WIDESPREAD ONSLAUGHT Dec1941 in Singapore Had Been Ordered Back to Them at Once
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PART 11 SOUTH-EAST ASIA CONQUERED CHAPTER 7 WIDESPREAD ONSLAUGH T EWS of an increasingly strong concentration of Japanese sea, land N and air forces in southern Indo-China and the South China Sea wa s received by Air Chief Marshal Brooke-Popham during November . A tele- gram from the British War Office gave warning that the Washington negotiations might collapse at any moment, and that Japan might be expected then to attack Thailand, the Netherlands East Indies, or th e Philippines. Aircraft, believed to be Japanese, flew over Malaya so fas t and so high that they escaped identification . Because of a report from Saigon that the Japanese intended landing troops in southern Thailand on 1st December, Air Headquarters was warned on 29th November to be ready to support Operation MATADO R at twelve hours' notice. Additional air forces were moved into north Malaya,l and daily air reconnaissances were carried out, though with th e stipulation that there must be no attack on any convoy thus located .2 Degrees of readiness of the forces generally were stepped up, and relief which had been proposed of the 22nd Australian Brigade in the Mersin g area by the 27th Brigade was indefinitely postponed . Late in November General Percival visited Sarawak . He was impressed by the fact that this part of Borneo was nearly as large as England, an d there were large Japanese-owned rubber plantations near the airfield seven miles south of its capital, Kuching ; yet the forces comprised only one Indian battalion (the 2/15th Punjab) to supplement partially-trained an d poorly-equipped local forces . Obviously there was little hope of holding Sarawak against serious attack ; but resistance might make the enemy use a greater force than otherwise would be necessary. Listening to radio news on 29th November, Percival heard that all troops away from barrack s , On 8th December, after certain moves by detachments had taken place in the early morning , the Air Force in Malaya was located as follows : Singapore Islan d Base Unit Type No . Seletar No . 36 (TB) Sqn RAF Vildebeeste 6 No. 100 (TB) Sqn RAF Vildebeeste 12 No . 205 (FB) Sqn RAF Catalina 3 Tengah No . 34 (B) Sqn RAF Blenheim IV 16 Sembawang No . 453 (F) Sqn RAAF Buffalo 1 6 Kallang No . 243 (F) Sqn RAF Buffalo 30 No. 488 (F) Sqn RNZA F Northern Malay a Sungei Patani No . 21 (F) Sqn RAAF Buffalo 1 2 No. 27 (NF) Sqn RAF Blenheim I 1 2 Kota Bharu No. 1 (GR) Sqn RAAF Hudson 1 2 Det No . 243 (F) Sqn RAF Buffalo 2 Gong Kedah Det No . 36 (TB) Sqn RAF Vildebeeste 6 Kuantan No. 8 (GR) Sqn RAAF Hudsons 1 2 No. 60 (B) Sqn RAF Blenheim 8 Alor Star No . 62 (B) Sqn RAF Blenheim I 1 1 158 There were also 3 Catalinas manned by Dutch crews on Singapore Island, making a total of 161 first-line aircraft in Malaya on the outbreak of war. • Rumours to the effect that Thailand was the objective had been spread by the Japanese to conceal their real intentions . 122 WIDESPREAD ONSLAUGHT Dec1941 in Singapore had been ordered back to them at once . Returning with all speed aboard a destroyer, he found on arrival on 1st December tha t Brooke-Popham had ordered the second degree of readiness, and th e Volunteers were being mobilised . Soon troops were recalled from leave and other precautions were taken, including the rounding up of Japanes e civilians. Admiral Phillips,3 who had flown from Colombo to Singapore in advanc e of Prince of Wales and Repulse and taken up duty as Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet (leaving local naval defence to Vice-Admiral Layton 4 ) flew on 4th December to confer at Manila with the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Thomas C . Hart. The conference was ended abruptly by news that a large Japanese convoy was on its way from Camranh Bay towards the Gulf of Siam . As Phillips was leaving for Singapore because of this situation, Hart told him that he had just ordered four of his destroyers, then at Balikpapan (Borneo), to joi n Phillips' force . Authority to order MATADOR in certain contingencies without referenc e to the War Office reached Brooke-Popham on 5th December, in con - sequence of the previously mentioned assurance of American armed sup - port if Britain found it necessary either to forestall a Japanese landin g in the Kra Isthmus, or in certain other circumstances . The contingencies specified to Brooke-Popham for instituting operation MATADOR were: (a) If he had information that a Japanese expedition was advancing with th e apparent intention of landing on the Kra Isthmus ; or (b) If the Japanese violated any other part of Thailand . It had, however, been impressed on him only a few days before b y the British Chiefs of Staff that such an operation, if the Japanese intende d to land in southern Thailand, would almost certainly mean war with Japan . He therefore considered it his duty to be scrupulously careful in actin g on the telegram. Also on 5th December, Repulse had left Singapore at slow speed, pre- ceded by three Vildebeeste planes as an anti-submarine patrol, and screened by the destroyers Tenedos and Vampire (the latter a vessel of the Royal Australian Navy which had been refitting at Singapore) for Darwin .6 In Australia that day, Cabinet decided at a special meeting to cancel army leave, and authorised Australian participation in the provisional plans fo r cooperation with the United States and the Netherlands Indies . Soon after midday on 6th December6 a Hudson of No. 1 Squadron R.A.A.F., operating from Kota Bharu reported three transports with a • Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, KCB ; RN. Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty and Vice-Chief of Naval Staff 1939-41 ; C-in-C Eastern Fleet 1941 . B . 19 Feb 1888 . Killed in action 10 Dec 1941 . 4 The appointment of Commander-in-Chief, China Station, held by Layton, lapsed at the outbrea k of war with Japan, the Admiralty having decided to merge the command of the China Station with that of the Eastern Fleet . L Concerned about the exposed position of Repulse and Prince of Wales, the British Admiralty had cabled on 1st December to Phillips suggesting that they be sent away from Singapore . Prince of Wales, however, required a few days at Singapore to repair defects before putting t o sea again. •Malayan time (2 hours 40 minutes behind Australian Eastern time) . Local times are used in this and succeeding chapters . 6-7 Dec TRANSPORTS SIGHTED 123 cruiser as escort about 80 miles south of Cape Cambodia, steering north- west. This report was followed by two other sightings, the first considerabl y farther east, of twenty-two transports with a heavy escort of cruisers an d destroyers steering west ; and the second, similarly constituted, but slightly south, which might either have been the same convoy or another steering a parallel course . As one of the Hudsons on reconnaissance was chase d by an enemy plane, it was apparent that the Japanese knew they had bee n seen. However, the air force was under orders not to attack owing t o Brooke-Popham's anxiety lest, by holding out a bait, the Japanese migh t provoke the first blow, and make the British appear the aggressors . Had the main group of Japanese vessels continued its observed course, it woul d have reached the Kra Isthmus, a narrow neck of land joining Thailand to Malaya. Did this clearly indicate an attack on Thailand—so clearly tha t Brooke-Popham could set MATADOR in motion—or would the expeditio n attack Malaya ? In this grave situation, Brooke-Popham consulted Layton and Phillips ' Chief of Staff, Rear-Admiral Palliser .? They concluded that probably th e expedition would follow the course of the vessels first observed, and anchor at Koh Rong on the west coast of Indo-China . No word had been received of an actual breakdown of the Washington talks, and this Japanese mov e might be but another step towards, yet not into, Thailand, in the war o f nerves in which Japan was engaged . Brooke-Popham decided that he woul d not be justified in ordering MATADOR but he gave instructions that all forces bring themselves to the highest degree of readiness, and that air contact with the expedition be maintained. Battle stations were accordingly taken up. Though time to move forces into Thailand before an enemy could fore - stall them was the essence of Operation MATADOR, attempts to maintain contact with the Japanese ships had meanwhile failed. One Catalina flying- boat sent to take over the search in the early part of the night returned to Singapore at 8 a.m. on the 7th without having seen anything of th e enemy convoys because of bad weather ; another, dispatched at 2 a .m. on 7th December, failed either to report contact or return to base . The reconnaissance plan for 7th December provided for a cover b y British, Australian, and Dutch aircraft of the more direct approaches to Singapore and the Mersing-Endau area, and a sweep into the Gulf of Siam . Vildebeestes were dispatched to maintain the anti-submarine patrol ahea d of Repulse, which had been recalled from its intended voyage to Australia . Because of bad weather the aircraft which were to make the sweep int o the Gulf of Siam did not take off until 6.45 a.m. Two of them, which ha d encountered rain, low clouds and bad visibility, returned shortly afterwards , and the third sighted nothing.