Construction of Mind

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Construction of Mind THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIND By STEPHEN CHARLES TOMLINSON A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 1991 This study is dedicated to the memory of Robert Landis Long ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS with the guidance and inspiration provided Whatever merit this work may have rests ultimately of like to acknowledge the special contributions by my teachers and coUeagues. In particular I should and assiduous efforts in editing and in discussing this the foUowing: Dr. Robert Sherman, for his critical introduced me to many of the issues work; Dr. Robert D'Amico, whose philosophy seminars first and Charles Nelson, with whom it has been a discussed in these pages; and to Drs. Bruce Edwards all these teachers to my feUow students, for delight to teach mathematics. I would strongly recommend that this university can be proud of. in my opinion they personify standards of excellence iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ill ABSTRACT vi CHAPTERS I INTRODUCTION 1 Philosophy in Education 7 Philosophy, Psychology, and the Problem of Mind 22 Problems in the Philosophy of Mind 35 Conclusion Summary 39 43 Notes n EPISTEMOLOGY FROM DESCARTES TO HEGEL 44 Introduction 44 Overview 45 Descartes 49 Empiricism and Rationalism 54 Kant 58 The German Romantic Philosophers 70 Hegel 72 Ill LfiVI-STRAUSS AND THE STRUCTURALIST MOVEMENT..., Introduction 98 The Origins of Structuralism 99 Claude Levi-Strauss 118 Conclusion 158 IV CHOMSKY'S THEORY OF MIND 168 Introduction 168 Chomsky's Theory 170 Descriptive Linguistics 174 iv i Pags The Modularity Thesis Grammar and Mind Plato's Problem ^ Chomsky and Kant ^ Conclusion V PIAGET ^ Introduction The Development of Piaget's Thought 237 The Psychogenesis of Thought 250 274 Genetic Epistemology Structure ^ Function Conclusion VI THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIND 331 Introduction • Reasons and Causes in Psychological Explanations 332 Theory and Practice 339 Education as Growth 341 Education as Initiation 349 Education, Society, and Mind 358 REFERENCES BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 380 V School of the Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Requirements for the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIND by Stephen Charles Tomlinson August 1991 Chairman: Dr. Robert Sherman Major Department: Foimdations of Education inquiries within logic, information theory, Although cognitivism is usually traced to convergent in the work of three structuralist cybernetics, and neurology, its inteUectual origins are also found phenomenological theories, thmkers: L6vi-Strauss, Piaget, and Chomsky. In opposition to empiricist and thought based on the syntactic each maintamed the existence of underlying cognitive structures, laws of model of mind. manipulation of mental representations that provided a foundation for the computational a complementary anology Their efforts to chart the mechanisms of the intellect were accompanied by that of an active and autonomous that replaced the behaviorist image of a passive, maUeable subject with agent. L6vi- This dissertation identifies two theories of human nature within the cognitive sciences. arguing that the brain is biologically Strauss and Chomsky, endorse the thesis of the structured mind , endowed with specialized functions that mature-like physical organs--in the course of "mtellectual explaining cognitive development growth." In contrast, Piaget adopts the model of the constructive mind , through general learning mechanisms. The nativist thus presents a scientific version of Kant's critical of philosophy, whereas the constructivist, hke Hegel, attempts to explain the rational development reason. vi that its theories This dissertation criticizes the thesis of the structured mind by demonstrating underdetermined, and otherwise are excessively individualistic, biologically unfounded, theoretically Piaget recognizes the incapable of explaining the intentional character of experience. Further, although remains fundamentally asocial purposive historical dimension m the development of mind, his account interpreted not as a soUtary Cartesian and prone to logicism. However, if Piaget's epistemic subject is but as a social construct-along the scientist producing knowledge through abstract laws of organization, mind becomes an initiation into Unes suggested by Hegel's philosophy of spirit-then the development of pubUcally evolving forms of knowledge. clearly raises a Because a central aim of schooUng is the development of mind, this debate issues by examining the number of important educational concerns. This study explores some of these philosophy of education pedagogies these theories support, and concludes by advocating a constructivist based upon the work of Richard Peters. vii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Philosophy in Education above, so high Francis Bacon once said that the discourses of the philosophers are like the stars that many students of education will find up that they shed Uttle Ught (Peters, 1972, p. 135). I conjecture the philosophy of education may this criticism equally apposite. For although in its present form, address the practical introduce students to a variety of stimulatmg issues, it has failed as a subject to to the preparation of problems facing the teacher. Yet if there is one discipline that is essential defined by change, educationalists can no teachers, it is surely philosophy, for, in a worid that is often predecessors. Tomorrow's longer rely upon the set aims, methods, and content prescribed by their of pedagogy generate. teachers must be able to distinguish among the complex of issues that questions and sociological research While this imperative clearly demands a knowledge of the psychological the importance pertinent to the mtellectual and emotional development of the child, it also highlights of their own of preparing teachers with the ability to make intelligent decisions in the course experiences. that will The ability to synthesize technical information provided by inquiry into a judgment recognition that support and direct action is a philosophical skill. This realization, in concert with the education, teachers will face many difficult social and ethical problems in the context of a multicultural ought, one would hope, provide the impetus for a rejuvenation of interest in the role that philosophy Philosophy of should play m educational theory. I shall argue that as a subject in its own right, the Education is pertinent to all educational problems, while as a component of thought, implicit in any claim, mquiry, it is precisely philosophy that saves science from abstractness and, in contrast to Bacon's makes investigation purposeful. 1 i i i 2 manifesto for the reorganization of teacher education, Although it is not my intention to offer a presentation of my dissertation topic. In some general comments are necessary to set the stage for the scholarship has obscured the common particular, since I will be arguing that a lack of philosophical it is important to clarify what kinds purpose behind the theories of Piaget, Chomsky, and L6vi-Strauss, with. By identifying those conditions that of questions and inquiries educationalists should be concerned complete comparison should be have obfuscated the similarity of these views, a program for a more realized. in its own right. According The most important observation is that education is not a discipline methods, or logic of inquiry that it may call to Paul Hirst (1974), it has no unique concepts, distinctive in order to address problems that are of its own. Instead, it amalgamates several independent subjects inquiry that Hirst particular cultural significance. In this sense, education is a hybrid mterdisciplinary the avenues along which calls "a field of knowledge." From the outset, then, it is essential to recognize accessible to thought must travel. Since experience does not come neatly packaged and immediately Prior to the analysis, all concerns must be elevated to a level that permits conceptualization. can employment of any problem solving strategies, there must be a question; and before any question inquiry rests on be posed, there must be a felt sense of perplexity withm the situation.' Accordingly, the phrasing of questions in such a manner that problems can be approached through the techniques into the of the distinctive discipUnes. If this process of molding an undifferentiated awareness conceptual form necessary for investigation is the first moment of philosophical thought, it should not that gave be the last. For the results of research must be used to requalify our conception of the context parts, rise to the problem. It is this philosophical synthesis, the integration of previously discriminated that should characterize the final stage in any inquiry. In many instances, however, it seems that the interdisciplmary nature of educational problems actually supports the fragmentation of knowledge and promotes the preoccupation among subject specialists with abstract and increasingly vacuous ideas. By way of an example, consider the range of problems associated with discipline and punishment in schools. Such issues clearly raise a myriad of 3 wiU weigh theories of deterrence and ethical, sociological, and psychological questions. Philosophers teaching styles, authority, and retribution; sociologists must investigate the relationships between techniques. Yet the conduct; and psycholo^ts will evaluate the effectiveness of behavior
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