HISTORY
The White Ensign standard of the Royal Navy. The Rising Sun flag of imperial Japan. LEONARD BIRCHALL AND THE JAPANESE RAID ON COLOMBO
by Rob Stuart
Introduction objectives included disrupting shipping in the Bay of Bengal, and encouraging the Indian independence ir Commodore Leonard Joseph Birchall, Member movement, which desired to take India out of the Aof the Order of Canada, Member of the Order war. In other words, this was a raid, and not an invasion of Ontario, Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the of Ceylon.1 British Empire, Distinguished Flying Cross, Canadian Forces Decoration, Officer of the United States Legion of The British were still reeling from a string of recent d Merit, passed away in September 2004 at the age of 89. isasters. Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, Borneo, and His passing was reported in most Canadian newspapers, much of Burma had fallen, and the Japanese Army and all of them noted that he had been nicknamed was approaching India’s eastern border. To stem the ‘the Saviour of Ceylon’ for having spotted a Japanese Japanese advance, such reinforcements as were available fleet approaching Ceylon (now Sri had been dispatched to the Far East. Lanka) on 4 April 1942 while on patrol Among them was 413 Squadron, which, in a 413 (RCAF) Squadron Consolidated “The force Birchall at the end of February, had been ordered Catalina flying boat. Unfortunately, spotted was the to move to Ceylon from Sullom Voe few accounts of Birchall’s actions that in the Shetland Islands. The squadron’s First Air Fleet, day paint a full picture of the combat four Catalinas departed Europe in operations in which his sighting the carrier battle mid-March, and its ground crews soon report played an important factor. The group that followed by ship.2 aim of this article is to put Birchall’s had previously discovery of the Japanese fleet into A new British Eastern Fleet was the full context of the operations conducted attacked assembled in Ceylonese waters, and off and over Ceylon between 26 March Pearl Harbor.” Admiral Sir James Somerville assumed and 9 April 1942. command on 26 March 1942. It consisted of the modern fleet carriers Indomitable Background and Formidable, the small carrier Hermes, the battleships Warspite, Resolution, Ramillies, Royal Sovereign, and he force Birchall spotted was the First Air Fleet, Revenge, the heavy cruisers Dorsetshire and Cornwall, T the carrier battle group that had previously five light cruisers, and 14 destroyers. This was a substantial attacked Pearl Harbor. It was commanded by Vice force, but it had only just been assembled and it had Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, and it consisted of the not yet been trained to operate as a fleet. The four R-class carriers Akagi, Hiryu, Soryu, Shokaku, and Zuikaku, battleships were old, slow, and short-ranged, and several the battleships Kongo, Haruna, Kirishima, and Hiei, the of the cruisers and destroyers were past their prime. heavy cruisers Chikuma and Tone, a light cruiser, and Most importantly, the two fleet carriers embarked only eight destroyers. It was a well-trained and powerful force, with more than 300 modern combat aircraft embarked, including considerable numbers of the superb Rob Stuart, BA, B Ed, CD, served in the regular and reserve Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighter. The primary purpose components of the Canadian Forces from 1975 to 1991 in the of the Japanese mission, which they called Operation C, Communications and Electronics Branch and attained the was to secure Japan’s western flank by neutralizing rank of captain. He has been employed by the Communications British naval and air forces in the Indian Ocean. Secondary Security Establishment since 1989.
Winter 2006-2007 ● Canadian Military Journal 65 The FECB, in conjunction with US Navy sigint centres, was beginning to read main Japanese fleet code successfully from their encryption devices, known to the Allies as JN-25. By March 1942, the latest variant of this equipment, introduced during the previous December and known as JN-25B, had been reconstructed to the point where substantial portions of many messages could be read with little delay. Before the end of the month, US cryptographers determined that Japanese carriers were about to enter the Indian Ocean, and accordingly, a warning was sent to Colombo.
CMJ collection FECB also repeatedly read of an imminent operation by a Leonard Joseph Birchall in the cockpit of his Catalina. carrier force in the area of “D,” and an air raid on “DG” 80 aircraft between them. There were no dive bombers, planned for either the first or second of April. The meaning and the 45 torpedo bombers were lumbering, antediluvian of these geographic designators, a sort of ‘code within Fairey Albacore biplanes. The 35 fighters, comprising a code,’ was not clear, but “D” was thought to be either 14 Grumman Martlets, as the American-made Wildcat India or Ceylon.8 Fortunately, the meaning of “DG” was not was known in British service, 9 Hawker Sea Hurricanes, clear to all the Japanese either, for on 28 March, one and 12 two-seater Fairey Fulmars, were all inferior of their operators advised a colleague, in a JN-25B message to the Zero, especially the Fulmar.3 The author of The read by FECB, that it represented Colombo.9 Somerville World’s Worst Aircraft was perhaps going a little too was warned the same day and advised that the Japanese far when he included the Albacore and Fulmar in his would have “two or more” carriers, plus cruisers, destroyers 2005 book, but it makes the point that the Royal Navy was stuck with some rather mediocre aircraft at the time.4
On the plus side, the British had radar and the Japanese did not. The Eastern Fleet was well equipped with air search, surface search and fire control radar sets.5 Most of the Albacores also had radar, the air-to-surface-vessel (ASV) Mark IIN, which could detect a medium-sized ship at up to 15 miles range.6 Finally, the British had a secret anchorage, Addu Atoll, at the southern end of the Maldives, some 600 miles southwest of Ceylon. In fact, the Japanese did not learn of this hideaway until after the war.
Somerville knew he would be outmatched if the Japanese sent their main striking force against him, but believed he could deal with a smaller detachment and also that he would have an advantage at night. To avoid battle on unfavourable terms, the admiral needed early intelligence with respect to any Japanese force entering the Indian Ocean. The key intelligence organization supporting him was the Far Eastern Combined Bureau (FECB). This formation was a signals intelligence (sigint) unit, and it received a steady flow of Japanese radio traffic from intercept stations located throughout the CMJ collection Far East and Pacific, including one based at Esquimalt, Admiral Chuichi Nagumo. British Columbia.7
66 Canadian Military Journal ● Winter 2006-2007 Into Action
omerville ordered the SEastern Fleet to sea on 30 March. His ships left Colombo, Trincomalee, and Addu Atoll, and ren- HISTORY dezvoused 80 miles south of Ceylon at 1600 hours the following day. Seeing them assembled for the first time, he signaled, “So this is the Eastern Fleet. Never mind, many a good tune is played on an old fiddle.”16
The admiral also organized the fleet into two divisions. Force A, led by himself, included Warspite, Indomitable, Formidable, IWM photo A24959 IWM photo Cornwall, Dorsetshire, two
Admiral Sir James Somerville inspecting Wrens in Colombo. light cruisers, and six destroyers. Force B, the slow division, consisted and perhaps Kongo-class fast battleships.10 There were, of the four R-class battleships, Hermes, three light in fact, five carriers, as we have seen, and they were cruisers, and eight destroyers. accompanied by all four Kongos. As Admiral Somerville had been instructed by Somerville thought the Japanese would probably London that it was more important to preserve the attack Colombo and Trincomalee, Ceylon’s principal ports, Eastern Fleet than to defend Ceylon,17 one might simultaneously, and he estimated that their launch point have expected him to lead his ships well out of harm’s would be about 5° 20’ N, 80° 53’ E – roughly 100 miles way. There were two reasons why he did not. The first southeast of Ceylon, and 180 to 200 miles from both was his native pugnacity. In his own words, he wanted ports. Catalina searches were therefore organized to a to give the enemy “a good crack.”18 It was not for distance of 420 miles from Colombo, between the bearings nothing that his eventual biography was to be entitled of 110° and 154°, the direction from which the Japanese Fighting Admiral. The second reason was that the were expected to approach.11 In fact, the Japanese planned available intelligence led him to believe he could seek to hit only Colombo during their initial strike, so their battle on favourable terms. He had been told when the actual launch point proved to be well to the west of enemy would arrive, and that there might be as few Somerville’s estimate. as two carriers opposing him. Furthermore, British naval intelligence had underestimated the capabilities of Initially, only six Catalinas were available for Japanese carriers. For instance, it was thought that operations.12 As the patrols lasted up to 32 hours, only the Shokaku and Zuikaku carried 60 aircraft apiece, but half the available aircraft could be available for patrol in reality, they could operate 72 aircraft each and carry each day.13 This meant that each of the three aircraft another 12 for spares.19 The performance of their aircraft was had to cover an arced sector of about 15 degrees. likewise underestimated. Despite such occurrences as the In comparison, two months later, the US Navy dispatched participation of the Zero in the 8 December attack on 22 Catalinas from Midway Island to search a 180 degree targets near Manila, 450 miles from the Japanese bases arc for the Japanese task force predicted by sigint on Formosa (Taiwan), its tremendous range was not yet to be approaching, a resultant search arc of just 8 degrees fully appreciated. This was partly due to the fact that the per aircraft.14 This limitation highlights the weakness various Allied commands did not broadly or promptly share of the reconnaissance force upon which Somerville their after action reports, which worked to their mutual depended. disadvantage.20
Fortunately, the small RCAF contingent was starting Somerville thought the Japanese aircraft would to arrive, in the proverbial nick of time. The first probably attack in moonlight – there was a full moon 413 Squadron aircraft, flown by RAF Flight Lieutenant Rae on 1 April – and arrive back over their carriers at dawn, Thomas, DFC, arrived on 28 March, and flew its first at approximately 0600 hours. To accomplish this, Nagumo mission three days later. Birchall, then a squadron leader, would have to reach his launch point by about 0200 hours. arrived on 2 April with the second aircraft.15 Somerville decided to ambush him. If his radar-equipped
Winter 2006-2007 ● Canadian Military Journal 67 Operation C had not been cancelled. It was, in fact, carried out as predicted by sigint, but not on the first or second of April. One source explains the delay by claiming that Nagumo decided to wait until 5 April, as that was Easter Sunday, and he hoped to catch the British in port for the holiday.22 Other sources note that between 11 and 16 March, Shokaku and Zuikaku made an unplanned sortie to search for a US carrier task
CMJ collection force thought to be approaching Japan, and Operation C gets underway, 26 March 1942: Akagi leaves Staring Bay, to be followed by Soryu, Hiryu, the they did not rejoin the battleships Hiei, Kongo, Kirishima and Haruna, then carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku. Note that Akagi and Hiryu have portside bridge structures. First Air Fleet at Staring Bay, off Kendari on the island now known as force found radar-deficient Nagumo during the night, Sulawesi (then Celebes), until 24 March.23 Nagumo set he could launch a torpedo aircraft strike with a fair sail on Operation C from there on 26 March but it is prospect of inflicting damage. Until last light on 31 March, not clear if that was the originally planned date, or he kept well to the west, out of range of Nagumo’s search if it represented a postponement for either of the aircraft, and then headed straight for the anticipated aforementioned reasons. Japanese launch point, which he reached at 0230 hours. At 1600 hours on 4 April, Birchall and his crew Not finding Nagumo during the night of 31 March/ sighted the First Air Fleet 360 miles from Dondra Head, 1 April, the admiral withdrew southwestward to remain the southernmost point in Ceylon, bearing 155 degrees out of range of his opponent’s daylight searches on from Ceylon.24 As noted earlier, they had just arrived 1 April, in case the Japanese appeared on the scene in Ceylon on 2 April. They were given 24 hours to rest unexpectedly. He then headed back toward Nagumo’s after their 10-day trip from Sullom Voe, but then, before anticipated launch point during the night of 1/2 April, being given any opportunity to familiarize themselves and withdrew again before daylight on 2 April. At with their new operational area, they were ordered to last light on 2 April, the third night, he again started join the search for Nagumo. They took off from Lake searching to the east. Koggala, the Catalina base on the south coast of Ceylon, before dawn on 4 April, and they were scheduled By 2100 hours on 2 April, having seen no sign to return after dawn on 5 April. of the Japanese after three days, Somerville decided that their attack had likely been cancelled. He could Birchall arrived in his patrol area just as the sun not keep his fleet at sea much longer in any case, as rose. Hour after hour, the Catalina flew 150 mile-long his four R-class battleships could not produce enough east-west lines, spaced 50 miles apart, at an altitude fresh water for their boilers for more than a very of 2000 feet over the water. While they were flying few days. He therefore led the fleet to Addu Atoll the last assigned leg, Birchall’s navigator, Warrant to replenish, partly because most of his auxiliary vessels Officer Onyette, the only other Canadian aboard, pointed had already been sent there, and partly to stay out that if they flew an extra leg, he could confirm clear of Colombo, in case the Japanese belatedly their actual position by using the moon, which was appeared there after all. However, then rising. Since they were required he had to send Cornwall and Dorsetshire to remain airborne until after dawn “Fortunately, to Colombo, the former to escort a the next day in any case, Birchall troop convoy, and the latter to resume the small RCAF agreed.25 a refit. He also sent Hermes and contingent was Vampire to Trincomalee, to resume Birchall’s crew had been assigned starting to arrive, preparations for the upcoming occu- the southernmost search sector. And pation of Vichy French-controlled in the proverbial just as they were completing this Madagascar, code-named Operation nick of time.” extra leg and were at the southernmost Ironclad.21 point in their search, ships appeared
68 Canadian Military Journal ● Winter 2006-2007 on the southern horizon. another started, and the aircraft began to break up. Due “‘We were halfway If the Japanese had to our low altitude it was impossible to bail out, but I got through our required been any further to the the aircraft down on the water before the tail fell off.”26 south, or if the Catalina third transmission crew had not flown the The one-sided fight lasted just seven minutes. when a shell extra leg, they almost Stupidly, the Zeros strafed and sank the Catalina after HISTORY destroyed our certainly would have it alighted, possibly forfeiting an opportunity for it to be escaped detection until boarded and searched for items of intelligence interest. wireless equipment their aircraft arrived The strafing also killed two wounded survivors floating and seriously over Colombo the next in their life jackets, when they were about to be captured injured the morning. What follows and could also have been interrogated. The destroyer Leonard is Birchall’s Isokaze picked up the six surviving crewmembers. operator...’” own account of what happened next: The Japanese wished to know if the crew had transmitted a sighting report, but could think of no more “As we got close enough to identify the lead ships sophisticated way of learning this then by administering we knew at once what we were into but the closer we repeated beatings. The airmen stuck to their story that got the more ships appeared and so it was necessary to they had not had time to use the radio before being keep going until we could count and identify them all. shot down, but then the Japanese intercepted a message By the time we did this there was very little chance left.” from Colombo asking the Catalina to repeat its report. This sigint success, apparently the only one the Japanese The Catalina was then attacked by up to 12 Zeros. enjoyed during Operation C, led them to conclude that they had lost the element of surprise – and prompted “All we could do was to put the nose down and go full them to beat the Catalina crew again.27 out, about 150 knots. We immediately coded a message and started transmission ...We were halfway through our The element of surprise had indeed been lost. Birchall’s required third transmission when a shell destroyed our message galvanized the British commanders. Colombo’s wireless equipment and seriously injured the operator; we garrison and the RAF units on the island were ordered were now under constant attack. Shells set fire to our to stand-to from 0300 hours the next morning, and the internal tanks. We managed to get the fire out and then harbour was cleared of warships and merchant vessels. CMJ collection
RCAF ground crew from No. 413 Squadron service a Consolidated Catalina flying boat in Ceylon during the spring of 1943.
Winter 2006-2007 ● Canadian Military Journal 69 Despite Birchall’s warning almost 16 hours before, most of the defending fighters were still on the ground, with some pilots stood down for breakfast, when the Japanese arrived shortly before 0800 hours. The 30 Squadron on-line history claims that the local fighter controllers, under- estimating the range of the Zero, did not expect an attack that morning, but the First Air Fleet was only 360 miles off the island when sighted by Birchall. Even if the Zeros were as short-legged as the British supposed, Nagumo could easily have moved to a position from which they could reach Colombo early on 5 April. The on-line history also claims that the Colombo DND photo radar was unmanned and/or A Catalina of an unidentified RCAF squadron. down for routine maintenance at the time. In fact, it had not even been set up yet. About 60 vessels had been sent out of harm’s way At about the same time that 413 Squadron had been following the 28 March sigint warning, and another 25 were ordered to move to Ceylon, the Royal Air Force rushed dispatched now, including Cornwall and Dorsetshire. eight air surveillance radar sets to the island. One was Two destroyers, a submarine, a submarine depot ship, operational at Trincomalee before the Japanese arrived, but an armed merchant cruiser, and 21 merchant ships the one deployed to Colombo was not.31 were unfit for sea, and they remained in the harbour.28 Instead of the tactical advantage of having the Somerville was now badly out of position, having defending fighters awaiting the Japanese from above, it just entered Addu Atoll. As he recorded it, “Damn and was now the Japanese who held the advantage of height. blast it looks as if I’ve been had...here I am miles And the defenders suffered accordingly. Almost half away and unable to strike.”29 Ultimately, the admiral the defending force – four Fulmars and 15 Hurricanes – was sailed with Force A just as soon as it finished replenishing, shot down, as were six Fairey Swordfish torpedo aircraft which was not until midnight, and steered straight for the of 788 Squadron, which arrived on the scene from Japanese. Force B followed about eight hours later. Trincomalee. In fact, the Swordfish, certain that any fighters over Colombo must be friendly, flashed recognition Japanese carrier task forces used the floatplanes of their signals to identify themselves as British as the Zeros escorting battleships and cruisers for reconnaissance and approached. The attackers also sank an old destroyer anti-submarine patrols, partly in order not to reduce the and an armed merchant cruiser, damaged a few other number of carrier aircraft available for offensive ships, and battered various shore installations. Only operations. Accordingly, at first light on 5 April, several seven Japanese aircraft were lost, but another 15 were floatplanes were launched to search the surrounding seas. damaged. Ten Bristol Blenheim light bombers of A short time later, the carriers dispatched 127 aircraft 11 Squadron took off from Ratmalana at 0830 hours to attack Colombo. Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, who to attack the Japanese fleet, but failed to locate it.32 had led the strike on Pearl Harbor, led the strike force. The defenders of Colombo were not the only ones Colombo was defended by 42 fighter aircraft. Stationed to be affected by underestimation of Japanese capabilities. at Ratmalana airfield were 30 Squadron, with 22 Hurricanes, In response to Birchall’s sighting report, Cornwall and 803 and 806 Squadrons, with just six Fulmars between and Dorsetshire left Colombo at 2200 hours on 4 April, them. 258 Squadron, with 14 Hurricanes, was located at but instead of being sent to the west, to get well out the local racetrack, using an improvised strip, of which the of range of Nagumo’s aircraft, they were sent to the Japanese were ignorant. Several of the pilots were southwest, toward Addu Atoll. Captain Agar, VC, of Canadians. Colombo was also defended by 18 heavy and the Dorsetshire was the Senior Officer Afloat. During the 25 light anti-aircraft guns, and Ratmalana by four heavy night, he received orders from Somerville to join and 12 light anti-aircraft guns.30 Force A, and, accordingly, altered course to almost
70 Canadian Military Journal ● Winter 2006-2007 due south at 0700, which kept him Somerville] would have been placed within range of Nagumo that much “The defenders even further to the west.”34 longer.33 of Colombo were A certain lack of enterprise on the not the only ones A floatplane from Tone sighted part of the Japanese scouting aircraft the British cruisers at 1200 hours. to be affected must also be acknowledged. It apparently HISTORY Nagumo promptly dispatched 88 Aichi by underestimation never occurred to their crews that the D3A Val dive bombers, which began cruisers may have been heading for a of Japanese their attack at 1338 hours. By 1355, rendezvous with other British ships. in a remarkable display of bombing capabilities.” So far as is known, the floatplanes efficiency, Dorsetshire and Cornwall that found Agar’s ships concentrated were both sunk. on maintaining contact with them, instead of searching farther down their apparent track. Somerville Birchall’s sighting report had arrived in time was very fortunate that this was the case, as Force A was to prevent the loss of these valuable ships, but poor only 84 miles from the cruisers when the Vals began intelligence on Japanese aircraft performance led to their attack. This distance is precisely known, since their being risked too close to Nagumo’s force. To quote the Vals were detected on Warspite’s radar.35 In contrast, Captain Agar, two months later, a group of US Navy dive bombers showed no such lack of enterprise when they came “One point which had escaped the notice of upon a Japanese destroyer proceeding independently everyone...was the range and performance of the on an unknown mission. Altering course to search Japanese naval aircraft...[W]e gave them the same along the destroyer’s track, they found and sank performance as our own, but it later transpired that the carriers Akagi and Kaga, turning the Battle of we had sadly underrated them. Actually, they had Midway into a great American victory. What is in a nearly double our performance. It is not surprising name, you say? Appropriately enough, they were from therefore that when next day [5 April] we sighted the USS Enterprise.36 first Japanese ‘shadower’ on the horizon astern, we had no idea at the time that they could possibly reach By sunset on 5 April, Somerville was in a surprisingly out so far, otherwise the R/V [the rendezvous with favourable position, despite the unnecessary loss of his heavy cruisers. He had closed to within 200 miles of Nagumo during the afternoon, but instead of being destroyed by his more powerful opponent, he remained undetected. There was now every prospect that he could launch a night torpedo attack with his Albacores. As Japanese carrier air- craft did not operate at night, their task force would be defended only by anti-aircraft guns, and would not be able to launch a retaliatory strike until first light, by which time Somerville could be out of range.
Unfortunately, Somerville did not receive accurate intel-
Data by ESRI Corp. 2007. Cartography by C.E. (Terry) Warner Data by ESRI Corp. 2007. Cartography C.E. (Terry) ligence on Nagumo’s movements. Following Map – Japanese Raid on Ceylon Birchall’s sighting
Winter 2006-2007 ● Canadian Military Journal 71 report on 4 April, which apparently did not indicate If the five Japanese vessels in fact were steering how many carriers Nagumo possessed, other Catalinas to the northwest at 1600 hours, it was only a brief were dispatched to regain contact, and, starting at alteration from their mean course. When Somerville 0700 hours the following morning, Somerville launched altered course to the northwest, Nagumo was actually air searches ahead of Force A. Numerous sightings were steering southeast, and he was soon beyond reach.39 made, but the reports were incomplete, contradictory, often late, and, in some respects, just plain wrong. This is easily Admiral Somerville continued to search for Nagumo understood when one remembers that the search aircraft were to the southwest of Ceylon until he re-entered Addu highly vulnerable to the defending Zeros, which shot down Atoll on 8 April. After a conference there with his senior an RAF Catalina in the morning and an Albacore from officers, among them the rescued captains of Cornwall Indomitable in the afternoon.37 Consider this account from and Dorsetshire, Somerville finally realized how seriously the second pilot of a RAF Catalina that found Nagumo on the outmatched he was. It was now clear that his fighters morning of 5 April: would not be able to ward off large-scale attacks like the one that sank his heavy cruisers, that the R-class “We invented on the spur of the moment an obvious battleships were liabilities, and that Colombo, Trincomalee, tactic for survival. We flew at wave-slapping height and Addu Atoll were not secure bases. He therefore sent and then, with all the crew placed at vantage points for Force B to the east coast of Africa, where it could protect look out, pulled briefly up to 100 feet. If no Japanese the sea route to the Middle East, and personally led masts broke the horizon we went down to nought feet Force A to Bombay.40 The Eastern Fleet did not move again and flew on to where the distant horizon had been. back to Ceylon until September 1943. Here we repeated the exercise. In this way we successfully shadowed the Japanese, never, after the initial identification, What Then Transpired seeing more than the tops of their masts...”38 he rest of Operation C can be described quickly. The upshot was that Somerville had great difficulty T Admiral Nagumo remained beyond Catalina finding Nagumo. Finally, at 1817 hours, he was advised range, swung around to the east of Ceylon, and attacked that five Japanese vessels sighted about 120 miles away, two Trincomalee on 9 April 1942. Events there mirrored those of them carriers, were steering to the northwest. Somerville at Colombo in several ways. Nagumo’s force was immediately altered course to northwest himself, to keep sighted at 1517 hours on 8 April by an RAF Catalina. within striking distance. Receiving no further reports, All seaworthy vessels in Trincomalee harbour, including he maintained this course through the night, with Hermes, were ordered to sail. No further contact with radar-equipped Albacores searching to the north and the Japanese was made until 0706 hours the next day, northeast, but they found nothing. when the radar station at Trincomalee detected aircraft approaching at a range of 91 miles. The defending fighters were scrambled in good time, but there were only 23 of them – 17 Hurricanes and 6 Fulmars – against 132 Japanese aircraft. Together with the anti-aircraft guns they managed to shoot down only four of the attackers, and the defences lost eight Hurricanes and a Fulmar. Both the RAF station and the docks were heavily bombed, the monitor Erebus was damaged, and a merchant ship was set ablaze.41
Overall, the raid on Trincomalee produced disap- pointing results for the Japanese, but just after it ended, a floatplane from Haruna sighted Hermes and its sole escort, Vampire. The 80 Vals on standby
Photo courtesy of Bill Whalan readiness aboard the Japanese carriers were promptly dis- RCAF pilots serving with the RAF’s 30 Squadron in April 1942. All seven survived the 5 April attack on Colombo. patched, and they arrived over
72 Canadian Military Journal ● Winter 2006-2007 the two British ships at 1035 hours. The claim that Birchall prevented By 1055 hours, both of them were “Just before Japanese a second Pearl Harbor is closer to the sunk, and the Vals that still had bombers arrived truth, even though the bulk of the bombs attacked other ships nearby, Eastern Fleet, the main Japanese target, over the British carrier, sinking the corvette Hollyhock, the was at Addu Atoll, and not Colombo. naval auxiliary Athelstone, the tanker British bombers, His sighting report permitted Cornwall HISTORY British Sergeant, and the cargo ship in turn, arrived over and Dorsetshire to sortie before the Norviken. Four Vals were shot down attack, but miscalculation and under- a Japanese carrier.” by Fulmars, which arrived after estimation of Japanese aircraft performance Hermes sank. Two of the Fulmars were led to their loss all the same. The also lost.42 same problems, and the lack of radar, led to most of the fighters defending Colombo being caught on the ground. Just before Japanese bombers arrived over the British carrier, British bombers, in turn, arrived over His warning did allow 25 merchant ships to flee a Japanese carrier. Nine unescorted 11 Squadron Colombo harbour and to get clean away. It also Blenheims attacked Akagi at 1025 hours. No Japanese permitted Somerville to leave Addu Atoll eight hours lookout sighted the Blenheims until they dropped before Colombo was attacked, giving him a chance to their bombs. This was the first time any ship of the launch an air attack on Nagumo during the night of First Air Fleet had been attacked since the war began. 5-6 April. But just as night fell, a false report sent him A few near misses were scored, but no hits, and four haring off in the wrong direction. of the attacking Blenheims, a notoriously frail aircraft, were shot down. The remaining five got away, but It is often asserted that it was Churchill who dubbed then had the misfortune to meet Zeros returning Birchall the ‘Saviour of Ceylon,’ but this appears not from the strike on Hermes. Another Blenheim was to be the case. The Official History of the RCAF, Volume 3, shot down, but the Blenheim force managed to shoot down an authoritative source, acknowledges that this label two of the Zeros.43 was bestowed by the Canadian press.49 However, Churchill did say that Birchall “made one of the most important Another 413 Squadron aircraft was lost on 9 April. single contributions to victory,” but this was in 1946,50 This was the Catalina of RAF Flight Lieutenant Thomas, when the British still thought they had destroyed which sighted the Japanese at about 0716 hours. Its more than 50 of Nagumo’s aircraft, and that Japan sighting report faded before being completely received had contemplated invasion. He did not repeat this and it was presumed, correctly as it materialized, compliment when he discussed Operation C in his war that it had been shot down. There were no survivors.44 memoirs, penned circa 1950. Indeed, Birchall was not even named, and his aircraft was described simply Admiral Nagumo then headed for Japan as soon as “a Catalina.”51 as he recovered the aircraft from the Hermes strike. During Operation C, he had destroyed an aircraft carrier, This article is not an attempt to put forward a two heavy cruisers, two destroyers, one corvette, and revisionist view of Birchall’s actions on 4 April 1942. five other vessels, and had shot down 45 aircraft. A He did everything he is said to have done, and he certainly separate squadron, with the light carrier Ryujo and deserves all the recognition he has received. However, several cruisers, sank 21 merchant ships during a it is argued here only that his sighting report did not concurrent foray into the Bay of Bengal, and the six result in Ceylon being saved. Strictly speaking, it is submarines deployed for the operation sank five more.45 therefore not historically accurate to call him the ‘Saviour The Japanese lost just 17 aircraft, and no Japanese ship was of Ceylon,’ – but, in my view, we should do so all the even damaged. same. Monickers defy logic. Perhaps he should have a nickname that recalls his three-and-a-half years of Conclusions sustained courage and leadership as the senior Allied officer in several brutal Japanese prison camps, for which aving surveyed Operation C, let us now reconsider he was awarded a rare Gallantry category of the Order H the impact of Birchall’s discovery of Admiral Nagumo’s of the British Empire, rather than for his single day of force on 4 April 1942. 413 Squadron’s on-line history46 Pacific combat, for which he received the Distinguished says Birchall “is credited with saving the island,” and a Sri Flying Cross. Asking his many admirers, among whom Lankan writer claims that [5 April 1942] was “the day Ceylon the current author counts himself, to instead refer to escaped Japanese occupation.”47 Leslie Robert’s history of him as ‘Hero of Ceylon,’ or some other more narrowly the RCAF, There Shall be Wings, claims: “A single Canadian accurate but bland nickname, would be as unappealing Catalina and its crew... averted a second Pearl Harbor.”48 as it would be futile. Leonard Birchall should be remembered for his heroism, and there is no doubt that he will always It is simply not true that Birchall saved Ceylon be the ‘Saviour of Ceylon’ in the eyes of most people who from occupation, for the straightforward reason that the knew him or of him. Japanese had no intention of invading it at that time. As we have seen, Operation C was just a raid.
Winter 2006-2007 ● Canadian Military Journal 73 NOTES
1. David A. Thomas, Japan’s War at Sea: Pearl 8. John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded: The Society, June 2005, at
74 Canadian Military Journal ● Winter 2006-2007