DOCSLIB.ORG

Abdacom: America’S First Coalition Experience in World War Ii

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Abdacom: America’S First Coalition Experience in World War Ii ABDACOM: AMERICA’S FIRST COALITION EXPERIENCE IN WORLD WAR II by JEFFREY C. NELSON B.A., Humboldt State University, 1994 A THESIS submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF ARTS Department of History College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2012 Approved by: Major Professor David Graff Copyright JEFFREY C. NELSON 2012 Abstract On December 7, 1941 the Japanese Empire launched a surprise attack on the United States at the Pearl Harbor naval base in the territory of Hawaii. The following day President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared war on Japan, and America was suddenly an active participant in a global war that had already been underway for over five years. World War II pitted the Axis (Japan, Germany, and Italy) against a coalition of allied nations that were united primarily by fear of Axis totalitarianism. Typically referred to as the Allies, the alliance’s most powerful participants included the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. However, many other nations were involved on the Allied side. Smaller European countries such as Holland, Belgium, and Poland fought with armed forces and governments in exile located in London after their homelands had been overrun by the Germans in 1939 and 1940. China had been at war with Japan since 1937. After the United States entered the war, allied action resulted in the creation of different, localized military coalitions between 1941 and 1945. These coalitions presented Allied leaders with unique problems created by the political, geographic, military and logistical issues of fighting war on a global scale. The earliest coalition in which the United States was involved was known by the acronym ABDACOM, short for the American, British, Dutch, Australian Command. ABDACOM’s mission was the defense of the Malay Barrier, which stretched from the Malay Peninsula through the Dutch East Indies to New Guinea, and the protection of the Southwest Pacific Area from Japanese invasion. In its brief two-month existence the ADBA coalition in the Southwest Pacific Area failed to prevent the Japanese from taking the Malay Barrier, Singapore, Burma and the islands between Java and the Philippines. This was due not to one overriding problem, but to a combination of planning, command, and logistical problems, compounded by the distance of Allied production and training centers from the front lines. These problems can be traced from the late 1930s to the dissolution of ABDACOM at the end of February 1942. Historians have often overlooked the underlying causes of the United States’ first foray into coalition warfare in World War II. To better understand why the Allied forces succumbed to the Japanese onslaught so quickly, one must look at political, military and economic relations between the United States and its allies prior to the onset of hostilities in 1941. Domestic political realities combined with international diplomatic differences kept the United States from openly preparing for coalition action until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The ensuing military coalition suffered from numerous deficiencies in command structure and logistics. Though pre-war planning existed within each of the Allied governments, the lack of cooperative action gave the Japanese military an insurmountable military advantage over the members of the ABDA coalition. Given the limited scope of this paper the focus will be on American participation in ABDACOM. The other countries involved will be included insomuch as they help to fill out the story of the United States and its first coalition effort in World War II. The story of the ABDACOM coalition is one of perseverance, creative planning, and deep stoicism in the face of overwhelming odds. The short life of the coalition gave planners in Washington, D.C. and London time to sort out potential conflicts between the Allies. Table of Contents List of Figures............................................................................................................................... vii Acknowledgements........................................................................................................................ ix Dedication...................................................................................................................................... xi Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER 1 - Policy and Strategy in the Pacific......................................................................... 14 Western Pacific Geopolitical Landscape .................................................................................. 14 American War Plans: Plan Orange ........................................................................................... 22 American War Plans: Plan Dog................................................................................................ 25 American War Plans: ABC-1 and Rainbow 5 .......................................................................... 30 CHAPTER 2 - Coalition ............................................................................................................... 36 The Birth of ABDACOM ......................................................................................................... 36 Missing Links in the Chain of Command................................................................................. 41 Too Many Chefs Spoil the Pot.................................................................................................. 47 The Problems of Babel ............................................................................................................. 53 CHAPTER 3 - ABDA Logistics................................................................................................... 66 Relocate .................................................................................................................................... 67 Replace...................................................................................................................................... 72 Repair........................................................................................................................................ 78 CHAPTER 4 - Conclusion............................................................................................................ 81 Political Unity........................................................................................................................... 82 Command Clarity...................................................................................................................... 85 v Logistics.................................................................................................................................... 87 The Final Movement................................................................................................................. 89 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 92 Appendix A - ABDACOM Organization ..................................................................................... 96 vi List of Figures Figure 1. Map of the ABDACOM Theater Showing the Subcommand Areas. ............................. 1 Figure 2. Map of Sunda Strait and Banten Bay. ............................................................................. 3 Figure 3. Chain of Command Table for ABDACOM. January-February 1942. .......................... 46 Figure 4. Japanese Invasion Routes in the Southwest Pacific Theater......................................... 57 Figure 5. Japanese Attacks Along the Malay Barrier. .................................................................. 69 vii Acronyms List ABC-1 American, British, Canadian planning conference, 1941 ABDA American, British, Dutch, Australian Coalition members ABDACOM ABDA command ABDAAIR ABDA air force command ABDAFLOAT ABDA naval command ABDAGROUND ABDA ground force command CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff (U.S./U.K.) FDR Franklin Delano Roosevelt HMS His Majesty’s Ship HMAS His Majesty’s Australian Ship JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.) N.E.I. Netherlands East Indies R.A.F Royal Air Force R.A.A.F. Royal Australian Air Force RNN Royal Netherlands Navy USS United States Ship viii Acknowledgements This work would not have been possible without the support of a great number of people. Most important was the support of my wife Shigeko and my parents Tom and Mary Nelson. The members of my thesis committee Dr. Mark Parillo, Dr. Michael Krysko and Dr. David Graff were constant sources of support and guidance. They were patient with my conceptual struggles and provided much appreciated input whenever I had questions or problems. Dr. Mike Ramsay was always there to show me how to look at a problem from a new angle. The entire Department of History at Kansas State University was always ready to give a helping hand, offer a new idea or encouraging word, and most importantly, provide me with the direction needed to give focus to the vague topic I brought to the program three years ago. The archival staff at the Eisenhower Presidential Library was most helpful in my search of their archival materials. Kevin Bailey was particularly adept at suggesting useful documents to further my research. The Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library has a very useful digital archive that saved countless hours of
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Ellis, Edmund D
    DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER LIBRARY ABILENE, KANSAS ELLIS, EDMUND: Material re U. S. Military Academy Class of 1915, 1949-82 Accessions 71-15, 72-13, 74-17, 76-11, 76-11/1, 77-5, 78-15, 79-8, 80-10, 81-11, 82-8, 82-8/1 Processed by: EB, TB Date completed: February 1992 This collection was received from Edmund Ellis in several shipments between 1971 and 1982. No restrictions were placed on the material. Linear feet of shelf space occupied: .4 Approximate number of pages: 250 Approximate number of items: 50 SCOPE AND CONTENT NOTE Colonel Edmund Ellis was a member of the U.S. Military Academy Class of 1915. This class included Henry Aurand, Omar Bradley, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John Leonard, Henry Sayler, James Van Fleet, and a number of other famous generals. Ellis served as class secretary for many years and compiled periodic news letters which contained information about the members of the class and their families. Copies of the news letters were distributed to surviving classmates and spouses. In 1971 Ellis began donating copies of the newsletter to the Eisenhower Library. This collection contains the newsletters from 1971 to 1982 as well as some earlier printed material on the class and some memorabilia relating to West Point and class reunions. The newsletter was discontinued after 1982 due to the decline in the number of classmates. By 1991 Colonel Ellis and General Van Fleet were the only two surviving members of the class. Ellis, who was born in March 1890, became the oldest living graduate of West Point in October 1990.
    [Show full text]
  • Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group
    HISTORICAL MATERIALS IN THE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER LIBRARY OF INTEREST TO THE NAZI WAR CRIMES AND JAPANESE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT RECORDS INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library holds a large quantity of documentation relating to World War II and to the Cold War era. Information relating to war crimes committed by Nazi Germany and by the Japanese Government during World War II can be found widely scattered within the Library’s holdings. The Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group is mandated to identify, locate and, as necessary, declassify records pertaining to war crimes committed by Nazi Germany and Japan. In order to assist the Interagency Working Group in carrying out this mission, the Library staff endeavored to identify historical documentation within its holdings relating to this topic. The staff conducted its search as broadly and as thoroughly as staff time, resources, and intellectual control allowed and prepared this guide to assist interested members of the public in conducting research on documents relating generally to Nazi and Japanese war crimes. The search covered post- war references to such crimes, the use of individuals who may have been involved in such crimes for intelligence or other purposes, and the handling of captured enemy assets. Therefore, while much of the documentation described herein was originated during the years when the United States was involved in World War II (1939 to 1945) one marginal document originated prior to this period can be found and numerous post-war items are also covered, especially materials concerning United States handling of captured German and Japanese assets and correspondence relating to clemency for Japanese soldiers convicted and imprisoned for war crimes.
    [Show full text]
  • Aanspraak September 2016 English
    AanspraakAfdeling Verzetsdeelnemers en Oorlogsgetroffenen September 2016 Suddenly we were refugees with nowhere to go Lydia and Annie Aldewereld’s flight from the Nazis took them to the Dutch East Indies Contents Page 3 Speaking for your benefit. Page 4-7 Suddenly we were refugees with nowhere to go. Lydia and Annie Aldewereld’s flight from the Nazis took them to the Dutch East Indies. Page 8-10 Caught between two cultures. John Simons: They took my homeland from me and called it Indonesia. Page 11-14 I never saw them again. Henk Kleijn survived the Battle of the Java Sea and witnessed the atomic bomb on Nagasaki. Page 15 Questions and answers. No rights may be derived from this text. Translation: SVB, Amstelveen. Aanspraak - September 2016 - 2 Speaking for your benefit Increasingly, commemoration ceremonies tend It is even more to be regretted now that, after more to focus on passing stories on to the younger than 70 years, interest in the Second World War is generations. This year, for the first time during the growing among the younger generations. This is Remembrance Day Ceremony on Amsterdam’s important, not only because so many survivors and Dam Square, the young people who laid a wreath their direct descendants are still alive and deserving at the cenotaph told us who it was for and what had of respect, but also because, for the younger happened to that person during the war. At the generations, WW II is part of history and offers a National Indies Commemoration for the victims of framework for our present-day norms and values.
    [Show full text]
  • June 10, 1927, Minutes | UI Board of Trustees
    MEETING OF BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF TEE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS Jnne 10,1927 With Executive Committee Meetings June 14,21, and 29,1927 The June meeting of the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois was held at the Blackstone Hotel, in Chicago, at 9:30 a. m. on Friday, June 10, 1927. When the Board convened, the following members were present: President Trees, Mr. Barr, Mrs. Busey, Mrs. Evans, Mrs. Grigsby, Mrs. Ickes. President Kinley was present. MINUTES APPROVED The Secretary presented the minutes of the meeting of May 21, 1927. On motion of Mrs. Grigsby, the minutes were approved as printed on pages 269 to 281 above. 283 284 BOARD OF TRUSTEES [June 10 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING, JUNE 2. 1927 The Secretary presented for record the minutes of a meeting of the Executive Committee : A meeting of the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees of the Uni- versity of Illinois was held in the office of Mr. Merle J. Trees, 37 West Van Buren Street, Chicago, at 2:30 p. IIL on Thursday, June 2. 1927. Mr. Merle J. Trees, Chairman, Dr. W. L. Noble and President David Kiniey were present. INSURANCE ON MEDICAL AND DENTAL BUILDINGS President Kinley presented a report on the matter of insurance on the Medical and Dental Buildings which was referred to the Executive Committee by the Board of Trustees at the meeting of May 21, 1927. On motion of Dr. Noble the Comptroller's &on was approved and the con- tracts for insurance on the Chicago Building were confirmed, and the Comptroller was authorized to pay the premiums.
    [Show full text]
  • Victory Program
    WORLD WAR II’s REAL VICTORY PROGRAM Author: James Lacey Word Count: 8,219 It has long been an article of faith among World War II historians that then Major Albert Wedemeyer, a junior member of the Army’s War Plans Division, foresaw and laid out America’s mobilization and production effort during World War II. The basis of this claim lies in a fourteen page document, The Ultimate Requirements Study: Estimate of Army Ground Forces, which Wedemeyer completed in early September of 1941. The histories of World War II, which mention what became known as the “Victory Program,” generally focus on this as a document of remarkable prescience and the basis of most of America’s wartime strategic and mobilization planning. Ironically, such reviewers developed this opinion without ever reading the document. In fact, Wedemeyer’s “Victory Program” was wrong in nearly every particular.1 Moreover, its effect on mobilization or future war plans appears to have been virtually nil. In fact, one searches in vain for documents, memos, or letters produced during the war that reference Wedemeyer’s program.2 In modern terms, Wedemeyer’s version of the “Victory 1 An early copy of this document can be found in the Wedemeyer Papers, Box 76, Hoover Institute, Stanford University. It has been reprinted: Charles E. Kirkpatrick, An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941(Washington D.C., 1992). 2 There is not a single copy to be found in any of the records of the Office of Production Management, The War Production Board, or FDR’s War Files, nor is it mentioned in any of the early histories of these organizations or their successors.
    [Show full text]
  • World War II at Sea This Page Intentionally Left Blank World War II at Sea
    World War II at Sea This page intentionally left blank World War II at Sea AN ENCYCLOPEDIA Volume I: A–K Dr. Spencer C. Tucker Editor Dr. Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. Associate Editor Dr. Eric W. Osborne Assistant Editor Vincent P. O’Hara Assistant Editor Copyright 2012 by ABC-CLIO, LLC All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data World War II at sea : an encyclopedia / Spencer C. Tucker. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-59884-457-3 (hardcopy : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-59884-458-0 (ebook) 1. World War, 1939–1945—Naval operations— Encyclopedias. I. Tucker, Spencer, 1937– II. Title: World War Two at sea. D770.W66 2011 940.54'503—dc23 2011042142 ISBN: 978-1-59884-457-3 EISBN: 978-1-59884-458-0 15 14 13 12 11 1 2 3 4 5 This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America To Malcolm “Kip” Muir Jr., scholar, gifted teacher, and friend. This page intentionally left blank Contents About the Editor ix Editorial Advisory Board xi List of Entries xiii Preface xxiii Overview xxv Entries A–Z 1 Chronology of Principal Events of World War II at Sea 823 Glossary of World War II Naval Terms 831 Bibliography 839 List of Editors and Contributors 865 Categorical Index 877 Index 889 vii This page intentionally left blank About the Editor Spencer C.
    [Show full text]
  • The US Asiatic Fleet's Gray-Zone Deterrence Campaign Against Japan, 1937–40
    Naval War College Review Volume 72 Article 9 Number 3 Summer 2019 2019 “They Were Playing Chicken”—The .SU . Asiatic Fleet’s Gray-Zone Deterrence Campaign against Japan, 1937–40 Hunter Stires Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Stires, Hunter (2019) "“They eW re Playing Chicken”—The .SU . Asiatic Fleet’s Gray-Zone Deterrence Campaign against Japan, 1937–40," Naval War College Review: Vol. 72 : No. 3 , Article 9. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/9 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Stires: “They Were Playing Chicken”—The U.S. Asiatic Fleet’s Gray-Zone De “THEY WERE PLAYING CHICKEN” The U.S. Asiatic Fleet’s Gray-Zone Deterrence Campaign against Japan, 1937–40 Hunter Stires he United States is facing a significant strategic challenge to its interests, al- lies, and leadership of the liberal world order from an increasingly wealthy, Twell-armed, and assertively nationalistic China� Whether through the seizure of maritime features and the construction of artificial island fortifications in the South China Sea, the aggressive use of maritime law enforcement to articulate and impose its nationalistic territorial claims on its neighbors, or attempts to re- strict military and civilian freedom of navigation in international waters, Chinese forces are working to undermine and revise the political and geopolitical status quo in East Asia�1 These subtly assertive steps, which stop short of open warfare, constitute a category of activity known to contemporary military thinkers as gray-zone aggression�2 Current U�S� policy makers and the forces at their com- mand struggle to find effective countermeasures Hunter Stires is a fellow at the John B.
    [Show full text]
  • The Dutch Strategic and Operational Approach in the Indonesian War of Independence, 1945– 1949
    Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 46, Nr 2, 2018. doi: 10.5787/46-2-1237 THE DUTCH STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL APPROACH IN THE INDONESIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1945– 1949 Leopold Scholtz1 North-West University Abstract The Indonesian War of Independence (1945–1949) and the Dutch attempt to combat the insurgency campaign by the Indonesian nationalists provides an excellent case study of how not to conduct a counter-insurgency war. In this article, it is reasoned that the Dutch security strategic objective – a smokescreen of autonomy while keeping hold of political power – was unrealistic. Their military strategic approach was very deficient. They approached the war with a conventional war mind- set, thinking that if they could merely reoccupy the whole archipelago and take the nationalist leaders prisoner, that it would guarantee victory. They also mistreated the indigenous population badly, including several mass murders and other war crimes, and ensured that the population turned against them. There was little coordination between the civilian and military authorities. Two conventional mobile operations, while conducted professionally, actually enlarged the territory to be pacified and weakened the Dutch hold on the country. By early 1949, it was clear that the Dutch had lost the war, mainly because the Dutch made a series of crucial mistakes, such as not attempting to win the hearts and minds of the local population. In addition, the implacable opposition by the United States made their war effort futile. Keywords: Indonesian War of Independence, Netherlands, insurgency, counter- insurgency, police actions, strategy, operations, tactics, Dutch army Introduction Analyses of counter-insurgency operations mostly concentrate on the well- known conflicts – the French and Americans in Vietnam, the British in Malaya and Kenya, the French in Algeria, the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, the Ian Smith government in Rhodesia, the South Africans in Namibia, et cetera.
    [Show full text]
  • A Survey of Naval Communications
    THE EXCLUSIVE TO THE SERVICES RULES 1. The design must be capable of reproduction on paper, in wood or metal, or as a stencil. Design a new badge for NAAFI 2. Each entrant may submit up to three designs. FIRST PRIZE and win a prize in this Services-only £200 3. Competitors may prepare designs in pencil, Competition. crayon, ink or paint. 4. Entries will be judged on the following You are familiar with the present symbol qualities — (it is shown above) in which you will have (a) Shape; (6) Colour; (c) the incorpo­ £100 spotted the Navy, Army and Air Force ration of the letters NAAFI; (d) Motif. elements. NAAFI is looking for a new As a guide, the Shape should be bold, badge — one which will be suitable to recognisable at some distance, and likely SECOND PRIZE appear outside Clubs and Canteens, to to be easily remembered. serve as a direction board, and for all Colour; there is no restriction in the use of similar purposes. The competition is colours but entrants will no doubt bear in mind the Navy blue, Army scarlet and exclusively for all serving Sailors, Soldiers Royal Air Force blue as suggesting a i 5 0 and Airmen, and WRNS, ATS, and WAAF. suitable colour basis. Entries may also be submitted by men and NAAFI; the letters NAAFI (without full women of the three Services who will be on points) should be incorporated into the THIRD PRIZE demobilisation Release Leave on 31st design and be immediately readable. October, 1947. Motif; this should symbolise the NAAFI's service to the Royal Navy, Army and the THE CLOSING DATE FOR THE Royal Air Force.
    [Show full text]
  • Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
    Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Autumn 2002 AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE Inc. The Australian Naval Institute was formed and incorporated in the ACT in 1975. The main objectives of the Institute are: • to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession; and • to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession. The Institute is self-supporting and non-profit-making. Views and opinions expressed in the Institute's publications are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Institute or the Royal Australian Navy. The aim is to encourage discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters. The membership of the Institute is open to: • Regular Members. Regular membership is open to members of the RAN, RANR, RNZN, RNZNVR and persons who, having qualified for regular membership, subsequently leave the service. • Associate Members. Associate membership is open to people not qualified to be Regular Members, who profess an interest in the aims of the Institute. • Honorary Members. Honorary Membership is awarded to people who have made a distinguished contribution to the Navy, the maritime profession or the Institute. FRIENDS AND SUPPORTERS OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE The corporations listed below have demonstrated their support for the aims of the Australian Naval Institute by becoming Friends or Supporters of the Australian Naval Institute. The Institute is grateful for their assistance. LOPAC Raytheon SAAB Systems Thales Underwater Systems Journal of the Australian Naval Institute ISSN 0312-5807 Volume 28 Number 1 Autumn 2002 The Australian Naval Institute - PO Box 29 RED HILL ACT 2603 A.UN.
    [Show full text]
  • WIDESPREAD ONSLAUGHT Dec1941 in Singapore Had Been Ordered Back to Them at Once
    PART 11 SOUTH-EAST ASIA CONQUERED CHAPTER 7 WIDESPREAD ONSLAUGH T EWS of an increasingly strong concentration of Japanese sea, land N and air forces in southern Indo-China and the South China Sea wa s received by Air Chief Marshal Brooke-Popham during November . A tele- gram from the British War Office gave warning that the Washington negotiations might collapse at any moment, and that Japan might be expected then to attack Thailand, the Netherlands East Indies, or th e Philippines. Aircraft, believed to be Japanese, flew over Malaya so fas t and so high that they escaped identification . Because of a report from Saigon that the Japanese intended landing troops in southern Thailand on 1st December, Air Headquarters was warned on 29th November to be ready to support Operation MATADO R at twelve hours' notice. Additional air forces were moved into north Malaya,l and daily air reconnaissances were carried out, though with th e stipulation that there must be no attack on any convoy thus located .2 Degrees of readiness of the forces generally were stepped up, and relief which had been proposed of the 22nd Australian Brigade in the Mersin g area by the 27th Brigade was indefinitely postponed . Late in November General Percival visited Sarawak . He was impressed by the fact that this part of Borneo was nearly as large as England, an d there were large Japanese-owned rubber plantations near the airfield seven miles south of its capital, Kuching ; yet the forces comprised only one Indian battalion (the 2/15th Punjab) to supplement partially-trained an d poorly-equipped local forces .
    [Show full text]
  • List of United States Navy Losses in World War II
    List of United States Navy losses in World War II From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (Redirected from List of U.S. Navy losses in World War II) Jump to: navigation, search This article includes a list of references, but its sources remain unclear because it has insufficient inline citations. Please help to improve this article by introducing more precise citations. (August 2009) List of United States Navy and Coast Guard ships lost during World War II, from 31 October 1941 to 1 October 1945, sorted by type and name. See also List of ships of the United States Navy. Contents [hide] 1 Battleships 2 Aircraft carriers 3 Escort aircraft carriers 4 Heavy cruisers 5 Light cruisers 6 Destroyers 7 Destroyer escort vessels 8 Submarines 9 Minelayers 10 Minesweepers 11 Submarine chasers 12 Coast Guard vessels 13 Gunboats 14 Seaplane tenders 15 Motor torpedo boats 16 Tank landing ships 17 Medium landing ships 18 Tank landing craft 19 Infantry landing craft 20 Support landing craft 21 Tugs 22 Tankers 23 Troop transports 24 District patrol craft 25 Miscellaneous district craft 26 Cargo vessels 27 Miscellaneous auxiliaries 28 References 29 External links Battleships[edit source | edit] Name Location Date Cause 21°21′N 7 December Arizona 157°57′W21.350°N Sunk by carrier-based aircraft bombs 1941 157.950°W, Pearl Harbor Sunk by carrier-based aircraft torpedoes, 7 December raised in 1943, sank 17 May 1947 in a Oklahoma Pearl Harbor 1941 storm while being towed to San Francisco for scrapping Aircraft carriers[edit source |
    [Show full text]