superiority, but we also become the prey in cyberwar. he United States is preparing for (for which a formal solicitation has not yet This article challenges the universities’ cyber conflicts and ushering in been issued at the point of authorship) will, abilities to provide support for the doctrinal a new era for national security. according to media outlets, give an additional change to cyber operations, mainly because of The concept of cyber operations infusion of $110 million to research in pursuit the overemphasis on information assurance T 5 is rapidly developing, and the time has come of cyber operational capacities. Herbert S. and the lack of intra-university collaboration. to transpose the conceptual heights to a broad Lin of the National Research Council of the Another issue considered is that in case we fail ability to fight a strategic cyber conflict and National Academy of Sciences commented, to transpose the theory to broad implementa- defend the Nation in a cohesive way. Richard “They’re talking about being able to dominate tion, adversaries may be watching and learn- M. George, a former National Security Agency the digital battlefield just like they do the tradi- ing what we should be implementing. The official, commented on recent developments: tional battlefield.”2 Plan X adds to the DARPA support for this scenario is drawn from the “Other countries are preparing for a cyberwar. budget of $1.54 billion for cyber research in development of armored warfare. If we’re not pushing the envelope in cyber, the period 2013–2017.3 Additional funds are somebody else will.”1 Therefore, increased allocated for a variety of Federal agencies. The Business of Information Security budgets are allocated to cyber operations The most desirable goal is to acquire Traditionally, information security research and education. The Defense Advanced cyber supremacy—global U.S. dominance research and education have been founded on Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Plan X in cyberspace that permits the secure, reli- the key concept of information assurance— actions that protect and defend information systems by ensuring availability, integrity, Dr. Jan Kallberg is a Research Associate in the Cyber Security Research and Education Center in the Erik authentication, confidentiality, and nonre- Jonsson School of Engineering and Computer Science at the University of Texas at Dallas. Dr. Bhavani pudiation. Information assurance is often Thuraisingham is the Louis A. Beecher Jr. I Distinguished Professor in the Department of Computer Science expressed in underlying subfields such as and Executive Director of the Cyber Security Research and Education Center. forensics, network security, and penetration ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 53 Special Feature | Cyber Operations testing. It is similar to positional warfare utilized, such as Charles de Gaulle’s proposed be learned in the employment, organization displayed at the Western Front of World War armored warfare tactics and the French air- and construction of armor and of armored I. The front would be quiet for a long period, men’s innovation of advanced dive-bombing, units that went beyond the doctrines then then an attack would erupt in heavy bom- but also that the Allies publically and vocally accepted abroad. After years of hard struggle, bardment followed by an attempt to penetrate debated the opportunities these tactical inno- I had succeeded in putting my theories into the defense lines, and the key to victory would vations offered. The Germans were listening, practice before the other armies had arrived be to hold a few heavily fortified positions in a but not the Allied high command. Due to at the same conclusions. The advance we had battle of attrition. groupthink and intellectual path dependency, made in the organization and employment In information security, victory has the French military never accepted it or even of tanks was the primary factor on which my included providing for restoration of informa- considered it seriously. belief in our forthcoming success was based.7 tion systems by incorporating detection, pro- The French preferred structured posi- tective, and reactive capabilities. Restoration tional warfare. An integral part of positional The opportunity in cyber operations in is similar to recapturing a lost trench, to use warfare was fighting for fixed hardened the next decade is not a revolutionary technol- terminology from trench warfare. The defen- positions—a war of holding positions and ogy, but instead derives from how we utilize sive posture has been reflected in research, attrition. In 1940, France had the largest land and militarize existing technologies in a way research funding, and scholarly output. From army and also the largest number of battle that is unburdened by tradition, to use Gude- information security’s early inception in the tanks in Western Europe. In addition, there rian’s words. 1980s to today’s secured environments, we were Allied forces such as the British Expedi- The French in 1940 were still think- have become skilled in our ability to secure tionary Force. ing of warfare as a solid front between two and harden information systems. The fluid The difference between the combatants adversaries, consisting of three lines of units: and soon-to-be-automated battlefield of cyber was the tactics of how to use battle tanks. The infantry, artillery, and bakery. The traditional operations is a novelty. The defense and intel- German strategy—which was old and known way of fighting war was that infantry faced ligence establishments are moving quickly to the French—was an attempt to encircle the and fought the enemy, artillery supported toward full-spectrum cyber operations.6 The French after a breakthrough, but the tactics the infantry with indirect fire, and the rear challenge for cyber security research centers and operational performance were revolution- echelon, here called bakery, provided logistic is to adapt to the changing environment as ary. The German tanks were in the hands of support. Guderian broke the rules and fought the earlier academic paradigm assumption of Heinz Guderian, who carefully studied how the war in reverse order. He concentrated future conflict is invalidated. to utilize tanks in an unconventional manner. his units and overran the French lines at a He invented and refined armored warfare, weak point, and in a deep stroke attacked The Lure of Traditional Thinking ensuring that he could exploit the adversary’s the bakery, ignored the infantry, and let the The cyber warfare concepts and abili- weaknesses. The number of French tanks artillery panic. The attack was identical to the ties of the early years will continue to evolve and massive French army did not matter. sketches of deep-penetrating armored assaults over the decades to come. Developments tend The reason was simple: the French were not that Liddell Hart and de Gaulle envisioned to take longer than first anticipated not only able in their minds to fight modern warfare before the war. because of technological hindrances, but and therefore were doomed to destruction or The lure in applying traditional military also due to a path-dependent culture favor- submission. thinking on cyber warfare is that we can ing earlier methods and a natural instinct to prefer what is known. There is a valid analogy between the dawn of cyber warfare and the the defense and intelligence establishments are moving quickly dawn of armored warfare. It took 25 years for toward full-spectrum cyber operations Western armies to figure out a proper use for the armored tank. Once that was understood, Guderian utilized the embedded abilities fight cyberwar based on the doctrines and the way wars were fought was fundamentally of armored units. The Germans changed the intellectual underpinnings of land battle as changed. That has continued for 70 years and aim point, and instead of racing toward Paris we know it. Carl von Clausewitz assumed still counting. through Belgium, the armored units pushed that the soil, woods, heights, and rivers of For the first 25 years, the French and toward the Atlantic Coast to cut off the Allied the Napoleonic battlefield were fixed. In a British saw the battle tank as a moveable forces in Flanders and Belgium where they Clausewitzian world, the battle commander machinegun pillbox from trench warfare. waited for a repeat of the attack of 1914. The could understand and study the battlefield, The tank was not a fighting platform; it was a Sichelschnitt Plan of 1940 was designed for and by objective permanence, the intended mobile fortification that supported infantry. armored warfare; it had momentum and speed battlefield would be there the next day ready This perception changed when those countries and captured the initiative. Once executed by for battle. The woods would not move, the suffered a horrifying defeat to the Germans in the Germans, the French line of defense col- rivers would not disappear, and the heights May 1940; the Germans had studied, devel- lapsed. After the Blitzkrieg of 1940, Guderian would not sink. In cyber, the map and terrain oped, and understood armored warfare. For wrote about his preparation: that form the battlespace change continuously the Allied forces, it was too late; the damage in real time and beyond our imagination as was done. The irony is not only that the French For someone observing tank theory from afar, new nodes are discovered and a kaleidoscope developed many of the ideas the Germans unburdened by tradition, there were lessons to of network patterns occurs and disappears. 54 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu kallberg and thuraisingham Traditional military theories could be less tial in armored warfare, but for institutional continued to deliver mainly information assur- relevant in cyberspace than we are ready to reasons and internal biasness, they refused to ance. Even the information assurance context admit. Traditional thinking appeals to us, but capitalize on these modern ideas. has been following the Zeitgeist by focusing it could be spurious. In the 1930s, both France and Britain on Cold War spies, terrorists, drug cartels, If we assume that we have control of the failed to transpose theory to methods, tools, white-collar crime, and economic espionage. situation and knowledge of our enemy’s posi- and implementation. In military terms, The bottom line is that it is still information tions and the full extent of the map, with our theory transposes to tactics, weapons, and security with a theoretical foundation from the defense focused on hardened strongpoints, training. Theory was created in France and 1980s. Information security has had a decade then we are fighting the digital cyberwar Britain but transposed by Germany through of high levels of funding as a response to 9/11 with the tools of analogue positional warfare. generals such as Erich von Manstein and and society’s increased reliance on the Internet Edward N. Luttwak noted that strategy only Guderian to tactics, weapons, and training. and computerized systems. This posture has matters if we have the resources to execute the strategy, and embedded in Luttwak’s state- even if the military develops the most thought-through doctrine ment is the general condition that if we are unable to identify, understand, and utilize our ever conceived, it will still be only a doctrine resources, strategy does not matter. Cyber supremacy will be achieved if we Guderian wrote after the war: “The proposals been built on hardening systems. The surge can understand the unique tenets of cyber, of de Gaulle, Daladier and others along these of resources to research centers, contractors, create a doctrine that exploits opportunity lines had been ignored. From this it must be Federal agencies, and private industry has and technical ability, achieve broad societal concluded that the highest French leadership resulted in a greater understanding of how to alignment to cyber strategy, and assemble the either would not or could not grasp the sig- secure systems. workforce to execute it. Universities play a nificance of the tank in mobile warfare.”9 Basic operational questions as to why vital part in the last three components. Even The United States faces the same risk as things are done, their strategic value, how they if the military develops the brightest and most Britain and France in the 1930s, except our can tangibly strengthen operations, and the thought-through doctrine ever conceived, it military leadership clearly understands the factual effects have sometimes been overshad- will still be only a doctrine and nothing more. changing paradigm; there are other obstacles owed by details with limited systematic think- Doctrines are instruments of war, but they to transposing theory. We are the creators of ing behind them. Traditional information tell only how to play the cards; the actual deck cyber ideas and concepts, but we fail to move security—the hardening of systems—has been of cards in cyberwar is mainly produced by beyond the present and implement them. so prevailing that it is often misinterpreted as private enterprises and academia. Today, the Department of Defense (DOD) and exchangeable with cyber defense and cyber Intelligence Community are world leaders operations. Inability to Transpose Theory to in developing cyber operation concepts and In the pursuit of cyber superiority, infor- Practice innovative strategies to ensure future Ameri- mation security, renamed information assur- The United States is having an exten- can cyber supremacy. Instead of the military ance, is one piece among many and, depending sive public debate about the future of cyber being the blockage for intellectual prolifera- on the operational environment in different warfare and how it should be conducted. We tion as it was in France 75 years ago, the hin- scenarios, is of even less importance than other debate openly as a free and democratic society. drance for cyber warfare’s development today measures. DOD defines cyber superiority as We are not the first open society that has is in the civil society and the academic realm. “the degree of dominance in cyberspace by one been able to generate magnificent ideas and We can assume that our adversar- force that permits the secure, reliable conduct theories about future warfare. In the 1930s, ies or covert adversaries in the digital age of operations of that force, and its related B.H. Liddell Hart, Giffard Le Quesne Martel, carefully study our new strategies and ideas land, air, sea, and space forces at a given time and John F.C. Fuller wrote extensively about and develop plans to utilize these publically and sphere of operations without prohibitive the future of mobile warfare. Martel was con- discussed innovative concepts. The most loyal interference by an adversary.”10 Dominance sidered one of the world’s leading tank experts online readers of the offensive cyber operation in cyber space can only be achieved if there of the 1930s. He went so far to prove his case discourse in American journals are likely our is an ability to collect information, attack and that he built a light tank in his own garden, at adversaries. All of them are ready to capitalize intercept other actors’ cyber activities thus his own expense, which became the platform on our ideas if they can. preventing their interference, and likely also for the British Bren gun-carrier.8 Liddell Hart utilizing digital lethality to destroy or severely was a prolific writer and developed theories The University Role in Cyberwar damage other actors’ cyber systems. Informa- of exploits after an armored breakthrough of A nation’s cyber warfighting ability tion assurance is not enough. It is part of cyber enemy lines, the deep strike that would force will be determined by its ability to mobilize defense—but it is not cyber defense. the enemy to react and lead to the collapse of resources and knowledge and coordinate the The National Security Agency (NSA) the defense. In France, then–Colonel Charles effort. These resources are not as easily identi- has set up criteria for the designation of aca- de Gaulle advocated for armored divisions, fied. At the entrance to the contested cyber- demic departments as Centers of Academic freeing the tank corps from the infantry and space as a warfighting domain, academia and Excellence (CAE) to ensure that the quality of utilizing armored warfare’s full potential. university research centers have to find their education and research is upheld. There are 48 France and Britain in the 1930s saw the poten- new roles. University cyber researchers have research centers and university departments ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 55 Special Feature | Cyber Operations that have been considered Centers of Aca- schools that are moving toward cyber opera- the CAE-R criteria had information assurance demic Excellence–Research (CAE-R). NSA’s tions even if the actual approach as of today is programs in place as the foundation for the latest addition is CAE Cyber Operations.11 ad hoc and less defined. designation. The variables used were: According to the NSA, key abilities are collec- Cyber operations research requires tion, exploitation, and response. The majority linkages outside of the engineering schools ■■ whether there is research on offensive of the CAE-R institutions are likely to pursue and benefits from collaboration with other and responding cyber defense and if the the CAE Cyber Operations. university-wide schools and departments. research conducted steers toward offensive The research can then be transferred through countercyber, cyber operational preparation A Quick Survey research-based education to the workforce of the environment, and pursuing cyber supe- As an experiment, we conducted a that is needed to achieve national cyber riority in cyber warfare, or is predominantly survey to get a snapshot of where CAE-R defense objectives. A broader knowledge base based on information assurance only research centers stand today in relation to enables the research center to do work that can ■■ if there is a legal component support- the broader systematic full-spectrum view support, prepare, and conduct defensive coun- ing utilization of weapons control status, espe- on cyber warfare pursuing cyber superior- tercyber operations, offensive cyber operations, cially international law, ethics, and privacy, ity. The question was whether the academic and cyber operational preparation of the envi- and a future need for assessments of military institutions are embracing the cyber opera- ronment aligned with the national interest. ethics, cyber rules of engagement, and the tions paradigm shift or are institutionally A set of variables was created and then legal foundation for collateral effects, first and path-dependent and continuing with the each academic CAE-R research center’s second tier information assurance track that has been Web presence was visited, along with their ■■ whether the research has involved prevailing since the Cold War. The purpose leading researchers’ Web presence, and the political scientists or other social scientists, of the survey was to determine how many materials presented on the Web site were especially in theories about national institu- research universities have broken down evaluated against the variables. Some of the tional stability and international relations, their internal walls between departments in observations were reviewed and validated by creating understanding of foreign societies or professional and engineering schools and an external reviewer to ensure that the evalu- institutions that are the targeted adversaries, successfully pursued a broader approach to ation did not contain systematic errors. There aligned with the concept of cyber operational match the complexity of cyber operations. were 48 academic cyber research centers in preparation of the environment and informa- We acknowledge that this paradigm shift nonmilitary higher education in the United tion operations, leading to increased effect on is a work in progress, and we have credited States in February 2012. All schools that met adversarial society Commander of U.S. Fleet Cyber Command speaks to Information Dominance Corps Sailors at Naval Station Mayport, Florida U.S. Navy (Robert Wood, Sr.) U.S. Navy (Robert Wood, 56 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu kallberg and thuraisingham ■■ if the university has a designed policy activities to operate and defend the Global research. A significant number of schools do school or similar entity to determine the extent Information Grid.”12 not involve social scientists in projects that of resources available on campus to optimize are focused on human behavior and institu- cyber operations research to take advantage of Cyber attacking U.S. space assets can tional arrangements. A few universities go intelligence-gathering opportunities, human give high returns for an adversary.13 The as far as to design complex research projects terrain, political instability, and fragile institu- global information grid is pivotal to U.S. mili- that are partly based on behavior, sociopoliti- tional design of target countries or institutions tary might and information supremacy.14 cal institutions, and societal factors with only ■■ whether there is a clear linkage computer scientists and engineers on the between the cyber research program and Results and Reflections team. Of the 48 CAE-Rs, 10 have a full-size policy school of the same university, if one We do not consider this survey as policy school on campus, with numerous exists delivering a perfect picture of the state of specialized scholars running research over a ■■ if security studies scholars are involved national cyber research, but it will reveal spectrum of policy related inquiries and with in the cyber security research, creating an a fundamental understanding of what understanding of core tenets of societal cyber understanding of security fundamentals and research universities are able to deliver and operation components. Only 5 CAE-Rs out military science that would support a better where the majority of the U.S. cyber security of these 10 collaborate to a visible degree with understanding of the final goal with the cyber research centers are on the learning curve. their own policy school and utilize the joint operation mission and doctrinal goals All 48 CAE-Rs are researching information knowledge. In other terms, half of the tier- ■■ whether there is an international rela- assurance. Only five are actively researching one universities with cyber security research tions component in the research to determine offensive and defensive cyber operations centers underutilize their own policy schools’ the degree the opportunity to exploit human to a broader extent. This includes research pool of competence. Even if we are in a terrain, political instability, and fragile institu- supporting information operations and globalized world with cyber as not only a tional design of target countries or institutions psychological operations aligned with future warfighting domain, but also an arena for is understood military operations. If a military com- international cybercrime and transnational ■■if the cyber research covers the space mander wants to have cyber weapons made, illicit activities, only 6 CAE-Rs involved domain since the importance of the defense these universities are able to make military international relations scholars in their proj- of the global information grid is clearly iden- grade cyber weapons. ects. Cyber issues in space only draw interest tified by the term cyber operations, defined as The high number of CAE-Rs that have from 5 CAE-Rs. the “employment of cyber capabilities where legal components in their research reflects The largest portion of the CAE-R the primary purpose is to achieve objectives privacy research, which is also an integral cyber research centers is doing information in or through cyberspace. Such operations part of information assurance. Only 10 assurance research independently and sepa- include computer network operations and CAE-Rs involve social scientists in their rated from other scholarly activity on their Survey Results of 48 Centers of Academic Excellence-Research (Defense Department Institutions Not Counted) Variable Number of schools Percentage of total Offensive cyber research, such as offensive countercyber and cyber operational preparation of the environment 5 10.4 Legal considerations and privacy 18 37.5 Involving social scientists and/or behavioral scientists 10 20.8 Policy school on campus 10 20.8 Utilizing the assets of a policy school 5 10.4 Presence of security studies scholars or activity in research 14 29.2 International relations 6 12.5 Cyber in outer space, considering outer space as a part of cyber defense 5 10.4 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 57 Special Feature | Cyber Operations campuses. The results are presented in the standing of the need to collaborate, and they by steering funding and increasing interac- accompanying table. can even seek to collaborate, but the internal tion among the actors in the national cyber culture often prevails. defense. Unless corrected, the misalignment Concerns and Opportunity There could be several reasons why will continue to create a national security risk. Cohesive cyber defense research the academic turf war mentality exists. One These innovative ideas can be put to use by requires universities to optimize their is funding; cyber defense is seen as one of our adversaries while we as a nation fail to campus-wide resources to fuse knowledge, the few areas where funding could increase achieve cyber superiority. JFQ intellectual capacity, and practical skills in an significantly in the future. Academic depart- unprecedented way. This is a major challenge ments are trying to set out on their own for universities that have historically sepa- journeys to seek sponsored research instead of Notes rated departments and schools and driven jointly seeking grants with other disciplines, 1 Ellen Nakashima, “With Plan X, Pentagon specialization so far that intra-university which would lead to fewer resources once they seeks to spread U.S. military might to cyberspace,” collaboration seldom occurs. In an era of aus- are shared. The Washington Post, May 30, 2012, available terity, it is justifiable for DOD to steer toward For researchers, it is always more pleas- at 58 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Values Statements and the Profession of Arms A Reevaluation By John Mark Mattox ver the past decade and a half, that underwrite, circumscribe, and guide Core Value Statements Compared the Department of Defense the organization’s goals and work. As such, Upon undertaking a critical examina- (DOD) and each of the uni- each merits both special attention and tion, the first thing we notice about these O formed Services has issued core careful reflection. However, each addition- statements is that each is different, even values statements: ally deserves critical examination—espe- though the uniformed members of the respec- cially since each is intended to communicate tive organizations are members of the same DOD: Duty, Integrity, Ethics, Honor, to the profession’s members, particularly profession of arms and, with one exception, Courage, and Loyalty. its newest members, its core ethical com- the same executive department. In their 2009 U.S. Air Force: Integrity first, Service before mitments. A critical examination includes review of these core values statements, the self, and Excellence in all we do. questions such as: Military Leadership Diversity Commission U.S. Army: Loyalty, Duty, Respect, offered the following apologetic explanation Selfless service, Honor, Integrity, and ■■ How well do these statements capture for this lack of uniformity: Personal courage. the essence of how each organization’s U.S. Coast Guard: Honor, Respect, and members ought to conduct their personal and Although the DoD core-values statement indi- Devotion to duty.1 professional lives? cates that uniformed military members share a U.S. Department of the Navy: Honor, ■■ How successfully and comprehensively common set of core values, each Service’s iden- Courage, and Commitment. do they communicate the ethical standards of tity is reflected in its own uniquely defined core the organization? values, which serve as common ground for all Each of these statements purports ■■ How well do they imbue the members its members. For example, the Marine Corps’ to constitute a succinct summary of the of the organization with a sense of what it core values “ form the bedrock of [a Marine’s] owning organization’s most fundamental means to belong to the profession of arms in a character” (Sturkey, 2001), the Air Force’s “tell commitments—the moral reference points democratic society? us the price of admission to the Air Force itself” (United States Air Force, 1997), and the Army’s are “what being a soldier is all about” (United States Army, n.d.).2 This descriptive statement, coming from DOD (Cherie Cullen) a commission with a mandate to promote diversity, comes as no particular surprise, and, in all fairness, there is nothing overtly objectionable about it. On further reflection, however, it raises some questions that properly claim our attention: ■■ Since DOD has a common set of core values, and DOD is the organization that encompasses the profession of arms in the United States, why should its subordinate organizations find it necessary to espouse dif- ferent sets of core values? John Mark Mattox was the inaugural occupant of the General Hugh Shelton Chair in Ethics at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He is currently a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for Joint Forces Color Guard participates in National POW/MIA Recognition Ceremony the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 59 COMMENTARY | Values Statements and the Profession of Arms Core Values Compared DOD duty integrity ethics honor courage loyalty Air Force integrity service excellence first before self in all we do personal selfless Army duty integrity honor loyalty respect courage service devotion Coast Guard honor respect to duty Marine Corps honor courage commitment Navy honor courage commitment ■■ Is there something fundamentally of their identity. If in the process of self- the superior unit mission and the subordinate different between DOD and the uniformed examination, they encounter discomfiting restated missions. Services or among the uniformed Services flaws in their assumptions or methods, they The next thing of note is that none of themselves that makes distinctions in their must resist the temptation to dismiss those the Services includes “ethics” in their respec- core values a matter of logical necessity? encounters out of hand, but instead take as tive core values statements. At first blush, ■■ Do the Services’ values actually differ, their touchstone the question, “What is best this may seem nothing less than incredible. or do the differences in wording and compo- for America?” and relegate other consider- Indeed, one might ask, “How can it possibly sition exist merely for cosmetic reasons? ations to a secondary status. be that none of the subordinate command- ■■ If their values actually differ, why is ers finds ‘ethics’ to be important enough to this so? DOD Core Values include from the superior commander’s ethics ■■ If their distinctions are merely On the basis of the comparison in the operation order into their own?” However, cosmetic, might not such artificialities actu- table, we observe that all five uniformed the likely answer is that the subordinate com- ally have the effect of detracting from the Services contain one or more elements found manders omitted ethics precisely because seriousness that should attach to core values in the DOD core values. This should come as its inclusion serves no clear purpose in a statements? no surprise since, after all, DOD is the parent statement that, by its nature, is understood to ■■ Are the individual tenets themselves organization. However, what should be star- enshrine the institution’s ethics. With respect logically necessary or are they essentially tling to anyone familiar with standard five- to this particular tenet, the superior com- arbitrary? paragraph operation orders is that there is so mander’s core values statement does not serve ■■ If they are logically necessary, on what little overlap between DOD’s core values state- its subordinate commanders very well. grounds is this so? ment and those of the individual Services. Let Now we turn to the individual Service ■■ If they are arbitrary, does that mean us liken the DOD core values statement to a core values statements (in alphabetical order) that any list of virtues would suffice as a mili- superior command’s operation order and the as shown in the table. tary core values statement? core values statements of the individual Ser- ■■ Are the Service core values qualities vices to the operations orders of subordinate Air Force Core Values that members of that Service have a unique units, derived from the order received from It is immediately clear that the Air requirement to possess, or are they merely the superior headquarters. If the DOD core Force statement is the least aligned of all the desirable qualities that any virtuous citizen in values statement were to appear in what we Services with the DOD core values statement. a democratic society should have? might call an “ethics operation” order, where That in no way implies that the Air Force would it appear? Is seems clear enough that does not cherish ethical values; it simply Members of a profession have an it would appear either as paragraph two (the means that the DOD and Air Force state- obligation to be self-critical—to look for mission statement) or in paragraph three in ments do not, prima facie, appear to reflect a ways in which to better themselves and the “concept of the operation” subparagraph, reliance on each other as might be expected more effectively discharge the special public which addresses the commander’s intent. between superior and subordinate organiza- trust that distinguishes them as members One might argue that the individual Service tions. In particular, we are struck by the Air of a profession. That means they must, core values statements are simply instances Force core value not found in any other core from time to time, scrutinize cherished of the “restated mission statement” found in values statement, namely “excellence in all we notions, ideas that they have grown to hold subordinate unit operation orders. Perhaps, do.” In practical terms, this is not a particu- dear, or things that because of the passage but the problem with this interpretation is larly helpful tenet. It does not require a great of time have come to be regarded as part that there is no obvious connection between deal of reflection on general life experience 60 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu MATTOX to conclude that if everything truly is excel- ties upon the values statement. For example, apply, in the present context, to persons lent then nothing is excellent. Human beings the Army core values statement refers not to based on whether or not they are leaders. simply do not do everything excellently; and “courage,” but to “personal courage.” This when they try to lead their lives in a way that is, of course, a rather odd and counterintui- Coast Guard Core Values insists on excellence in every single aspect, tive construction since courage, by its very While it is understood that the Coast they often end up frustrated and excellent in nature, is personal. Indeed, what would it Guard is aligned bureaucratically with the nothing. Certainly members of the profession mean if one were to refer to “corporate” Department of Homeland Security and not of arms are better served by being imbued courage? There is no such thing as a coura- DOD, the nature of its work as a uniformed with the understanding that they must learn geous squad, a courageous platoon, or a Service charged with the Nation’s defense to look at tactical situations, quickly and accu- courageous company. Only the members aligns it, for purposes of the present discus- rately assess them to separate that which is of that squad, platoon, or company can be sion, both conceptually and philosophically important from that which is not, and relegate courageous. Courage, like all moral values, with the Services under the Department of that which is not important to the possibility can be meaningfully experienced only at the Defense. of less-than-excellent outcomes. individual level. Even if every member of a The Coast Guard core values statement The next most prominent feature collective is courageous, the collective does is not particularly distinctive, except for its in the Air Force core values statement is not thereby become courageous; only its reference to “respect”—a reference shared its reference to “service before self.” This individual members can do that. with the Army’s core values statement. statement is not precisely the same thing as The other apparent artificiality in the Prima facie, it is not entirely clear what role the value of “selfless service” articulated in LDRSHIP acronym is “honor.” On the face “respect” should play as an essential charac- the Army statement. “Service before self” of it, this does not appear to be a problem, teristic of the profession of arms. This is not suffers from the same theoretical malady especially since every DOD and Service core to say that “respect” is not an honorable or that attends many such moral-philosophical values statement, except for the Air Force, desirable trait; but how does its inclusion in a statements: If we always serve others before includes it. However, its artificiality in the core values statement illuminate the essential attending to ourselves, our ability to serve context of the acronym is betrayed by the character of the profession of arms any more others ultimately diminishes because we fail Army’s own official definition of what it than, say, “cheerfulness,” “friendliness,” or to “sharpen the saw,” as it were. On the other hand, “selfless service” suggests that when one does serve—with the assumption that there is both a legal and philosophical basis for expecting a the idea of “service” in the profession of arms member of the uniformed Services to demonstrate “courage” represents the norm and not the exception— in a way that cannot necessarily be expected of members of one should do so selflessly. This characteriza- American society at large tion of service probably more closely reflects what is actually intended in the Air Force core values statement. means by “honor,” to wit: “Live up to all the “courteousness” would? Contrast “respect” Army values.” The notion thus becomes self- with ideas like “courage” or “duty” and it Army Core Values referential and to that extent, vacuous; for quickly becomes clear that no special expla- The Army’s statement is the most what good is a “value” that merely tells one to nation is necessary for why one carrying closely aligned of all the Services with the “live the values”? a loaded weapon in defense of the Nation DOD values statement. At the same time, The idea of making a core values list should be courageous or dutiful. Rather, the however, it is also the longest—raising the fit an acronym is something that probably inclusion of a notion like “respect” raises the question of whether Occam’s razor might be merits discussion among Army profession- question of how it helps capture the essence advantageously applied. als. However well intended the gesture, of the profession of arms as a distinct social But why exactly is it the longest? The might it not be the case that forcing a fit with entity with highly specialized responsibilities. unfortunate answer appears to be that a an acronym results in a case of misplaced Upon considered reflection, it may be that corporate decision was made to express the emphasis? Indeed, the acronym LDRSHIP is those values statements that refer to “respect” Army’s core values as an acronym, no matter itself a choice that invites some questioning. as a core value do so as a genuflection to what contortions needed to be applied to Is the intent of the acronym to suggest that political correctness. If so, it should be noted make it so. The acronym L-D-R-S-H-I-P is core values are the province of leaders only? that any such genuflection undermines the what has come to be Soldier-speak for “lead- Is it to suggest that everyone in a civilian-led spirit of seriousness that ought to attend ership.” Now, acronyms certainly have their military (in which all uniformed personnel ethical reflection. Perhaps inclusion of a place. After all, what drill sergeant would are, to that extent, followers) are actually value such as “respect” is a reactive response object to having the aid of an abbreviation leaders—and if so, in what sense? Indeed, to media scrutiny in recent years of cases of to help new recruits remember a long list of moral values are not about leaders per se; physical or other kinds of abuse by or among values, alongside the many other lists that they are about persons. To confuse the two military members. If so, the oddity of its trainees are expected to digest? However, is to misunderstand something fundamental inclusion in a military core values statement insistence on this particular acronym about our humanity. Values apply to leaders stands in even greater relief, for it is not clear appears to have imposed certain artificiali- because they are persons; values do not that there exists a rational basis to say that ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 61 COMMENTARY | Values Statements and the Profession of Arms U.S. Navy (Steven L. Shepard) U.S. Navy (Steven L. Shepard) Sailors in formation for seasonal uniform shift inspection from whites to blues a member of the uniformed Services has Marine Corps core values are presented as enlistment and from its commissioned officer any greater responsibility to demonstrate having been derived from the Constitution oath of office constitutes a curious juxtaposi- respect for others than every other member of the United States. This is a remarkably tion that may detract from the philosophical of American society does. The law holds— powerful and sophisticated approach because elegance of the arrangement. or should hold—every American citizen it provides a grounding and derivation for This goes to a point that some might accountable for the abuse of other persons. If the core values and a rationale for their selec- consider esoteric, but which in fact deserves that is what “respect” refers to here, it simply tion. Hence, the Department of the Navy consideration, namely, the question of what is not the case, legally or philosophically, statement does not suffer from the apparent exactly constitutes the “professional” part of that a distinctive standard need exist on this arbitrariness in selection of core values that the military profession. By their very nature, point for members of the uniformed Services. plagues the other statements. The Navy state- codes of ethics pertain most directly to the In contrast, there is both a legal and philo- ment ties each core value to key phrases from professional segments of society. For example, sophical basis for expecting a member of the one of the oaths administered upon entry while medical doctors are bound by the uniformed Services to demonstrate “courage” into naval service,3 to wit: Hippocratic oath, it does not follow that the in a way that cannot necessarily be expected Honor: “I will bear true faith and allegiance . . .” hospital medical records clerk or the radiol- of members of American society at large. ogy clinic receptionist are professionals in Courage: “I will support and defend . . .” “Courage” must be understood as not only the same, relevant sense. They may be skilled Commitment: “I will obey the orders . . .” fundamental to the performance of military technicians or tradespersons, but it is hard to duty—as a defining hallmark of the profes- Even if the connection of the Navy and make the case that they are classifiable as pro- sion—but also distinctively so, in a way that Marine Corps core values to these key phrases fessionals in the traditional sense of the word. “respect” must not necessarily be understood. is not obvious, the Navy’s official explana- American society has grown so accustomed, tion of the connection is compelling and in the last quarter or third of a century, to Department of the Navy Core Values makes an excellent basis for elucidating the referring to anyone who is gainfully employed The Department of the Navy core import of these core values—and for explain- as a “professional” that the concept has values statement, as manifested in both the ing precisely why they are core values—in become quite diluted. Hence, one routinely Navy and Marine Corps core value state- instructional settings with naval personnel. hears references to “professional” golfers, ments, features a singular elegance that is On the downside, the fact that the key phrases “professional” air conditioner repair persons, worthy of special attention: The Navy and come from a mixture of the Navy’s oath of “professional” sales clerks in department 62 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu MATTOX stores, and the like. Please note that this is not values statements. Rather, it is a reevaluation arms should be able to articulate a defense of to say that “professionals” thus described do of the efficacy of the current core values state- why this is so. not make meaningful contributions to society. ments in terms of their ability to communicate Some members of the profession might Rather, it means that members of professions to the members of the profession the serious find these claims to be unduly theoretical. hold special responsibilities that set them nature of the ethical enterprise. Some might Some might regard them as bordering on apart from the rest of society. feel inclined to counter by saying, in effect, irreverence. They might place such question- Properly speaking, professionals are “Aren’t we making much too big a deal about ing in the same class with, for example, tin- persons charged with the control of expert this? Is it not far more important that we have kering with the words of “America the Beau- tiful” or of the Pledge of Allegiance. However, the current core values statements deserve to perhaps the time has come for DOD and each of the uniformed be scrutinized. If after a decade of experience Services to consider what values distinctively define the with the various core values statements their profession of arms in a democratic society words are found to withstand scrutiny, they will become stronger and more enduring. If they are not able to withstand scrutiny borne knowledge not easily obtained by and not some core values statements than it is that we of careful reflection, they need to be changed. readily available to lay persons.4 That is have any particular values statements?” The In either case, it may well be that the time has why the medical doctor is a professional in question is a fair one, but it is also one that come to conduct that reevaluation. JFQ the relevant sense and the medical office invites members of the profession to recall the receptionist is not. In a similar vein, it is ancient words of Socrates: “This is not a trivial notes not entirely clear that every member of the question; what we are talking about is how 1 As will be argued hereafter, the Coast uniformed Services is a “professional” in the one ought to live.”5 Presumably, the various Guard’s mission clearly makes it a part of the relevant sense. At least the question should uniformed Services expect their members to profession of arms, even if it is not aligned bureau- be asked as to whether there is a relevant take their respective core values statements cratically with the Department of Defense. difference in terms of professional status seriously—to memorize them, to reflect upon 2 “Department of Defense Core Values,” between, say, the young enlistee who drives them, and to incorporate the values thus Military Leadership Diversity Commission, Issue a truck and the company commander who enshrined in their individual lives. However, Paper 6, December 2009, 1, available at Reconsidering The Armed Forces Officer of 1950 he 1950 edition of The Armed Forces Officer is the best book by the prolific military writer Democracy, Dialogue, T S.L.A. Marshall, and it is prob- ably the best book on military leadership ever written by an American.1 In this article, I briefly describe how the timing and circum- the Humanities, and stances of the composition of The Armed Forces Officer helped Marshall to write his the Military Profession masterpiece, and then go on to illuminate the book’s innate, enduring, and timely strengths. This book represents a significant By Reed R. Bonadonna and perhaps still-unmatched achievement in uniting the form and content of the values and outlook required of an officer serving in the armed forces of a democracy. The Armed Forces Officer emphasizes both the acces- sibility and complexity of military leadership. Colonel Reed R. Bonadonna, USMC (Ret.), is the In The Armed Forces Officer, the profession Director of Ethics at the U.S. Merchant Marine of arms itself becomes an interdisciplinary Academy. subset of the humanities, connected to both 64 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BONADONNA military professionalism. On the one hand, Marshall rejects the narrow, technocratic approach to professionalism that had over- taken the German officer corps and General Staff in the later 19th century, in effect reach- ing back to an older, more humanist, and ethical model (represented by Gerhard von Scharnhorst and the other Prussian reform- ers of the Napoleonic period). Moreover, he takes into account American culture and conditions. Marshall may also have been aided by the fact that he was writing before the field of “leadership studies” and military professionalism had come to be dominated by sociologists, psychologists, and others in academe, so that there was still room for eclecticism, even eccentricity. As opposed to the prevailing social science model of the officer as a “manager of violence,” Marshall’s officer is much more a leader, an in-person figure and not a faceless member of a bureau- cracy.5 The book reflects the era of the common man in which it was written. With liberal 20th-century ideas of education in the air, such as those of John Dewey, Marshall writes of the Armed Forces as a school in liberal democracy whose subjects include citizenship, virtue, self-knowledge, and even creativity and self-invention. It is no coincidence that The Armed Forces Officer was written just a few years after Navy and Marine Corps officers toss hats World War II. World War II was a life-chang- during graduation and commissioning ing event for Marshall, as it was for the U.S. ceremony for Naval Academy Class of 2011 Army (in which he served intermittently for three decades), for the Armed Forces, and for the Nation. Marshall had created and devel- a canon of writing on military leadership Printing Office editions of the book. Writing oped on World War II battlefields the method and officer education, and most importantly without his own name dampened Marshall’s of small-unit combat analysis that would to the larger culture, past and present. strong inclination for self-promotion, allow- make him famous. He would go on to write Marshall’s approach to the paradoxes of the ing his undoubted abilities, which included about the next war. His postwar works Men citizen-soldier and the commissioned elite a prolific, although not infallible, memory Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in the service of a democracy is dialogic to dominate.3 The Marshall of The Armed in Future War and The Soldier’s Load and the and inclusive. The book merits widespread Forces Officer was just nearing 50. His lively Mobility of a Nation were explicitly intended to reading and reconsideration at a time when mind was full of his readings and of the prepare the country for wars to come.6 the American military profession is beset by scenes and voices of his recent war experi- If these works prepared the Nation great challenges and confronted with formi- ence, and he was not yet as curmudgeonly or for future wars by addressing tactical and dable adversaries. reactionary as he sometimes seems in some logistical challenges, The Armed Forces later writings.4 The tone of this book is decid- Officer can be seen as having a similar Marshall and the Army of a Democracy edly democratic and egalitarian. purpose concerning officer leadership and How did it come about that this book, Perhaps partly due to the instructive military professionalism. In World War II, Guided-missile cruiser USS Monterey apparently written at speed in 30 days after experience of World War II, The Armed the United Statesunder had createdway in Mediterranean an enormous Marshall (at least by his own later account) Forces Officer is very non-Prussian, rejecting officer corps almost from scratch. Prewar had assumed responsibility for a languish- militarism, dogmatism, and other forms of regular and reserve officers provided the ing Department of Defense (DOD) project, professional insularity in favor of one more cadre, but the great majority of junior offi- come to be his tour de force?2 One important suited to America’s Army. The book eschews cers had no military experience or training element might be that Marshall was an the German model that sometimes seems before the war. These were the products of anonymous author in the earlier Government to be the dominant historical example of the various officer candidate schools, the ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 65 COMMENTARY | Reconsidering The Armed Forces Officer of 1950 90-day wonders—“gentlemen by act of Con- to adopt an ethos of duty and service, and to since Cicero, through medieval manuals on gress”—who attracted considerable derision communicate freely on these matters within chivalry and kingship, to Baldesar Casti- for their growing pains and inexperience. the military and with the civil community. glione’s The Book of the Courtier (1528) and The United States and its allies won most of He introduces the idea in the very first the “self-help” genre named if not started by the battles and the war, but it was obvious words of chapter 1, “The Meaning of Your 19th-century Englishman Samuel Smiles. The that some of the leaders could have been Commission”: best of the works on military leadership draw better prepared for their responsibilities. In on larger intellectual currents and traditions. The Armed Forces Officer, Marshall focuses Upon being commissioned in the Armed They contain explicit and implied reminders on certain challenges to the performance Services of the United States, a man incurs of the officer’s civic role and responsibilities, and perception of officer candidate school– a lasting obligation to cherish and protect and of his obligation to acknowledge ties with trained junior officers in particular, but also his country and to develop within himself the culture, government, and populace of his of American officers in general. that capacity and reserve strength which will society. As works of literature concerned with One of the main difficulties addressed enable him to serve its arms and the welfare the education and betterment of the indi- in The Armed Forces Officer is an American of his fellow Americans with increasing vidual and of society, they form a link to the discomfort with hierarchy and elitism. The wisdom, diligence, and patriotic conviction.8 classical conception of the humanities as not rigidly stratified structure of an army, and in only a set of academic disciplines, but also an particular the elevated, even privileged status Humanities and the Profession of Arms education for public life and leadership. of junior officers over men sometimes older Marshall’s approach to officership In The Armed Forces Officer, officer and more accomplished, had struck earlier builds on a venerable canon of works on education, and the military profession itself, generations of Americans as paradoxical military leadership. Earlier works on this is a branch of the humanities. The book is and even untenable in a democracy. This subject had taken pains to establish the terms open-ended, creative, and inquisitorial more perception had been sharpened in the citizen of an officer’s right to command, wage war, than it is prescriptive. By reaching outside army of World War II, which drew on an enjoy privilege, and compel obedience. In itself to a broad culture, in the form of fre- American society grown more egalitarian. writing his work, Marshall is adding to a quent quotations and allusions, it stresses If the military community seemed to World distinguished tradition of works on military the human, humanistic, literary, and artistic War II British novelist-turned-officer Evelyn leadership, sometimes inspired by defeat, aspects of leadership and officership. The Waugh as a “happy civilization” in which but sometimes by the cost, consequences, or allusiveness of The Armed Forces Officer is “differences in rank were exactly defined and imperatives of victory. This body of work can one indication that it is not meant to com- frankly accepted,” the military insistence on be traced at least as far back as Xenophon, plete even a junior office’s education, but hierarchy struck some Americans as anach- through many other Greek and Roman to inspire a beginning, a journey of experi- ronistic and artificial.7 Part of Marshall’s task writers to include Vegetius, author of the ence, reflection, and discovery that ideally was to establish a hierarchical basis for officer enduring De Re Militari. The catalogue of will last a lifetime. The narrative voice is status and authority that was acceptable in a writers on military leadership should not well-read and even cultivated, but it is also democracy while maintaining professional exclude medieval works such as Christine de unmistakably the voice of an officer and of an American. From early in his book, Marshall one of the main difficulties addressed in The Armed Forces in effect makes an instructive example of his own broad, selective reading. Officer is an American discomfort with hierarchy and elitism Chapter 1 contains quotations or cita- tions from Voltaire, Bertrand Russell, the standards. In common with the works on civil Pizan’s Book of Acts of Arms and Chivalry or British politician Lionel Curtis, Confucius, conduct and self-improvement of which it Honoré Bonet’s Tree of Battles.9 The genre Thomas Jefferson, William James, Theo- may be said to be a close relative, Marshall’s experienced its own renaissance following dore Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower, and an book is about locating and promoting oneself Niccolò Machiavelli’s Art of War (1521), anonymous admiral. Tellingly, only two of on a hierarchy. As in many other accounts of a rebirth that gained momentum during those cited are professional officers. Unlike social existence, this is not merely a matter of the early modern “military revolution” of most more recent writers on military leader- ambition, but of legitimacy and authenticity. 1550–1650.10 During the 18th century, written ship, Marshall makes it clear that an officer’s Marshall provides the bases for an officer’s works centered in France where a reexamina- education consists of much more than military authority, right to lead, and even entitlement tion of military practices would follow French knowledge, and that an officer’s values are not to certain privileges and deference. The reader defeats by the British and Prussians.11 One a thing apart from those of the civilization that is given to understand, in a manner urbane of the best 19th-century books on military he or she serves. The officer is a human being and commanding, that the commissioned leadership, a work that anticipates Marshall and a citizen serving in the armed forces. person must constantly and restlessly acquire in its emphasis on cohesion and morale (and In a refreshing relief from uncritical and reacquire the justifications for officership which he cites more than once), is French and repeated references to Servicemembers in order to be worthy of the title of officer. army Colonel Ardant du Picq’s Battle Studies: as “warriors” among current writers, Marshall Marshall emphasizes that the officer’s posi- Ancient and Modern Battle.12 notes that the American military does not tion is actually dependent on a willingness to As a genre, works on military leader- produce “warriors per se,” but instills in its acquire knowledge, to assume responsibility, ship may be linked to works on civil behavior members a sense of “the right thing to do” in 66 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BONADONNA the “long run.”13 Marshall explains the need Brigadier General for the armed forces to instill values, saying S.L.A. Marshall, USA DOD they have a greater need to do so than “gentler institutions” because of the unregimented character of American citizens and the demands and pressures of war and combat. In these settings, “all barriers are down” and only a strong internal sense of right and wrong will prevent atrocity and disorder.14 Not only are officers accountable to their society for their own moral conduct, but they are also in a position to articulate and exemplify moral standards. Officers are not a group apart, not a “guardian class,” but “a strong right arm.”15 Finally, officers require broad educations because the demands of their calling are often novel and unexpected. An officer must antici- pate encountering the enemy’s opposing and unpredictable will, the ways and manners of unfamiliar cultures, technological change, the inherent chaos of the battlefield, and human nature at its most beleaguered. Marshall pres- ents this as a fascinating challenge. He writes: If he has the ambition to excel as a com- mander of men, rather than as a technician, then the study of human nature and of individual characteristics within the military on all of one’s capabilities, knowledge, and to scrupulously avoid patronizing them or crowd becomes a major part of his training. emotional and intellectual depths. addressing them as other than his “intel- That is the prime reason why the life of any lectual and political peers from any walk of tactical leader becomes so very interesting, The Dialogic Form life.”18 Characteristically, Marshall quotes provided he possesses some imagination. In The Armed Forces Officer, the educa- both soldiers and civilians on dialogue. He Everything is grist for his mill.16 tion of officers, and their roles as educators, is cites William Hazlitt on developing one’s largely a matter of dialogue. Officers should own strength by testing it against others: As the list of quoted writers from chapter talk with subordinates, superiors, peers, and “A Man who shrinks from a collision with 1 indicates, Marshall only lightly draws on the the people. Perhaps the most important reason his equals or superiors will shrink below writings of officers and other military writers. for open speech by officers is the fact that himself.”19 This observation is echoed by What connects his diverse citations is that they American officers are servants of a democracy. Marshall Saxe, who asks that the assurance all underscore the value and character of the Officers must not be “intellectual eunuchs” with which he expresses his opinions not civilized works, practices, and attitudes that who remain aloof from debate out of either be taken amiss by “experts”: “They should the military officer must sometimes paradoxi- an exaggerated sense of infallibility, a habit correct them; that is the fruit I expect of my cally use force to protect. For Marshall, that of obedience, or because they do not believe w or k .” 20 Eisenhower is quoted (in fact, slightly an officer understand and exemplify these they have a right to express an opinion on misquoted) on the importance of enlisted civilized values hardly takes second place to the policies it may be their professional duty men talking naturally to officers so that the an understanding of the use of force itself, to enforce.17 Even in their areas of expertise, “product of their resourcefulness becomes since only a civilized person will appreciate the officers should be prepared to have their available to all.”21 For the officer uninterested depth of the officer’s commitment to use force views questioned. Marshall offers arguments in or unconvinced of the value of dialogue, only as consistent with the mission, propor- supporting officers engaging the open market Marshall offers two observations. One is that tionately, and even with reluctance—certainly of ideas, and he gives many examples of how “fully half of boredom comes from lack of with a desire to see peace restored as soon as to talk in various settings and to a variety of the habit of careful listening.” The other is possible. Only in this way will the officer keep audiences and interlocutors. an anecdote about a newspaper editor who faith with his or her constitutional oath, and Marshall provides both precept and greeted enthusiastically the dubious ideas of only in this way is the officer distinguished as example on the art of conversation. He his juniors, encouraging them to develop a an educated professional from a mere techni- cautions against the temptation to score completed plan, and allowing them in effect cian or “manager of violence.” The military off seniors as shortsighted and unwise. He to discover the flaws in their ideas for them- profession is a branch of the humanities encourages officers to talk to their subordi- selves. The need for an exchange of words and because war is such a human activity, calling nates about their families and interests and ideas is upheld by Marshall’s insistence—in ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 67 COMMENTARY | Reconsidering The Armed Forces Officer of 1950 another valuable holdover from World War II atomic bomb, had been built by an unprec- country. Unlike the post–World War II experience—that an officer must be receptive edented alliance of industry, academe, gov- period, the military has neither a “nation of to new knowledge and attainments, seeking ernment, and military. The 1950s would see veterans,” nor numbers of former officers in or creating knowledge along with greater a series of best-selling books on the lives of prominent nonmilitary positions, nor a recent responsibility, rather than relying on a narrow Soldiers and Sailors by veterans such as James example of large scale and highly public specialization. The officer’s education should Jones, Leon Uris, Norman Mailer, James civil-military cooperation on which to form a give him or her cognitive and linguistic tools Gould Cozzens, Herman Wouk, and Thomas foundation of understanding and trust. to question old ideas and new, to articulate Heggan. Many of these became popular and Admiral Mullen’s concern with the lack change and adaptation, and to process and critically well-received feature films. South of communication between the American to channel experience rather than to rely on Pacific was both on Broadway (1949–1954) military and its nonmilitary citizenry struck formulas or conventional wisdom. and on the screen (1958). The Nation was a chord with his distinguished audience of military educators. Indeed, except for Army second maintaining the relevance of its warfighting lieutenants capability, communication with the rest of commissioned America may be the great challenge facing at Indiana War the military profession in the coming decades Memorial of the 21st century. While it is not possible U.S. Army (John Crosby) to recapture a lost age, a consideration of Marshall’s work points a way to alleviate the estrangement of civil and military. Marshall’s CAPTION view of the profession of arms is in essence a branch of the humanities. His emphases on the need for dialogic communication and on a daily recognition of the American officer as a servant and exemplar of democracy address the challenges of our time as I have depicted them above, and in other ways I discuss in the rest of this article. The 21st-century Armed Forces Officer The prevailing attitude to military pro- Finally, for Marshall, talk and dia- crisscrossed by interconnecting networks of fessionalism may be inadequate to deal with logue are vital to the success of a unit in soldier-civilians and civilian-soldiers engaged the contemporary challenge of the need for combat. “Talking it up” is an essential part in a dialogue based on shared experience. a wider, discursive approach. In this context, of Marshall’s menu of actions (as argued at Soon after Korea, the military would deseg- the social science model for military profes- much greater length in Men Against Fire, regate, reluctantly at first but with growing sionalism could be described as necessary and running through his many works on progress, and nearly always in advance of the but insufficient. An example may be found small-unit combat) that a leader must take to rest of American society, playing a leading in the most recent edition of The Armed remove “the paralysis which comes of fear.”22 role in an important social issue. Forces Officer (2007). Compared to the 1950 Communication, practiced in peacetime, How different is the situation today? As edition, the range of reference and allusion in delivers its greatest rewards in battle. then–Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral the newer work is relatively narrow, drawing Mike Mullen noted at a conference on the mostly on American military history. The Armed Forces Officer, future of the military profession in January Although the book discusses the officer’s Then and Now 2011, the American people respect their role as a member of a larger society, it sets an Despite its occasional anachronisms, armed forces but scarcely know it. Although unsatisfying example in this area, suggest- Marshall’s book is probably needed now the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have ing by inference that the military profession more than when it was first published. In produced their share of literary and media should look mostly inward for example, 1950, Marshall’s emphasis on humanistic attention, the scale is much smaller, the inter- inspiration, and instruction. dialogue and democracy were underwrit- est more limited. The need for democratic The 21st century requires American mili- ten by America’s World War II experience and humanistic dialogue is greater because it tary officers to engage in continuous dialogue of a citizen army. George C. Marshall, the is too rare—and because we are in an era in both within and outside the ranks of their only American career Soldier to win the which the links between civil and military will profession. Officers have already recognized Nobel Prize for Peace, signed as Secretary of be tested and forced to grow or give way like that the “communicate” branch of the “move, Defense the first edition of The Armed Forces unexercised muscles. As in the 1940s and for shoot, communicate” trivium is assuming Officer. In 1952, the voters elected another most of the 1950s, the military is shrinking, greater importance in our times. Counterin- career Soldier to the Presidency. The machin- heavily deployed overseas, and demographi- surgency, humanitarian, security, and peace ery of war, to include the fearful, war-ending cally and geographically isolated in its own operations, contact with U.S. Government 68 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BONADONNA agencies, international nongovernmental as educated, but they must be educated, and MA: President and Fellows of Harvard College, agencies, allies and coalition partners, and even learned, men and women comfortable 1957); and Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: even joint operations all stress the officer’s role and capable with words as well as deeds. The A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1960). as a professional conversationalist and facilita- officer may be a “manager of violence,” but 6 S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem tor of dialogue: a lawyer, diplomat, or coun- he or she is more than that: part artist, part of Battle Command in Future War (Alexandria, VA: selor in uniform and under arms. Americans storyteller, part scholar, and part teacher. The Byrrd Enterprises, 1947, rpt. 1961); and The Soldier’s have had to slow their pace of conversation military profession is correctly conceived as a Load and the Mobility of a Nation (Quantico, VA: to come more in line with the allusive and branch of the humanities broad in both scope Marine Corps Association, 1950, rpt. 1980). 7 Evelyn Waugh, Officers and Gentlemen (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1955, rpt. officers must be equipped to engage in common speech, but 1979), 90. some must also be prepared to communicate with intellectual 8 AFO, 1. and political elites as equals 9 Phillipe Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, trans. Michael Jones (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1985), 212–214. ruminative nature of Middle Eastern dis- and purpose, which are the study and the bet- 10 Since the term military revolution was first course. They have had to acquire knowledge terment of humankind. For S.L.A. Marshall coined by Michael Roberts in his inaugural address of customs, manners, social codes, habits of in The Armed Forces Officer, the profession of at Belfast University in 1955, many works have been mind, and religious beliefs, but it is even more arms and the people who make up the armed written on this idea. For a compendium of works on important that these diplomats in uniform be forces are a tremendous repository of knowl- the subject, see Clifford Rogers, The Military Revolu- able to serve as fit representatives of their own edge and belief, a great book to be read in tion Debate: Readings on Military Transformation in culture, its history, its literature, its values and crowded and in quiet moments: fight, endure, Early Modern Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, aspirations. The role of talker may have struck reflect, grow wise. JFQ 1995). some officers as incongruous or unwelcome. It 11 R.R. Palmer, “Frederick the Great, Guibert, requires innovation, new skills, and personal Notes Bulow: From Dynastic to National War,” in Makers change, but it is in a sense a reconnection with of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear 1 a traditional role for the profession of arms as The Armed Forces Officer was first published Age, ed. Peter Paret, 93, 105 (Princeton: Princeton by the Government Printing Office in 1950. (This University Press, 1986). bearer of order and civilization. original version is hereafter referred to in endnotes 12 Ardant du Picq was killed in action during the Military officers need skill in dialogue as AFO.) Since then, it has gone through a number Franco-Prussian War in 1870. His book was post- and narrative to do their jobs, to tell their of reprintings and revisions. Marshall wrote an humously compiled from his writings (organized as stories, and to participate in the civic discourse expanded version published as The Officer as a he had outlined) and published in France in 1880. of a democracy. Officers must be equipped to Leader (Stackpole Books, 1966). The American The 1921 American translation of the eighth French engage in common speech, but some must also Forces Information Service published a revised edition by John N. Greely and Robert C. Cotton can be prepared to communicate with intellectual edition in 1975 and a greatly altered version in 1988. still be found in reprints today. and political elites as equals.23 The post–World The 1975 edition is especially good, leaving the orig- 13 AFO, 17. 14 War II alliance of civilian and military elite inal mostly untouched but adding sections based on Ibid., 14–15. 15 cultures was largely a casualty of the Vietnam Korea and Vietnam. A completely new edition was Ibid., 3. 16 Ibid., 169. War. It might seem that the differences are co-published by NDU Press and Potomac Books in 2007, although this copy contained chapter one of 17 Ibid., 8. insurmountable, but the post–“Don’t ask, don’t the original: “The Meaning of Your Commission” in 18 Ibid., 77, 190. tell” military offers the opportunity for a rap- its entirety as an appendix. 19 Ibid., 174. prochement with elite universities, the media, 2 The Officer as a Leader, 12–13. 20 Ibid., 113. and big cities such as Washington, DC, for a 3 This is noted by David H. Hackworth and 21 Ibid. Marshall quotes Eisenhower as stating, role in social change equivalent to the desegre- Julie Sherman in About Face: The Odyssey of an “There is among the mass of individuals who carry gation of the 1950s and 1960s. American Warrior (New York: Simon and Schuster, rifles in war a great amount of ingenuity and effi- 1989), although Hackworth is often S.L.A. Marshall’s ciency.” Eisenhower’s words in Crusade in Europe A Call to Arms and Letters: unsparing and even unfair and untruthful critic. (New York: Doubleday, 1949) are “ingenuity and Knight and Scribe 4 John Douglas Marshall, Reconciliation Road: initiative” (314). 22 A reading of Marshall’s magnum opus A Family Odyssey (Seattle: University of Washington AFO, 120. 23 See Charles Hill, Grand Strategies: Literature, can serve as a necessary and timely correc- Press, 1993). Grandson John Marshall identifies S.L.A. Marshall’s 1960 heart attack as a watershed, Statecraft, and World Order (New Haven: Yale tion to the narrowness and insularity that following which he became increasingly difficult University Press, 2010). This book is a compelling may afflict all professions or institutions in and inflexible. argument for the importance of the humanities tra- the course of their development, but which is 5 The social science approach to military profes- dition in developing sophisticated strategic thought. particularly insidious and undesirable in the sionalism may be traced back to some of the works Although aimed mostly at the civilian diplomat or case of America’s profession of arms. Com- of Max Weber, the seminal German sociologist. In statesman, the work has value for the military strate- mitted autodidact Marshall is also a corrective America, the classic works are probably still two gist as well. Hill teaches a highly selective, yearlong to the creeping anti-intellectualism that some- based on the post–World War II military: Samuel P. seminar on this subject at Yale. times seems to infect the American military Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory profession. Officers must be trained as well and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 69 U.S. Air Force (Christopher Griffin) Airmen prepare to land MQ-1B Predator UAV from control room at Ali Base, Iraq Controversial Contrails The Costs of Remotely Piloted Foreign Policy By Houston R. Cantwell It is well that we find war so terrible—lest we would become fond of it. —Robert E. Lee s six unsuspecting young sat the individual responsible for this vio- reliance on unmanned strike capabilities by men drove their nondescript lence. From this comfortable vantage point, the U.S. Government. This article questions van across the vast Yemeni during the time leading up to the engage- the increasing reliance on armed UAVs by A desert on November 3, 2002, ment, the operators of the lethal MQ-1 Preda- the United States as a foreign policy tool. a small piston-driven aircraft covertly tor unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) ensured Though the use of armed UAVs continues monitored their activities from roughly 3 minimal collateral damage, precise weapons to expand, this unabated trend could prove miles overhead. Following a great deal of effects, and positive target identification.2 detrimental to U.S. national interests. intense data collaboration and synthesis, The strike was a politician’s dream—objec- intelligence confirmed that one of the vehicle tive neutralized at low risk with no visible Questioning the UAV Trend occupants was involved in the 2002 bombing collateral damage. Today, the voracious appetite for UAV of the USS Cole. The aircraft set up for an Though this was not the first time a capabilities remains strong. The recently attack. Minutes later, an AGM-114 Hellfire UAV employed lethal force, the 2002 Yemen released fiscal year 2013 Department of air-to-surface missile carrying an 18-pound strike showcased the unique strengths of Defense (DOD) budget proposal cut a sig- warhead scored a direct hit on the vehicle, armed UAVs—a persistent surveillance killing all occupants.1 platform capable of precise and lethal engage- Lieutenant Colonel Houston R. Cantwell, USAF, is Located in an air-conditioned Predator ment at a moment’s notice. This successful Vice Wing Commander, 35th Fighter Wing, Misawa ground control station over 100 miles away strike helped pave the way for increased Air Base, Japan. 70 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu CANTWELL nificant number of programs, yet increased were any disadvantages to using precision countries we need to work with to contain UAV investment, directing the Air Force to standoff weapons. He responded: and defuse terrorism, and in the lives of the expand from a current level of 61 Predator/ many innocent people we’ve killed through Reaper orbits to 65 with a surge capability of We’d be damned fools if we didn’t take either sloppiness or ignorance.”11 According 85.3 But as the United States continues to send advantage of our capabilities and use our to Foust, “In Yemen the insistence on drone unmanned machines to execute national technology to the maximum extent possible. strikes in the absence of any broader political security policy, some have begun to question Why would you want to get somebody killed engagement with the opposition political this trend—most notably the Central Intel- if you don’t have to? . . . If we can prevail in a movements has created the mass perception ligence Agency’s (CIA’s) regular use of lethal conflict by imposing maximum damage on that the U.S. is intimately tied to the oppres- force through unmanned aircraft. the enemy at a minimal cost to ourselves, I sion of the Yemeni people.”12 Estimates of Nowhere have unmanned airstrikes can’t think of a better way to pursue.8 civilian casualties, though extremely difficult become more prolific than in Pakistan. In a to measure with any degree of accuracy, 2011 Foreign Affairs article, Peter Bergen and But public concern has risen given the also cast a troubling light: “According to [a] Katherine Tiedemann report that: emerging trend of using machines to fight survey of reliable press accounts, about 30 our enemies while safely distanced from the percent of all those killed by drones since from June 2004, when the strikes in Pakistan battlespace. 2004 [through 2010] were nonmilitants.”13 began, to January 2009, the Bush adminis- Peter Singer, renowned author of In making an interesting science fiction tration authorized 44 strikes in the rugged Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution analogy, Noah Shachtman points out that northwestern region of Pakistan. Since and Conflict in the 21st Century, recently sending machines abroad to kill on our assuming office, Barack Obama has greatly published an article entitled “Do Drones behalf “makes us look like the Evil Empire accelerated the program. . . . In just two Undermine Democracy?” His concerns [from the Star Wars movies] and the other years, the Obama administration authorized focus on the growing disconnect between guys like the Rebel Alliance, defending nearly four times as many drone strikes as the U.S. public and government regarding themselves versus robot invaders.”14 did the Bush administration throughout its decisions to employ deadly force in defense Arguably the most troubling effect of entire time in office—or an average of one of national interests due to the increased use the proliferation of unmanned systems relates strike every four days, compared with one of unmanned aircraft. According to Singer, to the frequency of and decisionmaking every 40 days under Bush.4 Though these strikes have employed solely wars, even those fought via technologically advanced precision-guided munitions, they have still machines, are not costless endeavors resulted in tremendous destruction, killing an estimated 300 to 500 people in 2009 alone.5 “When politicians can avoid the political calculus toward future war. UAVs may lessen Congress passed an important piece consequences of the condolence letter—and the terrible costs of going to war, and in doing of legislation on September 18, 2001, that the impact that military casualties have on so, make it easier for leaders to go to war.15 indirectly supported this increased use of voters and the news media—they no longer The danger, as Christopher Coker argues, is UAVs. The Authorized Use of Military Force treat the previously weighty matters of war that leaders can: permits the President to use “all necessary and peace the same way.”9 As an example, he and appropriate force against those nations, cited the recent combat operations in Libya become so intoxicated by the idea of precise, organizations, or persons he determines where unmanned aircraft executed air- risk-free warfare that we believe what we planned, authorized, committed, or aided the strikes several months past the War Powers want to believe. Unfortunately, we may slip terrorist attacks that occurred on September Resolution 60-day deadline without con- down the slope and find ourselves using vio- 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or gressional approval. Arguably, the absence lence with impunity, having lost our capacity persons, in order to prevent any future acts of ground troops reduced congressional for critical judgments. We may no longer be of international terrorism against the United scrutiny over the operation. Mary Dudziak, a inclined to pay attention to the details of the States.”6 After years of projecting lethal law school professor at the University of Cali- ethical questions which all wars (even the force under this authority, the dependence fornia, puts it this way: “Drones are a techno- most ethical ones) raise.16 on armed UAVs has grown. In terms of logical step that further isolates the American government efforts at targeting al Qaeda and people from military action, undermining The trends emphasizing the increased Taliban leaders in their tribal areas, then– checks on . . . endless war.”10 use of unmanned aircraft are unmistakable. CIA Director Leon Panetta went as far as to Wars, even those fought via techno- As one of the last military growth industries, say UAVs are “the only game in town.”7 logically advanced machines at distances of companies work feverishly to design the mil- Given that politicians continually hundreds or even thousands of miles, are itary’s newest unmanned systems. Though strive to minimize the number of casualties not costless endeavors. All wars have costs. unmanned systems reduce the personal risk in our Armed Forces, the increased use of Joshua Foust, columnist for The Atlantic, shouldered by American Servicemembers on unmanned aircraft should not be surpris- argues that drone operations “come at an the battlefield and reduce the political risk to ing. While serving as Secretary of Defense, enormous cost: to our reputation, to our politicians, as an instrument of U.S. foreign Richard Cheney was asked if he felt there morals, to our relationship and status with policy, the employment of unmanned ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 71 COMMENTARY | Controversial Contrails U.S. Air Force (Jeffrey Hall) (Jeffrey U.S. Air Force MQ-1 Predator UAV, armed with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles combat aircraft must be carefully evaluated Weekly, November 13, 2002, available at 72 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Logistics Support “Seams” U.S. Air Force (Marc I. Lane) (Marc U.S. Air Force During Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector By W.A. Brown and Brent Coryell Here’s the complexity of this operation—you have kinetic effects in one Geographic Combatant Command (GCC), generated out of another GCC, partnered with a coalition, with resources from a third GCC, then NATO reinforced by interna- tional partners [that are] not a part of NATO. —USEUCOM Chief of Staff, April 12, 2011 Rear Admiral W.A. Brown, SC, USN, served as the Director of the Logistics Directorate (J4), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), during U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Libya operations. U.S. Airmen prepare B-1B Lancer in Lieutenant Colonel Brent Coryell, LG, USA, served as the Executive Officer of the Logistics Directorate (J4), support of Operation Odyssey Dawn USEUCOM, during U.S. and NATO Libya operations. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 73 COMMENTARY | Logistics Support “Seams” he collective and collabora- and USAFRICOM operation centers carefully implications, leverage information-sharing tive efforts of U.S. European monitored events as international pressure technology with a broad array of organiza- Command (USEUCOM), U.S. mounted for action in support of the Libyan tions, and facilitate collaboration and full T Africa Command (USAF- insurgency. The decision to engage kinetically situational awareness of the activities of RICOM), and the North Atlantic Treaty took a relatively short time in political terms, logistics planners. One simple but key tool Organization (NATO) to support Operations particularly considering the complex political for efficient coordination among support Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector from equities involved as well as the daunting oper- organizations was the use of Defense Connect March to October 2011 represented a remark- ational considerations. Odyssey Dawn and Online (DCO), a virtual conferencing capa- able and challenging logistics undertaking for Unified Protector introduced USAFRICOM bility. Daily online collaboration sessions all of these organizations. Consequently, the for the first time as a geographic combatant synchronized lines of effort and information experience offers a number of insights that command that faced committing armed sharing not only between the two involved can enhance our ability to prepare for, plan, assets to a United Nations–sanctioned opera- combatant commands but also among the and manage future joint endeavors. Odyssey tion. Odyssey Dawn transitioned to Unified U.S. Transportation Command, USEUCOM, Dawn took off so fast that the operation Protector on March 31, 2011, and thus became and USAFRICOM Service components; started as a “come as you are event,” without a NATO- vice USAFRICOM-led operation. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA); and a major force deployments from the conti- Initial American forces included global multitude of other high-level agencies. The nental United States and rapidly evolving strike assets from U.S. bases and forces DCOs fostered constructive multidirectional staff structures and alignments. Most of the forward positioned in Europe, both ashore discussions that minimized redundancy of operational forces “belonged” to USEUCOM and afloat. The commander, U.S. Naval Forces effort, clarified roles and responsibilities, and but were employed in support of, and by, Europe and Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet, quickly resolved mission challenges. USAFRICOM. This is not unusual in terms amassed surface and subsurface capabilities One critical issue associated with crisis of how U.S. forces are assigned globally, but that operated primarily in the USEUCOM response or short “lead time” operations in this case, the forces also operated from AOR and within the boundaries set by the is the coordination of air routes including USEUCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR). Odyssey Dawn joint operating area, which diplomatic clearances, logistical deconflic- This ad hoc construct, compounded by the covered Libya and extended north into the tion with international partners, and other matters. One valuable enabler was use of Standard Theater Airlift Routes (STAR) in international waters, the Navy was not encumbered during initial resupply operations. Similar by restrictions on flying U.S. combat operations in concept to a local bus circuit, the STAR consists of several preplanned air routes established for Europe-based C-130 aircraft shift to a NATO-led operation, added to the Mediterranean Sea. The U.S. Navy immedi- to fly cargo to designated locations. A load complexity and created a number of logistics ately held an advantage over the Air Force is placed on a previously scheduled mission issues that required close coordination, flex- for initial strike options during the planning along the STAR and then removed at the ibility, and a pervasive cooperative spirit. phase. While in international waters, the required destination. A major advantage is This article is intended to share logistics Navy was not encumbered by restrictions on the time saved by not having to apply for dip- observations, insights, and lessons learned flying U.S. combat operations. U.S. Air Forces lomatic clearances because routes are preap- while supporting these operations. While Europe, through 3rd Air Force (Air Forces proved through each country of transit. Over many of the support concepts and creative Europe), supported 17th Air Force (Air Forces time, the frequency of intratheater, Unified “solutions” from Odyssey Dawn and Unified Africa) by flying missions with forward posi- Protector–related movements declined, Protector were tailored specifically for those tioned aircraft. Within short order, additional resulting in more capacity than require- efforts, this is likely how almost all future nations joined the operation and forward ments, and USEUCOM swiftly reverted to logistics operations will be conducted. The basing was required. Libya’s distance from requirement-based missions. major observations in this article revolve Central Europe dictated moving strike aircraft Setting the Theater. Access, basing, and around three major themes: the no-notice operations to locations further south and in bed down, and reception, staging, onward- nature of the initial efforts, complexity of the Mediterranean littorals. movement, and integration (RSO&I) are a few the logistics enterprise, and issues associated of the many key aspects of “setting the theater.” with USEUCOM-USAFRICOM-NATO coor- Setting the Theater and Transfer to Our nation’s ability to respond to global crises dination. Many of the logistics techniques NATO and sustain operations depends on access and procedures developed and used by Initial Phase. During the initial startup agreements, overseas basing, and global USEUCOM, USAFRICOM, and NATO can of the operations, USEUCOM and USAFRI- en route infrastructure. The United States offer insights for future logistics planning, COM were able to employ existing logistics must work closely with its European Allies doctrine, and execution. management capabilities at their command to support operations from European facili- headquarters. The close coordination between ties. The ports and bases where U.S. forces Background the commands and the well-integrated staff are assigned in European nations (except As events unfolded across Northern processes enabled leaders to monitor opera- Germany) are not sovereign U.S. territory, and Africa in 2010 and early 2011, USEUCOM tions and assess logistics requirements and thus all U.S. access, basing, and operations are 74 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BROWN and CORYELL subject to host nation approval. There are gen- heavily on tourism, but all the hotels were and other nations on periodic conference erally bilateral agreements that stipulate limi- filled with Unified Protector personnel. The calls, but it lacked staff officers with specific tations on operations and other restrictions to hotel owners saw the operation as a one-time functional expertise, such as fuel coordina- how host nation territory may be used. event, and tour operators represent repeat tion specialists, to properly forecast, compile, As preparation to enforce the no-fly business. With hoteliers hesitant about evict- coordinate, and up-channel requirements zone gathered momentum, USEUCOM ing the military but concerned about their to a central fuels coordinator. Most of the became a lead for bed down and base support. economy, joint logistics planners made a support coordination efforts simply consisted This was no small task as there were 18 bases move to find additional billeting—and fast. of the development of logistics agreements in eight European countries involved in Navy Seabees and Air Force civil engineers and arrangements, with the United States Unified Protector. The simultaneous enhance- built a 500-person tent city literally from the routinely serving as the lead agent for most ment of 11 air bases for the large and quick ground up. The availability of prepositioned commodities and capabilities. Establishment influx of units and materiel required tremen- tents and the construction support (man- of routine logistics status reports required a dous coordination across U.S. and allied forces power and equipment) to build a tent city significant amount of staff coordination. throughout Europe. Of note was the extraor- ended up being a critical factor in sustaining dinary work done at Moron, Aviano, Souda the campaign. Beans, Bullets, Oil—Keep It Coming Bay, and Sigonella to prepare for the arrival of Transfer to NATO. NATO operations Food. The rapid buildup of naval units forces to include increasing billeting, aircraft are normally supported by a multinational in the Mediterranean was unprecedented in parking, and ammunition storage space. One logistics organization known as a Joint recent history. Due to the Sixth Fleet being primary example for the United States was Logistics Support Group (JLSG). These are primarily a transient theater for the past Naval Air Station Sigonella, on the Italian generally tailored to support specific opera- 10 years with only a minimal afloat pres- island of Sicily. With its ample runway, parking tions from a pool of voluntary on-call units ence, the deployment of several ships to this space, and logistics support, Sigonella became from NATO member nations. In the case of theater created an immediate need to build prime real estate supporting Unified Protector. Unified Protector, a JLSG was not deployed up subsistence inventories to a level that With seven nations operating from Sigonella, primarily due to the expected short duration could support the resulting increase of up to it truly became a multinational base. of the mission. In the absence of the JLSG, the 700 percent of their normal demand. DLA Logistics and operational planners United States stood up a coalition support cell Troop Support coordinated the procure- often fail to fully assess the impact of mili- (CSC) in Naples, Italy; however, it was clear to ment and receipt of an additional 80,000 tary operations on the environment around most senior leaders that more representation food shipments to keep ship provisions on them. For example, one significant hurdle was required from coalition partners. The cell hand, including 13 emergency airlifts from that surfaced in Sicily was the summer had members from three combatant com- the United States to Italy to supplement tourist season. The Sicilian economy relies mands, the Joint Staff, Department of State, the extraordinary spike in demands. The NATO NATO E3A AWACS at Trapani-Birgi, Italy ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 75 COMMENTARY | Logistics Support “Seams” Airmen load C-5M Super Galaxy at Dover Air Force Base bound for Italy in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn U.S. Air Force (Jason Minto) U.S. Air Force response by DLA Troop Support demon- To manage the liaison and expediting Fuel. From the onset of Unified Protec- strated its ability to assist quickly and effec- work, USEUCOM J4 established a Munitions tor, it became immediately clear that sustain- tively in challenging operations. Coordination Cell to ensure all nations had ing the coalition with fuel would be one of Ammunition. USEUCOM headquar- the weapons required to fulfill their NATO the top logistics priorities and challenges. ters directed the staff to support USAFRI- taskings. Such close oversight helped ensure To accomplish this, the USEUCOM/USAF- COM in Odyssey Dawn “to the maximum that no missions were cancelled due to lack of RICOM combined Joint Petroleum Office amount possible,” and the Joint Munitions on-hand munitions. During the course of the synchronized all fuel requirements through- Office (JMO) began by providing theater operation, PGMs valued at over $100 million out the Combined Joint Operating Area. A asset postures for combat air and naval were sold in over 50 FMS transactions to number of issues and challenges emerged forces, advice on munitions infrastructure to seven participating nations. Expediting the during the course of operations including support the many basing decisions needed, FMS purchases, the sourcing of specific vari- limited visibility of coalition requirements and additional staff assistance to USAFRI- ants from stocks in USEUCOM when pos- and resources, equipment maintenance COM and NATO nations. sible and expediting their transportation to problems, and specialized fuel requirements. Early in Unified Protector, it was appar- the applicable bases was essential to warfight- For example, the fuel required by the MQ-1 ent that precision-guided missile (PGM) ers executing the air tasking orders. Predator unmanned aerial vehicles was expenditure rates would exceed the capacity USEUCOM’s experience with Unified not readily available. USEUCOM had to of several participating nations. As support Protector made it clear that future European arrange spot purchases of the fuel through requirements were identified for our allied air-to-ground combat operations would DLA-Energy and reposition fuel handling partners, the USEUCOM J4 JMO built the be heavily reliant on PGMs. In almost any equipment packages from other locations at a necessary coordinating mechanisms with combat support scenario, it is apparent that significant cost to cover this shortfall. USEUCOM J5, the Joint Staff, the Defense on-hand stocks for most nations and for The bottom line to the above discussion Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), forward deployed U.S. units will quickly is that all of the support required by the U.S. and U.S. Service Headquarters to facilitate become depleted. USEUCOM immediately military and its NATO partners was provided expedited Foreign Military Sales (FMS) issued command guidance to establish on time and as needed to accomplish the deliveries. As it became evident that Unified minimum stockage levels of PGMs to mission. Many of the most challenging issues Protector would be a longer operation than support NATO operations, engaged with resulted from the unusual structure of the anticipated, it was clear that a more robust the Joint Staff on various means by which to combined force that executed the operations ammunition management and forecasting preposition PGMs in-theater in anticipation and the short planning and coordination capability would be needed. USEUCOM of possible contingency FMS requirements timeframes that will likely be the hallmark was directed to manage PGM forecasting similar to the expedited sales needed, and of future operations. Hard work, close coor- and resupply operations for all operation requested that DSCA include PGMs in its dination, and robust lines of communication partners, with commitments from individual newly restarted Special Defense Acquisition will enable logisticians to support future participating nations to provide forecasts of Fund to reduce the lead time for normal FMS operations effectively and efficiently despite their requirements. deliveries needed for NATO nation resupply. 76 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BROWN and CORYELL challenging environments and rapidly chang- own logistical support, but such an organiza- agreements to facilitate the rapid exchange of ing requirements. tion will clearly facilitate improved ability to goods and services among coalition partners. support the combined joint task force com- One of our major efforts in future years should Future Implications for Cross mander’s priorities—and offer better visibility be to ensure that we do as much coordination Logistics Operations of logistics challenges. and planning in advance as possible for opera- Communication. One of our biggest Planning. Short notice, “come as you are” tions involving multiple combatant commands, seams was communication between events, and the increasing number of simulta- nations, coalitions, alliances, and non–Depart- USEUCOM, USAFRICOM, and our coali- neous small to medium actions, have dramatic ment of Defense entities—which is to say tion partners. Despite NATO being our logistics planning implications. Typically, almost all future operations. longest-lived alliance, U.S. capabilities to under normal operating conditions, military share information are often limited, many logisticians receive well-defined materiel Conclusion times in ways that directly affect operations. requirements and are often given adequate lead From a logistics perspective, Operations The U.S. SIPRNET (Secret Internet Protocol time to fill those requirements. The United Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector were Router Network) system worked well with States and NATO did not know how long remarkably successful, and at no time were USEUCOM and the Joint Staff, but it was Unified Protector would last, and due to this the operations constrained by logistics short- challenging for our NATO partners to work uncertainty the longer range logistics planning falls. At its conclusion, Unified Protector had with. During Unified Protector, the combined required to sustain the operation was challeng- 15 nations contributing air and naval forces headquarters set up a classified email system ing. In building sustainment plans, especially operating from 18 locations throughout using laptop computers in the USEUCOM for PGM munitions, U.S. logistics planners Europe. At the same time, the complexity of and USAFRICOM Joint Operations Centers attempt to work with expenditure projections the operations and required coordination for to communicate with NATO counterparts. for up to 90 days out. It greatly assisted the sustainment presented significant challenges. Unfortunately, obtaining approval for trans- logistics planners when NATO authorized Given the certainty that we will operate in ferring classified/sensitive information to our operations for up to 90 days and approved organizations that will form in response to allies kept our Foreign Disclosure Officer extensions in 90-day increments. This took the requirements, it is essential that we plan for extremely busy. This is an area where the logis- logistics planning requirement from a risky 4 and practice so that organizing and working tics community in particular must develop to 5 days out to 3 months. as a cohesive team on short notice becomes information-sharing protocols and practice them both in exercises and in day-to-day operations to ensure that required information the U.S. Government should carefully consider anticipated sharing is second nature to all concerned. requirements across a variety of scenarios before reducing Coordination and Synchronization of stocks based on resourcing constraints Logistics. One of the most consistent lessons to emerge from every recent multinational Prepositioning and Access Agreements. second nature for all participants. The military operation is the crucial role of a In the case of Unified Protector, the use of professionalism and can-do attitude of all capability to synchronize and harmonize preexisting bases provided fast ramp-up the players produced the highly successful logistics efforts among all the participants. of facilities and personnel during RSO&I. outcomes we experienced, but we must do This includes other nations, coalitions, inter- Robust airports and seaports with sufficient better. The ability to sustain “come as you agency partners, nongovernmental organiza- operational capacity, adequate fuel storage are” military operations with nontraditional tions, and in essence almost anyone involved and distribution systems, and maintenance command relationships and continuously in support operations. In Odyssey Dawn capability will always be critical enablers for shifting members of the coalition is critical. and Unified Protector, coordinating support military operations. During the operation, a While the team of USEUCOM, USAFRI- across geographic combatant commands number of European facilities were revalidated COM, and NATO was collectively able to certainly posed challenges but also offered as having enduring strategic importance, plan, source, and deliver, we must continue opportunities to think about how we will including Sigonella, Souda Bay, and Moron. to reinforce the fact that “synchronization undertake such efforts in the future. Opera- These installations and others will likely be of logistics” is not just a catch phrase but an tions of this nature are much more likely in needed again, yet there will be continued operational imperative. JFQ the years ahead. Coordination with NATO for pressure in a reduced funding environment to integrated and synchronized support across not maintain them. Operations in support of national lines is another area where we must Libya also made use of prepositioned assets in increase our collective proficiency. In terms Europe, and the U.S. Government should care- of a NATO support organization, whether it fully consider anticipated requirements across is called a CSC or a JLSG, a “scalable” over- a variety of scenarios before reducing stocks arching logistics organization is critical at the based on resourcing constraints. Just as impor- outset of any NATO operation to help plan, tant as preexisting facilities and real estate are coordinate, and synchronize coalition logis- prearranged access agreements, fuel exchange tics efforts. Member nations are always going agreements, expedited FMS procedures, diplo- to provide a significant proportion of their matic clearances, and acquisition cross-service ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 77 U.S. Army (Austin Berner) 78 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Afghanistan The Challenges of Attaining a Regional Solution By John F. O’Connell ince taking office in January of cusses the benefits of a regional approach to out the north. Historically, Afghanistan was 2009, President Barack Obama Afghanistan and its neighbors and the inher- at the center of the southern route of the old and his national security team ent obstacles that may never be overcome. Silk Road. Afghanistan is often referred to have insisted that a regional as a Rubik’s Cube, which could not be more S Why Care about Afghanistan? approach to Afghanistan is critical for appropriate. The Rubik’s Cube is an agoniz- success. Indeed, as early as the waning days Afghanistan is a landlocked country ingly complex three-dimensional puzzle with of the Presidency of George W. Bush, it geostrategically located at the crossroads of an alleged 43 quintillion (18 zeros) permuta- appeared that achieving success in Afghani- South, Central, and Western Asia. It is bor- tions, but only one correct alignment.1 Not stan would require the support of regional dered by nuclear neighbors Pakistan to the unlike the cube, Afghanistan is a conundrum state actors as well as others in the interna- south and east and China in the far north- that frustrates the United States and its tional community. On paper, it seems so east, as well as a potential nuclear state in allies as they attempt to solve the structural simple: Afghanistan’s neighbors will derive Iran to the west. (Add Russia and India to the significant benefit from a secure and stable mix, and we have a region with four nuclear Lieutenant Colonel John F. O’Connell, USAF (ANG), Afghanistan. But as the old adage implies, the states.) The Central Asian states of Turk- is the Staff Judge Advocate for the 177th Fighter devil is in the details. This article broadly dis- menistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan round Wing, Egg Harbor Township, New Jersey. Afghan flag atop observation post overlooking border of Afghanistan and Pakistan ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 79 FEATURES | Afghanistan: The Challenges of Attaining a Regional Solution problem of moving the parts independently strategic review of the Afghan war, it became of the neighboring countries would benefit without the entire mechanism falling apart. clear that not only Pakistan’s cooperation was from Afghanistan realizing its objectives, Admittedly, Afghanistan is not com- so inextricably linked to achieving success in there are several impediments to Afghani- pletely analogous to the Rubik’s Cube, which Afghanistan, but also Pakistan itself had to stan doing so, some of which include the has only one correct solution. Perhaps it is have equal priority.3 But what about Afghani- relationship between India and Pakistan, more of a high stakes card game, requiring stan’s other neighbors? particularly concerning Kashmir; Russia and the patience of regional players as they the Central Asian Republics’ disagreement maneuver to build the best hand possible. A Regional Solution: From Their over the former’s preferred sphere of influ- But, like a card game of this nature, regional Perspective ence in the region; and border disputes and players must decide if they are “all-in” in The need for a regional approach to the water-sharing disagreements with Afghani- hopes of realizing the enormous potential war in Afghanistan was clearly articulated by stan’s neighbors.7 Many of the impediments economic benefit in reestablishing the long then–U.S. Central Command Commander date back to the British and Russian colonial dormant continental land routes across General David H. Petraeus during remarks era, are interwoven throughout the region, Eurasia. to a conference hosted by the United States and would require complex multilateral Aside from the U.S. proxy war with the Institute of Peace only 12 days before Barack agreements to resolve if the parties could then–Soviet Union following that country’s Obama was sworn in as the 42nd President. even reach agreement. But as Haroun Mir invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, General Petraeus stated: notes in his essay on Afghanistan, “the more Afghanistan had wallowed in this neglected practical approach should focus on exploring corner of the world, nearly ignored by the It’s not possible to resolve the challenges opportunities rather than trying to fix what United States until that bright, blue-skied internal to Afghanistan without addressing countries of the region have not been able to Tuesday morning of September 11, 2001. In the challenges especially in terms of security achieve for themselves.”8 the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, which to Afghanistan’s neighbors. . . . [The Coali- As Afghanistan and its neighbors were orchestrated by Osama bin Laden tion] will have to develop and execute a begin to realize the untapped potential, and his al Qaeda organization, Operation regional strategy that includes Pakistan, regional organizations such as the Shanghai Enduring Freedom was launched as teams India, the Central Asian States and even Cooperation Organization and the Eco- of U.S. and British special operations forces China and Russia along with perhaps at nomic Cooperation Organization, which joined with the Northern Alliance to topple some point Iran.4 have been timid in their actions thus far, the Taliban government and capture or kill should be encouraged to take the lead in bin Laden. As Taliban and al Qaeda forces On the surface, it seems so obvious that fostering economic cooperation and free fled across the porous border into Pakistan’s a regional solution is the answer the United trade and transit through a revival of the western frontier to regroup, a new Afghan States and the coalition have been searching old Silk Road.9 The continued development government under Hamid Karzai was formed for that one wonders why it has not happened of regional energy projects to transport in December 2001. Reconstruction of a already. Surely a stable and secure Afghani- electricity from Central Asia to Pakistan war-weary Afghanistan began in early 2002, stan, with open and safe trade and transit and India, and the construction of rail and and there was renewed hope for the Afghan routes, must be in the interest of regional highway links between South and Central population, but by March of 2003 the focus actors and the international community Asia as well as China and Iran, will set in of the United States and its allies shifted to a at large. Perhaps a review of the interests place the critical infrastructure needed for new war in Iraq. What little optimism there or objectives of each state actor and what development of the region as a whole. Again, was for Afghans began to fade as the Taliban obstacles need to be overcome will shed some the approach seems so simple—why has crept back into their lives, forming a shadow light on the illusive “regional approach.” it not happened yet? Lack of political will government in many parts of the country. Near the end of his second term, President George W. Bush moved toward it seems so obvious that a regional solution is the answer that a regional approach to the Afghanistan one wonders why it has not happened already problem set. As Jessica Matthews noted in her introduction to a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report on the viabil- Afghanistan among the regional leadership, as well as an ity of a regional strategy for Afghanistan, Afghanistan is a poor, landlocked inability to look beyond historical conflicts, “the Washington Post reported as early as country, and as such is dependent on its are the culprits. November 11, 2008 that ‘At [Chairman of the neighbors and other regional countries for Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael] Mul- the bulk of its legal trade.5 Afghanistan’s Relevant Players and Impediments len’s direction, the map of the Afghanistan national interests, therefore, include achiev- Pakistan. As discussed earlier, it is battlespace is being redrawn to include the ing internal security and stability, maintain- generally acknowledged that Afghanistan’s tribal regions of western Pakistan.’”2 With the ing friendly relations, and establishing itself success—however loosely defined that is—is incoming administration of Barack Obama, as the “trade and transit hub linking South dependent on the cooperation of Pakistan. the concept of “AfPak” was introduced, and and Central Asia as well as China with Iran However, take a contentious border dispute with the Obama administration’s second and the rest of the Middle East.”6 While most between the two countries, mix in a strategic 80 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu O’CONNELL U.S., Pakistani, and Afghan military leaders at conference in Kabul U.S. Army (Zackary Root) partnership agreement between Afghani- India. Even other regional states such as India. No doubt there is an intense stan and India, and combine those with an Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are looked at strategic rivalry between India and Pakistan unhealthy dose of Pakistani paranoia and through an Indo-centric lens and viewed as for influence in Afghanistan. While we have the underpinning for Pakistan’s a threat because an alternative supply route Pakistan’s actions are Indo-centric, India’s destabilization of Afghanistan. Despite the through those countries would lessen the interests in Afghanistan extend well great economic benefits that it could derive U.S. reliance on Pakistan, thereby diminish- beyond its rivalry with Pakistan. India’s from a stable Afghanistan, Pakistan has ing its importance and benefiting India.10 objective is for increased trade and new instead chosen to undermine the Karzai The bottom line is that in Pakistan, any- economic ties with Central and Western government through its tacit support of the thing and everything India does is aimed Asia through traditional land routes. India Taliban. Blind paranoia toward India drives at weakening Pakistan. Pakistan must take has well-founded concerns for security in Pakistan’s need to control Afghanistan and positive steps to eliminate state support for Afghanistan. Given the abrupt departure of disrupt economic and security relationships Taliban terror. However, as Frédéric Grare India from a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in with India. noted: 1996, India clearly has a strong interest in To the delight of China, the paranoia developing a long-term strategic partnership also dictates that the Pakistani military Pakistan is a revisionist power and, in the that includes stronger economic ties as well position troops on the eastern border with eyes of India, an aggressor. It will continue as security training as a means of contain- India instead of the western border (assum- to feed its own paranoia. For this reason, ing or reversing the wave of militant Islamic ing that they would even want to engage concessions to a Pakistan that will not fundamentalism. with Taliban or al Qaeda fighters), thus renounce terrorism as a means of pursuing India, however, is fearful of a rushed forcing India’s hand to focus on the Paki- its foreign policy objectives [are] likely to lead U.S./coalition exit from Afghanistan before stani border and not direct its attention to to a resurgence of the very organizations the the Taliban is weakened to the point of China and the Sino-Indian border dispute, coalition has been trying to eliminate for the ineffectiveness. Gautam Mukhopadhaya most recently the result of the century-old past eight years. In a regional context where notes that such an outcome could conceiv- McMahon Line. Almost every decision that the political balance might have been altered ably be worse than the Taliban rule of Pakistan makes is Indo-centric, whether it in favor of Pakistan, such concessions would 1996–2001 because of “the extent to which is denying Indian influence in Afghanistan constitute regression and would make little jihadi groups have now gained ground in or gaining any international support against sense from a security perspective.11 Pakistan, strengthened ties with the Taliban ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 81 FEATURES | Afghanistan: The Challenges of Attaining a Regional Solution U.S. Air Force (Sean Martin) U.S. Air Force Soldier with Kandahar PRT adjusts laser on M4 carbine for member of Indian consulate as part of effort to build sustainable infrastructure capacity and al-Qaeda, and assimilated the ambitions stronger, more Afghan-centric, and more have privately admitted that a U.S. presence and methodology of al-Qaeda (for example inclusive regional economic and political in Afghanistan helps Iran by keeping “the Lashkar-e-Taiba).”12 While historically India’s approaches to the country’s problems.”14 Taliban at bay and serves as a source of stance on the Taliban has been absolute, it Iran. While it would seem that India’s leverage for Tehran.”15 has opened a small window of compromise national interests and objectives broadly Saudi Arabia. Iran also has a strained by indicating support for the Afghan govern- converge with most other regional players— relationship with Saudi Arabia, a regional ment’s effort to reconcile and reintegrate Iran, Russia, the Central Asian Republics, power and rival that views the current gov- former fighters, though a fair amount of and China—it should come as no surprise ernment in Tehran as a threat to security in skepticism remains. that Pakistan plays the spoiler yet again. the region and the Muslim world. Though India supports the U.S.-led effort in While all benefit from a stable and secure the United States is Saudi Arabia’s most Afghanistan and believes that the develop- Afghanistan, there are differences between important foreign partner—a relationship ment and buildup of the Afghan National India and the other regional players that the House of Saud would like to preserve— Security Forces is the best course of action may not be overcome. India enjoys good the interests of Saudi Arabia in Afghanistan to set the conditions for a transition to relations with Iran and supports a more are often in conflict with those of the Afghan takeover of security responsibility. inclusive regional approach, to include United States; Saudi Arabia was one of just India also supports the coalition counter- Iran. However, Iran’s deep animosity three countries to recognize the Taliban insurgency campaign, but would like to toward the United States not only pre- government when it took power in Afghani- see a more robust political, economic, and vents Iran from pursuing shared interests stan, so it is no surprise that the Saudis diplomatic strategy interwoven into the in Afghanistan, but also leads it to take would like to see in Afghanistan an Islamist effort and endorses the inclusion of other actions that undermine U.S. efforts there state focused on the “domestic propagation regional players to include Iran, Russia, and and are detrimental to Iran’s own national of religion and enforcing moral strictures the Central Asian Republics.13 Finally, India interests—actions such as narcotraffick- within the country,” much like their own believes that its role in stabilizing Afghani- ing and a return to power of the anti-Shia Wahhabist (Salafist) state. Saudi Arabia stan is through continued capacity-building: Taliban (against whom Iran almost went to has already provided a sizable amount of the development of institutions, business and war). That said, both India and Iran have a financial support to Afghanistan, mostly human capital, and good governance that shared interest in not seeing Afghanistan in the form of reconstruction and direct allows the Afghan state to “provide for the dominated by Pakistan, and have issued foreign aid, and also supports reconcilia- security and welfare of its own citizens with joint statements pledging to cooperate in tion efforts with moderate elements of the a view to an independent, pluralistic, demo- stabilizing Afghanistan. Interestingly, as Taliban. While the United States and Saudi cratic, and united Afghanistan. It favors Karim Sadjadpour reports, Iranian officials Arabia have different views of success in 82 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu O’CONNELL Afghanistan, the United States should lever- great benefit to Afghanistan and the region notes age the close alliances of both Afghanistan as a whole, but would Pakistan take such and Pakistan with Saudi Arabia to reach an action against the Taliban? 1 “The Perplexing Life of Erno Rubik,” Dis- agreeable outcome. From the Russian perspective, China’s cover (March 1986), 81, available at USS Tucson transits seas east of the Korean Peninsula during combined alliance maritime and air readiness exercise Invincible Spirit 84 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu PARK and UTGOFF scope. More specific changes are apparent if This article summarizes the more capabilities and then penetrate its missile we compare the statements made at the end important arguments for why and how the defenses as well. Alliance efforts to strengthen of the yearly Alliance Security Consultative extended deterrence arrangements for the these capabilities should help guard against Meetings (SCMs) in 2006, held just after alliance might be strengthened. It considers and thus deter this potential scenario. The North Korea’s first nuclear test, and those held both the technical steps already identified in alliance should also ensure the survivability in 2011 and 2012. SCM communiqués and further steps that and connectivity of its high-level command In the 2006 SCM, “Secretary of Defense might be needed. The purpose is to illustrate and control capabilities despite nuclear [Donald] Rumsfeld offered assurances of firm how the more important interests of the two attacks. U.S. commitment and immediate support allies might be expected to shape further In the second scenario, North Korea to the ROK, including continuation of the strengthening of the alliance’s extended would optimistically presume that its willing- extended deterrence offered by the U.S. nuclear nuclear deterrence. The article then describes ness and capacity to endure the pain of a few umbrella, consistent with the Mutual Defense how a small nuclear force might enable North nuclear strikes and keep fighting is greater Tre at y.” 1 In the 2011 SCM: Korea to challenge the alliance with intense than that of the alliance. It would further crises or perhaps even by initiating the use of assume that (a) the alliance cannot destroy Secretary of Defense [Leon] Panetta reaffirmed nuclear weapons. Next, the article argues that a substantial portion of its nuclear forces or the continued U.S. commitment to provide and there is already a strong basis for confidence defend effectively against those it succeeds in strengthen extended deterrence for the ROK, in the alliance’s extended nuclear deterrence launching, (b) fear of further nuclear strikes using the full range of capabilities, including arrangements, but nonetheless that further would greatly limit the alliance’s retaliation, the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, strengthening would be needed as North and (c) the alliance would quickly offer a and missile defense capabilities. Moreover, the Korean nuclear capabilities evolve. The article settlement of the conflict that would be a Minister and the Secretary decided to further then discusses the more desirable features that major improvement over DPRK prewar develop the Extended Deterrence Policy Com- the allies should want to see in strengthened circumstances, even taking into account the mittee (EDPC), already held twice this year, arrangements for extended deterrence. After damage it had suffered. which serves as a cooperation mechanism to presenting an example plan for how alliance In this scenario, too, strong precision enhance the effectiveness of extended deter- arrangements for extended nuclear deterrence strike capabilities and defenses for the alliance rence. To this end, the Minister and the Sec- might be prepared to adapt over the next would make a big difference as they would retary endorsed the “EDPC Multi-year Work decade and beyond, the final section provides negate presumption (a) above. Furthermore, Plan,” and decided to develop a tailored bilat- some conclusions. The article thus presents a to the extent that the alliance could make eral deterrence strategy including future activi- picture of how extended nuclear deterrence clear that it would not concede anything that ties, such as the ROK-U.S. Extended Deterrence arrangements for the alliance would have to North Korea could possibly value enough Table Top Exercise (TTX), to enhance effective evolve given the continued evolution of the to outweigh the damage it would suffer, this deterrence options against the nuclear and North Korean nuclear threat. scenario might be deterred. The United States WMD threats from North Korea.2 has a fundamental interest in demonstrat- Potential Scenarios for DPRK Nuclear ing to all its allies and potential adversaries Then in the 2012 SCM: Challenges worldwide that it will—at a minimum—not How might North Korea make use allow a state to profit by attacking it or its the Secretary and the Minister decided to of nuclear forces? We see three plausible allies with nuclear weapons.5 develop a tailored bilateral deterrence strategy scenarios for nuclear-backed aggression that In the third type of scenario, North through the Extended Deterrence Policy Com- North Korea might think it could profit from.4 Korea would not commit to nuclear war but mittee . . . particularly against North Korean First, North Korea might gamble that nuclear would instead test the alliance with intense nuclear and WMD threats. To this end, the strikes that destroyed the most important crises, conventional military provocations, Secretary and the Minister approved the joint alliance command and control centers would and frightening nuclear threats to see if such concepts and principles of tailored deterrence, enable quick victory. Such attacks would brinksmanship can shatter alliance resolve. upon which the bilateral deterrence strategy is presumably leave the ROK armed forces Single initiatives of this kind might be aimed to be based.3 without high-level leadership and essential at winning some specific concession. Alter- intelligence. DPRK military forces might then natively, a series of such initiatives might aim The increasing breadth of the U.S. break through weakened alliance defenses at gradually weakening the allies’ resolve and extended deterrence commitments reflects and paralyze South Korea by capturing Seoul loosening the ties between them. the ROK’s need for assurance that it can and by making deep penetrations to neutral- In confronting any highly stressful continue to rely on these commitments. It ize key military targets. DPRK nuclear-backed provocation, the allies demonstrates U.S. willingness to provide Success in decapitating alliance leader- such assurance. Moreover, it highlights the ship with nuclear strikes would require better Dr. Chang Kwoun Park is a Senior Research Fellow need to take further concrete and timely nuclear and missile technology than North in the Center for Security and Strategic Studies at steps to strengthen extended deterrence as Korea apparently has. But we can expect the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses. Dr. Victor the North Korean nuclear threat evolves. But further improvements. North Korea would A. Utgoff is a Senior Division Fellow in the Strategy, what steps should be taken and under what require sufficient nuclear forces to survive Forces, and Resources Division at the Institute for circumstances? potential attacks by alliance precision strike Defense Analyses. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 85 FEATURES | On Strengthening Extended Deterrence for the ROK-U.S. Alliance would need to agree on and implement effec- tests of alliance resolve as the DPRK nuclear cumstances from which the scenario seems tive and timely steps to convince the North threat continues to emerge.9 to offer escape. Thus, the alliance and other that its provocation will at best not do it any Our third reason for believing that regional powers must keep an eye on condi- good and could lead to disaster. The confron- nuclear-backed provocations are the most tions in North Korea and consider provid- tation will have to be carefully managed by likely of nuclear scenarios is that intense ing humanitarian aid if dire circumstances the alliance and teach the right lesson: that provocations serve the interests of the Kim threaten, so long as it is not provided in such brinksmanship is not worth its costs dynasty that has ruled North Korea. Military response to threats. and risks. For at least three reasons, this kind provocations allow the dynasty to portray of scenario seems much more likely than the itself as once again bravely defending the Alliance Confidence in Extended first two, though they could evolve from it. nation against aggression by the United States Deterrence First, North Korea would expect to and its ROK “puppet” government—thus The current basis for the allies’ con- control the pressure it puts on the alliance, suggesting that the Kim dynasty’s leadership fidence in extended deterrence is sound. escalating only so long as the alliance has is essential to its citizens’ security. Military History counts for a great deal in both not found an effective counterstrategy, does provocations can also cause reactions from cultures. The ROK-U.S. alliance was estab- lished during a war where some 30,000 U.S. military personnel died, and the allies have various motivations for North Korea to continue military been reliable partners in facing security chal- provocations seem unlikely to recede any time soon lenges on and off the Korean Peninsula ever since. While relations between the allies have their ups and downs, ties of such consistent not appear likely to escalate excessively, the alliance that can unify the North while the strength and duration can be expected to and shows signs it might make substantial new leadership is consolidating its control. survive whatever challenges North Korea concessions. Second, North Korea has a long Provoking the alliance can impress the mili- might attempt. history of initiating provocations against the tary by demonstrating its new leader’s willing- The credibility of the alliance’s extended allies stretching back to its invasion of South ness to act boldly against powerful adversar- deterrence is backed up by continuing U.S. Korea in 1950. Its more serious provoca- ies, as well as demonstrating the military’s contributions to ROK defense, by the U.S.- tions since then include several attempts to willingness to follow his leadership.10 ROK defense treaty, and by the U.S.-ROK assassinate presidents of South Korea; the Finally, these various motivations for combined defense system. The United States capture of a number of ships including the North Korea to continue to mount military is committed to maintaining more than USS Pueblo; the highjacking, attacks on, and provocations against the alliance seem 28,000 U.S. military personnel in South Korea bombings of several ROK and U.S. aircraft; unlikely to recede any time soon. We might and providing much larger forces in the event and the abduction of South Korean citizens.6 hope that the extra dangers that North Korea of war. As expected of a strong alliance, its These provocations took place mostly in the would face as a result of its having become a military forces carry out a regular schedule of decades immediately following the Korean nuclear-armed adversary would induce new exercises with each other. War. In recent years, most of them have been caution, but the alliance should not count on The nuclear component of the alliance’s associated with DPRK nuclear proliferation, that. extended deterrent is vastly superior to any especially its nuclear weapon and missile tests. It seems clear that the extended deter- nuclear forces North Korea could ever hope North Korea has on occasion threatened to rence capability of the alliance—including to have. Alert U.S. nuclear forces are always turn Seoul into a “sea of fire.” strategic strike capabilities, missile defenses, within range and more than sufficient to More troubling at this point are two and nuclear deterrence arrangements—would derive the maximum deterrence of North severe DPRK provocations in 2010. The first help to deter and, if need be, defend against Korea that can be had from such forces. U.S. was the sinking by North Korea in April 2010 the first two types of scenarios. It could also nuclear forces could be deployed in South of the ROKS Cheonan, a South Korean naval help the alliance to deter the third type of Korea within a few days whenever the alli- ship. This attack caused greater loss of life scenario. Strong extended deterrence arrange- ance’s concerns might dictate. than North Korea had inflicted on the South ments of these kinds should make it easier Finally, the ROK-U.S. alliance is a key in more than 20 years. The second was a for the allies to discount the nuclear threats component of the global system of alliances DPRK artillery attack in November 2010 on that North Korea makes. We note that while maintained by the United States for its own Yeonpyeong Island, which is near the North- the allies surely do not look forward to the security. Failure by the United States to meet ern Limit Line of the Yellow Sea (West Sea). intense provocations that seem likely to come, its most important security obligations would This attack was seen as particularly significant the experience of successfully weathering risk the collapse of the entire system. because two of the four people killed on the them should draw the allies closer together. In While the basis for confidence in the island were civilians, and because this was an general, better anticipation and advance prep- alliance’s extended deterrence seems sufficient attack on South Korea’s sovereign territory.7 arations to respond firmly to DPRK provoca- now, as the DPRK nuclear threat continues to The ROK government has since promised tions should help to deter provocations. evolve, the alliance’s extended deterrence will strong retaliation for any future military Note that any of the three scenarios have to evolve, too. Improved defenses and attacks by the North.8 These especially intense would be more plausible to the extent that conventional strike forces will need to become provocations may foretell even more intense North Korea finds itself in desperate cir- a reality. The nuclear deterrence arrangements 86 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu PARK and UTGOFF will need to be strengthened on a timely basis. Korea. It is at least conceivable that as defense arrangements could be established—perhaps To do otherwise would risk a crisis of confi- and strike technologies improve, these forces similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- dence in the ROK-U.S. alliance—and among could greatly limit the number of targets tion’s Nuclear Planning Group—to enable other U.S. allies as well. It could encourage North Korea could expect to destroy. If both allies to work out nuclear strategies— North Korea to believe that it could establish the alliance were able to suppress DPRK and to plan specific nuclear options for pos- a meaningful advantage in coercive power. nuclear forces to this degree, its dependence sible choice by the two presidents. DPRK efforts to pose an increased threat on nuclear weapons to deter North Korea Consultation by the two presidents to the alliance should be answered with would be much reduced. Of course, such would be needed to decide on the nature and increased costs and concerns for them. effective protection may not be possible. And timing of any nuclear use, and even threats even if it is, the alliance may be substantially of use. Both would want to remain within Desirable Features for the Extended uncertain of how effective it is. North Korea their homelands. Their consultations with Deterrent might succeed in building effective counter- each other and essential subordinates would The following six observations are measures, perhaps with help from outside. It have to be supported by reliable, secure, high- interpretations of points made in the four might also plan other means for transporting bandwidth communications. defense policy papers released by the United nuclear weapons to alliance targets. Finally, both allies’ military forces States in 2010, especially the Nuclear Posture Despite the uncertainties and the should participate in carrying out the neces- Review (NPR), or were drawn from two substantial costs, even considerably less than sary nuclear missions. papers written separately by the authors,11 or perfect protection against North Korean Establish Jointly Controlled Conven- in several cases from our discussions. nuclear attack could be valuable. Every DPRK tional Strategic Strike Capabilities. Former Broaden Extended Deterrence to nuclear-armed missile that does not reach ROK Defense Minister Kim Tae-young stated Include Missile Defenses and Conventional its target would reduce the potential damage in his confirmation hearing that the locations Strategic Strike. These two steps were agreed to the alliance and could justify limiting the of DPRK nuclear facilities are known and that to and reaffirmed in the last three SCM com- damage the alliance imposes in retaliation. if there is a concern that North Korea is going muniqués. The 2010 NPR calls for “work[ing] Finally, missile defenses and strategic strike to make a nuclear attack, the United States with allies and partners to respond to regional capabilities could help allied citizens maintain and South Korea would then make the final threats by deploying effective missile defenses, their confidence when North Korea threatens decision on whether or not to strike these including in Europe, Northeast Asia, the to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire.” Nonetheless, facilities.17 Middle East, and Southwest Asia.”12 The given the high likelihood that the missile While nuclear attacks on these facilities United States is also pursuing enhanced long- defenses and strike capabilities deployed by might offer the best chance to destroy them, range strike forces that can help protect U.S. the alliance would prove substantially less unless low-yield precision delivery weapons forward forces and allies.13 They would be than perfect, the Alliance must continue to can be made available, nuclear preemption able to strike a limited number of targets from intercontinental distances in tens of minutes. Of course, conventional forces within the despite uncertainties and substantial costs, even considerably theater may be similarly capable and quicker. less than perfect protection against North Korean nuclear We discuss this possibility later. attack could be valuable Some observers are concerned that this broadening of the alliance’s extended deterrence implies a weakening of its nuclear maintain a strong nuclear deterrent. could cause great collateral damage on the component. Their concerns may be based on Enable the ROK to Share Alliance Korean Peninsula and beyond. Thus, if practi- President Obama’s commitment “to seek the Nuclear Responsibilities More Fully. There cal conventional weapons could be essentially peace and security of a world without nuclear are at least two strong arguments in favor as effective in carrying out attacks against weapons.”14 The 2010 NPR connected this of ensuring that the two allies share the these facilities, they would be preferable. commitment to changes in extended deter- responsibility for any nuclear use. First, both The ability to attack quickly once the rence arrangements by stating that “Strength- presidents would be held responsible by their decision has been made is important. Mini- ening the non-nuclear elements of regional citizens for whatever strategic actions are mizing the time to reach these targets can security architectures is vital to moving taken and the outcomes. Thus, both their increase the time available to the presidents toward a world free of nuclear weapons.”15 At views must be taken into account if nuclear to decide whether to attack. Anticipating the same time, the President and high-level weapons are to be used, or not used, in cir- quick attacks, North Korea can be expected U.S. officials have continued to state, “so long cumstances where they seemed warranted. to minimize the time from the first detectable as [nuclear] weapons exist, the United States Second, whatever happens when nuclear signs it is preparing to attack until its forces will maintain a safe, secure and effective weapons are used to defend the alliance, are launched. Thus, the alliance should want arsenal to deter any adversary and guarantee it should be clear that both allies are fully conventional strike capabilities that can reach that defense to our allies.”16 responsible. DPRK nuclear targets as quickly as possible. Missile defenses and strategic strike Enabling the ROK to share fully in the This suggests that conventional ballistic forces should give the alliance substantial responsibilities for any alliance nuclear use missile strike forces should be deployed on or advantages in the event of war with North could be done in many ways. Institutional near the Korean Peninsula. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 87 FEATURES | On Strengthening Extended Deterrence for the ROK-U.S. Alliance South Korea has been interested in Japan, as long as the payload does not exceed The political values of having U.S. creating a ballistic missile strike force that can 500 kilograms, about half a ton.”19 nuclear weapons on or near South Korea attack North Korean nuclear facilities, but The ROK’s prospective deployment of reside in the extra measures of assurance and until early October 2012 had been restricted such forces is not without risk. North Korea deterrence they would provide. The ROK and by the New Missile Guidelines—agreed to might have alerted its missiles to pose a its citizens are likely to be more confident with its U.S. ally in 2001—to ballistic missiles heightened threat to the alliance but with no that they are protected by nuclear weapons that can carry no more than a 500-kilogram intent to launch. A conventional preemptive deployed forward for that purpose. Simi- payload, at a range no more than 300 kilo- attack could be substantially less than perfect, larly, North Korea should have little trouble meters. As some DPRK nuclear facilities and and even though collateral damage would be understanding that deterrence of attacks on longer range missile bases are more than 500 low, it could leave the North Korean leader- South Korea would be the primary purpose kilometers from plausible missile launch loca- ship sufficiently angry or panicked to launch of nuclear weapons located there. It should tions in South Korea, the alliance would have the surviving missiles—which might not all see U.S. willingness to forward deploy nuclear to agree to increase these limits.18 be intercepted by allied missile defenses. weapons as a particularly credible indication In addition, the United States is bound In sum then, the deployment of a con- of alliance intent to use them should that by the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces ventional ballistic missile force by the ROK prove necessary. Treaty not to have ground-launched missiles should make the DPRK more cautious about On the other hand, stationing nuclear with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilome- readying its own missile forces as a ploy to weapons on or near South Korea would seem ters. While South Korea is not a party to the frighten South Korea and its U.S. ally. In other a serious setback for nuclear nonproliferation. treaty, the United States could be seen as sub- words, it should help to deter this kind of pro- Some would call this nuclear proliferation. verting the treaty if it were to support ROK vocative action. At the same time, given the Many would see it as inconsistent with the CAPTION deployment of such missiles. Deploying air- risks to the alliance of striking at the DPRK, goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, with the to-surface missiles or sea-based missiles could both allies should agree to any such use of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of be one way around this problem, but either of ROK ballistic missile force. the Korean Peninsula signed by North and these options would be a wholly new program Deploy U.S. Nuclear Weapons on or South Korea, or with U.S. and allied efforts to for South Korea while deploying longer range Near South Korea as Needed. Deployment reduce their dependence on nuclear weapons. surface-to-surface missiles would not. of nuclear weapons on or near South Korea Some would see this step difficult to reverse. Instead, after long negotiations, and could have both military and political advan- Some would lament the precedent that might two direct discussions between Presidents tages. While we would not expect the alliance be set for other states wanting the strongest Barack Obama and Lee Myung-bak, the allies to need to make quick strikes with nuclear possible nuclear assurances from the United reached an agreement to revise the Missile weapons, air-to-surface ballistic missiles or States. Guidelines: “Under the revised guidelines sea-based missiles located over or near the Nonetheless, the continuing statements South Korea can deploy ballistic missiles with peninsula could strike within minutes—sig- and decisions made by U.S. leaders and senior a range of up to 800 kilometers . . . enough nificantly less than the few tens of minutes officials that South Korea is protected by to reach any target in North Korea but not required for ballistic missiles to fly interconti- U.S. extended deterrence including nuclear enough to be considered a threat to China or nental distances. weapons have not been qualified in any way. USS Carl Vinson (center), deployed with the U.S. Seventh Fleet, steams with ROK destroyers Kwanggaeto and Dae Jo Yeong U.S. Navy (Christopher K. Hwang) 88 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu PARK and UTGOFF They imply that the U.S. leadership sees its the alliance’s will to make necessary changes targets. The third organization would be obligation to defend the alliance as a higher in a timely manner. Knowledge of its exis- responsible for activating and sustaining priority than even nuclear nonprolifera- tence and general features could help convey survivable, reliable, and secure command, tion. The United States also expects that by to North Korea that its efforts to increase its control, and high-bandwidth communica- meeting the assurance and deterrence needs nuclear threat will be countered, which might tions support to enable the two presidents to of its allies, it will maintain their confidence slow—or less likely halt—its pursuit of nuclear consult and implement their decisions. that they need not establish nuclear deterrent forces. Group 2. On a schedule suitably forces of their own. The plan should facilitate steps to synchronized with DPRK efforts to deploy A decision by the two presidents to strengthen extended nuclear deterrence its first operational nuclear-armed ballistic deploy nuclear weapons in Korea—even arrangements when needed and scale them missiles, the alliance would take the follow- temporarily—would be momentous. Given back if the nuclear threat were reduced. Desir- ing specific steps. The U.S. Air Force would the current embryonic state of DPRK nuclear able changes either way are more prudent provide, or the ROK would build, long-range forces, there is little reason to make this deci- if they can be reversed in a timely manner. precision conventional air-to-ground missiles sion anytime soon. To do so would provide To the extent possible, changes should be that could be quickly launched from ROK North Korea with an argument that it needs designed and managed to avoid providing aircraft patrolling in suitable launch areas nuclear weapons to defend itself. excuses for increases in the North Korean during crisis and conflict. The ROK air force Nonetheless, the continued emer- nuclear threat, or for resisting steps toward would plan, purchase, deploy, train pilots for, gence of the North Korean nuclear threat elimination of that threat. and exercise a small force of stealthy dual- will provide strong arguments for nuclear weapons to be deployed in or near South Korea—especially when any serious security the continued emergence of the North Korean nuclear threat crisis arises. will provide strong arguments for nuclear weapons to be Structure Extended Deterrence to deployed in or near South Korea Minimize North Korean Peacetime Threats and Provocations. North Korea’s periodic peacetime threats and provocations have been An Example Adaptive Plan for the Alli- capable aircraft such as the F-35. These ROK a substantial political, psychological, and ance’s Extended Nuclear Deterrent pilots would periodically train at air exercise material burden for the alliance. As noted, the The following example adaptive plan ranges in the western United States. Training most likely way for North Korea to attempt specifies three groups of steps to strengthen would include delivery of nuclear missiles and to capitalize on operational nuclear forces the alliance’s extended nuclear deterrent, each bombs. Weapons delivery would be practiced when it gets them is to engage in intensely keyed to a different phase of North Korea’s against mockups of planned targets. The hostile conventional provocations and nuclear efforts to establish substantial operational Air Force and ROK air force would arrange brinksmanship, and count on its nuclear nuclear forces. for timely covert forward delivery and safe forces to deter military escalation by the Group 1. On a schedule suitably syn- storage of nuclear bombs and/or nuclear alliance. chronized with North Korean development warheads for the ROK air-to-ground missiles. Strengthened extended deterrence may of an initial technical capability to deliver These weapons would be equipped with use- help to reduce hostile peacetime acts by North nuclear weapons with ballistic missiles, the control systems requiring separate codes from Korea. If the alliance deploys effective conven- alliance would organize, equip, and task three the two presidents. Regular peacetime exer- tional strategic strike forces (as the ROK can combined organizations. The first would cises of the delivery, storage, and arming of now do) and missile defenses, it could become be a combined, political-strategic advisory the dual-capable aircraft would be carried out capable of destroying much of North Korea’s group that would examine and recommend with mockup nuclear bombs and warheads. nuclear forces and defending against many high-level policies for deterring DPRK use Group 3. On a schedule suitably syn- of those that survive. If North Korea were to and threats to use its nuclear forces. It would chronized with the deployment by North credit the alliance with such a capability, it develop strategies and operational approaches Korea of enough nuclear capability to attack should be especially leery of making realistic for alliance employment of nuclear weapons. the majority of the bases across which the threats of nuclear war, as it would then have It would also look for strategies for bringing ROK dual-capable strategic strike force might to worry more about the possibility of pre- nuclear use to a halt quickly while achiev- be deployed, one or both of the following emptive attack by the alliance. Strengthening ing a reasonable political outcome to the steps might be taken. The ROK air force extended deterrence in this way should also war. The second organization would be a would develop and exercise the capability to help allied civilians discount DPRK nuclear combined intelligence and target-planning disperse its strategic strike aircraft on sections threats. group. Combined intelligence would provide of hard roads. Ground crews would practice Develop an Adaptive Plan for Strength- the best basis for planning strikes in support minor maintenance and refueling ening Extended Deterrence. The alliance of approved strategies and operational at dispersal sites. Air Force personnel would should have a flexible plan for well-coordi- approaches, or otherwise of interest to the practice transporting mockup nuclear nated and timely adaptation to the evolving two presidents. This group would also plan weapons to exercise sites and arming ROK North Korean nuclear threat as it reaches conventional strategic strikes on key North dual-capable aircraft. specific milestones.20 Such a plan can bolster Korean targets, especially nuclear-related ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 89 FEATURES | On Strengthening Extended Deterrence for the ROK-U.S. Alliance Many variants of this example adaptive 9 See Kongdan Oh Hassig, Military Confronta- plan are conceivable. Perhaps arrangements The authors thank their institutions for tion on the Korean Peninsula, IDA Document NS could be made to disperse the ROK strategic supporting the collaboration that made this D-4259 (Alexandria, VA: IDA, January 2011). article possible. We also appreciate the 10 Dr. Kongdan Oh Hassig of IDA sees military strike force to airbases outside South Korea. helpful comments made by many of our col- provocations by North Korea as particularly impor- This could make them less vulnerable to leagues as the work progressed. We remain tant for the leader’s efforts to maintain control over DPRK special forces expected to attempt to solely responsible for the contents. the citizens and the military officer corps, especially penetrate deep into South Korea in crisis or the most senior officers. See also “North Korean war. Alternatively, the alliance might choose leader may use dispute to rally support,” Denver to deploy sea-based ballistic missile forces Post, May 26, 2010, available at 90 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Secretary Panetta meets with then–Vice President Xi Jinping of China to discuss ways to advance communications DOD (Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo) The Effects of 9/11 on China’s Strategic Environment Illusive Gains and Tangible Setbacks By Marc Koehler The clear victor of the global war on terror appears to be China.1 —Anatol Lieven ome Chinese grand strategists China, therefore, would lie within a of U.S. forces into Central Asia, and the are said to have breathed sighs strategic penumbra for a number of years, exploding U.S. military footprint suggested of relief on September 12, 2001. offering it a chance to develop quietly a plans for a more enduring American presence Relations between the United variety of coercive military capabilities in China’s rear areas. It appeared to be too S soon, therefore, for leaders across Eurasia to States and the People’s Republic of China intended to expand its power in East Asia. (PRC) had been heading downhill in the This, in turn, would allow it to pressure pro- resign themselves to the Chinese hegemony months and years leading up to that day, with independence forces on Taiwan and raise that had seemed inevitable before 9/11. increasing prospects for a significant clash. substantially the projected cost to U.S. forces As the second decade of the 21st century But even before the fires at the World Trade that might be called on to react to PRC mili- begins, the global landscape is changing once Center and Pentagon were completely out, it tary provocations in the region. Such, at least, more. China is rapidly expanding a wide was immediately clear—to Chinese experts was the initial thinking among many PRC variety of military capabilities of the People’s and to most of the world—that Washing- experts and international observers. Liberation Army (PLA), which in turn is ton’s strategic focus would be shifting 3,000 But after a year or two, strategists across bringing about a new level of assertiveness miles to the west, away from East Asia and the globe started to have second thoughts. By in PRC foreign policy. Despite the multiyear the Taiwan Strait and onto the mountains the end of 2001, after a handful of U.S. special efforts of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty and deserts of Afghanistan. U.S. strategists operations forces ousted the Taliban regime Organization (NATO) soldiers and civilians, who had been increasingly concerned about in a matter of weeks, global assessments of success in Afghanistan remains in question. China’s rising power would now be engaged U.S. power started shifting. Governments around the clock on what would become throughout the region scrambled to accom- Marc Koehler is a Foreign Service Officer with the known as the war on terror. modate the aggressive and determined entry Department of State. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 91 FEATURES | The Effects of 9/11 on China’s Strategic Environment U.S. influence in the Middle East is dimin- had identified with Clausewitzian precision During the Clinton years, Sino-Amer- ished after the Iraq invasion. The measurable as the center of gravity of Taiwan’s defense). ican ties continued to be a target of critics in costs to the United States from the war on Later that year, Deng Xiaoping became the both countries. Beijing’s coercive population terror include at least $1 trillion and more first communist Chinese leader to visit the control policies were attacked by Christian than 6,000 U.S. dead; less quantifiable are the United States. His pragmatism and apparent groups while organized labor raised concerns global costs to the U.S. reputation and soft moderation impressed U.S. audiences, spark- over goods produced by PRC prisoners for power. But at the same time, U.S. alliances ing popular support for enhanced bilateral sale in U.S. markets. Tibet became a cause with Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), ties.3 China’s soft power was growing.4 célèbre in Congress and on college cam- and Australia are robust and expanding, a But Sino-American ties ruptured puses across the country. But in addition to nascent U.S.-India friendship is deepening, severely on June 4, 1989, when PLA troops concerns about human rights, U.S. worries and the U.S. military footprint in Central in and around Beijing’s Tiananmen Square about security issues now became much more Asia remains significant. There are several opened fire on unarmed students and other pronounced. For example, despite intensive drivers of these relationships, the most civilians protesting against corruption diplomacy, the Clinton administration failed important of which is strategic mistrust over and in favor of democracy. Western media to prevent Chinese proliferation of missile China’s intentions. In short, the PLA military coverage of China switched overnight, and nuclear technology to Iran and Pakistan. buildup, coupled with Beijing’s recent foreign portraying the Chinese leadership as bar- Washington imposed sanctions on PRC enti- policy aggressiveness, seems to be driving baric and backward.5 Parliamentarians and ties for violations of international regimes.10 Eurasian nations closer to the United States. nongovernmental organizations expressed PRC strategists assessed that U.S. and How, then, should one assess the impact revulsion at the massacre and demanded Western attacks on Moscow’s human rights of 9/11 on China’s strategic environment? their governments cease business as usual practices had been instrumental in weaken- Ten years after the terror attacks against New with “the butchers of Beijing.” Western ing the foundation of Soviet control, so they York City and Washington, DC, is China governments responded with all instru- worried about the same with regard to China. better off strategically? Or do the gains and ments of national power including canceling They viewed the imposition of sanctions as losses balance out? This article examines existing arms deals, ceasing military-to- part of an effort to “contain” China. Start- these questions, first by outlining the history military exchanges, imposing sanctions on ing in 1985, PRC leaders ordered the PLA of Sino-American relations to illustrate the the regime and travel bans on high-level to downgrade preparations for a major war downward spiral that marked the period up PRC officials, suspending loans and export with the Soviet Union and begin planning to 9/11. Next it discusses the strategic gains credits, and tightening controls on exports of for fighting local, limited wars on China’s that PRC scholars and others thought would military hardware and advanced technology periphery, such as a conflict over Taiwan.11 accrue to China in the immediate aftermath to China.6 U.S. public opinion of the PRC After the 1991 Gulf War, PLA planners of 9/11, and the PLA military buildup that government declined sharply, to this day also began to concentrate on the possibility ensued. The strategic costs to China that never returning to the positive levels that of war with the United States; war games became evident in the years that followed prevailed before 1989.7 against “the American ‘enemy’” became standard.12 The Taiwan Strait Crises in 1995 from the depths of the Korean War to the heights of and 1996 and the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 President Richard Nixon’s groundbreaking visit to China in exacerbated an increasingly antagonistic 1972, Sino-American relations have been complicated relationship.13 Debate about “the China threat” heated are analyzed in the subsequent section. This During the same period, two other up globally. Congress reacted by directing article concludes with an assessment of the global events had significant impacts on the Secretary of Defense to begin submitting situation as of 2011, arguing that ultimately Sino-American relations. First, Taiwan’s annual reports on “the current and future China lost more than it gained in the after- authoritarian regime began to give way to military strategy” of the PRC.14 Congress math of 9/11. representative democracy. In 1989, as PRC also established in 2000 the U.S.-China Eco- authorities unleashed the crackdown in nomic and Security Review Commission to Strategic and Historical Context Tiananmen, Taiwan held its first multiparty “monitor, investigate and submit to Congress From the depths of the Korean War elections, increasing support for Taiwan in an annual report on the national security to the heights of President Richard Nixon’s the United States—especially in Congress.8 implications” of Sino-American trade, and to groundbreaking visit to China in 1972, Sino- Second, the dramatic collapse of communist focus as well on Chinese proliferation prac- American relations have been complicated. regimes in Eastern Europe starting in 1989, tices and restrictions on free speech.15 Con- The shared perception that Soviet power and of the Soviet Union itself in 1991, under- gress also set up the Congressional-Executive was growing, and threatening, brought the cut the strategic rationale for collaboration Commission on Human Rights to “monitor two sides together in the early 1970s and with China. Absent an existential threat human rights and the development of the kept frictions to a minimum for nearly two from the Soviet Union, the ability of the rule of law in China” and to report annually decades.2 Diplomatic ties were established in White House to cite national security con- on these topics.16 1979, which necessitated the termination of cerns to override pluralistic U.S. domestic Against this backdrop, George W. Bush the U.S.-Taiwan defense treaty (which Beijing interests eroded.9 entered the White House in 2001 promising 92 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu KOEHLER to treat China not as the “strategic partner” U.S. backing for Chinese efforts to control annual exercise of submitting an anti-China that his predecessor had talked about, but as its own “terrorists”—ethnic Uighurs living resolution at the annual meeting of the UN a “strategic competitor.”17 Bush was deter- in Muslim-majority regions of western Human Rights Committee;29 and on China’s mined to raise the profile of U.S. allies in China—with the additional benefit of U.S. top concern, Taiwan, the administration Asia while downgrading the role of China.18 attacks against extremists in Afghanistan began to apply diplomatic pressure on Taipei Senior administration officials also departed who were believed to be aiding Uighur not to take symbolic steps toward indepen- from historical practice by intimating greater separatist groups,23 and a generally more dence, such as by holding a referendum on willingness to consider significant arms sales stable relationship with the United States, the question.30 and diplomatic support for Taiwan.19 But these early events in the Bush for Beijing, 9/11 was quickly seen as an opportunity to put administration paled in comparison to what happened on April 1, 2001, when a PLA Sino-U.S. relations “back on the healthy development track” fighter jet attempting to buzz a U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance plane inadvertently crashed which by 2001 was both the largest market America Restrained? A second stra- into the EP-3. The PLA pilot was killed. The for Chinese exports and the largest source tegic benefit that PRC strategists thought EP-3 made an emergency landing on a PLA of foreign direct investment to China.24 would accrue from the 9/11 attacks was that airfield. China released the American aircrew Perhaps sensing an opportunity to shift their chief geopolitical rival, the United after 11 days, but kept the aircraft longer the bilateral relationship into a more positive States, would become mired down in to examine fully the sensitive electronics direction, President Jiang Zemin was among Afghanistan. Soon after 9/11, commentators on board.20 Administration officials were the first world leaders to contact the White in official PRC media expressed expectations furious, which no doubt helped inform the House, sending a telegram on September 11 that Afghanistan would turn into “another decision 3 weeks later to announce the offer and calling President Bush on September 12. Vietnam.” Some argued that this expectation of a significant U.S. arms package to Taiwan. Jiang’s message termed terrorism “a common lay behind Beijing’s expression of support for Asked 2 days later what he would do to scourge” and offered sympathy and condo- the U.S. military response.31 defend Taiwan, President Bush responded, lences to the families of the victims.25 Presi- Moreover, even where it was not “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend dent Bush wrote in his memoirs that Jiang engaged in armed conflict, the United herself.”21 Beijing was stunned. had pledged during his phone call “to help in States was suffering from a fast degradation Thus, three decades after Nixon’s any way he could.”26 of its soft power. Negative attitudes toward strategic breakthrough, Sino-American Chinese support took several forms. U.S. policy among Muslims were already relations were quickly spiraling downhill. Before the year was out, China had voted in high by 2002.32 After the invasion of Iraq On the eve of 9/11, there was little reason favor of four UN Security Council Resolu- in 2003, hostility increased, spreading for for optimism that bilateral relations would tions (UNSCR) dealing with Afghanistan the first time beyond the Middle East to recover anytime soon. and global counterterrorism efforts, includ- Muslim nations such as Indonesia.33 For ing UNSCR 1368, which justified a vigorous influential Chinese scholar Wang Jisi, 9/11 and Strategic Gains for China international response to those who carried director of the Institute of International In the days and weeks after September out the 9/11 attacks. As Beijing had only 2 Strategic Studies at the Central Party School 11, 2001, observers in China and around the years earlier strongly protested U.S. “inter- of the Communist Party, the Iraq invasion world saw the possibility of at least three stra- ventionism” in the 1999 Kosovo campaign, its had resulted in “international isolation” tegic gains accruing to China. first-ever endorsement of U.S. military action of the United States, providing China Easing of Tensions. First, Sino- against another state was seen in Washington with “new, albeit limited, opportunities American tensions quickly relaxed as the as a significant, and welcome, departure from for maneuver. So long as the U.S. image Bush administration began working to build past practice.27 remains tainted, China will have greater an international coalition against terrorism For its moral support and lack leverage in multilateral settings.”34 and PRC officials began stressing a common of obstructionism, Beijing was quickly Strategic Blind Spot. The third benefit interest in fighting terrorism. That China upgraded in status within the Bush adminis- for China flowing from 9/11 involved the was a veto-wielding member of the United tration. The President traveled there within a strategic shift that occurred throughout the Nations (UN) Security Council was also a month of 9/11 and again in February 2002; he U.S. national security community. Indeed, consideration to the extent the administra- would travel twice more before the end of his informed observers termed 9/11 a “miracle” tion was planning to gain global support for second term, including to the 2008 Olympics. and a “heaven-sent opportunity” for Beijing. its military response through UN resolutions. In contrast, no other President had visited Hong Kong scholar Frank Ching wrote For Beijing, 9/11 was quickly seen as China more than once.28 Moreover, by the in 2011 that, “from China’s point of view, an opportunity to put Sino-U.S. relations end of 2003, Washington acted on several the [9/11] attacks were a blessing in dis- “back on the healthy development track” PRC priorities. For example, it declared a guise. . . . China owes a huge debt of gratitude and to halt the steady deterioration in rela- dormant Uighur entity, the East Turkestan to Osama bin Laden.”35 Writing 4 years after tions that had accelerated during 2001.22 Islamic Movement, a terrorist group in the event, Wang Jisi noted that “the readjust- Among the benefits that Beijing hoped for August 2002; despite opposition from Con- ment of the center of gravity of U.S. global were diminished U.S. support for Taiwan, gress, Bush pledged in 2003 not to repeat the strategy has determined that for several years ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 93 FEATURES | The Effects of 9/11 on China’s Strategic Environment to come it will not regard China as its main Significantly, it appears that Beijing could compete toe-to-toe with the United security threat.”36 drastically increased its already high rate of States.54 All Central Asian states quickly Although it is hard to quantify, the fact defense expenditure immediately after 9/11. offered U.S. forces overflight rights, while is that the 9/11 attacks effectively shifted the By some estimates, China’s defense spending Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan focus of U.S. strategists and decisionmak- more than tripled between 2001 and 2011.46 also opened their bases to U.S. troops and ers away from China.37 For example, in Why PRC leaders decided to ramp up spend- aircraft. These states had multiple interests their recently published memoirs, top Bush ing after 9/11 is a matter of debate, although in a robust U.S. presence, but they generally administration officials mentioned China it would appear to be a rational response to shared a desire to see a third global power much less often than their predecessors.38 an assessment that other global actors would present in what had largely been contested The frequency of congressional action on not be paying attention. ground between China and Russia, some- China also dropped significantly. The Senate In any event, China’s expanding mili- thing that allowed Central Asian govern- Foreign Relations Committee held 11 hear- tary capability and booming economy47 seem ments more latitude in balancing against ings on China during 106th Congress (1999– to have emboldened many of its national Moscow and Beijing.55 2000), including on its military buildup, security decisionmakers. PRC diplomats South Asia. U.S. ties to China’s key South Asian ally, Pakistan, deepened right after 9/11. U.S. forces quickly deployed to despite gains they perceived after 9/11, by 2002 PRC observers air and naval bases in the country, albeit also started to focus on strategic setbacks on a small scale to avoid creating political problems for Pakistani President Pervez human rights practices, trade disputes, and were sent across Southeast Asia, Africa, and Musharraf.56 By September 22, Washington security of Taiwan. But no subsequent session Latin America in what multiple scholars had lifted all sanctions imposed since 1990; a of Congress has held even half that number.39 termed a “charm offensive,” seeking to assure month later, it was starting to provide nearly And what did China do with its time in counterparts of China’s “peaceful rise.”48 By $700 million in budgetary support and the strategic shadows? It quickly accelerated 2007, public opinion surveys in Asia showed security assistance.57 On the diplomatic front, and broadened its military buildup, most Beijing was more trusted to wield global President Bush invited Musharraf to the aggressively in pursuit of “the world’s most power than Washington.49 White House in 2002 and to the more pres- active land-based ballistic and cruise missile tigious destination of Camp David in 2003, program”—the military instrument of power Strategic Setbacks during which he declared Pakistan a “major most effective at altering the strategic balance Despite the gains they perceived in the non-NATO ally” and offered a $3 billion aid across the Taiwan Strait and at putting U.S. weeks and months after 9/11, by 2002 PRC package.58 forces in the region at risk.40 In 2002, China observers also started to focus on strategic Despite the initial post-9/11 warmth, was assessed to have 350 short-range ballistic setbacks—setbacks that are evident when U.S.-Pakistani ties cooled as the decade wore missiles (SRBMs) deployed opposite Taiwan,41 examining the reaction of key nations on on. In the last 60 years, the two countries and by 2011, it had 1,000–1,200 SRBMs oppo- China’s periphery. have seen their strategic interests overlap site Taiwan, along with hundreds of other Central Asia. Checked to the north by only when the shared perception of the new longer range missiles targeting U.S. and Russia, to the south by India, and to the east Soviet threat was high. At other times, threat allied bases throughout Asia.42 In other areas, by U.S. allies Japan and South Korea, Beijing perceptions diverged. Islamabad fears India’s it rushed forward production and purchase since the early 1990s had viewed Central Asia superior military power, and its security of fourth-generation fighter jets, modern air as an opening to expand its influence, trade, services have supported Islamic extrem- defenses, conventional and nuclear-powered and access to energy resources.50 It also saw ist networks whose perceived value lies in attack and ballistic missile submarines, a potential threats in the region from growing their ability to launch attacks in Kashmir, range of space-denial capabilities, and the Islamic extremism.51 In 1996, China orga- tying up large numbers of Indian troops in ability to attack U.S. computer networks.43 nized what became known as the Shanghai locations away from the Pakistani border. Since at least 2005, China’s political- Cooperation Organization (SCO), which Islamabad also wants a Pakistan-friendly military goal has been described as the devel- included Russia and the Central Asian states regime to its rear in Afghanistan and sup- opment of antiaccess/area-denial capabilities and was formed primarily to promote secu- ports at least some extremist groups there. to restrict the U.S. freedom of action in the rity cooperation against “extremists and sep- But in the post-9/11 era, state support for western Pacific and threaten U.S. bases in the aratists,” and secondarily to expand trade.52 extremism ensures a clash of vital interests region with missiles capable of overwhelming Hope and fear motivated Central Asian states with Washington. missile defenses.44 China’s broader political- to join the SCO—hope for an active PRC role Pakistan’s support for terrorism affects military strategy, experts argue, includes in a region historically dominated by Russia, China, too. Islamic extremists are angry over “reducing the salience of U.S. power to and fear of Islamic extremism.53 Beijing’s repression of Chinese Muslims,59 support allies in the region, and undercutting But the speed with which U.S. forces and there are indications that some terrorist the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent” crushed the Taliban in the fall of 2001 networks in Pakistan are supporting Uighur so that allies and other regional actors may served as a vivid illustration that the SCO separatists.60 But while concerned, PRC feel compelled, over time, to accommodate was ineffective in comparison, and that strategists remain focused on their larger Chinese interests.45 China still had a long way to go before it interest in South Asia: keeping potential 94 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu KOEHLER rival India tied down on the subcontinent.61 and provider of security in the broader Junichiro Koizumi announced that his Beijing must perform a delicate balancing Indian Ocean region.”65 nation would provide military support to act. If it gets too close to Islamabad, it drives All of this only added to Sino-Indian U.S. forces in Afghanistan by deploying naval New Delhi into a tighter relationship with tensions. Experts on Asian affairs note that vessels to the Indian Ocean—the first time Washington; too much distance from Islam- the “Chinese are increasingly wary over the since the end of World War II that Japan had abad, however, creates an opening for better growing strategic relationship between the sent troops overseas.71 As the decade wore on, U.S.-Pakistani ties. United States and India, and Beijing has Washington and Tokyo worked productively As for India, U.S. relations with New expressed concern over potential alignments to resolve alliance issues involving U.S. bases Delhi continued to improve during the last in Asia that could result in the ‘encirclement’ in Japan, ultimately taking steps to increase decade, even as Sino-Indian ties deteriorated. of China.”66 At the same time, writes former interoperability and cooperation between After 9/11, New Delhi immediately offered National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzez- Japanese forces and the 40,000-plus U.S. assistance to Washington, including the inski, the China-India relationship itself “is troops stationed there.72 use of its bases for staging operations in inherently competitive and antagonistic.”67 Sino-Japanese ties worsened over the Afghanistan and intelligence on regional The result is that both China and India are same period. Since the 1950s, Beijing has terrorist organizations.62 President Bush rushing to rearm their frontier regions, been consistently wary about the resurgence aggressively sought to deepen ties in pursuit while India is now conducting more military of Japanese power and expanded U.S.-Japan of a “strategic partnership” based on shared exercises with the United States than with military cooperation.73 Flexing its new values and converging geopolitical interests.63 any other country.68 Washington’s ties to muscles, the PLA navy has increasingly His administration signed deals with India India—the world’s largest democracy, second harassed Japanese fishing and oil exploration on civilian nuclear cooperation and on a most populous state, third largest army, and vessels in contested waters over oil and gas defense framework agreement, leading to fourth largest economy—are deepening.69 fields in the East China Sea.74 Japanese views major U.S. arms sales and combined military In contrast, Beijing is paired with a terror- of China have dropped steadily since 1989, exercises.64 Moreover, 2012 strategic guidance exporting Pakistani state in internal turmoil. displaying a growing concern over China’s for the Department of Defense released by The net benefits of this relationship for China rise; a 2009 survey of Japanese elites saw 51 the Obama administration asserts that “the are decreasing.70 percent identify China as posing a threat to United States is . . . investing in a long term East Asia. U.S. ties to its principal Japan.75 In contrast, surveys showed strong strategic partnership with India to support its Asian ally, Japan, expanded rapidly after 9/11. and growing inclination to retain the security ability to serve as a regional economic anchor On September 19, Japanese Prime Minister alliance with the United States.76 U.S. admiral greets Chinese soldiers aboard USS Gravely at Naval Station Norfolk during visit by PLA chief of general staff U.S. Navy (Tom Ouellette) U.S. Navy (Tom ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 95 FEATURES | The Effects of 9/11 on China’s Strategic Environment As for the Republic of Korea, its reli- military ties, and the first-ever joint U.S.- These actions created the dreaded ance on the United States to deter conflict Vietnamese naval exercises. security dilemma in which an increasingly with nuclear-armed North Korea means U.S. alliances in the region are strong powerful nation finds it is not more secure that bilateral security ties will remain close, and growing. The U.S.-Thai mutual defense because of growing strategic mistrust among anchored by a 1953 mutual defense treaty treaty is six decades old, and the two sides its neighbors, which respond by working to and the presence of 28,500 U.S. troops.77 engage in an average of 40 joint exercises enhance their own security.89 The common Beijing, in contrast, saw its ties to Seoul annually.84 The U.S.-Philippines mutual response of states on China’s periphery has weaken after a series of impolitic moves defense treaty is older, and both sides have been to take steps to balance China’s growing related to ancient Chinese territorial claims. agreed to increases in military exercises and power. Existing U.S. allies (Philippines, After a North Korean submarine torpedoed joint efforts to combat extremist groups.85 Japan, Korea, Australia, and Thailand) and an ROK naval vessel in 2010, killing 46 U.S.-Singapore security ties deepened steadily long-term friends (Singapore, New Zealand) sailors, China was the only regional player since the 1990s, and the latter recently have doubled down on their security ties to that refused to condemn the North.78 South expanded its naval base to accommodate Washington by looking for ways to build up Korean favorable views on China dropped to U.S. Navy vessels.86 U.S.-Australia ties are the U.S. presence inside their borders and 38 percent in 2010, an 8-year low.79 Among deepest of all. The two nations have fought enhance interoperability with U.S. forces. elites surveyed in 2009, 56 percent identified together in every war since 1900, and Austra- Emerging partners (India, Vietnam) have China as the ROK’s principal threat; only 24 lia has the largest non-NATO contingent in increased the tempo of joint exercises, strate- percent identified North Korea.80 As with Afghanistan. President Obama announced in gic dialogues, and purchases of U.S. defense Japan, South Koreans strongly favor main- November 2011 that U.S. Marines will begin articles. Fence sitters (Central Asian states) taining a security alliance with the United deploying to Australia for 6-month rotations, are not necessarily looking for deeper security States.81 In contrast, China is allied to North with total size of the deployment reaching relations with the United States, but neither Korea, a broken, backward regime whose 2,500 by 2018.87 are they anxious to see the U.S. presence in their region diminish anytime soon. “Few countries, if any, would want to join China in an anti-U.S. alliance,” rues Chinese scholar Wang Jisi.90 Beijing likely would have acted dif- ferently over the last decade if 9/11 had not occurred. It would have wanted to build its U.S. Marine Corps (Mark Stroud) military power in any case, but might have tried to do so more slowly in order to gain real capability before encountering the pos- sible need to use it. However, the apparent jump in defense spending right after 9/11 suggests that PRC leaders thought they saw an opportunity—and acted on it. If true, then Marines board C-17 Globemaster III in Kyrgyzstan to support Operation Enduring Freedom they lurched forward too soon. Everyone is now watching, and the PLA is not yet pre- pared to go toe-to-toe with any but the small- reckless behavior could pull the region (and Conclusion est of its neighbors. its patron) into an unwanted war.82 Wash- At the end of the first decade of the 21st In sum, Beijing’s actions over the past ington’s ally is a strategic asset; Beijing’s is a century, China’s security environment is not decade led to widespread fear of China’s rise, strategic liability. what Beijing hoped for in 2001. A number the emergence of balancing coalitions by its Southeast Asia. Finally, Beijing’s of tactical benefits did accrue immediately neighbors, and a more complicated security recent resumption of assertive diplomacy after the 9/11 attacks—including a lessening environment than it enjoyed before 9/11. over its disputed claims to the entire South of tensions with the United States—but they China’s crowning as the “clear victor” of the China Sea—and its harassment of U.S. Navy were of limited duration. Most significantly, global war on terror is certainly premature. reconnaissance ships, Vietnamese trawlers, PRC decisionmakers may have assessed, cor- JFQ and Philippine vessels—have “managed to rectly, that other global actors would not be sour relations with virtually every Asian paying close attention to the PLA military notes country and every advanced industrial buildup while war was raging elsewhere. nation.”83 In the last 2 years, widespread They quickly ratcheted up defense spend- 1 Anatol Lieven, “China the Quiet Winner in regional concern over China’s “spiraling ing, leading to significant increases in the War on Terror,” The Australian, August 29, 2011. domestic confidence” has led to expanded quantity and quality of a wide range of PLA 2 Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The U.S.-Indonesian military cooperation, the armaments. Concomitantly, China became Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search reestablishment of full U.S.–New Zealand more aggressive in its diplomacy.88 for Security (New York: Norton, 1997), 43. 96 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu KOEHLER 3 Time magazine named Deng “Man of the available at “clear,” according to Dr. Krepinevich of the Center 60 Jabin T. Jacob, “The Future of China- 75 Nicholas Khoo, “Fear Factor: Northeast for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments: “China Pakistan Relations after Osama bin Laden,” Future Asian Responses to China’s Rise,” Asian Security 7, has the means to threaten the forward bases from Directions International, August 8, 2011, available no. 2 (2011). which most U.S. strike aircraft operate.” at 98 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Courtesy of Author Courtesy of Author of Courtesy Rwandan Patriotic Army soldiers during 1998 Congo war and insurgency Rwandan Patriotic Army soldiers guard refugees streaming toward collection point near Rwerere during Rwanda insurgency, 1998 The Kitona Operation Rwanda’s Gamble to Capture Kinshasa and the Misreading of an “Ally” By James Stejskal One who is not acquainted with the designs of his neighbors should not enter into alliances with them. —Sun Tzu James Stejskal is a Consultant on International Political and Security Affairs and a Military Historian. He was present at the U.S. Embassy in Kigali, Rwanda, from 1997 to 2000, and witnessed the events of the Second Congo War. He is a retired Foreign Service Officer (Political Officer) and retired from the U.S. Army as a Special Forces Warrant Officer in 1996. He is currently working as a Consulting Historian for the Namib Battlefield Heritage Project. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 99 RECALL | The Kitona Operation n early August 1998, a white Boeing remain hurdles that must be confronted by Uganda, DRC in 1998 remained a safe haven 727 commercial airliner touched down U.S. planners and decisionmakers when for rebels who represented a threat to their unannounced and without warning considering military operations in today’s respective nations. Angola had shared this at the Kitona military airbase in Africa. Rwanda’s foray into DRC in 1998 also concern in 1996, and its dominant security I illustrates the consequences of a failure to imperative remained an ongoing civil war the southwestern Bas Congo region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). understand that the generals’ view was not with the rebel National Union for the Total As the civilian-marked airplane rolled to always the same as the civilian leaders’ view. Independence of Angola (União Nacional a stop, the doors opened, and a force of This strategic failure has relevance for the para a Independência Total de Angola or, heavily armed Rwandan soldiers poured out. U.S. military as it deals with allies as well as UNITA) force. In supporting the 1996 inva- Within 30 minutes, the main facilities were opponents. Anyone—including the United sion, dos Santos and his party, the People’s secured, and the airfield was in the hands of States—could easily repeat Rwanda’s mistake. Movement for the Liberation of Angola–Labor the invaders. Once the airfield was secured, Party (Movimento Popular de Libertação de additional aircraft began to land and offload Prologue Angola–Partido do Trabalho or, MPLA), saw troops and equipment to reinforce the Laurent Desiré Kabila, a former youth- supporting Kabila as a chance to overthrow initial landing force. So began one of the wing member of the Balubakat, a party their nemesis, Mobutu, for his Cold War most brazen operations in African military aligned with Patrice Lumumba, and the support (at the behest of the United States) of history—all the more remarkable because “Simba” rebels who opposed Zairian President Holden Roberto’s National Liberation Front the small African country that launched Mobutu Sese Seku in the 1960s, was used by of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de the raid did so without outside assistance or Rwanda and Uganda as a surrogate to lend Angola) and Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA. Pro- support. It was the Rwandan army, a small credibility to the rebellion and ousting of Mobutu UNITA forces operating in Zaire but extremely competent force with a reputa- Mobutu during the first Congo war in 1996.2 (DRC) resisted the Rwanda/Ugandan inva- tion for brilliant leadership, discipline, and In planning a second coup, the Rwandans and sion. By supporting the invasion and Kabila, tactical excellence.1 Ugandans counted on the tacit acceptance of Angola was able to disrupt UNITA’s bases In a classic maneuver made up of their plans and intentions by Angola, their and logistical lifeline and was thus better equal parts speed, surprise, and audacity, former ally, which had supported the over- able control its northern and eastern regions. a small force of Rwandan Patriotic Army throw of Mobutu in 1996. Angola was also convinced that Kabila would (RPA) and Ugandan People’s Defense Force Rwanda’s president in 1998 was Pasteur never support UNITA precisely because they (UPDF) troops under the command of RPA Bizimungu, although most political and all had supported Mobutu. Thus by 1998, dos Colonel James Kabarebe commandeered a military decisions were made by then–Vice Santos no longer saw DRC as a safe haven for civilian airliner and flew over 1,000 miles President Major General Paul Kagame. his enemies. His interests lay with Kabila, not from Goma in the far east of DRC across the Uganda’s president was (and still is) Yoweri with Rwanda or Uganda. Congo River basin to seize Kitona Airfield near the Atlantic coast and then threaten the misconceptions about how decisions are made in many African capital of Kinshasa. The “Kitona Operation” was an countries remain hurdles that must be confronted extremely risky but potentially strategically by U.S. decisionmakers decisive special operation that had as its objective nothing less than the capture of the Museveni. In 1996, both viewed themselves Rwanda’s leaders faced a problem they DRC’s capital, Kinshasa, and the overthrow as representing a “new generation” of African thought they understood and based their of President Laurent Desiré Kabila. Within leaders who were prepared to chart their own calculations on a situation in which their days, however, the raid began to unravel destinies with or without the approval of primary Angolan interlocutors, senior mili- as opposition came from an unexpected others—whether traditional Western powers tary and security officials, misrepresented opponent: Angola. The assault at Kitona is or other African leaders. By contrast, Angola’s their country’s position as well as their an example of a brilliant military operation José Eduardo dos Santos, in power since 1979, decisionmaking mandates. The summer of that ultimately failed because of erroneous could be considered the quintessential “old 1998 was another turning point for the small political assumptions, in this case, a singular style” African strongman. It is not known country, one of many in its 8-year civil war misunderstanding of the strategic political to what extent the generational difference that had led to a genocide in which nearly interests of Angola, the one regional power was a factor in the misunderstanding among 800,000 people were murdered, the Hutu-led that Rwanda and Uganda needed on their Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola, but it may have government in Kigali was toppled, and the side more than any other country. It was a strongly influenced the respective leaders’ stability of the new government remained in fault that could have been avoided through assumptions about decisionmaking. question. a better understanding of both the deci- The strategic factors that drove Rwanda Earlier, in 1994, following the victory sionmaking process in Angola and regional and Uganda to turn against Kabila, their of the Tutsi–exile dominated Rwandan power politics. former protégé, and their decision to remove Patriotic Front’s (RPF’s) military wing over Misconceptions about how decisions him from power lay in the civil war that the Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces Armées are made in many African countries, and the began in Rwanda in 1990 and ultimately Rwandaise, or FAR) and its Interahamwe3 importance of the regional political context, led to the 1994 genocide. For Rwanda and militia force, several million Hutus fled west 100 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Stejskal CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CAMEROON UGANDA REPUBLIC OF DEMOCRATIC Kisangani CONGO KENY (Brazzaville) REPUBLIC OF THE GABON CONGO Goma ULT Bukavu SA RWANDA AIR AS Kinshasa L BURUNDI WA WITHDRA Kitona TANZANIA Maquela de Zombo ANGOLA MALAWI MOZAMBI ZAMBIA MOROCCO TUNISIA ALGERIA LIBYA EGYPT WESTERN (USCENTCOM SAHARA AOR) MAURITANIA CAPE VERDE MALI NIGER ERITREA SUDAN SENEGAL CHAD THE GAMBIA DJIBOUTI GUINEA- BURKINA FASO BISSAU GUINEA BENIN NIGERIA SOMALIA SIERRA LEONE CÔTE D’IVOIRE ETHIOPIA GHANA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC TOGO LIBERIA CAMEROON EQUATORIAL GUINEA UGANDA REPUBLIC OF CONGO KENYA SAO TOME & PRINCIPE (Brazzaville) GABON DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE RWANDA Cabinda CONGO Enclave BURUNDI (Angola) TANZANIA Operation Kitona SEYCHELLES COMOROS ANGOLA MALAWI MOZAMBIQUE ZAMBIA MADAGASCAR ZIMBABWE NAMIBIA MAURITIUS BOTSWANA Rwandan, Ugandan, Rebel Movements SWAZILAND DRC Government Forces LESOTHO Angolan and Zimbabwean Forces SOUTH AFRICA ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 101 RECALL | The Kitona Operation into neighboring Zaire. Among the refugees southern Africa of “foreign” interference once wanted Kabila’s continued presence as a docile was a large, organized, and armed remnant and for all.7 and compliant neighbor to the north to ensure of the FAR and Interahamwe who, once The AFDL, with Rwandan officers and the eventual victory over UNITA.9 settled among the other refugees in United noncommissioned officers leading the way, Prior to the invasion, the director Nations refugee camps, began preparations quickly overwhelmed Mobutu’s forces and of Rwanda’s external intelligence service, for a guerrilla campaign into Rwanda’s north- forced him to flee into exile. Kabila declared Colonel Patrick Karegeya, conducted a western territory as a prelude to an offensive himself president and thereafter began pursuing number of meetings with senior officials in to reconquer Rwanda. The new RPF govern- his own erratic agenda, which included promot- Angola. Karegeya received assurances from ment in Kigali had intelligence sources in the ing his Lubakat tribe to the exclusion of other two powerful Angolan rivals, General Manuel camps and discovered the plans. Of additional tribal groups.8 This eventually led to a falling Helder Vieira Dias, also known as “Kopelipa,” concern to Kigali was the information that out between the Rwandans and their protege. minister of state and head of military house Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko was con- By early summer 1998, Kabila was facing in the Office of the President, and General doning, if not directly supporting, the activi- Congolese popular discontent over Rwanda’s Fernando Garcia Miala, director of Angola’s ties of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe.4 Despite heavy-handed tactics in the eastern DRC External Security Services and Military Intel- warnings provided to the United Nations by and a perception that he was a puppet of two ligence, that their country would remain on the new Rwandan government, nothing was foreign powers. This led him to send home the the sidelines. Thereafter, Karegeya briefed done to stop these preparations and the RPF Rwandan forces that installed him and had Kagame that the invasion plan could proceed decided it had to act alone. been protecting him in Kinshasa, including without fear of outside intervention. But, The 1996 offensive that followed was Colonel Kabarebe, whom Kabila had named unknown to the Rwandans and Ugandans, launched by Rwanda into Zaire initially only his defense minister after assuming power. the discussions were not briefed to dos Santos, to eliminate the threat from the camps in the Additionally, he began to consolidate his who repudiated the agreement once the inva- extreme eastern border area of Zaire and, it control of the country by allying with some sion commenced as he perceived a danger to was hoped, to enable the refugees to return home to Rwanda. The RPF believed the the dynamics of the mission changed; the Rwandans found ex-FAR/Interahamwe militias were effectively holding many of them hostage. (The RPF themselves actively opposing another country’s armed forces leadership’s supposition was in fact correct as many Hutus returned to Rwanda after the of the groups “his” AFDL had just defeated, his own interests.10 Dos Santos had befriended camps were liberated.5) Quickly overrunning including the remaining Rwandan ex-FAR Kabila and gained an influence over him the camps, the RPA began to pursue the armed and Interahamwe, as well as the local Congo- that the Angolan leader was not eager to lose, militias westward into the Congo River basin. lese Mai-Mai militias. While Kabila probably especially when no one knew who the next As this happened, Mobutu ordered Zairian felt the militias would act as a buffer against a Congolese leader would be. This factor would military forces to oppose the intruders and Rwandan invasion, the Rwandan leadership prove decisive in the end game. the dynamics of the mission changed; the perceived Kabila’s support for the militias as a Rwandans found themselves actively oppos- threat to Rwanda itself. The Military Operation: The Successful ing another country’s armed forces.6 Rather The Rwandans and Ugandans inter- Aspect of the Plan than backing away, the Rwandans took their preted this as an irrevocable break that, Colonel James Kabarebe knew the coalition of forces, which by now included combined with Kabila’s apparent support terrain and the enemy best, having marched Ugandans, Zairian Banyamulenge (an ethnic for (or tacit acceptance of) the Hutu militias the ground with his troops and led both group closely related to Rwandan Tutsis), in eastern Congo, convinced Kagame and the Zairian/Congolese rebels, as well as the Burundians, and rebel Congolese army and Museveni that Kabila had to go. Kabila’s fears RPA in 1996 and through 1997. He would militiamen—including one Laurent Desiré became a self-fulfilling prophecy. lead the most dangerous and audacious part Kabila—and moved farther west toward The Rwandan and Ugandan decision of the invasion, the air assault deep into Kinshasa. At that time, Kabila was pushed to invade in 1998 was linked to their sense of enemy territory to seize the key province of forward to nominally head the coalition imminent danger from the militias that were Bas Congo and then to capture the capital known as the Alliance of Democratic Forces engaged in a cross-border insurgency in north- of Kinshasa. On August 2, 1998, breakaway for the Liberation of the Congo (Alliance des western Rwanda at the time. In their minds, elements of Kabila’s newly created Congolese Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du it was a continuation of the 1996 operation Army Forces (Forces Armées Congolaises, Congo-Zaïre or, AFDL) by former Tanzanian to eliminate the ex-RPF and Interahamwe. or FAC) in Goma led by Major Sylvain President Julius Nyerere. The leaders of the However, it is now clear that Kagame and Mbuki declared their opposition to Kabila so-called Front-line States, Zimbabwe’s Robert Museveni had not fully considered their allies’ and launched a ground assault westward, Mugabe, Angola’s dos Santos, South Africa’s motivations for their earlier support or the supported by Rwandan and Ugandan army Thabo Mbeki, and Namibia’s Sam Nujoma, potential regional political ramifications that forces. Simultaneously, Kabarebe seized a along with Nyerere, saw the “rebellion” as would result from a renewal of the conflict. In civilian Boeing 727 airliner that was on the akin to their own liberation struggles, for they dos Santos’s view, the removal of Mobutu had tarmac of Goma Airfield and loaded it with had always viewed Mobutu as a puppet of the achieved MPLA’s aim and nothing was to be his assault force. The plan was simple and imperialist West. His departure would rid gained in another regime change. Dos Santos elegant, but it was built on a faulty premise: 102 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Stejskal incursion, on August 22, after intense lobbying Then–Rwandan Vice President Paul Kagame and deal making, the presidents of three coun- tries—Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Sam Nujoma of Namibia, and dos Santos of Angola—agreed to Courtesy of Author help Kabila to repulse the invaders. But these leaders were also seeking influence and a share of DRC’s immense mineral reserves, especially in the case of Zimbabwe.13 A Zimbabwean businessman, Billy Rautenbach, was given the position of director of Gécamines, DRC’s parastatal cobalt and copper mining company, which permitted Zimbabwe to siphon off large sums of money as well as raw resources from the mine’s lucrative operations.14 The Reversal Dos Santos’s Angola had the most powerful forces of all the allies available and began immediately to undo what Kabarebe that Rwanda’s and Uganda’s allies from knew that if they could control the port and had wrought with an assault south across the the first Congo War that deposed Mobutu, the mercantile traffic that supplied Kinshasa, Congo River from its Cabinda enclave that namely Angola and Zimbabwe, would they could strangle the government. More- quickly recaptured Moanda. With a large, remain neutral. Despite indications that over, if the huge hydroelectric plant at the armor-heavy column, the Angolans cut off these countries would stay on the sidelines, Inga Dam complex on the Congo River could Kabarebe’s comparatively lightly armed rear that would not be the case. be captured, the invaders would control all guard from the main force, placing the entire On August 4, Kabarebe’s force landed the electrical power for the western part of plan in jeopardy. Left with few options, Kaba- in Kitona and quickly dispersed across the the country. A third component of Kabarebe’s rebe attacked Kinshasa, forcing his way into installation and secured key points. Kabarebe plan was even more ingenious: the several the city to the perimeter of the Ndjili Interna- then met with the former Zairian Army Forces thousand soldiers suspected of being loyal tional Airport. At the same time, Rwandan (Forces Armées Zaïroises or, FAZ) army offi- to Mobutu who were interned at the Kitona Tutsis and ethnically related Congolese cers who were being “re-educated” at Kitona. Airbase rallied to Kabarebe and augmented Banyamulenge civilians were being hunted Kabarebe was in a good position to understand his own small force to complete the mission. down and killed in Kinshasa as Congolese both their plight and their motivations. He The incursion forced Kabila to face government-controlled radio began to broad- had been the FAC chief of staff when Kabila not one but two fronts, as a joint force made cast messages warning of Tutsi spies and sabo- ordered approximately 2,000 ex-FAZ soldiers up of Rwandan and Ugandan army forces teurs in the capital city that were reminiscent and officers to be interned there because he along with the rebellious FAC launched an of hate messages broadcast by Radio Télévi- did not trust them. After about 30 minutes of attack from the east that quickly captured the sion Libre des Mille Collines during the 1994 negotiations, an agreement was reached and eastern third of DRC. Rwandan Genocide. That, and the arrival Kabarebe had his “army.”11 After capturing the seaports, Kabarebe’s of Zimbabwean helicopter gunships and an With the airfield secured, several force then turned east, reinforced by the ex-FAZ Angolan Armed Forces (Forças Armadas additional aircraft brought more troops from soldiers. By August 10, his force had moved 40 Angolanas or, FAA) armored column that Goma until the Kitona raiders totaled two kilometers up river and seized the river port threatened his rear, forced Kabarebe to break battalions (800 men), including a 31-man, city of Boma, followed by the railhead/pipeline off the engagement at the end of August. He self-contained UPDF light artillery unit. The terminal at Matadi. They took Inga Dam on knew that his continued advance could well raiders set up blocking positions to the east of August 13 and turned off the power on August mean large-scale ethnic killings.15 the airfield and then headed west with a small 14, plunging most of the DRC into darkness. Although outgunned and outnumbered element to seize the port cities of Banana and The force had quickly moved 110 kilometers in and with little maneuver room, Kabarebe Moanda about 6 kilometers away, which they 6 days meeting little resistance. Kabila’s FAC chose to conduct a tactical withdrawal rather did on August 5. had no will to fight Kabarebe and ran back to than surrender. To preserve his force and When Kabarebe’s force took control Kinshasa or melted into the jungle, although link up with the main invasion force in the of Kitona Airbase and the coastal ports, his they outnumbered the invaders three to one.12 east, he and his officers decided to move 360 small force effectively closed DRC’s connec- Leadership, discipline, and a fearsome reputa- kilometers south into Angola to get to a suit- tion to the outside world. Under Mobutu, the tion made the difference for the Rwandans. able airfield for exfiltration. Moving swiftly, capital city of Kinshasa had been effectively By August 17, 1998, Kabarebe and his Kabarebe’s force brushed off their pursuers reduced to one means of resupply: the Atlan- forces were located 30 kilometers west of and punched through another Angolan force tic Ocean port of Banana, which lies at the Kinshasa and President Kabila was under of around 400 defenders to seize the airfield at mouth of the Congo River. The Rwandans pressure. Alarmed by the success of Rwanda’s Manuela do Zombo in mid-September 1998. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 103 RECALL | The Kitona Operation For several weeks, the beleaguered force held that ended only after long negotiations. The 6 John Pomfret, “Rwandans Led Revolt in off the FAA and worked to extend the airfield singular fault in the planning was political. Congo,” The Washington Post, July 9, 1997, A1. 7 to 1,400 meters to enable large transport Rwanda and Uganda miscalculated Angolan Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War—Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Con- aircraft to use it. At one point an RPA unit at a President dos Santos’s readiness to accept the tinental Catastrophe (Oxford: Oxford University defensive post positioned 100 kilometers from overthrow of Kabila. Their understanding of Press, 2009), 116. the airfield stopped an FAA armored convoy Angola’s position was based on representa- 8 Jason Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Mon- 16 that was en route to recapture the field. tions of senior Angolan officers that did not sters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War Finally, once the runway was prepared, air- reflect political reality. The only way this of Africa (Philadelphia: PublicAffairs, 2011), 203. craft began to land and extract the Rwandan, mistake could have been avoided would have 9 Robert E. Gribbon, In the Aftermath of Genocide: The U.S. Role in Rwanda (Lincoln, NE: Rwanda and Uganda miscalculated Angolan President dos iUniverse, 2005), 276. 10 Author’s discussion with a senior Rwandan Santos’s readiness to accept the overthrow of Kabila military officer, Kigali, September 1998. 11 Prunier, 182. 12 Charles Onyango-Obbo, “Daring RPA Raid Ugandan, and eastern Congolese forces. Most been through direct negotiations between in Congo, Angola; and a Heroic UPDF Unit,” The of the ex-FAZ had already made the choice to Kagame and dos Santos. Amazing as it may Sunday Monitor (Kampala), April 16, 2000. return to their homes or to remain in Angola seem today, the two leaders never discussed 13 Kevin C. Dunn, “A Survival Guide to Kin- with antigovernment UNITA rebel forces. Rwanda’s plans because the Rwandans did shasa: Lessons of the Father, Passed Down to the Some 30 flights were made over the next not fully appreciate the power structure or Son,” in The African Stakes of the Congo War, ed. several days, and as the defensive perimeter political interests of the Angolan government. John F. Clark, 65 (London: Macmillan, 2004). was collapsed inward, successive numbers Kitona could have had a place in the 14 Author’s conversation with a Congolese official of Kabarebe’s forces were flown out. The last annals of great victories. Instead it is a little- in Goma, September 1998. Rautenbach’s Ridge- flight was literally loaded with troops running known example of brilliance unhinged by fate. pointe Overseas Developments, Ltd., took control of from their positions to the airplane, with the Gécamines shortly after Zimbabwe’s entry into the war. 15 commanders being the last to leave. It is not Epilogue Ouzani. 16 Onyango-Obbo. clear how many casualties the Rwandans took Following the Second Congo War, 17 Ibid. in the operation—the secretive RPA will not Kabarebe served as chief of Rwanda’s Defense discuss the operation openly—but it is believed Forces before he became minister of defense in that the majority of the force was repatriated. 2010, a capacity in which he still serves. Paul The Ugandans stated that their small part of Kagame became President of Rwanda in 2000, the force returned home without any losses.17 a position he still holds. Angolan General Miala was imprisoned for coup plotting in 2007, while The Final Analysis “Kopelipa” remains a principal advisor to dos When the decision is made to go to war, Santos. Also in 2007, Colonel Karegeya was a successful plan for victory rarely involves cashiered from the RPA for insubordination timidity or restraint. Risks must be taken, espe- and conduct unbecoming. He is currently in cially when one chooses to engage a country exile in South Africa and is a vociferous critic far greater in size, with forbidding distances of the Kagame government. Kabila was assas- to conquer, and to fight an army that has more sinated by his bodyguards in 2001. JFQ soldiers and equipment at its disposal. The tactical aspect of the Kitona Operation is a testament to the great skill of its planner and Notes commander, as well as the fighting capabilities 1 Greg Mills, “The Boot Is Now on the Other of a small African nation’s army. Foot in Rwanda: Lessons from Both Sides of Insur- The Kitona Operation was an auda- gency,” RUSI Journal 153, no. 3 (June 2008), 72–78. cious strategic gamble by the Rwandans to 2 Che Guevera wrote of Kabila: “Nothing leads me avoid a protracted struggle in their bid to to believe he is the man of the hour.’’ See Bolivian Diary oust Laurent Kabila. As long as neighbor- [of] Ernesto “Che” Guevara, trans. Carlos P. Hansen and ing countries stayed out of the conflict, Andrew Sinclair (London: Cape-Lorrimer, 1968). the chances of its success were very high. 3 A Kinyarwanda word meaning “those who However, once Angola, and to a lesser degree fight together.” 4 Zimbabwe, entered the fray, the odds changed International Crisis Group (ICG), “Africa’s dramatically. The Kitona military plan was Seven Nation War,” ICG Democratic Republic of Congo Report No. 4, May 21, 1999, 2. not faulty; rather, it was well planned for 5 Author’s conversation with a United Nations strategic effect and could have achieved its High Commissioner for Refugees officer, Kigali, desired aim. As it was, the so-called Second Rwanda, 1997. Congo War turned into a protracted affair 104 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BOOK REVIEWS Moreover, a number of military mono- closely the case study of @America, the graphs have explored the role and purpose innovative, high-tech approach to Indonesian of IO. But still today, the Barnes & Noble youth chronicled in this book. In a logical bookshelf does not feature many text or refer- but unprecedented step for the stodgy State ence books on the actual practice of strategic Department, Embassy Jakarta moved its communication, information operations, or youth outreach efforts to a shopping mall. As public diplomacy. Yes, you can find Leigh Hillary Clinton told Time, “we are going to Armistead’s edited work (Brassey’s Inc., 2004), take America’s message to where people actu- and there have been books about soft power ally live and work!” Why not a shopping mall? and public diplomacy at the national strat- That’s where people are today, isn’t it? egy level by Craig Hayden, Phil Seib, Barry Beyond the adventuresome leap to the Sanders, and others. mall, the diplomats struck deals with Ameri- The Last Three Feet: Case Studies in This book is unique. Where else do you can companies such as Apple and Google to Public Diplomacy find current public diplomacy practitioners provide an American experience to Indonesian Edited by William P. Kiehl pulling back the curtain on their craft, explain- visitors. Indeed, from the moment newcomers The Public Diplomacy Council/ ing the judgments, and analyzing the factors walk into @America and are greeted by young, PDWorldwide, 2012 that led them to take one path or another to English-speaking Indonesian “e-guides,” they 196 pp. $14.99 (paperback) accomplish something in a foreign context? engage with an array of technology, videos and ISBN: 978-1-47811-295-2 Take, for example, the excellent descrip- photos, interactive games, and myriad U.S. tion of the effort to “recapture the narrative” information sources. An educational advising Reviewed by in Turkey, a vital U.S. ally, member of the service answers questions—for free. Sounds BRIAN E. CARLSON North Atlantic Treaty Organization, regional vaguely like an Apple store, doesn’t it? power, and example of a secular Muslim To be honest, not every chapter is as ow hard can it be to do infor- majority nation with democratic values. Yet energizing and creative as the one from mation operations (IO) and the Embassy faced one of the world’s most Indonesia. But every one opens a door on strategic communication in hostile and erratic media environments, what really goes on in public diplomacy. foreign countries? This is exceeded perhaps only by that of Pakistan. As The country case studies and political chal- H the Embassy public diplomacy chief Elizabeth America—the land that invented marketing, lenges—as well as the responses—are as public relations, and survey research, right? McKay writes, they “recognized that if we varied as a United Nations session. After all, what most of us know from addressed the problem from the sole perspec- And one can see the gaps. One could watching car advertising and political cam- tive of what we wanted, our efforts would be wish, for example, that public diplomacy offi- paigns is that there are just a few rules. You less successful than if we approached things cers spent more time measuring the impact of develop a message, keep it simple, and say it from the perspective of what our audiences their programs in objective terms or at least often. If you are in a foreign environment, you wanted from us.” measuring effect and adjusting as they go. do not have to translate from English. Just McKay goes on to describe in detail There are not a lot of OODA loops in public turn up the volume and say it again. Negative what the Embassy did with Turkish youth, diplomacy. advertising always wins in politics. Right? from entrepreneurship training to innovative Nevertheless, for the military infor- Too often and inadvertently, we slip film production, but if there is a lesson for mation support operations team leader or into the language, if not the theory, of artil- communicators, it is that we need to learn the senior combatant command officer lery—using terms such as OODA (observe, “to approach the design of programs with engaging Embassy counterparts on a theater orient, decide, act) loop, concentrating fires, the audience’s needs in mind—rather than strategic cooperation plan, this book should target audiences, and intelligence preparation merely our own.” be required reading. Out of these pages, the of the battlespace. Those who work in this field Another lesson comes through in many military IO warrior will begin to appreciate know that messages are not cannon shots, of the accounts: consistency over time. Public the operational mindset, as well as the chal- civilian audiences are not targets, and what diplomacy, like information operations, takes lenges, that confront the “diplomatic IO” matters is not what we say but what they hear. time. In multiple chapters, this book makes folks—you know: the ones who talk about That is why the arrival of The Last Three Feet: it clear that success depends on four or five “public diplomacy.” Case Studies in Public Diplomacy is a welcome rotations of officers continuing with the same The fact is, we need to learn from each addition to the IO library. vision, the same commitment, and the same other’s experience. JFQ To be fair, the U.S. military has made program activities. Newly arrived Ambas- tremendous strides in recent years and has sadors eschew the impulse to invent a new Ambassador Brian E. Carlson served the State become, about this subject especially, a much program with their name on it and instead Department as Senior Liaison with the Department smarter organization. From Field Manual put their full enthusiasm to making a success of Defense for strategic communication. Today, he advises InterMedia Research Institute on defense (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, to FM 3-0, of something started by predecessors once or and diplomacy and serves on the board of the Operations, to Joint Publication 3-13, Joint twice removed. Public Diplomacy Council. Doctrine for Information Operations, progres- With the current enthusiasm for digital sive military thinking is evident. diplomacy, many will want to examine ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 105 BOOK REVIEWS East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) made Islam a believes it can use with precision against India rare commonality throughout the country. Even to increase or decrease the “temperature” as before the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan, policy requirements dictate. However, Pakistan Pakistan used pan-Islamism to undermine cannot turn off the flame because it cannot Pashtun separatist sentiment along the Pakistan- restart the “pilot light.” Afghanistan border. Additionally, Pakistan As Pakistan increased restraint on developed militant proxies to offset India’s mili- militant activity to further its policy priorities, tary superiority. Among militant proxies, LeT specifically in Kashmir, many militants turned was one of the most loyal groups and followed a their attention to foreigners in Afghanistan and unique Islamic school of thought—Ahl-e-Had- in some cases Pakistan’s government. Organiza- ith—that initially limited LeT’s popular support tions perceived to be too restrained by Pakistan and, in turn, its threat to the state. lost prestige. In LeT’s case, this decline in pres- Storming the World Stage: The Story of The second section examines how and tige likely encouraged it to launch the attack in Lashkar-e-Taiba why Pakistan used militants in Kashmir, Mumbai, vaulting it into the international spot- By Stephen Tankel how LeT grew into a global organization, and light and increasing its status among extremists. Columbia University Press, 2011 finally how 9/11 initially impacted LeT and While Tankel makes no attempt to 288 pp. $35 other Pakistani militants. LeT’s loyalty and develop policy recommendations to reduce ISBN: 978-0-231-70152-5 perceived limited growth prospects encour- the potential threat from LeT, he arms readers aged Pakistan to provide it with substantial with the context necessary to avoid major Reviewed by training and other support. This state support policy blunders. He explains how Pakistan BENJAMIN FERNANDES enabled LeT to become the best trained outfit relies on LeT and other militant groups operating in Kashmir and gave it the freedom to serve a series of domestic and foreign akistan simultaneously acts as to build a robust domestic and international policy objectives. Tankel also describes the one of America’s most important network dedicated to spreading its ideology conundrum for policy options dealing with allies and one of its most impla- and supporting military operations. LeT built LeT and other militant groups that Pakistan cable foes. It is an ally when it schools and hospitals and ran other social pro- supports. Efforts to substantially degrade P grams in Pakistan to proselytize and support provides critical support to U.S. efforts against a group’s capabilities would likely negate al Qaeda and becomes an adversary when jihad. Its social works improved its financing Pakistani restraints and encourage vigorous it provides safe haven to violent extremists and influence with Pakistan’s patriotic mili- self-defense. Neither American nor Pakistani such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). In Storming tary leaders and politicians, who often benefit- leaders want LeT to shift its operational activi- the World Stage, Stephen Tankel—a highly ted from LeT’s political support. Internation- ties from Kashmir, India, and Afghanistan to regarded academic expert on Pakistan with ally, LeT capitalized on perceptions of Muslim Pakistan, Europe, or the United States. substantial experience in-country—details abuse in India, the Pakistani diaspora, and Storming the World Stage is the best LeT’s evolution into a “powerful and protected” the spread of Salafism to increase recruitment, analytical history of LeT’s development and Pakistan-based organization with international fundraise, and spread LeT’s ideology. cogently explains how it balances competing reach. The book uses a variety of academic The last section explores how Pakistan secular and religious aspects to form one of the sources and original field research in Pakistan views militants, perceptions that caused most capable terrorist networks in the world. and elsewhere to produce the best account of Pakistan’s government to protect LeT after Ultimately, it is LeT’s practical nature that LeT’s evolution along with important insights 9/11, and LeT’s spectacular 2008 attack in allows balance, which subsequently prevents it into Pakistan’s relationship with Islamic mili- Mumbai. Pakistani actions against LeT have from becoming the next al Qaeda, at least for tants in general. Tankel argues LeT’s growth almost universally been a facade to appease the now. As a result, the greatest threat from LeT and international reach result from its ability international community with minimal lasting is its long-term potential to erode moderate to reconcile two dualities: “identity as militant impact because Pakistan perceives LeT as values in a Pakistan already plagued by weak outfit and as a missionary organization” along “good” Islamic militants. One of Tankel’s most governance and violent Islamists. While the with being both a tool of Pakistan and a pan- important concepts is that Pakistan protects or book’s focus is LeT, readers will gain a better Islamist militant organization. Storming the counters militants depending on their status understanding of Pakistan and its relationship World Stage is a must read for anyone attempt- as “good” or “bad” jihadis. This distinction is with militants in general. While Pakistan is too ing to understand the complex and opaque neither static nor exact as militant actions cause complex to understand from one book, Storm- Pakistani logic that permits Islamic militants to Pakistan’s perception of loyalty and utility to ing the World Stage provides a strong founda- survive and thrive in that country. shift. Though other Pakistan experts such as tion to readers unfamiliar with Pakistan, and its The book first explains how Pakistan’s Christine Fair and Ashley Tellis implicitly use extensive field research offers new insights for “jihadi milieu” influenced the development of similar concepts, Tankel’s construct is more Pakistan experts. JFQ Pakistan-based militants. The domestic and concise and equally valid. Tankel clearly articu- foreign problems of the nascent state drove lates how perceptions of good and bad jihadis Major Benjamin Fernandes is an Army Strategist national leaders to rely on Islam and militant affect Pakistani decisions and uses events assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command. He proxies as important tools of state. West Paki- after 9/11 as a poignant example. His sources has served in Afghanistan and spent several years studying and working South Asia issues. stan’s mixed ethnicities and differences from describe militants as a “gas stove” that Pakistan 106 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BOOK REVIEWS what conditions will most likely deliver a As generations of political and military firmly resolved insurgency. The book con- leaders will attest, and as many academics cludes with robust endnotes and a thorough will agree, the formulation of national stra- bibliography and index. tegic policy is an inexact process that relies In his first chapter, Gleis offers a rapid heavily on experience and study to develop an review of the evolution of insurgency and how, awareness of what has both worked and failed over the past century, we have witnessed an in the past. Ultimately, the goal of our leaders increase in state repression that has served to should be to plan and to resolve conflicts, mobilize the “grass roots” level of society to regardless of the specific type, allowing us participate in insurgencies. He then provides to withdraw with honor and to not be faced a detailed explanation that seeks to define the with “repercussions [which] . . . may last for characteristics of an Islamic insurgency and generations” (p. 149). Withdrawing Under Fire: Lessons Learned why they are noteworthy enough to merit a With such goals in mind, and with from Islamist Insurgencies unique label as a fourth-generation mode of the current war in Afghanistan at a critical By Joshua L. Gleis warfare. This uniqueness, we learn, is rooted in point, the final chapter is the most important. Potomac Books, 2011 the use of suicide or martyrdom attacks, use of Focused on the lessons that Gleis has derived 238 pp. $29.95 social welfare networks, and presence of outside from his case studies, his recommendations ISBN: 978-1-59797-665-7 state sponsorship. Seemingly simple and some- are particularly relevant in Afghanistan since what innocuous, these basic elements combine the civil-military leadership of many coun- Reviewed by and leverage the fervor of religious conviction tries is concerned with “getting [the strategy] TODD M. MANYX and the solidarity of shared ideology to develop right” as they seek to balance the elements of a whole that is greater than the sum of its pieces. strategy and art that will ultimately guide the key challenge for academics The first chapter concludes by discussing the coalition’s withdrawal. the world over is conducting “democratic dilemma” and the challenges con- While not a primer in the classic sense, research that advances the fronted in a counterinsurgency environment these recommendations are a wide-ranging understanding of their chosen where the state is faced with determining how list that reflects the myriad considerations A it will conduct an effective counterinsurgency fields of study. In some fields, the process of that commanders at all levels must deal with selecting a new topic might be compared to strategy designed to deter aggression while in developing and executing a transition and staring at a plate of spaghetti and untangling “maintaining the civil liberties of its domestic withdrawal strategy. In particular, Gleis notes a single strand. In other fields, it is more akin population,” and to do that while the insurgents the importance of clearly defining phases, to splitting a light beam with a prism and then are not similarly constrained (p. 11). controlling borders, declaring “red lines,” selecting a sliver of the resultant rainbow as Chapters two through five are subse- executing an effective strategic communica- your academic focus area. In Withdrawing quently devoted to individual case studies. tion plan, establishing realistic goals, holding Under Fire: Lessons Learned from Islamist Insur- Listed sequentially, the case studies cover the insurgents accountable to the rules of war, and gencies, Joshua Gleis uses his academic prism to British withdrawal from Iraq in the 1920s, supporting and protecting the public. This last dissect the study of armed conflict and, in turn, the French withdrawal from Algeria in 1962, element is, in fact, a truism clearly understood focus on the area of war termination theory. the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in by counterinsurgency experts who have long He then further refines his study to the subject 1989, and the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia advocated the “will of the people” as any of “when and how a state should withdraw in 1994. Organized through the consistent insurgency’s “center of gravity.” from . . . [an Islamic] insurgency” (p. xiv). use of subheadings, each chapter provides In the final analysis, Withdrawing Under Since Gleis’s book is derived from the the relevant background followed by a focus Fire does not seek to provide a prescriptive dissertation he wrote while completing his on the tactics employed by the insurgency solution for resolving any insurgency— doctorate at The Fletcher School, it follows a and the counterinsurgency forces, the factors Islamic or otherwise. It does, however, present cogent and easy-to-follow structure. Chapters leading to withdrawal, the consequences and a well-organized study of those issues that are divided into titled subsections that help subsequent policies, and finally an analysis of have, over the past century, most affected the readers trace the logical construction that the campaign and its aftermath. ability of a nation to resolve and to withdraw Gleis has devised. Overall, the book first Chapters six and seven focus on Israel from Islamic insurgencies. It is a study that traces the evolution of irregular warfare and and its handling of the Hizballah insurgency casual readers can easily comprehend and then provides a number of case studies. The in Lebanon in 2000 as well as the Hamas that seasoned professionals would do well first four depict how Islamic insurgencies were insurgency in Gaza in 2005. As a result of the to review as a refresher on what they should resolved by Great Britain, France, the Soviet nuanced history behind these case studies and be thinking about as they develop and enact Union, and the United States. A fifth case the fact that the unsatisfactory resolution of the strategy. JFQ study, Israel, is examined over two chapters Lebanon withdrawal directly contributed to the to reflect on how Tel Aviv has dealt with two Gaza uprising, these chapters, while retaining Lieutenant Colonel Todd M. Manyx, USMC, is an types of insurgencies. Finally, a lengthy con- the same general categories as the previous case Intelligence Officer deployed to the International clusion chapter summarizes both the author’s studies, are much more robustly developed in Security Assistance Force. lessons learned and recommendations on detailing all aspects of the campaign. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 107 Operational Design and the Center of Gravity Two Steps Forward, One Step Back By Dale C. Eikmeier oint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Opera- complementary way. Unfortunately, this is not “understanding the operational environment” tion Planning, contains a significant always easy; doctrine is not “plug and play.” step.4 The placement of the COG identifica- editing error that, if not corrected, Making sure the new concept is ready is only tion in this step is likely based on a poor J will further confuse the integration half of the integration process. Integration understanding of JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence of the already difficult concepts of “design” of new and older concepts and how they will Preparation of the Operational Environment and the “center of gravity.” Figure III-4 incor- function together requires thorough consid- (JIPOE), which discusses COG identifica- rectly places identification of friendly and eration. Existing concepts need to be reexam- tion in detail.5 JP 2-01.3 emphasizes using a enemy centers of gravity (COGs) in opera- ined in light of the new concepts and, if neces- holistic view of the operational environment tional design’s “understanding the operational sary, adapted to fit the new. Unfortunately, to identify centers of gravity in a system. environment” step.1 This placement is also even with thorough consideration, doctrinal The use of the word environment in both challenged by the J7’s Planner’s Handbook for or editing errors are still possible. These errors design’s first step and the JIPOE’s discussion Operational Design and the 2006 version of may occur because a new concept has not of centers of gravity may have contributed JP 5-0.2 A better placement would put identi- fully matured or the implications on existing to misplacing COG identification. The first fication of the enemy center of gravity in the doctrine are not fully realized at the time of step of JIPOE defines the operational envi- “defining the problem” step and the friendly publication. The latter appears to be the case ronment, which includes understanding the center of gravity’s identification in “develop- with JP 5-0’s discussion of operational design joint force’s mission, operational area, and ing the operational approach” step. The good and the center of gravity. significant characteristics of the operational news is the error is repairable. In JP 5-0, figure III-4 clearly shows environment; this is consistent with design’s This article argues three main points. that the identification of friendly and enemy first step.6 However, the COG is not identified First, commanders and staff cannot properly COGs is an output of operational design’s in this step. JIPOE’s identification of enemy identify enemy COGs until after they have defined the problem. The logic is that until we identify the problem, we cannot be sure JP 5-0, Figure III-4. Understanding the Operational Environment who or what the real adversary is. Second, as the commander develops an operational Key Inputs Key Outputs approach, or solution to the problem, he iden- tifies his friendly COG; different approaches Strategic guidance Description of the current operational environment to solving a problem may require different Nature of the conflict • Systems perspective of the capabilities and therefore different friendly operational environment Relevant history COGs. Lastly, identifying the enemy and • Impacts of physical and information factors on the friendly COGs during the “understanding Physical and information Understanding operational environment the environment” step is premature, illogi- factors of the air, land, maritime, and space domains the Operational • Friendly/enemy COGs cal, and counter to the intent of operational and the information Environment design thinking.3 The conclusion then environment Description of the desired operational environment recommends changes to current doctrine PMESII Analysis • Military endstate that would make operational design and the • Opposing • Termination criteria center of gravity concept more compatible • Neutral Description of the opposing and complementary. • Friendly When doctrine writers introduce a endstates new concept such as operational design, they try to integrate it with existing concepts in a NOTE: All inputs/outputs are reviewed throughout the planning process and updated as changes occur in the operational environment, the problem, or the strategic guidance. Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier, USA (Ret.), is an Assistant Legend Professor at the U.S. Army Command and General COG center of gravity PMESII political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure Staff College. 108 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Eikmeier COGs occurs in the third step, “evaluate the simply asks, “What are the strategic goals to planners should defer COG analysis until adversary,” which in some ways is similar be achieved and the military objectives that they have at least an initial problem frame, to design’s “define the problem” step.7 It is support their attainment?”12 More simply, this because identifying the factors that comprise assumed that a misplaced focus on the word step defines the goalposts and where they are, the problem should facilitate COG analysis.”16 environment led someone to mistakenly place but not how to get to them. That occurs later Identification of problems or adversaries and the COG identification step in operational in the process. This step provides a framework solutions that would provide insights to COG design’s “understanding the operational that defines the desired environment, but it identification occurs in the following steps. environment” step. It is an easy mistake, and does not describe the current environment. even easier to overlook, but it represents a lack That framework and description are filled in Defining the Problem of understanding of the purpose and origins during the second step. Defining the problem’s purpose “is of operational design, specifically the problem defining what needs to be acted upon to identification and operational approach steps. Understanding the Operational reconcile the differences between the exist- The purpose of design thinking is “to Environment ing and desired conditions.”17 In this step, understand, visualize, and describe complex, The purpose of this step is to “help the the commander looks at the environment ill-structured problems and develop approaches [joint force commander] . . . better identify “puzzles” and asks what the problem, obstacle, to solve them.”8 The origins of design thinking the problem; anticipate potential outcomes; or condition is that prevents the current envi- in military doctrine resulted from a recogni- and understand the results of various friendly, ronment from becoming the desired environ- tion that commanders were having difficulty adversary, and neutral actions and how these ment. The answer to this question defines the understanding increasingly complex environ- actions affect achieving the military end problem and what needs to be “fixed.” ments that in turn hindered their ability to state.”13 It asks, “What is the larger context The problem is not the enemy COG. distinguish between the symptoms and the that will help me determine our problem?”14 The problem merely defines the adversary actual root causes of problems. This inability to This step can be thought of as a prerequisite, or enemy system. (Note, in this context, identify root causes of problems led to solutions not an end. This is a key point. In the 2011 the terms adversary or enemy do not imply that often attacked symptoms rather than the version of JP 5-0, “understanding the opera- hostility, only that they are obstacles to root problem, with disappointing results. What tional environment” is one step in a larger obtaining the goals. They are “the problem.”) commanders needed was a better identifica- design process. In this step, the commander This adversary system contains a center of tion process suited to ill-structured problems and staff create “pictures” of the current and gravity that must be identified by studying to complement existing problem-solving desired environments. It is akin to collecting the system.18 This is where some argue that processes such as the joint operation planning and assembling the pieces of two puzzles. design’s problem statement actually replaces process. Operational design was the solution to The goal is to arrive at understanding by the COG. This is an incorrect understand- this challenge and is essentially a methodology assembling the pieces and knowing why and ing. The defined problem is not the center of for understanding complex environments and how the pieces fit and function together. At gravity. Rather, it determines what the adver- identifying ill-structured problems and poten- the end of this step, the commander and staff sary system is and sets up a systems analysis tial solutions. should be able to look at each puzzle (current based on the adversary’s goals, capabilities, Operational design, as described in JP and desired environments) and understand and requirements that contribute to the COG 5-0, “is a process of iterative understanding what is going on in the current environment identification and analysis process of that and problem framing that supports com- and why, and what the desired environment system. Planners using a systems perspective manders and staffs in their application of should look like. The only things that have analyze the adversary system that is causing operational art with tools and a methodology been identified are the desired and current the problem to determine the enemy center of to conceive of and construct viable approaches conditions, actors, relationships, functions, gravity. More simply, design’s problem identi- to operations and campaigns.”9 Operational and tensions in the environment that establish fication defines for commanders and planners design consists of three steps: “understand- the operational context. the system in which to look for an enemy ing the strategic direction,” “understanding Any discussions of centers of gravity at center of gravity. Once the adversary or enemy the operational environment,” and “defining this point are premature. A detailed under- center of gravity is identified, the next logical the problem.” The answers or understanding standing of 2006’s JP 5-0, JP 2-01.3, and the step is determining how to solve the problem. obtained from these three steps enable the discussion in 2011’s JP 5-0 support this conclu- JP 5-0’s figure III-4 would have the development of an “operational approach.”10 sion. For example, the 2006 pre–operational commander identify the enemy center of (A claim could be made that developing the design JP 5-0 states, “The primary purpose of gravity prior to determining the adversary operational approach is actually a fourth step mission analysis is to understand the problem or enemy system causing the problem facing that completes the operational design process, and purpose of the operation.”15 This clearly the joint force. This makes no sense and is but doctrine does not label it as a step.11) suggests that identifying the problem is para- contrary to the intent of operational design as mount and other planning elements derive expressed in the J7 handbook on operational Understanding the Strategic Direction from it. Even the Planner’s Handbook for design, which states: This step helps the commander under- Operational Design acknowledges that COG stand the strategic endstate and objectives as identification in the environmental step, and The requirement to frame the problem and the starting point to formulate a vision of what prior to problem identification, is premature write a problem statement early in design raises the desired environment should look like. It when it states that “Given sufficient time, a question concerning how the problem relates ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 109 JOINT DOCTRINE | Operational Design and the Center of Gravity to one or more centers of gravity. Both [COG removed, then change is an approach. Again, in the context of operational design, are and problem] are important to developing the these are broad categories of approaches, and first discussed in JP 5-0 in the narrative on operational approach, but the caution to plan- actual approaches will be more specific and the developing the operational approach. The ners is that jumping to COG analysis too early lists of approaches are only limited by the ability discussion does not specifically address in design [specifically understanding the envi- to think creatively, but RPC provides a starting when COG identification takes place, only ronmental step] can constrain creative thinking point. Additionally, these categories can be used that COGs, along with other elements of about the problem.19 in combination for a multifaceted approach to operational design, are useful in developing addressing the problem set. an operational approach.22 This suggests that This statement clearly indicates that Once an RPC approach or combination COG identification should occur prior to the identifying the COG should not precede is selected, commanders and staffs can iden- completion of an operational approach, but problem analysis. tify the friendly center of gravity by asking it is ambiguous. As shown in JP 5-0, it occurs who or what has the critical capability to during understanding the environment. But Developing an Operational Approach execute the RPC action and achieve the objec- is this logical? Just as the identification of the problem tive or endstate. The answer to that question is Here is an example using the current provided an enemy system for COG analysis, the friendly center of gravity. logic of JP 5-0’s figure III-4. The operating development of an operational approach guides the selection of a friendly center of JP 5-0, Figure III-6. Defining the Problem gravity: “The operational approach reflects understanding of the strategic direction [step one], the operational environment [step two], Key Inputs Key Outputs and the problem [step three] while describ- Description of the current Problem statement that ing the commander’s visualization of a broad operational environment identifies problem to be 20 approach for achieving the desired end state.” • Systems perspective of the solved operational environment Simply speaking, the operational approach is Tension between current a description of the solution to the problem. • Impacts of physical and conditions and desired information factors on the endstate It outlines the objectives, actions, tasks, mis- operational environment Defining sions, and desired conditions that are intended • Friendly/enemy COGs the Elements within the to solve the problem. These actions then help Problem operational environment Description of the desired that must change to achieve identify critical capabilities required to address operational environment desired endstate the problem and achieve the objective. These • Military endstate critical capabilities in turn will suggest a Opportunities and threats • Termination criteria to achieving endstates friendly center of gravity that can perform the Description of the opposing Limitations actions and achieve the objective. endstates JP 5-0—as currently illustrated, but contradicted by the J7 design handbook—has NOTE: All inputs/outputs are reviewed throughout the planning process and updated as changes occur in the commander identifying the friendly the operational environment, the problem, or the strategic guidance. center of gravity before defining the problem and determining the broad operational Legend COG center of gravity approach to solving the problem. This is selecting “the tool” before we know what needs to be fixed or how to fix it. This type of logic is exactly what design thinking means The Illogic of Identifying the COG in environment is an old house. The strategic to prevent. Step Two direction (step one) is to have a solid floor. Here is one way to think about an JP 5-0 figures III-4 and III-6 clearly The current environment has a floor with operational approach and its relationship to the show that friendly and enemy COGs are an loose boards and nails sticking up. The com- friendly center of gravity. Since most problem output of “understanding the operational mander, knowing the goal is solid floors and sets can be described as blocking, lacking capac- environment” and an input to “defining seeing that the boards are loose and nails ity, or faulty behavior, a technique for develop- the problem.”21 Interestingly, in the textual are sticking up, identifies the nails as the ing an operational approach is the remove, discussion, there is no mention of COGs enemy center of gravity and a hammer as the provide, and change (RPC) framework. For in either step. The error appears only in friendly center of gravity. The commander example, if the problem is blocking the transi- the figures. This, along with the J7 design is tempted to skip “defining the problem” tion to the desired state and it is not needed in handbook, suggests that doctrine never and go directly to developing an operational the desired state, then removal is an approach. intended COG identification to be part of approach—that is, hammering in the nails. If the problem is the absence of a requirement “understanding the operational environ- After all, why define the problem if we or capability, then an approach is to provide. ment” because of weak logic. It also suggests already have identified the friendly and If the problem is a behavior or a condition of that the figures may simply contain an enemy COGs? It is a superfluous step. But a requirement, or something that cannot be editing error. On the other hand, COGs, is it? 110 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Eikmeier The commander resists and continues to use operational design. To define the problem, he looks at the current and desired environment and asks probing questions to NEW get at the root problem and not be misled by from NDU Press symptoms. Are the boards loose because the nails are sticking up? What caused the nails for the to stick up? Could the boards be warped, Institute for National Strategic Studies causing the nails to pull out? What is the con- dition of the wood? By attempting to identify the problem, he refines his understanding of the environment and realizes that the nails are not the problem or the enemy COG but rather a symptom of a larger problem that he needs to identify. He now realizes his hammer COG—and hammering nails— might not be the solution. By defining the problem, he may realize that the enemy COG is warped and rotten wood, which he needs to Transatlantic Current 7 replace—that is, his operational approach. So now his COG is no longer a hammer, but new Building Future Transatlantic floorboards. Interoperability Around a Robust Without operational design thinking, NATO Response Force the commander may have chosen to hammer nails, and when that did not work satisfacto- By Charles Barry rily, try another approach and so on until the problem was ultimately solved or the effort The centerpiece of U.S. military doctrine is joint coalition operations and high abandoned, both at additional cost. Opera- Transatlantic Current 6 interoperability with other militaries. tional design was specifically introduced into After the International Security doctrine to address this problem of misiden- Widening Gaps in U.S. and European Assistance Force in Afghanistan draws tifying symptoms as root causes. Therefore, it Defense Capabilities and Cooperation down, the North Atlantic Treaty is critical that the error be corrected because Organization (NATO) Response Force in the best case it will be ignored or explained By Charles Barry and Hans Binnendijk will be the essential core of future away, which undermines doctrine’s credabil- interoperability. This paper suggests The United States needs allies and partners ity. In the worst case, it subverts operational steps that the United States should take to help implement its global military design and takes doctrine backward to where to build and build on this core, such as strategy. However, as this analysis points symptoms, not root causes, are addressed. designating U.S. European Command out, there are growing gaps in current (USEUCOM) as global executive and near- to mid-term future military Summary agent for interoperability; giving capabilities across Europe. This paper is interoperability requirements a special Operational design’s discrete steps a synthesis of recent research projects at budget line outside Service budgets; can enhance understanding and enemy and National Defense University (NDU) as revamping USEUCOM force posture friendly COG identification by correctly well as initiatives at the May 2012 North to optimize multinational training and placing them into separate cognitive bins in Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) crisis response; and tying USEUCOM a logical sequence. By asking what the root Summit that address these gaps, such components close to the NATO problem is before determining an enemy as NDU’s “Mission Focus Groups” and Command Structure. NATO’s “Smart Defense” and “Connected COG, operational design can point com- Forces Initiatives.” After exploring these manders and staffs toward an adversary initiatives, the paper discusses several system in order to identify the enemy center obstacles and concerns that NATO will of gravity. This center of gravity, if attacked have to address effectively in order to close directly or indirectly, can significantly con- the growing capabilities gap. tribute to solving the problem. By asking in the “developing the operational approach” step, how the problem can be solved or center of gravity attacked and what has the capabil- ity to do so, commanders have an insight as to what their friendly center of gravity is Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications or should be. Any discussion of enemy and at ndupress.ndu.edu ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 111 JOINT DOCTRINE | Operational Design and the Center of Gravity friendly centers of gravity prior to defining The Joint Staff, June 16, 2009), I-3–I-4, II-44–I-46, the problem and the start of developing an III-13. 6 operational approach is illogical and negates Ibid., II-2. 7 Ibid., II-55. NEW the utility of operational design. from NDU Press 8 Field Manual 5-0, The Operations Process (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the for the Recommendations Center for the Study of Weapons of Army, March 2010), 3-1. This issue can be resolved by adopting 9 JP 5-0 (2011), III-1. Mass Destruction two recommendations. The first is to delete 10 Ibid., III-7. references to friendly and enemy centers of 11 Ibid. gravity in figures III-4 and III-6. This rec- 12 Ibid. ommendation corrects the error, but alone 13 Ibid., III-8. is insufficient to increase understanding of 14 Ibid., III-7. 15 how operational design and the center of JP 5-0 (2006), III-20–III-21. 16 gravity concept complement each other. To Planner’s Handbook, VI-5. 17 JP 5-0 (2011), III-12. improve understanding and clarity, a discus- 18 See Dale C. Eikmeier, “Redefining the Center sion of enemy COG identification should of Gravity,” Joint Force Quarterly 59 (4th Quarter be added to the narrative on defining the 2010); JP 2-01.3. problem along with a similar discussion on 19 Planner’s Handbook, VI-4. the friendly COG in developing the opera- 20 JP 5-0 (2011), III-13. tional approach. 21 Ibid., III-8, III-12. The discussion should include the 22 Ibid., III-14. following points: The problem defined in step three identifies the adversary and its Case Study 5 system and sets up a systems analysis for identification of the enemy center of gravity The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of in accordance with JP 2-01.3. More simply, 1991–1992 design’s problem identification defines for commanders and planners the system in by Susan J. Koch which to look for an enemy center of gravity. In step four, developing an operational In late 1991 and early 1992, President approach, the enemy’s center of gravity and George H.W. Bush announced a series of changes to U.S. nuclear forces that critical factors analysis will identify require- became known as the Presidential Nuclear ments and vulnerabilities that suggest where Initiatives. Intended to be primarily to act and offer possible solutions or actions unilateral, the proposals challenged the to take. These actions require capabilities, Soviet Union to take comparable actions. and the possessor of these capabilities is the It did so, in responses first by Soviet friendly center of gravity. President Mikhail Gorbachev and then Adopting these recommendations Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The and clarifying the relationship between initiatives, which resulted in the reduction operational design and center of gravity will of nuclear forces and changes in nuclear strengthen synergy and contribute stronger, practices, were unprecedented on several more useful doctrine. JFQ levels: the broad scope and scale of the reductions, their unilateral nature (even though they were reciprocated), and the Notes extraordinary speed and secrecy in which they were developed (3 weeks compared 1 Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation to months and years for traditional Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2011), arms control measures). This case study III-8. discusses the general context of the 2 Joint Staff, J7 Joint and Coalition Warfight- initiatives, the concerns that motivated ing, Planner’s Handbook for Operational Design, them, and the national and international v1.0 (Suffolk, VA: Joint Staff J7, October 7, 2011); JP processes that saw them carried out, 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: including the texts of the key U.S. The Joint Staff, 2006), III-20–III-21. proposals and Soviet/Russian responses. 3 Planner’s Handbook, VI-4–VI-5. 4 JP 5-0 (2011), III-8. Visit the NDU Press Web site 5 JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of for more information on publications the Operational Environment (Washington, DC: at ndupress.ndu.edu 112 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu CALL FOR ENTRIES for the 2013 Secretary of Defense and 2013 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competitions Are you a professional military education (PME) student? Imagine your winning essay published in a future issue of Joint Force Quarterly, catching the eye of the Secretary and Chairman as well as contributing to the debate on an important national security issue. These rewards, along with a monetary prize, await the winners. Who’s Eligible? Students, including international students, at U.S. PME colleges, schools, and other programs, and Service research fellows. What’s Required? Research and write an original, unclassified essay on some aspect of U.S. national, defense, or military strategy. The essay may be written in conjunction with a course writing requirement. Important: Please note that entries must be selected by and submitted through your college. When? Any time during the 2012–2013 academic year. Students are encouraged to begin early and avoid the spring rush. Colleges set their own internal deadlines, but must submit their official entries to NDU Press by April 24, 2013, for the first round of judging. Final judging and selection of winners take place May 14–15, 2013, at NDU Press, Fort McNair, Washington, DC. National Defense University Press conducts the competition with the generous support of the NDU Foundation. For further information, see your college’s essay coordinator or go to: www.ndu.edu/press/SECDEF-EssayCompetition.html www.ndu.edu/press/CJCS-EssayCompetition.html General Martin E. Dempsey, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, presents award certificate to Colonel Andrew C. Foltz, USAF. While a student at the Air War College, Colonel Foltz won First Place in the 2012 CJCS Strategy Essay Competition with his strategic research paper entitled “Stuxnet, Schmitt Analysis, and the Cyber ‘Use of Force’ Debate.” New from NDU Press Strategic Reflections: Operation Iraqi Freedom, July 2004–February 2007 By George W. Casey, Jr. General, U.S. Army Retired Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom were the first major wars of the 21st century. They will not be the last. They have significantly impacted how the U.S. Government and military think about prosecuting wars. They will have a generational impact on the U.S. military, as its future leaders, particularly those in the ground forces, will for decades be men and women who served in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is imperative that leaders at all levels, both military and civilian, share their experiences to ensure that we, as a military and as a country, gain appropriate insights for the future. When General George W. Casey, Jr., was the Army chief of staff, he encouraged leaders at the war colleges, staff colleges, and advanced courses to write about what they did in Iraq and Afghanistan so that others could be better prepared when they faced similar challenges. This book is General Casey’s effort to follow his own advice, offering narratives and insights about his tenure as commander of Multi-National Force–Iraq so that future leaders can be better prepared for the next conflict. Available in PDF and e-book formats at: www.ndu.edu/press/strategicreflections PRISM A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations PRISM 4, no. 1 (December 2012), contains the following Feature articles: Dr. Zoltan Brany, University of Texas, suggests “How to Build Democratic Armies”; Hans-Jürgen Kasselmann provides an instructive view in “Civil-Miltary Cooperation: A Way to Resolve Complex Crisis Situations”; Christian Bayer Tygesen addresses the imbalance favoring military institution-building in “Making the Afghan Civil-Military Imbalance Conducive to Democratization”; Frank Cilluffo teams with Joseph Clark on “Thinking about Strategic Hybrid Threats—In Theory and Practice,” proposing a “threat council response model”; Dr. R. Evan Ellis amply documents “Chinese Organized Crime in Latin America” and its troubling implications; Chiemi Hayashi and Amey Soo survey past catastrophes in “Adaptive Leadership in Times of Crisis”; and risk analyst Dr. Gordon Woo contributes “Risk Management of Future Foreign Conflict Intervention.” In From the Field, John Acree presents “Stabilization Success in Afghanistan: The Challenges Within.” In Lessons Learned, Stuart Bowen, Jr., and Craig Collier coauthor two articles on reconstruction in Iraq: “Reconstruction Leaders’ Perceptions of CERP in Iraq” and “The Human Toll of Reconstruction during Operation Iraqi Freedom.” Next, PRISM interviews Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations. Two book reviews close out the issue: Michelle Hughes assesses Rachel Kleinfeld’s Advancing the Rule of Law Abroad: Next CENTER FOR Generation Reform, and Nathaniel Moir reviews The Art of Intelligence—Lessons from a Life in the CIA’s COMPLEX OPERATIONS Clandestine Service by Henry Crumpton. DIPLOMACY • DEFENSE • DEVELOPMENT PRISM explores, promotes, and debates emerging thought and best practices as civilian capacity increases in order to address challenges in stability, reconstruction, security, counterinsurgency, and irregular warfare. Published by NDU Press for the Center for Complex Operations, PRISM welcomes articles on a broad range of complex operations issues, especially civil-military integration. Manuscript submissions should be be- tween 2,500 and 6,000 words and sent via email to [email protected]. JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University Press National Defense University, Washington, DC