Worthy of Better Memory: the Royal Navy and the Defence of the Eastern Empire 1935 - 1942
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Worthy of better Memory: The Royal Navy and the defence of the Eastern Empire 1935 - 1942 Volume 2 of 2 Andrew Jonathan Corrie Boyd Student Number: 1102571 Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Humanities in the University of Buckingham February 2015 Abbreviations ABC-1 American British Staff Conference No 1 ACNS Assistant Chief of Naval Staff ADB American Dutch British AMWIS Air Ministry Weekly Intelligence Survey ASV Air to Surface Vessel Search Radar CAS Chief of Air Staff CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff CinC Commander in Chief CNO Chief of Naval Operations in the US Navy COS Chiefs of Staff DRC Defence Requirements Committee DCNS Deputy Chief of Naval Staff D of P Director of Plans DMI Director of Military Intelligence DNI Director of Naval Intelligence EF RN Eastern Fleet FAA Fleet Air Arm FEA Far East Appreciation FECB Far East Combined Bureau Force G RN Task Force comprising battleship HMS Prince of Wales and escorts Force H RN Task Force established mid-1940 to guard Western Mediterranean Force Z RN Task Force renamed from Force G on 8 December comprising the battleship HMS Prince of Wales, battle-cruiser HMS Repulse and escorts FSL First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff GC&CS Government Code & Cypher School IJN Imperial Japanese Navy IJNAF Imperial Japanese Naval Air Force IJAAF Imperial Japanese Army Air Force JIC Joint Intelligence Committee i JPC Joint Planning Committee JPS Joint Planning Staff JN25 Japanese Navy Cypher KGV King George V class battleships NEI Netherlands East Indies NID Naval Intelligence Division OIC Operational Intelligence Centre PM Prime Minister R-class Royal Sovereign class battleships RAF Royal Air Force RN Royal Navy SIS Secret Intelligence Service USN US Navy VCNS Vice Chief of Naval Staff WIR Weekly Intelligence Report Additional Abbreviations used in References ADM Admiralty AIR Air Ministry AT Admiralty Telegram CAB Cabinet Office CCA Churchill College Archives, Cambridge FO Foreign Office IWM Imperial War Museum JM Japanese Monograph NMM National Maritime Museum, Greenwich PREM Premier TNA The National Archives UCI University of California Irvine Libraries WO War Office ii Table of Contents Volume 1 Title Page Abstract i Dedication iii Acknowledgements iv Abbreviations v Table of Contents vii List of Tables and Maps ix Declaration of Originality x Word Count xi Introduction 1 Chapter One The Royal Navy 1935 – 39: Rearming for a two hemisphere war 13 Chapter Two The naval defence of the Eastern Empire 1935 – 40: Managing 72 competing risks Chapter Three Britain’s Eastern strategy after the fall of France and its impact on 127 naval planning iii Chapter Four The US relationship, ABC-1, and the resurrection of a Royal Navy 187 Eastern Fleet Volume 2 Chapter Five Royal Navy readiness for a war with Japan in mid-1941: 244 Intelligence and capability Chapter Six Summer and autumn 1941: Reinforcement and deterrence 298 Chapter Seven The deployment of Force Z and its consequences: An inevitable 346 disaster? Chapter Eight Defending the Indian Ocean in 1942 392 Conclusions 446 Annex 1 The historiography of the naval defence of the Eastern Empire 458 1919 – 1942 Annex II Warships completed by principal naval powers 1930 - 1942 466 Bibliography 473 iv List of Tables and Maps Tables 1. Warships commissioned by the main naval powers January 1922 – December 27 1934 2. Proposed DRC Fleet and actual orders compared 43 3. RN Expansion Options 1938 – 1942 45 4. RN Strength at 31 March 1942 – Proposed and Achieved 47 5. RN Ships commissioned compared with the three Axis Powers 1 January 50 1935 – 31 December 1942 6. US Naval Forces in the Atlantic 1940 – 1941 216 7. US and RN Naval Forces in the Pacific and Asiatic Theatres 1940 – 1941 218 8. British Empire Target Naval Strength 279 Annexes A. Total warship completions by the principal naval powers across the period 469 1930 - 1942 B. Warship completion by the principal naval powers presented on an annual 470 basis from 1930 – 1942 Maps 1. Eastern Fleet Waiting Area off Ceylon 2 – 4 April 1942 412 2. Comparative Tracks of Eastern Fleet and IJN Task Force off Ceylon 417 5 – 6 April 1942 v VOLUME 2 vi Chapter Five Royal Navy readiness for a war with Japan in mid-1941: Intelligence and capability The previous two chapters have explained why the defence of the Indian Ocean became an increasingly important factor in British strategic calculations during the first half of 1941, and how US determination to prioritise the Atlantic over the Pacific obliged the RN to resurrect the concept of an Eastern Fleet to ensure adequate security against Japanese intervention in the war. The next chapter argues that, for a number of reasons, the mid- point of the year marked a watershed for both Britain and the US in their perception of the risk from Japan and the start of a series of moves on both sides that led inexorably to confrontation at the end of the year. This chapter therefore examines the RN’s intelligence picture of the naval risk posed by Japan in mid-1941 as it became both possible and necessary to contemplate deploying significant reinforcements to the East. It also looks at the overall resources and capabilities available to the RN from which those reinforcements would need to be drawn. The chapter begins therefore by reviewing what the RN knew at this time of overall IJN capability, comprising strength, plans and doctrine. It evaluates the intelligence sources available to the RN, identifies critical intelligence gaps, and looks at how intelligence then influenced subsequent decisions on Far East naval resources and reinforcement. It assesses how far the RN underestimated its IJN enemy, why this occurred, and whether it mattered compared to other factors such as resource overstretch. The second part of the chapter investigates the RN resources and capabilities available to create an Eastern Fleet from mid-1941 and how this influenced naval policy and strategy for the Eastern theatre. It also considers how the policy and capability of the RAF impacted on RN strategy. Did the RN recognise the importance of having the right RAF resources if it was to cope successfully with the IJN? Why was RAF reinforcement so slow to appear? This part concludes by asking whether the case for “imperial overstretch” holds up or whether the RN had adequate resources to pursue a successful defensive strategy focused on keeping 244 control of the Indian Ocean if it made timely choices. The chapter also considers how far war experience in Europe and the Mediterranean influenced the RN’s approach to managing the evolving naval risk posed by Japan. Here it looks especially at the conclusions the RN was reaching on the impact of airpower at sea and the potential of carrier operations. Did the RN underestimate the importance of carrier based airpower in a future war in the East? Or did it have a different but equally valid operational doctrine based not only on pre-war thinking but recent war experience? The RN picture of the IJN in 1941 For most of the inter-war period the RN viewed the IJN as both its most likely opponent in a future war and the only naval power that posed a significant threat. In terms of size, the IJN ranked third after the RN and USN, its fleet spanned the full range of naval capability, it had established a fine tradition1, and was recognised as an innovator.2 It was by any measure a powerful force and therefore a key standard against which the RN judged its strength and capability. As explained in Chapter One, the strength of the IJN, current and projected, was a crucial key determinant of the RN rearmament programme from 1935 onward but it also shaped RN programmes in the 1920s and early 1930s, especially for cruisers and submarines.3 As also demonstrated in Chapters One and Two, until 1940, defence of the Far East was seen as pre-eminently a naval problem and the Admiralty dominated Far East defence policy and planning. Until 1937, this policy and planning had a theoretical quality but Japan’s invasion of China increased the risk of confrontation and 1 This phrase appears in JIC (41) 175 of 1 May, ‘Japan Future Strategy’, and would have reflected NID thinking. This paper also noted that the IJN had little experience of modern warfare though in China they had demonstrated excellence in combined operations. 2 The Kongo class battlecruisers (1913) and Nagato class battleships (1920) were superior to their foreign contemporaries when they first appeared and this was recognised by both the RN and USN. The Nagatos were the first battleships to mount 16 inch guns. The RN was sufficiently impressed by the Kongos to try and negotiate their loan to the RN in 1915 albeit without success. See: Evans and Peattie, p 159-175. 3 The specifications of the ‘County’ class cruisers laid down from 1924 onward were largely dictated by IJN cruiser plans following the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty. The Southampton class laid down in 1934 were strongly influenced by the Mogami class. The ‘O’, ‘P’ and ‘R’ class submarines, laid down between 1924- 1929, were specifically designed to hold off an IJN fleet in the South China Sea pending the arrival of the main RN fleet. See: Evans and Peattie, p 226; H T Lenton, p 33-37, 46-52, 60-64, and 212-215; Peter Padfield, War Beneath the Sea, (London: John Murray, 1995 ), p 18-19. 245 the prospect of an attack on British possessions. The 1937 Imperial Review and FEA represented a watershed in judging those risks.