NATTOMS ADV1GOKY COmiT ON TIIE CONGO

MEETINGS

Nos. 9-15 November I960

ENGLISH

OONFTnFTITJAL

VOL. 2

UNITFJ) NAT TONS CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No. 9 5 November* I960 ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters on Saturday, 5 November 1960^ at 10 a.m.

60-27730 The SECRETARY^GENERAL; I suppose we can begin, although there are still a few who are to be expected here today. First of all, I would like to draw your attention to the English translation of the Loi fondamentale which has been circulated. It is available to the members of the Committee. We have before us again one item, paragraph 3 of the resolution of 21 September. I suppose, however, that it may be that members of the Committee would like to avail themselves of this opportunity to get a bit more of the background for the action planned. We have with us today, as you know, Ambassador Dayal, who arrived yesterday from Leopoldville, and we have, of course, an opportunity to listen to -him, either in commenting on his report or in such other observations as may be of relevance. I do not mean toy 'that in any way to invite his observations on the action taken or planned by the Committee. This is for the Committee to decide, in consultation with the Secretary-General. But I felt that members of the Committee would like to be as well informed as possible of the setting against which we have to judge action taken, here, and for that reason I would just ask the members of the Committee if they would not like Ambassador Dayal to say something by way of introduction of his report or to fill out the picture regarding the background setting for the operation. Is that agreeable to the members of the Committee? Then I would invite Ambassador Dayal to say what he wishes.

Mr. DAYAL (Special Representative in the Congo): Mr. Secretary-General, I am grateful for this opportunity to meet the members of your Advisory Committee and to say a few words perhaps by way of background information to the Second Progress Report. The report is before you and it gives in considerable detail the principal developments which have taken place in the Congo since my first report. As we have said there, this period of about six weeks has been one of very great turbulence and even greater uncertainty. The principal factor,of course, in this state of affairs has been the absence of any organized and effective authority. There have been various governments, but they existed only on paper. An effort was made, as a purely working arrangement, to constitute a College of Commissioners. I have described this body in the report. It is composed of rather inexperienced young men. Of course, it has no governmental status at all, and the best that we could do in order to keep our technical assistance programmes functioning was to have a working arrangement with these Commissioners at the technical level without any element whatsoever of any form of political recognition. That position, I think, was well understood on both sides, on our side as well as on the side of the College of Commissioners. Another factor which supervened during this period and added considerably to our difficulties was the role played by the Arme'e Nationale Congolaise. You are, I am sure, fully familiar with the development of events. The Chief of Staff assumed power, according to him, not directly, of course, but through the College of Commissioners, and he declared his purpose to be to neutralize the principal political elements and the Parliament until the end of this year, in order to pave the way for a political settlement. Well, things did not quite work out that way. The army began to come more and more into the picture, and indeed to such an extent that instead of helping in the maintenance of law and order it became perhaps the principal fomenter of trouble. And this state of affairs, which was rather serious in Leopoldville, found reflection in the other principal centres where the army was located. I am glad to say that certain steps which were taken after we had felt our way and were fairly sure of our ground, have had the effect of sending the soldiers,who had been roaming the streets of Leopoldville practically at will, back to their barracks. This has also meant that the United Nations troops have taken on additional responsibilities. I hope this state of affairs lasts. We shall certainly maintain full pressure on the ANC Command to respect this undertaking. Still another factor which has added to the complexity of the situation has been the incursion of various types of youth movements which seem to have some kind of political colour --at least they claim to have a political colour. These youths have, in the general state of anarchy, been indulging increasingly in acts of violence of one kind or another. I have impressed upon all the -5- leaders of the country the seriousness of this/ type of situation and have requested them to do something to control thes-e "bands of rather lawless youths. They have been committing acts of terrorism of one«kind or another and there,is evidence that their activities are fairly veil organized, and they are certainly of a rather subversive nature. 6.10

So far as the country at large is concerned, you must have read about the difficulties we have encountered in south Kasai. We were able to arrange a cease- fire there between the Kalonjist forces and the ANCj but during recent weeks an attempt was made to break that arrangement. Here, I must pay a tribute to our troops who were in that area. They dealt with the situation rather firmly and without any bloodshed except that four of our own people were wounded. They managed to take into their custody four of the principal ringleaders of the ICalonjist forces who were leading and directing them. These people were non-Congolese and they are still in protective custody in Luluabourg. In north Katanga, indeed in other parts of Katanga as well, the differences between the Cpnakat and the Balubakat parties found expression in various acts of violence which the gendarmerie of Katanga tried to suppress, at least so far as the Balubakats were concerned. This suppression, was rather brutal and instead of bringing about an end to that state of affairs it set in motion a pattern of reprisals. We negotiated an arrangement with the Katanga authorities whereby a certain area of north Katanga was placed under the direct control, so far as law and order was concerned, of the United Nations troops. Of course, the methods that we used were pacific and the very presence of the United Nations forces there had an inhibiting effect on violence. Furthermore, we afforded shelter to all kinds of people who had been threatened in the area. We pursued these efforts by utilizing the good offices of a leader of that area who had considerable influence with the Baluba tribesmen. The latest reports are that these combined measures have had a salutary effect and that area is now fairly calm. Of course, there are other parts which are outside the zone where the United Nations has assumed responsibility, where some trouble has recently occurred. That is the general picture in the Congo and it will be easy to see how it has reacted upon the functions which the United Nations operations in the Congo have been called upon to perform. Ours is, of course, I suppose, basically a technical assistance mission. We are there to assist the Congolese authorities in the maintenance of law and order and in helping to strengthen their independence, to give life and substance to it. But in the absence of a coherent governmental authority, in the face of so much disorder, chaos and violence, it is understandable that this aspect of our functions has not been able to progress as rapidly as we would have wished. 11

In feet, I think it is almost a tuiracle that we have been able to make the degree of progress which we have achieved. I do not wish to take any more time, because I have just given this background information which, I think, might stimulate questions, and I am at your disposal to answer them to the best of my knowledge and ability*

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): I am not going to ask anything of Mr. Dayal based upon what he has said, but I will just connect what he has aaid with what we have tried to'do here. We here have been trying to find ways and means of impletmenting paragraph 3 of the resolution passed in the General Assembly on 21 Septenber.

Now, I would like to know from Mr0 Dayal, from his own experiences in Leopoidviile, whether there is any chance for a conciliation commission, which we contemplate here, doing good work if it does go to the Congo. That is the first question. The second question is whether the atmosphere is such as to permit a reconciliation of the various leaders in the Congo at the moment.

Mr. DAYAL (Special Representative): Well, so far as we are concerned in Leopoidviile -- by this I mean the United Nations operations in the Congo — we would very much welcome the arrival of a conciliation commission, and you can be assured that we shall give our fullest co-operation and assistance in making your task a success. Now, you have enquired whether there is any chance of the commission meeting with success. It is difficult to make any predictions, but I think it is important to consider the question of preparation and of timing. My report shows .the state of affairs there at present; and I am quite sure that there will>e have to be a balance of these considerations in order to decide what would be the most appropriate time for the commission to come to Leopoidviile. - .i" Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I should like to thank Ambassador Dayal for what he has done in his report, and I want to thank him for his statements. But I should like to ask some details. 12-15

With respect to the situation of a Parliament and members of Parliament, Deputies as well as Senators, I should like to know whether most of them are in Leopoldville, or are they scattered? What is the situation as regards their leaders; are they ready to meet or to be brought together? Is there any chance at present of operating along these lines?

Mr. DAYAL (Special Representative); I presume that the object is to enable Parliament to meet, the full Parliament to meet, which means the representatives in the Parliament of all six provinces. Now, in that regard, the position, I should imagine, is that the majority of members in Leopoldville are still residing there,but many of thoss coming from the provinces have gone back to their homes, and, as you know, a considerable number from Katanga and from south Kasai have not come at all. Well, in my judgement, before ,a meeting of the full Parliament can be called, a good deal of preliminary negotiations will be necessary* In view of the past background, it is difficult to imagine that if Parliament is summoned, then the full house will assemble without any prior arrangements being made to make it possible for all of them to come. >

Mr* GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Would you share our view that the situation in tbe Congo can only be solved by attacking the substance of the problem; that is to say, to conciliate the differences which exist? Are we correct in that assumption? 16

Mr. DAYAL (Special Representative): Yes, that has been my consistent view.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): If that is the case, then is it not logical to say that such conciliation should be made in accordance with paragraph 3 of the emergency resolution and that we should no longer delay matters but should proceed to its implementation? Of course, the required preparation, will have to be made. But is it not true that part of that preparation will have to be done by the Commission-- for example, certain negotiations-: to make possible the meeting of Parliament?

Mr. DAYAL (Special Representative): I should here like to mention the views expressed by the Afro-Asian'representatives in Leopoldville, with whom I have been in very close touch. What I said a moment ago reflects their thinking. I had1 nine representatives there to see me, a day or so before I • left, and they were all united Ih-tb'e view that some^ advanced preparation by them and by? other people of goodwill would help' to pave the way in order to make the work of the Commission really fruitful, Some' consideration also has to be paid to the law-and-order situation in the country as a-whole* That will also affect peaceful political association. As I said a few moments ago, some of the steps recently taken by ue there "have reacted .somewhat • favourably on the law-and-order situation. We would like to see for a little longer how things develop. That also is a matter which could be taken into account. But, as I mentioned earlier, there has to be a balancing of -factors. Some preparation could be made by your representatives in Leopoldville and others, combined with preparation which the Commission itself could make on reaching the spot.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): At this stage, I should like to ask a couple of questions of Mr. Dayal. These questions imply neither a view nor any criticism — at this stage, at any case. My first question would be: What is the position in Katanga in respect of law and order and in respect of economic activity? I am making this inquiry about Katanga alone because there, by and large, affairs are being guided by a Congolese leader himself, without any great interference or guidance or supervision by the United Nations. 17-20

Secondly, in paragraph 5 of Mr. Dayal!s report it is stated that there has been a "rapid break down of law and order". In fact, the impression is distinctly given that there has been an overall deterioration in law and order. According to the Security Council resolution, the main purpose of United Nations intervention in the Congo was to assist the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order. Apparently, the Congo can now turn back on the United Nations and say that, instead of making improvements, we have caused deterioration. In any case, I should like to have, if that is possible, Mr. Dayal's appreciation of what would have happened if the United Nations had restricted itself to clearing the Belgians from the Congo and had left the rest to the Congolese themselves, to settle among thems'elves. One more question: Mr. Dayal, as seen from the report, has dealt with almost everyone -- with Kasavubu, Mobutu, Lumumba. 21

Would .it. "be a legitimate inference that if Mr. Dayal had not dealt with everyone but had dealt with one or two outstanding personalities, that would have-enabled those one or two personalities to muster other people around them by giving the Implication that they were the'people of the future/ instead of the way it is at present when there are a numbe'r of leaders? Almost .everyone -who collects twenty or thirty persons around him becomes a leader -and is not an outstanding -personality'at all. Have we contributed to that state of affairs by dealing with almost everyone? ' ' Iram asking this particular question because'there is a rather amusing sentence which saysi t!ONUC has continued to deal with whatever authority it finds in the ministerial chair." This almost gives the impression that whoever is physically in occupation of a particular chair has been dealt with by OWC. Therefore, has this practice of dealing with almost everyone contributed to the absence of leadership?

Mr. DAYAL (Special Representative): May I deal with the last quetion first? The sentence to which the representative of Pakistan refers is really concerned with the conduct of our technical assistance operations. It is evident that our people have to remain in contact with somebody who is in a position to give some kind of orders, and that person is the man who happens to be sitting in the chair. At the present time that man is generally one of the Commissioners. As part of the question which was put to me, there is an implication that we should have dealt with only one or two people and thereby helped to build them up. That, of course, would have been violation of our principle of complete neutrality and impartiality so far as the political situation of the country is concerned. Our doors have been open all the time to anybody who wanted to come and see us, and it is our duty to maintain contact with people of different shades of opinion in order to ascertain their views to see how the situation is developing, how political thought is evolving. As to the question on Katanga, I should like to say that, as has been made clear from the report, it is not true that law and order have been maintained there. In fact, because of the complete breakdown of law and order in northern Katanga, we were compelled to assume certain rather onerous responsibilities and, as I mentioned a few minutes ago, there has since been some trouble in Katanga outside this zone. 22-25

The third question seeks to point out that we have not prevented a deterioration of the law and order situation. I think it is correct to say that there has been a deterioration during the last month and we have set out the reasons responsible for that state of affairs. I should also like to add that we are hopeful that we are now in a position to exercise better control over the situation. But I should like to put one consideration to the members of the Committee when it is said that we have not been able to fulfil our mandate to assist in the preservation of law and order; and that consideration is: what would have been the situation in the Congo if the United Nations troops had not been there?

Mr. Krishna MENQN (India): I was going to refer to what the representative of Ethiopia has said. He asked a question; Mr. Dayal answered: "yes". I do not know whether they mean the same thing and, if they do, what the implications are. It arises from the background from the discussion of last time. The question was whether a United Nations body — that is What this will be, people going from hers who will be a United Nations delegation, a delegation of people who are sponsored by or under the auspices of the General Assembly resolution -- whether they should go out and engage themselves in a mission of conciliation. Conciliation means, in the popular sense -- or the result of conciliation means bringing peaceful conditions. That, one can understand. But if conciliation means reconciling different authorities and heads, then a new situation arises; that is to say, you endow the people with whom you discuss with a certain amount of prestige. NR/rh 26

I presume froiii previous discussion that the Ambassador from Ethiopia means conciliation in the sense-of''bringing some arrangement as "between various people who hbld authority. Now, does Mr. Dayal mean the same'thing?' Even if it were necessary, how would that cross knives, so to say, with whatever the United Nations' administration is doing?

Mr* DAYAL (Special Representative): Of course, my approach is that our main difficulty is the absence of a simple central Government, and it is' for the Committee to decide-in what way it could help to bririg about a situation where a central Government could be created. I cannot express ;ah opinion as to what conciliation could or should mean. That is really for the members of the Committee to decide.

Mr> Krishna MENON (India): The central'authority de facto does not exist. That is what he means. The United"Nations, so far as' I am aware, has not taken the position that there is no central tJQvernmeht because'that" is what ' we are dealing 'withi It: Is one thing' talking about central'authority de facto and anbther, as^ you say, dealing with a lot of schoolboys"and"various army " leaders and'so on'who may have"'usurped authority in each place. A body under the United Nations General Assembly goes ttiefe now and tries to bring them all together. To what extent does tnat endow these people with a degree of authority {-.'.- ..'-..-. .,.«•,.-. •-..- . •:••: •.. :•; ; . .;. ;. •. •.; ••...- ::, .. , ;-,;. . ).'.. ' • ';-; '.. and a degree of"prestige? That is the question. And how does it affect the whole question oiTthe integrity and independence of the Congo and non-interference in its affairs and so on? In othe'r words, we have taken, at the last meeting, a certain view about this resolution and about conciliation. Conciliation in the sense of assisting in the restoration of peace or law and order, one understands, but, in the sense, as I said, of reconciling different pretenders, that is a different matter. That is the problem.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; The representative of Nigeria has asked for the floor, but- I think we can use the right of reply, because obviously the representative of Ethiopia wants to explain his stand. NR/rh 27-30

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I asked a question a"bout what is found in the resolution, but I did not attach any interpretation to it that it is contrary to what the Advisory Committee discussed last time. The precise meaning of that, I take it, will "be defined when we — I hope, in a moment -- will come to discuss the terms of reference and thereby deal with this problem. But my preoccupation was — and we hold this very firmly -- that we have let matters drift too long. Therefore we believe now we should proceed to the discussion of the terms of reference and dispatch the group to the Congo. I do not believe that very extensive preparation should have to be made, because I should have thought that by this time that preparation would be already done. If preparation means discussion with every person and getting his agreement, that is going to take a long time. So it is from that point of view that I asked the question and not from the point of view of exactly what is the meaning of conciliation.

Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria): Following more or less on the same ground as the representative of Ethiopia, I wonder whether Mr. Dayal can tell us what kind of preparation he thinks is necessary. When he says "not immediate" — for how long will such preparations last before the commission reaches the Congo? Then there is a point that is a little disturbing, I am sure the Secretary-General must have seen the publication in the New York Times, in yesterday's edition, of the following: "Congo officers here. "Army group will tour US military installations. "Eleven Congo army officers arrived at New York International Airport last night from Leopoldville to tour United States Army installations. The group will visit Fort Dix, West Point, and Fort Benning, Ga. "After their tour in the United States they will go to Canada, Britain, France, Belgium and West Germany also to study military installations." 31

Oh page 5t'"of"the Second Report, there is special praise, or.commendation or a remark is made here/ with particular reference'to the example set by the United Stated in channelling aid" through the United Nations. I should like to rea'd this particular portion: "My requests to the Belgian Government ara twofold in nature. Firstly, the' Belgians would withdraw all 'the- military, para-military and civilian ' personnel they have placed at the disposal of the authorities in the Congo, and, secondly, they would henceforth follow the example given by the great, • Western Pdwers, and above all by the United States, in channelling any assistance to the Congo, or to any authorities in the Congo, through the ; "'• United Nations". (aA55T,P*57) I'want to know ^whether the visit of these eleven Army officers to the United States arid their visit to installations in-Canada and the United Kingdom is with the knowledge, consent and approval of the Secretary-General or hia representative. I did not know anything about it. What is the connexion of these visits :of Armyv;dffieeris''to the present position In the.Congo? Is this is part' of 'the 'fts si statute thfet la 6f fetfed and channelled through the United Nations or is it unilateral? JQods. ie very important because of'what I will have to say later on when !I will conaaent on the question of the report.'- '-•:•". . -if. •-..•.;':• •.:, •• • .;.; '.-..'„ . \ .•;...... •.".-.'.;, Then., there..Iff this comment; whic3a'we "find in The New York Time a..today >. I should like the representative of the Secretary-General to tallrus, "what he. has to say about the apparent conflict between his.views on .the Belgian situation and that of the United States. This report .is contained on page 6 of The Nev York Times today. It. is something which appears to be in. defence of the Belgian intervention there by the United States..; I do not want-to ..make any comment for or-against anybody, /but those of us who have been in this • Committee- for some time know that our reaction is that we want the Belgians to get out.-• We do not want them to keep on intervening- either directly.or indirectly. It is rather disconcerting to read that one of the great Powers in whom confidence has been reposed by the United Nations -- that such a commendation is put in the report by the Special Representative and that it should turn out now to be completely contrary to this interpretation. 32-35

I should like an explanation of these points so as to be able to know where I stand before I make any further cement on this report and the possibility of the visit of the Commission to the Congo,

The SECRETARY-GENERAL! If the representative of Nigeria will permit me to reply in part to the question, I think that on the whole we should follow the advice of the representative of Ethiopia and turn as quickly as possible to the concrete question of the Commission. But I fully see and understand the concern felt by the representative of Nigeria. As regards the visit of the eleven officers here, it is something about which we have not been informed nor consulted and in which we have no part. As regards the comments made by the State Department on the Belgian aspect of the report, it is something which I leave to the representatives to interpret. I do not think it is in contradiction in fact as regards substance, but it is a wish by the State Department's spokesman to give the Belgians the benefit of the doubt; that is to say, it is a question of difference of interpretation. Why they have made such a statement is not for me to say. ' After that, I will leave it to Ambassador Dayal to reply to the question why it is felt that this interpretation which is in the report is warranted by the facts, but I can perhaps -first take up the quotation- from .the.report about which we have heard. That quotation is in fact from a letter from me with which Ambassador Dayarhas nothing to do. It is a letter dated 8 October to Mr. Tshombe. At-that stage it was a- fact that a request for assistance from anyone in the Congo to the United States received the same reply: that such-a ;request should be addressed to the United Nations and that the United States- was not interested in or willing to deal directly, but wanted all assistance'it could give to be,.channelled through the United Nations. I agree with the representative that there is a. contradiction between that, and the fact . we see before: us, :of: this visit which has now come about. This visit, however, is close to a month; la.ter, and I do not know if it reflects any.,change, of policy. It may be .that the United States interpretation-is: that this is not to be Classified as assistance. However, the question upon which I would like to ask Mr. Dayal to comment is the question regarding the United States comments on the Belgium part in the story. I understand that is what is worrying Mr. Jaja Wachaku* My own feeling on that point, and I repeat this, is that they do not contest the facts but they want to put an interpretation on the factsother than the one ve believe they found in the report; that is, they want to give the benefit of the doubt to the Belgians. That is my way of interpreting their comments, and for that reason I think it may be of interest if Ambassador Dayal commented on this. 37-^0

Mr. DAYAL (Special Representative); The Belgian question has been factually covered in my report. Whatever has been said there has been based upon definite information which has come to our notice by one means or another, but mostly through our technical assistance people who have to deal daily with the Congolese officials. There, as I have said, during recent weeks they have been encountering more and inore Belgian advisers who, in some Ministries, have been constituting almost a screen against United Nations consultants* We have had cases where agreements previously arrived at have been reversed, and, over and above this, there has been a steady influx of Belgians into the country. la

Combined vith this there is news of the setting up of a recruiting agency in Brussels which maintains contact with a similar organization in Leopoldville,, which suggests that there is some measure of planning in this return of the Belgians. As regards the question of preparation for the visit of the Conciliation Commission, I quoted a few moments ago the views of nine representatives of the Afro-Asian countries whom I consulted a day or two prior to my departure from Leopoldville. The points they made were that some contacts with the leading personalities there was necessary in order -- if I may use the expression -- to sell the idea of the Conciliation Commission going to Leopoldville for the purpose set out in paragraph 3 of the resolution of 20 September. They also were of the opinion that no leader should be allowed a power of veto to prevent the Commission from coming. That also seemed to me to be a very valid point of view. They were also conscious of the importance of the law and order situation as affecting the functions of the Conciliation Commission, and in particular they felt that it would be essential for the Commission to take advantage of its visit to assist in the direction of building up the unity and integrity of the country. In other words, they felt that it was essential to establish some form of contact with the Katangese authorities and with the South Kasai authorities. It may well be that they thought that if the Commission arrived without any prior preparation of the ground they might not be able to meet Mr. Tshombe or Mr. Kalonji, and therefore felt that the timing would depend also upon their ability, and some of them had the intention of contacting these people to try to ascertain their views and to try to convince them that it is in their interest and in the interest of the country as a whole to invite the Commission to come in to exercise its good offices. I hope that by the time I return some such contacts will have been established. Then another important point that was raised was that to enable the Asian-African envoys in Leopoldville to establish worthwhile and fruitful contacts with the local personalities they would like to know more definitely the terms of reference of the Conciliation Commission. Until the time of my departure I had not seen the terms of reference, And I do not know if they have been involved as yet, but it would certainly assist the envoys if they were to have these terms of reference spelled out to them so that they could, on that basis, persuade the various personalities there with regard to the advisability of welcoming this body into their midst. Mr» HASAN (Pakistan) s To put a slight variation on a question which has already been asked, I should like to Know whether these four or five, or half a dozen, contenders for power would: — if they were brought together and made to shafee hands and Kiss one another, and so on — be able combinedly to bring back peace to the country,whether, not fighting one another but even collectively, they have influence enough to bring back peace and coherent and integrated government into the Congo. That is one question. The other is this. Mr. Dayal told us just now that he had consulted with nine envoys. I personally do not know which nine they are or which are the countries at present represented in the Congo, but I presume that many of these nine envoys have strong views about the many contending personalities and that those views — some for them and some against — are known to the personalities in question. So, would they be influential enough to sway the views of these personalities, and are they useful in the sense that they could be employed in the preparatory worK preceding the visit of the mediation group from here? Mr. EAYAL (Special Representative): I think that depends upon' their capacity and diplomatic skill; I cannot say very much more than that, but as to the other question, whether a fev or a handful of personalities could bring about conditions of peace and order in the country, that again is rather difficult to say. I do not think they would confine their acitivities, their contacts, just to a handful of people. I think many of them have extensive contacts with a large number of personalities, parliamentarians and others, and it was their 'intention to make soundings. It might be interesting to know the position there so far as political parties are concerned in the Congo. Even the majority party, which is Mr. Lumumba's MNC, had no more than about twenty per cent of its members in the Parliament. The rest are all small groups, very often with tribal, provincial of regional loyalties and there are not many parties which can really be called ' political parties in the strict sense of the term. If members are interested, I could show them after the meeting some of the lists of the various parties which ' are there; there are actually no less than twenty parties,' some with only brie member, some with two or three, and so on.

Mr. BARNES (Liberia):There are two questions I wanted to ask Mr. Dayal, but I think he has already answered one and that was whether contact had been established with any of the leaders in the Congo in regard to this Conciliation Commission; I think he answered that in his last statement. My second question is this. I think Mr. Payal said that he was trying to impress upon the leaders of the Congo that they should do something about these youth organizations or groups which were contributing to the deterioration of law and order. Is he in a position to tell us who these leaders are with whom he has consulted on the question?

Mr. DAYAL (Special Representative): To deal with the second question first, we have not had any recent cases of lawless activities by these youth organizations, so presumably their leaders are somewhat conscious of the dangers of allowing them free play. They have taken,some sort of measures to bring them under control. But whether the disease has been cured, or only palliatives have been applied, time alone can tell. Mr. BARNES (Liberia): I was wondering whether you could tell.us who are the leaders you have consulted about these youth organizations. You said you'bad consulted with some leaders and tried to impress upon them that they should do something. Who are they? . .

Mr. MYAL (Special Representative); There is the MNC, that is to,say tfte Lumumba youth; I have spoken to some of their leaders and have drawn their. - -.- attention to the .dangers of these lawless activities. Then there is the ATbako ; . youth groupj there again I have drawn the attention of their leaders to the rather, difficult situation created by these lawless .young men, and there are one or two . other organizations which function in a more subterranean manner. We have, been trying to contact them also. . . . ,

Mr.- BARNES (Liberia) ; 'But who .are the leaders of these..youth ; organizations? : • . : :••...:. .. .. , ...-.-

* Mr. MYAL (Special Representative)-; They aye rather, influential people; for Instance, the leader of the Abako party .is • President .I^jasavubu himself, and of the MNC. the leader is Mr i Lumumba. • • : . •.-...-: •

. . Mr. WIRJOFRANOTO. (Indonesia); I am., going $o.ask for some informatioa, but maybe it is rather-delicate..--However,, we need tliis kind of. information, ...... ;. especially from Mr. Dayal, who has just, recently come from the, spot...... 51 •

I would like to know Mr. Dayal's impression regarding the state of mind of some of the important leaders, for instance> President Kasavubu and Premier Lumumba. I understand that during Mr. Dayal's stay in Leopoldville he probably had occasion many times to talk freely with the leaders, to find out their real state of mind. I am interested in the answer to this question, because according to our opinion, if we want to restore law and order, if we want to have a strong government, or even a functioning government in Leopoldville, if we want to have reciprocal co-operation between the United Nations and the Government of the Republic of the Congo in favour of the peopleJ s interests, I think the first thing we need to have is an accurate analysis of the state of mind of the important leaders. I repeat, this question is very important because we are now facing a new situation in the Congo, in the sense that it is more complicated than it was a few months ago. That is to say, when the Security Council started its discussion of the Congo problem, at that time the situation was rather good. I mean, there was a Central Government, But meanwhile this Government has been fading and even now the picture is not clear. Therefore, I think we have to do something to, I do not say restore a new government or a strong government^ but at least to promote the establishment of a strong Central Government. I am very interested for this reason alone. We cannot create leaders in one day or one night; that is not possible. We have had some experience with some leaders. Perhaps those leaders have made mistakes in the past, but I am still optimistic in the sense that I have confidence in the common sense of these important leaders. As I told you before, we cannot create leaders in one day or one night, but I have confidence that leaders of this kind, after making some mistakes, after having some experience — and perhaps better experience -- will in future follow the right course. And what is the right course? The right course, according to us, is following or devoting their minds and activities for the pure national aspiration of the people — devoting their minds and activities towards people*s interests. I have to confess that at this time the situation is confused because the Belgian influence is now getting stronger. A few months ago the Belgian influence, the stronghold, the headquarters of the Belgians was more or less 52-55 concentrated in Katanga .only, and perhaps in Kasai; but .now .the Belgian influence has been moved to Leopoldville also, and perhaps even everywhere in the whole Congo* For this reason, because the situation is confused and I •.,'•• .-•.,.•. ' , . . . . - • .. • ; •.•.'.... understand.that Mr. Daysl, coming from the spot, knows better than we dp here, I would like to know the analysis of Mr. Dayal in regard to the state of mind of the leaders, and is there seme prospect of having some reconciliation? 56

I mufit confess, we must first clean out the Belgian influence from the Congo, because as long as the Belgians are there the confusion will Btill he there. Assuming we can clean the Belgian influence out of the Congo, my pertinent question is this: Starting on a new basis, with clean hands, is there any prospect for reconciliation among the important leaders, havirfg in mind that they will follow the right course, that is, to devote their minds and their activities to the interests of the people?

Mr. MYAL (Special Representative): It is difficult to make an objective report on the state of mind of the leaders. All that I can say is that I have with great persistence, and perhaps as another task in this respect, appealed to all of them personally, on the radio and by other means, to take stock of the situation in their country, to take advantage of the experience of other Afro-Asian countries which since the war have won their independence, and to sink their particular interests, their party or factional interests, in order to achieve national unity and the integrity of the country. I will keep on making these appeals. I certainly have faith in the Congolese people, I have faith in human nature, I have great faith in the Principles of the Charter and faith in the high purposes of our mission there; and I share with the Ambassador from Indonesia the hope that the leadership will rise to the full stature of their responsibilities. But it is our duty, it will be the duty of the goo.d-will mission that goes there, to impress upon the leaders their responsibilities to t he 14 million' Congolese. It is they who are suffering from the absence of a government, from the absence of law and order and all the elements which go to make an organized society. So far as the Belgian influence is concerned, I think I have said enough about that in my report; but I should like to add that the three principal contenders for power all have foreign advisers.

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): Mr. Secretary-General, it has been very- useful to us to listen to Mr. Dayal and to the able and very clear introductory remarks which he gave us at the beginning of the meeting. I am also sure that it is very useful to ask questions on the background of the situation. But I 57 want to remind the Committee of the purpose for which we are here. You, sir, at the beginning made it very clear what the purpose of our meeting is, and in fact we are trying to connect our objective with the presence here of Mr. Dayal. I say this because, if we are to delve deeply into the report which he has submitted, I am sure that that could go on indefinitely* May I, sir, suggest that we hear Ambassador Slim, who I know is supposed to give a report about the terms of reference, and that we then base our discussion on what he will tell us together with what has been said by Mr. Dayal regarding the atmosphere in the Congo, the advisability of sending the mission, the timing, and so on. If we turn our energies towards that end, it will be possible for us to achieve something before we leave this room.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; What you have recalled here is what I said at the beginning; and I also later on reminded ourselves of the fact that we are here for a practical purpose. I would say, in defence of us all, that I think that the exchange which has taken place has certainly helped in fulfilling the task which we have before us. I have four speakers inscribed on my list. I think I may interpret the suggestion by Ambassador ^uaison-Sackey in the sense) that when these speakers have asked their questions we should invite Ambassador Slim to bring in the text for our consideration and proposals for our study. But I feel, on the other hand, that we should not cut anyone off from the discussion which has been proceeding so far. 58

Mr. JAJA WACHUKU (Nigeria): I asked certain questions. I thought we were asking questions before any speeches ."because certain facts may be lost . in the interest of speeches. I asked two questions, one was answered but the . ,'• - ot>.er one was left out. I aSked, "How long it would take to make these • .\ preparations?" That was not answered.. And I have more questions arising . . from the statement which the Ambassador has made. For instancey I would like . to put the question -- because this will,determine the;.'course of my contribution to this discussion -- I would not be-satisfied in my mind in commenting.on anything without having some --

'The SECRETABY>GEPIRAL; --May-I/meet your need by including you on.the .' •- list of speakers "who will speak and'ask ^theif questions before Ambassador Slim takes the" floor -- and 'get back to'dt-in that .way? , . • , .:.••• -,,.« : .

Mf » JAJA WACEUKU (Nigeria): • ^hankvyou. ' ' - - -

MrA LOUTFI (United Arab: Republic)(interpretation from French): - I should like to ask Ambassador Dayal how -much time, he thinks ^ will -be .needed . for the prSparatioris of this Commission? I know he vill not be able, tb give . ; a specific date, but how long would these preparations take>approximately?; ••; ,.

Mr. DAYAL (Special Representative): It is very difficult to give a date line. It depends upon so many factors. But in talking to the representatives of the Afro-Asian countries, I got the impression that they would advise their opposite numbers here in regard to what they considered to be the most suitable moment for the Commission to arrive. Therefore, I must leave the matter, as far as I am concerned, to their Judgement. I think they are conscious of the fact that it should not be too early; and also that it should not be too late. But that, translated in terms of the calendar*is not very explicit --at least at this moment.

Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpret at ion from French): How long do you think, the Commission should meet in the Congo -- how long should it stay in the Congo, approximately? 59-60

Mr* DAYAL (Special Representative): That also, if I may say so, is a sixty-four dollar question. I think it all depends upon thu response which the Comnission encounters there, and whether they decide to visit the provinces also or confine their activities to Leopoldville. There is a sentiment there among some of the Congolese leaders that it might be useful for the Canmission to visit some of the provinces -- not only Katanga and Kasai. 61

Mr. CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): Before asking two or three questions, I should like to draw the attention Of our advisory group to an illegal circulation, and, I would even say, a tendentious one, of the document of the General Assembly which is A/^56o, which has messages of President Kasavubu and Mrt Bomboko to the President of the General Assembly. This document also gives the replies of the President to Mr. Kasavubu. We believe that this is a circulation which is in opposition to the practice in the United Nations Organization. A document which is circulated to Member States, first of all, is requested by the State which communicates to the United Nations that document in question, and my delegation protests energetically against such a circulation which has as its sole purpose to influence the discussion in the General Assembly and to lead some delegations into error. We should like to ask why all documents, coming from all the political personalities in the Congo are not circulated in such a way. We are surprised, moreover, when we read, in particular, paragraph 4 of the report of the Secretary-General, which says that there is no effective central Government, but political confusion has extended, to a great extent, to the provincial governments. Many documents are distributed to delegations, but all we have to do is to have a communication questioning or affecting Guinea or Morocco be circulated to all Member States »- and I should like to point out that I have requested that the protest of the Secretary-General against Belgium be circulated, in the General Assembly. We have never seen this protest — and all we have to do is be involved by people who maintain illegality in the Congo in order that the document be circulated. For example, on page 2 of this very same document, the President of the General Assembly says: "I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your cable of 1^ October, to which I have given careful attention, and would inform you that it will be circulated to Member States as soon as this question comes before the General Assembly for discussion." (A/**56o, P» 2) Now, read the letter of President Kasavubu. He never asked that the document be circulated. He brought one fact to the attention of the President of the General Assembly* 62-65

The SECRETARY-GENERAL (interpretation from French): I should like to make a point -- not a point of order — but I think I should make this observation. (Continued in English) I think that this Committee is not entitled to discuss actions of the President of the General Assembly. You have other opportunities to discuss such actions, and for that reason, I would believe that we could leave this question aside. You would certainly find an opportunity to discuss it directly with the President. On the other hand, I wish to draw your attention to one fact. Mr. Kasavubu is uncontested Chief of State. Is it your view that a letter from a Chief of State to the General Assembly should be suppressed? But I leave the question for further discussion between you and the President of the General Assembly. As regards the non-circulation of some protests from me, I do not exactly know what you have in mind. I think that in this report, all the protests which I have made formally to the Belgian Government are circulated. If they have not been circulated before, it is because I followed what is good diplomatic practice. You do not circulate your letters until you have received their reply, because courtesy requires that you do not reserve for yourself the last word,

Mr. CABA (Guinea) (interpretation From French): Thank you. It was not my intention in the slightest to dwell upon this point. I merely wanted to make this protest in the Committee, which we shall denounce in the plenary when the queetiori does come .up for discussion, because we know with what purpose this circulation was made. We now come to the subject which is of concern to us. I honestly believe that the agenda is quite specific. We are trying to define this morning the terms of reference which should guide the activities of the conciliation commission which is to go to Leopoldville, and I believe that the statements just made to us are sufficiently eloquent and clearly show that the situation has worsened. Why? Because Belgium has returned with more subtle methods, of course, but more powerful ones. And this confirms our position, -Which has never changed, that if this Power maintains its position and continues to complicate things for us in Leopoldville and in the entire country, it means that, as a matter of fact, it is not alone. We maintain our point of view. Some statements vhlch are being made now in capitals which are very close to UB show the complicity of all the NATO Powers> which support Belgium. I believe that we agree fully with the- statements: that are being made — it is useless to know why and how Belgium is strengthening itself. There is no point in knowing that it;is a deliberate policy, as Ambassador Dayal pointed out so well. It is a deliberate policy which has support within the country^ first of :all, and extensions in ,all the NATO capitals. ... . But 'what I fail to understand is what has been the attitude of the United Nations itself with respect to elements that have maintained this situation -- namely, Mobuto, who is not recognized constitutionally.Whathas been our action with respect to this trouble-maker? That is the question to which I want a specific answer. =.-• . Secondly, I believe that this morning .we;, could very well define in a few words the terms of reference which should guide the Conciliation Commission. .I propose that we have as our basic .document the resolution of the emergency session of the General Assembly, which, specifies:very clearly, in paragraph $, the purpose which we are pursuing and.the functions, of such 3 Conciliation Commission* Ihus, we shall be able to define in these terns of . reference that the Conciliation

Commission should do everything in order to: brin^ together the Congolese leaders who are split today --to bring them together> in their own interests, to solve this crisis, and to do everything to see to it that Parliament may be able to meet as soon as possible. -According to this.document, there are no longer any valid, spokesmen.there; we-:np longer know with whom to deal. Some sort of sovereign body should be able to speak quite freely, in full sovereignty, so'that we could have, some true spokesmen. ••••••'.' • -.' :•-",J - I believe that this is the essential task which is before us now. On that basis, I believe that we can resume consideration of the resolution of the General Assembly, and define briefly these terms of reference, because we do not have to go into detail, in these terms of reference. We have the proof, because one representative asked how much time would be left for the Commission, and we were told that this could not be foreseen. In other words, there are situations in the crisis which might recur; there are other situations which could face the Commission. We cannot foresee in detail all these changes of the situation. Therefore, paragraph 5 of the resolution should be the basic document. 67-70 Mr, ADEEL (Sudan): I am intervening only to Bay how completely I agree with the representatives of Ethiopia and Ghana that we should direct our attention to the purpose for -which we have met this morning, and that is the question of the Conciliation Commission. It is only in that limited context teat I should like to ask a question of Ambassador Dayal. We have heard that thera have been attempts at conciliation in Leopoldville by diplomatic representatives of the African countries there. I should like to ask how extensive those attempts were; what results they yielded, if any; and what those results augur for the fate of further attempts at conciliation.

Mr. DAYAL (Special Representative): Several of the Afro-Asian envoys in Leopoldville have made considerable efforts to bring about some kind of reconciliation, but I think it is evident that those efforts have not met with any success* Otherwise, we would not be faced with the situation with which we are faced today. That does not mean that a further effort is not worth making, in my judgement. A good deal of water has ..flowed down the Congo since those attempts were made and it may be that the political leaders may see in the activities of the ANC leadership a threat to political life in''the country, arid that may induce in them a more reasonable attitude tovards effort's to conciliate their differences.

Mr* HASAN (Pakistan): I have two more questions; I shall put the short one first. Mr0 Dayal'has referred a few times to Afro-Asian envoys in the Congo. May I ask which are the Asian countries represented in the Congo?

Mr* DAYAL (Special Representative): There is India and, I think, Indonesia was there for a while. Is he still there? Yes, there is an Indian charge* d* affaires and an Indonesian charg£ d * affaires *

,Mr. HASAN (Pakistan) Another question. We all agree that the Belgians' should be turned out — they should have been turned out long ago. In the Congolese tragedy they are the villains of the piece. But I think there is one danger, and we do not agree that the presence of the Belgians should be allowed to become an alibi for failures on other accounts. It is recognized by Mr. Dayal, and it has been admitted in the report and stated by some of our colleagues here, that the situation in the Congo in August was much less complex than it was in October and than it is in November. In August there were more Belgians in the Congo and they controlled almost the entire economic life in the Congo and held very influential positions, politically, there, Today they do not hold the same positions. Even if they are sneaking back to some extent, they are by no means in the same strength either economically or politically that they were in August. And yet there is more complexity in the situation in the Congo today than there was in August. Thus, one is left with the impression that there is danger of the Belgian presence in the Congo being made an alibi, an escape for other factors which are causing failure there.

Mr. DAYAL (Special Representative): Today there is a situation of economic and political vacuum and, therefore, even the limited presence of outsiders has a considerable impact. I do not think I have said anywhere in the report that the entire situation is due to the arrival of the Belgians; it is one of the factors,and a complicating one, but there are many other factors which are spelled out in the report* 72-75

The SECRREABY-GENERALg May I add one question to yours., because I think there may be some misunderstanding. Militarily, yes, the Belgians were fairly strong in August, but I do not believe that one can say that in the five provinces they had any greater strength than now; I think it is the other way round« I think the number of Belgians in the five provinces was much less than it is today and they had no economic control positions at all; to my knowledge* In Katanga, I think it is more or less status quo. They were then in control of the main production in Katanga, and they are also today. As you see from the report, there are very slight changes in that respect. They have perhaps in some respects reduced their influence in the Katanga administration; in other respects, they have increased it. It is a kind of shift of tide. I say this subject to confirmation by Mr. Dayal in order to correct what might be a misunderstanding.

Mr. JAJA WACHUKU (Nigeria): Mr. Dayal told us that there were about twenty parties — and some of them having only one member — in the legislature. The statistics say that Mr. Lumumba has about 20 per cent of the membership. I should like to know what is the composition of, say, the Senate and the House of Representatives. What is the proportion — take the various parties — what is their respective membership? 76-

Then the leaders whose names we have heard -- what is the nature of their following in the legislature? T.he,n take the provincial legislatures. Have the provincial legislatures disintegrated also .or are they intact? Does the Ambassador think that it is possible to gring about any stability or conciliation without taking into consideration this provincial governmental set-up? What does he think? Does he think that a commission going to the Congo can treat with^he central set-up and forget the provincial leaders of the Congp? I have in mind the six provinces. ..He.gave the representation of two Asian States in the Congo. Can he help us with,the number? How many African States are represented in the Congo.now? Be frank with us. What do you: think is the role of some of them, whether they have anything to do — because there has been some correspondence, and I am not saying, it Is accurate or npt accurate.. I, think this Committee is entitled to know, the facts of the position, -Is any; one of these States, Asian and African, playing a, role that is not fconourafc>lethe-re? This IB very essential, because, from the Nigerian, point o£;;view, we want the Congo to,be a stabilise^ communityt If we are not f ranjt here, I do not think we can be frank in.the General Assembly, It is necessary for the representative of the United Nations to tell us the raw truth, so that we know those who really have an axe to grind there and know exactly that the Commission is going there to be factual. In my own opinion, I do not think the Congolese situation would have got to its present stage if some people had not an axe to grind, as regards personalities. To us that is very important. This is not a committee of personalities. It is a committee in the interests of the Congolese people and the Congolese Government. Therefore, if we do not know these facts, if they are concealed from us, we will commit the same blunder, and if it is committed by a committee like this it will be even worse than before, and we will be blamed not only by our own States; the whole world will blame us for mistakes of this nature. So I would like the representative of this world Organization to tell us frankly the position and the role of these African and Asian States in the Congo, because I have a clear feeling that, apart from the Belgians and the great 77-80

Powers, whose vested interests we know, it may well be that our own people have a say in the deterioration there. If that is the case, then we will know exactly what attitude to adopt in dealing with ourselves, I would not like anything that would help in a permanent solution to be concealed from this Committee. On the basis of the answers you give I will determine my line of action, because I have been in contact with my Government and I know the line I am supposed to follow. 81

Mr. Krishna MENON (India): I should like some direction on thie. As regards Mr. Dayal, at the present moment I do not know who pays his salary but he is an international civil servant and I would have very serious objections to his expressing, an opinion about the Ambassador of my country or anyone else. I would hold the Secretary-General responsible for any acts which would have to be complained about.

Mr. SECRETARY-GENERAL; Mr. Manon, first of all, I have the greatest confidence in Ambassador Dayal's fine judgement. Secondly, I said myself to what extent Mr. Dayal.may be in a position to reply.

Mr. DAYAL;(Special Representative): I hope you also have some confidence in my discretion. I shall answer one question only, if I may,because it would not be proper, as Mr. Menon has quite rightly said, for me to make any comment on the second, beyond saying that so far as I personally am concerned, my relations with the envoys are extremely close and friendly and I have had nothing but co-operation from them* What they do as diplomatic envoys is not my affair, nor are we supposed to keep in touch with that sort of thing. As regards the question of the composition of the Parliament I can give some figures from the Chamber of Representatives. The position is more or less the same so far as proportions are concerned in the Senate. In the Chamber of Representatives, which has a total membership of 135 members, there are 11 members of the Abako party, one from the Abazi party, one from the ACK, one from the ARP, two from the Association Nagwaka Minagendi, seven from the parti Katangaise, nine from the Severe Party, three from Kguaka, seven from individual lists and local interests, three from the Luka party, eight from the MNC Kalonji, thirty five from the MKC (Lumumba), eleven from the PNP, thirteen from the PSA, seven from PUNA, one from the RBLK, I do not know what stands for — three from REKU party, one from the Unimo, three from the Union nationale congolaise. That is the breakdown and it is more or less the same story in the Senate. 82-85

Mr.Kr1shna MENON (India): I heard someone say that we had met here this morning for the definite purpose of considering this delegation or whatever you may like to call it. I was not quite certain about this. I thought we had mot partly for this purpose and partly to get first hand information from the United Nations representative, especially in view of the general reports that there may be an assembly discussion on the Congo question and of the very strong and firm views expressad by the Belgians, the United States and various other parties concerned in military alliances in regard to the situation, and therefore the whole of these problems are interconnected. But, Mr, Secretary-General, whatever we are discussing there is no doubt, either now or at any time, that we are meeting here, not as suggested, to back one individual or another individual in the Congo but generally in the interests of the Congolese people in pursuance of the resolution of the Security Council. In this connexion I should like to know, some time before we conclude this meeting, whether it would be possible to raise with the United Nations representative the three or four points I have placed before you from the Government of India, perhaps that must take its place. I should like to make this point for the purpose of the record. My delegation and my Government do not take the view that paragraph $ of the resolution of the Assembly binds us to send a committee. I said that last time, and therefore no one could say that,there is a mandatory position in regard to this, where the Assembly has ordered a committee to go to the Congo. All that is said is this: the African nations as appropriate must act for conciliation. 86

Therefore, I am unable .to accept the position that paragraph 3 gives us an order in that way, a direction or even guidance, There is nothing here to suggest that paragraph 5 necessarily meant a committee as one of the many things or a coonittee exclusively of that character. But perhaps it is too late to talk about it in that way, because a good many discussions have gone forward. Secondly, it is my submission, not because the United Nations Special Representative happens to be one of our nationals, but we take the view we have always taken that once these gentlemen have taken over, we do not deal with them, because they are international civil servants. We will criticize, praise or : be indifferent to them, just as we would to'anyone else, - But I think it is proper that, if the United Nations is sending a delegation, because, after ail, it must be under the General Assembly's umbrella, we should not have permission, not even wait on their agreement, but surely ; the United Nations organization there, the establishment or the set-Up-there, should be not only au fa it but should be able to respond. There must be some; rapport between the two. In other words, the United Nations should not be there with two voices, pursuing two different lines, and so on. For that purpose^ ' the discussions with the United Nations representative and whoever else may- be concerned, in our submission, must be more prolonged than can be done in this meeting before any final decision is taken. Thirdly, with regard to Ambassadors, when this committee matter was suggested, I made careful enquiries whether the idea was .send this committee over. Apparently it was not to be the members of this Committee. Apparently "the. idea was that this Committee should make a recommendation and we would then tell our Governments to appoint someone for that purpose. So far as-we are i concerned, our Ambassador is also appointed by our Government, Therefore, ; it is only either because he is overworked or that there may be some fresh life brought on this matter that any other kind of representation may be necessary. Then my friend from Pakistan has referred to the Belgians as being an alibi, I do not want to pick into the words of this. Of course, there is no question about an alibi here. An alibi really means that an accused person pleads that he was not there. In this case, the responsibility is pinned on the United Nations, The United Nations is not pleading it is not there. It means that in a general sense you are making an excuse for someone else, which 87-90 is not the real reason. But I do not want to quarrel with words. My Government's view, as has been expressed by my Prime Minister, is that there is no question but that the main factor of the problem in the Congo is the intervention of outside parties, non-Congolese parties. Especially when a country is an empire of the past, and with a discreditable record of leaving peoples when they go in a way that the peoples cannot look after themselves, there cannot be any greater indictment, not even the atrocities of the time of King Albert, The vorst indictment is the fact that these people have besn left almost helpless, there has been no political, no administrative and no emotional integrity in that sense to carry on. After us the deluge, sort of thing. In these circumstances, to argue that they require technical assistance and say that is why they chould be there is not a position we can support, India places the first insistence — and I am quite sure we will have the support of the whole of the Assembly in this matter, as we had in the case of the invasion of Egypt by the British and the French — on the fact that the main issue in all these matters is the withdrawal of foreign elements. As you know, this has been the trouble in other parts of the world also, where perhaps for a very good reason, perhaps someone may think if he does not protect it, someone else will, this has occurred. Therefore, I join issue on this, but not in order to be controversial with my colleague from Pakistan, We should not be diverted from this position. So far as my Government is concerned, our position is quite firm that one of the main issues in this matter is the withdrawal of foreign elements. The United Nations cannot play second fiddle there, or hold the ring for these people or allow a situation to develop which may become an internal conflict with racial implications. That sort of thing cannot take place. 91

I think, therefore! that whatever may he the other aspects of the position we should not lose eight of this fact, the more BO because the country involved in this matter is part of a big military alliance, and we have seen the consequences of that in Algeria and places of that character. That brings me to the next point which is whether, during Mr. Dayal's presence in New York with you, Mr. Secretary-General, it will be possible for you to pursue the point raised by the Government of India last time. What steps can be taken to exclude and to stop the further entry of non-Congolese nationals into the Congo, irrespective of all the fine points of certain interpretations of law, because every country has rules of immigration and emigration and every country has opinions as to who should wander about. In our own country we do not allow our nationals to wander about everywhere if there is an operation of thin character. ,In any country that is so, and we asked last time to what extent the United Nations works with whatever administration there is with regard to immigration and customs and things of that character which would prevent the entry of personnel as well as of goodss and money into the country. That is one point on which we think great stress has to be laid. The second is that we should like to know from your representative not necessarily a date by the calendar, absolute and unalterable, but something that vill guide us as to the proximity and the possibility of the convening of Parliament, I think that anyone vho holds one view or the otker must take the consequences of a Parliamentary decision, and we should like to know how soon Parliament can be convened in order that the matter may be put to it, and whether, in that convening,there will be any practical or theoretical difficulties with regard to United Nations supervision. After all, we are constantly talking about United Nations supervision of elections and so on. If that is so, Mr. Secretary-General, we ought to go to the General Assembly and obtain its assent for United Nations supervision, because if the United Nations role is limited to taking all the blame and to being there in a limited capacity, even to protect its own personnel, and if the role of the Secretary-General is to obtain supplementary grants passed by the Fifth Committee with great difficulty, that is not a very enviable position. 92-95

We want to be as helpful as possible in this, but it is difficult unless we are able to pinpoint the main trouble. The main trouble is the presence of the empire. What has happened is this. The empire, having being withdrawn, is getting in by a side door, or by a 'hole in the roof, or whatever it is, and trying to sit on these people. We were alco told this morning, to my surprise, not only of the presence of these so-callad technicians, which is an impediment to unity, order and so on in the country, but also that they are getting in the way of technical assistance given by the United Nations itself. On the one hand, in this building we are constantly urging that, without any violation of the right of nations to conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements, aid should be channeled through the United Nations, But here we have the reverse process. We heard Mr. Dayal say a while ago that people give one kind of advice and they give another kind of advice. That is a direct contradiction not only of this resolution but of the entire purpose of this business. Also, it creates a situation, if I may say so without any disrespect to anyone, of, shall we say, the danger of individuals or groups in the country itself playing off rxne agency against another -- getting more money or more aid, or not disclosing the fact that aid has come from one place and that it is still wanted, and so on* It can lead to a lot of maladministration in that way. These are the points we should like to submit, and also we should, like to ask whether it is appropriate and possible for the United Nations, with such co-operation as it can obtain, to make it clear that acts that are illegAl under the law of the Congo would, if perpetrated, come under whatever penalties attached to them in due course or whenever it is that a government is established. That might be a deterrent to people saying, "So and so told me so and so, and I am going to make trouble". In other words, it is a question of the individual responsibility of people. A sergeant cannot 'say that Mr. Mobutu ordered me to do this, whatever it is . that is being done, because under the Congolese law a soldier cannot do these things. Therefore, if they knew when they committed excesses, or tried to bre'ak through customs and other regulations in order to upset-their currency, that, they would be held individually responsible, and if they were conscious that with a return to more stable conditions the law was likely to be against them as individuals,1 'if it were possible for that to be presented with some emphasis, it might act as a deterrent to people who would otherwise take irresponsible action* " : ' - • . • ..•:•.•••, . .; .•..',-.••'•;.. .--.•• With regard to the Commission itself,;we have supported its going to the ••••. . Congo because that was the majority view; we have supported its being composed exclusively of Asian-African representatives, again because it was the majority view and not because we have : any tendency toward racial discrimination --if other countries wished to-go, we 'should hot <5bject -- we neve gon6 along witfc the majority view but we also hold very :stronglyvthe viev that the timing of.this : is extremely important, it is also "ijfflp'drtant that it be a help and not a hindrance. It is also important that those of us-who afS going crtiduld be fully congxizant of the purposes for which-we are tne're and that there is full co-operation between/ the United Nations machinery and ourselves-. ;ltois is not just merely so that we can echo what they sayj' if there are, as may be suggested, errors and mistakes, they can'be pointed out and'that is our primary purpose --:we have no objection : to that. Biit to have a parallel authority in a place where there is already . a multiplicity of authorities would result, I think, in just one mbre addition to the'confusion; ; : ., • ; . . • •

" The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I would like to make one brief'observation = ;.! to explain the tactical position, so to say. When I invited Ambassador Dayal to return here, it was with a dual purpose: first of all, I felt that at the present stage it would be very useful for the Members of this Committee, and perhaps other delegations, to be able to discuss the situation first-hand with a man who has first-hand knowledge. On the other hand, I felt that it was also very necessary to have an opportunity to study just the type of problem to which Mr. Menon has drawn attention, immigration and similar matters, in a much more comprehensive way than is possible by cable or letter. For that reason, I asked 97-100

Ambassador Dayal to come here, so that we could have his assistance in these matters. Today, I have considered this meeting as being called primarily for a discussion of the Commission and its mandate; but I felt that; all the same^ it might help members to clarify their own thoughts and to get a clearer idea of tiie setting with reference to the Commission by getting such additional information as Mr. Dayal can give. I did not, however, have it in mind that this would be a full discussion with Ambassador Dayal concerning the Congo problem, For my own part, I would like to suggest that members, loth individually and. as a group, take the opportunity offered by Ambassador DayalJs presence to go much more fully into the matter, but I repeat that I regarded this meeting as primarily concerned with the question of the Commission and that this discussion with Ambassador Dayal is geared to that purpose; that is to say is a discussion which should serve to help us in considering the problem of the Commission•

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): We should like to point out that at the end of the last meeting we asked Ambassador Dayal to carry out certain talks -and, consultations and to prepare; as far as possible^ a text which could be used as a basis for discussion of the terms of reference to be given to the Conciliation Commission. 101

Ambassador Dayal has carried out these talks, and following up this he prepared the following te.xt ,as: terms of reference, which I should like to read out: . r (continued, in English) . -•-.,.•' .- : .-••- "In accordance with General Assembly resolution. 1^7^.. and in consultation with the Secretary-General, the Advisory Committee on the Congo" appoints the representatives of India, Tunisia, Guinea, Ghana, UAR, Sudan, Pakistan, Liberia, Mali, .Ethiopia,. Nigeria, Senegal,, .Indonesia,

Malaya and-Morocco" --. - ; ...... (continued* in French) : ••>.-••• • = : . . in other words, the' fifteen African-Asian Members of this Committee: ; , : (continued in English) . . . • --* "to assist in .carrying out the purposes of paragraph 3. of the . General Assembly resolution with, the; following terms of reference.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: We will duplicate the text and have it circulated at once.

TJN?; (Senegal) (interpretation from French): I intervene in the debate because, as several delegates have pointed out today, it is mainly a question of ascertaining whether we can implement the resolution adopted by the General Assembly, particularly paragraph 3. That is to say, after having accepted the membership and composition of the Conciliation Commission, we should now reach an agreement on Its mandate. io6 I believe that it is particularly'with regard to the definition of the mandate that it has seemed to me useful to have some clarification on two points which I believe are of interest. With your permission, sir, I should like to know, for example, whether we shall be able to find out, when the Conciliation Commission will be on the spot, if the political situation has changed so much during these six weeks during which Ambassador Dayal has been in the Congo. I should also like to know whether general elections carried out throughout the country might bring the same Deputies back to Parliament, or whether this would bring about radical changes. My delegation would be very much interested to know the opinion held by Ambassador Dayal with respect to this change in the political situation in the Congo. Is the change complete? In other words, would general elections bring hew representatives to the Chamber and the Senate, or would the same representatives be elected again?

Mr. DAYAL (Special Representative): So- far as the composition of the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate is concerned, I have inquired from a number of members of different political parties as to their opinion of the manner in which the elections were conducted, the previous elections, and every one of them has told me that the elections were fair enough; nobody has disputed the fairness of the elections. So I doubt that it would be useful or practicable to organize a new election. It might only add to the political turmoil without effecting any improvement whatsoever. • . -

Mr. DIALLO (Mali) (interpretation from French): I had asked for the floor, Mr. Secretary-General, to propose what you have now suggested, in order to bring us back to our actual agenda; so now there is no purpose in my intervening. I wish only to ock if, in view of the draft prepared by Ambassador Slim, which has yet to be circulated, we could not in the meantime turn our discussion to practical problems, for example, the best date, the best time, to send the Conciliation Commission. This would enable us to gain time and avoid dealing in generalities, which we shall have time to .deal with later. 107

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I think, Mr. Secretary-General, that the proposal made by our friend from Mali is very interesting. May I make a suggestion in this respect. In accordance with information just supplied to us by Ambassador Dayal, information with respect to our representatives at Leopoldville, it would "be useful to have some preparation before the arrival of the Conciliation Commission. I therefore wonder whether it might not be useful, with a view to this preparation, to resume the problem we left off laat time, that is to say, to send one member immediately as our agent to make the preliminary contact until such time as the Conciliation Commission arrives. I think it would take from a week to ten days to do all that is necessary and make known our views and pave the way for the arrival of the Commission. I believe this would be useful preparation which might contribute to creating a healthy atmosphere before the arrival of the Commission. I make this suggestion because it seems to me necessary to have some preparation beforehand. If this group does not agree, it is free to suggest other types of preparation. 108

The SECRETARY-GMRAL; I have a cable which repeats: something which was said yesterday, but in much more definite fora. I Just received it. "The Congolese President,'Joseph Kasavubu, is scheduled to fly to Now York tomorrow to protest against United Nations interference in Congolese internal affairsi, sources close to Kasavubu said today. The sources said that the President was expected to meet with the Secretary- General next week and also would protest personally against the United Nations leaderTs failure to recognize the High Commissioners set up to ,; run the nation. It aaid Kasavubu Would protest against the {Secretary-. General's criticism about the return of the Belgian technicians to the Congo." The first 'part is the one which may have "a certain influence on. the. ; cons iderat ions 'here. 'If this is donfirmed that President Kasavubu flies here ... tomorrow, obviously it is not a fact to be entirely left out. of account. ,

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): Does this information come from United Nations sources? In other words, more or less official sources, or does this come from a nevs agency?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; This comes from a nevs agency, from the United Press International.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): I do not really want to enter into an argument, but perhaps I was misunderstood. I did not say that the Belgians were not a factor and were only an alibi. When I used the word "alibi" I also used the word "escape" in order to make my meaning slightly clearer. I said that they were the villains of the piece as far as the Congolese tragedy was concerned. But I also advised that they should not be identified completely and exclusively with that tragedy. That was not the only factor. I, myself, mentioned some other reasons; for example, that the Special Representative had dealt with so many persons — Toms, Dicks and Harrys — that that had prevented a real leader being built up. The Nigerian Minister made an allusion to some other factors> that is, inferentially, certain activities which might have contributed to the accentuation of the gravity in the Congo. Therefore, it was certainly not my 109

intention, and I did not say that the Belgians were only an escape* What I was trying to point out was that they were one factor, but that there were many other factors which should also be analyzed before we arrive at a judgement. I wanted to give that explanation. But while I have the right of speaking, I refer to another point which is not connected with this at all. Mr. Menon has reiterated the suggestion which he made at the last meeting about officials, small and big, being made to realize that they would be answerable for every act of theirs. You said at the last meeting, Mr. Secretary-General, that you did not desire a built-in amnesty. I said — I do not know whether you remember that — that I was not talking about amnesty but I was talking about indemnity for all such actions. I remember the time when it was a favourite pastime of the British generals in India to shoot down Indians, In my own home town, I remember as a child watching about fifteen or twenty thousand Indians — my own countrymen at that time — being shot down, I just escaped myself as a little boy, in Jalianwala Bagh. But what happened later on? There was indemnity. And as far as the British administration was concerned, it was a very efficient and competent administration, whatever its other drawbacks were, or whatever its virtues may or may not have been. Therefore, I suggested at the last meeting also that let us not do this — tell these people that they will be responsible for every act; there should be indemnity for every act which was done under proper orders. Certainly, there should be no indemnity against wantonness. But if somebody is carrying out the orders of his superior., there ought to be indemnity. 110

.;.. . Mr* CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I believe that the proposal made*J>y .the representative pf Mali ,1s quite a wise one. It will enable us to lay down in detail certain practical tasks of our commission. But I believe that the-proposal of my colleague, Mr. Mongi Slim, cannot he3.p us. I da,not see how we can,send an agent to the Congo to prepare the climate, so to speak, which would enable the conciliation commission to arrive in the country end get down to work. What would be the terms of reference of this -..*•.;.. agent? What would his practipal Job be? Who would this agent go to see? These are very dangerous questions,and I believe that this solution cannot in any way help us to settle this criqis. In the opinion of my delegation, it is not correct at all to send an agent of this Committee to sort of prepare the ground in advance. What we should do is to..asK immediately all Governments Members of this commission to transmit

to the% Secretary-General of the United Nations the names of their representatives, and they cannot even fix a date of a meeting of this commission before our Committee * ...... Now, it Is possible that some members of the conciliation commission may be members of the Committee, but to foresee a meeting at the organization bringing

the members of the conciliation commission tand the: members of the Advisory Committee together in order to have an.exchange of,views on the entire situation, because the terms of reference which we just read out quickly, and which we have not discussed as yet, could then bs discussed and we could express our points'of" view on it --theseterms of reference does not.indicate in any detail what are the practical jobs of the commission. They are based on para0raph 3 of the resolution of the General Assembly, and specifically, the people who prepare these terms of reference did not wish to go into the practical aspects. Therefore, it would be during such a meetlngwhich I advocate that each delegate might express his point of view. That is why I asked that question a short while ago of Ambassador Dayal, designed to have me know what was the attitude of the United Nations concerning that trouble-maker.* Mobutu. Constitutionally* , he is a personality with whom we cannot deal. In particular, when we learned that this person has sent eleven Congolese officers to Washington for military training, the situation is serious. Ill

Now, the terms of reference, when we prepared them, did not take this into account. There is the Belgian presence. Perhaps we might make an amendment in the terms of reference. There are also those people whom we must see; but we cannot spell this out in the terms of reference. We can only do it when we have this meeting with those people who will go to Leopoldville, and then we can express our point of view. To sum up, with all due respect to the representative of Tunisia, I believe that his solution is very harmful to our work, and I believe that he will withdraw it for the present.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; The Committee, last time, decided in principle on this commission and, in doing so, gave an interpretation to sub-paragraph 3 of the resolution. I agree with Mr. Menon, that there is no mandatory rule that there should be a commission,but that was the decision, a majority decision. We also decided on the composition. We reserved, however, for further study the question of the mandate of theCocaalseioc and, while the Committee here was .studying it, Ambassador Dayal, as representative of the United Nations, was instructed to inform parties about this decision in principle. That is exactly where we were. Now there is a proposal for terms of reference, and my own feeling is that we should, first of all, try to get that text in our hands, and as an agreed text. Once we have that agreed text, I would agree with the Ambassador of Guinea that the proper thing is to approach Governments. I felt that I should not approach Governments pending whatever report might come from Leopoldville regarding reactions when parties were informed of our decision, and especially pending the study of the question of the terms of reference, because Governments are quite likely, before appointing a delegate, to want to see the terms of .reference. I felt that I was proceeding with one part of the ball, but not the other part; that is to say, there was not a whole ball. 112

For that reason, if the Committee can give further thought to the terms of reference, and perhaps reach a decision on them, that would give me the basis, as I see it, on which I could inform the fifteen Governments and ask them to take such meanures as they would consider practical for the assignment of representatives. I note the suggestion notf made by Mr. Caba Sory that the group should get together here so as to be able to discuss with the members of the Advisory Committee, who have given so much time to this problem, the practical issues which arise under the'terms of reference. That is to say, we would have written terms of reference, and then full discussion with the members of the Commission, which would enable them to see what is really the sense of these terms of reference in their practical application. That is the way in which I interpret the view of the Ambassador of Guinea, •' - • . That, however, takes us back to this meeting and to1 the immediate task, which should "DC, first of all, I believe^'to study and if possible to agree on the text of terms of reference, because that seems to be the step necessary in order to make it possible to proceed further in other directions with all the practical steps necessary and with the approaches'to"Governments, which are also necessary.

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana j: 'While we elre waiting for the copies of the •••> draft, we might, as has been suggested, touch upon other matters. • I want to know from Ambassador Dayal — because' I am a bit ignorant of what is happening — the actual activities of our envoys in Leopoldville as-regards their attempts to bring'about reconciliation. I want this in detail. I ask for this because the representative of Nigeria salid that'he was being frank and he questioned the honour of certain envoys in the Congo. % own country has an * Ambassador there —'a former Minister of the Cabinet, and a very experienced man — • who has the cause of Africa at heart. I think that any aspersion against the honour of'our envoys must be removed. I therefore feel it might tie worth while for Ambassador Dayal to give us information especially as regards the attempt being made by these envoys to bring about stability and help 'the Congolese cause • generally, I think it would be very useful for us to have this honest appraisal which has been requested. 113-115

Mr. JAJA WACKUKI? (Nigeria): Before Ambassador Dayal answers, I want to say clearly that I did not question anybodyfs honour. What I said is exactly what the representative of Ghana is saying now: I said that I wanted a frank statement of the facts. I am not interested in opinions. I want the facts as they are, because I have seen certain publications implicating some of our African Governments. I do not know whether they are true or false. But Ambassador Dayal, as the accredited representative of the United Nations, in whom the Secretary-General has confidence and this Committee has confidence, as the man who is on the scene and who has just arrived from there, is the one who is likely to be able to give us the facts. I do not want his personal comments; he is not entitled to comment, one way or the other. I should like the facts as he saw them, and that is all. But my friend, the Minister of India, felt that he should not say anything. Well, I did not press it. As far as I am concerned, if the facts are no longer secret and comments free — well, I will Just leave it at that. It may well be that, when the Commission gets there, it will be able to find the facts as they are. Whichever way it happens, then, is all right. If it comes now, well and good; if it does not come now, the facts will be out sooner or later* I only want to say that I did not question anybody!s honour, because I am interested in the facts and not in thq honour or dishonour of anybody. 116 :•

Mr. SECRETARY-GENERAL; The question is fully understood, I would Just say one thing and that is, I hope-'nobody attaches too much importance to the speculations in-the papers. Those speculations and rumours are running rather wild. ,If -J: were to believe what is said about myself I would really have a very shaky life* But I do not know to what extentj in this way/ you can clarify the joint activities of the Africari envoys in helping towards greater stability.

•:.:•• •;•• ••••Mr.. DAYAL (Special Representative): I think it would be relevant- for me tp, mention in a little detail ;the reactions of the Afro-Asian envoys to the^ propose:! to. send a- goodwill commission there. They all welcomed it, all nine of them. Some people thought "the number was too large, but when I informed them' that that was. the decision of the A'dvisory Committee, they naturally were content to ac'cept it:. They were; all convinced that some preparation with, the Government " was essential-, and Mr* Loutfi's colleague there said,.quite rightly in my

Judgement, that he Wjasr anxious, to. establish, contact with such political figures , there whom; he had, not met until,that -tine;,, such .contacts' being essential in view of our over.-riding •.purpojB.e .to help in -the establishment of the integrity end the unity of the. country. He said he .would like> for example, to go'and .see1 •• . Mr. Tshombe.., but his, opinion was->-< with-which.I personally agreed — that at the present time Mr. Tshombe's nerves were a little ruffled and he should allow him. some time in which to cool off before trying to contact him. It was also thought that a little time should be given to allow the dust to settle a bit so far as the law and order situation is concerned. Our mission of pacification in northern Katanga has been fairly successful. Similarly, the latest information from the province of Kasai is that the bands of Balubas are being dispersed and going back to their villages and to the forests; that the United Nations troops there are spreading themselves out to maintain and enforce the peace. In Leopoldville the arrangements that were arrived at last week with the ANC should be given a little time to settle down, and then we would have a better picture of the law and order situation. I am repeating the views held by the Afro-Asian envoys in Leopoldville, with which I found myself in general agreement. But they also at the same time insisted on having the full terms of reference of the Commission in order to make their contacts with the political figures as effective as possible. 117-120

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: There was the other question about their general efforts in the direction of pacification, fcecaufle they have been active, as you know,

Mr. IflUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): I have only one word to say. I agree fully that we -just decide on the competence and terms of reference of our Commission today. The terras of reference are rather wide. I myself believe that much discussion among us will not be required. We can transmit these terms of reference immediately to our Ambassadors there so that they may know the objectives of the Commission. At the same time, we can immediately cable our Governments and ask them to appoint their representatives, because that procedure will take a week at least. I believe that Mr. Dayal himself said that a week would be necessary for preparation. The Governments will have to brief the Ambassadors in order that the Commission may go to Leopoldville as quickly as possible. Now I should like to put a question to Mr. Dayal, who has spoken about Katanga. Frdin what I have understood, the forces of the United Nations are not yet in the area at the south of Katanga — that is to say, in the region which borders on Rhodesia. 121 '

Mr DAYAL (Special Representative)^- Th'e United Nations troops are not actually along the border but they are- in certain centres not very far from the border.

Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic): I heard that there was very much smuggling of arms into this country from the Union and from Rhodesia. I do not know if it--is true-or not.

The SECRKEARY^GENERAL; That might- be', because, at the railway and the regular road/ if I understand correctly, where.-we have our people/ such smuggling of arms should certainly be observed by them8 They are not at the frontier, but, if> they are not taking them through the savannah, I think that should be possible• • • .'- , - We have now got the text. It is only in English, but I think that the French will come very soon. So we can perhaps-now devote ow attention primarily to the text when we have had a couple of minutes to-study It.

Mr* Krishna MENON (India): I am reatiy. Aa often happens, I have to • - go to another Committee. I have only one submission to make. I do not think that drafting can be done by way of moving amendments, but I would like to leave one suggestion with the Committee to be considered. Assuming that the main structure is going to remain as it is, I think we should say, in consonance with the resolution and everything else, in line fcwr somewhere: "without interfering in the internal affairs of the Congo, towards the attainment of solutions of the present difficulties in the Congo", because "by the Congolese of solutions" and so on brings a lot of other problems, such as that of who is to find out which Congolese and everything else. We are concerned with the difficulties in the area. I would suggest we say: "towards the attainment of solutions of the present difficultes in the Congo". I mean, it may be by someone, by this or by that. It is a much longer-term problem. But that is assuming that the format remains. Of course, I assume that by such a study of the situation it would be understood by the Commission that it would in a very principal way include a study of the situation of the presence of non-Congolese nationals who are there not under the mandate of the United Nations. If that is assumed, I would not 122-125 press to have it in the terms of reference — if that is understood among the people who are going — because the Commission should not be in the position that one member may say, Veil, we are not allowed to look into this." If the situation covers that fact by r n understanding; then my Government will not ask for it to be put down in express terms. Otherwise, if we were to say somewhere about this factor of non-Congolese residence ••<•

The SBCREgARY-GENTglALi If I understand you correctly, you would like to have the sentence read: "towards the attainment of solutions of present difficulties."

Mr. Krishna MENON (India): "in the Congo".

The S BCRKSARY-GENSRAL: That is a geographical denomination?

Mr. Krishna MENON (India): Yes.

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): I wonder whether we could make a small amendment after "the Congo": after "without interference in the internal affairs of the Congo"; if we can then put in this phrase: "and without recognition of any authority not having any legal or constitutional sanction". So the sentence would read: "The Commission should study the situation, such a study to cover the entire territory of the Congo, and to direct the efforts without interference in the internal affairs of the Congo and without recognition of any authority not having any legal or constitutional sanction, towards the attainment .,." and so on. 126:

Mr. KrftftftOfe MSaoWdnOials I share .the concern of Ghana in this matter. We all know vhat is in his mind. ; We have*been discussing it all. along, but I am wondering, whether the phrase, "within the framework of the1constitutional and legal structure ..of the Republic, of the .Congo'1, is not more powerful than anything-else* As in the other case, this must, also be explained before people go there. I am afraid he raised the point because it should not be forgotten tha-t e.B far as the wording is concerned we should stress that "within the framework of the constitutional and .legal structure" involves a lot of things, whether somebody can send somebody else .out, whether somebody can recognize . : .- . somebody else and so on. It Is somewhat wider but at the same time not weaker*, This fact has been pinpointed and now,having done that, if my friend from Ghana feels that it is adequate that would be a happy solution. But it must be understood that he raised it.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I think I should say here now that we participated in drafting this paper and that we took a number of facts into consideration. This phrase which Mr. Krishna Menon has rightfully pointed out, "within the framework: of the constitutional and legal structure of the Republic of the Corigo'V was put 'in precisely to take this point and, so to speak, not ; to prevent the ComniLssioa trom speaking, to someone without in any way giving that person or vesting him with any kind of recognition, to see him as a matter of fact because he is there, but not to give him any legal authority. That is why we have ,ilxjluded this., phrase. I would feel, I think, that that is adequately covered; the i. preoccupation of Ambassador QuaiSon-Sackey is absolutely right, but 1 rbninki it, has .been covered adequately.

Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria )i I want to say that while it is quite all right for us to make it implicitly clear in our discussion here so that the Committee shall be aware of what is meant, the clause here naturally makes it absolutely clear to the Committee that only the constitutional provisions will guide their actions. They are not supposed to give recognition to what is not recognized by the law that has been established by the Congolese State because to do so means to deal with things that would bring about complications. 127-130

The amendment itself, if it goes specifically to mention this particular point, will in fact derogate from this particular clause and may lead to certain difficulties. This is going to be sent to various Governments and would go to the Congo, This may "bring about the very problem we will want to solve because there may be certain elements there who will get this docianent and say, "Oh, well, so it means that this Committee is coming here and they wonrb even consider us". It is better to leave these things Just as they are so that everybody will feel that the Committee is coming to £he Congo to find a solution. The moment you put that clause there, it shows exclusiveness, that you are trying to exclude certain elements. You do not need to express in certain terms in &ie terms of reference the idea of excluding a particular element. We do not consider any particular element as an illegal organization. That may be a matter for discussion here, but I do not feel that it is something that should be excluded at all* So the clause as it stands covers everyOhing. 131

.Mr. ALIOUNE (Senegal)(interpretati6n from French): Of course, I still do not have the French version, of the text, but I have tried to understand it and to follow, the. discussion. If this Commission is to go to the Congo in .. order to f indt a solution for the .Congolese people, I do not believe it would be appropriate-,to. have a. rigid; document wjiich would place the Commission in a rather difficult -situation.- It .would be better to be flexible from the start. May ..I give an ,exainple.? . If we speak of the constitution in respect to Katanga, .we may say that no .discussions,are to be held with Mr. Tshombe, but the reality is such that once we are there .we will have .to discuss these matters even with Provincial Governments, because from our point .of view we must implement, the General Assembly resolution, particularly paragraph 3 with respect to the integrity .and unity of-the Congolese, territory and people. Therefore, if we start witfc a document that excludes some elements, our task will not be made easier. .-;.:' - . .-. .-.-. • :•/-, ..•• . .-... -••;•.'.. ' ,•-.••. . ..- •

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): I have the greatest respect for Mr. Krishna MenonTs views, but I do not quite see why he wants to delete the words "by the Congolese". I think that those who prepared the text wished to come as close as possible to the exact framework defined in paragraph 3 of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at the special emergency session. I have already had occasion to explain this at other meetings of our group. The solution to be found for the Congo problem has to be found by the Congolese without any specification as to which Congolese, Paragraph 3 of that resolution states: "Appeals to all Congolese within the Republic of the Congo" — that means Congolese who are not abroad — "to seek a speedy solution by peaceful means of all their internal conflicts for the unity and integrity of the Congo, with the assistance, as appropriate, of Asian and African representatives appointed by the Advisory Committee on the Congo..." Therefore, I think we would lose nothing by retaining the words "by the Congolese" because otherwise we might be criticized for having imposed a solution ourselves, and it is not for us to give them a solution. The Conciliation Commission may, by means of discussions and talks, persuade the various parties to find the best solution for their stability and unity within their legal and constitutional framework, but we are not the ones who have to find a solution. 132-135

It is they who must find the solution and, particularly, to agree on a given solution. Therefore, I believe that the words "by the Congolese" are of some importance, and I would be grateful to the Indian delegation if it would not prass the point. I think this places us precisely within the framework of the resolution. 156 , Mr* BARNES (Liberia); I fully appreciate the reasons given by the representative of Ghana for an amendment of the terms of reference of the Conciliation Commission to include a provision which would preclude the . Commission's consulting on or discussing political factors within the constitutional framework of the Congolese Government. However, in the light of the provisions of these terms of reference as well as of the emergency session resolution, which provides in respect of the terms of reference that a study should be undertaken to cover the entire territory of the Congo, I have been wondering in my own mind whether such a study could be successfully carried out in all areas of the Congo without consulting and bringing into consideration the political leaderships that exists in all parts of the country. I do not believe that limiting the study or the consultations to a particular group of leaders in the Congo will achieve any beneficial results for the Conciliation Commission. I think that the Conciliation Commission, in the interests of reaching some agreement between these leaders, will have to take into consideration the realities that exist in the Congo — that certain political leaders are in effective control of certain areas of the Congo, and that they must be brought into these discussions.

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): I have no doubt whatsoever that whichever Commission goes will take into consideration a number of factors in its work, and there is definitely no question of restricting its activities whatsoever, VJhat is important is that there should be peace, stability and conciliation in the Congo. I brought in my amendment solely to emphasize the aspect of our work and our respect for the institutions which have been established in the Congo for the moment. My Government has always believed that, in spite of talk about anarchy and so on, there are institutions which have been set up with the approval of the Congolese people through democratic processes. However, in view of the interventions which have been made by members here, I am prepared to give and take, and therefore I withdraw my suggestion.

Mr. JHA (India): My Minister has already explained the text of the amendment that he proposes. I think his idea was to have a slightly larger framework. The resolution says that the General Assembly "Appeals to all Congolese within the Republic of the Congo to seek a speedy solution", and so on, but so far as assistance from the Asian and African* representatives was concerned -- I am speaking purely semantically and I would differ slightly from Mr. Slim — that assistance was not necessarily to be confined to the Congolese. In other words, such assistance may have a somevhat larger framework. His doubt about the specification "attainment by the Congolese" is connected with what he has already told us today and on the last occasion, namely, that we do not want this Conciliation Commission to go about and parley with all kinds of Congolese people claiming to have a say in this. Of course, some must be consulted. There is no question about that — some important ones, at any rate — and certainly those which come into the constitutional legal structure of the Republic of the Congo, But he did not want the Commission to "become an instrument for further divergencies, and that is what was at the back of his mind. I should like to know what the views of our other members are. We have heard two members, I think, and I should like to know what others feel about this suggestion. Then I should like to reply at the end, if I may.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; For purposes of clarification, may I raise a question? Is not the amendment proposed by Mr. Menon in fact an amendment in two parts which can be separated? The first part refers to "by the Congolese" and is, I feel, an obvious effort to adjust the text here to the resolution. The other part is somewhat limitative -- "for solutions of their present difficulties in the Congo". "Present difficulties in the Congo" can certainly be said without any departure from the resolution, "because, of course, there are difficulties in the Congo which are not particularly the difficulties of the Congolese. In the interests of clarification, I would just like to point out that while the argument brought out by Mr, Slim certainly applies to the first part, it does not necessarily apply to the second part. Mr. WmJOPRANqro (Indonesia): I would like to recall the position at the last meeting, when we understood'that i!n sending a Conciliation Commission it should "be, in the first place, a kind of representative of the United Nations and only in the second place, or even the third and fourth place, should its members consider themselves as representatives of their respective Governments. This was a very important decision and, because I understand it has been accepted unanimously, I consider the terms of reference as a kind of guidance to combine and unify the efforts of the members of the Commission who are going to the Con^o. In my observations at the last meeting I stressed the importance of the unity oif opinion, deep understanding and complete agreement among the members. I think this is very important;'it may even be the key to success or failure in this mission. I have therefore 'stressed that there should be deep understanding and close co-operation among the members themselves, I consider these terms of reference as a kind of guidance in this unification of opinion. Therefore I will not study the terms of reference paragraph by paragraph; what I have in mind is their aim, and in that sense my delegation has ho objection to accepting them as guidance. We do not consider them as anything other than guidance, because it does not matter whether they are splendid or not splendid, what matters is the approach of the members on the spot when they confront and talk with the various leaders in the Congo. We cannot put this kind of thing down in a letter or in terms of reference. This, of course, is more or less a personal approach, but I think it is important. To be brief, therefore, we have no objection to this draft of the terms of reference, but I would like also to know what is the opinion of the Secretary-General, because all this is done in consultation with the Secretary-General.

The SECRETARY GENERAL: If I accept this invitation to speak, I would say just two words. I felt mildly unhappy with the text of the terms of reference because it was of such a general nature. Putting myself in the place of the delegates — I mean those going out to the Congo — I would not feel that I had very solid guidance. However, with the suggestion made here by Mr. Caba, that it vould meet and consult with this Committee and, so to speak, develop more practical terms, thinking on the basis of these terms of reference, this weakness in the terms of reference may be met. That would fill the gap that I think exists here. There is, for example, the very touchy question, with whom they should get in touch, and so on and so forth. That is a problem that can be discussed with them, and here. In such circumstances the text does not meet with the same objections that I felt I had, locking at it from the point of view of the emissaries. As regards the suggested amendment, I would for my part follow Ambassador Slim on the first phrase, nby the Congolese", but I would accept the second one because it just widens the scope, so that even, for example, the return of the Belgians can be studied as part of the problem. I have, however, one very small editing change in the introduction. I wonder if we should say, " In accordance with", because it is not strictly in accordance with;, it is under the resolution. I would there take the point made by Mr. Krishna Menon. I think it is legally more correct to say, "Under the General Assembly resolution", such and such, "and in consultation with ...". That is to say, we invoke it with authority, but we do not say that it is exactly what the resolution requested the Committee to do. Further, there is another small editing change. In the third line I would prefer n ... on the Congo appoints representatives of", because if it said "the representatives", I am afraid the Press and other readers may believe that it is a self-appointment of the Members of the Committee, and that is not intended, as you know. With those few observations I, for my part, do not have anything further to say.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I am a little confused. I do not quite understand the amendment which Mr. Krishna Menon suggested. .Apparently it is in two parts* I wonder if you would give us those amendments*

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I will read it to you, and Ambassador Jha can check to see that I am correct. It is in the fourth line of the text within quotes, *.., affairs of the Congo towards the attainment ,..fl. The amendment suggested — the first part of the amendment suggested — is"the deletion of the 1^7-150

three words "by the Congolese". Then In the next line, "of solutions of present difficulties in the Congo"/instead of, as it now stands, "solutions of their present difficulties."

Mr. JAJA WACHUKU (Nigeria): I think that will be all right so'long as""'' we leave the othar one and Just make the second amendment. That does not alter the sense at all. I think that would be acceptable.

Mr. JHA (India): If that is the view of the Committee, I think we will accept it. . .,

Mr. DIALLO (Mali)(interpretation from French): Mr. Secretary-General, I simply wish to say that I am very interested in the debate, but I wish to apologize to Committee members, I cannot now state the views of my delegation until I have seen the 'text in French.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL (interpretation from French): The French text is coming. This will help us. Then I would suggest'that it"start, "Under . . - - .,''...'....•. General Assembly resolution", etc., "appoints representatives", in the third ••• line, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding. I take it that bur French-speaking friends will want a few minutes to read this. ' '.''" ' 151-152

For the French-speaking members, I shall indicate the amendments before they are made in the text. In the first line, replace "Conforme*ment a" with "Aux termes de", In the third line, replace "les repre'sentants" with "des repre'sentants", Finally, in the text of the mandate, in the fourth line, replace "de leurs difficulty's pr^sentes1' with "aux difficulte's pre*sentes au Congo".

Mr« JHA (India): I think the names of the countries should be regrouped in alphabetical order.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: That is good for you from the point of view of protocolI

Mr. JAJA WACHUKU (Nigeria): Mr. Secretary-General, I want to move now that the Committee adopt these as the terms of reference of the commission,

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; As amended.

Mr. JAJA WACHUKU (Nigeria): As amended.

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): In the English text I suggest that we insert commas after "efforts" and after "affairs of the Congo", so that it will read "direct their efforts, without interference in the internal affairs of the Congo, towards the attainment", etc.

Mr. CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I agree with the representative of Nigeria that we should not waste the Committee's time,but it seems to me that we could avoid certain repetitions in the text. I should like to propose that we remove the words "cette e'tude devant englober", so that we should avoid repetition by simply saying "La Commission e*tudiera la situation dans la totalitd du territoire du Congo ... " . 155

Mr. BARNES (Liberia): I think that this should read as follows: "The Commission should study the situation as it covers the entire territory of the Congo." . . ' : ,

The SECRETARY»«GENERAL: I am afraid that we are now entering into a very dangerous stage where we do not really improve the text, but there are very many ways to improve the same source, as you know. (Continued in French) ., For my part, it is possible that the text is somewhat long. It is not a matter of elegance. Moreover, in order to avoid any extension of the discussion I should propose that purely drafting matters not be ;discussed. This is not an important point. But in the English text it does not have another meaning. : After the word "situation11 — this is a word for word translation — that is why it IB not good French. • ..-;.• ; •

Mr. JHA (India): I do not worry about the French text. I suppose there may be some difficulty there. But I would not like-the English text to ,be changed. I think it is put in the right form, with only one little suggestion, that is the word Man. It should read "the Commission should study the situation, such study to cover ...M.

The- SECRETARY"GEHEftA.L; It does not change the meaning in; any. way. . ,

Should we defer the•• observations and follow the wise suggestion of the ; •• representative of Nigeria, since we are not likely to improve'-very much on the, . text.

Mr. CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I believe that if the proposal we just made were accepted, namely, a meeting with the Commission, we could make many comments concerning these terms of reference, which we do not reject. We do accept them in order to save time. Nevertheless, we should like to draw the attention of our Advisory Cocanittee to that clause: "The Cccmioeion ...should diarect their efforts without interference in the internal affairs of the Congo ...". It Is necessary to avoid having the Commission falling into the trap into which the United Nations has fallen. In other words, that non-interference has been interpreted by formulas which have complicated the situation for us in the Congo. At the beginning when we said "no negotiations in Katanga1* we were told about non-interference, and now we see that Katanga has taken an affirmative stand. When we said that we would take a firm stand with Belgium, the United Nations had not taken a radical position and today we now see that the situation is dangerous. When we said that we must listen to the decisions of the Parliament, mention was also made of "non-interference" and now we see the need to convene Parliament. I therefore see that events have fully justified us. Under cover of neutralism, this does not mean that the Commiesion should make the same mistakes which the United Nations made in the Congo. The fact that the situation is worsening today is very clear in the eyes of the Committee. We have seen a massive infiltration of Belgian elements in all sectors of the Congolese national life. The situation has worsened just because we did not wish to take a stand concerning certain problems. 155

Committee must avoid such mistakes and both elements which I have pointed out— on the one hand political disorder .with any kind of puppet government which someone has tried to set up: in the Congo, and, on the other hand, the anarchy created by the Congolese national army. The report of the Secretary-General is quite clear on this; there is anarchy. Now, if we do not take any clear-cut stand on such problems, I do not see what would be the purpose of the presence of the United Nations in the Congo. We must not hide behind the cloak of non-interference and leave the problem . • ''-"'• -\ " untouc'hed, the problem which we are called upon to settle. Each delegate must weigh the actual meaning of this clause, what is meant by rioh- interference. It is ju'st because anarchy is prevailing that we have spoken of non-interference. But what about these off icers who are coming to Washington and then going to London? Now, what kind of non-interference is this?

•'The SECRETARY-GENERAL; You do not object to the' phrase — the phrase has to be here '— but you feel that the interpretation' requires some discussion? That is to say, you do not object to the text, but you want to discuss the interpretation at a later stage,

Mr0 CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I am not opposed at all to including these words, but it is the interpretation which is made of this clause. This has been interpreted so incorrectly, this phrase, non-interference, that we are now confronted with difficult situations because we did not wish to take any clear-cut stand on concrete problems that have faced us in the Congo.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I feel you may have opened a theme on which we can have a new meeting without any difficulty, but I do not think you want to do that. I feel that your observations will be carefully noted, and without any difficulty for our adoption of this text.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) : I suggest that we proceed now to the consideration of adopting this. If that is the Committee's wish, that is the wish of my delegation. 156

Secondly, we should proceed to the question of a practical consideration of where are these people to come. Are we to take up the suggestion of ray colleague,Ambassador Cafca Sory; are we going to suggest that they come here? Shall we proceed to some practical matters?

The BT3CRKPA.RY-GENEEIAL; I thought we were now at the point to note that there is no objection to the text, and, as we do not vote here unless absolutely necessary, we can just put on record the fact that the text is accepted by the Committee. It was so decided.

The SECRETARY-GEMERAL: That leaves us with the other question to which you have referred. There have been several references to the suggestion of Ambassador Caba Sory. My practical suggestion would be that all of you — and we would send a letter — now approach your Governments, inform them about the decision, inform them, about the terms of reference, ask them to appoint forthwith their representatives, and then say that it is the view of the Committee that it would be useful if these representatives could meet here in New York and have a discussion with this committee so as to clarify the field and their task in more detail. I take that, in view of this discussion, to be, more or less, the agreed line. That leaves us with one practical question, and that is when we should suggest that such a meeting should take place.

Mr.Mongi SLIM(Tunisia)(interpretation from French): It is precisely with respect to this that I was about to suggest, and for your assistance in advising our Governments, that we would be happy to have the representatives from here or elsewhere here in New York next week sometime so as to be able to arrange a meeting as soon cts possible, as suggested by Ambassador Caba Sory.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I should express the desire that such a meeting be held next week, and give that as an indication. My guess would be, in view of the debate which is likely to cake place in the General Assembly, that we would then be thrown over to Saturday again. But that might be useful also from other points of view, because it may be difficult for some people to turn up right away. 157

. Mr, JHA (India): Mr. Secretary-General, I think it is better it, in your communications to Governments, you mentioned Saturday or some date lilce thatj because I cannot see that they will be able to select a representative — there will be a process of selection — and then the representative selected will be able to arrive here before a weeke I think it is perhaps better to say "that it is the desire of the Advisory Committee that the representatives nominated should be here by a certain date and meet the Advisory Committee on Saturday. i

The SECREIARY-GENERAL; I would feel that the earlier they come, the better it is. But you can combine the two things by saying that the Advisory Committee plans to have a meeting on Saturday, and then they can come here earlier and consult with delegations^ and so forth; and yet we have the fixed date and have the meeting on Saturday. It was so decided, , .. . •

The meeting rose at 1.15 P«m» CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No. 10 12 November 1960 ENGLISH

ITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE COKGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters on Saturday, 12 November I960, at 10 a,m.

60-265^0 The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think we can begin now, although there are a couple of members who have not yet arrived. I should like, first of all, to mention a letter I received yesterday from the delegation of India, which has been brought to your attention. I also wish to draw to your attention a letter received this morning from Mr. Lumumba; addressed to the President of the General Assembly, but also to me. It is obviously for the present session of the General Assembly to decide how this letter should be treated, what kind of character it should have as a document, and so on and so forth. But, in spite of that, I feel that I must mention the main point of the letter to you, as it has a bearing on our discussion. It is a fairly long letter, and I shall go straight to the relevant point. 5 (The Secretary-General) (continued in French) MI ask for the immediate organization of a referendum in which all citizens of the Republic will participate; this referendum to tie organized under the direction of the assemblies of the provincial governments, but under the control of a United Nations Observer Commission* This Commission will tske all provisions nect.ssary to ensure th<* freedom of vcrte of all electors. Provisions will aJ.,3o be taken to avoid any fraud; aud this referendum will be for the adoption of a presidential regime, followed by the election of the PresJderrt of the Republic, by direct suffrage and will allow the people freely and directly to choose their own leaders and end the present crisis.H (continued in English) I delete a few sentences that are not relevant. (continued in French) "The Congolese people impatiently await the decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations on this realistic and objective proposal, and that the Conciliation Commission that will soon arrive in the Congo be a commission of observers in charge of controlling the referendum." (continued in English) I felt that I should bring this to your knowledge for the significance you may wish to attach or not to attach to it. We could not on this occasion have the advantage of meeting., as we hoped, all the representatives on the planned conciliation commission. In order to do that, I think we will need to have a meeting early next week. But pending that, it was considered useful to have this regular Saturday meeting for stock-taking and for further discussion.

Mr* GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I take the floor to express the deep sorrow of my delegation, indeed, of my Government, for the loss sustained by the Irish troops in North Katanga, in the performance of their duties* We feel particular sorrow because our troops have worked in co-operation with the troops of the Irish people. It is therefore my duty to express that sorrow to the Irish delegation. The SECRETARY-GENERAL! I am sure that the representative of Ethiopia has voiced the opinion of the whole Comnittee and all its members. May I suggest that we join in asking our colleague from Ireland to transmit to .feis Government arid troops the heartfelt sympathy, regret and condolences of this Committee.

Mr« KENMSDY (Ireland): Mr. Secretary-General, may I express on behalf of my delegation our deep appreciation; of. the expression of sympathy so graciously made by the representative of Ethiopia.; and by yourself. When this meeting is over, I shall convey these expressions to the Irish Government and I shall ask them to convey these condolences also to the relations of the deceased. I feel quite certain that these expressions of heartfelt sympathy will greatly sustain them in the deep sorrow which has come upon them in the cause of peace. Mr* SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I should Like to ask for some information from you, Mr. Secretary-General, Do you know whether there are any telegrams or letters which have come to you regarding the designation of delegates? How many have been nominated to form the Conciliation Commission/ and how many are here or will be here soon?

Mr» BUNCHE; As of this moment we have designations of representatives on the Commission to go to the Congo from India, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Mali, Nigeria, the Sudan, Ghana, Guinea, Malaya and the United Arab Republic.

Mr. BARNES (Liberia); We have already sent a notification that we have designated our representative, Ambassador George Sherman, who is here.

The ^SECRETARY^IIERAL;! The other part of' ttoa question was, time of arrival. What can you say about that?

Mr* BUNCHEt Only one or two of the letters indicate when they will arrive. Most of them ask for an indication of the date of departure of the Commission, which we have not been able to give to them. Some are already here, of course.

Mr. KRISHNA MENON (India); My Government's position in this matter is that we should communicate to them, after this meeting, the date of the meeting of the Commission in Leopoldville, which we have been requested to fix, and our delegate will go direct to Leopoldville because the Government does not feel that it is necessary to send him here; and also, in the event of delays taking place, we do not want him to hang around here. So our delegate, whose name has been communicated to you and who has had experience in Africa, as soon as you let. us know the date, will be present on the date of the assembly of the Commission* 7-10

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: That has already been communicated* But for those who are here we should arrange a meeting where we can discuss the details of the terms of reference* But obviously, today would be too early to arrange a discussion with those who are to take part in the: Commission/ and for that reason we shall have to check, I suppose, on Monday morning, as to who are here, and if there is a sufficient number, it should be either Monday night or at the earliest possible time when we have present those who are to-arrive in New York. I think that that is the reasonable way to handle it. All we can note is that we are not in that fortunate position today,

Mro LQUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French),; I merely wished to inform the Committee that, our representative, Mr. Zayat, who was our, representative on the Advisory Committee on Somalia, arrived here and will be in this room in a few moments, ,-.. ..

. . -Mr. E^SAN (Pakistan): Would it be in order to inquire the names of these nominees from the countries who have sent in their nominations? It might assist us-in choosing our own nominees. .

Mr. BUNCHE; For India, it is Shri Rameshwar Rao, M.P.; there is an inquiry as to the probable date of the departure of tiae Commission; for Ethiopia, H.E. Ato Andom Mellesse, Ambassador to the Sudan; for Tunisia, H.E. TaieVSahbani, With the rank of Ambassador; For Malaya, Mr. Mohamed Sopiee bin Shaikh Ibrahim; for Nigeria, Mr. Ja

(Mr. Bunche)

For Guinea, the representative will be Mr. Keita Fodeba, Minister of National Defence. For Mali, the representative will be Mr* Demba Diallo, who is a member of the delegation here. For the United Arab Republic, the representative will be Dr. Mohamed Hassan El Zayat.

Mr, BARNES (Liberia): Our representative will be Mr. George Sherman, our Ambassador, to Ghana.

Mr. WIRJOPRABQIO (Indonesia): The Indonesian representative will be Ambassador Major General Abdul Kadir.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I think that that is all the information we can give at the present time. :

Mr. BUNCBE; We now have before us the cablegram from Indonesia appointing Ambassador Major General Abdul Kadir,

Mr. CABA. (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I should like to inform the Committee that our representative on the Conciliation Commission, Mr, Keita Fodeba, the Minister of National Defence and Security, will be arriving in New York at 2 p.m* today and will thug be able to be present at a meeting CB Mor.day evening. 12-15

Mr. THIAM (Senegal) (interpretation from French): I have not asked to speak in order to give this Committee the name of the Senegalese representative* My Government will no doubt inform me very soon of the name of our representative who will take part in the work of the Conciliation Commission. I have asked to speak in order to raise a question which, although it has already been examined, should, we believe, be reconsidered. I refer to the question of the composition of the Conciliation Commission. As everyone here knows, we held a number of discussions on the question whether the membership of the Commission should be restricted or expanded. After an exchange of many views it appeared that agreement had been reached that the Commission should be composed of countries with troops in the Congo. I have now had some contacts with African countries, and especially countries of West Africa. As a result of those contacts I have re-examined the above-mentioned question. Furthermore, a number of countries have asked me officially to raise again before this Committee the question of the composition of the Conciliation Commission. Some other countries are as interested as we are in the solution of this problem. It is true that these countries have not sent troops to the Congo, but their political and moral interest in settling the Congolese problem in the best possible conditions is evident. These countries would also like to take part in the work of the Commission. They feel that they might make a useful contribution. I am thinking specifically of countries that are members of the Agreement and have expressed the desire to participate in the work of the Conciliation Commission. I would therefore appreciate it if the Secretary-General would allow us once again to examine whether the membership of the Conciliation Commission should be eipandeti or nhether the restricted membership should be maintained. 16

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think that the members of the Committee will "be reluctant to re-open a discussion TTrUli has been resolved after long consideration in the African group, but, of course, I am in the hands of the members and it is not for me to rule one way or the other. I Just wanted to express this assumption regarding the attitude of the members.

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): I vas going to start a discussion on the timing of the departure of the Conciliation Commission, but in view of the intervention which has been made by the representative of Senegal, may I be allowed to say a word or two on this . The matter which he has raised is definitely a very important one and, with all due respect to the representative of Senegal, I would maintain that at this late hour a discussion on the composition of the Conciliation Commission would only serve to create more difficulties for us and would impede our progress. May I say here that in fact this matter was raised in the African group and it was one of us, if I may mention a name, the representative of Tunisia,, who explained very fully the import of the resolution of 21 September. After his explanation and a full discussion, the representative of the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), who raised the issue, was prepared to abandon the idea. I think all of us agreed that it was impossible not to confine the composition of the Commission to those of us on this Advisory Committee. Therefore, I would appeal to my friend not to press this too much and to allow us to proceed and make progress. We have made considerable progress in the matter, and we should continue doing so. Secondly, I think it is very clear that we are all eager to start. The Conciliation Commission definitely must proceed, and the view of my delegation is that the earlier they leave New York for Leopoldville the better. Although you, Mr. Secretary-General, have suggested there might be a meeting on Monday, we should not rule out the idea of having a meeting on Sunday, if it is possible and if those who must come here arrive in time. If the Commission left by the middle of next week — I am thinking of Tuesday or Wednesday — that would allow the arrangements to be made for their departure. That is the view of my delegation. 17-20 ' . . .:V -.I,;.:-. . (My. $j&teop~eaQkiy, Ghana)

The other point upon 'which I vlah to comment is the message which you have received from Prime Minister Lumumba. I do not know whether in fact you want us to express a view on this, but I would suggest that the Commission should definitely bear this communication in mind. In any case, 'I 'have no 'doubt that in their work in the Congo, Mr. Lumumba will definitely raise' the issue again. But I think it should be left to the Commission to do what it can about the proposals which wp re put forward by the various leaders in the Congo.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: It was not my intention to submit this letter, which was, in fact, addresead to the President of the General Assembly, for debate, but it contains important information of which I think the members should be aware, , 21

Mr. CAEA. (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I simply wish to take up the suggestion of the Minister of Senegal to say that at this precise moment in our deliberations it will be difficult for the Advisory Committee to go back on the terms of reference that have already been approved and that have been put before the General Assembly as a whole and the political leaders of the Congo. The constitution and composition of the Commission took at least three weeks to decide upon, and it was after lengthy deliberations and discussions that we finally agreed to set this Commission up. And if I recall correctly, our colleague of Tunisia specified that it was not a question of telling the political leaders of the Congo that the members of the Commission were going to the Congo because their Governments had sent troops. I know with what idea in mind he expressed this clarification, and I know what was in our minds when we agreed to the composition of this Commission and when we notified both the Assembly and the Congolese of this Commission. I think that we should tell our colleague of Senegal, who spoke on behalf of a number of African States, that the United Nations does not discard their co-operation in the search for a solution to the Congolese problem, but that we are ready to take account of this suggestion for the future; but $*>« Committee cannot change the terms of reference at this point in the discussion.

Mr. THIAM (Senegal) (interpretation from French): I think that . there are some points that should be clarified here. First of all, it is not a question of going back on the terms of reference of the Commission. The composition of the Commission is one thing, and the terms of reference of the Commission is a different question. Therefore, 1 would ask that the problem I raised be discussed only, and that is the composition of the Commission. If I did speak, it was not because I had the desire, nor have I the habit, of going back on decisions already taken, but I that-in such a thorny and delicate question it is not too good to be inflexible in oners position, and whenever we believe that a solution might be better than the previously adopted one, it is up to us to suggest these solutions, if possible. I think that we are all aware of the fact that, since the composition of the Commission was made public, certain officials of the Congo have expressed the desire — and this can be gathered from a telegram that was .received by the 22-25 (Mr, Thiam, Senegal)

Secretary-General and w"hich was-:. r^ad..out to us — that if a Commission is to go to the

Mr. Krishna MEtON (India): We cannot but regret that we have to spend time on this preliminary discussion; as you know, in the communique we made, we regard this problem as having developed in the new State which requires a sense of urgency -- not only urgency in procedural ways but urgency in addressing ourselves to the political implications for what is going on. Therefore now, in addition to the questions of dates and so on, this new problem has arisen and I should like to state our position on it. My Government had its views and reservations in regard to the composition of this Commission when it was formed, but we were parties behind the Committee discussions and we agreed to che present position as the general view. This has been communicated. First of all, procedurally any changes in this would require reference .back to Delhi and consideration inside Government, with all its implications, and that would take considerable time. I am sure that it is not the desire of the representative of Senegal, whatever may be the merits of this new proposal, which I do not want to discuss now,and that is far eclipsed by the consideration that delays are not only undesirable but may probably may prejudical to the very purposes the United Nations has in the Congo and also to the visit of this delegation. Ultimately, after this Commission goes there, if in their wisdom they desire the assistance of other Africans, then it is up to them to inform the Advisory Committee and add to them or send a second committee or whatever it may be. Nothing prevents any advice being taken by people at their own levels and in their own way; it does not commit the whole body of us. That is one thing. Therefore, we agree with the representatives of Ghana and Guinea in thinking that we might have made a better decision or that we might have made a worse decision. But we have taken a decision and we have gone so far, we have advised people to come. How do we know, for example, theoretically speaking, that each of these Governments would have agreed to send delegations if the conditions had been what is now being proposed? They might say, "we do not agree to a delegation of twenty people or thirty people going, it is large enough" This is a new problem altogether. It would certainly take very considerable uime so far as we are concerned. Therefore I hope that the representative of Senegal would listen to his colleagues and neighbours from Africa and feel that he has made the point. I have no doubt that that would have a bearing on the thinking of the other delegations, particularly the African delegations which are there and on his own representative who might press this point of view. 27-50

• ' ' (Mr v.Krishna Menon, India) The second, thing we want to say is tills: that it is more important today to us to fix a date for this Commission to meet in Leopuldville. As I said, we accepted the common view. We think that it is not a useful expenditure of time to have brought all these people here and to have involved them in all these matters. But now that has been done. We have given ohera ,a. date to meet here,the 12th. Any of these people that wanted to come should have come. If their Governments had thought that it was a wise decision, they would have sent their people here. We did not think it was and therefore we would have preferred to send our man to Leopoldville. These people would have "been there today if we had wanted it. However, since these people are here, they should meet at the earliest possible moment, either today or early tomorrow morning or whatever time can be arranged by the. United Nations. We can fix an early date such as Monday afternoon or Tuesday morning for chem to meet in Leopoldville. I hope that all my colleagues will .support this because the longer we go on the more complications arise in ..this matter.. Ic is very necessary Uiat the delegation should become a fait, accompli-before further complications set in in this matter, I am sure that we all know the implications of this, end we therefore request that we now proceed tb consider the date of the assembly, cf the delegations in Leopoldville,.and take the-view that we have informed the Governments that the preliminary, meeting will take place here today and that if they have not come it is unfortunate -- and that they can come tomorrow morning, if you want to give them a little grace. We can send them away and arrange for them to leave by tomorrow -or by Monday morning so that they may • assembly in Leopoldville late Monday afternoon or evening or on Tuesday, morning.

After all, we are not dealing with situations of usual character:. There are emergency positions here, there are, armed- groups and disorders. Now there: is this telegram of Mobutu's having arrested a member of the Lumumba Government or his associate or whatever it may be -.-.- the1 President of che Leopoldville - province. 31 (Mr, Krishna Menon, India) . ' * • -: "•'.• ' ' ' In spite of-our" Views, "we are now laying great stress on tfce position of Mr, Kasavubu because he is > the Head of State. In spite of, our views none of us has questioned his position as Head of State in respect of the Congolese Constitution. Here is one of the elements that is operating in an opposite direction with regard to another, though lower level, constitutional Head. We know nothing about t&ie nxtihave never heard of this before. .With your permission, sir,•I would like to appeal to everybody to view this net as a kind, of panicky situation but with an appreciation of its gravity, because when we spe.ak about, the next item we shall refer to that. Therefore, may we proceed, with your permission, if thG delegates' agree, to the fixing of a date for a meeting in, Leopoldville and, subject'to the exigencies of our communication, our submission should be that it should take place np later than Tuesday. , • ' '

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I just want to inform the distinguished • • ' representative of India that, of course, immediate and forceful action was taken for the release of Mr. Kamltatu/

• Mr* BARNES. (Liberia): % delegation had supported the composition of the Conciliation Commission as it stands. However, in view of the reactions of certain leaders in the-Congo with regard to the composition of the Conciliation Commission, which has been se't up for the purpose of reconciling these differences, I think there is great merit in the observations of the representative of Senegal. My Government has., reviewed its position on this question of the composition of the Conciliation: Commission,and it feels that if the reaction from the constitutional Head of State is that the Conciliation Commission should be made up of representatives of more than the fifteen African States who have troops in the Congo, then some consideration by the Advisory Committee should be given to that request. The second consideration to which I should like to refer is the question of the time of departure of the Conciliation Coroniasion to the Congo. I wonder if it would be useful for the Commission to go to the Congo in the absence of the President of the Congo. President Kasavubu is in New York, What is the haste in sending the Commission to the Congo? Who will they consult with? Viewed in this light, I think we should review the question of the composition of this (Mr. Barnes, Liberia)

Conciliation Cooanission and also take into consideration, when thinking about despatching such a Commission, the fact that President Kasavubu is nov in New York.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): First of all, I should like to speak on the question of membership. Of course, we have decided that this Commission would consist of the fifteen members of Africa and Asia which are part of the Congo Advisory Committee. I have already had the opportunity of pointing out the position of my delegation. We would have preferred, and we still feel, that the Conciliation Commission should have been a much smaller group, because we feel that the committee, which consists of many members, will be burdened by its size and will have great difficulty in acting. But we decided that the Commission would have its present membership — that is, fifteen Member States from Africa and Asia, which are members of the Advisory Committee. It seems to me that it would be quite difficult to reopen the whole issue. In so far as my delegation is concerned, I felt that the composition of this Conciliation Commission could have been made up of States or delegations which are not even involved in the discussions in the Security Council or in the General Assembly. But we bow to the majority opinion, and we accept the present membership. I believe that it would be very difficult in the present circumstances to reopen the whole issue of membership. It would jeopardize the whole situation and adversely affect the conciliation situation which we would like to see cleared up as quickly as possible. Of course, the Advisory Committee can make any decision it wishes on this subject. (Mr. Slim; Tunisia) I should like to come back now to the urgency of this Conciliation Commission. The urgency is quite absolute, and we would like to see this conciliation work start immediately. But we are confronted with a problem. It seems to me that in our discussion, in defining the terms of reference of this Conciliation Commission, we spoke, and we agreed that this Conciliation Commission should make contacts first of all with the chief personalities involved in Congolese politics, in other words, the Chief of State and Mr. Lumumba, since these are the two chief personalities, apparently, involved in the political complexity which exists in the Congo. Now, Mr. Kasavubu is here. Is the Conciliation Commission going to leave while he is here? Would it not be wiser to profit by his presence here by having the Conciliation Commission make contact with him first? I would even go further: would it not be wiser to have the Advisory Committee for the Congo make informal contact, even, with Mr. Kasavubu? I say "informal contact" or "unofficial contact7' because, let us not forget, the Advisory Committee is an advisory committee to the Secretary-General for the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council and of the special session of the General Assembly, and we cannot as such make official contact with Mr. Kasavubu. But I believe it would be at least useful in the very interests of conciliation for us to start making contact with this man who is here and who is the Chief of State of the Congo. What is the usefulness of any conciliation whatsoever, of any attempt at conciliation whatsoever, if it is carried out without the participation of the Chief of State, who is here? I believe that in order to save time and to get started on this work of conciliation, before fixing the date for arrival at Leopoldville or for the meeting of the Conciliation Commission at Leopoldville, the members of the Conciliation Commission should first of all establish contact here with the Chief of State. 57

* Slim, Tunisia)

This leads me to say that we cannot, in the present circumstances, fix the date of departure for the Conciliation Commission or the date for its meeting in Leopoldville until we know on what date the Chief of State of the Congo will "be in Leopoldville, I will GO even further: I will say that it will "be extremely dangerous for the Conciliation Commission to meet, in part or in whole, at Leopoldville "before the Chief of State of the Congo is there. Everyone knows that we have debated this question in the General Assembly. With regard to this, 'it seems to me regrettable that the General Assembly was occupied with this debate last week, but that is what did occur. It seems to me that since we are confronted with this situation, we should get started on our work, make contact with the Chief of State of tlie Congo and then afterward try to continue bur work of 'conciliation. But I repeat, I consider it very dangerous for tha Conciliation Commission to meet as a whole or in part in Leopoldville before the Chief of State is there. 38-1*0

Mr. JAJA WACHUKU (Nigeria): I want to say in no uncertain terms that my delegation is opposed to any further discussion of the composition or to any change now. We have already seen what is likely to happen. The moment we reopen that question there will be a long debate on the matter, and everything that we were going to do will not "be done. We would spend another week or two debating the composition unless we agree that everybody should be a member of it. That is the only answer that would satisfy everyone. Yet I am perfectly certain that were we to crowd everybody on this Commission it would cease to be a Conciliation Commission, and we would also mark it as another sub-committee of the General Assembly in the Congo* My delegation cannot.support such a situation. In fact, it would be very difficult to handle over there, and instead of achieving anything would only create more trouble. •41- (Hr. Jaja Vachuku, Nigeria)

It is suggested that the leaders in the Congo have complained about the composition of the Commission and there is doubt about their willingness to accept the Commission because of.aversion they feel for certain of its members. I would like to say this. I understand that this is a United Nations Commission; much as we must give the greatest possible weight to the views of the leaders of the Congo, I would heaitate to agree that we should be dictated to; if the Commission is going to work• - ,' it must •wor k• wit• h a •certai . • • • n amount.».'..'.. of .authorit y in tha.t . it represents the United Nations, Its desire is to be as fair as possible, to be as Just as possible, tp hold a brief for no qne; whether the Head of the State, Mr. Lumumba, or anybody else. In other vords, it must go there, and find out the position as it is; no matter whose interest may he affected, that is no concern of this Commission, aqd on the basis of what the Commission finds out there, .it should make every possible effort to bring the leaders together and to get them to see reason in the service of the interests of their own nation. If the Commission tries and is unable to succeed, it must report back to the General Assembly on the facts of the situation. That is my understanding of the purpose of this Commission. Therefore, it would be dangerous to agree that partisan politics should enter into this, I know that elsewhere when this matter was being discussed there were some heated arguments based on attacks and counter-attacks between certain divergent views, but to bring this into the Commission now will destroy the purpose of the Commission, will destroy its objectives and will amount to admitting failure at the start. I think the number of members is too large; I know the Secretary-General suggested five or six, but it was with great difficulty that we could agree even on the fifteen members. It took us two or three weeks to adopt that, so on the face of it I would be very hesitant to accept -- in fact I am opposed to — any change now. I therefore suggest that we decide outright that there is no question of any change at this stage; it is too late to go into the matter, I sincerely sympathize with the representative of Senegal, who I know generally represents the opinion of the other African States, They would like to serve, and we are all anxious to settle this Congolese problem, but once a decision has been arrived at after such a long debate I think we should stick to it and not make any change now. k 2 -45

(Mr. Jaja Wachuku. Nigeria)

That was the first point I wanted to make about the composition. I thought we might have decided the other important matter that has been raised here first, so as to get to something, but now that ve are debating several points together I might as well make my own remarks now. As for the date of departure, I am sorry, but again I must disagree with the representative of India. I do not think it has been suggested that the members of this Commission are just robots, that you can just press buttons and send them to outer space. This is a Commission of people, who before they leave will have to consult their Governments, they will have to transmit information directly in writing. In fact, I might tell you that my own Government would like me to call in on my way there. In that respect so many factors must be taken into consideration. Some may do it by the transmission of messages, but there are certain existing factors which must be cleared before this Commission even departs. : :. . 46 (Mr. Jaja Wachuku» Nigeria)

». : I. iiaye • just noted this down,here: We know that, the. Credentials Committee has met, ; On the basis of the report we have read, we know that they have agreed to recommend the seating of the representatives nominated by the President — and, of course, they cannot be seated unless the matter is brought to the General Assembly.. For us, that raises another very serious matter. We do hot want any mud-slinging in. the Assembly. We do not want the President of the Congoleee Republic to be humiliated* There is no guarantee that, if the matter is brought to the Assembly, a two-thirds majority will be secureeU. ..If it is not,.he will

be.vhumiliated, and that will infuriate him and make, p.ur work impossible. Therefore, I thought it would have been possible-for us.to.dissuade the Committee, because I learned that they intend to bring this,.into'plenary session. Will it be in the interests of the.Commission and the work of the .Commission to bring up this matter for debate again in the General Assembly, when we -- I mean the Afro-Asian countries -- have decided that we do not want any more debate on the Congo in the Assembly until we have done our work? Is the Credentials Committee right to come and upset our programme again? Can we leave New York and leave them here to play behind our back? When the cat is away, the mice will play* That is what, in effect, is going to happen. That is one of the major problems that we must settle here before any Commission goes out — to be sure that no debate on the Congo will be held here in our absence. If certain gentlemen think that you can rush a Commission, that you can press a button and allow tha people to mess up the whole thing here, by all means let them do it — but I will not be a party to such a Commission, and I am sure that my Government would never support me in such a measure. That, then, is one of the subjects we must settle before we go. Then a very important point has been raised here: the presence of the President of the Congolese Republic in New Y Tk, Everybody agrees that his authority is not challenged; he is the constitutional head. How can you go to his State, to settle a problem when he is still sitting here? I mean, let us be realistic. Before the Commission leaves, he should either have returned voluntarily or he should have done so by suasion: you may try to make him see the necessity of going back to his State at least to act as a host to the U7-50 (Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

Commission, if nothing else* If we leave before he does, that means that we shall have nobody at all to receive us* Even a hostile reception is something. It may be bad, but no reception at all is even worse. If for no other reason, then, he should be there to receive representatives of the United Nations. That is a hurdle that we must clear before anybody can think of going to the Congo. Then there is another question: The Secretary-General was kind enough to inform us of the message that had come from Mr. Lumumba. Whether anybody likes it or not, Mr. Lumumba is a factor to be considered in the settlement. He has sent a message to the President of the General Assembly — not to this Advisory Committee. Do we know what step the President of the General Assembly will take? Suppose he decides to bring this matter to the General Assembly for decision* Would that not raise the question of debate? Is it right for the Commission to leave when an important matter like this is being discussed in the General Assembly? You see, rushing the matter without thrashing this out is another means of making it impossible for the Commission to succeed. Therefore, I would say that this is another matter which we have to take 'into consideration before we leave. Then, a Commission of 15 or 20 or 25 or 100 must have a certain leadership. I am sure there must be one or two or three people who would be held responsible for holding the Commission together. In other words, you must appoint a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman, a Rapporteur — whatever is thought desirable -- who will work in co-operation with the officials of the United Nations there and with the other people and who will be held responsible for presenting the report here. 51 (Mr. Jaja Wacbuku, Nigeria)

Certainly, this must be settled, and you cannot settle this when the representatives who'are going there, are not here. . First of all, this '• Advisory Committee meets and then the people who have been appointed will meet and then decide. Either this body will decide on these officers and then they : will meet and have'a discussion on their line of work -- the way they intend to carry out their Vork, before'they leave here. I do not think it is intended to say that they will not have any idea of the manner in which they will work, before, they leave New York, on arrival at the Congo, to plan their line of work. -I am sure nobody Is suggesting that,-because the nature of the persons appointed to such position may affect the attitude of the leaders of the Congo one wa.y or the other. Before we dispersed the other time, the Secretary-General suggested that it is necessary that those who were appointed should meet here with a view to having proper briefing. Now, if it is suggested that- whether people have arrived •- those are the expressed intentions -- the people come here, while on the way they should be left in the air and'go over there. Is it suggested that they have a eecond-hand briefing --irhen otntere are having a firefe-band briefing and discussion so that they1have the :groundwork of the whole thing - the idea properly imbedded In their'mind/others should go without? Naturally, I know the representative o'f India says, well, the people should take into consideration about certain countries which will be going there. That is quite all right. I am sure they have a representative here who will give them thorough briefing on everything that goes on •- everything. I have no doubt about that. But it is not every State here who has the same machinery which India has. India has been in this game much longer than others and therefore has the necessary machinery and equipment to carry out all these things and have their representative thoroughly briefed. But others do not have them. Some do not even have an office here; they live in a hotel. So I say that this should be considered. 52-55 (Mr. Jaja Wachuhu, Nigeria)

This is my final point on matters which we have to consider. The last time when we met I asked the question, when Mr. Dayal said that "before we go, certain preparations will have to be made in the Congo, I asked, "How long will it take to make these preliminary preparations?". It was not possible to answer that question at the last meeting and I expected that that question would be answered today. Have the preparations been made and what is the nature of the preparations that have been made? If the preparations have not been completed, how soon will they be completed? These are factors which we have to consider before we go» On these grounds, Mi*, Secretary-General, I feel thet much as I am very very anxious that this Commission should leave ao quickly as possible, we have to take into consideration these factors before deciding on a date. If we do not take this into consideration, in my candid opinion> it means that we are starting our work without adequate preparation, and the result will be obvious: it will only spell failure. That is my considered opinion on this matter. Therefore, I feel that we should examine all these factors very carefully on deciding on a date. And once the date is decided, then all the representatives will be able to make other arrangements to settle their own affairs. For instance, in my own case, I am the Head of my delegation here, although I have a Vice -Chairman« There is another idea that just occurred to me. With respect to the Afro-Asian States, we have so many irons in the fire: we have a problem of Security Council representation, Algeria, Mauritania, programme of development and independence — all these are material and very vital to us* 56 (Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

Surely before we leave we must make certain that all our respective powder- kega are quite dry and that those who will handle the weapons of our war for independence will be well looked after when we are away. So, in this particular respect, I ask that the compos it ion'be not changed, that it remain the same, and that the date of departure should be determined after these factors have been taken into consideration. Therefore, when my'good friehd from Ghana suggests that we should meet tomorrow, Sunday, I must say that I am totally opposed to any meeting of this Committee tomorrow. I have some other engagements which I canndt easily change. The Secretary-General suggested some time early next week, and that would bs quite feasible.

- ' The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Before proceeding I think that it might be wise to clear-the'decks a 3.ittle bit, : The representative of Senegal has heard' that all those speaking have, so to say, confirmed my guess that this Committee would feel that this is not the time for"reconsideration of the composition. ' ,.,... There is one point on which I'would like both you, Mr. Mini.oter, and others to be quite clear. I am entitled to speak only for myself, but I feel sure that I can speak for everybody around the table. If those African Keob^iro who'are not members- of this Committee are not included in the Cofcailiatign Commission, nothing in principle should be read-into this. I fully recognize"-- and I am sure everybody here recognises — that they have an equal interest and an equal right to take part in and to work with the problem of the Congo. No privilege is established because of the fact that there have been contributions of troops. It is just that, historically, this has come to emerge as a possible basis for election of members of the Conciliation Commission and nothing more should be read into it. I feel sure that I shall be followed by other members of this Committee in continuous efforts increasingly to keep those African States which are not on this Committee closely in touch with the developments. I shall do what I can, and I am sure that all of you will do so. I think that that is the best reply which we can give and if this is the common line, I think that it should also be considered a reply which, although not fully satisfactory, is understandable and, for the moment, the best one for the whole matter. 57-6o (The Secretary-General)

For the rest, the representative of 81g9*ia gave us a kind of agenda. All the points which he raised were concentrated on the one question — the time of departure — and my suggestion would be that we devote this debate now exclusively to that in order to clarify the views of the Committee and arrive at a clear line for our actions. I may just remind you that the points raised, first, by the representative of Tunisia and, later, by the representative of Nigeria, include a number of factors which certainly should be kept in mind. The first one was the fate of the report of the Credentials Committee. Certainly you will wish to keep it in mind. On the other hand, I feel — and I think you will agree with me — that the way in which this report will be handled is outside the competence of this Committee. The second point was the presence of Kasavubu, Tn« third point was what kind of reaction there may be, General Assembly-wise, to the new approach by Lumumba. TIa» jfct&rbH point was the need to organize the Commission, even in a most modect way, with a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman. A further point was the question of briefing, which is already covered by the idea that we should have a special meeting for the briefing. Another point was the preparations in the Congo. 61 ' ' ' (The Secretary"General)

The practical preparations need not be time-consuming. Members may, however, feel that the ground should'be prepared,beyond what ha# already been done, with the various personalities — in explanation of the task, and so forth* This is something which has not yet been discussed. The various personalities have merely been informed that the Commission would be coming. Finally, there ia of course the personal problem of the representative of Nigeria and other representatives), namely, that they are also heads of their delegations to the General Assembly and will wish to hand over their i responsibilities here* That is a long list, but I think that representatives may wish to keep in mind all the points on it,

Mr. CABA. (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I should like to refer to the formal proposal put forward by the representative of Tunisia. What have we in this Committee been saying for the last three weeks regarding the date of departure of the Conciliation Commission, regarding the urgency of appealing to the legal,constitutional authorities of the Republic of the Congo? All the members of the Committee have stressed the urgency of appointirg a Conciliation Commission so that, in accordance with paragraph 3 of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its special session, the Commission could quickly go to the Congo and assist the Congolese in settling their difficulties. We have been working on those lines. We have established the Conciliation Commission. We have appealed to our Governments, which, despite certain internal difficulties, have answered our appeal. Many representatives who have been appointed to the Conciliation Commission are with us today. Now, this morning the Advisory Committee — if it wishes to be logical and consistent and to follow the course of events — should consider the material preparations for the departure of the Commission; it should discuss the information services and translation services to be provided, the kind of records which will be kept so that we may read the statements of the representatives, the practical modalities of the voyage, and the recommendations which this Committee would wish to make to the Conciliation Commission on the basis of our own meetings. 62-65

(Mr* Caba. Guinea)

If I remember veil, and if the verbatim records are correct, it was on the suggestion of my delegation that the Committee agreed that we should meet with the members of the Commission, who would be leaving very soon, in order to re-read with them, in detail, the very brief terms of reference which we had adopted. It is now proposed that we should not tackle that problem and should no longer consider the departure of the Commission to be an urgent matter. And why not? Because the Head of State of the Congo is in New York at present? But is there anyone in the United Nations who denies that Mr, Kasavubu is the Head of State? Who would honestly speak against this person whom we all respect so much? Let us not forget the circumstances of the arrival of this Head of State, the circumstances in which the Credentials Committee met, the fact that two plenary meetings of the Assembly failed, and so forth* All those circumstances have further complicated the already serious Congolese crisis. 66 (Mr. Caba, Guinea)

The Head of £tate hold 'his powers from Parliament, and the Head, of State • •»'.... J ' * . ' -. '' here must act on behalf of his,.people, his Government and his Parliament* If our brother,' Kasavubu, honestly .knows .that'he has come from the people, if he realizes that a conflict opposes him to. his, brethren^,then he must get ahead of the Conciliation Commission. He must.30 before the Commission arrives there and tell the people of the Congo ttyat they §re going to receive fifteen representatives of brother and friendly states and that they should act to create a'fraternal atmosphaie that will facilitate the carrying out by this t •..,'". • ..'.... Commission of its mission and its task. u If we say that we should see what: the Head of State is going to tell us and that we cannot go to the country without him,, then I must say that"we are: not 'carrying out those .duties which we shouldered when we joined the Committee-. We know the importance of the meetings of the Credentials Committee, but those present at that meeting know full well -that two African States, members of that Committee, the representatives, of the United Arab Republic and Morocco, refused to participate in the vote precisely in order not to give the impression that their Governments, that for three months have been fighting in the Congo, are ready to go along with the strategisms or manoeuvres of those who wish to impose the Congolese delegation on the United Nations. For the record to reflect the facts, these manoeuvres were carried out by the Government of the United States--whether we say it or hide it, that is a fact. My Government is one of those which wishes to speak clearly. Since the Congolese crisis began, we have never ceased to speak the truth at all times,and we have done so time and time again. Let us look back; three months, when the first meetings of the Secretary- General's Advisory Committee were held. We were talking about certain troops European troops, and my European friends may perhaps excuse me for my words, but my delegation at that time stressed the danger of certain European troops. The records are there, and they will bear me out. I said honestly that with the psychology of the Congolese army, with the insufficient Congolese cadres, it might well be that one day misunderstanding and mistakes might occur and we would be confronted by a catastrophe. The Congolese troops might well confuse the Belgians against whom they were fighting with our friends who are helping 67-70^ '--'-•• '-: (Mr, Caba, Guinea) to set vip order in the Congo. 'WhaVnive^'rdiM^ morning, you*/ Mr^ Secretary-Gener'al, on behalf|S Sf the Cbtoiftte'e^etddFessed bur mos't m'ovfng r"'"'*' condolences to the delegation of "Iceland, * t«t uViob'k atf ^nls'morning's ';*v newspapers. This morning the New York Times' state'd that -£ne TJalubas had '•'*'•" -' *'''• declared on the radio that they1 confused the Irish troops with Belgian troopsJ"'*"1 'That'is an example. That is why we say that we must be loyal to our : '^»; commitments. It is'not the personality of or the presence 6t:Mr« Kasavubu in: r'vrt New ?orfe that is going to stop Us from setting lip the date of the departure of ~*<* the Conciliation Commission, Therefore I would say that'if the Head1 6fr'''Stattfv^' knows his people are behind him and if he knows his people are there in order to assist tne' Conciliation 'Commission, he will get there before the Commission arrives", '" ' *'" ' '•'' "' " '"'' '''' ' ' ' '" "' '";:"f' If^we adopt a decision now to contact him and to dalay the departure of Ibfee Commission until we find out what happens, we will be overlooking the ' needs of the people. Let UB also bear in'mind that we must hot :fall into the trap that has already been prepaf ed^Stlour 'fe'ei. We gtress Ubat the trap been prepared by members of NATO, with the Government in Washington at its head." We must stress' ..,v ""''

n^ i Cannot we leave ! < aside the' question of *igerieral'p6li tic s/ be" practical?

Mr. CABA (Guinea) ^interpretation from French): I am trying to be ' practical^ but as you pointed out the importance of the work of the

Credenttais Cuuahitteef I thought I should stress the way in which some of these countries have'been induced and how some of'these countries who are playing .' today with the fate of the Congo have been led to underestimate the importance of the fate of a people, I do not think I need go back to that question; I believe I nave covered it adequately, l • 71 (Mr. Caba. Guinea) I want to say that my delegation strongly supports the Indian proposal, to. send this Commission off immediately, and on behalf of my Government, I declare that if delegations do not seriously see the manoeuvres that tend to liquidate the Government and peoples of the Congo, then my Government is ready to announce that it will never take part in the work of such a Commission* We do not want Africa to judge us; we do not want to "be accomplices in the work of those vho vant to subject Africa to any form of domination* We are ready to walk out of that Commission if it is in that way that the work of the Commission is going to be carried out. lhank you.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I think that you will agree with me, Mr. Ambassador, that whatever historical interest it may have, the worries you had concerning the European troops, that the matter has been settled and we can leave it aside now. I happen to come from one of the countries represented. Though I am not speaking for it, I think that we would like here to repeat what you said, the fact of our appreciation of their co-operation.

Mr. CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): No, I do not think there is a misunderstanding, sir. I was very sad when I heard of the loss suffered by the friendly Government of Ireland. I was extremely shocked by this. If I did mention the terms of my first statement in this Committee, it was merely to stress once again the fact that daily my delegation is quite set at rest and assured when events carry out our statement.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL! I have no confirmation of what The New York Times says at all* You will remember, very regrettably, that our Tunisian friends first suffered casualties in a similar way*

Mr. THIAM (Senegal) (interpretation from French): I shall not go back too often and for too great a length of time on a subject that has been so often discussed here, the composition of the Commission, and I must apologize for the delay that I am inflicting on this Committee on this matter, but when we are convinced of something, we have to try to share that conviction with those vho share responsibilities with us. 72 ,--75 (Mr. Thiam, Senegal) V-I must remind you that I was among those who felt that the Conciliation Commission should be an extremely .restricted "bo^y.> On that point I strongly supported the proposal made at..the time..,-.-But it ap happened that the Co^go^es* problem is one .that evolves, and from .event to event and from day-to jday.^we.-,, ^, are confronted with new problems that• require new solutions. I was among;$hoa,e who .felt 'that the debate that was undertaken in the Assembly was an inappropriate debate; it was untimely.•_,The .fact that the debate took place, whether we liked it or: not,.allowed certain positions to be taken that.might have been interpreted/— andrpro.bably were in Africa —-and:I specifically address my remarks to my African colleagues who know the problem so well — these positions, as I say, mistakenly orocorrectly may,have been interpreted in Africa: as favouring.this, that.or the other-Congolese leader. This cannot.be, denied. 4 ;;,J 6hall not go back on certain resolutions that were intended to seat the

Central, Government.\p£ the Congo* the sponsors of., which were, .some Africans. . ..x.:. If I go back, .however* to..the,-.composition .of the Commission* it is purely, in the light;of those,i[events and.-4,n:t]ae iight o.f,;tlae debate that recently took place.In th£-General AsBe»blyrto:yhi,c]a. Anterpretatio^s were given that were perhaps not in keeping with reality. It BO happens that after; /that debate, and after certain positions were takenj specifijcally l?y our cplleagues from Africa — we may as well be-.fjran• * * - - "k* about thi....,.»a -. - .•..*>/....certai, i n• ^.other ..•„ •.-,•. • Africa*, -. . 'n . *.nations. ^ . • • • ^ *», fel• t that it was their duty to participate in thei wor^ o;f^ tfee-Coa^i^i&tio^ Gopimiesiont I am not asking for Senegal to become a member; it is one, 3ut.I believe that from the moment where •^certain.number of (African countries^ may,Jiave felt that positions adopted by oth^er African na-t.io.ns might have a tendentious.nature — rightly or wrongly supposed. —. tb.en.they ask that the composition of the Conaniasion be revised, and we with it. 16 (Mr. Thiam, Senegal) Of course, you can decide whatever you like. The future will tell who is right and who is wrong. If the Commission goes as it IB, it may satisfy some and it may allow a solution to be arrived at. I will not insist on this point; it is up to this Committee to decide on it. I should like to go back to the second point raised by the representative of India and on which some representatives have already stated their opinions, I am among those who feel that it is useless to send a delegation to the Congo if that delegation has not previously taken the necessary precautions. I have said this before. The United Nations has committed itself to a very difficult task. All of us are concerned to safeguard the interests and the moral authority of the United Nations. If we send a Commission that from its very day of departure does not have the confidence of those we are to conciliate; then that Commission is heading straight towards failure, and once again the failure of that Commission is the failure of the United Nations. We do not want this Organization, which we trust so deeply, to be hoodwinked or mistaken. We want the greatest precautions possible to be taken. ' . • . We have already had pointed out that the Head of the State of the Congo is here. It is not up to us or to me to tell the Head of that State what his duties are. I do not know whether his duty lies in staying here or in going back to the Congo. I do not know the reasons why he came here, that is not my business. But the fact is that the Head of State of the Republic of the Congo is in the united States, and I have the impression that to send a Commission to the Congo when the Head of the Congolese State is here would be to plow in the water* This may be interpreted by the Head of that State as a manoeuvre and as an effort to settle the Congolese question in his absence. Therefore, it would be perfectly normal for us to try to settle the manner in the most proper manner possible, to bring together all the tendencies existing when the Commission arrives in the Congo. That is what we should do. Let us then ask Mr. Kasavubu if he will return to the Congo to receive us or if he will receive us here or should we wait until he spontaneously, of his own will, goes back, whenever that may be? This is a problem that can be examined. I really do believe that it is impossible, if we really want to work realistically 77-80 (Mr. Thiam, Senegal)

and vith .pommon sense, to send a; Commission .to the Cpngo while the Head of the State is here. What is at stake here? It is the Congolese people. We know this,. If we want to be realistic, we have to "bring together the different.tendencies

that -are embodied in the diffcrept.men, Mr. Lumumba and fcflr,.Kasavubu . ,In the,. .v present state of affairs Mr. Lumumba is in the Congo and M£. Kasavubu is here,,,,, and I do not see how we can find a solution if one man is on one continent ....

and another man is on another cqntinent. They ought both to be in the Congo . ,.^v so that we can conciliate them. This is the first condition. , „ ., : »'•••• • . . ' ' • '. * • • .' •"'••"••?«: .f The second condition on which.I .insist is the,,following: that we should try.,,. to convince the Congolese authorities of the .spirit in which we are sending the Commission to the Congo. .There can be no doubt that certain confusion has been

Bo\m on this point. Some partisans.of Mr.,,Lumumba believe that the Commission, v will be favourable,$o them or unfavourably to them.. Other partisans of .. . ,j,.,.>.

Mr-, Kasavubu .feel that the -Commiss ion,.-? .. .this ie a fact and I do not think Ii;.aw.. denying the facts, — .tliajt,.i^^^l^ng^o be, Ae^i.t there ,is ^oing to be unfavourable^ to Mr, Kasavubu or .;fayoA,ir^b^, to^ .hiffi»/ Therefor^., ,.I believe that the. psychological work-must be done in BUC!\ a va^that al^ tendencies, and. trends of thought should., know that the spirit of ^the.Commission ia ; -81- (Mr, Thiam, Senegal)

The problem is one that can be raised in the United Nations. At times we have had surprise debates. Some items are suddenly placed on the agenda, and we do not know vfe<*re they came from. But vhy do we consider it useful; while the Commission is doing its work, to suspend the debate? This, too, is a question that could certainly not be minimized. No matter how urgent it may be to send a commission — and I agree as to urgency — if a certain number of prior conditions are not fulfilled, then the Commission is headed for failure. We cannot take part in another failure which will, when all is said and done, be interpreted as another failure of the United Nations.

Mr» DIALLO (Mali) (interpretation from French): I do not think that I am the only one who feels that the atmosphere in our Committee is deteriorating. Rather than progressing, we are regressing. At our last meeting we agreed to certain principles. We seemed to agree that it was a question of conscience for each member of the C on i ill at ion Commission going to the Congo to know that they were not going as individuals or as representatives of their States, but as representatives of the higher interests of the United Nations. Prom that moment,if each of us realized that this interest was paramount to all others, then we should have become more objective and realized that what we had done would lead us to meet this morning and then try to go onward from that point. Regarding the composition, I cannot but stress the hope that this matter will be declared closed after all that has been said and after the assurances which the Secretary-General was kind enough to give us. When all is said and done, we are at present in a necessarily restricted Committee. All of the Members of the United Nations are not members of this Advisory Committee -- and for very specific reasons. But from the moment that this Committee decided to keep those directly concerned with the question of the Congo up to date and allowed them to check on the progress made, we felt that this was sufficient assurance for us to let time exercise its effects and then go on to more practical matters and thus take up the question of departure. 82-85

: S^nce the representatives of India, Ghana and Guinea have taken tho floor; .

I,wpuld,also like to stress, as they did in respect of .the departure date, the,, ; fact-,that when we decided to meet today with the membersMof the Conciliation Commission that were presently in New vork, all of us knew, at least unofficially, that President Kasttvubu was due to come to New York. This did not, however- .... • • • • • / . / . 1* I v . stop us fran iome^Lately telegraphing our States and Governments and .asking them to nominate representatiy.es to be here in time for this morning^ meeting. If i: we, therefore, want to be consistent} we must ?

rThe General, Ass,ei)ik.}.y,. furtherm^ro, was led tp .take ,the decision not to examine tjae Congo^.eae until th,e Concj^liation C^onimission had been there,, But WQ now find ourselves on &, -road out. p^. which we .paonpt turn. We really have ! to wait until we get Mr, Ka^avubu B reacliiQns as(,t,o whether the Conciliation

Commission is going to the Congo or whether he conaiders :himself the head of the

Congolese mission here. We mu3;ty wait un,til.l7. De.cember and find out what happens then. . . . 86 (Mr. Diallo. Mali)

The opinion of my delegation is that we have discussed this matter for a long time. We have already agreed on its urgency, we have already appealed to the States that have sent their representatives who are now present in New York. We would at present "be definitely serving both the interests of the Congo ond of the United Nations by immediately sending the Conciliation Commission to Leopoldville, in view of the complexity of the problem which we consider not simply a question of mediation between X and Y, but a much more complicated and difficult phenomenon. There are secondary aspects that ai*e equally important, and these were pointed out by the representative of India. There are other aspects. The departure of the Commission for the Congo on its mission of conciliation would certainly lead the Chief of otate to realize that the United Nations decision is being implemented and that therefore it is not a question of the Congo being discussed here until the Conciliation Commission has completed its work. We can only hope that this will lead him to return to the Congo, because obviously he has interests to defend and information to put before them. Then it will be no longer a question of starting the work of the Conciliation Commission in New York, because from the moment when we defined the terms of reference we realized that it was a question of discussing with the Congolese in the Congo the national problems of the country. Therefore, to sum up, I feel that our departure, rather than causing the situation to deteriorate, would on the contrary lead the Chief of State to go* back to the Congo. Even if a week or ten days1 time elapses it will be better, because I am sure that our Commission is fully aware of the tasks it has to perform.

Mr, KRISHNA MENON (India): Sir, we have already indicated that what we should discuss now is with regard to the dispatch of the Commission, and if I may say so, we respectfully agree. Therefore I am not going to reply to the points that have been raised by the representative of Senegal, But if you will permit me, I would like very briefly to refer to what I said last time, that four or five days before the regular session of the Assembly met, the Security Council, in its wisdom and with the support of all of those who are now dissenting, 87 (Mr, Krishna Menon. India) decided to bring this matter before the emergency'session. Since then .we hmv«/-i been sittigg here for seven or-eight weeks, The-Advisory Committee-Was appointed in view of the emergency and the nature of the - situation'» All these actions ;ar'«' directed-towards pointing to the emergency of the situation while they; are' 'delaying the situation. And now we-are told that, after having appointed a • •-• Commissior., it must take its own time and come back to ue» Now, there are other matters that are of some importance. It has been said to us by the representative of Nigeria that this Commission should be briefed. My Government takes very strong exception to hhis. We havo chairman of commissions in other places, and tli3 only reason we go there is that we are expected by ourselves and by others to undartaka imparbially a study of the situation. Therefore I would request the Committee to address its attention to the first line of the terms of reference: "The Commission- ehould ato# -he situation". The Commission is not to be briefed by us from here. That would be an entirely improper proceeding. We can brief them,if they or their officials are here, in regard to what my colleague from Guinea said; we can transport them and look after their arrangements, and so on. But as to the rest, they are presumably competent men, appointed by their Governments to take an objective view and understand the situation. There is no question arising from that. My Government is not interested in the personalities of this person or that person. Most of them we do not even know. We are interested in a real solution of the problem of the Congo and in pulling the United Nations out of a none too enviable situation and leaving the Congolese to run their own affairs. So I think that the suggestion that this Commission is a kind of body of advocates, a body of implementers, that can be used for some resolution we have passed here is an entirely wrong view. This is a body of people to advise us, to give us advice in addition to the advice we get from the United Nations representatives — to advise us; it saya so at the end. Therefore, any idea that they should come here and be briefed by us, and so on, is out of court. 9o that some of the people who have spoken that way have not bothered about 88-90 (Mr. Krishna Menon, India) * these terras of reference which make it very clear that there should he no interference in the internal affairs of this State. So naturally, the study Commission is going to report and, vithin the framework of the Constitution, will lead us back to the Republic, Now, the next question is that Mr. Kasavubu, the President, the Head of State, is here- in New York, and therefore the whole matter should be reconsidered. 91: : (Mr. Kriaha Menon, India)

Tb,ere are three points in connexion with ^hia pne /which haa "been raided by the representative of Mali, namely,, Ibhat,we knew.tjiat he was coming here, when we

decided this.: Furthermore, yp;u will remember that ..the point was raised whether ..we..should get his .permission, to go. or not, and the., general view at that time, was that, he should be informed, that a .United Nations Commission was entitled to go • •'••••.- •,',-...... ' " . ' '•" ''-.," . there* Secondly, with great respect, the place of a Head of State in these . - ••'••••. • : .. • . ' ,. ft critical times is in his own country, and not over here, and presumably the Congolese constitution provides for affairs to be carried on, i,f the Head ,of Stjate • is absent. If there were no such provisions, such provisions would emerge, and .therefore the presence of Mr. Kasavubu here as Head of State does not. compl.ica1£e the.situation except to the extent that it is politically complicated otherwise,

which you have rulefl. is not to be discussed at this meeting... rV . ., .Now, the other matter4s this*. Jf the representative of Tunisia says th$t we should have an opportunity of Accuse ing this, that or the other, I agree with the general purport qf. tb,at. Taut such ^iscussiipns are, not to be carried on by the

special delegates, apppinted: for,.this purpose, by Goyernnien£s, For examplef if r jtfee..Government of India wants, to bring some impact, to bear on Mr. Kasavubu, we should;not do it through Mr,» Rameshwar Rao, who was,sent for a special purpose;

it would.be done through .the Ambassadp;r:,p,r tlhie .^ad^of the delegation or whoever n is,,here, or by ,our Ambagsadpr,ti the Congo* These channels are different. These

ar.e.:a number of people selected for the .particular purpose of study, investigation, report and any conqiliation they may be abj.e^tp do on the spot. .As far as my Government is concerned, there are not people to whom has been delegated the

entire responsibility.of government. We do not appoint people like;that. For example, if there were any matter .to be settled here with the..United States Government, even though I meet them here in ;bhe context of United Nations matters, I do not deal with them; our Ambassador in,Washington .deals with them. Therefore, the,.question of'consultation with Mr« Kasavubu by this Commission., does not matter for the Secretary-GeneraX, for the ..members of the Advisory Committee,., if _ their

Governments delegate them in:,that way, ora l^heir. Ambassadors. So I submit that while I agree with one part of the Tunisian suggestion I cannot find any reason to be convinced of the other aspect of it. He has nothing to do. with the Commission that is going. 92-95

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

Then we come to another matter. The terms of reference state: "The Commission is requested to proceed to the Congo and to submit a report to the Advisory Committee on the Congo as early as possible." Nov if the advice of certain people were to be accepted, it would mean that Mr. Kasavubu would decide when we should go. If he stays for six months, the Commission should not go. After all, the representative of Nigeria said that the delegations stay in hotels, so there is no difficulty about his staying here. There has been no difficulty about his coming here; it is other people who are finding difficulties, the people opposed to his views are finding difficulties in coming here. But that is another matter altogether. The terms of reference were unanimously approved; my Government has reservations about some of these things, but we have submitted to the majority view and we have said we will agree. We decided only last week that this Commission should report to the Advisory Committee on the Congo as early as possible. So far as some of us who voted for the adjournment resolution in the General Assembly a few days ago are concerned, the difficulty also arises of our relations with and regard for the General Assembly. We asked the General Assembly kindly to stop considering this question until the 'return of the Commission. Surely it is a slight on the General Assembly if we get through a resolution postponing consideration until the return of the Commission and then come back here and say we are not sending the Commission. That amounts to rendering the General Assembly unfruitful, or doing what is often apt to happen in this building trying to get something by the back door, by getting that resolution rescinded. Now it may be said that it is all right for those people to go who are interested, but the point is that we told the General Assembly that, pending the return of this Commission, it should not consider it. If I may so, by implication if not directly that means that we should proceed with the business. If we told the Assembly not to consider the matter until the Commission comes back and then come here and say to the Commission "Do not go", where do we get? It is an extraordinary situation and as reasonable people we cannot adopt it. 96

(Mr. Krishna MePOD, India)

Then come the p^ynoncd difficulties .of my colleague from Nigeria, which I fully understand. His qualifications and his position in his country are such that he is required for more than one purpose. He has many irons in the-fire.,; It is always very bad to have too many irons in the fire. At any rate, if, tha,t is. the way things had to be done here, half of the difficulties that the United Nations heg hac!. would never have been, solved. Therefore, while we appreciate. , the^difficulties of the representative of Nigeria, this is a ma:Vt^ •*;,-, :hj, with fcis great ability, he must solve himself. We simply cannot regulate the date.j ; of departure of this Commission by the individual difficulties of delegations,. ., however great they may be. They are taken into cone1deration collectively, Perhaps the Nigerian Government will find it pr.ricible -p-p find somebody — perhaps not equally .competent,, .but good .enough for this, purpose. After all, this .is .not the major matter for which my friend will remain here.,. . Therefore, please, do .pot let us bother abput.jthat. , • • -,»-..' '••••••. •::.-•;•. As for hotelsi,, I, suppose,,thfl.ro are hotols .'in,JLeoppldville, as there are'here,

,gp ,we may dismiss thatf garticuilar; problem.,, >; /, ..,.,<;..,.;i«...<•-.

'..-.. We therefore comer back tip.,the, question o£ the a^Journnient resolution, , Ws. have a responsibility tq .th£..Assejnbly .ta B*ndLt^4s .Commission as quickly as. pQseible or to info*?a-t&e; AfjBembly,,tha^ >fe. ^ve .cljange.^ our minds. My delegation is not prepared to say-that, it has .changed, its mind. We think that tyva discussior of. tl*e Congo position at the present moment in the Assembly is fraught with .grave 'consequences. You have-heard about the casualties suffered by the troops. While troops do suffer casualties -- that is one of the facts in connexion with being troops — we do not want to create the conditions for that. .And we have no desire to go back on this,, either by implication or by direct reference. I submit that the adjournment resolution, which was a political resolution— it was not merely a procedural one, although it was procedural in form — places a moral as well as a constitutional responsibility upon us to proceed. It would be a slight.to the Assembly to pay to them "Please wait until we come back11, and then to come in here.ancl say that we are not going. .., That., is the position that, we would be putting ourselves in. • . .-,.-; -., .-... v .->. - - , . 1 ~~

97 (Mr, Krishna Menon, India)

Then ve come to the question of the Head of State. This is nelthor the time nor the place to discuss the various constitutional positions,whica wa are now able to study thanks to the kindness of the Cvj?.^-jev;>S5ii

To the best of my knowledge, we have at least two representatives here who have come from their homelands: the representative of Ghana and the Ambassador to India from Indonesia. Ho* lo&g ***.. they to cool their heels over here? My delegation was not very keen on the idea of this meeting in New York. New York. 1* not the place where conciliation should take place. But you so decided, in your wisdom, and we agreed to it. Now, having agreed to that, we must; keep to these dates. We had an obligation to meet today and, if people "have not come, that is their fault. If there is a desire to meet tomorrow, Sunday is a good day. But they should leave very quickly. 101 (Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

vfe therefore reiterate our position that the date of the meeting in Leopoldville should be fixed, vhich would also have an effect on the solution of some of these problems. : Yesterday, these Irishmen were killed; some other constituted head lsv arrested by someone who has no authority --in any other country he would be court-martialed for doing so — and various other situations take plaee. Mr. Hanunarskjold^ representative is in New York and not able to return because of the present state of affairs. So all these things point to the United Nations not vacillating. What we say here — you know, most of these things are in today's morning newspaper. To e:±>ibit •these vacillations r.nd tr allow other people to exaggerate t-hem, we are thus not serving the cause of Africa, of peace or even serving our own self-respect* Therefore, Mr. Secretary-General, if it were possible for the Conmittee now to come to a decision on the date of the departure of these delegations — my delegation is awaiting insturctions because we live a long way off from Africa —we should like to make arrangements for this gentleman to go, or to be informed that he is no longer wanted. 102-105

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I will Just deal with the points raised here. First, I must express riy'afclpreciation'td the1 re^gehtati-re of. Senegal for not having insisted on the Question which he "raised when we first met here-"1':; earlier today. We are very susceptible, and had this question'been raised "-'-'•• *'•*' earlier in our meetings, I am sure we would have found a formula to satisfy him;'' but we arrived at a decision, which we did after ;du£ consultation with :alr of us, and at this la^e hour I must agree with my other colleagues that it would be^ • rather difficult. I would beg Mm to know that In so sa^i'rig we have no malice"' " whatsoever. Indeed, he can remain assured that the work which the Conciliation' " Committee has undertaken will be done completely in the interest of'the unity of the Congo and to have a very stable and durable Government. *' 'Secondly, the presence of the President of the Republic of the Congo* •••'••''• r'! Let me first say that we would not be a party to any language that would in an'y "' '•••-. - - ' ' ••'••' . ' • .• „/-,•.- '\ way be discourteous to' him. From that point of view we are fully agreed thali''**' '*' formulas and ways can be found to show him bur respect'and bur courtesy. And I think that can be done in the line whicti*was suggested by'the Minister from "'** ,. vL •*"••' ''" - ••'•'' -•-•.':.f.'i£i-^-.iV.\:/.':••.--&•..&;: .,;-..:«^ K.v/.J1 -r::; ":-•...-.. ..-.Vr';^-..fr-i'- .;:->. - • -.\;-v^.' India. As regards action at the"'tMited"Sfttibns, all 1 iniist say now is that nothing'' should be done to prevent a solution of the proiolem in Isub'stahce. That, I ! think- :-v:i-'., i'••;—s wha. t:.- / I '••-.-..wil• l «£-*/.-?>allo" w- mysel1. :;:,•:•...f t.-o. sa•>.•y .-..^ here. •,-.-.•..•'...... '- c;.^.>,^ ;;: , . ,-. . .---.;.:•, ' As regards why the preparations have not taken place, as I asked the last time/ I will not repeat myself. As to the meeting, we had also agreed that we would try to get our man here today. Unfortunately, he is not here, but I am quite certain he will not be an impediment to any decision that will be arrived here. Therefore, I would say that if a date is fixed, I will try to get him wherever you want him to be in accordance with the wishes of the majority. lo6

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): I must say at once that I am in a conciliatory mood and, therefore, in that mood I shall not raise any extraenous matters affecting this problem, I shall stick to the matter before the Committee* It must be emphasized that it is not what happens in the General Assembly that will determine the course of action of the Conciliation Commission, but rather what the Commission is able to do that will influence matters in the Assembly as far as the Congo is concerned. There is no doubt in the mind of anyone who has been in close touch with the problem, who has studied it carefully, who has taken part in the proceedings which have taken place in the United Nations regarding the problem, that we have reached an impasse from which we must extricate ourselves, and Ghana believes very strongly that a Conciliation Commission, an impartial commission, an objective commission, whose report is given in an impartial way, can only be the solution to the problem* Therefore, it is against this background that we ourselves selected our nan to serve on this Commission, You may want to know that my Government did not wish to appoint anyone who is already involved

in the problem, ( That is why they appointed Nana Kobina Nketsia IV, a man who has ruled people, a Doctor of Philosophy, a man who has been used to conciliate, because,as a Chief, one would naturally every day solve problems of conciliation; He is here behind us and has not been involved in this problem in any way, That shows you, Mr. Secretary-General, the attitude of my Government towards bhis problem, . We think that it should be a Conciliation Commission at the disposal of the United Nations and, therefore, the question of briefing by Governments is out of tune with the purpose for which this Conciliation Commission has been appointed, We also wish to say that by no means should we do anything which would prejudice the work of the Commission, If Kasavubu, the President of the State — whom we recognize as such not because he was made President by Mobutu, but because he is President as a result of Parliament sanction — is here and, therefore, there is some difficulty, our position is that, by all means, let us 107-110 (Mr* Quaison-Sackey, Ghana) limit it. Tuesday has been suggested. We 'supported'* it very -stronglyy but if Tuesday is too early let us make a date on which*"the Commission can depart from here for Leopoldville. Then,' if the Secretary-General who," I am sure/ can be "' in touch with Kasavubu, will inform him that the "Comn.ft£ee has decided tb seftd the Commission on Tuesday -- inform him of this out of courtesy -- I think that would be in order. At tl?.e same time, possibly it will be necessary for the United Nations'" **'"' Headquarters in Leopoldville to inform certain other personalities of the'' arrive^ of the Conciliation Commission. " ' ' ' ' fy'1"""'"' With the terms of reference at the dinpc^al of the Commission, I cannot sW that any other preparation is necessary. Once they hr»ve the terms of rei '.?••;;'-•. t::-._ ..•...-. *s .-...;.. • : •. •• ; ...... they must meet and organize their v^ork. They must decide who must be with whom on the Commission; they must decide how they are going to proceed with "'•'** their Conciliation or their assessment of the situation, armed by the terms of :: : % reference whicht we in the Advisory'bonmittee'have' &iveii them. ' - -*' ••' • ••'I '• a'm • ' .sur. **•e . that•'*•»' -, '••'.'• ' i&"Xi>/:v<*of we ca. n&}[ $approac »f!'i' •."'.•,!'h; ^ this.,. :/'£^£ problem;-..' "••',')"• 4* brJ'-Ti" th^4 e •"'',/'»'•"basis'' •'"•'*• of••" th' • e poiritB.....,.,." . which I have made, there is no reason why we should not reach a solution to the problem of the "date, which"'seems ib con^ouhd'us^at the'mbmehtr •'•" Lastly,''may I know"-from'' the"Seer:etary-Generainwhe'infer,v; in fact, the leaders' in the Congo have already been informed that a" Coftcillfe:bn Commission is going, and if not, whether'"'it is*"hdt' tne time n6w"tb!fdtt so.' Ill

Pie SECRETARY-GENERAL; In reply to that last question, I would say that these leaders have been informed* It is a matter of vide public knowledge, in any case. I should, however, like to ask Ambassador Dayal about the form of the Information; I think that it was just factual.

Mr, DAYAL (Special Representative)? Before I left Leopoldville I, myself contacted -jhe Cnief of State and some other leaders in regard to the proposal to send the Conciliation Commission to the Congo. We have taken no more formal action pending some Information regarding the Commission's terms of reference and the Advisory Committee's thinking on the general question of when the Commission would go to Leopoldville, and so on. But I think that the time has now cone to agree with the Secret;-ry-General to inform the be leaders in a more formal way.

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): I think that in those circumstances my suggestion that we should set a date and Inform the leaders of it is germane.

Mr. SUM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I apologize for speaking again, but I think that there is a matter on which we in this Committee are not in agreement at the moment. I believe that the main aim is to assist the Congolese in their efforts at conciliation. Furthermore, I believe that recently we have been exceeding our terms of reference by trying to assist the Congolese to find formulas of conciliation* Certain persons have to be seen: the Head of State, Mr. Kasavubu; Mr. Lumumba; the Heads of the Provinces — this was a suggestion made by the representative of Nigeria; the President of the Assembly in the Congo, and so forth. But the purpose of all the work must be to achieve conciliation. My delegation is much more interested in seeing that conciliation is achieved than in receiving a report from the Commission. We trust that the Commission will achieve conciliation and not give us a report showing the futility of its efforts. I do not believe that the Conciliation Commission is going to Leopoldville only to contact personalities there. It is not going to the Congo merely to find out what the people want* It is going there to try to conciliate the opposing tendencies which have caused the conflict, and to do this on the basis of the integrity of the Congo. ac 112-115 (Mr. 311m, Tunisia) Ihat being the case, I feel that the discussions which took place last week have prejudiced the task of conciliation — I said that before and I adhere to my view. The views which, rightly or wrongly, have been expressed in the discussions have given ttye impression, rightly or wrongly, that we are supporting one party, rather than the other. I trust that we shall try not .to take a stand in favour -of one party or the other but, rather, shall attempt to bring the two sides together an4 achieve conciliation between them. I fear that if we go too fast, if we try to have the Commission leave for Leopoldville while the Head of State is here, . we may run the risk of being criticized for maintaining or assisting to maintain the conflict. .,, • If the Conciliation Commission Fere to arrive in the Congo on Tuesday, .. - it would have to contact someone. But who vould that be? I think that it has l>een stressed here that one of the 'Irat ;.esks of the Commission will be to decide the number and names of the persons to be contacted. ., 116 (Mr. Slim, Tunisia) We also face a psychological problem. If we see the Head of State before the Prime Minister, it may lead some people to believe that we are t.?.X:Lng a stand in favour of the Head of State and against the Prime Minister. If we see the Prime Minister before the Head of State, it may lead some people to believe that we are taking a stand in favour of the Prime Minister and against the Head of Stater This is, as you realize, an extremely touchy and difficult problem. Normally it is a difficult situation, and at present it is even more so. How our actions or the actions of the Conciliation Commission will be interpreted when it reports to the Assembly is another question, if the Conciliation Commission left on Tuesday or K.nday or tomorrow — if it wants to be in Leopoldville on Tuesday — before t-.-yicg to contact the Head of State. Some of my colleagues have already stressed that the different personalities will have to be convinced that it is a Conciliation Commission in every sense of the word, that it is not directed against anyone. We know the reservations that have been made by certain Congolese officials, and especially the Head of State, specifically in telegrams that arrived more than a week ago in which the Head of State opposed the setting up of this Commission because this Commissit was intended to impose some solution. We asked you, Mr. Hammarskjold, to clarify the situation and to make it quite obvious that we are not in favour of that tendency, that that was not the aim of the Commission at all. Would it not be useful, as the first task for the Commission or for the members of the Commission here, to try to convince the Head of State that ours is a mission of conciliation, that it is not directed against him or in favour of Mr. Lumumba, that it is not against Mr, Lumumba or in favour of Mr. Kasavubu, that it is only intended to conciliate everyone? Mr. Hammarskjold, I fear that the urgency that we all feel underlying this question and the urgency of the Conciliation Commission's beginning of its work might be turned into precipitous action. We are convinced of the urgency of the Conciliation Commission's beginning of its work. Urgency is one thing, but let us not precipitate matters. Let us not go too fast, as regards the date. Let us try to take the first steps first, for example, vis-a-vis the Head of State Let us tell him, "We are going to be there on Tuesday, and we suggest that you try to leave on Sunday to be there on Tuesday." Would this be useful for conciliation? This is a question we have to ask ourselves, and then we can also 117-120 ask him and tell him that it might also be useful for him as Head of State, as well as for the whole United Nations, for us all.to work together in .ths interest of .his country. I am asking/this as a question. Would this not "be useful? . ..., The Tunisian delegation, which.participated in .this Advisory Committee, and . • - • :•;.••. •• • .•..,.;.;•;.• . . >' . . • •-•.*'•.• is also to participate in the Conciliation Commission, cannot undertake a tas^, that may be misinterpreted or may have a very prejudicial effect with regard tq the aim which we have in, mind. Last week, we decided on a meeting with the§J., representatives of the Conciliation Commission present here, to work out certain details regarding conciliation. . Ity Government nominated ,an ambassador to . ,_ participate in the work of the Conciliation Coiamission.flnd to be at the disposal of that Commission as soon as possible. In order not tc hamper the work of .the. _..

Commission, Ambassador Chatci, who iLsy be nominated as our alternate in ..:

Leopoldville, on the Commission^ and I myself are .here; if our Ambassador is $ot-{ yet here, he will be here tomorrow prqbably, but we are keeping him informed 9? >y eci e8 everything that is decided 'here,, aud if,, the Commission:4 d to. leave we sha^ also let him know. xButrI aratasainst a too- hasty departure by the Conciliation Commission. Although I recognise the urgency of its work, I,must say- .that I have serious reservations regarding $Jae departure ..of the CommiBs^pn before contacting the Head of S^ate while he i 121-125

Mr. WIRJOPPANOTO (Indonesia): I must confess that I am not happy about our discussion this morning* I have the impression that -we are going back, that we are now hesitating, and any kind of hesitation in the implementation of the General Assembly resolution, adopted on 20 September at the fourth emergency special session, would be a sign of weakness. Even the so-called neutrality of the past, and T do not know about the future, has been interpreted as weakness, so that any hesitation, any kind of weakness, with the consequences of delay, will be detrimental to the resolution adopted by the General Assembly, The whole world is waiting for the correct and speedy implementation of that resolutior The Congolese people are waiting for its implementation, but there has been no real progress there since July. We have more troops in t/.e Congo. We now have about 20,000 troops, but from the reports of Mr. Dayal, I have gained the impression that no progress has been made at all. If we make an ana?.ysis, we find there are two obstacles in this problem. These two obstacles are rinter-related and, in fact, are practically orte* The first obstacle is that the Belgians are still there. The Belgians even have been going back and are stronger. We find the Belgians everywhere. Everybody is in danger* The Congolese are in danger and the United Nations forces are in danger, all except the Belgians. That is the paradox in the Congo. That is one of the obstacles, the other is the disunity among the leaders, the split between the leaders, but the presence of the Belgian forces, the intrigue of Belgium and the disunity of the leaders is practically one matter. The General Assembly made a good and wise decision. It first requested the Secretary-General to take vigorous action and so on. What does this mean? It means that the whole General Assembly is backing the Secretary-General in action to have the Belgian troops and the Belgian forces withdrawn as soon as possible, including the so-called Belgian assistance, which, in fact, means the intrigue of Belgium, So we understand we have nothing against the good faith of Belgium, and we appreciate the Belgian assistance so long as it is channelled through the .United Nations. The other matter which is inter-related with the intrigue of Belgium is the disunity of the national leadera. I stated a few moneys ago that a vise decision made was that we should do something for the reconciliation of the national leaders •126 .150 (Mr, Wlrjopranoto, Indonesia)

. _ Now, in the way of the reconciliation, during^two months already we.have tried .^ to. have a jgood composition. As you know, Indonesia,was, and is still, not happy .'". • ' ' • •' .. . • • "-)''•.•'•':'-. "• • '.- •''••' " • - •.'•.. -.7 with the "big composition, but we have to Accommodate ourselves to the,situation. We have no objection to having the composition of fifteen countries.. :••, . ' ',;•'" ' '.'. '• ' * "•. . .'• ' '• ' ' ')''• ; • ' .' ! • ' .W;'- .Just.on the eve of the departure of this Commission, my colleague from _.4. Senegal asked us to reconsider again. But now I understand that he is not insisting on this matter, so I am very happy. Anyhow, one obstacle we have now -.. pvercpme. Now the matter of departure: I have said already that any.kind of dej.ay.-is a^weakness, and any kind of weakness is beneficial for the Belgian intrigue.. So our delegation will oppose any kind of delay if it is not absolutely necessary. In this matter I am touched by the words of our colleague from Tunisia. Indeed, •''.,.... b' .. • '' ' .;•.' :.'- ••'..'.. • . '• we had hoped, .1 think, j>wo or three clays, ago, for the success of this Commission.

Atrleast, there are minimum, conditions for its success< One of the conditions for. the success of this, Commission is that this. .Commission should be able, .from .". ", 0''- ' • •' ': •.. j.'.i-.T'j ; i/i: • :,-:.i;.: '•: • '.."^ •"•,'. • .'. .. .•..'.' '/'.'..-.'. :..• •.: vv. ....".• n *, > .the beginning until .thei ;endj :tp. create.and to, have a gpod;atmosphere, tyhat does this mean?.. This, means that the .Commission -should proceed and should approach .-' • : .; ; "-"J- .?^C''! .•!•'•• •.'•• ."-' I. '""' •':'> ••*••••••.•: .!. ••'.;• '' -_{!-\ "•' \- •'. .' !* carefully, ^ : . tr-..,,,. .. -. ... ,. . •- ,.:. ....,..- . ,. • -.. , . .-: -•• Now, the fact is that .the Head of State of the Congo, $4r. Kasavubu, is here. .-•':* ••.- '!• •-,••»..•/ .;-ii":.,;;vi'r-.-L'-': -.--.:^ :-.;••, ••>••: :"...i' ':•-. :-. .?n.-.?;C'. ,;. . .•••/ That is a fact. When the Commission, or a .part of the Commission, is in New.(York,

that means that the Commission and the Head .of Statej are in the same place. We are expecting that the Commission should have a contact with the Head of State of .th^ Congo, because it has to deal with the Head of State of the Congo. What kind of contact; official contact, personal contact, informal contact? That is up to the Commission. The Commission is wise enough to do all this at least for the sake of courtesy. But as soon as the date has been fixed by the Commission or by the Secretary- General -- because they are helping each other; it is a consultation between the Secretary-General and the Commission --as soon as the date has been fixed, I : ' . .: •'• • . ' ' .' i .'-.'. ..'•'..'..':. .- '.••;,'..!' personally expect the Head of State of the Congo will go back to the Congo as soon as possible• There are rumours that he will stay longer, but I do not believe thi ••:: •*• ' '• •<•••. • '. . •'•' .•.•'.'•:*.''.";:-'•'-'v.1''',:';. '.-.:>/' . ,i ';.•." ] 'K. :A '•'•' • - '" • Sc fixing a date as soon as possible for the departure ,o£ the Commission will • •.' . '' '.'•• ' ' '. '. : ;. "'..''. . ' :• i ;'.•:'.»'• ' •/ - '•.•' •••.."•* - .'•'"'!'.?' .'.."' -.- '". . • "•.;•• .!.-.*.... stimulate also the Head.of State of the Congo to go back to hia country. »» .•..;•..'. '. •• • . . " • • • 7 . • ••' •" . •" • •• ,.-••• • • • ' • 131

(Mr. Wirjopranoto, Indonesia) I Btill harbour the hope and the conviction that the Head of the State is a leader of the Congo. For this reason, our delegation is against any long dispute. As to the composition, we are not in favour of a change in composition. We are opposed to any kind of delay. Of course, it is up to the representatives of the many countries to decide, "but we still have the hope that there will be no long delay.

Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): I shall begin by thanking the representative of Senegal for not having pressed his proposal which obviously warranted greater and more concentrated effort; but, of course, since we are pressed for time we could not change our decisions. Regarding the departure of the Commission my delegation feels that it should take place as soon as possible. However, in taking this position, we are not against the members of the Advisory Committee or the members of the Commission that have arrived here contacting Mr. Kasavubu and explaining to him that they are going there, why they are going there and clarifying the situation from this end. To set the date today, we would need certain elements. Are all members here? When do the planes leave? I know that they would be willing to leave as soon as possible, but the Commission should be given sufficient time to contact Mr. Kasavubu, My delegation takes this position, among other reasons, because of the fact that if we do not allow the Commission to leave immediately and as soon a possible, we will probably have meetings and discussions in the plenary, and we feel that these meetings could not but have a bad effect on conciliation. That is why we want these departures to take place as soon as possible.

Mr, HASAN (Pakistan): I agree with the representative of Mali that the affairs of the Advisory Committee, perhaps even more than those of the Congo,are becoming more and more complex week after week. Two simple questions that we are discussing this morning are the composition of the Commission and the date of departure of the mediation group. As regards the compoeitionj the representative of Senegal proposed the inclusion of some West African States, to which proposal very strong objections have been made. The main reason for those objections is the consideration of time ...... (Mr. Hasan, Pakistan)

that the existing! composition-, bag taken several'^weeks' to decide u^on and that in view of,.the' urgency of, affaire :in the Congo,.we -Should not-spend, more tlme-uorv-- recomposing that Commission. It was stated by one of the representative* , that it bad taken -several weeks to determine the present composition of the ^CdcanlBBion. The.-fact itself that it tools severe,!, weeks .to decide upon tjje ;; composition of the Committee would not. £ew/tp .express a recognition of ...: :.,r,Looking around at the wisdom and experience collected in t£is Ocwm rJ'wo"uld. normally think that it sho.uld> nq;t have taken an inordinately long t^m^r ;^o reconsider that matter .if it-was really urgent and deserving-of consideration^-/

; y».lY::v,It is indubitable that the tragedy of the Congo affects, the African , ....?..'..,•;/ 'countries much more than it.affects the,,non-African countries. That has been^y:, the .-view of my delegation from the very beginning, and that is why I have •••-•^..

suggested- time after time that this. Commission should comprise only Afri-can.&>.;; ? countriest To me it did not seem to be a very important point tha^becanse; of

some accident .or 8omftfQ^|iejr-.'anaasf>«v:; my ,co^ci^cy^l?a

tfafer Congo or that )&ome;.pt^r/flou^tryv^^ given spmev alffiQ^4-nflignif icant assl^tanc

tq the Congo, It s/bOtuidjentttlejipy -eounliry ;o^..8ome other .country to, have .a- ^r.

., .representative .on tha msdiatiion sroui>, but ng.-t an ..Af ri:can; country .which .for -^.. viietarrritar; has ,tO' be .a^•Jaei^JxDUl?4o|^:tile-;.(3.q»pgo•;, a*i$.-has t^?/;{bpjrAffected by, the ; r happiness or unhappiness of the. GJongolese people* ...... r

,..- r.

:1 V -.,-, •"-.-, ',.-. •" ' I ; ; I _ ;r| . 136 (Mr. Haaan, Pakistan)

It seemed to us that it vould have been rational only to have an African commission. However, we decided here that all of us, Africans and Asians, should go there, and in that ve acquiesced. The feeling is very strong in certain Western countries — and I know nothing about that feeling at all, and I must rely on what our colleagues in tbie Committee tell us and on what the representative of Senegal has said — that some West African countries should be included in the mediation group. The representative of Indonesia said previously that he would not insist on that,but when I asked him later, he did insist on that, so I presume that he does Insist on the inclusion of some West African countries in this mediation group, I suggest a compromise. That compromise would be that we authorize the mediation group to co-opt any countrj •whoae co*operatj&on, in the opinion 01? tfee »*dlation group, would be useful and desirable from the viewpoint of the reconciliation which is going to be the task of this group. I now turn to the date of departure. When the representative of Ghana introduced the representative of his country who is going to be a member of the mediation group, he stated that one of bis attributes, besides the great qualifications of the gentleman, was that he had not been Involved in the affairs of the Congo and, therefore, his detachment and his objectivity was a great virtue. I agree with that entirely. That is a great virtue. A person coming from Ghana, or from any other country of Africa, even without being tortefad or instructed,would know a great deal about the affairs of the Congo. But Imagine a person coming from a far, remote, distant place such as Pakistan, who is uninstructed and not briefed by us, going straight to Leopoldville and being thrown right into the vortex of mediation activities. What would he know about the affairs of the Congo? How would he be helpful in bringing about or assisting the reconciliation among the various parties? It was in light of this factor, I believe, that the Advisory Committee decided that the first meeting of the mediation group should be held here because, after all, the mediation group represents the Advisory Committee and the Advisory Committee must brief and instruct the mediation group. They represent us and nobody else. Therefore, It is only fair and wise that the mediation group hold its first meeting here as soon as possible — and in this respect I agree as to (Mr. Hasan, Pakistan) urgency. We must brief It and instrubt it.1 Besides that, thera'±e also another consideration, to which reference'has been made; aM that is the presence of the President of the Congo in New York. .... We cannot but agree with th£ fluggsst&ro made by several representatives here that the mediation group should try to establish contact ^with the President. After all, this mediation group is supposed to bring about a reconciliation): and one of the major parties to that reconciliation is the President of the Obngov" If the President of the Congo is not in the Congo at present, it may very well •Y appear that we are trying to play Hamlet without the Prince. Therefore, in light of these factors, I suggest that we do not act hurriedly In regard to th6 departure of the irediation groap. We should bring them here v and try to etrfea&ligrtfc contact with the President of the fiongo. We should brief this Mediation,group along the lines oh which we desire the group to act and work. Mr, BARNES (Liberia): I regret, Mr. Secretary-General, that I have to intervene on this question of the dispatch of the Conciliation Commission to the Congo in the absence of President Kasavubu, but it was my delegation that raised this question this morning. I must confess my concern over this effort to have the Conciliation Commission go to the Congo in the absence of President Kasavubu, who is the recognized Head of State of the Republic of the Congo and who must be dealt with in any case in this endeavour on the part of the Conciliation Commission to reconcile the differences among the political factions there. I think the resolution of the Gemsral Assembly of 21 September pointed out'very clearly that there was no mandate to this Advisory Committee for the setting-up of the Conciliation Commission, but that the establishment of the Conciliation Commission was dependent upon its purposefulness and usefulness in going to the Congo to assist the Congolese people in reconciling their differences• Now, I ask the question, would it be appropriate for a Conciliation Commission to go to the Congo for the purpose which has been set out in the resolution, in the absence of the President of the Congo? Why create hostility among those persons with whom you must deal? I think it is entirely wrong to press for the. dispatch of the Conciliation Commission in the present circumstances. It was pointed out some time ago by the Liberian delegation that that delegation thought it was desirable to have consultations with the people, including the President, with whom we had to deal before the Commission went. This morning we have heard that there has been no consultation* What would be the usefulness of hurry and haste in this action when the necessary groundwork has not been laid for the effectiveness of the Commission? I would therefore urge, Mr. Secretary-General and members of the Committee, that we show no haste in dispatching this mission to the Congo until such time as we have established that the parties with whom we have to deal will be available in the Congo* My Government does not want to be part of any arrangement whereby any Commission that is not assured of effectiveness is sent to the Congo. I should like to stop at that point. Mr« BQUCETTA (Morocco}.:, (interpretation, fron). French): I should Mr,'Secretary-General, to underline one point., if. you .will allow me, vith regard to the urgency involved in the sending of this Commission* I share the point,,pf view expressed by our colleague from Indonesia who,.stressed the fact that we •-;• are today actually making no progress but rather going."backward in our work,;,.••, which might be characterized as a sort of weakness or hesitation, I believe the decision that was taken to send the Commission is a wise one, and that the sending is very, very urgent... It Is very, very urgent because the decision that was taken by the General Assembly was not aimed, at trying to bury the Congo question, but on the contrary, at trying to create a situation such as to enable us to solve the prcolem, Furthermore, I should Kke. to bring out the fact that the decision to, , postpone the departure of the Commission would only add' .further troubles and - con-fusion in the minds of those concerned* This, worry wae already expressed.by the Credentials Committeei-of which.our delegation was, a .member. That Commission, by* the position it tooky 'had indicated-clear -cut opposition;to such a decision.

•'•''• 0'. '. i'i..;, '•'.:•.) , >.. . • * .-'.'. (Mr. Boucetta, Morocco)

In the light of the position we took and which we clearly expressed, and which had to be a clear-cut position or else we should only have thrown further confusion into the matter, I wanted to underline this fact. We took our position and in doing so based ourselves in particular on the decision taken by the General Assembly, which did not decide to bury the Congo question but decided rather to try to find a rapid solution for it. In this search for a solution; all hopes were placed in the Conciliation Commission, and that is why we think that that Commission should get down to work immediately. It must get down to work immediately, because the situation is getting worse every day; it is becoming more explosive and more dangerous day by day. Apart from the action of the United Nations, the only slight hopes which remained in the Congo were the provincial Governments. Now the news which comes to us from the Congo of the arrest of Mr. Kamitatu creates a new and very serious situation. In view of the confusion in the central Government, our only hope had rested in co-operation with these provincial Governments. If the leaders of these Goverrments are being arrested, I do not know what kind of situation we shall find ourselves in after a few days or a few weeks, and I do not think I am exaggerating if I say after a few days. Therefore, it is extremely urgent to send this Commission. In my opinion, although the Commission must make contact with Mr. Kasavubu who is in New York, it has nothing else to do in New York. It has everything to do in Leopoldville, and the problem cannot be transferred from Leopoldville to any other part of the world. This is a very complex situation; I apologize for speaking in such a way, but I myself was an eye-witness to what was going on. I lived through the situation in the Congo for about fifty days. Several times efforts at conciliation were made, some on the basis of good offices by African countries represented here and some on an official basis through parliamentary missions or different groups which tried to bring about reconciliation. The representative of the Secretary-General witnessed all the efforts that were made to solve the question. Today the only remaining hope is the dispatch of this Commission. It has a very important task to perform and a very urgent one in Leopoldville, before the situation becomes even worse. 147-150 (Mr* Boucetta, Morocco)

Mention has been made of several matters in an attempt to explain why the Commission should .not be dispatched hastily or in any kind of helter-skelter fashion. I fully share this point of view, but the argument has been put forward that there are certain material or physical questions to be settled, with regard to hotels or apartments or villas., which in my opinion are a very secondary question. The representative of the Secretary-General has told us that there are facilities and, if I may refer to my own case, I still have a villa at my disposal since the month of August. I could find no one in authority in Leopoldville to whom to turn it over and it is still there and * can place it at the dispoal of the Commission. As to the fact that Mr. Kasavubu is here in New York, the Commission could easily get in touch with him very quickly. The Commission, however, has a job to be done on the spot, in Leopoldville; it has to see other persons and to try to find a sound solution, it has to report to the General Assembly giving specific data on the situation as it prevails in Leopoldville. What is more serious still is that throughout the entire Congo there is now growing up, particularly in Leopoldville, a certain hostility or animosity towards the United Nations; this is something against which we have fought and are fighting, because it is our duty to do so. In this connexion, it should not happen that whenever the United Nations takes a decision and that decision becomes public, some sort of setback, hesitation or change in the position should occur. On the contrary, the United Nations decisions must be put into effect very.quickly with the maximum guarantees and circumspection, and also with the greatest possible speed. 151 (Mr. Boucetta, Morocco) I believe that it is very useful to underline the fact that this Commission must get to Leopoldville as quickly as possible. I see no objection if the Commission before leaving, gets in touch with Mr. Kasavubu. But it should be done as quickly as possible. Other points have been raised — questions of protocol -- which persons this Commission should deal with, first of all. That is an important question from a psychological point of view* If we could bring about the miracle of seeing everybody at once, we would be finding a solution to the whole Congo question by doing that. But, since Mr. Kasavubu is here, the Conciliation Commission can get in touch with him and perhaps express the wish that he may return to the Congo as quickly as possible so that they can see him there. I have no objection to that. But that should not be any reason for delaying the work of the Commission, which has a very important job to do.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think I may be permitted at this stage -- I still have four speakers on my list — to say one word. After all, the resolution of the General Assembly provided that decisions of the Advisory Committee in this case should be taken in consultation with the Secretary- General. It is extremely difficult at this time to give a fair summary of the trend or of the stands taken so far in this Committee. I do this, then, with all reservations, and what I say will perhaps reflect more my personal conclusions from the debate than an attempt at a summary of, so to speak, majorities. I feel, first of all, that we can leave aside the question of a change in the composition of the Commission. It may be that later the members of the Committee would like to go back to the proposal made by the representative of Pakistan, in one form or another. But I would say that, as of today, I think the wise thing to do is to count on the composition as it stands, I think we can also leave aside the question of practical preparation because as was so rightly pointed out by the representative of Morocco, that is not something that should delay us or that we should not be able to tackle in a way satisfactory to all members. 152-155 (The Secretary-General)

That leaves us with one question regarding Leopoldville, and that is the preparation on the spot, in political terms. The main leaders have boen informed and know about it; there is nothing new about this Commission. What they do not know about are the terms of reference and the time-table. I think this is the time when at least the terms of reference should be made known to all the leaders/ and whatever may be the outcome of this discussion in regard to time should' also be made known at this stage. Then I assume, at least as a working hypothesis, that we start out from the viewpoint expressed the other day by the representative of Nigeria/ to the effect that all who hold constitutionally recognized positions in the country are included among those with whom contact should be made. The most important pofht in that respect is that all the Provincial Presidents are parties to this problem. They should therefore, in my view, at least be informed about this plan and its further development. I do riot think that that id' a very time-consuming operation and, as the Committee, in my view, has taken the stand that no objections from their side can be accepted as a'veto, the fact that we may run into discussions which are a bit time-consuming need not bother us. We then come to the central question -- the question of departure and what should perhaps precede the departure. In my view, we must keep in mind the fact that this is a Conciliation Commission -- in the sense explained, I think, fairly fully in an exchange between Mr. Krishna Menon and myself the other day. It is not a question of conciliating this man or that man. It is a question of creating an orderly situation in a constitutional sense; That means that we are, in a sense — or the Conciliation Commission will be, in a sense — above personalities, and I think that that is something we must keep very firmly in mind. On the other hand, • 'it will naturally, 'to a large extent, be dependent on personalities — to the extent that these, personalities may decisively influence the outcome. I think we all agree that there are two personalities who come into the field unavoidably and at once: the Chief of State and Mr. Lumumba as Prime Minister, 156 (The Secretary-General)

The whole present conflict, the whole present trouble which we are facing has of course its formal root in a conflict between the Head of State and the Head of Government. And I think we also agree that the normal way to resolve a conflict between the Head of State and the Head of Government is by parliamentary means. Parliament is the judge between the two authorities both of which they have instituted in the country. However, they are both parties to it and there is no way around it. Mr. Kasavubu is here. I think that presents us with a paradox. On the one side I feel that it is really making the task of the Conciliation Commission impossible if we were to start by antagonizing the Cb.--.ef of State, If we put him in, so to say, the wrong box from the very beginning, where can we get? There is nobody speaking for him likely to take another line than the one he dictates. On the other hand, and that is the other side of the paradox, I consider it impossible to accept that this initiative of the United Nations, embodied here in this Committee, should be frustrated by a possibility of Mr. Kasavubu blocking it aimply by staying here. The compromise which seems to me to present at least a possible way out of the paradox, is the one which has been indicated here by several representatives, in fact, I think most recently by the representative of Liberia and also by the representative of Morocco, and that is, that without admitting that Mr. Kasavubu1r presence in Leopoldville is a necessary condition for the Commission to go, we should inform the President of the wish of this Committee to send a Commission without any delay at all. We should inform him, however, in such a way that he has a chance to express views here and to arrange his plans so that he cannot say that h& le presented with an ultiEattea, tfcq»t &e la treated at gun*a point, because that indeed would be rather unwise in view of the task of this Commission. 157-160 (The Secretary-General)

My practical conclusion from that would be that we should fix a tentative date for the first meeting in Leopoldville; in fty • view it would be perfectly reasonable to set a first ireeting in Leopoldville at tlja end of next week. Th^t would give us a couple of days -- two or three days -- for whatever contact need to be established with Mr. Kasavubu; that would allow him time to give it fair consideration; he would not say that he was rushed into something which is impossible. On the other hand, it would not mean that we would make the whole operation dependent on his travel plans or his personal decisions,which I think would be humiliating and quite impossible in relation to the General Assembly, after the decision taken by the General Assembly last Wednesday. As regards this kind of preparation, I would, for my part, consider that the most natural and appropriate way would be, if that is agreeable to you, very immediate contact with Mr* Kasavubu, first of all through Mr. Dayal, who is in & cert ait informal sense accredited to him. That does not mean any formal recognition or anything beyond what is already a fact. Mr. Dayal certainly could explain to him, with all courtesy, why this Commission has to go, why there cannot be delay, why, on the other hand, we feel that it is right and proper to use his presence here for preliminary contact. That is to say, it could be explained to him and not presented in a rough form which would create too rugged edges from the very beginning. That would, on the other hand, perhaps prepare the ground, if you feel that is the right thing to do, for either those who go in the Commission, or a delegation of the members of the Commission; my preference would be a delegation of the Commission, not all of them -- that would be considered the natural thing — not to start a reconciliation manouevre with 'him, but at least so to say pay a call on him, as a matter of courtesy. But that is less important than thia contact through Mr. Dayal which would be,, I think, the natural and proper way to approach him and to keep him in the picture. 163, •-.". (The Secretary-General) I would like to end by saying that my feeling is that it is really essential that v« do everything.ye. can to make this Commission a success, first of all, for the sake of the Congo, Itself, but. secondly, also for the .reason that the failure of this, kind of political miseion(indeed would be a failure which would reflect very heavily on-the :authority of.the United Nations in the Congo. For that reason, what io very, very foremost in my mind is that we should not, with open eyes,-;, le.nve anything.aside which, we can do, without giving up the sain plan, which may increase the chances of success. In.that respect I would say that, roughly, theiprocedure and, roughly, the timetable which I have indicated would seem to be the ;mpst. promising one. that w.ou3Li give ue a o.baoce to have a meeting on Monday night, Ik November. . It; would make it. necessary to make tentative reservations, letviis say> for Wednesday. We would then have the possibility of winding up things on Tuesday. •••••-••. • I wpuld say one more thing,about the preparations. It has rightly been said that there should not be .any Inf truct4.ons;i. any directive. I did not understand the., representative of;.Guinea..,.tp haye that in mind .when he proposed a week ago that tfce Conciliation Conin$ssipn 6fcoul,d. meet with this group. I understood him n'qt to in'tend5 to tie their hands in..any way, .but Jjust to give them the advantage of clarification of the situation through discussion with us, who have 'for so lOing been studying the problem.. . ^a,t,.;Ls to, say, it would .be a way to clarify theirvown.thinking when they come to meet to interpret ttheir terms of reference which have already been agreed. , , .. . ,«., I excuse .myself for this intervention, but I felt at this stage that this might helprus ,to .wind up this discussion a little bit more quickly. In any :event,1-. I am open to any correction which you might feel is needed in the picture which*'I have tried to draw. I repeat, it-is not at this stage an attempt at a summary, :-wh^ch I find very difficult, but more an attempt to indicate the conclusions..which I, personally, so far have drawn from the discussion.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I was about to make a similar suggestion on the line which you have made, Mr. Secretary-General. I believe that, provided it is acceptable to the majority if the Committee, it is quite acceptable to us. 162-165

Mr. JAJA WACHUKU (Nigeria): When I spoke here I mentioned that in fixing a time, certain factors have to "be taken into consideration. But I did not make any suggestion as to time, and I had no intention that anybody should construe the suggestion that certain factors should be taken into consideration to mean to delay the work of this Commission. But I said what I believed to be factors which we must recognize if we want to be successful. As for briefing, I think that when we met here the last time, the question of briefing came up. As a barrister who has been in practice for a number of years, I have no intention of suggesting that briefing here means the type of briefing that a counsel would give. In my sixteen years of practice I know what briefing means. But surely, Mr* Secretary-General, I do not know whether every member of the Committee has got a copy of the provisional constitution in both English and French. Certainly, the Commission going to the Congo without this fundamental document is beginning on the wrong leg. Those who speak French can read the French version authoritatively, but it would be a severe handicap on the part of those who speak English if they have not a copy which is authoritative. Even the mere supply of that document to each member of the delegation is briefing. .. 166

' ;(Mr/ Jaja Wachuku., Nigeria) I had no.intention,of suggesting that the members of the Conciliation

Commits ion should "be "brought here and told what to say; where to put a full stop.or a comma, and so forth. If that were the purpose of bringing them here, they would not deserve to be representatives of their countries. • The representative of, Ghana referred to the question of impartiality, ,cnd so fprth. I want to say that my own position is very clear. I can leave tere in twenty-four.hours. The Prime Minister of my country, who is also the Foreign Minister, left me here when he returned to the Federation.' ' I am a Cabinet Minister of the Federation of Nigeria. I have been in the thick of .negotiations since 19^7« There was no stage in the negotiations leading to the-independence of Nigerla in vhich I did not participate. If it is a question pf rulership according .to African traditions, I think that further investigation wlH show that we are in,-line in .thatv matter and have participated all along. i-,-: ..When one is going, to..enter.a new environment; one must buttrsss previous knowledge with.new knowledge...., We,.ar:e new in the Lto.ite.dL Nations; my country was admitted on 7 October* Surely persons who are to deal with jtfrotrleme with a world perspective are entitled to have from the Secretariat material which will give them a sufficient background to proceed to their very delicate work. In my opinion, we must not go there and make mistakes that could be avoided. Therefore, the members of the Commission must be supplied by the Secretariat with sufficient background material so that they can proceed to carry out their responsibilities with a certain amount of confidence. I think that it was Justice Willis who gave this good advice to lawyers: Know your facts and know the principle of law applicable to your facts, and then you may proceed with confidence. In the present case the members of the Conciliation Commission must have all the facts available to the Secretariat so that they will have sound background knowledge. Otherwise, they may make mistakes that are avoidable. As the representative of India has said, we take into account our own governmental attitudes. I, myself, have always based my examination of the Congo case on the opinion that it is not a purely legalistic and technical matter. A human factor is involved. In politics one does not deal only with laws and constitutions; one deals with human beings, with their whims and 167-170 (Mr, Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria) caprices, their likes and dislikes* All these factors interplay in day-to-day relations, one must take into account the factor of pride* A person may feel that he has "been ill treated or has not "been shown the respect that he deserves. Because of that he may make things difficult for others. All these factors must be taken into consideration If it is a question of proximity, we in Nigeria are very close to the Congo, and we are therefore very much concerned about any chain reaction starting in the Congo and spreading to our own territory. Sudan is the only one of the newly independent African States whose territory is adjacent to the Congo; the Sudan will naturally be concerned. We are very much concerned about the disintegration in the Congo because we know that it will have a far-reaching effect on us. Hence, if we are anxious that certain basic factors should be taken into consideration, no one should construe that to mean that we want to delay matters. We have no intention of delaying any matters affecting the Congo. The only thing we are saying here is that we should not ignore the facts which, if ignored, would make our work more difficult. No amount of enthusiasm will solve our problem if we blindly or inadvertently make avoidable mistakes. (Mr« Jaja Wacfruku, Nigeria)

So I want to make -thifl .position clear. 'As for being not in any way • concerned or involved-'jLn^this, I think that if any country is-riot involved)-ve.: • are not. • W6 are not involved in the Congo. > Tha only way we have any involvement in the Congo is in the contribution we have made in recponse to a request by < ^ the .'United Nations, what we have been asked to contribute, what we have done in cur own way. But, as 'for actual intervention or participation, whether in the- internal affairs or anything else, nobody would accuse Nigeria of doing anything of the sort. But we are alert to what is happening - in. the vCongo« - We -have _fcept our ears to the ground to listen to thece things. Today it i& a good thing that the Afro-Asian countries, together with our friends cuteids those" two continents,, have shown great concern that the Congo must be stabilised, atfd-lt is the one thing that binds us together in this Advisory Committee. We should bear that- in mind and forget our likes or dislikes. As I have stated

Mra Krishna MENON (India): I have no wish to intervene at length, I have intervened eo many times. With great respect, I would like to say that the Secretary-General's intervention and the statement he has made represents the situation, and we should have really stopped there and gotis c*o to decisions. But the reason for my intervention is merely to state the position of my Government In regard to a particular matter. 172-175 (Mr* Krishna Menon, India)

The appointment of a representative to this body arises in a telegram from Mr. HcoanGrskjold to the Government of India, where it says: "The representatives I referred to are to be appointed by tho States named; and I vould be appreciative" — for the Secretary-General tc.kec the responsibility in this matter — "if a representative of your Government oa this Commission were promptly appointed and his name communicated to me. Recognizing the urgency of the work to be undertaken by this CoTmission and the need for it to go to the Congo with a minimum of delay • ».." and so on. The two points I em making are these. Whether it be this matter of the sending of personnel or of making Mr. Dayal's services available, we have, in the pursuance of the Security Council resolution and in our own relations with the Secretary-General and the United Nations, acted on the understanding that our purpose is to forward the purpose of the United Nations. So far as this delegation is concerned, there is only one position I want to make clear on behalf of my Government. We have not the slightest objection, and I think it is appropriate that Mr. Dayal, Mr. Eammarskjokd's representative, should see Mr. Kasavubu. That is a proper function, and everyone would subscribe to that. With regard to anyone else going in to see him, if Mr. Kasavubu is willing to receive them, and if they are in a position to make the necessary contacts, which may or may not be so, it would not be for us to say yes or no, but I would like to make it entirely clear that, as far as we are concerned, the delegation does not begin to exist until it is on the soil of the Congo, and anybody going in and saying anything, having a discussion, does not in any way colour or bind the delegation. The delegation begins when it holds its first meeting or is called together by anybody in authority in the Congo. Otherwise there would be complications in the future, and we, of all countries in the world, have not the slightest predilection or the reverse in regard to any of these personalities. ~'" '" '"•" (Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

So that the proposal that is made.that .the delegation should go and meet him is probably that if any delegate wants', t'o. go and see him it would be bound by two conditions, one that Mr. Kasavubu must: be willing and,; secondly, they must have facilities to make contact with him. '. If .they can do so, that is up to them. It io not for us to say yes or no/ they can do so, but-it would not be. a meeting of ths delegation, the delegation does not exist.. ... • This idea of meeting in New-York, of which we were not at. all in favour, is not a political decision, it is an administrative decision in regard to the preparatory work of the delegation, and we feel we do not need it. I again reiterate the fact that our delegate would not be expected to, take any briefing from this Comm'.ttee.-' It would be entirely inappropriate and improper,... There could be briefing'with regard to procedures, but not with, regard to ideas, policies* politics> or whatever it may be in this, matter. ; . With these reservations, we hope ;that the Secretary-Generalts suggestion, of sending it ov.i'with a-minimum' of delay,, on -Wednesday or whenever it is, will be followed/ once again reiterating our responsibility to the Assembly for having this discussion adjourned''in view of the delegation going, to which you and I .. are parties. It would be entirely unfair and improper, to the President and to ,the Assembly now' to go back on* it, and that is our position. AH, I wanted to .say ie that 'the delegation meets in Leopoldville'.-

'The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think there is no contradiction because you may remember that I said that the conciliation operation could ,not start here.

Mr. JAJA WACHUKU (Nigeria): I wish to state that I support the proposal about timing. - . .

Mr, KAMIL (Malaya): I wish to intervene on two. small points bearing on the question of a possible meeting here in New York of the Conciliation Commission. I should like to report that the appointee of my Government is expected to arrive the first thing tomorrow morning, so that he will be available here from tomorrow onwards. 177-180 (Mr. Kamll, Malays)

Secondly, while my delegation would not deflect from its support of the eeise of urgency in despatching the Commission to the Congo, we feel that there is a lot of merit in the suggestion made here that those members of the Cora7rJ.fi a ion who are available here before their departure could perhaps call on the President in New York, but purely as a formal courtesy call. In the light cf v:!aat Mr. Menon has said, there cannot be any talk of any conciliation here; it must be done in the Congo. But it is the view of my delegation that a form of courtesy call would help towards future discussions in the Congo. Thirdly, on the question of briefing, I will not comment on the views stated here by other representatives, but it has been the understanding of my delegation that trie briefing that it is intended should be given to the delegates or Government appointees who will serve on the Commission will be confined purely to making available to them all the documents that have been produced in this Committee. Let thorn know about the decisions of the Security Council and so on, but ve should not in any sense tell them exactly vhat they should do and how they should do it, because, as Mr. Menon eaid, it is up to them to follow exactly the form of the terms of reference already agreed upon by this Committee. That is the understanding of vy delegation. 181

Mr. OgEJD (Sudan): It was my, intention to make the same'proposals which were made by you, Mr. Secretary-General, and supported by the representative of Ethiopia. ; . . . . Ms.y I suggest another thing? Why donrt we adjourn, or postpone fixing a date^today until Ambassador Payal has the chance of meeting President Kasavubu. Th-?re is every possibility that the information carried to us may help us in fixing a- date -which-, will be more appropriate, than fixing a date without knowing what is behind. • • .-, •'•i The SECRETARY -GENERAL; If you will allow me., to explain my stand on this last-mentioned point, I think that with such a large group, one should make travel arrangements- in due time. You may observe that I said tentative reservations, leaving it thus to a later decision. But I would not like practical arrangements of that .type later on to .turn out to be difficult in the way of sending a delegation or the mission, if it is so decided. I also feel that it is necessary to.indicate a target date as fixed as possible to President Kasavubu, because .he has the need to adjust his plans and thinking to some facts. For that reason I would consider it dangerous to lefiLve the question of time-table entirely open? but to use a very worn phrase, the group is raster of its own procedures. In this case, I would say that the group is in a position to have afterthoughts o From that point of view, I would say one thing: I would ask you not to let this come in any way to the Press, because that ties our hands in a way which may be very, very awkward. We Just regard this as a negotiation approach. I think with those explanations you see there is no basic contradiction, although I do feel that the tentative planning is of urgency, and I do feel that the President of the Republic should be informed about what will be considered to be the most desirable line of action.

Mr. OBEID (Sudan): I think we are in agreement on that point,

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I was going to bring up this very question of the dates. I think it is difficult to>set the date here and now, at least until Ambassador Dayal has contacted Mr. Kasavubu, 182-185 (Mr. Slim, Tunisia)

Furthermore, the Secretariat will have to take the preliminary steps to make sure of transportation possibilities, such as making reservations and so on, and to set a date here and now might even more aggravate the situation from the psychological point of view and make it more difficult for this Conciliation Commission to achieve its objective * I would prefer the date not be set, and that it be set only on Monday, during the meeting of the Conciliation Commission. I come now to another point. I entirely agree that the work of the Commission, the conciliation work, is work that must be done in the Congo, and not in New York or anywhere else. But there is certain approach work in order to assure success in the work of the Commission. Now that Mr. Kasavubu is here, I would not object to certain members of the Conciliation Commission -- I do not say that all the Conciliation Commission --. but I would not object to certain members of the Conciliation Commission, by their representative* or in their own persons, getting together with Ambassador Dayal and seeing Mr. Kasavubu after Ambassador Dayal has already seen him. They could see him informally, without it truly being a work of conciliation, but in order to explain to Mr. Kasavubu that this conciliation work is not partial work or work that is intended to impose one solution or another; that it is a task that has been carried out in order to create an atmosphere conducive to conciliation and stability and a normal way of life in the Congo -- but in all of the Congo -- and in the interests of the unity and stability of the country. 186 • • ' ' (Mr. Slim ., Tunisia) I feel that such contacts, informal in character, as I said, that in no way enter into the field of conciliation would nevertheless be extremely helpful and useful for conciliation later on* •

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): Mr, Secretary-General, I merely want to say that my delegation supports your views about the procedure and timing of the Commission's going to the Congo. My mission is ready to receive any communication from you as to other matters,

Mr, BQUCETTA (Morocco) (interpretation from French): I entirely agree with the conclusions drawn by the Secretary-General in our Committee and I want to thank him for them. I fully agree with those conclusions especially as regards the schedule you have adopted and because of the urgency, which I stressed earlier, of sending this Commission to the Congo, As.to the contacts to be made with Mr. Kasavubu in New York, your proposal that Mr. Dayal, who is accredited to Mr, Kasavubu, should contact Mr, .Kasavubu is also a happy solution. But if the work of the Commission is to begin very soon, I see no objection to having all the members of the Commission making a date with Mr, Kasavubu in Leopoldville, This would allow them to contact him. The contact would not mean work, it would not mean an investigation or conciliation. It would merely be to fix a date in Leopoldville with Mr, Kasavubu so that his programme of work could be arranged with that of the Commission. It would be very useful on the formal level if the only contact made in New York would be made by- Mr. Dayal. I therefore fully agree with your conclusions, Mr. Secretary-General, and I would ask that the Commission itself, as regards material needs, as regards the documents and records that the members of the Commission would need, would have no difficulty since all the members of the Commission, or at least the representatives of States on the Commission are aware of the findings of the Security Council and General Assembly; thus they have a large basis on which to start their work* Basically it is a iguestion of redressing the situation created in the Congo by the crisis there. It is also a question, and especially for the Sgcretary-General, of ending the intrigues which have multiplied, especially those-of the Belgians. I fully agree with the idea expressed by the representative of Nigeria regarding the intrigues which led to the division not only of the Congo but which can be contagious in many other countries. 187-190 (Mr. Boucetta, Morocco) I therefore think that it would be extremely useful to begin the work of the Commission immediately in New York by means of an unofficial contact, which would not be aimed at making a direct effort at conciliation or of investigation but to have as its goal the fixing of a date in Leopoldville because that is a task that is extremely urgent and which must be done.

Mr, JHA (India): As Mr. Krishna Menon has said, your summing up, Mr. Secretary-General, was very fair and very wise, We shall be well advised to conclude this meeting on a decision in terms of what you have said. Two questions have been raised since. The first is that the date should not be fixed. As regards that, my delegation entirely agrees with you. I think we would regard it as very dangerous to give the slightest impression that the date of the Commission's departure from here or its meeting in Leopoldyille, and consequently whether it will go at all or not, is dependent upon Mr0 Kasavubu, Mr, Kasavubu is the Head of State, we acknowledge him. We want to show all courtesy, we have shown him this in the General Assembly already. But we cannot accept the position that either he or someone else or Lumumba has any kind of veto or supervisory power over this Commission, I beg to differ from my very good friend, Mr. Slim,, that we shall be putting ourselves in a very awkward position if we defer the fixing of a date until after Mr. Dayal's meeting with President Kasavubu. 191 iv (Mr. Jha, India) Therefore, ne should, proceed to fix a date now. You have already indicated a tentative date; we would agree to that. The second point that has been raised was about contacts with President Kasavubu, what the Commission should do, where it should meet, and all that. It seems to me that it is not for this Advisory Committee to decide what the Conmission should or should not do. The Commission will be a body of representatives nominated by sovereign States. They will have plenary powers. It is for them to determine how they should arrange their work, whom they should meet, et cetera. I do not think it is correct for us tb try to bind them in any way. Actually, ye cannot bind them in deciding as to how they should conduct their business. , • It is true thab there are some members who have already been nominated to that Commission,that are here in New York. That is entirely up to them. They are entirely at liberty to contact President Kasavubu and to pay courtesy calls to him, but they do not do that as a member of the Commission because the Commission has.not met as yet. It has not elected its chairman, it has not-ofranged its rules of business, and I do not think we should try to impinge upon a region which properly belongs to them. Therefore, if the representatives to the Commission who are here wish to call on President Kasavubu, they are entirely free to do so. In fact, it may even be the right thing to do. But they do not do so as members of the Commission, but as a part of their own governmental delegations here. That is why my Minister emphasized, just before he left, that everybody can do that as part of the governmental delegations bore, but not as a Commission, because the Commission does not start functioning until it has met. It is quite clear that most of the representatives are not here. In any case, my Government has said that our representative will go directly to the Congo. Therefore, it is quite clear that the Commission cannot meet here. The Commission will meet for the first time in the Congo and then organize its business. In conclusion, I would say that we entirely agree with the line that you have suggested, Mr. Secretary-General. 192-195

Mr« CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I think; Mr. Secretary- General, that you have very correctly summed up the different opinions which have be^n expressed here. You have very clearly expressed the views of my delegation, which opposed any delay in the departure of the Conciliation Commission. I have noted one part of your statement; and that is that we must rise above the : :'Dno As you have correctly noted, I am sure, my delegation has always tried to avoid posing the Congolese question around a person, a name or a man. I do not know why certain delegations feel that the presence of Mr* Kasavubu will hamper or jeopardize the work of our Commission. They pose one side of the problem and refuse to see the other side. They say that we should not try to take a stand which might lead the other purt of the Congolese population in Leopoldville to say that we are for Kaaavubu. But they overlook the fact that in undertaking any negotiation — in eves approaching him — we are goic*j to be criticized from Leopoldville. They know that in leaving immediately the delegation of Kaeavubu can raise object!one. !?hat is why I am summing up on this Question; that is why I am referring to it. Any contact on the part of members of the Commission only commits those members of the Ccnmissicn and their Governments. 196

i; ••'.•'•.-•.•<•-. ; (Mr. Caba, Guinea) I say this because' 1 vant it clearly understood that any c6ntact on the part of the authorities of the United Nations with the Chief df State 'ait present in New York do not commit the Government of the Republic of Guinea, because in the course of our last meeting we made this, I think, extremely clear that the Chief of State was advised, as were all the 'officials in the Congo. We knew that he was coming here, and if he can really depend on his people, he should have been awaiting the arrival of the Commission. - ; We should not like it to be said that we ought not to set a date until we have some reaction here from the Chief of State. On this point our pbsitibn is clear, and no contact commits my Government. • ;•••...• Secondly, regarding the meeting itself, the meeting prior to the departure- of the Commission, I recall that the proposal came from my delegation. But after having heard the opinions expressed here, we do not press for that meeting to take place prior to the departure of the Commission and we are ready t6 withdraw our proposal. It will be, of course, up to the Secretary-General to indicate to us the practical need for a meeting at which the members of the Conciliation Commission will be given whatever documentation is in the hands of the United Nations. But in the course of that meeting, all political discussion is excluded. If we have been discussing up to this point the fixing of a date, it is because we have divergent points of view on certain aspects of the Congolese problem. But if we regard it from the angle of gaining time, that meeting becomes inappropriate. The Governments are adequately informed on everything that is happening in the Congo, in the United Nations and in New York at the present time. Our Governments know on what political level their actions must be taken within the framework of the terms of reference described by the United Nations. Since the Secretary-General has just stressed the urgency of appealing 'to the highest body of the Congo, that is, the Parliament, it will be necessary for him to provide, in his preparations, for immediate concrete measures assuring the freedom — the effective freedom — of those who will be called upon later to go to Leopoldville and pronounce themselves upon the future of the Congo and of the Government whose task it will be to provide for the welfare of the Congolese people. As a matter of fact, there have been numerous arrests; 197-200 (Mr* Caba, Guinea) numerous political figures who have been democratically elected by the Congolese people are no longer in a position to express themselves freely. These statesmen are as concerned as we are to contribute to the search for a speedy and peaceful solution of the Congolese problem. Their full freedom must be ascured. We have adequate troops of the United Nations in the Congo — their number now reaches 20,000 men — to assure that the United Nations will be able to guarantee that the Parliament can meet under adequate conditions of freedom. I believe that, after the summing-up of the Secretary-General, this Committee has said everything it has to say. Concretely, we suggest that on Tuesday or Wednesday at the latest the Conciliation Commission leave New York, and that it meet on Friday or Thursday in Leopoldville, so that its members will become acquainted with one another, be able to exchange their points of view and immediately start their work. With regard to contacts between Ambassador Dayel and the Chief of State, this can be done by correspondence. The Chief of State can be informed of the date of departure of the Commission, and it will be up to him then to decide what is his desire, either to stay in New York or to go to Leopoldville. These are the comments j wish to put before the Committee*

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: There are a few ponts on which I should like to make clarification. In addressing the various Governments in accordance with the decision of this Committee last Saturday, there was a direct indication that there would be meetings with members of the Commission, and I think I have to stick to my promise, my indication to them. On the other point, everybody has a right to his opinion, but in my own summary I said — and I think I will stick to that firmly myself — that as a minimum contact and courtesy, Mr, Dayal has to see the President. We cannot handle this by correspondence without running quite unnecessary risks. But these are personal observations. However, I am quite firm on that second point. ,201

Mr* teARNES (Liberia")t We fully share the views ..of the representatives of Tunisia and Sudan forthe postponement of a decision with regard to the Commission^ date of arrival.i& the Congo. • , ,..-...-

^•^IgUTOl (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French):. I fiiid myself in agreement with you regarding the proposals you-have -just made. I would also propose that -Mr. Dayal should see- President Kasavubu as.soon as. possible. I think this contact could take place perhaps even this afternoon, I do not know what the H-e'sident's hours happen to bey but I .think it would be very useful if the contact took place as soon as, possible. Another point, which you took up, Mr, Secretary-General, was that the question of the date should not 'be made known to the Press* I think this is an important question, I.do- not think that the Press siiould either know or publish the;date of Departure . of the Commission' at the moment, because this might create great difficulties for us* That is why I propose that Mr, Dayal be empowered to see the President this afternoon if possible, because the Press cannot possibly publish; that until tomorrow morning'in any case, even if it found out about, it, ^ The representative of Guinea has touched upon a point which I tfrlnk .is somewhat important. He spoke about the members of the Congoleoe parliament ...... and referred to those who are imprisoned despite the fact that t,hey have, immunity. Of course they must be released, they must be.set at liberty,.when,. the Commission arrives there,

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): -I merely wish to say that I think the. . points have been exhausted and that you, Mr, Secretary-General, have rightly summed them up, I should be very much obliged to my colleagues if they would now allow me to go back where I came from, because I have other engagements,

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I must regard the list as closed, and to those who are still on the list I would quote a famous phrase of Prince Wanfs, "we are all hungry." 202-205

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French)s What I said earlier did not truly express my point of view too clearly) I do not think many members of the Committee understood exactly what I maant. I said, repeated and reiterated that I felt that the work of the Conciliation Commission must "be indjrtaken as soon as possible, that the work of the Commission must be carried out in tae Congo and not here.. Thirdly, I said that contacts, of no matter what kind, with Mr. Kasavubu or Mr. Lumumba cannot in any way be of such a character as to allow them to cast a veto of any sort on eithsr the composition or on the character of the Conciliation Commission. This being the case, I think, and I continue to take this point of view, that it would be the most elementary question of courtesy if members — I do not say the Conciliation Commission, but members of the Commission -- have aome contact with Mr. Kasavubu while he is here. Naturally such contents cannot in any way commit the Conciliation Commission as a Commission regularly and normally set up. I feel that this contact is necessary for the following reasons. I am sorry, Mr. Secretary-General, but I have to recall that at the last meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Congo some of our colleagues, specifically the representative of Nigeria, tried to insist — although it was rightly considered to be a question which did not fall within the scope of this Committee's work « that no discussion should take place last week of the question of the Congo, because it was felt that to take up the question in the plenary might be prejudicial to the possibility of success in the work of the Commission. This was the case. 206* (Mr. Slim, Tunisia)

It is because this took place and because we vere forced to ask for the postponement of the debate in the General Assembly, and because we had a meeting of the Credentials 0onmittee,that I feel that,, in order to try to . take advantage of all possible chances of compromise, and conciliation, a preliminary and informal — and may I stress the word "informal" — contact should be achieved. That would in no way Commit the Conciliation Commission . as a Commission regularly set up— because it has not yet been set up — but such preliminary contact could assist them to're-establish the situation and also. coulcj. strengthen the possibilities of success'for the Conciliation Commission^ That being the case, I entirely share the point of view•expressed by the • representative of the United Arab Republic, that it would be very dangerous .for.us here and now to decide upon the date, and I say that for the specific reasons .advanced by the representative of the United Arab Republic* It.is..;•• ; very possible that even tomorrow we may see the date of departure of the -, Commission set for Tuesday and the date'of arrival in Leopoldville-set for ..• the end of the week. We may see that in the papers tomorrow,' and we may see that date disseminated all over tosiorrow, thus jepoardizing even the • : ., possibility of success of the Commission* -. . < - When I said that it was useful for certain members to contact the.:.. President of the Congo, Mr. Kas'avubu, I did not say that we should awaitj

Mr. DIALJjQ (Mali) (interpretation from French): I hope that I am the last speaker on the list. I should like to support the proposal made by ray friend from Ethiopia because, after all is said and done, Mr. Secretary-General, the summary which you made of our discussions seems to satisfy all of us. If I have properly understood the matter, there has been no set date in the proposal you made. You gave a sort of time-table by way of example, and on a very provisional basis. Thus I should like to say that I am in favour of having a meeting with the Secretary-General on Monday — first of all, because this was announced to Governments, and, secondly,because from an administrative point of view there are documents and other things that must be handled. With respect to contact,?, this has also been made quite clear. All I should like to state is that -we can trust the persons who are meeting in this room not to say that we were discussing the question of Tuesday or Wednesday. That is a matter of common sense. We are sufficiently responsible people not to indulge in such frivolous behaviour. I, personally, have confidence in everyone here. I

211 (Mr. Diallo, Mali)

But I believe that .Mr. Dayal, as Mr. Lputfi pointed out, should see Mr. Ksoavubu as quickly as possible, and if anyone., should see Mr. Ka^avubu, it should be clear that they are not speaking of the timing of the departure; otherwise, we will be confronted with a fait accompli and this would meet a refusal by the Head of State, which would confront us with another case of co-cniencQ. I think that the contact of Mr. Dayal is very important, and if there are other meetings, we must be very careful about them.

•> Mr. CAM (Guinea) (interpretation from Frer-eh): I shall be very brief, Mr. Secretary-General, After your most recent statement, we are not opposed to the principle of some sort of prior meeting -- the meeting which would precede the meeting of the Conciliation Commission. We are prepered to participate-in it on Monday. I am speaking to indicate quite clearly once more that it would be highly dangerous to postpone once more the departure of the mission and we would oppose any proposal which would be designed to delay this departure. I should like to point out again quite clearly that the members of the Commission are completely free to make contact wi'ch the Eead of State who is in New York now. They are completely free to take into account those suggestions and points of view. But what I say and would like to stipulate is that these contacts, if they are made, on behalf of the Advisory Committee or the Conciliation Commission do not in any way bind, commit or oblige the Republic of Guinea Secondly, we should like to point out and make very clear to our friends that the presence of the Head of State here would not represent an obstacle to the rapid operation of the Conciliation Commission.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think I may now try to sum up for the physical benefit of us all. First of all, there seems to be full agreement that Ambassador Dayal should take as quickly as possible a personal contact with President Kasavubu and that he should on that occasion, of course, with the background which he has so fully, explain both why the Commission is going, the task of the Commission as spelled out in the terms of reference and the strong sense of urgency shared by all around this table. 212-215 (The Secretary-General)

I feel that he should also say — and this is a slight precision in relation to what I said before, but I think it is fair in relation to the strong feelings held by some members — that although there is no formal decision regarding the date of the departure or the first meeting in Leopoldville, there is a widespread fec.V_*jg thr.t it should leave about the middle of the week and have a first meeting at the end of the week, let us say, stressing the lack of formal decision, but at the same time clearly indicating that the formal decision is likely to go in that direction. As regards visits with Kasavubu by members, as has been stressed here, everybody is free to go. I think the only thing that has to be stressed and which has emerged very clearly from various interventions, that before the formal constitution of the Cot-mission, of course, nobody speaks for the Commission — everybody takes whatever contacts he takes on a courtesy basis and in a personal capacity. All the same, it is my personal feeling that some such contacts, if they come about at the initiative of members, may serve a useful psychological purpose because they may pave the way to better human relations* But that is outside the order of the decisions of this Committee. The only thing we should keep in mind is the fact that obviously there is no conciliatory action or any other official action of the Commission before the formal constitution of the Commission; that formal constitution taking place in Leopoldville, the matter does not lend itself to any misunderstandings or ambiguities* The final point would be that we are agreed to meet on Monday and we will check with you on what time suits you best in the light of the arrival of various people* 216*

Mr* JHA. (India): I Just want to take up two minutes of your time* The first point J.s that we have sent you a letter which you have been good enough to circulate. I am afraid that, because of the discussion of the date of the despatch of the Commission, the matter cannot be taken up, It is rather late, and 1 wish to say that I should like to bring it up at the next meeting. The second thing is that I entirely agree with your last summation of the proceedings, but I have still some doubt and I do not want to carry it further myself — I leave it to the diplomatic policy of my friend and your special representative, Mr, Dayal — but I do not want to leave any doubt in the mind of Kasavubu that the date is in any way dependent on his discretion. On that point I am absolutely firm.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; That is not the intention. We should not, so to say, invite him to opposition. We shall most again on Monday.

The meeting rose at 2 p.m. CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No. 11 lU-November I960 ENGLISH . ..

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Monday/ 1^ November 1960, at k.jO p.m.

60-28699 : The SECRETARY •GENERAL; Ladles and gentlemen, I believe that the be0t vay to open the discussion this afternoon would be for me, with your consent, if it is agreeable to you, to invite Ambassador Dayal to say what he nay have to say regarding hie contact with President Kasavubu,

Mr. DAYAL (Special Representative): In deference to the wishes of the Committee, I tried to make an appointment with President Kasavubu for the afternoon, of Saturday the 12th and was informed that the President was then not available. Eventually I was able to see him on Sunday, 1J November, at eleven o*clock, Mr. Kasavubu was assisted by Mr, Bomboko and later by Mr, Cardoso, I informed the President that my call was not only in my capacity of Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo but specifically, at the request of the Committee, in order to inform him regarding the decision to set up a good offices commission and of its terms of reference, and also to consult him in regard to its programme and so on. 3-5 (Mr. Dayal, Special Representative)

; The President:8a^d that he had not been consulted in the matter/either about i:the composition of the Commission or its tenfta.of reference, .that the action taken had been unilateral, and that therefore he could not take-cognizance-of

it...... :. ,..'-.- ' ;. .- • - <•••-- ••'••-" •' .,,. . ;E nevertheless proceeded to explain to him the terms of reference of' the ^Commission and also the resolution of 21 September adopted by the special session of the Qeneral Assembly, adding that, as the President and the Government'had themselves requested United Nations aid for the, Congo, the decision to ;send---a good offices commission was in line with the United Nations action, which was directed.toward assisting the Congo to.build up its Independence, to achieve its unity an

The SECRETABY-GENERAL; Before inviting various members to take the floor I would like to address a welcome to those who have joined us today as members of the Conciliation Commission or as advisers. There are several new faces around the table. 1 hope that we will be able to establish a fruitful co-operation for the good of the Congo. You have heard Ambassador Dayal's report. I guess that in the first instance some members who may have had similar contacts or discussions, although in a personal capacity, may wish to give us additional information or complete our picture. If that is not the case — I do not want to impose any kind of order or any kind of rules on discussion — anybody who wishes to take the floor, is, as usual, welcome to do so. I think, however, we all recognize that the report of Ambassador Dayal introduces some very serious elements which have to be taken fully into account by this Committee in its further deliberations. 7-10

Mr • JA JA-WACHUKU (Nigeria): Before any comment, I vant to raise a matter which has caused some of us some concern. I think that matters discussed'here are supposed to be confidential until they are actually formally released. But somehow, no sooner than we finish a meeting, we find that within about ten or fifteen minutes after the meeting has adjourned, you have the whole decision or discussion of the Advisory Committee in the Press. I do not know how that happens. And I am not sure that everybody who comes here is a member of the Advisory Committee or an accredited representative of the United Nations Secretariat, I do not know how this information gets out. I am saying this because after the last time when we were here, it was amazing to discover that before I got to my hotel that all the information was in the New Ycrfc popersj everybody knew all about what we discussed. I sincerely hope that something will be done in order to prevent this type of thing from happening. That is the point I want to raise now. .-.;•• - . .- .,••./. .: »••'. :••:. •• .-..'.-•.:••• ; : '••:-.:*..••'••.• :: /..-.•.•"• • :•:' The SECRETARY-GENERAL; You address yourself 'to a '$ueatio'n which is not new or particular for this Committee. There is considerable difficulty with a great number of people present in various meetings, "even if they are closed, to keep stories or comments from going or coming to the Press. I think that will all due respect I must'say that it Is mainly a question of self-discipline for Us all: members', advisers and the Secretiariat --the same duties and the saine rights. ..>-•--.•.. i 11 (The Secretary-General)

Since these are closed meetings, it is most desirable that everyone should observe the utmost discretion. I am afraid, Mr. Wachuku, tbet beyond that there is nothing I can do to remedy this weakness.

Mr. COOPER (Liberia): I understood from Mr. Dayal that Mr. Kjasavubu claims that he has no knowledge of the Conciliation Commission or its terms of reference. I had thought, however, that the Secretary-General or his Representative in the Congo had communicated to Mr. Kasavubu the intention of the United Nations to send the Conciliation Commission to the Congo. I had thought that that had been done before Mr. Dayal left Leopoldville. Is that the case or not?

The SECRETARY-GENERALI I shall ask Mr. Dayal to answer that question.

Mr> DAYAL (Special Representative): I did see President Kasavubu before I left Leopoldville and informed him of the decision to send a good offices commission to the Congo. I did not at that time have the Conciliation Commission^ terms of reference, since they were drafted only last week. I had a general discussion with President Kasavubu about the purposes and functions of the Commission in terms of the resolution of 20 September.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: The representative of Liberia -will remember that the first information referred to paragraph 3 of the operative part of the General Assembly resolution, indicating the purposes, aims and character of the Conciliation Commission, but at that time there was no other text.

Mr. JHA. (India): At this moment I shall speak only on the question raised by the Minister of Nigeria. As you have said, Mr. Secretary-General, it is extremely difficult to keep from the Press, in some form or other, decisions and deliberations even of closed meetings. Since this Committee -- perhaps by sheer force of circumstances --is 12-15 (Mr, Jhe, India) called upon to discuss very important issues, t afo wondering whether it might not be a gocd idea to issue an agreed statement for the Frees at the'end of each meeting* There is no doubt that as soon as one leaves this room one'is surrounded and sometimes pestered by dozens of journalists, •' They are all anxious to get information; that is their legitimate'function. -It might be a good idea, whenever we have taken any important decision or have discussed any important matter, to issue a suitably worded statement- for the-Press at the end .'of the meeting. That is my suggestion to this Committee for its consideration.'

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; We may perhaps revert to that possibility at the end of our meeting and see if we can in that way obtain some discipline in this situation. If this special question has not been raised so. far,, it is of course because of the character of this Committee. As an Advisory Committee it is not supposed to communicate as a public body to the Press. On the other hand, as the representative of India has pointed out, with the development of the Committee's tasks it may now be both defensible and useful to issue Press statements *

Mr. ADEEL (Sudan): I should like to put some questions: to Mr; Dayal. The first question relates to the round-table conference which he is calling to meet at Leopoldville. Did-the President give any'indication as to when the round-table conference is scheduled to meet?

Mr. DAYAL (Special Representative): This round-table'conference idea has been in.the air-tfor a considerable.time. There was one attempt to convene such a conference some two or. three weeks ago, but it resulted in failure* In fact, some army officers had been sent out by Colonel Mobutu to collect delegates to the proJeatQd conference, but ultimately they were disowned and nothing came of the proposal. . • ' ...:.' (Mr. Dayal. Special Repyceentative)

Thon I again heard In Leopoldville a fev days before my departure that some o-cher project was in the air, but I have no information as to the composition of this proposed body, its terms of reference, or when it is likely to be invoked, and I personally think it might.be rather difficult to invoke a round table conference which would be generally acceptable.

Mr* ADEEL (Sudan): My second question relates to the President's complaint about his not being consulted on either the composition of the Commission or Its terms of reference. Wow that he has knowledge of this, I wonder if any comment has come forth from him on these two aspects.

Mr* DAYAL; I have not received any formal reply to the letter I sent and I think we should await any further reactions from the President in regard to this matter.

Mr, ADEEL (Sudan): Thank you.

Mr> SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I merely want to recall, in referring to the summary records, that basically we decided on the terms of reference during our discussion of the 5 November, a Saturday evening, and at that time we were aware of the fact that Mr. Kasavubu was about to come to New York. This will, I think, quite clearly explain why we did not send an official communique* to Mr. Kasavubu personally. Last week was reserved for debates in the General Assemly and the efforts that were made to hold the meeting of the Credentials Committee. I think it is a perfectly normal course of events and this would explain why no official communique' was available or made to him yesterday or the day before yesterday regarding the terms of reference.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Am I to understand that the terms of reference have not yet been communicated to all the people concernedt 17-20

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: The terms of reference were coimnunicated after our last meeting, when it was decided that it should be communicated to all parties

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Which one/the last one or the previous?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: The last meeting; they were communicated after ;'' . ----.-- the Saturday meeting. They were not communicated officially to people concerned after the first meeting because we still had a question of time-table and departure and so on, in abeyance, and it was felt that the matters belonged very closely; together, and we should make an ordinary approach. " . ;

Mr, JHA (India): Mr. Secretary-General, on the last occasion that we met there was a certain tentative consensus of opinion as regards the prompt , despatch of the Conciliation Commission to the Congo — or, rather, the members of the Conciliation Commission to'the Congo — because we had the feeling that the Commission would really come into being after the-members had assembled in. the Republic of the Congo. I have not heard anything in the statement of Ambassador Dayal to make us change that pbs'ition; that is to say, the urgency of the despatch of this Commission, the urgency of their assembling in Leopoldville and starting on their work, which, as we all know, is work of very great importance and very great difficulty. As" I said, there is nothing in Mr. Dayal1s report which induces us to alter our opinion that at the earliest possible date th'e Commission should proceed. Of course, when President Kasavubu says he was not aware of the terms of reference, that is probably very true, because he hadn't been given a copy, but now he has" that and the terms of reference are very carefully drafted, and my delegation feels that it is very appropriate and that, it will give tb.e Commission a very good chance to carry out1 the purposes of ' . ' •' . • . • . paragraph 3 of the resolution of 20 September* , 21 (Mr. Jha, India) So I would suggest, as regards the point that he was not consulted, that we have expressed the view earlier that it was not really for us to consult anybody. It is a United Nations function, it is a function of this Advisory Committee, which consists of representatives of member States and it was really our function to nominate the day. I would therefore suggest that we should get down to the task, and here we would be glad to have your suggestions and comments, if any. We heard some the other day, as to the earliest date that this Commission should proceed, or at least that the members of the Commission who are here should proceed to the Congo. Speaking for my own delegation, we have to report to them, because our representative is now ready in Delhi to proceed to Leopoldville as soon as he receives a signal from here. I would further add that the urgency of getting the Conciliation Commission into being is further reinforced b, developments during the last week here, and by the arrival of a delegation which is claiming to be seated in the vacant seat of the Republic of the Congo. This involves all sorts of political difficulties. On the last occasion I wrote a letter to you, Mr. Secretary-General, in which I wished to raise this question, and I hope I shall have a chance to say a few words on it later, but all I wish to say at this stage is that in view of the development that has taken place during the past week, it is all the more necessary that the Conciliation Commission should really start its work. It is true that there may be some opposition. Naturally, President Kasavubu feels that this is not a good Commission from his point of view, and he may not even like the terms of reference, but that is our field and these sentiments should not deter us too much. This is the right course to take, there is no doubt about it; it is the right course to take, it is a proper function of the United Nations, and once the Commission comes into being — it has very experienced and very able members --we feel sure that when the people of the Congo and the authorities and the various dignitaries there who have constitutional positions come into contact with the members of the Commission and find out how they are going to do their work, they will be impressed themselves by the usefulness of the Commission and I am sure that co-operation will be forthcoming. There will also be the Special Representative there, and I am sure that his assistance and his role in smoothing matters over will be extremely useful. It would be our solution that we should get down to our business and fix a date now, so that everybody should know, the terms of reference should be made public, and the members of the Commission should go to the Congo. 22-25

Mr. BARNES (Liberia): I am sorry that I have to disagree with the representative of India, Our presence in the Congo is to assist the Congolese, and we must first ascertain their reaction to this Commission. It is no use sending a Commission there against the wishes of any of the parties. We must first find out whether the splinter groups in the Congo really want the Commission, There is a proverb in English that says that one man can take a horse to the water but 10,000 men cannot make him drink, and that is what we are facing here. Until we get the reactions of Mr, Kasavubu, Mr. Lumumba and other leaders in the Congo, we should not attempt to force any Conciliation Commission on the Congolese Government, It is an independent country and we must respect the wishes of that- country, Because we have admitted them here as an independent "State, we cannot force a decision on them in the name of the United Nations, If we' say -that there must be a Conciliation Commission and that it must go to the Congo, it is the wrong attitude. If we send the Commission now and the people do hot wani it, it will be just a waste of money and be a fruitless errand. So I disagree : heartily with the representative of India and I think that, since we have indicated the views of this Commission to Mr. Kasavubu—• and I hope to the other parties in the Congo — we should wait for their reaction before we attempt to- do anything further, •••:••-: : , 26

Mr. TOURE (Guinea) (interpretation from French): Before taking the floor at this stage of the debate on the Good Offices Commission nay I present to you, Mr. Secretary-General, and to the members of this Committee ^he representative of my country, whom I should like to introduce to you. He is the one nominated to go to the Congo in keeping with your request. The Republic of Ckilnoei bae nominated as a member of the Good Offices Commission to go to Leopoldville the Minister of National Defence and Security, Keita Fodeba, who is sitting behind me, and I am extremely pleased to present him to the members of the Committee. His nomination surely shows the tremendous interest that my country and all African States attach to the activities of the Conmission and the United Nations, and also it proves our interest in finding a proper solution to the serious problem of the Congo. We listened with great attention to the report of Ambassador Doyal, and especially with that part of it dealing with his conversations with President Kasavubu. We shall not labour the question of that report, but our conviction is that basically no decisive element is brought to bear which can in any way change the views that we have already expressed. On the contrary, I should like to agree with the opinion expressed by the representative of India and to say that my country also earnestly hopes that the Commission already set up will go to the Congo as soon as possible. The terms of reference of that Commission are extremely interesting and can be very important. If the Commission is expected to have a chance of success then it will have to study the situation in the Congo. At the same time, it must do everything in its power to enable the responsible persons in the country to settle their difficulties. The Commission must also encourage the setting in motion of the institutions of the country. That is an important — I would say indispensable -- task which the Commission has to fulfil. That is the conviction of my delegation, and I am sure that it is a conviction that is shared by all the delegations at this table — those who know that in any case of this nature it is the institutions of the country that must act at the framework within which the officials can conciliate their views. To conclude I would like to say that the representative of the Republic of Guinea and, naturally, all the distinguished personalities that have been nominated to go to the Congo, are surely ready to shoulder this task and are straining at the leash just waiting for instructions. They are more than eager to fulfil the 2700 (Mr. Toure*, Guinea; > .''••*. terns of reference given them and are awaiting only the details regarding the practical measures that are to be taken so that they can go to Leopoldville as soon as possible. We believe that while the Commission is not in Leopoldville -- . • • . . * : • t • . j while it is not confronting the realities there and in the Congo as a whole -- its work will not have begun. It is only there, on the basis of the directives and the terms of reference, and in keeping, too, with the resolution of the Special Emergency Session, that the Commission will be able to make efforts to 're-establish "normalcy in the Congo. Therefore, we are of the opinion that, as the representative of India said a few moments ago, a date as soon as possible should be set for the departure of the Commission, That is the point of view of the delegation of Guinea. Mr. QUAISOH-SACKEY (Ghana)j It would be a pity if we were to go bacfc and cover the same ground which we have covered thus far, namely, to send the Conciliation Commission to the Congo. I have listened to the argument put forward by the representative of Nigeria and it makes me very sad because I think that one factor is being forgotten in this whole issue* There would have been a prime, facie case against) sending any commission to the Congo and, for that matter, against any one of us flaying anything about Congolese affairs, but for the fact that we here as representatives of the United Nations are performing a task in the Congo* Normally, Article 2^7 of the Charter makes it impossible for any delegation, any country whatsoever, to say anything at all about the affairs of an independent country, and were it not for the fact that there is a responsibility imposed upon us by a situation which arose in July, my own country would very much hesitate to say anything at all, to express any views at all, about the Congolese situation. The fact is that the United Nations went to the Congo in July at the express request of the Central Government* We went in at a time when the country had become independent but was being interfered with by a foreign Power* I submit that it would be a sad commentary on United Nations activities in the Congo if we left the country in a worse state than we found it • How often have ve not heard Mr. Lumumba demand that United Nations troops be withdrawnj and now we hear the same demand being made by Mr* Kasavubu* If, sir, you decide that we should withdraw^ we shall willingly and very happily withdraw, in which case there would be no responsibility on us, on my country, or on any other delegation which has cent troops to the Congo. But as long as we are there, as long as we have gone in at a time when there was a particular Government, when there was a particular status quo, it would be very sad if we left the country without at least seeing to it that what we saw in the country is still there* That is one point which I wish to make. (Mr, Quaison-Sackoy, Ghana) Secondly, 1 cannot ate any difficulty about the Conciliation Commiesion going. Certainly every courtesy should be shown to Mr* Kasavubu while he 10 here, but this is a conciliation commission which is being sent because of the peculiar circumstances obtaining in the country* We are sending the Conciliation Commission because we feel that the United Nations has a responsibility -- the responsibility already outlined in the opening statement which I made* If that is BO, then are we to take Into consideration any opposition which we shall perforce have to meet, because definitely there are so many people who will not like Congo to succeed; there are so many people who are happy to find the situation ad it is now* Are we happier as a world organization to see what is happening? That is the first point which must be borne in mind, That is to say that if the United Nations has considered it necessary to send a Conciliation Commission to the Congo, then of course we have to accept the fact that not all people will receive us with open,{lands in the Congo* That must be fully admitted; it is a fact which must be admitted. 36 (Mr, Quaiflon-Sackey, Ghana)

Secondly, if we do not want to show discourtesy towards Mr* Kasavubu, there is a way out, to my mind. After all, if the Conciliation Commission goes to the Congo, it has a lot of work to do — "background work. It must read all the papers and it must organize itself, and I am sure that that would take time* if possible, then, we must not see anyone until possibly the President arrives in the Congo, if it is a matter of showing courtesy. We are not going to the Congo at the express invitation of any one personality. We are going there because there is work to be done. The United Nations headquarters is already established, and, since we are going there as a United Nations body, we shall perforce have to work out of headquarters. We are not going there as representatives of governments, with definite views, but we are going there as a United Nations body, and therefore we shall have to confine our activities within the United Nations headquarters. So I submit that the over-riding consideration which was before us last week is still there; that this Conciliation Commission can go to the Congo and do its preparatory work and, if it is a question of not seeing any other personality before seeing the President, of waiting until the President comes/ I am sure he is not going to stay here for a month, unless, of course, there is a definite attempt being made to sabotage the Conciliation Commission.

Mr. ADEEL (Sudan): Mr. Secretary-General, I am happy to say that I am in full agreement with the representative of Liberia, for the same reasons as he has stated. When I asked Ambassador Dayal whether he had any reactions from the President regarding the terms of reference and the composition of the commission, I think his answer was in the negative. We learned from you, sir, that these terms of reference have just been dispatched to the leaders in the Congo. This is a very important consideration to be borne in mind. The task of this commission, as we conceive it and as it is laid down in the resolution, is to assist the Congolese to find solutions themselves to their problem. I was wondering what would happen if one of the Congolese leaders said to the ambassador: "We don't need your assistance". Where would we be then? I think that the best way out for us is to wait a while and see what reactions come through before we proceed to dispatch this commission. That is all I wanted to say. 57-iK)

Mr. Hfl$AN (Pakistan): Mr« Secretary-General, I have an Important question to ask and a less important statement to make. • The question is; would Ambassador Dayal let us know to what extent, in his opinion, President .Kasavubu vaa genuine in his .efforts in convening this , round-table conference for settling the. constitutional and other problems?

Mr. DAYAL (Special Representative): It is very difficult for me to go into the question of mptives. I can only base my opinion on facts, and the fact is that the previous attempt to convoke a rpund-table conference was not successful, a»d I do not. know how far the present attempt has advanced. J heard, as I said ..before, . in Leppoldvil^e, from Mr. Bomboko again,, that he had the intention of convoking, a round-table conference, and this was repeated to me *'•• • •'-' • .'-"• ' .- ^? ' ; ' ' ' . : • >""•-.- .."••";•:.'.-. yesterday. .. "Jljat is #11 that I .know about this matter.

Mr. hftSAN (Pakistan): Mr. Secretary-Qeneral, now I have my unimportant statement^ At the last meeting there was a general consensus of opinion that. the commission should go to the Congo as soon as possible; but, as regards tfce actual date of departure and BO on, several opinions were expressed-- opinions about the date and opinions about the order or the sequence of various events which .should.. take place in order .to decide on the actual date of the departure. We. have that excellent arrangement, in this Committee that we never have any votes and we never contradict one another and we express our views in the hope that > you will take note of them and then follow them as well as is possible in the circumstances. As. far as I recall now, we all agreed that it was necessary to establish contact with President Kasavubu, not only as a matter of courtesy but also because

we thought .that without his being in the Congo the task pf: the QcnmiesioB would be not only more difficult of achievement but it would not be possible td accomplish very much if the commission went and stayed there in his absence* (Mr* Hasan, Pakistan)

It has been suggested today that the Commission can go despite the absence or the presence of the President. Now, it is not possible for me to opine on the Justification of skipping that very important thing: the presence of the President of the Congo in the Congo itself for the Commission to start its work. My very good friend from Ghana, in his usual useful manner, has suggested that the Commission can go now and study things, study papers, look around for accommodation, find secretariat, and do numerous small jobs while waiting for the President to return. Now, I do not know to what extent it will be useful for the Commission of very influential and able men to go and to sit several days in the Congo, waiting for the President's arrival, and in the meantime trying to make itself useful and keeping itself occupied with : certain small tasks. In my opinion, perhaps it would not serve a very great purpose. Therefore, while agreeing that it is extremely important for the Commission to go to the Congo as early as possible so that these conflicts, and dissensions should be brought to an end as speedily as possible, I do not agree that we should make haste in the matter. One of the important factors to be taken into consideration is that we should not alienate the President — this is one important point on which all of us are agreed, from yourself, Mr. Secretary-General, down to the least important member of the Commission, myself — because he is the President of the Congo and therefore an important factor in our negotiations, in our efforts at reconciliation. We should try to persuade him to go back as soon as possible, to receive the Commission there,to get into the process of reconciliation and negotiation. But we should not give an impression that his presence or absence is a matter of very trivial importance and could be skipped over, could be disregarded or could be neglected* That would perhaps make the task of the Commission even more difficult. Therefore, for the sake of good results, for the sake of the purpose that we all have in view, my opinion would be, if it is only a question of waiting one day, two days, or three or four days — and it has taken us so many weeks in arriving at even small decisions like the composition, like the date -- a few days more, a few days less, although extremely important for a country's future, would perhaps not be so important for us to do anything as to jeopardize the (Mr. Hasan, Pakistan)

BUCCCBS of the whole Commission. So, while urging that we accomplish this task as speedily as possible; I would advise against anything whichtsavours o:f haste, and haste of a kind which would affect the .chances and the prospect| of success. •.••••..-.•,- ;

f .-. Mr. AW (Mali)(interpretation from French): Without touching upon the substance of the matter, I should like to indicate that my delegation supports the proposals calling for the sending of this Conciliation Commission as soon as possible. I have Just heard a certain number of arguments against the despatch of the Commission, and that leads me to ask a question. President Kasavubu is in New York and, with all the respect that we all owe him, we cannot overlook the fact that there are difficulties in the Congo and that the task of the Commission does not consist only of persuading the President4 He is only one of the parties in this extremely complex problem of the Congo. Therefore, when the United Nations appoints a Commission and entrusts it with a task within the framework of a normal mission, which has come within the terms of reference since the beginning of the events in the Congo, this is not something that appears as a new element of initiative of any great scope which could completely transform the situation or would have such consequences that it would be essential to the United Nations to get in touch with President Kasavubu for this mission. As a matter of fact, I would like to add, without actually going into the substance, that, even if the United Nations were obliged to make contact with those who represent the Congo, it is admitted in the present difficulties —and I think everybody has recognized this -- that there are at least two elements or two institutions which are acknowledged to exist in the Congo, namely, the President and the Parliament which is in Leopoldville. Therefore, when w speak of this Conciliation Commission, this presupposes a mission which would try to persuade those who do not wish to speak to each other to get down to speaking to each other* Moreover, the task of this Commission which will go to Leopoldville is not actually in conflict with any round-table. In fact, President Kasavubu can hold that round-table conference at any time that he wishes. It would be even better if the Conciliation Commission happened to be in situ at the time; it would simply encourage the holding of such a round-table conference, not as an arbiter or leader in the debates but simply by way of assisting each of the parties to come to that round-table, because we know from the report of Ambassador Dayal that vain attempts have been made to achieve a convening of that round-table. It Is not at all necessary that Mr. Kasavubu be able by himself to hold such a round- table. (Mr, Aw, Mali)

Therefore, it is difficult to see how the- Conciliation Commission could harm the initiative which Mr. Kasavubu himself might take in the future if he himself has recognized the need for conciliation; "because we are speaking of conciliation, after all> and one of the factors in favour of the most rapid possible departure, of this Commission is that time is working against the Congo. On the "basis pf all the evidence and all the reports we have had so far, it has become apparent that, the more time is wasted, the worse things become in the Congo. After "the debates which took place last week, and the suspension which came-ab.out, pne might well wonder what else can be done at present than to undertake this action for , conciliation'.as soon as possible. That is why my delegation would wish to press firmly for the departure of the Conciliation Commission as soon as possible, since, as I say, time is working very definitely Against the Republic of the Congo. 51

Mr. BENABOUD (Morocco) (interpretation from French): Nfy delegation would support any view favouring the earliest possible departure of tbo Conciliation Commission in order that it may begin to carry out its tasks in the Congo. Of course, it would be desirable for all the elements involved to be in the Congo. It would therefore be desirable for the most vitally concerned and influential Members of the United Nations and for the Secretariat to support the view Just expressed by the representative of Mali — namely, that the longer we wait the more deterioration there will be in the situation. Accordingly, we should advise President Kasavubu that there is a crisis — he is, indeed, fully aware that there is a crisis; that this crisis is only a consequence of a far more deep-seated illness^ and that the United Nations wishes to attack that illness, but only with the collaboration of all the Congolese parties concerned. Without such collaboration it would not be easy for us to work energetically to halt foreign intrigues and to end provocations in the form of secessionist movements, and so forth. Things have bogged down, as it were. Our delegation has used the word "deterioration". We would wish to use the word a third time in this Advisory Committee because we are afraid that matters will go from bad to worse and that the real evil will be overlooked. As a matter of fact that is happening today. We are afraid that attention will be directed only to the consequence of that evil, which is the crisis. Therefore, it must be brought home to Mr. Kasavubu that the crisis is only a consequence and that the worse the crisis becomes the more likely it will be to draw attention, whereas the cause of the crisis will be completely overlooked That will have tremendously harmful consequences for the Congo, for the Organization as a whole and for the Secretariat. We have deplored in the strongest possible terms some actions taken last week which might encourage Mr. Kasavubu to strengthen his resistance and to feel that he has great support. If that happened, it would become more and more difficult to obtain from Mr. Kasavubu the collaboration that he is being asked to give. I am referring particularly to the convening of the Credentials Committee 52-55 (Mr* Benaboud, Morocco)

In the.face of the most energetic protests of my delegation and that.of the United Arab Republic, which are the only members of this Committee wLc are members of the-Credentials Committee. The Credentials Committee hopes to inform the President of the General Assembly of its decision and to ask the Assembly to take up the matter and uphold the Committee's decision. It seems to me that that would be disastrous for the collaboration we are seeking from all the influential parties concerned in the Congo in order to overcome the internal crisis, which, as.. JL have said, is only a consequence of a greater evil. It would make, the task almost insuperable, and we should never be able to carry out our goal. If Mr» Kasavubu realize,.•-'s . that the •Unite ... .d Nations wishes to• halt any actio• i- , ni . . withip our Organization which would further disturb the atmosphere, I think that he will realise that this is one. of the elements in favour of the collaboration whiph we are,hoping to cfotsaia from all ,ti}e influential personalities, both in . the Parliament and in the. Government 1$ .will be necessary to ask for the collaboration not only of. President KasavubuA but of all,the States Members of the United Nations.. tThat is w.hy, as the representative of India said, it would be wise to fix a date as soon as possible.. 56 (Mr. Benaboud, Morocco)

Our Governments have done their best in order to reply to the appeal of this Commission and have designated or nominated members to form part of tha Commission. Our work has already been rather slow in itself so far, and to accentuate this slowness would convert this Advisory Committee, and the whole of the United Nations into an organization which would look rather ridiculous in the eyes of public opinion. Then, it would be even more serious if we were to go back on a decision which has already been taken. We have communicated the document which was distributed to us last week to our Governments and we are going to communicate the paper which is before us today, and any announcement to international public opinion and to our Governments that we are still delaying, that we are going to go back on our responsibilities, will cause confidence to be lost both in this Advisory Committee and in the United Nations as a whole. Everybody will understand that the cold war, the introduction of which into Africa we hoped to be able to avoid, has been introduced into the United Nations itself. That I think would be catastrophic and, instead of dealing with the confusion in the Congo, we should then have to deal with the confusion in the United Nations. Therefore, the time factor becomes very important. We have to face the truth. What we wish to do is to re-establish normal conditions, and normal conditions without legality is an expression which is devoid of any meaning. What we imply is the re-establishment of constitutional order, and for that it is necessary to have the collaboration of the parties concerned. For such collaboration with the parties concerned to be brought about, two things are needed. First of all, we must not waste too much time because opinions change, and secondly we must not havt too much action within the United Nations which would tend to trouble still further waters which are already much more troubled than we hoped they would be at the outset. To sum up, I think that we must continue along the line of action that you, Mr. Secretary-General, have indicated. Last week we saw with great satisfaction a clarity of mind which has filled all our Governments with confidence. We have communicated this to our Government, in particular, and we have also seen that attempts have been made to hasten the procedure, but if today we- are going to continue to procrastinate then we are going to relapse into a chronic disease 57-60 (Mr. Benaboud, Morocco) which is precisely what: we.-wished to avoid in the Congo itself. We vc^e afraid to See. a state of advanced deterioration wifchin the Congo, and I Lope.%aat this will .not be transferred here, because in that case, both, .the.,patient and the,doctor will be in -need ,of someone ,to cure them both. It is necessary "immediately ;to. set a date, to advise Mr..,Ka.sa.vubu to .offer his collaboration, to. let it be understood by him that it is the United Nations which is speaking t9 him and not, just a small committee of the .United .Nations. It is necessary for this Commission not.to waste any time, in order -to avoid the dwindling of the .confidence, that-now .exists in public opinion and among our Governments...... - .,,-.-.. - ..., ,:

•:•-...-. - Mr. DIOP (Senegal)(interpretation from French): My .delegation qr course agrees that the Conciliation Gommissiop should go to ,the Congo,as( soon as possible, but we have been trying-to..dettermine.what Icpu3td.,'be the reasoins which are causing, Mr. Kasavubu's reluctance. If our information is correct, it seems that . Mr, Kasavubu doubts the impartiality of this Commission when he analyses its ; structure.- , ;.- ••-.•: .•< :. .•;••....-..•.. - ,..,; ••! ..,•.-••'• .•:'•••-• -...-.• • 6i (Mr. Plop, Senegal) Figures have been quoted and It seems that out of fifteen members, eight would be or are -- I don't know on what argument this was based — eig^b would be In favour of Mr. Lumumba and the others for Mr. Kasavubu. That is v^y, while we accept the idea that this Commission should be set up as soon as possible, would it not be possible, in order to overcome this reticence on the part of Mr. Kasavubu, to compose, or at least to nominate, new members for that Commission by choosing personalities which are not marked and in relation to the choice of which no reservation could be made? Perhaps we should take all the necessary precautions possible, even if that might involve delay. If that were possible, it might overcome the wish expressed because the Senegal delegation would wish to send a commisBlon under tiie best possible conditions so that its success would be guaranteed. It was said here before me that the failure of this Conciliation Commission would also be a failure of the United Nations, It would prejudice the work for peace and the re-establishment of law which the United Nations is seeking in the Congo.

Mr. Ismael TOURE (Guinea)(interpretation from French): While apologizing for taking the floor again in this debate, which we feel should not take up any time unduly because its essential objective is to decide upon the date of departure of the Good Offices Commission, I would like; however, to make a few remarks. It is the view of my delegation, sir, that the conversation which took place with President Kasavubu must not be taken as an obstacle being placed in the path of the Commission's departure. Even if the reactions of the President of the Republic of the Congo are disquieting for the full success of the Commission, we do not believe that we can consider those declarations at the moment as being negative. They cannot be such as to lead us to renounce our Reconciliation Commission. On this point it might be fit and proper to recall that in the explanation of the resolution that was adopted by the special session of the General Assembly, it was stated that the idea of this Reconciliation Commission was born of the collaboration of some of the most closely concerned delegations* This was unanimously supported by delegations of Asia and Africa. Since we felt that this country was beset by so many divisions, that this country was furthermore 62-65

(Mr. Toure1, Guinea) ccnfrenting an aggression — and I don't think anyone can afford to forget that — ths.'; 1:A order to come to a rapid solution, the feeling of solidarity linking the Conjo with other fledgling republics of Asia and Africa should be brought into play,; Tnat is the seme solidarity that links the Congo"with the United Nations that must also fcave weight in the matter• therefore, the objections that are now being raised .could have been raised at that time. Then we might have been told you want to prepare a Conciliation Comnission, but then you have got to get together; v^th 1}he parties concerned. ' Then we would have suggested that the viewpoint df the President of the Republic be sought out and that we try to sound out all the :other parties concerned because there are many others. They are as worthy of respect as is the Head of the State, too. Without dwelling on this aspect of the- qusstion, we nevertheless consider that it is not time to tell ua that this1 gentleman or that gentleman was not consulted before the Commission of Good Offices was set up. This Good Offices Commission was set up and there is no time now and it is no time now to go back on the question of the composition. This CommisBi'on was set up in keeping with'certain criteria that were followed. 66 (Mr. Toure*. Guinea) My delegation would like to stress one point. We have been told quite often that since the Head of State is the only incontestable, undeniable and unchallenged official of the country we have to take his views into account. But we have done many things without asking him, and many things that he has asked us to do the United Nations has not deemed it appropriate to do, either in its own intereste or even in his. I think the last occasion was when he expressed the most serious reservations regarding the United Nations action in the Congo itself. That certainly did not lead us to stop the intervention Of the United Nations in the Congo. Therefore, let us be logical and consistent with ourselves. We are in the Congo not to complicate the situation but to simplify it. We are not in the Congo to lead the parties to crystallize their positions but, rather, to seek out the surest ways and means of conciliation among the parties concerned. Therefore, I think it is important that we should recall certain aspects of the question. We are told very often in the United Nations that he is the only unchallenged authority. But are we talking of the country? If so, the affirmation is certainly not in keeping with reality. The authority of the Head of State has been contested and challenged by all the important sectors of the country, and I can recall this very rapidly. As Chief of State he appealed to the national army to lay down its weapons. You all know that the aray refused* Therefore, the army rose against the authority of the Head of State. Secondly, the Chief of State, and later the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, asked Tshombe to respect the constitution and thus to maintain the national integrity. We know full well that Tshombe did not heed that appeal and that he took upon himself certain prerogatives which the constitution has vested in the Chief of State alone. He went SC far as to strike coins of Katanga which today have already been put into circulation. Therefore, we cannot be told that Katanga does not challenge the Head of State and his authority. The next aspect of this is the conflict between the Chief of State and the Prime Minister* When the Chief of State revoked the powers of the Prime Minister the Prime Minister replied in kind. Therefore, we must say that there is a very strong and reciprocal challenging of authority between the Chief of State and the Government. But we have not finished yet. We have to go on to Colonel Mobuto. Colonel Mobuto not only neutralized the Government and the Parliament, but even neutralized the Chief of State. We do not see how you can .-...•;:•• 67-70

. , .(Mr. Toure\ Guinea) respect a Chief of-State when you neutralize him -- when you put him under house arrest and take from' him all the rights and duties that were- vested in him by the will of the people. Furthermore, if, aside from this neutralization, there is respect, then that respect really does not have any weight in the question of the Congo« It is the respect that one owes a man, hut it does not come into play here. ; ~ . • And the case is not yet ended. The radio has told us of ;an extremely • interesting thing that has just• fallen from the lips of the Head' df State when he expressed the view that Parliament itself is -illegal. --That -is a-very serious question, and it warrants'careful consideration. :^ .. : i - . ' ' However, I come back to' this question of the-unchallenged' Heeid of State;! Parliament disavows -the decision oi1 the'-Head o'f State'revoking the Prime Miriister, thus challenging' the legal Government of!the do'utttry. ; Therefore/ the 'Parliament, wtfich 'is'the- very expression >6f' the will of the people, has •contested' and ^ ; challenged- 'theauthority of the Chief of-State^; •' : ; : • -. ' ' - <••'•* Ttitis'-g' 'when the* people con"testsi and ahallerrjges the- Head of State,-when a: • military official contests' and challenge* his authorityy when the- -army refused- to obey him and ^/heh a province takes its own independence iand takeis over- all ' the1 prerogatives of the Itead of State;iti is ve'ry difficult to maintain 'outside that country that the Head of State is the only unchallenged authority of-that State/ • • : '. . . .-.-• ... • •.-.... ':•'.- • •• ;. . ; -.- ....;,. . •• • , 71 (Mr. Toure*, Guinea)

It is the contrary that is the case. But we do not by this wish to say that the Chief of State is the only challenged institution in this country; there is multilateral and reciprocal challenge. Thus, if an Impartial and objective commission goes there, it cannot base itself solely on the viewpoint of one of the parties* The lav gives a position, but the Commission cannot take a one-sided point of view. We must recall that the Chief of State shares his position with the Parliament. Therefore, as a conciliation commission; we should be in keeping with our rights if we sought the opinion of Parliament and of the Chief of State before taking a stand on them. Then if we are told that there is hostility on the part of the Head of State, that ve should not turn to him,this would be manifest partiality — which is precisely what we should try to avoid. Therefore, if we wish to take into account the latest reports and information, whereby the Chief of State and Parliament are still the valid institutions of the country, then we must take our courage in our hands and recognize that the Chief of State, in the present circumstances, is not heading towards immediate conciliation, This is difficult, but the Commission cannot feel that it Is going to have any bed of roses. The Chief of State has expressed certain views that are not reassuring as far as a speedy conclusion of our work is concerned, but the Commission will have to bring into play all the means at its disposal* But so far as the terms of reference are concerned, the point is not reconciliation itself, but reconciliation around something. Let us suppose that the Chief of State, that Colonel Mobutu, that even the deposed Chief of Government, as he is called here, should be reconciled, but reconciled outside the normal framework of the institutions of the country, outside the will of the people and without the people having taken a position; this reconciliation would be senseless and meaningless. This we know, and when we are told that the situation is deteriorating, we must say that there are proofs that, despite the neutralization by Colonel Mobutu, the Chief of State is on the best of terms with him. We know that Bomboko has been part of each team; he was part of the Lumumba team, a member of the Ileo team, and now he is the head of the team under the orders of Colonel Mobutu. So we see that there is a type of conciliation between the Chief of State and Mobutu, but we are convinced that this has not improved the situation in the Congo by one iota. ' 72-75 (Mr. Tours', Guinea)

Until.the people have'decided, nothing will be done and the Commission will if.it tries to';reach a solution without the people having taken a position. Therefore, we must give this Commission every possible chance, despite the words of the Chief of State» We are convinced that the latter will change his mind on many of the aspects of his statement, as many others of the leaders of the country have changed their minds regarding many of their statements. If there is reconciliation in the interests of the country, no one will maintain his initial position; each will have had to make concessions; each will have to recognize that the country must experience a reappraisal, and the people themselves will have to make up their minds, I shall not make an exigesis of the views expressed at this table, but I do not believe it .is fair to say that the success of the Commission depends on its composition. I think it goes much further than that, but our duty as a conciliation commission and as the Advisory Committee -- which are instruments for working towards African solidarity and for its support of United' Nations action — is 1 conceivable only within a legal and institutional framework. ,• • .I * ,'-••• - •' Mr. Secretary-General, I wished to make these remarks on behalf of my delegation.because we are still convinced that we can no longer contest the composition of the Commission nor the urgency of its departure tor the Congo. 76

(Mr, Toure, Guinea)

It has to bear all the trumps in its hand and it has to push ahead with the examination of practical questions and establish the modalities of work which will allow the commission to pull the Congo out of its chaos. If, as we note at present, the positions are crystallized, then we will surely have contributed to the stalemate, we will have failed, because the declaration of a very honourable man will nevertheless have forced us to renounce a mission supported by the Unite* Nations itself.

Mr. GEBRE-EQZY (Ethiopia): I will limit myself to practical points. First, I would inform you that our ambassador will arrive here at 8*30 tonight and therefore he is ready to serve on the Conciliation Committee. Secondly, regarding the time, I think that taking a rigid position will not help us. I think a practical solution has to be found, and in that connexion I would say this. Last time we decided to meet tonight but we did not say, if I recall rightly, that there mu*t be a very rigid schedule. If I recall your statement, sir, you put a certain schedule as more or less tentative, and I think we should have time to work that out. So I do not think the problem arises in terms of yes and no, Thursday or Friday, Wednesday or Sunday. I should think that very able ambassadors are here from many countries excluding myself, and they could use the time today, tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, and use it usefully, to bring about certain conditions that will make the work of this Conciliation Committee useful and fruitful. So I have to beg my colleagues not to put the matter in such a way that the world is black and white. It is very possible that sometimes it is purple. In that connexion, I think I would say what I said last time, and that is this. I do not believe that any action should be taken or any words should be said here at the United Nations, because that will not solve the Congolese problem. Therefore, it is our hope that no one here or outside will .do anything or fore* anyone to act in such a way that the work of the Conciliation Committee will fail. We rather hope that all the parties — and by that I mean all the Members of the United Nations — will give the African countries, which, after all, represent the preponderant majority on the Conciliation Committee, a chance 1^o work out the problem appropriately. 77-80 (Mr« Gebre-Egzy, Ethiopia)

The representative of Senegal has raised the point of the composition once more. All I wish to say about that is that last time the question was raised by the representative of Senegal we told him how we felt and we appealed to him not to insist upon the point. That point has been discussed at length and decided in full knowledge of all the conseguences. Secondly, I am compelled to say that; so far as my delegation and, I am sure, all delegations here are concerned, they will work in the spirit of the terms of the Conciliation Committee, so that no one need fear that two are for a certain leader and three are for another, or that eight are for this and seven for the other. We have not undertaken membership in the Conciliation Commission in that sense. We have undertaken membership in the Conciliation committee with the sole purpose of helping all the Congolese leaders within the structure of the Congolese constitution to bring about a settlement that will do honour to us and do honour to the Congolese people. Therefore I take this opportunity once more to appeal to the representative of Senegal, and through him to all others concerned, not to put us back,two or three weeks. . .. . 81

(Mr« Qebre-Egzy, Ethiopia)

Insofeir as my delegation is concerned, and I have said this "before, we arrived at this decision after we consulted all delegations concerned. I could not at this stage go back on that; though, had this been raised earlier, I would have gone to the utmost to accommodate such feeling as there may have been*

Mr* LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): Mi'. Secretary-General, I shall limit myself to outlining the view of my delegation. At the last meeting I entirely agreed with you in your summary of the debate. We believe that the departure of this Commission is necessary and that it be brought about as soon as possible. There is a case of urgency. The Congolese situation is serious. It is a bad situation add we cannot delay the departure of the Commission any longer. I do not object to our. having, and I believe we need to have, the collaboration of Mr. Kasavubu. If anyone else can go and see him and convince hint of the need for this departure, I think that this gentlemen would be rendering great service to the Conciliation Commission in so doing. This Commission, as you know, is a United Nations Commission. This question of saying that be they seven or eight on one side or eight or seven on the other side -- I do not. know — I am not included either in the seven or the eight, so I would not know, I believe it is necessary that those going there represent, and realize that they represent, the United Nations, They have a task to do: to assist the people and the Government of the Congo to find a solution to their problems. I am sorry that I cannot agree with my friend, the representative of Senegal, on a reconsideration of the composition of the Commission; it would take up too much time. I think that we dealt with this adequately in our last meeting. Furthermore, we should try here not to have a meeting of the General Assembly to deal with the report of the Credentials Committee, because we believe that this cannot but hamper and undermine any efforts at conciliation. 82-85

Mr, QUAI30N-SACKEY. (Ghana): Mr. Secretary-General I feel very guilty for taking the floor once again because I am sure that you would like to have the views of other delegations. It is apropos of that, that I am intervening again because the ultimate decision rests with you. We are an Advisory Committee to advise you on what we think should be done, but I hope you will agree with me that the final operation is entirely yours. Secondly, may I try to convince my friend from Senegal, as has been mentioned by other delegations, that this Conciliation Commission is not going to the Congo to take sides. In .fact9 if it is going to do so, there is no reason why we should send it at all; if it is going to conciliate, then it should do so. There is no question at all of any seven agreeing with a particular personality, and another one agreeing with another. The main thing is that they should finish their work of conciliation and they should report accordingly. I do not think there is a question of a majority report and of a minority report. Their task is to do a certain Job, that is, to try to bring order back in the Congo by the efforts of conciliation. Therefore, may I, at least for my delegation, let the representative of Senegal know that my Government is not sending someone on the delegation to the Congo to go and to take sides. We already have people in the Congo who could take sides if we wanted to. 66 (Mr. Quaison-Sackey, Ghana)

The third point vhich I want to make is that a lot more has been said about the President of the Congo than is necessary* I say this because, if ve consider his own statements, it puts us in a very difficult position indeed in continuing to overshov our courtesy* For example/ it has been reported in the New York Times that h« thinks that Parliament is illegal. Well, if Parliament is illegal, then he, as a member of Parliament, is in an illegal position* It is a very complicated situation* We want to put aside such considerations and to consider the matter as it is, without bringing in the question of whether you can ignore completely the President of the State, it he were in firm authority, legal authority/ complete authority, over the Congo, then there would be ho point in conciliating* I think that all cf us are agreed on the idea of sending a Conciliation Commission, and thai is because we are convinced that there is definitely a hiatus somewhere* That is why we are sending the Commission* Therefore, I do not think we should make too much of the fact that the President is here* Definitely, as I have said, some courtesy should be shown' him. Aside from that, I cannot see why the United Nations operations should be hampered by any such considerations of personalities* Lastly — and if I did not make myself clear in my first intervention, I want to do so now — I should like to say that the Conciliation Commission has a lot more to do than merely to interview people* There is a lot of background work that should be done. It is not merely going to sit in an office. It may entail actually seeing Leopoldville itself. It may entail the possibility of seeing some part of the country. There is a lot to be done — much more than merely seeing personalities. And I am sure that, if it can organize its work in such a way as to bring about this courtesy, which I myself also support -- I mean, I definitely think that no discourtesy should be shown to any personality who may be brought into this matter of conciliation — if that is so, then the Conciliation Commission should organize its work in such a way that it does not show discourtesy toward President Kasavubu. But we feel very strongly, Mr* Secretary•General,that your appraisal of our discussions last week -- that, by this weekend, at least the first meeting of the Conciliation Commission should be held — is definitely still germane to the issue. We may not fix a date for their departure but, if each of them will find ways and means of getting to Leopoldville well before the weekend, there is no reason why they should not assemble in Leopoldville by the weekend and start their work — always bearing in mind this question of courtesy* 87-90

Mr. JHA (India): I apologize for intervening again. I do so becauae of certain points that have been raised in the debate. The first thing.that I wish to put to you, Mr. Secretary-General, and to the members of -Mi?.Committee is that ve seem to be engaged exactly in the same debate that we had twp days ago. On that date, after detailed consideration of all the points.that have been raised today, ve came to a certain concensus, which -was summarized ,by you. Perhaps I may take the liberty of reading that summary, vhich was made toward . the end of the meeting: "I think I may now try to sum 'up for the benefit of us all. First of all, there seems to be full agreement that Ambassador Dayal should tstke as quickly as possible a personal contact with President Kasayubu and; ..that he should on that occasion, of course, with the background which he has so fully, explain both why the Commission is going, the task of the . ; .- Commission as spelled out In the terms of reference and the strong., >; ..

f .„, . sense of urgency shared by all a'foUhcI this table. ' . : •. . • : • -'->\ ,. L.-..•..;• i'i..- ..."•;.••.•.•.:•-•.•., ^<- • "I feel that he snould; also say;;;-* and this is a slight precision ... in relation to whai I said before/-but I think it-Is fair in relation,-, , .;_ to the strong feelings held by' some members--- that^although there .is., no formal decision regarding the date of the departure or the first . . meeting in Leopoldville/ there is a-••wide-spread feeling that it should leave about the middle of the weekend have a first meeting:at the.end of the week...". 91 (Mr. Jha, India)

It vas that summary by the Secretary-General which was accepted by the Committee. Now, I know that this Committee has no rules of procedure. I, for one, would not advocate our having any rules of procedure, because that would make our proceedings very rigid and hidebound. If, however, we are to engage in the same discussion at every meeting, it will be appreciated that the task of all of us will become very, very difficult. For my part, I communicated our decision to my Government. It is now aware of that decision and would be very surprised indeed if the Committee took any other decision today. That is the first point I wich3d to make. My second point is the following. In the course of the discussions, I obtained the impression that there "^as some feeling that the Conciliation Commission's task wculd be to nee-i various contending parties or leaders and try to bring them to some kind of settlement — in other words, that the Commission's task would be essentially one of mediation- On this point, too, this Committee, in consultation with you, Mr. Secretary-General « we are, after all, only your Advisory Committee — has taken a decision. In that respect I would recall the proceedings of our eighth meeting, on 29 October. My Minister, Mr. Kriehna Menon, said: "In other words, conciliation is to be interpreted as some sort Of conciliation in the Congo, and not conciliation between the parties; it is pacification in the sense of greater quietude.11 (Meeting No« 6, page 6) The Secretary-General then said: "That is my reading of the text." (Ibid.) Further on, the Secretary-General stated: "Let us try to be precise in this way: It is aiming at a certain aim; it is not a committee the task of which s/hould be read as one of mediation between various personalities." (Ibid.) Thus, it is not a question of whether or not a certain highly placed dignitary is in the Republic of the Congo, 'whether or not a certain other person is in gaol or has been wrongly arrested. If we were to try to disentangle all those things, I am afraid we should have to write off the Conciliation Commission; it would never go to the Congo. 92-95 (Mr, Jha, India)

I would therefore appeal to all the members of this Committee. We;have shown great comprehension and understanding pf each other's position. We should realty, not make the position of the Commission and. our Governments .acre difficult. .Almost all the Governments have1 faow nominated representatives to the Commission,.on the basis-of certain .understandings and certain terms of reference. . The.records.of our proceedings go to them. I can assure the Committee that in my Foreign Office • ;•.'.•)"• these^ records o.re studied very, very carefully. The Commission's main task is not mediation — although,- after a certain development and if the circumstances are propitious, mediation is.not excludepl and may be'one of• the Commission's ta^Ls. The first sentence of its tarms.., of reference is — and quite rightly —• ",„« xo ttu'.ly th2 situe.t ion/the ofcudyto extend to the" whole of "the Territory of the Congo". We have already agreed on that. I hope -we are not .going to argue new 'about changing the terms of reference. If those terms of reference are accepted; .then, as the representative of Ghana.has pointed out, the Commission has a great deal-,of preparatory work to do. It has to study the situation. It has to form its own, assessment. And in this respect. I could not agree more-with what the representative of the United Arab. Republic has said — namely,.- that, it is not, a question of eight or seven. These persons will be members1 of a United Nations Commission. It is true that they are the nominees of'their Governments,. .but they.will exercise independent judgement within their terms of reference... Otherwise) the. Commission's functions will really not be of much avail. , ...... , • -I do hot want,to go. over the ground that was covered the other day by my Minister1.' 'In an emergency session — held bepause the Security Council was deadld'aked.w- the General:Assembly over six. weeks ago adopted a resolution, in which the--Conciliation Commission was .asked to go to the Congo as soon asr possible. The other day/ debate•? in :the General Assembly was adjourned lately on the ground that the -Conciliation Commission was going to the Congo and had a very important task to perform and..that, therefore, nothing should be done in the General Assembly which might'prejudice the Commission's very important work of conqlliatlm. Then,- there was the Secretary-General's communication to Governments in which he said -- I shall: not take the time to read it put .--; that the Committee was ooncdtoua of the great emergency>and asked Governments to nominate their representatives to the Commissipn and send them tp ttew York within three or four days. 96

(Mr. Jha, India)

All these are on the record, and this whole matter of the Conciliation Commission, as was stated by Mr, Krishna Menon the other day, is cast :Ln the mold of emergency, and we cannot really go back on that. It would make our position extremely difficult in this Committee as well as vis-a-vis our Governments. We have had to take certain positions and stands and I would suggest that we should not depart from the decisions taken the other day in this Advisory Committee. The third point I want to bring before the Committee, as I tried to do the other day perhaps not very clearly, is this. This is an Advisory Committee to the Secretary-General. Normally, it would not be his function to appoint a Commission to the Congo; it was under a special mandate of the General Assembly that this body was asked to appoint a Commission to go to the Congo for the purpose of carrying out paragraph 3 of the resolution. Now we have done that. What we are trying to do now is to regulate the Commission's work, to regulate its time-table, to decide how soon it should go. We have given them the terms of reference, which say they should go as early as possible, and in my submission it is no longer for this Committee to decide what the exact date shall be or what the words "as early as possible" mean. It is really for the Commission to decide; of course, all the members of the Commission are not here, but so long as it is not here it is the normal function of the Secretary-General to decide in the ligjrb of the circumstances and of his personal judgement when the Commission should go to the Congo. That is my interpretation of our function so far as the nomination of this Commission is concerned. What we are trying to do now is to go further than that and to say that the Commission should meet with such and such a person, or should not meet with him, or should carry out its duties in a particular way. It seems to me that it is out of the question to speak in such terms. Our function is given to ur by paragraph 3 of the resolution of the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly. We have performed our task; we have nominated the Commission and it is for the Commission now, within the terms of reference where we also said "as early as possible", to decide when to go. Of course, if the Commission is not meeting here fully, it is for you to decide,after taking the views of the Committee into consideration,when the Commission should go to the Congo. 97-100 (Mr. Jha, India)

One final point'. It has been stated that we must have President Kasavubu favourable to the Commission's going there and functioning. That is perfectly true, because Mr. Kasavubu is a pillar of the State in the sense that he is the Head of State. We accept his status as Head of the State,,and we think that he is entitled to all the courtesy and respect which is due to his position, but '.••-' *r ' ' the Head of State does not constitute the Government. The Government also has several limbs. It has other elements of which the Head of State is only one. There is the legislature, there is the executive, the head of which is usually a prime minister,and a parliamentary system. There are.all these things in the Congo and it cannot be expected that the Commission is to be wholly or predominantly dependent on the views of the Head of the State. That would not be a correct way of looking at the whole situation and therefore I would say that if the Commission goes to the Congo it is as much incumbent on the President of the Republic to go back to the Congo and deal with the Commission and meet it as it is for the Commission to try to make contact with the President of the Republic. That would be my view. Of course, when I say this I say it with all respect, and I will reiterate the point we made the other day, this is a United Nations body. This is a body which has been given a certain mandate by this Committee under the terms of the United Nations resolution, and that cannot be subjected to any veto of the process. This cannot be arrested and ought not to be arrested. Apart from other reasons, there is the question of the very grave situation that still exists in the Congo. There is the question of the new development which has taken place during the last week, the whole controversy about seating, one delegation, and these things have really made our task more urgent and more important. I would submit that we really cannot waste much time. We should stick to the decision that we took last time. Of course, that decision may be subject to a matter of timing, there might a difference of a day or two. That does not matter too much, but we should not depart from the principle. j The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think I should clarify one point where there may be a difference of opinion between the representative of India, the representative who spoke before him and me. 101-105 (The Secretary-General)

The resolution of the General Assembly reads, "Leaders to get together", and besides that, they should "get assistance as appropriate from African nation Members or the Advisory Committee/ and then there is an added phrase regarding consultation with the Secretary-General. I must Interpret that as including a mandate for the Advisory Committee as Advisory Committee to take all decisions which have a bearing on the assistance and appropriateness of the assistance, that is to say, including timing and whatever arrangements are to be made for the Committee. The added phrase, "consultation with the Secretary-General/ obviously indicates that the Secretary-General is not the one who decides.

Mr* WIRJOERANOTO (Indonesia): Mr. Secretary-General, I regret I have to repeat what I have stated at the last meeting. Any kind of hesitation is a weakness and every weakness is detrimental to the presitge of the United Nations, to the prestige of the Conciliation Coxcmlssion, and even more than that; every weakness that is followed by some delay will be misused by the Belgians to continue the Intrigue in the Congo, the intrigue to create a split among the national leaders, because the Belgians know very well that if there is no split among the national leaders, if there is national unity and a strong national unity, the Belgians will lose the game and there is no place any more for the Belgians in the Congo. For this reason Belgium is using this time to make strong efforts to come back, and I think Belgium has succeeded in this effort. For this reason I am against any delay. Besides this move to send the Conciliation Commission, as I indicated at the last meeting, we should simultaneously back the United Nations Command to take stronger efforts to have the Belgian forces withdrawn, also, any kind of assistance, unless this assistance is channeled through the United Nations. I think that these two steps simultaneously taken will pave the way with success for the implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly. Now, to make a proposal, if you will allow me, Mr. Secretary-General: Suppose the Advisory Committee, in consultation with you, effects a date to have the first meeting of the Conciliation Commission in Leopoldvllle next week, Monday; I think this is reasonable and does not hurt or insult President Kasavubu, who is here, because 1 think there is enough time to arrange his Interests in New York, and I understand President Kasavubu is still President of the Congo, so he cannot stay too long outside the Congo. Thus, if we set a date for the first meeting of the Commission to take place on Monday of next week I think that that would be quite reasonable. 106-11U

(Mr. WirJopranoto. Indonesia) Another point which I should like to make is that I do appeal to all the countries which'are sending their representatives to the Congo to*have a united front and approach. I think that that is necessary to guarantee some success for the Commission. If the Conciliatipn .Commission; from now on until the end, is to keep a common, view and a united front ct£at common view will have to he based on a certain platform, i;f you, like*,,.!. can .eay also, that it should"be based on certain common ground, even on,common interest.. \ What is the 'common ground? What is the common interest? What is the platform? «Accordin g to our delegation, this common view can b. e explaine•d as follows. .The Commission has as its task conciliation. Conciliation means that some leaders have to change their views -- their political minds. Otherwise, there will be. no conciliation. The question then is in what direction the leaders have to Change their minds. The only correct course is to impress the leaders with the fact that the. United Nations is the only body which can save the Congolese people and their interests. I think that at this time the leaders are.living in some kind of political confusion because of the intrigue of the Belgians. So, there is a kind of competition between the United Nations and the Belgians, and in that competition the interests of the Congolese people, the interests of the leaders and the interests of the United Nations are practically identical. That is what I call the common view that it is necessary to make clear. i •. ' •• Otherwise, if among the fifteen members there are some disunited or even. controversial views, I am afraid that the whole task of the Commission will end •'•.'.' •• . • . ~ i • • * in failure.

: ' ' * r MrV Mongi SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I think the question has become a little more delicate because we had decided this last time, , We had decided to appoint this Conciliation Commission and we had agreed in this Committee that the nomination of its members should not be subject to any veto, either in respect of the membership of the Commission itself or of its terms of reference, because we were convinced that, as we had formed it and as we had assigned its terms of reference to it, it was likely to yield fruit an^l to produce •'' . ' • ' • • . '.: felicitous results for the Congo. j , Ill (Mr« Mocgi Slim, Tunisia) But we must not forget that this la a conciliation commission and, whatever may be the form in accordance vith which this Commission has been appointed, a conciliation commission can in no way, according to all the principles of International law and of the situations and precedents of the General Assembly and of the United Nations, begin its work if it is faced with formal opposition on the part of one of the parties concerned. I know that President Kasavubu is challenged by a certain number of bis political adversaries in the Congo* Nevertheless, from the international point of view, he is recognized by all the Member States and his ambassadors have been accredited accordingly. Of course, it would be very difficult for the Conciliation Commission to go to the Congo and begin its work before having made sure that there would be no formal opposition to this Commission from Kasavubu as Chief of State. In the course of the interviews which some of us had with him on Sunday morning we tried to convince him of the need for this Conciliation Commission and of the usefulness of its going to the Congo as soon as possible, within the next few days, in order to try to work with him and with the others — all the other political heads of the Congo -- towards finding a solution which would bring about conciliation and result in governmental stability within the framework of the unity of the Congo. We have met with certain resistance, which did not cause us to despair however, because he admitted the need for and the usefulness of conciliation work on these lines, but he spoke of certain psychological elements, and in this respect I remember that when we first began to discuss here in this Committee the creation of the Conciliation Commission — on 15 October, to be exact -- a number of delegations present spoke of the need, before deciding upon and despatching the Commission, to ensure that certain psychological conditions existed inthe Congo* And it is true that without such conditions, the Conciliation Commission would be doomed to failure. Of course, this involves the prestige of the United Nations. A decision was taken at the special emergency session of the Assembly, but that decision does specify "in case of need" and implied that the Commission should be set up for purposes of conciliation. In other words, "in case of need" means whenever such time comes, and the purpose is, after all, that of conciliation. 112-115 (Mr. Mongi Slim, Tunisia) I do not think it would be useful for the purposes of conciliation to • ••<•«'. * wish to reconcile — 1 do not say persons, "but trends which are represented by men, among whom are Mr. Lumumba and Mr. Kasavubu. I do not know that it would be useful to try to conciliate if at least one of these trends was firmly opposed to reconciliation at the moment* I am glad that Mr, Dayal has not received any fprmal and final reply from Mr* Kasavubu on that score. Ibis vould make it possible for us — not as a Commission of Conciliation or a delegation • from a conciliationcommission, not as delegations or as members of the Advisory • Committee — to try to convince Mr, Kasavubu, since he is the Chief of "State:, , r that it is ;urgent for this Conciliation Commission to go to the Congo and to begin its work there. ButI do not think it would be wise at this stage to set a date for departure or for convening this Commission in the Congo,' while we have not taken certain precautions. As the representative of Guinea said oh 13 October, the necessary psychological., conditions have to be created before the -work can be •-. done by this Conciliation Commission. I do not think that, among the psychological, conditions to be created JTor.the success of such Commission, it would be possible;- to say to Mr. Kasavubu, Chief of State: Whether you are in the 'Congo or not, whether you are,prepared tp receive us or not, we are still going to leave and ; we are going to start our conciliation work. Although we might'have interests »- or ratherf I vould not say interests, but although some of us have troops in , the Congo*:--these troops are there as troops of the United Nations. '•* . •••<. .:.,, (Mr» .MODS! Slim, Tunisia)

I do not consider that this gives us the right to impose any solution whatsoever on Mr, Kasavubu or on Mr. Lumumba or on any of the leaders representing any political trends in the Congo. For all these reasons, Mr. Secretary-General, I do not wish to expatiate too much on this, but I think it vould be wise, in accordance with the suggestion made by Ambassador Loutfi, to increase today and tomorrow informal contacts with Mr. Kasavubu in order to use all the available means of persuasion to bring him around to abandoning for the time being the objective he is seeking of having his delegation seated at present. This is a very laudable objective, and it is why he came here. Whether we will agree with him is another matter that will be discussed in due course when it comes up in the General Assembly. However, we should try to convince him that to discuss at present the report of the Credentials Committee might be very harmful to any possible conciliation in the Congo and therefore might be harmful to establishing any stability whatsoever at the real governmental level in the Congo, at least for some time to come, and having any form of legality and constitutionality re-established in the Congo with which the United Nations could work. Secondly, we should try to convince him that it is far more useful for him, as Chief of State, to be at Leopoldville in order to receive the Conciliation Commission and to assist it in ensuring that its work will be fruitful in the interests of all concerned. I think it would be necessary to take these precautions before deciding on the actual final date. That does not mean that my delegation would be in favour of any delay in the departure of the Conciliation Commission. I would continue to be in favour of the Commission departing and beginning its work in Leopoldville as soon as possible as a matter of urgency. But I doubt, Mr. Secretary-General, if these psychological conditions are hot met - I do not say completely, but up to a certain point -1 doubt that my Government, after having heard the official replies of President Kasavubu, will wish to continue to participate in the Conciliation Commission. I do not know if that is the opinion of the rest of the delegations, but in the meantime I have had to send this report to my Government, and I am awaiting its reply. 117-120r • • '-= '•••••• • •'••• > ••• ' '; : • '(Mr« Mdtigi Slim, Tunisia) ;',... i . - • ' ' For all these reasons,. I do not think it would be wise at this stage to set a date. I think it would be wiser at this point to increase our friendly and informal contacts In order to try to convince Mr. Kasavubu and thereby to prepare all the psychological circumstances and meet all the psychological requirements. Then it would be possible for you to set a date as soon as possible for the departure-of this Oatofcasion to the Congo.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): Mr. Secretary-General, the impression is becoming inescapable that the debates that have taken place in this Committee in the past many weeks are now being almost retraced and the whole question is1 being split open once again, right up to the point of the interpretation of the General Assembly resolution of 23 September. Many of our colleagues have suggested that the procedure of the United Nations is being affected by the delay in sending this mediation commission to the Congo. I personally do not see why it should be so. The General Assembly resolution urges the Congolese to seek a splution to their problems and asks the Advisory Committee to help. As far as we are aware, they are Just steps being taken by the Congolese themselves to seek a solution, for example, convening a round-table conference. 121 (Mr» Hasan> PaKlatan)

It vould therefore seem that it might be almost premature for Us to offer our help to them because they are still in the process of making arrangements for finding those solutions to which the resolution refers. It almost reminds me of a proverb in my own language which roughly translated means: °Do not trust a woman who shows greater solicitude for your welfare than your mother," So, if we show greater solicitude — . In my earlier statement I referred to the desirability of co-ordinating the movements of the Conciliation Commission with those of President Kasavubu. For us, that is, for the Pakistan delegation, President Kasavubu, Mr. Ileo, Mr. Mobutu, and Mr. Lumumba, are just names, and names which do not even symbolize different attitudes or different ideologies* They are names of leaders of the Congo who are struggling amongst themselves for the Government of the country. Therefore, if I referred to President Kasavubu, it was only because everyone in this Committee has again and again protested respect and regard for the President and stated their recognition of his position. I therefore believe that his position is in fact recognized firmly by everyone. If that is so, then every reason would seem to be on the side of not disregarding his presence or his absence from the Congo for the purposes of a visit of the conciliation group. As far as my delegation is concerned, that is the only extent to which we are concerned with personalities, and beyond that we are just completely detatched from any person or any personage in the Congo. I have considered this explanation necessary because I infer from certain statements of my friend sitting opposite me that there might be misunderstandings; and my friend on my right referred to a division of seven and eight. It could be a division of seven and seven, or six and eight, because my delegation cannot be in that fifteen where it can be on either side. Therefore, I have that fear that we might be identified with one side or the other and that is why I consider this explanation necessary. 122-125

The SECREIARY-GENEBAL; May I permit myself a short intervention at this stage* I would like to come back later in the debate, naturally, because I have to draw conclusions from all the various interventions, and some members have not yet spoken. I pointed out last time, and I would like to quote what I said, the necessity to do everything in order to make an initiative of this type a success* I said: "I vould like to end by saying that my feeling is that it is really essential that we do everything we can to make this Commission a success; first of all for the sake of the Congo 'itself, but secondly, also for the reason that a failure of this kind of political mission indeed would be a failure which would reflect very heavily on the authority of the United Nations in the Congo. For that reason, what is very foremost in my mind is that we should not with open eyes leave anything aside which we can do without giving up the plan which may increase the chances of success." I also said: nlj of course, recognized that the distinguished President of the Republic could not, so to say, obstruct the United Nations initiative simply by staying away — that is a matter of course. We should not bow to that kind of pressure." However, there is no indication of that. 126

(The Secretary-General)

On the other hand, as pointed out by Ambassador Dayal and as pointed out by several speakers around the table, there is a grave uncertainty as regards President Kasavubu's present attitude to that reconciliation effort -- an uncertainty which does not indicate definitely a negative stand but which, if we leave things as they are may very easily crystallize into a negative stand unless proper efforts are made, I should like to stop here because I think this is really the problem before us. We have the duty to see that the chances of success for this mission are made as great as possible. It may be that we are retracing our own steps from previous meetings, but that, I think,is only a reflection of the sense of responsibility that is felt and the need to weigh the chances and to see to it that we leave nothing undone which can be done in the interests of the Congo and in the interests of the success of this mission.

Mr. JAJA WACHUKU (Nigeria); As I have listened to the debate on this subject, I have become a bit impatient. I feel that there are certain things which we should do as a Committee that we have left undone, and that we are debating certain other things that we should not be dabbling with at the moment• In the first place, it is agreed that the Commission should go to the Congo. But, since this involves a Commission of fifteen people, we do not know on whose shoulders we will put the responsibility for directing the group. I would have thought that this Committee would make sure that we had officers who would be responsible for holding the group together. That is one of the essential duties that we should tackle here. Last time, we talked about the question of briefing. Personally, if I am going to the Congo, I think I should be given by the Secretariat certain materials that will help in this job. For instance, I have already said that those who speak French should have a copy of the Constitution in French, and those who speak English should have the English version, and I think that a map of Africa and a map of the Congo should be included. Then, there should be some data relating to the background knowledge that one will require about the Congo as a whole. I think the Secretariat should be able to supply that material. 127-130 (Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

Then, the members of the Commission should have with them the first and second reports on the Congo, the terms of reference and any other valuable literature -- not too bulkyt These are the preliminary things which the members of the Commission should have. The representative of Ghana said that we should leave here and then go and quarter ourselves in the Congoe I must say that I am not prepared to leave New York for tha Congo and then just to hang around there with no real objective. If our purpose is to go and inspect the United Nations installations, the soldiers and police and officers there, of course we can go and do that. But, if this is a Commission tnat is going for a specific purpose, I do nob see any useful purpose that will be served by leaving here and going over there to create more difficulties than we will solve. I do riot want to be accused of spending one minute interfering with anything there — whether rightly or wrongly. 131

(Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

If the fifteen members of the Commission go to the Congo and do not start their work immediately, a report will very soon come to New Yorl: eayj.ng that some people are interfering in the affairs there, are conspiring w:U:. one political party or another, and BO forth. I am perfectly certain that such a report will, "be sent — whether for malicious reasons, whether it is true or false* Therefore, I should not like to go to the Congo before we are ready to start work, I do not think that my Government would support me if I were to do so. Then there is this point. Orce we have appointed the officers and It"IB* known that we are really getting ready to go -io the Congo, there will be another difficulty which I do not think h-?s been mentioned here. 1, for one, am not going to ignore certain facts tint I know exist. Every member of this Committee knows that 0113 of the difficulties we have is that there are certain Powers in the United Nations which support the view that it is necessary to bring the report of the Credentials Committee before the General Assembly. One of our tasks -- it is a task of the Secretariat and of nl\ concerned — is to dissuade these Powers from trying to reopen in the General Assembly a debate on the Congo question, indirectly. If the report of the Credentials Committee comes before the General Assembly before the Conciliation Commission has gone to the Congo and done its work there, everything the Commission intends to do will be useless; its position will be prejudiced and its work will be abortive. There are two ways in which we can act. Either we can make up our minds that the suspension which we decided upon the other day in the General Assembly is no longer operative, and therefore we can bring the whole question before the Assembly and debate it, knowing that the Commission will not go to the Congo; or we can decide that we are determined to assist the Congolese people to solve their problem and, therefore, we can make every effort now to dissuade the Powers not members of this Advisory Committee which are aiding and abetting the attempts to bring the report of the Credentials Committee before the General Assembly. I am perfectly certain that if those Powers cease their activities in this ! respect, the difficulties of the Conciliation Commission will be very much reduced, although they will not, of course, be completely overcome. I say this with a full sense of responsibility. (Mr* Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

Now, it has "been suggested that the Commission can proceed to the Congo even if the President is not there. I do not see how we can do that. In the first place, there is no central Government with which the United Nations can deal. That is our problem. This is where I disagree with the representative of India. Of course, there are provincial Governments, but we are not going to deal with provincial Governments — although we may see the heads of those Governments. However, we cannot go there and immediately start to deal with the provincial Governments, "because that would amount to going below the level of the real authority representing the Congo in internetional affairs: the central Government. That is precisely the cause of our headache. The provinces have not disintegrated; tho r.roub.le is at the cantre* If there were a Government, a Cabinet, well constituted and headed by a Prime Minister around whom there was no dispute, I should not have minded if the Head of State remained in New York for one thousand years; I should have been the first person to say that we should Jump in the aircraft tomorrow, because there would have been someone in the Congo with whom we could deal. 136 •.-..:. ..-. '•:.!.. (Mr, Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

At the moment, the only person who acts lawfully and constitutionally, and speaks on behalf of the Congolese State, is the Bead of the State* Ho--is the only channel through which any United Nations Commission can have such contacts with*. < the Congolese State. I could not agree that we should* jump into a plane and*-land in the Congo and then, 'when we are to make contact in the name of the Congolese people, I should get to Leopoldville and have to ask with whom I was going to make contact. If that is to "be the case, Mr. Secretary-General) I am not prepared to "budge. I have other work to do in the United Nations and if that is: the condition on which we are going to the Congo I will not go, and: I ain perfectly sure that my Government will support me in th&t line of action. -As you have said, it is our determination that-we-shall -hot fail. If anybody wants to go.to .the , ' Congo with a view-to failing, I atn not one of them nor my delegation either. I want to make this perfectly clear.• The Nigerian Government will not like to hear that I have made myself a party to any- Commission which knew from the beginning that it was going to fail and which ye:t decided to go and, fail. When last time I enumerated a iromber of things that we had to consider,, some of us perhaps did not take them very seriously, but I did and I still do. There is the Chief of State, there is a Parliament consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives, and there are the Governments of the six Provinces, If we are going to convene Parliament, who is going to convene it? We are anxious to see it convened, but who is going to convene it? Certainly not I, and not the Commission. It will be the Head of State who will convene Parliament in the absence of any Prime Minister or any of those others. Who are we going to persuade to convene Parliament? Are we t.o say that if he is in New York we can stay in the Congo and convene Parliament behind his back? That is an impossible position. I listened to a statement from ray friend, the representative of Ghinea, who spoke about challenges to the Head of State. Presumably the best you can say is that he is a weak Head of State, but you cannot say that he is an unconstitutional or illegal Head of State. According to the constitutional provisions, he was elected by a two-thirds majority of both Houses, and I do not think any provision has been enacted to remove him. There was a report that he had been removed by a decision of a Joint meeting of Parliament, but his position is quite different. In the same constitution is the provision that the Head of the State appoints and (Mr, Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria) revokes the appointments of Prime ministers and ministers*-- I anr not justifying the action of any one or the'other, -"but the fact is that the "Bend of .the 3tat*e ; had power to dismiss- or appoint :prime ministers and ministers. It is..the • . . legislature that can revoke the Head of the State "by. a two^thirdsvmajority.iif . . they do not want him. We know that he has been voted in, "but we do not. kno'w..that he has been voted out.- We know that two prime ministers have -been, appointed, ,firsf- one was appointed and his appointment was revoked-and another, was appointed; I . do not know about the revocations, but Parliament said that it should, not''..have been done; that'is all we know and that is the cause of the trouble>,,it is. the reason we have no Central Government. ' .-•.:;.. .;•...-; The most that can be said about the provincial governments' challenges .to. the Head of the State is that we know he said that they were not going to, do : anything, he knew he had constitutional powers and simply said that he did not want to make^matters worse, that these challenges could be made but that he:.was not going to do anything about it* It is the same thing when it comes -to the . army. 1 do not want to argue the case in this way, but the Head of the State- has the power to designate the officers of -bhe armyf-he can take up anybody and make him anything, since he is the Commander-in-Ghief of the Army. The worst that can be said is that he is weak, but riot that > he Is not the recognized Head of. ;• the Congolese State. ''•'-• ;: . •• . .. ; . I am saying this to try to show -the way my mind is working when I say that I cannot go to the Congo without making sure that I shall 'hot meet an obstacle that is only going to make things impossible. If I do> I lose on both sides; the mission vill not work or achieve anything and I shall lose the duties I-am here to perform ih the United Nations. '-' There are; after all, other things which -.we . have to do.' •'•-•••• •' •'- • ' - - : •':-••• • . • :•_-..'.'••:•'...?,,•.••:.• ••.-..• :••• (Mr, Jaja Wacbiilr.u, Nigeria)

That being the case, Mr. Secretary-General, we have also to ask our question, have we a definite period to spend in the Congo? If we go to the: Cor_fo; how long are we going to spend there? Will we stay there until nsxt year? Is there any time limit? These are questions that we, as responsible people, busy people, must have answered. I must know whether I am going to spend a week or two or three. I am not prepared to go to the Congo on a holiday. I did not come here on a holiday. I am going to the Congo because I feel there is something we can contribute. All these matters must be discussed. Mr. Dayal was asked at our last meeting to meet the President of the Congo Republic, and to connmnicatr; to h::j3 off/.cially the wishes of the Advisory Committee and the terras of reference. I was told that he communicated these terms of reference and he said he would reply. We have not got his reply yet. We do not know whether in the first place he is willing to accept, to receive the Commission. We knew before that they were hostile to any Commission coming, but I know also that the attitude now has been very greatly modified. In fact, the attitude is one of acceptance subject to only one condition, and that is, the delegates that he nominated should be seated. That is the only condition. I do not think there is any disagreement on any point except that. Our problem is how to convince him that the seating of the delegates is not necessary to the settlement of the dispute, the problem in the Congo, and that it is not here, in the General Assembly, that we will find the solution of the Congolese problem, but rather in the Congo itself. In fact, he realizes that the solution is to be found in the Congo, not here. What we have to do now is to use every avenue, every channel, every means to make him see that the seating of somebody here is not as important as discovering and establishing a stable Government in the Congo, a stable central Government in the Congo, with which the United Nations can deal and transmit the aid and assistance which it is trying to give them in order to build up a healthy nation* That is our problem now. I feel, sir, that we should receive a reply from President Kasavubu to find out whether he confirms what I am now saying, whether he stipulates this particular condition. Once he does, then we have the business of negotiation. Our negotiation is not that we say that without him the heavens would fall on our head here as far ae our States are concerned. But certainly, without him, as things are now, it becomes impossible for us to go into the Congo without interfering with the internal affairs of the Congolese. (Mr, Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

One of the accusations that has been levelled against some of u& is that we have been dabbling in their politics and in their affairs, and we do not ..... want to be connected with anything like that at all. That is .why we c.c2 , ,• very hesitant. Not that we cannot take radical steps to get intg a plane, .I can assure you that my own Government can give me a plane' to go to-the Congo without the United Nations. As I say, our respective Governments can do that, but the whole point is that we all represent States, and when we are doing anything here we have to ask ourselves whether, if we were in a position like that, we would be happy to see others coining to our States and dabbling in our internal affairs -with' impunity * Those are questions wVllch we must examine very carefully, and 'it'is a delicate situation which requires careful and . > ; delicate handling. I may be very new here, but I think that matters of this nature should.be. treated with the greatest delicacy. Therefore I suggest that we should see if it is possible at this meeting to arrive at one thing anyway -- to decide if we are going to have any officeroetcOl to hold the Conmission together and to direct its affairs. I think we should try:to agree what,officea?s tbere should be — whether we are going to have.ia Chairman, a yice^Chalrman, a Rapporteur, or a Secretary or anybody like that. We should decide on those things, and once we have-done so we would await a-;reply from Mr. Kasayubu. Perhaps Mr. Dayal could get in touch with him again to see whether; he can obtain a reply today or tomorrow, on the basis that we think that we will be in a position to fix a date for departure.' Failing that, I do.not see how;we can. proceeds ''• ' •'••-•••• - ' •• / ". :;.''• - •.;-.-. '.. • : . . • ..-..• The other step is tb; try to use all the machinery of the United Nations to make all concerned realize that the Commission is a United Nations Commission. It will be sabotaging the effort of the United Nations if a .Commission is , going to the Congo and others are trying to open a debate on the same subject when the Commission is trying to settle matters. . . That is my suggestion to this Committee. I feel that unless-we do something of this kind we shall come here and carry on a debate for hours and achieve nothing. Sometimes some of us get into a debate of that nature. j We can debate for hours, and we are used to doing so. We have a very big House in my country — persons — and I have on occasion taken the floor for hours. I have controlled ivr-150 (Mr« Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria) the House for hours and put them in such a position that they have had to sit up all night and have become so tired that they could speak any more* So, Mr. Secretary-General,these are the suggestions I have in srvi'.l, and I sincerely hope that all of us now will see that the position in the Congo has come to a point where, if we do not act tactfully and carefully and handle the situation with the delicacy that is required, we may find that, in our anxiety and eagerness to solve the problem very quickly, we can destroy everything we have tried to build up.

The SECREO!AHY^GEMFdlAL?, I think we all feel that we cannot keep this discussion going for too long and that at a certain point, of coarse, arguments are fully exposed and, perLaps, exhausted. I have at present three speakers on my list, and there may be others who would like to ask me at once for the floor* After that I would feel that it would be time to try to wind up the discussion and to see where we really are. The three on my list are Mali, Ireland and Guinea. Is there anybody else who would like to ask for the floor before we try summing up? I call on the representative of Mali.

Mr. AW (Mali) (interpretation from French): I was extremely brief earlier, but I am not saying that in order to warn the Committee that I am going to be long-winded this time. In view of what ve had decided at our last meeting regarding the (k>od Offices Committee we felt that today's meeting — as has indeed been pointed out by the representative of India — would merely be for the purpose of agreeing on a date. Some of us felt that it was not even necessary to reopen the debate or to refute arguments adduced. That is all very well. We said *hot we would not touch upon the substance of the question because we felt that you all agreed. However, after having heard a number of speakers, it appears to us that the Committee does not intend to adhere to its decision of Saturday, or that at least a certain number of the members who had agreed then that this week the date Of departure for the Congo would have to be decided upon seem no longer to have that decision in mind. 151 (Mr. Av. MaU) 1 • ; ' •',''•'• That is why I would like to go back again and support,-Insist upon and . stress the need not to delay the departure of the Commission .for Leopoldville• Listening to some speakers, 1 really had the impression that there was no longer an institutional problem existing in the Congo* So much has been said and repeated regarding the representative quality of President,Kafiavubu, about his being the Chief o? State, that ve begin to wonder why the Congo seat in the Assembly is empty« We no longer understand whether there is a problem, if we consider that Mr. Kasavubu is the Head of State, that he 4.8 an unchallenged and unchallengable authority, that no initiative can be taken regarding the solution of the problem of the Congo, without his agreement, I say this not because I feel that we should disregard Mr. Kasavubu; as some speakers have reminded us, one cannot injure or harm either party, one cannot step on anyone's toes if one is trying to conciliate both sides, but the situation at present is that we are trying to get Mr* Kasavubu1s permission in order to undertake our work of ponciliation. This was the feeling I had when I listened to certain speakers* But looking at the matter carefully, if we go beyond the bounds of courtesy, if. we do not limit the contacts which we a.sk Mr. Dayal to establish with Mr. Kasavubu, if we really wish to make Mr. Kasavubufs views at least a condition — in other words if he agrees that we go to the Congo before we go -- then the psychological obstacle which we may manage to avoid as regards Mr. Kasavubu will appear in other places which will make our mission just as difficult to carry out* If we say that the Commission can go to the Congo only with the authority of Mr* Kasavubu, then the Commission has taken a stand on the substance; the Commission has thereupon decided that Kasavubu is the only authority in the Congo and that nothing can be done there unless he wants it, and only what he wants will be done* Therefore, what we did not intend to. do is what we have done; we have taken a stand on the substance of the question. That is why we felt that it was not the better part of policy in this case to stress too strongly the permission that Kasavubu would have to give the Commission before it could go to Leopoldville. 152-155 (Mr, Aw, Mali)

Without pressing this, I said earlier that Mr* Kasavubu was one of the parties. It may be noted that some have forgotten that there is absolute confusion and chaos in the Congo and that precisely the authority of Kasavubu as Head of the State is not as clear as. it would be in the case of a normal State if its Chief, of State and its institutions were fulfilling their duties in peace and quiet. This is far from being the case. When we speak of Kasavubu we must not forget this other aspect because, with Kasavubu the unchallenged authority, he could take decisions and could say: you can do this or you cannot do that* Then I would say that is fine. 156

.-.." • .- -(Mr, .Aw, Mall) . Then the Congofa seats In the Assembly would not ^e empty; the Credentials Committee would not have any problem to settle, and we would not here be trying to work our way out of a difficult situation. ' ' '"' There is another aspect that haa been raised here. We have been told that, aside from Mr. Kasavubu, there is- the parliament* But Mr .'Kasavubu is in New York today. He is here to head the delegation. His object is to have that delegation seated in the United Nations, and'he is having more than enough trouble in doing that. However, he says, "I am not-leaving until my delegation is seated in the United.Nations." Ihe Commission that we have tried"to!nominate Says, "We cannot leave unless Mr. Kasavubu tells us to go ahead." Well; I think that this is c -jprae that can last a long time. Mr4 Kasavubu can oppose the departure of the Commission for as long as he wishes. If we are going to play off Mr, Kasavubu against the parliament, let us remember that Mr* Kasavubu is in New York'and the parliament Is in Leopoldville. . v . .'...• .-«. . * I think that each of us has among his documents one in which we read that the -parliament is not in agreement with Mr. Kasavubu's 'presence in the United Nations and in New York. The Congolese law has been discussed end' argued but it was .finally established, and that contains the rapport that there must be between Mr. Kasavubu and the parliament. But Mr. Kasavubu, according to the information that we have beforfe us, is in New York agairist the will of the parliament. This being the case, if our Commission, in going to Leopoldville, is not satisfied merely to say, "We will see Mr. Kasavubu, because he is a respectable man, because he is an honourable gentleman and he is the Head of State", but if the Commission is going to base itself upon Mr. Kasavubu1 s authority as the only authority representing the Congo, then I do not believe that at that point we can raise an argument against the Commission's going to Leopoldville while Mr. Kasavubu is in the United States, when that position of Mr. Kasavubu1 s being in New York is illegal, and I use the word in the knowledge of these findings on the part of the parliament. Therefore, we have to consider Mr, Kasavubu as something other than one of the parties in what we would call an inextricable confusion that we are trying to get out of. 157-160 (Mr. Av, Mall) When ve take the stand that we have already taken here, and with the pretext that may have been thought of — it may be a good one or a bad one — but the pretext mentioned at the moment is the bad psychological atmosphere created around the fact that Mr. Kasavubu is away, but we are liable to hurt and upset all the other parties, whether we want to or not. This is a problem that^arises among men representing ideas, tendencies or what you will. There is, on the other hand, Mr. Kasavubu, who is a legal authority, and there is Mr. Lumumba, who is equally someone who at a certain time guided the Congo and has his opinions and his supporters. We cannot afford to let our Commission be accused a priori of backing Mr. Kasavubu. There are groups in the country that have set up more or "^38 valid Governments. Catastrophic events have taken place in the country. We wonder how we in this Commission can insist upon Mr. Kasavuburs having the only valid authority with regard to the Congo, because such a finding on our part would be definitely a settlement of the question from one side only. Therefore, I feel that we ought to limit our contacts with Mr. Kasavubu, as far as the mission is concerned, to the purely courteous contacts that must take place with a Head of State. We should go no further. Mr. Kasavubu seems today to be a man with whom the United Nations is willing to go along, whether we like it or not. There is only Mr. Kasavubu around. Leaving legality aside, let us see the facts straightforwardly as they appear, dhis will allow us to place less stress on the fact that Mr. Kasavubu is an unchallenged authority. 161

(Mr. Aw, Mali) >. • : , i _ • " sl * • '••••••' ,| Now; to go back'-to the Conciliation Commission. It so happens that we have set up a Ccramissipn. Well, once again we really seem to considering this Mission as a transcendental mission, which is more than normalV Ihe representative of the. Secretary-General -in Leopoldvill« could perfectly well; and within the framework of his own Miss ion , without any further mandate and by personal contact, have tried to call them back to reason. He might have contacted them all, when Mr. Bunche was in Leopoldville, or His Excellency, Ambassador Dayal was in Leopoldville; I do not see that there would have been any objection or any difficulty in asking one or the other to try to see the ethers1 point of>view; he would not have been reproached or chided for such a mo ye, ,<, v, - One of the aspects of the task of the Conciliation Commission is precisely to do that sort of work. The other aspect, as was repeated here, is the question ' • . • > i • .. .-.'•• •' .• of the Commission's dealing with the true reasons for the misunderstandings and • •'. V ' , ^ ••.•'.<••:'.•'; the chaos. Among,these true reasons are that the Congolese institutions are •'•••• •'••••' ..,*.';}.'• "I. not being respected, that they are being battered about by all the world — and I apologize for saying this — and even by the Congolese themselves inside the Congo and by States outside, that arbitrarily would'say or seem .to say that Mr. Kaeavubu is the only representative of the Congo or that it Is this other '> gentlemen, Mr, lAJmumba, who is the-head of the Government and he is the only t , . . • • .. . • valid chief. It is for all this that we consider that the very crux of the mission of the Conciliation Commission is to bring the entire question back to legality* When they arrive, they must be careful; they must realize that they must not court or woo one side as against the other. We cannot have the Commission say, "Well, Mr. Kasavubu said that the Commission could go to Leopoldville and therefore the work of the Commission will be simplified." Because, at that moment it will be purely the eternal seduction of each member by each outsider and we know that they will never agree on that point. And if they manage to agree at a round table, the moment the Mission turns its back, then everything can be overthrown again. 162-165 (Mr. Av^ Mali)

Therefore, it is indispensable that this Mission on the one hand realize full well that it is one of the essential points of its mission to begin by respecting legality, and this respect must begin by an awareness of the danger of an ipso facto recognition of Mr. Kasavubu in New York as the only valid and unchallenged authority of the Congo. This, I think, is very important and it was because certain statements were made in the course of this debate thet I was obliged to draw the attention of the Committee to this aspect. I should like to add, if I may, that what appears paramount to us is that no argument can convince us that we will gain anything by waiting and by delaying to do something in the Congo. In Mr. Dayalfs report — we are extremely impressed by what he says --he stressed the fact that every day lost, every minute wasted must make the situation more serious and more acute. Frankly, after everything that has been said here regarding Mr. Kasuvubu and the rest, when it has been proved to us and told to us that his authority has been challenged in his country, then we cannot give him authority here, that the Parliament has not recognized him in Leopoldville; we cannot deny it — it is a fact that in the course of all these discussions, and because of that, we cannot keep going around in circles. We have to choose one of two things: either we are going to stick to the path chosen whereby a Commission will very soon go to Leopoldville; we will try to take all precautions and to do everything in our power to make this a successful Mission; either we do that or we do nothing, and we wait. 166 (Mr. Av. Mall)

The Credentials Committee cannot present its report.-.- or. it will present ifc* If it does present It, there will be a spectacular taking of siut lib will not be catastrophic, because the good offices commission is one way we have thought of to settle this question. Naturally, we will surround it .by all possible .

guarantees. Butif, a priorit it appears as an emanation of tfce United Nations-, made up of men of good will who simply want once more to bring the; .Congolese officials back to reason, and that will not take sides in any way — and I repeat this: that will not take sides in any way — it is because this Conciliation Commission must be safe and above suspicion of doing anything but trying to conciliate. It must beware of all these dangers. It is because this Conciliation Commission must realize that it is entrusted with the possibility of bringing these parties together. But we are told that it cannot go because there is a person who is not there to meet them or receive them. Well, the Conciliation Commission will go to the Congo. We are still sending planes, we are sending men, we are sending food, we are sending assistance. And if, from a United Nations plane, a group of men of goodwill land in the Congo and study and see everything that they can, if they do everything that they can, interviewing whomever they can interview and doing the work that they can do -- and, on the day that Mr. Kasavubu arrives in Leopoldville, they will go and see him too, because, if they have not seen him before, it is simply because he was not there to be seen -- but I think tbat, if they realize that the situation appears in this light, then it will be much clearer. Then it cannot be considered that 167-170 (Mr. Av. Mall)

Mr. Kasavubu is the authority In the Congo and that he must be there to welcome the Commission, and that not to do so will be to disregard Mr. Kasavubu's importance. That the Commission goes to the bone of someone who is not there to receive them certainly does not make the Commission's work less important. This guilt feeling that I have is exacerbated when I see time elapse, when I see that two months ago we hurried to call an emergency special session because things were coming to a boil in the Congo and we could not allow this to take place — and that nevertheless today, agreeing on the principles and agreeing on the sending of a Conciliation Commission, we wait. What are we waiting for? I ao not know. We are waiting until Mr, Kasavubu decides what he wants to do. And Mr. Kasavubu has come to the United Nations with a well-defined mission in mind, which is to consolidate his position in this conflict. That was the object of his visit to the United Nations. I am sorry but I must say, with all due respect, that Mr. Kasavubu came here only to repeat that Mr* Kasavubu is the Congo. But he is not the Congo. There is the Congo, and there is Mr. Kasavubu, and there are the others. It is not Imperative and necessary that he have any evil intent against any of the parties. 171 (Mr. Aw, Mall)

' ' : . '/1| '•••••• • ' ' '-: '.--" 1. "I1** :• .'. ' •: »•: ' • .T'.'/f . We are here to find a solution, and; therefore I can speak, frankly. I .certainly cannot hide from this Committee that lfr I were to..tal£ to. Mr, Kasavubu I.would not say to him, "Qo tack to the Congo" — that?would not be the language of conciliation. What ve are trying to do is to find reasons to explain why he is here and is not hurrying back to the Congo. , . These last few days. Mr. Kasavubu has been doing certain things, and I aay that,if we. do not proceed we shall push our work of conciliation straight into failure. My delegation is convinced .that if we get bogged down in a substantive debate because of Mr, Kasavubu — that is, if we consider Mr. Kasavubu as the unchallenged, and incontestable authority whose permission is required before we ,c-.-.n go.,to the Congo — we shall, as. I said before, he abandoning, every trump card that we hold in our hands; we shall be throwing everything overboard.

I.have dwelt on that point at some length. ( The primary reason.for this second statement on my part is that I wish to draw the Committee's attention to the fact that nothing can justify a delay in the Conciliation Commies ionf .s departure. That Commission must go to the Congo as soon as possible because^ unless it does so, we risk getting into a vicious circle; we risk finding ourselves ;again before the General Assembly and seeing the delegation headed by Mr. Kasavubu seated in the Assembly — and that would make it appear that the Assembly had taken a position. In such a case a Conciliation Commission would no longer be necessary. I wonder whether anyone here has a solution to propose to us; I wonder whether anyone here can indicate the path which we must take. That is why conciliation appears to me to be our path --it may be a timid path, but it seems to me to be the only one on which we can move forward, in view of the present state of affairs. That is also why I urge the members of this Committee carefully to weigh all the consequences of any delay in taking conciliation action in the Congo. 172-175

Mr. AIKBlf (Ireland): The resolution vhich the General Assembly adopted directed the Advisory Committee to establish the Conciliation Commission. The fifteen members who have been appointed have not been appointed as arbitrators or Judges, but as conciliators. I think that If President Kasavubu had been in the Congo last week and the conciliators had gone there, one of the first persons they vould have asked to see would have been President Kasavubu. perhaps all fifteen members would not have gone to see him; they might have appointed two or three persons to see him and find out what he was thinking in regard to how the Congolese could get out of their difficulties. They would have asked President Kasavubu whom else they should see in the Congo, what the possibilities were of getting a number of people together to discuss the difficulties and try to determine how order could be restored and democratic and parliamentary institutions established. Neither we here nor the conciliators can draft a blueprint for the Congo. Only the Congolese can do that for themselves. All that the United Nations can do, all that the Conciliation Commission can do, is to try to help the Congolese to find a way out of their difficulties. There is a conflict of legitimacies. There is great confusion, and that confusion i« not going to be overcome within days or weeks or months; it may take years. 176 (Mr. Aiken, Ireland)

One of ttfe healthy aspects of this new approach to the difficulties is the fact that the United Nations has got around to appointing conciliators. I think they have a very valuable role to play in the type of world in which' we' are*living, and I would hope that this Conciliation Commission would be successful, not only > for the sake of the people of the Congo, who are our first concern, but for the sake of the future of the United Nations, of the future of the work of the United Nations in evolving the rule of law in the world. There is, of course, objection to any inordinate delay, but I think that it would not be too much of a delay if the members of the Conciliation Commission, or some of those whom we have appointed, saw President Kasavubu here in New York now that he is here, and I would very much support the suggestion that has been made by the representative of Tunisia to the effect that a delay of a day or two would not matter in an effort to try to see President Kasavubu and find out from him when, within a reasonable time and with all possible speed, it would be possible to meet him or someone to speak for him in the Congo as well as all the other people in the Congo that he might suggest the conciliators should meet. Their Job in the Congo is not going to be done in a couple of weeks and X feel that maybe they will have to leave some of their members behind, to continue for months or perhaps longer the work they have been given to do by the General Assembly and by this Advisory Committee. I do not want to take up the Committee's time any longer but I would point out that the terms of reference agreed upon by the Advisory Commtttee for the Conciliation Commission state that the Commission should direct its efforts towards the attainment by the Congolese of solutions of the present difficulties. The Commission is not going out to dictate solutions; it is going out to see whether compromises can be made so that the Congolese may work among themselves for the development of good order in the Congo. The terms of reference also speak about a speedy restoration of parliamentary institutions. It might very well be that the conciliators would find that the best way to get parliamentary institutions in the Congo is not by some effort by the conciliators to push them into an immediate resumption of Parliament but rather to get the leaders of the various parties together to discuss the Constitution and to see how best the Congo could be governed from now on* Undoubtedly the present constitution has 177-180 (Mr. Aiken, Ireland) failed. It has collapsed. There is a complete absence of any sort of governmental order now, it has to be re-established, but it will not be re-established by the will or according to a blueprint of the Conciliation Commission or of this Advisory Committee, or by the United Nations or anybody else outside the Congo* The conciliators are going there, in my opinion, to see whether or not, by talking with the Congolese representatives, they can get them to make the compromises that are absolutely necessary if the Congolese people are going to take their own affairs into their own hands and make a success of them. It is very urgent that they should do that and it is urgent for us all that they should do it as quickly as possible. 181

Mr* TOURE, (Guinea) (interpretation from-French): I shall be extremely brief, for two reasons. Firstly, many ideas have already: been expressed; and secondly, it is late and it would be completely remiss to take up too much of the Committee's time and weary the members of the Committee* I am also convinced, Mr. Secretary-General, that In the ultimate decision you will take into account the fact that the Governments which have been consulted have already sent their representatives to New York. These people are very busy; their time is valuable. They wish to fulfill their duties; namely, to go to the Congo as members of the Coneilation Commission on behalf of their countries. On the other hand, the suggestions of the representative of Ireland appeared to me to be very wise, and I would like in the very little time I have left to say a few words in that connexion. We are in absolute agreement with the representative of Ireland when he says that the firat person to see, within the framework of the Conciliation Commission's mandate, is the Chief of State. Therefore, once the Commission has been appointed and once it has acquired a Chairman, Vice-Chairraan and so on, it will then be in a position to see the Chief of State. The essential thing is not to waste time and not stop there; because we believe that the Commission must, of course, interview the Chief of State, see the other personalities concerned and visit all of the institutions, and then form an opinion as a conciliation commission. Therefore, this idea should be put into effect in the decision to be arrived at. We also agreed with him when he said that it was not a question of dictating anything at all to the Congolese people. Therefore, one of the urgent and important tasks of the Commission will be to encourage the Congolese people to manage their own affairs — in other words, encouraging parliamentary action and the convening of parliament. I would also like to point out that all those who support the Chief of State are correct when they say that it is a legal institution of the country; but they also must acknowledge the fact that the Parliament, which Invested the Chief of State with his powers, must be considered as legal to the same extent. They must also acknowledge that, in accordance with the constitution of the country, there are two articles —articles 20 and Wi- — which are absolutely formal in that regard* The Government of the country is also legal, and it exists. 182-185 t Toure, Guinea)

Therefore, that legal power exists at present. It is in order to bring the United Nations to the position where they vill recognize that legal power that some delegations of Africa and Asia have deemed it necessary to raise the question of representation in the United Nations of that country. A delegation cannot be that of a Chief of State nor a member of Parliament. A delegation of a country in the united Nations can be only the delegation representing the country and the Government. It was said that the Chief of State was the only authority which could presently act in any legal fashion. I have said that this is an interpretation which is not in line with the constitution, which states clearly that the Chief of State, as a person, is inviolable, but he is not responsible, and can do nothing in the name of the country which would not be countersigned by a minister and, therefore, that any decision which he adopts only commits the responsibility of one minister, and the minister, as is universally accepted, belongs to a Government or forms part of a Government. 186

(Mr. Toure*. Guinea) Therefore, let us have no illusion at present. At least, as there is no legally recognized Government/ we cannot say that to deal with the Chief of State places us within our legal framework within the Congo, foe cannot adopt or come to any decisions with him personally. In fact, it is n6t certain whether the mandate which he has presented was countersigned by a Minister and in fact whether this Minister was fully empowered. The Government must be considered as one of the bulwarks of the system/ just as respected as the Chief .-of State, which is also one of the bulwarks of the system. This has not been stressed sufficiently. ' , '' . It was asked who was going to convene the Parliament, and I should like to say that in this respect the Constitution is quite clear. The Chief of State may convene the Parliament.. The Chief of Government may do so: after the Council of Ministers;as the steering committee of the Houses themselves can do, and everybody understands that in a democratic country the majority of the members of Parliament can call the Chairman or Chairmen of the two Houses to convene a regular session. That is a problem of detail which, in our view, cannot slow down the work of our Conciliation Commission. I should also like to add that we consider conciliation to be a very useful measure to the extent that it adopts a valid and universally accepted criterion, and this criterion can only be the will of the Congolese people. In other words, as long as there is an absence of Congolese legality, any conciliation which might be achieved would only be tentative and provisional, because the people itself can revoke the decision once it has been given the opportunity to speak. That is why it would be useful, within the framework of the conciliation mission, to re-establish the Government as a freely functioning unit. It is also necessary to stress,as far as the Commission is concerned, which has a factual authority, that the Government is condemned not because it is illegal and not because of any initial illegal situation it found itself in, but because it was not acting in agreement with the unanimous wishes of the people. It has simply shown itself as the power behind the system which is condemned in the Congo, namely, the colonial system. It is not necessary for me to dwell on that aspect of the problem. Therefore, the opinion to the effect that we must wait until the Cnief of State has finished sitting here and trying to seat his delegation here -- and I stress this,"his delegation"— that is the most subtle way of disregarding the institutions of the Congo. 187-190

(Mr. Toure*. Guinea)

This opinion is something that I am obliged to express quite frankly here. As far es we are concerned, we tried, in an absolutely objective effort, to have the Government of the Congo recognized, and therefore to have its Chief of State and its Parliament recognized, as well as all of its institutions; therefore, to have one delegation seated, which would be that of the Central Government, which ca!3.ed the United Nations to its rescue. But if this effort would today hamper reconciliation we have foreseen this and we have postponed the study of our resolution. The Assembly has followed us in this because it has also deferred the question of the representation of the Congo to the United Nations. Therefore, there is no question today of cautioning a delegation vhich includes, for example, a representative of the Government of Katanga. I believe that if the United Nations were to act in this -way, it would enshrine and definitely accept its final failure, all the more since the Parliament at present is protesting against this delegation and one of its members is refusing to be seated. I should now like to say a few words on the statement of the representative of Tunisia. 191 (Mr, Toure*, guinea)

Mr. Slim is of the opinion that the Cpmsissipn should be composed only of five members, and it was after discussions with all the African States that we had, accepted the figure of fifteen, which means that it would not be possible here for the African States to re-open discussion on that figure. It was also said — and this is something which seems to us to be quite important -- that, the States recognize the authority and the legality of the Chief of State, and that is true, but any State which, recognizes the authority and the legality of the Chief of State is obliged, in order to be consistent, to recognize the parliament of its authority and recognize the Government supported by that parliament and by that authority• But if we recognize only one of these three branches of the institutions of the country^ then we become partial, unwittingly, perhaps* As far as w* are concerned, we firmly believe that the possibilities of reconciliation exist, provided that -- and I wish to stress this, once again — these efforts at conciliation are related to the institutions of. the country* It is said that Guinea has insisted on psychological conditions. Guinea is not embarking upon any philosophy and would not be able to do so because we have no professors of philosophy. In our mind these psychological conditions consist in giving confidence to the people, to reassure the people, and to show them, in a clear-cut way that we have come to help and not to impose anything upon them. That is the psychological condition for reconciliation because the respect of the people would lead all of its leaders to submit to the laws. These are the conditions upon which we have laid stress, and not to wait until one responsible leader would, voice an opinion, which would be more or less the solution which is being sought. Therefore, it is the interest of the people that has led us to recommend to the Commission to bear in mind the psychological aspects. To conclude, Mr. Chairman, my delegation would wish to launch an appeal so that the courtesy owing to a Chief of State be inscribed within a framework of urgency involving the departure of the Commission, and that the interview with the Chief of State not be considered as the final solution, as the final attitude. This is one of the elements of the work of the Conciliation Commission, but this Commission cannot form an opinion until it has seen all of the aspects of the problem* Therefore, it must hear the Chief of State and then, as soon as 192-195 (Mr. Tour**, Guinea) possible, go to the country. We believe that that can be done without upsetting the agreement reached at the last meeting* There have been rapid exchangee and they may be explained, but my delegation has confidence in all, and we wish that there be no doubts at all among the members of the Conciliation Commission. If there are any members in that Commission who believe that some other delegates maintain this or that view, or support this or that trend, this support must, on the contrary, be something that would lead to a political solution. We believe that if we have any influence that we can exert upon the Chief of State today, we should exert this influence so that he might understand the need for reconciling himself with the other factions of the country. Therefore, we do not consider at all that this influence upon the Chief of State is a condition for failure. On the contrary, it would be a means towards successf To conclude once again, I would like to stress the fact that the instructions should be given so that documents should also be provided and that the Commission be convened rapidly, that it elect officers, and that it establish contact with the Chief of State as part of its programme, but that it also.be able to go bo the Congo within the time period that has been set earlier. Thank you, sir e 196

' The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think the time has come for us to reach a conclusion, if I am not to be forced to ask you to come for a night rcee.-cing— and I do not think that that is your wish. My own riotes indicate what we all remember* our general impression that, on the limited practical question regarding the time of departure and the •'-conditions for departure of the Commission, this Committee is deeply split. It is deeply cplit, and the views held on the two sides are held with equal conviction. That leaves us, of course,, in a state of affairs which is regrettable, and for my own part it;gives me the kind of freedom which I would not otherwise have had. I have in t.b.3 pre.Ti.ous stager, of tLis work felt that :'.f I could follow what has emerged: as a conser^us of the Comaitt-rje I should do so, even if on some points, as you .will reuembor, I ha"A> had vsy reservations. However, this split in two of the Committee, as 1 have said, leaves me a certain margin of freedom. First, one.word about President Kacavubu. I do not think it is necessary for' us at all to cover the constitutjlonal ground, and to see again how we

interpret the Loi funorrnentale in t&ls .or;:that: respect» It is not a question of law/ it is not a question of protocol; It is a purely pragmatic question. President Kasavubu is certainly in effective control of certain tendencies of

thought and action.in the Congo, and in:a most important way. That is a fact which we simply have to recognize. It is exactly the same fact which has been invoked most strongly in support of Mr, Lumumba and his significance in the political situation. • Now there has been one official contact with the President through Mr. Dayal. 'That contact led to the sending of formal notification to Mr. Kasavubu of the ' -terms of reference and the planned departure of the Commission. We have, if I understand Mr. Dayal correctly, to expect a formal reply from him. That formal reply is all:the more important as obviously the discussion held with Mr. 'Dayal — ' and, I gather, also discussions held with those who have visited him in a personal capacity — have not given a clear indication of where President Kasavubu stands. • •••••• • • • • • . • i , •»•»••• He has various more or less strongly held objections against this move. He has, on the other hand, not -- if I understand correctly — said the final word which means no co-operation. That means that we are facing a situation where, on the one side, a reply will be forthcoming from the President, the importance of which 197-200 (The Secretary-General)

I need not underscore. On the other hand, we have the possibility of hoping for a favourable relationship to the President, while, finally, we do not kaow yet for certain. It is not any kind of implied recognition,whatever that means in this context, to say that it is reasonable, on the one side, to try to convince President Kasavubu of the wisdom of this move and its usefulness, and on the other hand to wait for whatever action may be forthcoming after such talks as may come about. I think it is practical; it is something which we owe this Commission which is going on a difficult mission. We owe it because we must, as I said before, do whatever we can in order to guarantee its success. My own feeling — and here I em quite unreserved in what I say — is that if we were to take here and now a decision to the effect that such and such a day, with very short delay, the Commission leaves, that there will be no scope for further efforts to get around the difficulty of Mr. Kasavubu, and that for that reason we would leave the President. I will not say in a state of mind, but with convictions and views regarding the mission which certainly will be strongly reflected in the Congo, we doom this Commission to failure. And that leads me back to what I said. I do not think we can do that with open eyes. I do not thinl it is responsible. And if there were a strong view developed around the table that the Commission should go at all events, well, that is then the view of the Committee and the Committee has the mandate, but I would, under such circumstances, consider it necessary to have on record what I have just said regarding the responsible preparation of the operation. Now this does not lead to such revolutionary consequences as some people way feel, because I do not question the main operation. I do not question the urgency. I still feel that the old decision should stand both as to the operation and as to the urgency. What I introduce is only this element of preparation here when we have a chance to get further, to get a better situation and to know better where we really are before the Commission goes out. 201 (The Seeretary-General)

We talked tentatively .on Saturday about, the departure --let us say Wednesday and a meeting at the end of the week in Leopoldville. I .do not Relieve it is . going too far to say that this can easily be delayed a couple of. days., which . . would give us some more time to see where we are, to receive a reply from . . Kasavubu, and also to have such further contacts with him as may.prove useful.,,, and at least should be tried. In such circumstances,, I do. not feel, that we should

take,.he,re and now a firm decision o.n the departure. I would say that I would,, . ? for my part, count only on some few. days1 delay. ^ would in the meantime hope, . that not only Ambassador Eayal but, in the came informal and personal way as has been the case so far, that various members will make an-.effort to get round this difficulty, or at least to see to it that the ground is so well prepared, that we can say we have done all that it is possible to do in .order to,make t< yfcich X have ^xpressed freely and which I .hold firmly, I think that the, picture whic,h, we Jtiarye.-tQ^ayi *- roughly something, like, fifty-fifty^ or perhaps the .balance may,- be moved this or ihalb way -r as, . regards the possibility, of., ftuickand,immediat e departure, indicates, that the Committee is not in a position to take a decision hjere and now on the .time o.f, ...

departure. That would require a: far .greater consensus than has been .established, and fpr that reason I wooLd, for my. part, .aPpeal to those members who are eager. --

and I understand.their reasons.--, to respect the .strong, views held by tlfoeir ., ;

colleagues, and; the views, held also, by me, that, this is. not the hour .or, the day for a decision on the date of departure; that we .should, .on the other hand, not give up our plan in any way, an$ we should use the couple of days we have gained in the useful way which I have suggested; by th^e preparation which -- I repeat it -- is not. any kind of tribute to any kin^.of constitutional theory, but simply a pragmatic approach to a most difficult political task. I hope that, by this statement, I have not, so to say, provoked a new debate • which may be the case. I do remind you of the fact that it is 8.00 o'clock, and that, for that reason, we shall have the choice between winding up quickly or meeting again tonight. - 202-205

Mr» Ismael TOURE (Guinea) (interpretation from French): In thanking you, I should like to ask you a question on behalf of my delegation, My delegation ia concerned to know, if the contacts with the Chief of State were to indicate that he opposed the departure of the Commission and, further, that he did not agree with the principle of the Conciliation Commission, what would the attitude of the Advisory Committee be at that moment and in those circumstances as far as the departure is concerned. The reply to this question will, of course, determine the stand of my Government. /

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think that is a hypothetical question which your colleagues would find it exceedingly difficult to analyse and to treat in the proper way at this hour.

Mr. JHA. (India): As usual, you have tried to help us by your very able summary of the proceedings and by your suggestions. My delegation does not see any great objection to delaying the departure of the Commission by a few days. There is only one thing that concerns us, and that is this. If, as the representative of Guinea has said, by some mischance we get a very unfavourable, completely negative response from Mr. Kasavubu, does it really mean then that paragraph 3 of the resolution of 20 September is dead? That ie a very serious situation which I myself cannot contemplate. I think that it has grave repercussions and I know that my Government will be extremely worried about it. It may have its repercussions in different ways on the whole Congo operations and the discussions concerning these operations in the General Assembly and elsewhere. Therefore, would it not be better — while I agree that we might wait a few days — to fix a date and leave the thing open? The date can always be changed if the worst comes to the worst* 206 - (Mr. Jha, India)

But if you get an unfavourable answer-from President Kasavubu — of course, we are hoping for the best — then I am afraid we get into a most:dangerous situation^ and I must express my very grave concern on behalf of my Government. That would ; be a situation which we cannot countenance* Therefore, I would put it to our ; colleagues that we are all aiming at the same objective. Although there are differences in the way we express our views, in the nuances, I think we are all very close together. It is only a question of timing. If this is.so, then I think that perhaps what you nave said might perhaps be put in a slightly . ;• different way, that is to say, that we fix a tentative date, the preparations should be undertaken, and naturally then we shall see, without making the date contingent upon the reply of the President, which in the case of an unfavourable reply makes a very difficult situation for all of us.

The SECRETARY-OENEML; Mr. Ambassador, I would, under such circumstances, suggest the following formula, if it is agreeable to you: that we fix tentatively — after all, there is a week-end coming T-- that we Tix tentatively the departure for Saturday, that we call a meeting of thifc Committee as soon as there is a sufficiently clear indication of where Mr. Kasavubu stands, and that we solve the question raised by Mr. Tourl on that occasion* I would like to point out to you that the Committee has also open to it the possibility of, so to say, making public its stand, if the stand is that, due to certain obstacles or certain lack of co-operation, the mission cannot depart; that is a hard political fact for what it is worth and it is certainly not a fact which can be kept away from political discussion; But that is a . matter I would not like to raise now, because I hope that in a couple of days, with the good efforts and good offices of various people, it will be possible to convince Mr. Kasavubu that it is in the Congo's best interests and, for that reason, in his own best Interests that this operation is carried on without delay. > 207 (The Secretary-General)

I repeat my reply to your question about something more firm. My reply is in two parts: that we fix a departure date -- still, of course, with the possibility of revision of the stand -- and we agree that, as soon as a clear-cut indication of Mr. Kasavubu»s stand is available, positively or negatively, we call this Committee together for final consideration of the issue,

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): Mr. Secretary-General, I apologize but I must reserve my position regarding the setting of any departure date for the moment. I maintain that we should have as speedy a departure as possible, so that the work will be useful to the Congo.

Mr, HASAN (Pakistan): Mr. Secretary-General, as regards the problem as to what will happen if Mr. Kasavubu declines to co-operate, my suggestion would be that we cross the bridges when we reach them .and that for the time being we take no decision. As regards your suggestion, we *grae vith everything that you have said. We agree that you may fix Saturday as the provisional date of departure for this group.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Let us call it a target date, in the same way as we fixed Wednesday last time. It gives us something to accomplish,

Mr, HASAN (Pakistan): Yes, sir, but I presume that the intention is, firstly, that this date will be kept secret — as secret as it can be kept within a hundred persons -- and, secondly, that it is very provisional, subject to all the changes implied by the decisions of various people.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; If I may go back to what I said and take up my discussion with Ambassador Jha, I would prefer that we agree to say that we meet at all events on Wednesday, and,with this firm agreement to meet on Wednesday, we can leave the date of departure open. We may in all privacy and delicacy make our own arrangements; that is another matter. 208-210

Mr* JHA (India): Mr. Secretary-Oeneral, I am very sorry that I have to return to the subject again and again, but I would not regard that decision as satisfactory.* The,,way .that you put it a short while ago would be satisfactory to me, but ifwe say that we,do not decide anything about any date; even • • • ' • i • : ' • provisionally, and then meet again on Wednesday, we are really putting this - V \. whole problem into a more and more difficult mould. I think that the news: . ..,.•; cannot be prevented from leaking. We had a decision about a tentative date, ":\ a very good decision. The newspapers put it in quite a different way, that; - >..-. everything depended on Kasavubu. "' :t .>.....•..-< 211

And today we do this and it would be even more reinforced tomorrow. I am very sorry, I speak with the greatest respect for you and for my colleagues In the Committee, but I am really perturbed. I think we should take a tentative date and then we should meet again on Wednesday — everything is subject to change. If we tell the President that a provisional date has been fixed, subject to a further meeting on Wednesday, I think that should be all right; to that I do not see any objection. But if we do not take' any decision, after having taken a tentative decision as regards a date at the previous meeting, we slide back a few steps. I feel very concerned; I feel concerned as a member of this Committee, as representing my Government, from whom I have quite definite instructions in this matter, for very good reasons too. So, I would be very unhappy about a decision of this type. And I think we should take — not the absolutely final thing, for reasons which you have explained so veil — a tentative decision and we meet again on Wednesday. Nothing more need be said; we know why we meet on Wednesday.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; You mean a decision regarding the date of departure would be —

Mr. JHA (India): — Yes, a provisional date, Saturday; but the Committee would meet again on Wednesday to finalize this matter. I put it Just in that form.

The SECRETARY^GEHERAL; May I ask the representative of Tunisia if you still feel that to be — 212-215

Mr. Monfei' SLIM ^Tunisia)' (iht^pretat^oA'frorii.French) s Mr. Secretary-General, It i^ very painful for me to differ with you or with ray colleague Mr. Jha or'any of mjr colleagues. But you must understand too that at the last time when I tried to' say that we' did riot fix a date because of-the idea that the departure could be brought about during this week and that'a meeting could be held at the end of the week> yet, ten minutes later we find this news in the Press.' We may confront the same type of difficulty that-this information may be 1 used as a basis for publication. ; And then on Sunday we met Mr,: Kasavubu with whom we spent three and a half hours; and I beg you to believe that we used, every possible argument — arguments that I have never used in our Committee in; order to convince him of the need to have this Commission depart. . .. There are psychological elements, and my colleague and friend, the • Minister of Guinea .has referred to the, psychological aspects. If we read what was said on 13 October aprppd£ psychological elements> before we decided upon the possibilities of .conciliation,., we, see tj^at .it ie not the. psychological atmosphere that has to -be. set up in,t^e,;Congo .regarding, the, people] we have to create certain

psychological element8;; to oaks,.this^missip^,acceptable.and assure its success.

This Is our guiding, light. ;We #r.e anxious to, ee^ this Commiseion start its work* We,are anxious to see. it start as soon as possible«-. But I fear greatly that

anyr decisions taken at certain moments may seriously jeopardize the possible work of conciliation that we hope will be accomplishedi.. . . . • ; , That, is why I shall bow to ,a decision of the group; but.I must honestly admit that if there is strong opposition, if- the chances of conciliation diminish, I cannot at the moment answer for the final 'instructions I may. receive ^rpm my Government. That is why I beg you not to set the date. While respecting the. delay of a few days .— I am not talking about the end of tbe week or fifteen days or a fortnight — but we take a few days to consider the. situation and that we consider the departure as soon as feasible or possible. But as I said at the beginning, it is always painful for me to oppose a suggestion that you, Mr. Secretary-General, make or one that my colleague and friend, Ambassador Jha may make. We greatly respect your views, but this is the position we are in. 216

Mr. QUAISON-aACKEY (Ghana): Whatever I eay will not be useful If those on the other side feel very strongly about their position. But I was going to say that the suggestion that we might consider Saturday as a departure date was quite useful. However, I was going to add that Mr. Dayal should be sent immediately to speak to Mr. Kasavubu and tell him about this date and about the preparations that must be made, without divulging anything to anybody else outside this room. I am sure that such a mission from Mr. Dayal, informing Mr. Kasavubu about the decision we have taken here, might be very useful in creating a certain frame of mind on the part of Mr. Kasavubu. It is very vital that we should live up to our responsibilities. If we are not decisive in our action, we might allow ourselves to be balked by an individual.

Mr. COOPER (Liberia): I wholeheartedly agree with the suggestion about Saturday, but would we not be confronting Mr. Kasavubu with a fait accompli? Would we not be saying that, whether he agrees or not, the Commission is going on Saturday? If that is the case, then why should we ask him? This would be my suggestion: Since Wednesday has been tentatively fixed as the date for this Committee to meet, why not wait until Wednesday? By that time, we will know what Mr. Kasavubu has said, and then we can take a decision as to the date on which the Commiesion should leave. But we should not ask Mr. Kasavubu whether he agrees or not and say that, if he agrees, the Commission is going on Saturday — and, if he does not agree, the Commission is going on Saturday. He will then say: ttWhy do you ask me if you have made up your minds when the Commission is going?"

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; With the rules of procedure which are accepted by this kind of Committee, it is extremely difficult to resolve the kind of detailed and precise conflict of views which we have before us. I must say, however, that I do feel that we should not over-formalize matters. In fact, the views expressed and the positions held are clearly on record. I think we all know what the opinions are regarding Saturday, and I wonder whether we could not leave it at that. There are differences of view as to the wisdom of a more formalized decision. However, the thoughts which have been developed here clearly indicate that something of that type would be very desirable if we found that it was possible. That would mean that the formal decision would be limited to an agreement to meet on Wednesday. • ' -.••-.. -217-S20' •••:•'•••••

• •' ' . (The Secretary "General) . . • ' • • ' ••:.: . •. ;...-• , •, .• - .- .•:•• .• -.. I would like to add one thing to Ambassador Slim. You need not in any way hesitate to express opposition, first of all, because I have to improvise views,' but, more than that, I really tried here only to express views which I thought might unite the group — and, if they do not,'so much the worse for me. Butp I do not feel in any way offended by that kind of opposition. . .. . ' . • : , •:••" -•.:.•• r; • • -I-,.1 :.•;•.-: . :•? (.- ;-:-•;• ..:

•--.-;• . ,„.,„•.• .,,... . • V Mr. WIRJOPRANQTO (Indonesia): Something has happened in Leopbidville which is very serious. Just a few moments ago, I received a cablegram from my Government, telling me that our Charge d1Affaires ad interim was attacked and beaten by the Congolese army on 9 November, that is, about one week ago. He was arrested and detained for two hours. This happening is very serious, and I think »:".<. ' •• we can use it for an appeal to President Kasavubu to go back to his country as •••:.••.!>.; , :'.:;:. / ••••• •-:.- • . -.- . ..;" '. . .. . :. .' soon as possible, because the situation is deteriorating and it is detrimental to his own interests and to the inhereeta of the people of the Congo*

Mr» JHA (todia): Referring to your last statement, Mr. Secretary-General, I do not think that we have asked Mr. Kasavubu to tell us anything about the dates* Mr. Dayal has informed him; he has had a talk wit,•-••.•'•'-...••"''.h him* which he has • reported. I myself went to see him just an hour ago, but I am not at liberty to report.on my talk, because it was a private conversation. But I think that, as . you said, he has not indicated in any way his rejection of this Commission idea*

And that seems to be the correct position, although one might infer that he is, t^

not enthusiastic about it, that perhaps he is not very happy about tfit, ...... , 221

(Mr, Jha. India) Now, if the decision is left like that, why should we meet on Wednesday? We shall not have a reply from Mr. Kasavubu. No reply has been asked of Mr. Kasavubu. A communication has been sent to him; he now has the terms of reference. He told me that Mr. Dayal had sent him a communication. But I do not think that Mr. Dayal asked Mr. Kasavubu for any cozanents. So why should we meet on Wednesday? Would it not be preferable not to put ourselves in the position of having to overrule Mr. Kasavubu? That is the question that concerns me. What if Mr. Kasavubu should say: "I do not want this Commission; this is a bad Commission; it should have a smaller number of member a, "and so forth? What if Mr. Kasavubu should say: nl do not want the Commission to go to the Congo11? We should then be placed in the painful position of having to overrule him, because we hold that the Commission is a United Nations body with a mandate from the United Nations and -- unless the United Nations itself decides to modify the resolution-- cannot be subject to any decision of any other body or any other individual. That would be the painful position. We should avoid that position if we were to say that, tentatively, the target date is the end of the week --we need not even mention a definite day — subject to reconsideration, if necessary, at a meeting on Wednesday. If ve did that we should all know the purpose of the meeting on Wednesday. If we do not set any date, even tentatively, and Just meet on Wednesday, I do not see what we shall accomplish; we shall simply have a four-hour meeting, repeat the same arguments, and get nowhere. I would therefore beg Mr. Slim and other representatives here to consider whether the formula I have suggested will not be acceptable. It is not a formula which really binds us. It merely indicates a provisional date, subject to reconsideration, if necessary, at a further meeting. It saves us from being put in the painful postion of having to overrule the President of the Republic of the Congo, whose status is as dear to us as the status of our own President. 222

The SECREIARY-GENERAL; I think that the difference is in fact very, very small. But again I would like to ask if we could not, in view of the situation In this Committee and the type of procedure ue follow, let this rest as it now stands on record.

The meeting rose at 8.23 P*m. Meeting No. 12 l6 NoVembcr 1960 ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO

feting at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 16 November I960, at 5 p.m.

60-29020 RSH/mtm 2-5

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Naturally, we are not all here, but I think that all the same it might prove useful if we started our discussion. The others will certainly come in due time, and we can then inform them about the situation and they can join in the discussion. We agreed to meet today at all events, whatever the situation, in order to take stock of where we are and where we should go from here. After our last meeting, there are two pieces of information which may be considered relevant by the members to our discussion and the decision of the Committee. One is, naturally, the reply from Mr, Kasavubu to Mr, Dayal, which has been circulated to you and which I am sure you have had tine to study. The other fact is that I am informed by the President of the General Assembly that he is calling a meeting of the General Assembly for Friday morning and on that occasion the report from the Credentials Committee will be before the Assembly. I do not know if there is any further information any member would like to give in view of such contacts as he may have had with President Kasavutu or with other interested parties. If that is not the case, I think we are now ready to turn to our discussion.

Mr. BOUCETTA (Morocco) (interpretation from French): I have just learned that letters have been addressed either to the Secretary-General or to his special representative at Leopoldville, I do not know whether these letters have arrived, they were sent by Mr. Kanza and Mr. Lumumba,

The SECRETARY -GENERAL (interpretation from French): This afternoon we received a letter from Mr. Kanza, but this letter has not yet been reproduced. It simply deals with the operation of the Advisory Committee, and it is at your disposal if you are concerned to see it, for information. I have no knowledge of any other letter. BC/Sd . . . 6 . (The Secretary -General)

Does anyone wish to open the discussion? If I may say so, we have rarely suffered here from a lack of speakers*

Mr. GEBRE-E&Z.Y (Ethiopia): I did not. hear what you. saicLat beginning" of the meeting, Mr. Secretary-General. I am wondering whether • Ambassador Dayal could add anything to the contents of this letter. Could- he give any verbal explanation?

The SECRETARY -GENERAL; I do. not believe that Ambassador Dayal had any other personal contact with Mr. Kasavubu. However, I would now ask him . whether he has anything to add a? any comments to nft.k& on the latter.

Mr. DAYAL (Special Representative): I have nothing to add to 'the letter which is before members of this Committee. A certain number of points have been made in the letter, and, in my opinion, it is for members of the Committee to consider those points* That is all I pan say on this matter, I have had no further contact with President Kasavubu.

Mr» LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): Since this letter is addressed to Mr. Dayal, does he intend to reply to Mr. Kasavubu?

Mr. Py*YAL (Special Representative): I thought it would be better to hear the views of members of the Committee before taking a decision on the further handling of this matter.

The SECRETARY -GENERAL: I may add on this point that the question has been raised in some quarters whether this letter should not be made an Assembly document. For my part, I feel that this is a reply to a letter from Mr. Dayal, which was sent on the mandate of this Committee, and for that reason at. this stage the letter belongs to the internal documents of this Committee. Of course, that does not mean that the letter cannot be made available, but it does mean, necessarily, that this Committee should first have a chance to look at the letter before any further steps are \ taken regarding it. BC/cw 7-10

Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): A decision has been taken by the President of the General Assembly to call a meeting of the Assembly on Friday. I had understood that the President still had to consult delegations.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL (interpretation from French): I was just informed, a quarter of an hour ago^ that the President had taken the decision — certainly as a result of the existing situation. If I may be allowed to do so, I would say that this introduces a factor of major importance as regards the time-table. (continued in English) I should perhaps add one thing. In the somewhat free tone that we can permit ourselves in this Committee, I would say that to my surprise this fact has, eo far as I know, not appeared in the newspapers: tomorrow, the Organization will be honoured by a visit from President Youlou of Congo (Brazzaville). Yesterday he announced that he would arrive here tomorrow, and today he his sent a further cablegram requesting that no debate on the .Congo — in any respect, I understand — should take place before hie arrival. AP/rh 11 ., (The Secretary-General)

If no member wishes to take the floor I would venture in the field, although I do it with very great hesitation, as in this case the constitutional situation is that the Committee decides on appropriate assistance, in consultation with the Secretary-General. But if we want to be consulted, I may be permitted to express the view before any decision or any stand has been taken by the Committee; you will then perhaps bear with me. . - I must say th'ia decision to convene the General Assembly on the credentials question, as I said, obviously introduces an element of considerable significance for the actions of this Committee. We can easily see that depending upon the outcome of the General Assembly debate, the line to be taken by this Committee may be quite different. I do not mean that th?re is any reason for reconsideration of the basic attitude taken by the Committee, but I do mean that the task of the Conciliation Commission in case of a postponement will be different obviously from the task in case of either an approval of the report of the Credentials Committee or a disapproval. For those reasons I ask myself if this Committee is not facing a situation where it must, for the time being, adjourn with a decision to meet immediately after the end of the deliberations of the General Assembly, to take appropriate decisions concerning its responsibilities. In this context there is another question which has come to my mixad. This Committee, in this particular case, is in essence an organ of the General Assembly. The General Assembly has in its resolution of 20 September included a mandate for the Advisory Committee. I think that at some stage this Committee must give consideration to the question whether the Committee is not under an obligation to present to the General Assembly a report on action taken in implementation of the resolution. I do not know when the proper stage will come for such a report, but I think that it is something which we should keep in mind. W[jr feeling is that if a definite decision were taken on the sending of the Mission, it would be the natural and courteous thing for this Committee to do so, AP/rh 12-15 (The Secretary-General) to inform the General Assembly accordingly. When matters are still at a, preparatory stage it is, I think, perfectly understandable if the Committee has not devoted any time to the question whether, and if so, how to report to the General Assembly. This is, however, a minor point; the main point was the first one to which I referred: What influence, if any, the decision to convene the General Assembly on one of the Congo problems should have on the immediate action of this Committee, I say "immediate action" because fron my part I would consider it premature to start a discussion about the policies of this Committee in other essential respects. HA/aJ 16

Mr. GEBRE-EG2Y (Ethiopia): May I ask what specific language was moved the last time the debate was adjourned? Could we get the exact text?

The SECRETARY.GENERAL; .Je can go back to the text of our last meeting.

•• - Mr. GEBRE-EGZY' (Ethiopia): I do not mean the last meeting of this Committe; I am referring to the plenary meeting. . . . .^

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Since Mr. ^uaison-S^ckey is here and he is the one who moved the adjournment, he would probably be the best witness.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Secondly, I have the feeling — and I may be wrong -- that there was in fact a concrete decision to send the Conciliation Commission. There may be difficulties as to the timing and as to the date fixed, in terms of our discussion last time. But I was under the impression that there was a decision to send the Conciliation Commission. I think that decision was made at about the time when we decided on the composition of the Commission.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: It is my understanding of the situation — but you may correct me -- that this Committee concluded from its deliberations that a commission of such and such composition should be sent, leaving open certain details for further decision, the most important one being the time of departure.

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): To be frank with you, Mr. Secretary-General, I feel rather sad to hear that pressure has been brought to bear upon the President to call a meeting of the General Assembly to consider the Credentials Committee!s report. I say I am sad because, as you have indicated, the General Assembly decided, upon our motion, to postpone consideration of the item dealing with the situation in the Congo until further notice. In fact, during my intervention, I made it clear that there was a Conciliation Commission being sent to the Congo and that, in our view, it would be better and, in fact, helpful for the General Assembly not to consider the situation until the HA/aj 17.20 (Mr. Quaison-Sackey, Ghana)

Conciliation Commission had gone to the Congo and returned and until the Assembly knew the results of such efforts as might have been made by the Commission. It was upon that basis that we tried to convince the Assembly and it was on that basis that the adjournment took place. I am rather emboldened to take up this matter here because, Mr. Secretary-General, you have just said that the Advisory Committee, being a body of the General Assembly, will have to give a report of its work to the General Assembly. If that is so, my suggestion would be that the Advisory Committee should decide on this question, namely, whether it would be politic for the General Assembly to convene at all when the Conciliation Commission has not left. In other words, can we not, if we so decide, bring our moral weight to bear upon the situation and get the President not to call a meeting? GSC/rah .21 (Mr. Quaison-Sackey, Ghana)

I understand: that normally, if the President, of l&e' A&sembly is going to call a meeting of the General Assembly, he considers various views; in other words, he must be convinced that the majority of delegations want a meeting. That la to say, this happens vhen the general committee itself has decided upon an item to be , discussed, but when a delegation or d Member State Wants a meeting to be held, he considers the various facets of ttie base before he calls a meeting. ' . May I know whether we cannot, as an Advisory Committee to you, and 'taking ,. into account the various facets of the case, prevail upon the President of the Assembly not to heed any request to call a meeting, because if the General Assembler convenes, I am sure that there is going. to be a -lot of heat produced, and that is what we want to avoid* In fact, this cannot be avoided if the matter comes'up. •' '• .'•• ''•:•••'•.-• '• ...... •<•;••..•: '• . •• .••;,. •...„.. : May £ know from you whether we Cannot prevail upon the President not to convene the' General Assembly meeting? • •'-"'• .''• ...... • ' -. ../ -

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: My feeling is that individual delegates/ of , / course,1 as delegates, are free' to take the matter -u£ for discuss ion-, with the President arid explain their 'stand -and their views in relation to the work of -.-; -. •< the -Conciliation Commission. • •• •'•'.'" .' • . :.-:-./ \ -..• = • L . .' ••••..-. '• • 'On- the :6ther handy it would be my. understanding of the status; .of. ijfeifl .' • specific Committee that it cannot pronounce itself, on General Assembly procedures or on the action of the President, as a Committee. I irast, remind you that this Committee was established by the Secretary-General, later endorsed by the General Assembly, but only on one specific point — the one referring to the Conciliation Commission. I think that even in other cases, with regular Assembly committees, there might have been difficulties to intervene in the proceedings of the General Assembly; but in view of the status of this Committee, I think that my reply is probably the only one possible. That reduces the possibility of initiative to those which can be taken individually by members of delegations or by heads of delegations. T

GSC/mb 22-25

Mr. JAJA WACHUKU (Nigeria): I notice that there are rules governing requests for special assemblies by the Security Council or at the request of Members, but I do not seem to see any rule governing the summoning of the General Assembly, as in this particular case, to report from a Committee, as the case may be. I wonder whether the Secretary-General can help me out on this, because I am beginning to wonder whether any Member can just go to the Secretary-General ar.id say, nl want a meeting of the General Assembly," and then another can say that we have no right to attend such a meeting.

The B3CRgTARY-GF'.NBRAL; No; this is the prerogative of the President of the General Assembly, and his position has been rightly described by the representative of Ghana. He enters upon consultations when he receives such a request, and if he feels that this is the general desire or that there is sufficient backing for such a request, he certainly considers himself in duty bound to proceed in accordance with the will of the regis-fcsred tendency in the Assembly. As an aside, I may add that sometimes it functions even more freely. I can mention that during the Suez crisis, for example, I remember a case,which certainly the representative of the United Arab Republic remembers, when the President called the General Assembly,over the opposition of various people, at the sole request of the United Arab Republic.

•Ml; DR/ds 26

Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria): We do not consider that the position of the Advisory Committee to advise the President not to summon the meeting at this stage would be a sufficient reason not to summon it. Considering that this is the Advisory Committee on the Congo and that we have been handed a situation that is very delicate -- I do not want to be too blunt --it seems to me that the pressure to summon the'meeting to consider the report of the Credentials Committee is particularly e. matter which is being forced by one of the big Powers here and to us, particularly ir* -::hi.s ;Co;mnittee, I think that this is,a matter of our own concern. We are -very much concerned -.- perhaps more so.than the particular Power that is trying "to force this issue — to see that we arrive at a sound conclusion, a conclusion that would be satisfactory to all concerned and give us satisfaction . that we have, dons a good job of work, ... I -feel that it is necessary that ttyis Committee as a body should inform the President that.iwe are not.happy about this meeting although, he has tfce right and the discretion; to 'cvimmoii the meeting. At this stage it would not help us at all to do 'our- wcrfc. .•••.-••. •: • . ; ; .

>.'..•*'-' -ffa e '.SECRETARY*£?1NERAI.; I have explained-what I believe to be the constitutional^position, .Of. course any number pf representatives, members of this Committee,1 can ^express their views and the views reflecting the trend .within this. Committee to the President, but I am afraid that the Committee as such cannot do it. For example, I can point out only this fact: that as a matter of necessity I . would have to rule :uyself out because obviously the Secretary- General cannot express a view on actions of the President; he does not and he cannot.

Mr, JHA (India): Mr. Secretary-General, I apologize for not being present in the earlier stages of the discussion, but I think that the point which has been raised is of real importance. I fully agree with you that if tha constitutional authority for summoning the Assembly rests with the President DR/ds 27-30

(Mr. Jha, India) it is not really for the Secretary-General to advise him to take a particular stand. I entirely appreciate your position. On the other hand, this is really a very great issue, a big issue, an issue on the proper handling of which the entire future of the United Nations efforts in the Congo may very well depend. Speaking for my own delegation, I think that we would like to go on record about our views on this question of a hasty meeting of a General Assembly to pronounce on the Credentials Cc-riitteefs report which, as the whole world knows,has gone in favour of President Kasavubu's delegation. To us it seems that although it is true that this Advisory Committee has limited functions -- its primary function is to advise you — but today this is the one body which really meets regularly and applies its minds and many hours of its time to a discussion of the problems in the Congo. We venture to think that perhaps thees discussions, though lengthy, have some use for you too, Mr. Secretary-General, and your associates, who also give us so much of their time and attention at these meetings. We are really face to face with a grr»ve crisis with regard to the future of the Africa continent, The United Nations undertook a very great effort in the Congo* It was not an easy thing for the United Nations to send thousands of soldiers and civilians and to undertake these tremendous operations in the Congo for the protection of law and order and for the protection of the territorial integrity, peace and unity of the Congo. These operations were undertaken, as nobody knows better than yourself, under very difficult conditions and, as we have said on other occasions, we are filled with admiration at the celerity, at the efficiency with which on the whole these operations have been undertaken and conducted. PGB/bg 51 (Mr. Jha, India)

But you will remember that these operations have not been easy. Prom time to time even a Bright slip, unintentional though it may have been, has caused a tremendous storm in the United Nations, in Africa and elsewhere. Fortunately we — the United Nations and ourselves -- have been able to rectify this, and today the situation as far as the United Nations is concerned is really viewed with great satisfaction in relation to its efforts in the Congo. I ara speaking principally from the point of v:'-?v of my own delegation. The United lotions has to go on functioning in the Congo under the mandate of the various resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly for some considerable time, and it is extremely important that tiiere should be no slips, no deviations from the straight path that has been laid down by the General Assembly in its resolution of 20 September and by the various resolutions of the Security CouiiOil. And one of the cardinal principles which is enshrined in the Security Council resolutions is non-interference in the internal affairs of the Congo. We heartily subscribe to that. In fact, without adherence to that principle the United Nations cannot function in the Congo, or anywhere else, and you yourself, Mr. Secretly-General, in your various pronouncements in the Security Council have held on to that principle as. a sheet ejichor., ...... What is the position today? Let me make the position of my delegation clear. President Kasavubu .is the Chief of State of the Congo. We recognize that, we show him all courtesy, and we recognize his status as Chief of State. But no one can ignore the v^pt that President Kasavubu is also one of the contending parties for power in the Congo. That is an obvious fact. He and his associates are in opposition to another party, which is also a very important party, which cannot be ignored and which seems to have -- or, at any rate, to have had until a short time ago — the authority of the Parliament itself. The position is not so simple. It is not a question simply of carrying out the behest of the Chief of State. On 20 September, when these new States were admitted, the President of the Security Council very rightly said -- I have not the verbatim record before me, but this is the purport of his remarks -- that, as the Assembly knew, there were serious political difficulties in the Congo, and for that reason it would be better to keep the seat vacant and refer the matter to /the Credentials Committee. Those political difficulties still remain, and it is really a political FGB/bg 32-55 (Mr. Jho, India) question, so that if the United Nations by any chance, by any gesture, gives the impression of seating hastily either the Lumumba delegation or this delegation I am afraid we shall be burning our boats for a long time to come. We do not want the powder keg to be lighted in the heart of Africa. We do not want Africa to be converted into another Korea, and we do not want the delegation seated here to be another delegation such as the so-called delegation from China, because it is the experience of the United Nations that once delegaticns take their seats they become firmly rooted and it is very difficult to get them out of those seats. They become very comfortable there. Thus we are really face to face with a very grave crisis. While recognizing the full status of President Kasavubu as Head of State — and I nyself had the great pleasure the other day, on behalf of my Government, of paying him my respects — we must take into consideration the fact that we are confronted with a tremendous political dispute and a tremendous conflict for the acquisition of power. And if the United Nations, by any chance, slips into siding, either deliberately or by negligence, with one party or the other I foresee a very difficult future in the Congo, perhaps with repercussions in other parts of Africa and for the entire operations of the United Nations. The position is going to be crystallized, and it will take a long, long time, a great deal of suffering, perhaps, a great deal of diplomatic bitterness and a great deal of cold war, possibly, beforo the situation can ever be disentangled. I am speaking, perhaps, a little strongly, and with considerable emotion, but I can tell you that we*believe with great conviction and sincerity in this, and we have no interest other than seeing that the Congo operation proceeds smoothly and that,the United Nations having fulfilled its task in the Congo and the people having solved their difficulties, we withdraw ourselves from the country. NR/jvm 36 > - ' .. (Mr. Jha, India) That Is really our aim. We are very much afraid that that aim will be jeopardized, perhaps irretrievably, if we are not cautious,' if we do not • restrain ourselves, at least some of us who are very anxious to plunge the General Assembly into a bitter fray.

: . I' . • ' I would, therefore, like to go on record here. 1 quite see that we cannot give you this mandate, but we have other means of doing so. If we are all agreed oh this, we c.?.n all go in a body to the President o'f the General Assembly and say, "This is whit we feel. It is true you have the power, but you are a wise man, and we have placed confidence in you. Please consider these things, and 'don't be in a hurry to do so." Apart from the other points that Ambassador Queison-Sackey raised, the Assembly has already adjourned for substantive debate on the Congo, and this matter will bring on a substantive debate. So this really has reference to the let'ter I wrote to you some time ago, and it was the view of my Government that it took a very serious view of this matter, and I was instructed to place it on record in this Committee, not with a view to any action, because we cannot really take action qua Advisory Committee to the Secretary-General, nor perhaps can we do so, except perhaps informally, but it is extremely important that we should realize the consequences and that we should not let posterity say that at the hour of crisis, at the hour of decision, we failed or that our wisdom faltered.

Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic)(interpretation from French): I must express my great regret at seeing that the President of the General Assembly has decided to call a meeting on Friday so as to consider once again the question of the Congo and the question of the verification of the credentials. We have debated the question of the verification of credentials, and I have defined the position of my delegation on that point. We continue to believe that the Credentials Committee on this occasion is not seized of a question of procedure; it is seized of a political question, and the political question may have grave repercussions upon the situation in the Congo. That is why I have attempted and on several occasions I have requested to postpone the matter and send it to the Credentials Committee. I hope that we will not have to go back on that decision and debate that report on Friday. Nfc/jvm 57-^0 (Mr. Loutfi, United Arab Republic) I do not see any reason that urges us to take such a course of action* There la no urgency here. Nothing can justify such a course of action. It is a political decision which we are called upon to take, a very grave political decision, because, if we decide in favour of Mr. Kasavubu and his delegation, which is composed of several ministers -- I do not have anything against them, but they are not really representative of the Congo — this may bring about very grave political repercussions in the Congo. Therefore, I associate myself with what has been said by the representative of India and I am ready to associate-myself with any other delegation here that might wish to go and speak to the President about our point of view. If the question comes up on Friday, I cannot but oppose its discussion.

Mr* GEBRB-EGZY (Ethiopia): I asked a question earlier, and that question is this. The Assembly in plenary meeting made a certain decision. Now, if we know specifically what that decision was, in terms of the text, then I think that this orgp-n will be in a better position to proceed further. That is to sny, if I recall rightly, the proposal by the representative of Ghana was that the entire discussion of the Congo be postponed until the Conciliation Committee resolves the problem in substance. HR/mtm Ifl (Mr. Gebre-Egzy, Ethiopia) ,

This was, I think, if I recall correctly, the decision. If that is so, then it seems to me that this Advisory Committee is duty bound to proceed and to implement the resolution of the Assembly because, first, the Assembly has the. resolution on the.^points and, secondly^ it has, by a vote of forty-eight members — again if I recall correctly --decided to postpone the entire discussion of .the Congo until the Conciliation Commission resolves the matter. That being the case, it seems to me that we can proceed to the implementation of the resolution; that, is to.say, take up the question of fixing the date, and, if all the members are here., we would take up the question of;appointing officers and so on*

' . Mr. BOUCETTA (Morocco) (interpretation from French); I also wanted to express my astonishment with regard to tlxese hesitations of the Committee. It hesitates to execute decisions taken more or. less in a definitive manner. At the last two meetings which we have he-Id > it was, a; question of sending a commission to the Congo* On those occasions we. discussed all the provisions which were to be made; we also informed .our Governments about this, and we even mentioned details of the matter,,when the Commission would be installed, the planes which it would take, its terms o£ reference, the meeting which it would hold with "you and the members of this Committee, so as to beg;in its work,, and a great majority here expressed a feeling of urgency that the;, Commission should begin to work almost immediately. . • - The Assembly adjourned the discussion of. 1

Another question arises: If the Assembly did not give a mandate to this Commission, it at least approved its establishment and allowed it to proceed to work. Is it that the Assembly no longer approves of this Commission of our8? I believe that under present circumstances, until such time as a new decision is reached to dissolve this Commission, that the Committee should continue to work. I do not know how it should approach the President of the Assembly in an attempt to hold off a meeting of the Assembly on the Congo, but in any case, our work must continue and the Conciliation Commission should go as soon as possible to Leopoldville.

Mr. COOPER (Liberia): You must excuse me if I get my facts wrong, but I think the first thing we have to decide here is whether we shall send this Conciliation Commission to the Congo, despite the opposition of Mr. Kasavubu. If we decide to send this Commission to the Congo in spite of the opposition of Mr. Kasavubu, then we can say to the President of the General Assembly that they have not yet decided in the General Assembly to take up the question of the Congo until this Commission reports, then we will be in a position to ask him ndfc to hold this meeting. On the other hand, if we decide that this Commission shall not go to the Congo, then there is no reason for the President of the General Assembly to hold this meeting. My point of view is, we must decide whether we shall go to the Congo despite Mr. Kasavubu's opposition. If we decide that we shall go, then we can persuade the President of the General Assembly that in view of the resolution passed in the General Assembly, the question of the Congo will not be taken up until the Commission reports; then we do not see how you can call this meeting. If, on the other hand, we decide that we shall not send this Commission to the Congo, then the President of the General Assembly has all the right to call the meeting. The President of the General Assembly has a right to call the meeting of the General Assembly. That is they way I see the matter. GR/cw ••' U6

- •'.-•: :The SECRETARY-GENERAL; As I understand the situation, there is a decision of this Committee to send the Conciliation Commission• The question which has' been left open is when and in what circumstances, A new factor came in last time in the form of certain reactions from Mr« Kasavubu. 'Whatever importance is to "be given to them in the legal or constitutional sense, there remains one problem which I think was foremost in the mind of those who looked at it as a complication, and that was*the purely pragmatic consideration that it was of cQuro?? desirable to do what we could in ordsr to obtain co-operation from those represented by President Kasavubu. But there is no decision of this Committee reversing its previous stand as to the sending of a Commission^ as far as I know. As I understand it, what was left open, I repeat, was the question of when and in what circumstances. For that reason, I believe tha't-the problem can be limited today to the question of when^ in view of these further developments on the side of the General Assembly. I do not see in the situation as it now stands, that is to say, that there is a decision to call a meeting of the General Assembly, a reason for the Committee, as of today, to revisa its previous stand in principle.

Mr0 CISSE (Senegal) (interpretation from French): I wish to state the position of my Government concerning the Congo Conciliation Commission. My Government has Just decided that the Commission should be sent, and this as soon as possible9 Of course, according to the provisions of the General Assembly resolution, especially paragraph 5 thereof, it is a Conciliation Commission and Mr« Kasavubu's letter has raised a certain obstacle. But we have been asked to emphasize here in the Advisory Committee that the Senegal Government completely agrees that the Conciliation Commission should go to the Congo and take all appropriate measures to reconcile the population in the Congo*

Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French); I apologize for speaking a second time, but I would like to make a small comment on Mr. Kasavubu!s letter. In my opinion, his letter is not in opposition to the departure or the dispatch of the Conciliation Commission, especially if we read the next to the last paragraph: It says: GR/cw Vf-50 (Mr. Loutfi, United Arab Republic)

"Congolese public opinion would find it difficult to accept the intervention of a conciliation commission if any doubt subsisted as to the exclusive competence of the Congolese authorities to take themselves the f ;Lnal decision demanded by the internal political situation in the Congo... Moreover, it would have difficulty in understanding how any effective conciliatory rule could be played by the representatives of Governments which have publicly taken a stand on problems of Congolese

internal policyu" I think we could explain to Mr, Kasavubu that we recognize the independence of the Congo, but what we want to do is assist him, and the Government of the Congo, the Parliament of the Congo, to find a solution for their problems. We are not going to impose a solution; we do not have any means of imposing a solution, I think we should explain this to Mr* Kasavubu and I do not think tha;t inasmuch as we have an Assembly resolution which is being implemented, that we can wait. We must let the Conciliation begin its work and go off, to the Congo* RSII/rh

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): I agree with the representative of Liberia."' to my mind, the sending of the Commission and the calling of the ; General Assembly are mutually related, but I disagree with him, of course, atiout his conclusions regarding the sending of a Commission whether or not' Mr. Kasavubu is opposed to it. At the last meeting, our position'on" this was made very clear. We should fix a date, and perhaps the date'you suggested might be a good day for the Commission to depart. There were other people here who felt that some more' consultation or some prodding to get Mr. Kasavubu to change his attitude towards the Conciliation Commission might'be a good idea. First of all, I shouli like to know whether in fact this prodding has taken place and whether or not the atmosphere, so far as the- other sdJe is concerned, has cleared to allow this Commission to start its work immediate."./• Secondly, I am afraid my delegation will find it very difficult indeed to proceed, with the idea of the Conciliation Commission if there is to be a debate in the General Assembly on the situation in the Congo. I say this becp.use, as we indicated, when we moved the motion in the General Assembly we felt that much heat was being produced and that if the debate continued there would be recriminations, acerbity of debate and accusations and counter-accusations which would make the work of the Compilation Commission very difficult indeed. How can my delegation take a stand in the General Assembly on this particular matter of seating, namely, of opposing the Kasavubu delegation, which we think we should do because there are grounds for that, and at the same time preach conciliation? Therefore, it is really a matter of conscience, of morality and of wanting the Committee to succeed. That is why we feel it would be impolitic and very unfortunate if a debate were to be held on the situation in the Congo, because it would help no one. It would merely bedevil the success of the work of the Commission, so I come back to my original point that we here in the Committee should all agree that the Assembly debate on the report of the Credentials Committee should be postponed. If we do not go to see the President as a committee but go to see him as a group of delegations, I think the same result would be produced. I feel that the moral authority of the Secretary-General himself, if he is convinced that there should be no debate on Friday on the situation, would produce dividends. I have no doubt whatsoever that the President of the Assembly is a reasonable man, and if he knows that this Advisory Committee has discussed the RSII/rh 52-55

(Mr* Quaison-Sackey, Ghana) matten and that it was of the candid opinion that a debate should not be held, I am sure he will consider this matter. Of course, Presidents have their own prejudices, their own likes and dislikes, and I would hate to feel that our present President was not an impartial and objective person. His own delegation is serving on the Advisory Committee, although he is a servant of the Assembly and does not act as the representative of Ireland, and I am sure he would definitely consider whatever recommendations were made to him, with the help of the Secretary-General.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: May I continue your speech by quoting for the benefit of us all, but first of all for the representative of Ethiopia who asked for the exact terms of your motion in the General Assembly. I quote from the record of the General Assembly of its meeting of 9 November, when you stated: "It is in this spirit that I appeal to all Member States here to agree with .me x-hcvb the debate should be suspended until the Coar.isFion has gone to the Congo, done its work and come back to report to us, so that we can resume in an atmosphere of peace and in the interests of the Congolese people*" (A/FV.91?* P» (The ,.«ic.rftar^-iiovien* 1)

I '.hoxii.') iiK-11 to meisl. ion Uwt, WtiatevBt the confctltutiorwl considerat rastj "C, I CAO .id think t;vst it would t'« In any vny improper if -~ vit.li the Cotuiultvee11> permission, of course,, and purely informally -- the record; of ',..U tueetiiijj were to be given to the President.

Mr. T/iJA WAaiUKU (Nigeria): My remark* at this tine are .aged on paragraphs ^ and 5(7.) of t...e General Assembly resolution of i'O Beptemeftr 19<->G establishing the Conciliation Ccjmleaion. Parc.^,' lfi 3 of the resolution: I/ "Appeals to all Congolese vithin the Reputlic of tne Congo to geek a epeeuy solution by peacefi.il meaoa o* all Vrwir Interne! conflicts for the unity und integrity of lihe Congo,, with th* aei»iflt*nce, o the Mambert of the United Nations. We now see that that appeal and thnt request are being set aside -« the app««.l IB being «ns«ns« of th« Initsd Rations resolution. tlitm' <:ireurwUnc<"i5, is this r.ot %pp:ro][ rlfit'S t:toe for ti.ie tody to luring it to the attention of t^» P:- ;-i* :>1" the Aftse».:iy that If .ne agrees to l;iru!; xhe metter before the «Y:f '-J.I.. In effect be nul.-l fyir^ 1 the i-eeolutio)!? I do not think that be F Jurir,g ni« x*rm ol' office, to do anything, advertently or inadvsrten*. i :v, tiiat would be likely to OrsarJ. nation look foolisii. AP/mh 61 (Mr« JaJa Wacnuku, Nigeria)

I think the sooner this "body brings this home to those concerned, ia pressing this matter this day, the better. And I go to the extent of saying that the last time vhen this matter was raised, when ve met here, I spoke in favour of waiting for a result or a reply to the letter which was sent officially by tfciB Committee through Mr. Dayal to the President of the Republic of the Congo, to know whether he is in favour or against our going. It is Just a matter of courtesy to know whal he has to say. Otherwise, if we did not get any reply and then we Just went away, he would say, well, we did riot even want to hear from him and we sent him a letter without waiting for any reply — we Just flew over to the Congo. Now, we have a reply. I feel that those of us, and their respective Governments who are taking responsibility, under the United Nations, to aid the Congo in various forms to bring about stability, deserve a certain amount of respect from the leaders of the Congo Republic. And their views should be taken into consideration in whatever they do, particularly those Governments that have to live on the continent of Africa with the Congolese Republic. It would be very terrible for any Government that does not have immediate proximity with this Republic to conduct itaelf in such a way that it would make the position existing there virtually impossible for us* I am saying this because my Government is very much disturbed about the present state and the extent to which things are going. It is true ve are new in the Organization, but we are taking our responsibilities, in relation to the Congo, most willingly, and we are prepared to do anything within our power to see to it that this situation is solved. But we would not like any Member of this Organization, however powerful it may be, however wealthy it may be, and however influential it may be to make the situation more difficult than it would normally be. I feel that I should make our position very clear in this respect. The time has come now when we have to decide definitely to go to the Congo* There are two things which we may do: one, to go on with the work of reconciliation with the people; and the other one, is to find out ,for ourselves, as a fact-finding Commission. Surely, we cannot do the work of reconciliation without knowing the facts. At least, it would be possible for us to find out the situation, AP/rah 62-65

whether in fact those who say this or that are in a position to exercise their authority which they say they do exercise. : So, I will agree -- now that we have the reply, with the letter, I think my conscience is quite clear now --that we should fix a date early next week -;- very early next week --to go to the Congo, not necessarily to start a : reconciliation, but to find out for ourselves, as agents of the United Nations/1 what is -the present position in the Congo. I am not prepared to start negotiation about settlement or reconciliation without the Head of the State of the Congo; but certainly, as a representative of a State that supports this ••-..• Organization, and is prepared to do everything possible to assist them to ;regain stability, we are entitled to know the position of the territory and .what is . • happening in respect of their leaders. . : . HA/ds 66

(Mr. Jaja Wachufcu^ Nigeria) And so I feel that, whether we succeed in persuading the President to persuade the other people who are bringing this pressure to summon this meeting on Friday or not, we are justified now in deciding that the Commission should leave here early next week to proceed to the Congo, if for nothing else than to act as a fact-finding body, in order to report back to the General Assembly whether anybody who is claiming authority, in one way or another, beyond what the constitution ha? given to him actually has that authority or not. It is on the strength of that that the United Nations can be justified in any line of action it may take or that it would be in a position to do what it should do. The report that we now have from the Special Representative of the Secretary- General has been attacked by one side and the other. I am very happy to read in the New York Times that a supporter of the Belgian Government has decided not to support the Belgian Government in this matter, Which is a very good thing. The second progress report pointed out certain things, and the Belgian Government opened an attack on the Secretariat on everything, and they were defended, and now the defence has been removed. 1 think that we should take this decision and that this body should meet the President — it is not only a question of one or two people going there — and tell him exactly what we think at this time, and that we intend to go to the Congo. The resolution that you read out should be put before him and we should tell him exactly what we feel and what our decision is. I think that that should make him weigh very carefully whether our feelings should be disregarded in deference to the feelings of one or two others who may be pushing this .matter the way they want. I know that, if matters proceed to their logical conclusion as they are going, if we do not get a Korea in the Congo,we will get something very close to it. That is what we who live in Africa want to avoid. We are not siding with one party of the other. As far as my country is concerned, we are not siding with anybody. All we want is what is best for the Congolese people. These are the points I want to make, and I insist very strongly that this step should be adopted now. AH along,! have pursued a course which made some of my friends think that we wanted to delay any action* But I simply wanted to HA/de 67*70

(Mr. Jaja Wachuku. Nigeria) make sure ti*at we have a situation which I can.explain to my Government, and I think I am in a position to explain whatever action I take here in the light of, facts that are available, and I am quite certain that I will have .the Government behind me in the .views I have ^ust expressed* , . -

... Mr* RITCHIE (Canada): I wonder whether I might revert for a moment to, the poin$. me4e by the representative of the United Arab Republic* I had the same impression..when I read the text of the letter which is before us from , President Kasavubu, and particularly the penultimate paragraph: that this letter does not, to my mind, close the door to the Commission's going to the Congo* I really believe that we should try, if possible, to follow up with ... President .Kasavubu the meaning which he attributes to this penultinate paragraph, because certainly it would be very desirable if we had at any rate the tacit acquiescence of the President before the Commission set out. •......

4,,. GSC/bg 71 (Mr. Ritchie, Canada)

In that connexion, like other delegations who spoke here at our last meeting, I vas a little bit concerned — quite concerned — at the precedent involved in completely other circumstances from this immediate problem of the Congo in a commission proceeding to a country, if not on the invitation of the Prime Minister --because of the complexities which we all know of — or of the Parliament, and faced with, if it turned out to be so, the flat hostility of'the Head of State. Now, I am not saying by this at all that icy-'delegation in any way wishes to reverse or go back upon the decision of the Advisory Committee, that this Commission Should proceed to the Congo, but in reading'this letter, I feel that it is our obligation to clarify as' much as we can that this position of flat hostility to tile departure of the Commission does not exist and"'that'we should know that before a final decision is taken.

Mr. JHA (India): I was also going to speak on this communication from President Kasavubu. tl!:e the representatives of the United Arab Repub'lia and Canada, I do not regard this letter as a rejection of the Commission in any sense. It seems to me to be based on certain doubts or misapprehensions In President Kasavubufs mind. For example, he talks o£ intervention. There is the word "intervention" in the last paragraph on the first page. He has some doubt about the competence of the United Nations sending such Commission. The third point is that he feels that if countries have taken definite positions, how can they help in the conciliation? The fourth point is that there is a feeling that there are other methods which might be impeded, such as African Chiefs of State trying their hands, or a round- '' • > '. ' : ' ' • '''"•'. table conference. I do not want to repeat what I said last time and what seems to be the general view at the meeting today, that we should not delay any longer the decision as to a definite date for the despatch of the Commission. I entirely agree with that view. I think that the best line to adopt would be to send a letter to President Kaeavubu. Mr. Dayal should send this letter at our request. I have scribbled what might be the terms of it, which is something like this: GSC/bg 72.75 (Mr. Jha, India)

nl received your letter of 15 November I960, the contents of vhich I reported to the Advisory Committee on the Congo. The Advisory Committee has asked me to thank Your Excellency for the communication. They have given much consideration to the contents of your letter and have asked me to assure you that the creation of the Conciliation Commission, under paragraph 3 of resolution iVfif, is neither intended to, nor does it constitute, any kind of intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of the Congo. This has been made clear in the terms of reference of the Commission. "Furthermore, the Commission is to vork within the framework of the legal and constitutional structure of the Republic of tlie Congo and, in consequence, its efforts will be directed towards conciliation within the letter and spirit of this provision. "The Commission would also, as observed by Your Excellency, respect the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo- "The Commission has been constituted under the General Assembly resolution taken in pursuance of and as part of United Nations current interest in the Congo by virtue of the heavy responsibilities it hae undertaken at the request of the Government of the Republic of the Congo. Commissions of this nature have been appointed in the past by the United Nations. "It is the intention of the Commission to undertake its task in close collaboration with and without any derogation of the lawful authorities of the Congo, and there is no intention to impose any solution; the Commission will only help as far as possible. "The representatives of the Commission will function in their individual capacity as members of the United Nations body, and will not be subject to any instructions from their Governments in respect of their responsibilities as members of the Conciliation Commission. DR/jvm 76 • .v (Mr. Jha, India)

? "The Advisory Committee has asked me to assure you that the formation

of the Conciliation Committee is not intended to impede nor does it ;

: preclude any methods such as referred- to "by Your Excellency $or bringing -.

. about .harmony in thevCongo. Indeed the Advisory Committee and the . . Conciliation Commission will heartily welcome the initiation of, any process of conciliation". ••-.•-. - ' . , If we send him a letter of this kind, that means we ere giving him the fj... f . v_.W»..... necessary, assurance, that we are trying to remove what appears to be some misapprehension in,the mind of President Kasavubu. . , - -: Having done ths.t, ! think we have to turn to our task which has been entrusted by a definite mandate of the United Nations General Assembly and / proceed to, fix a date for the departure of the Commission- to tho Congo.

Mrl COOPER (Liberia): Mr. Secretary-General,, I just want to ask a question for clarification. •••-.. -,. . In view of the decision of the General Assembly to .postpone any diocuflsion on .the Congo, can the President in view of that decision unilaterally aall, a meeting of the General Assembly to discuss, the Congo without first revising the position already taken? We have,definitely decided t&atwe should suspend v debate on the Congo until a repqrt, of, the Conciliation Commission. In view of that, how .can the President call a meeting,of the General Assembly without: revoking the first decision? ,.,. .- . ..

The SECRE1ARY-GEMERAL; I am afraid I am not in a position to reply for the President.

Mr, HASAN (Pakistan): Mr. Secretary-General, first I have to inform you that the Government of Pakistan has nominated Mr. Agha Shahi as our representative on the Conciliation Commission. Mr. Agha Shahi is known to all the other members of the Commission so he needs no introduction. ER/jvm 77-80 (Mr. Hasan, Pakistan) As regards the subject of the discussion just now, I agree entirely with the representative of the United Arab Republic that the President of the Congo has not declined to co-operate with the Conciliation Commission. Compromise is an integral part of reconciliation, and let us consider whether it is possible for us to take advantage of the rather restricted agreement of the President of the Congo to co-operate with this Commission. He has said that he is prepared to receive a commission comprising representatives of Heads of African States, to accept three or four Asian countries. Every other member of the mediation group is a nominee of the Head of an African State. Therefore, if we withdraw, three or four of us, the rest would be acceptable to the President of the Congo. Therefore, the conflict as far as that point is concerned would be obliterated and we would maite progress; it will be a step forward and we will be able to start our work immediately. So that is my suggestion: let us compromise, If possible, on this. Let us have only representatives of the African States who of course are nominees of the Heads of their Governments and without three or four Asian countries. The rest are acceptable to the President of the Congo. Why not extend the hand of compromise to him now end accept his suggestion which will facilitate our work? After all, our goal is to advance the great purpose of bringing peace to the Congo. Let us not stand on these petty formalisms and things like that. Let us make a move. If we can satisfy him on that account, let us try to satisfy him because we are not abandoning or surrendering any principle on this. That would be my suggestion. FGB/mtm -81.* :..,:-..;»,

Mr. JAJA WACHUKU (Nigeria): Much as I would support compromise and like to compromise in matters myself, I think that to accept-the suggestion of the representative of Pakistan vould really mean revoking our former decision and opening up•the question of the composition of the Commission. If you remove the representatives of the Asian countries and want, according to this, heads of States or their representatives, it means that you have rescinded a former decision and that then the very debate which we avoiied last time would be opened. It means also that we would have to increase the number until everybody went, and it may well be that the departure would be very much delayed because of the' question who should represent each head of State. As for the head of State," as such, t would oppose any suggestion at this stage to ask the lisad1 of my own ; ' State or anyone else to come and interfere in this matter now. W2 are all the representatives of our Governments, as has been said, and 1Ihink ' that we'are competent to do anything. If there is any question of appeal later on, I think that then the heads of Sta'-.^s can act as courts of appeal where their representatives have done something. Thus I would-be opposed to any Suggestion of br^r.^ing'the heads of'African States into this matter because the time has not come for that type of~thing. It has not gone beyond the ability of the accredited " : representatives of the respective Governments here, working through the United Nations. ""' '>l ' ' "' Furthermore, with the' greatest deference to the President of the Congo Republic, one thing we do not like is dictation. We do not want to dictate to the State of the Congo, but we do not want anything which-appears to be dictation to the United Nations. We want to work in co-operation, hot on the basis of ah Implied dictation. Conciliation must come from two sides. therefore, 'i''would' like something on the lines suggested by the representative of thdia. .Anything" which went beyond that would in fact completely knock the bottom but of the whole essence of this Commission, and it would mean that I would have to refer back for further instructions on my line of action, which might delay matters. FGB/mtm 82-85

The SECBETAPY^ENFML; This is the first time anyone has spoken to the concrete proposal made by the representative of India. I for my part have the feeling that the suggestion made by him is likely to meet with very general approval -- that it is the vise thing and the right thing to do. I think that we should at least be able at this stage to register this much of action before we go on. Go may I make a suggestion that ve agree that Ambassador Dayal should address a letter of the general tenor of the draft of Ambassador Jha to President Kasavubu? But if I may make an additional suggestion, it would be that Mr. Dayal, in this context, could count on consultations with, for example, Ambassador Jha, Ambassador Quaison-Sackey and Ambassador Wachuku. — who are the three who have spoken on the matter -- just to see that it truly reflects the considerations and feelings of the group. It is a delicate matter, as indicated "by you, Sir. I think that you rightly indicated that this is about as far as one can go in this Committee, but I think that it would "be good for Ambassador to have the advantage of comparing not GO with a few of you. I do not want to formalize.that at all* I happened to mention three, but others are just ac welcome and anybody with whom Ambassador Dayal can find the opportunity to consult will certainly be much eppreciated, I would regard this as a line of action which meets with approval. The representative of Ghana had asked for the floor.

Mr. CEITAJSQ_N-SACKE_Y (Ghana): I was going to support the suggestion made by the representative of India, but now you, Sir, have summarized the situation. I was going to follow on my proposing that now we might possibly fix a date for the departure of the Conciliation Commission. I put this forward as it has already been put forward by the representative of Nigeria. I think we should fix a date now, and I propose that, since today is Wednesday and we want to allow enough time, possibly next Tuesday might be a good day. - TL/cw 86

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Then you take into account the probability that the General Assembly meeting will be held, ' • '•' .--.:.-

...... ' Mr *' QUAlSOff-SACKEY (Ghana) ; I am 'hoping that the General Assembly- ; meeting will not be held, Sir. ' : . .-.••

The SECRETARY -GENERAL: But I gaid, then you take into account the probability that it may be held* • ' ' : '

" Mr '. QUAISON-SACKEY. (Ghana): If it will be held, I am afraid I will - have to consider my position* .•.-.

Mr* HASAN . (Pakistan): Mr » Secretary-General, I Just wanted to add to what I said about Mr« Agha Shahi, that the instructions that I have received -: from my 'Government are that while Mr» Agha Shahi id serving as a member of . - the Conciliation Commission he will have the rank and statue of an

"' Mr» EGZY (Ethiopia) i :Sir , I 'agree that the letter of the President is not really a rejection, Nowhere ' does 'lie say flatly that he -has rejected the • •'• idea at all. Therefore, I think' we l have to construe" the letter' on the positive and constructive side, and" tiiat -t:;h^ref6re the letter which Ambassador Jha has suggested is proper* Secondly, I think we have to take up the proposal of the representative of Nigeria and define the date* Some time early next week, Tuesday, for example, has been mentioned. That is perfectly all right. Between today! s date, Wednesday, and next Tuesday is almost a week, which would give us adequate time to make all the necessary preparations. I would not wish, on my part, to have our Ambassador here staying longer than is necessary, and therefore we agree that, taking into account what has been said all along, the date should be fixed and the letter should go to the President.

The SECRETARY -GENERAL: Thank you. As we are agreed on the question of the letter, we should now address ourselves to the complete proposal made by the representative of Nigeria and supported by the representatives of Ghana and Ethiopia* TL/cw 87-90

Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): I wish merely to say, Mr» Secretary-General, that I support the proposal inade by the representatives of Nigeria, Ghana and Ethiopia to the effect that we should £ix the date for the departure of the mission* I would agree on Tuesday. I would also propose that we advise Mr* Kasavubu of the departure of the mission next week.

Mr* CISSE (Senegal) (interpretation from French): Mr, Secretary- General, I am not against the date that was proposed by the representative of Nigeria, but it seems to me that since we have to send a letter to His Excellency Mr. Kasavubu, perhaps it would be advisable to maintain the principle that the Commission should go to the Congo as soon as possible, that is to say next week, and then we could fix a final date — because certain things may arise, particularly the General Assembly meeting, as well as the letter that is to be sent to Mr. Kasavubu. May I again say that I agree that the Commission should be sent to the Congo at once, but I do not think we should set a date new.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I apologize, Mr. Secretary-General, for arriving late at this meeting. ' I was busy elsewhere. I wish only to say that I believe that, while the letter sent by President Kasavubu gives rise to certain difficulties, it does not close the door to conciliation. It is not in definite opposition to conciliation. BG/rh 91 (Mr, Slim, Tunisia)

However, there is a possibility of arriving at some agreement with Mr. Kasavubu, and I believe that the suggestion which has been, made by Ambassador Jha is very interesting, that we should bear it In mind and try to get Ambassador Dayal to see Mr, Kasavubu. Wot only should a letter4 be sent to;tiiTn, .; '.'.''"'., • > • '. . ..,•... . but he should try personally to persuade him that this conciliation is necessary .' ''""».••;• and that he should no longer oppose these decisions. ^ • -, With respect to the date, at the present time I cannot take a decision; but I maintain what I said earlier as to the date, although I reserve the right to say something different if I receive other instructions from.my. Government.

Mr. TOURE (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I wish to state the viewpoint of my delegation concerning, firstly, the proposal which has -been made by the representative of India. Jfy delegation fully supports this motion/ by virtue of which Mr. Kasavubu would'be'informed of the intentions and methods of work of the Commission. ' ' - • •"'•-' Secondly, my delegation would also like to support the proposal which has been made concerning the departure of the Commission next Tuesday. We think that this is a very good date, which would enable us to continue our work without losing any more time.

Mr. AIKEN (Ireland): It seems to me that the conciliation in the Congo is going to take a very long time. The United Nations has been operating in the Congo for four months. I think we should be very careful at every step we take in this exercise. I do not know what will happen on Friday. If the Assembly convenes in order to discuss the report of the Credentials Committee, I take it it will be open to any Member in the Assembly to propose the adjournment of the debate until the Conciliation Commission reports back from the Congo. If that proposal was made, the Irish delegation would support it. But I do think that we should wait a little while and not be over-hasty in coming todecisions regarding the fixing of dates, because one of the main tasks concerning the Conciliation Commission will be to counsel with President Kasavubu. I would submit that perhaps we might be wiser to postpone this debate on fixing a date until we see what happens in the Assembly on Friday. HG/rh 92.95

Mr, COOPER (Liberia); My delegation is fully in accord with fixing a date as to when this Commission should go to the Congo. I think that if we fix it shortly, we could advise the President of the Assembly that the Advisory Committee has fixed a date when this Commission will go to the Congo; and I think this would influence him with reference to the calling of this meeting.

Mr. KAMIL (Federation of Malaya): I would Just like to add a few words to the debate this afternoon. Firstly, my delegation would support fully the suggestions which had "been made by the representative of Nigeria earlier. At one stage, when I read this letter this morning, I thought it might be the best way out, ab suggested by the representative of Pakistan, that probably the Asian members should withdraw from this, if it is going to help at all. NR/ds 96

(Mr. Kemil. Federation of Malaya) But, as the Nigerian Minister has said, it is too late now to do anything to alter the-Delegation, to add or to subtract. My delegation, of course, is ready to » abide by- whatever decision is Tnade by this. Committee. • , ,,. - • Regarding the date, my Government's appointee is ready here and he will be ready to leave on-whatever date is fixed for the Commission to leave, at any time.

• •: -..-• .M-vMr,- JHA. (India): I think we seem to be nearing an agreement, which-16 very welcome, if only for the reason that we would be creating a record for ^ V- brevity*'" ;.: .:••.-.•••'.- .-.-..• . ...•'. '•••••• :• • •• •'.;/j.:.' .... The -point has been raised by the Foreign Minister of Ireland that we might1-' wait before taking a final decision, that we might await the renult of Friday's meeting, if the meeting is held. Then we get into a kind of mer:-;/-go-round. We want the Assembly debate to be adjourned because the Conciliation Commission is going. We want the Conciliation Commission to postpone its departure because of the Assembly debate, and we get into a very peculiar position, which would really ire an that the Conciliation Commission would never go to the Con&o. If that Is the conclusion that we reach in our wisdom, I suppose that is all right, but I believe that it is the wish of everyone around the table that the Conciliation Commission should make an attempt* It has a difficult task, but the attempt is worth making. Nothing will be lost by that, and everything might be gained, if it has propitious circumstances. One of these circumstances is, of course, the good will, or,at least, the absence of serious opposition from President Kasavubu, That is why I suggested that, if we try to explain politely the doubts which are inherent in this letter -- it is full of doubts -- and we try to remove those doubts, I think we shall have done our very best to create a proper atmosphere with President Kasavubu. That brings me to another question. You will recall, Mr. Secretary-General, that a few days ago my Minister said that he was not in favour of the convening of the Commission here, that the first meeting should be held in Leopoldville, that is, when it starts. On further consideration, in view of the developments, we would have no objection if the Commission were to meet with such of the members as are present, and, as for the others, possibly their local representatives might deputize for them under authority from their Governments and -elect a chairman who might meet President Kasavubu here. So we shall not have any objection NR/ds 97-100

(Mr. Jha. India) to that now under the changed circumstances, but that is entirely a matter for decision here* It does not mean postponement of the departure of the Commission, because I think that a large number of the members of the Commission are here now. My country has not sent its representative here, but I think perhaps one of us who happens to be in New York would fill the gap in any such meeting that would be held, and I would be Quite prepared to give the authority of my Government to any of the other members of my delegation to sit in the Commission for that time. This is an idea which I thought I might mention. Then, of course, the Commission might start at the beginning of next week or on the date that has been suggested.

' i i ,i,|. 4,1 HR/mh, 101 I

The SECRETARY.-GENERAL; I am happy to hear the last observations of the representative of India because, in the changed circumstances, I have personally come to the same conclusion. It is one way iii which it can at least be made clear that the-basic/decision of this Committee stands, and we gain time by it, and I think the very fact that the Conciliation Commission is constituted and has•'its presiding officers) and so on, will lend a kind of firmness to this development which we r,re beginning to'lose.

1 Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I am sorry to have taken the floor so'often today. That its not really my habit. I would like to introduce bur Attbeeeador -*- I should-have done so earlier -- and I am sure you will allow me to do it now. The Ambassador to the Sudan. We feel that he will be a useful member of our Conciliation Commidftion and do his best to resolve the problem of the Congo in substance. I had'forgotten to say earlier that the* Advisory-Committee had decided on the composition of the Conciliation Commission, and I am of the same mind as the- representative of Liberia; It Is rather to6 late to do anything about it, and furthermore, from the point of'view of-my delegation; we feel that our colleagues from Asia are equally entitled to be on it, and what is more, able and capable to help resolve the problem. I heard the representative from Liberia make a very pertinent suggestion, and I hope we will take that up; that is, that we should inform the President of the decision of the Advisory Committee of the date of departure of the Conciliation Commission, and if we so agree now, also that the Conciliation Commission elect its officers. I think we should elect the officers and inform the President of the decision of the Advisory Committee.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): I have asked for the floor for two reasons: Firstly, I found Ambassador Jha's suggestion, concerning the letter sent by Mr. Dayal to Mr. Kasavubu, one that can help us very much in coming to some agreement or arrangement on this question. That is the idea that the delegates will no longer be representatives of the Governments, but rather the members of a commission that will be leaving on behalf of the United Nations. HR/mh 102-105 (Mr. Slim, Tunisia)

And in order to avoid the possibility of hurting anyone's feelings, I think this is a very interesting idea that should be clearly expressed along tbe lines of the statements made by Ambassador Jha. As to the second suggestion made by him, I was going to make it myself. I think that since the Advisory Committee has maintained its position concerning the earliest possible departure to the Conciliation Commission, it would be a good thing if this C0i

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I would like to suggest an amendment to what you said. If the Advisory Committee were to ask the members of the Conciliation Commission to meet tomorrow and constitute themselves as a Commission, something which, as I have already indicated, I am very much in favour of, could not the decision on time be a bit more precise than the one indicated by the representative of Tunisia — that this Committee recommends the Conciliation Commission to plan its departure on such and such a date?

Mr* WACHUKU (Nigeria): The procedure at the United Nations is so very different from what we are used to elsewhere.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; We have our own procedures too, you know.

Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria): I take it that the Commission is being appointed by the Advisory Committee, and usually the body which appoints a commission appoints its chairman. If a Government appoints a commission, it usually appoints its chairman and does not allow the commission to nominate its own chairman. The Government choses the chairman, because he is responsible to the body that appoints him; it is to that body that a report is brought back. I am not pressing this, but I wondered whether We could not shorten the proceedings by appointing the chairman, the vice-chairman, rapporteur and the secretary sc that by tomorrow the^ may be able to convene the first meeting among themselves. This would shorten things and Mr. Dayal would know with whom he was going to work.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Before turning to the point made by the representative of Nigeria, may I try to sum up what I think is the result of our discussion so far. There is agreement that Ambassador Dayal should address a letter to Mr. Kasavubu along the general lines indicated in Mr. Jha!s intervention, and I add my hope that he will profit from the consultations with those among you gentlemen who are interested. The second point is that this Committee asks the Conciliation Commission to meet tomorrow — I leave out the question of constituting itself, because we will return to that — but it should meet tomorrow. 107-110 (The Seer eta ry-rQeneral)

Further> as a third point, this Committee recommends to the Conciliation Commission that it should envisage its departure for early next week, tentatively Tuesday4 If that would be a,fair summing up of where we are, and I believe it is, we can turn to the point made by the representative of Nigeria, as to whether this Committee wishes to constitute the Conciliation Commission or> as I thought was the intention, that the Conciliation Commission should, constitute itself*

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): Our view is that the Conciliation Commission will be composed of individuals who must know each other, arid therefore it is they themselves who must appoint their officers. I do not know all of them; I can see only one or two whom I know, but when they meet themselves, possibly under your chairmanship — because there should be someone there to preside over the first meeting -- they themselves will decide who will be their chairman, rapporteur and vice-chairman. I say this because I do not believe it should be done according to countries but according to personalities, and that is why, if they meet, they will know themselves and will make their selections on the basis of personality,

Mr. AW (Mali) (interpretation from French): I want to ask for a clarification. When-you Just spoke about conversation or consultations and agreement, I understood -something-about a'date. Tile object of tonight's meeting, as has been recalled by some of the speakers, was to fix the date of departure. There have been some exchanges of views; -we have been informed of some new elements too, and finally we came to an agreement to the effect '•' that what we have to do is to set a date, Tuesday was proposed, and as I understood it some of the speakers agreed on thaU date. -:..1-. ..:. in (Mr, Av, Mali) j- ' . ' 'I ."•;:.'."' .'•''..• . ' '' • • • - ' • '•> • ' • • - • ,.....!•:-...... -..-- • ..-•..••-.• •'••!•- .. •:'•«• v / '"> ••.." In'yotir summing up-a few moments ago, I understood you. to say that, concerning India's suggestibn, the Commission would meet and'prepare for its departure on a tentative'date, which would be Tuesday, I understood you to say, "tentatively fixed for Tuesday11^ and this is very important, because what we have been trying to do for a number of meetings is to set a date, and if we keep the words "tentatively fixed for Tuesday", we will not have solved our problem. I very muchiTear'that between now and Tuesday certain new elements might be introduced. t was expecting to hear about some new elements today, and I very much fear that between'now and Tuesday there may be another meeting to decide on a date. This Question of "the date of departure is not a detail that can be left' to the discretion of the Commission to decide'whether it is to be Tuesday or'later. It seems to me that the essence of our discussion was precisely that we should set a date: ! have only heard one intervention in which reservations were made about Tuesday, and I think the word "tentatively" used by you, Mr. Secretary-General, again raises a number of difficulties arid''puts'u&' back to where we were before.

The SSCRETARy-OEKERAL; I was more explicit than the quotation seems to indicate^ because I''said that''this Committee would're6ommend to the Conciliation Commission that it 'leave "early'"next weeV.'" Tne're was 'no prbvisoiremenf in that part. 'And then we mentioned a date, Tue's'day,' ani' I' qualified ^Tuesday provieoirement, but not early next week, because I felt that after all they should have some slight margin to decide how things fitted in with travel plans and other things and'that we should hot take that out of their Hands. That is to' say, the recommendation would be firm on'early next week.

Mr. AW, {Mali) (interpretation fromi French): "I apologize- for insisting, but the'-last time we met "we" decided that today we would fix a date, which probably would be Saturday. That would have left two or thre'e days, but next Tuesday Is a whole week away, and I think that to set that date definitely would leave enough margin fos the Commission to prepare for its departure. May I point out that some representatives have come from very far away and have been in New York for a few , and perhaps they may even be compelled to leave. -' 112-115 (Mr. Av, Mall)

I honestly think that early next week or tentatively Tuesday would not solve our problem and that unfortunately we would find ourselves in exactly the same situation as at the last meeting. Unless we say that the Commission will leave on Tuesday, the argument we have given to the General Assembly will not hold because we would be adopting exactly the same attitude as we adopted before and we will be adopting it for the third tine. I did not earlier state the position of my delegation, but I associate myself with the statements made to the effect that a letter should be sent to Mr. Kasavubu, although I had thought we should avoid starting this kind of correspondence because we will have Mr. K&savubu's reply next Tuesday and then we will meet again. But since this is the opinion of the majority and they agree that the letter should be sent, I agree alao. But as to the date, I wish to insist that today we must give the impression that we have taken a decision that Tuesday should be set as the date of departure, since it is this Committee which has to set the date. I insist i£at the Committee should tell the Commission it is to leave on Tuesday. That will givo the Commission one week, and I think that in a week it can prepare for its departure.

Mr. SL3M (Tunisia)(interpretation from French); As to the point raised about tomorrow's meeting of the Conciliation Commission, would you, Mr. Secretary-Genoral, organize that meeting since it will be the first meeting of the Commission

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; If there is no election of the chairman of the Commission today, I will call the meeting for tomorrow.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): It is precisely for that reason that I was going to suggest a provisional chairman for tomorrow. I would suggest that Mr. Wachuku be the provisional chairman, and the Commission could then elect its officers. AP/jvm 116-

Mr. BOUCETTA (Morocco)(interpretation from French): May I say that the fixing of the date will help us greatly and will dissipate the apprehensions of many of us. I do not see that there is much hesitation concerning the.'departure of the Commission as soon as possible early next week. There is neither hesitation nor opposition. Early next week could be either Monday or Tuesday. To set Tuesday would "be perhaps the best of all transactions. The Governments could tie informed — end the majority of these Governments have already sent their representatives who are already in New York. Some of those representatives have begun to complain because they said they thought that our group wprked seriously arid that they would not be spending too many days doing nothing. Now, they 'are beginning to lose some of their faith in the seriousness of pur work, ''It'seems'to me that at the present time, since there are valid reason< s for avoiding any kind of error which would have great repercussions for those that commit them and for those that feel their effects., it would be just as well to set Tuesday as the bast date since it would be the last date of the early part of the week, I see no obstacle to setting that date today. As to the Chairmanship of the discussions of the Commission tomorrow, since there IB no elected Chairman, as yet, as you have always done, helping us so generously at all times, I repeat, I think that it would perhaps be advisable if you should attend the meeting tomorrow and help the Commission with your ability and your celerity, and help them to appoint their officers. It would be premature on our part to make concrete suggestions. We do not wish to Interfere with the work of the Commission, but sines you have always inaugurated the work of any commission that has not as yet elected its officers — as you have presided over the work of this Committee -- I think your presence tomorrow would be most useful. At any rate, it seems to me that any indecision would spoil anything which we have done so far. I sincerely hope that we can fix Tuesday as the final date of departure. Anything that we might fear concerning the fixing of this date could be eliminated on the basis of the other decisions we have taken: consultations, the letter, the manner In which our work is to begin, etc. Therefore, I think this date should be definitely set in order that the representatives of Governments who are already here do not gather the impression that they will always be kept waiting. AP/Jvm 117-120

Mr« HASAN (Pakistan): Mr, Secretary-General, I will not take more than a moment, I was going to support the suggestion made by the representative of Tunisia that we request the Minister of Nigeria to convene the meeting tomorrow and be its provisional Chairman, We hope it will be possible for you also to attend the meeting, as a summing up of the entire situation by you would be better than a summing up by anyone else that we know of, because no one else knows the situation better, no one else can analyse the situation better than yourself, I am sure the Conciliation Commission would benefit a great deal by your presence. We all hope that it will be possible for you to be present at the meeting and that the Minister of Nigeria will be the provsional Chairman. I was going to say "permanent Chairman" but that is for the Conciliation Commission to decide. HA/mtm 121 »•. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; The last point you made, about my attendance or non-attendance, IB a practical matter, and I do not think there is any need for a decision here. If it is the wish of the;Conciliation..Commission'-that I come, T will'be happy to come. • •- '•• ' That reduces the points we have to decide to two. One is the suggestion - ; for the election here and now of a'Provisional Chairman of the Conciliation : .: Commission. The oth^r'is concerned with the way in which we address the Conciliation Commission as to the date, t think that question is mildl^ ' ' academic because it is, as we well know, the same majority, and I think that a recommendation from this Committee will be carried out vby the others without any hesitation* On the other hand, I feel that it is good protocol-, so to speak; ! that the Commission be given a little bit of leeway in relation to this Committee. But I have no strong feelings about it; I think that on the whole it is an-academic question.

Mr. L017PFI (United Arab Republic): I wish to say something about the ' date. We could say that we recommend that the Commission leave on Tuesday. It will be up to the Commission to see whether this can be done in practice, but we recommend Tuesday as the date of departure. ' '

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Tuesday is perfectly all right for us, - in the sense in T*i:ich it was just stated by Ambassador Loutfi. Secondly, I think it is a good' idea to have a Provisional Chairman, and I wish to support Ambassador Slim's proposal that the Minister of Nigeria, Mr, Wachuku, should be'' the Provisional Chairman and should convene the first meeting of the Conciliation Commission.

Mr. Ismael TOURE (Guinea) (interpretation from French): May I say <• that my delegation also thinks that Tuesday meets with the approval of all the members' of the Committee as the date of departure, and we could say in our r «| •".'• o '^ •..:-.'•-••...... ,.• ••.'•>• conclusions' that the Committee agrees that Tuesday should be set as the date ' of departure. HA/mtm 122

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I believe I am really voicing the views of all those around the table when I say that we would all be happy to see Mr. Wachuku assume the Chairmanship tomorrow and convene the meeting. I am sure I am simply expressing what is in fact a vote of acclamation. Under those circumstances, there is the question of the time, and on that point the record is quite clear that there is a consensus on Tuesday as the date of departure. If we express it in the form of a recommendation, I think it is all right* If so, the situation would now be that we have asked Ambassador Dayal, as I stated before, to address President Kasavubu with a reply along the lines already discussed, and that further we ask the Conciliation Commission to convene tomorrow. For ttat purpose, we Kask Mr. Wachuku, as Provisional Chairman, to call a meeting at a convenient time tomorrow. Finally, we address to the Conciliation Commission, through Mr. Wachuku, the recommendation -- the background of which you have heard in this discussion — that the Commission depart on Tuesday.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I think there is one point left: the suggestion of Ambassador Cooper of Liberia that the decision of the Advisory Committee be communicated to the President of the General Assembly. We would very much appreciate it if that could be done.

The SECnETARY-GENERAL: I will do that ae a matter of course, because that is part of my formal duties. .But also, as I said, on an informal basis -- because it is an internal document — I feel that I have your approval for making the records of this meeting available to the President of the General Assembly,

Mr. JAJA WACHUKU (Nigeria): I want to taank this body for treating me as a kind of favourite baby, anyway; I suppose it is just because I happen to be the last born so far that you have decided to ask me to be the Provisional Chairman. I do appreciate this very much indeed and I can assure you that I will do my best tp see that the confidence you have reposed in me is not misplaced. HA/mtm 122

The SECRETARY -GENERAL; We all wish you all good luck. Is there anything more that we have to deal with?

Miy &JA WACBUKU ( Nigeria)* 1 should like to ask the members of Commission to stay behind when the others leave, so as to avoid any correspondence about the time tomorrow. The representatives of the various delegations may have i somebody to deputize for them to enable us to agree on a time tomorrow,

The SECRETARY -GENERAL; Thank you, gentlemen. We Will leave the time to you.

The meeting rose at TOO p.m.

c CONFIDENTIAL Meeting Wo. 1} 22 November 1960 ; .' .ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO . , .

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 22 November 1966, at 9 pcito.

60-29716 2-5

The SECRETARY-GENERAL! Everyone has not arrived, but as there are some formal pieces of information which I shall give you, I feel that I can begin in order to save us time. The Committee has before it three documents: a letter from the President of the Republic of the Congo of today, starting out with a reference to the correspondence with Mr. Dayal; a second short letter, juet distributed, which does not refer to Mr. Dayal but treats also with the question of the Conciliation Conmiseion and its departure for Leopoldville.; and there is, of course, finally, a third document, the report of General Rikhye, which has been circulated as General Assembly document A/4587. With the background in these three cLocuments, I should like to give you a brief history of this afternoon. The Conciliation Commission met at 3 o'clock. At the moment of the opening of the meeting I received the first letter from President Kasavubu and, as a matter of course, as the letter had a serious bearing on the decisions of the Conciliation Commission, I felt that I should inform the members about its receipt. So I read the letter. In view of the stand which seemed to be taken by President Kasavubu in this letter, seen against the background of the events of last night as reported in the report from General Rikhye to the General Assembly, there was a general feeling in the Conciliation Commission that the departure of some members of the Commission tonight should be postponed as, on the one side, that did not mean any loss of time in Leopoldville; on the other hand, it would provide an opportunity for the consideration by the Advisory Committee of the situation which had arisen because of President Kasavubufs new stand and the incidents in Leopoldville. Thus, the Conciliation Commission postponed the departure of some members for a few days,and, without changing their main programme, asked me to refer the whole question to the Advisory Committee and to report on this stand of the Conciliation Commission as well as of President Kasavubu. HR/aJ 6 (The Secretary "-General)

When ve in the Conciliation Commission read the letter from Mr. Kasavubu we observed, of course, that on the one hand it seemed to be the most definite stand taken against the Conciliation Commission so far. The text lent itself, at least, to a very negative interpretation. On the other hand, we observed that,obviously, the President had very much in mind the particular situation which had been created by the most unfortunate, most regrettable, and in fact, in some respects, shocking incidents of last night and this morning. Very soon after the end of the meeting of the Conciliation Commission I received an oral message from President Kasavubu. This message was to be interpreted as a comment on his letter, and I think I can sum up authoritatively his views as follows: Firstly, he wanted to make it perfectly clear tha^ the letter should not be read as a refusal to co-operate with the Conciliation Commission. Secondly, what was said about the responsibilities and possible serious consequences referred only to the particular situation which had temporarily arisen because of the recent incidents; that is to say, he vented to bring home to the Conciliation Commission and to myself the fact that in the wake of the recent events he was deeply worried about the reception and the possible experiences of the Conciliation Commission if it went out without any preparation* Thirdly, he felt that the situation being what it was, he would like to find an opportunity, together with the Advisory Committee, myself and the Conciliation Commission, to prepare the ground for a good reception and, I take it, for a useful visit of the Conciliation Commission in Leopoldville.

You will observe that this interpretation, soothing and encouragin0 as it is, is perhaps not exactly in correspondence with what an uninformed reader would find in the text of the first letter. However, that is the message I got and, as a matter of course, I had to take it for what it was, an authoritative interpretation of the intentions of the first letter. HR/aJ . 7-10 (The Secretary•General)

Later — in fact, a few hours later, at the end of the debate in the General Assembly — I got the second letter /which, as you will see, partly reflects the ideas transmitted to:me by oral message, and stresses specifically the wish for consultations with the Advisory Committee in order to facilitate the task of the Conciliation Commission and prepare the ground for useful work in Leopoldville. I take it from this letter, also, when reference is made to "serious consequences", that should not be understood in any sense as a threat, but as an indication of a sense of concern of the President. . Of course, these three communications,, the two letters and the in-between oral message, should be seen against the background of events of which you have, I think, a full and certainly an objective and detatched picture in the report in the General Assembly document. In concluding, I would like to say that, as I understand the stand of the Conciliation Commission which is here represented by its Chairman who, of course, will speak for the Commission — and I would stand corrected if I have incorrectly interpreted its intentions — the view, of the Conciliation Commission was that there was no change in the general mandate given the Conciliation Commission. AP/hh 11 (The Secretary-General)

There was, however, a situation which made it reasonable to think again concerning its time-table, especially as the time-table for departures need not influence the time-table for work in Leopoldyille.. That being the case, the Conciliation Commission considered, as I said before, that it was natural

•that the whole situation, as it is now;facing us, was referred to the Advisory Committee for such decisions as the Committee would find appropriate.

I would like -to add., on my own,( one point. On an earlier occasion I pointed out that as regards the conciliation operation, the Advisory Conmittee acts under a mandate of the.General Assembly. I further mentioned that this being the case it reamed appropriate, indeed necessary, that at the right stage the Advisory Conmittee present a brief report to the General Assembly saying what were and what are its decisions. In view of the initiative of the representative of Guinea in the General Assembly this afternoon, when there was a request for information of the General Assembly concerning the next but last case of the exchange of letters with President Kasavubu, I feel that it has become imperative to inform the General Assembly• I would, for my part, feel that that can be done very simply by, let us say, a one-page report, setting out what is the decision: that the Conciliation Commission should go; that such and such a mandate has been given to the Conciliation Commission; and that the intended time-table is such and such* Then, I would say, on that occasion, that I feel that now five letters of correspondence between the Advisory Committee and President Kasavubu rightly should be annexed for the information of the General Assembly. It seems to me to be good order, good procedure, and a reasonable way of keeping the General Assembly in the picture. However, we may consider this last procedural point at a later stage as obviously this report to the General Assembly, however brief, should reflect what may be the outcome of your consideration of the present situation at this meeting. I apologize for having talked at some length, but I felt that I had to give you an oral report which made it easier for you to see these various documents in their proper interrelationship and perspective. AP/hh 12-15

(The Secretary-General)

I would invite you to express your views on the situation as it is facing us for such decisions as you may wish to take for the guidance of the Conciliation Commission. However, as I have ventured to assume the responsibility to report on the stand of the Conciliation Commission, you may find it correct and appropriate if first of all, I call on the Chairman of the Conciliation Commission for such comments as regards the development in the Commission as he might wish to make. So with your permission, Gentlemen, and with your permission Mr. Minister, if I may ask you for your observations on the Conciliation Commission situation. Therefore, I call on the representative of Nigeria. RSH/bg 16

Mr. Jaja WACHUKU (Nigeria); .Thank, you, .Mr. Secretary-General.. The position in which the Conciliation Commission now finds itself is that, owing to the contents of the first letter, particularly of the last two paragraphs, and realizing that the Commission itself was appointed by the Advisory Committee, which, in turn, was set up by the General Assembly, we felt that we could not proceed with our normal programme without bringing this letter to your notice.- In the first place, the members of my Commission definitely resented the suggestion contained in the last but one paragraph of that letter, suggesting that in effect the Commission was going on the sole authority of the Secretary- General and that it had no authority derived from the General Assembly or from the Charter of the United Nations. As you all know, this is not so. It is this body that appointed the ' Conciliation Commission, and the Advisory Committee was set up because of a resolution which was adopted by the General Assembly. We felt it would be necessary to make the President of the Republic of the Congo understand this and that there is nothing at all in the Commission's work which we would consider as a personal matter or as a personal business of the Secretary-General. If you look at the last three lines of the last paragraph, you will see that it places any responsibility for anything that might happen on the shoulders of the Secretary-General personally. We did not think that this was the best way of setting about the reconciliation of people who are in difficulty, and so we felt that we should discuss this letter. Again, a decision was arrived at during the last meeting of the Advisory Committee that the Conciliation Commission should leave early this week, and the Advisory Committee tentatively suggested Tuesday, but definitely said it should be early in the week. Following that decision, the Commission met and confirmed the date. A final decision was arrived at with regard to the date when the Commission would assemble in Leopoldville. That date was Saturday, but it was left open for members to leave between Tuesday and any other day. The most important point was that all must assemble by 10 o'clock in Leopoldville, because there are some members who are not here in New York and who will be going direct. RSH/bg 17-20 (Mr» Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

That was the basis on which we arrived at our decision that we should assemble in Leopoldville on Saturday. This letter came at a time when the members of the Commission who were to leave tonight were getting ready to go. Under the circumstances, we had no alternative but to cancel the departure today. The second group was to leave on Thursday, and I was to leave with that group. Now a new situation has arisen, so we felt that this matter should come before you for a decision. So far as we are concerned, we have been given orders to go, and we cannot retreat unless you, who asked us to go, say we should wait. We fixed the date of Saturday to meet in Leopoldville, and unless there is a change in your decision that we should go and we should postpone anything, our view is that, as we have cancelled the Tuesday departure, thsn the next day to leave will be Thursday, in order to enable us to get to Leopoldville by Saturday morning. BC/rh 21

(Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Niger!a)

Hence, in view of what the Secretary-General has said and because it appears that a report will have to be made to the General Assembly, it will be necessary for the Advisory Committee to consider whether the report could be submitted to the Assembly and examined by it soon enough for the Conciliation Commission to leave on Thursday and be in Leopoldville on Saturday, or whether the Advisory Committee should rescind the decision which it took that the Commission should leave early this week. If the Committee did rescind that previous decision, it would have to decide when, in the light of the present developmenta, the Conciliation Commission should leave, I would now like to make some comments on the second letter which we have before us from Mr. Kasavubu; we had not seen it before. We had an oral report from the Secretary-General which contained part of what we find in this letter. Howevert there were other things in thd oral report which we should prefer to see in writing. Now that the General Assembly has decided to seat the President of the Republic of the Congo, there is no longer any excuse for him not to tell us definitely whether or not he is prepared to accept the Conciliation Commission. It is no good leaving any doubt on that point. President Kasavubu has said, "If we are seated, there will be no objection to the Conciliation Commission"; we have had such a statement from him orally* Now the General Assembly, as I have said, has voted to seat Mr. Kasavubu. I think that it would be only fair to this Advisory Committee for Mr. Kasavubu to say definitely and categorically whether or not he is now prepared to accept the Conciliation Commission. We must know that; no doubts must be left on that point. If Mr. Kasavubu does not give us such a categorical statement as to whether or not he is prepared to accept the Conciliation Commission, I do not see how the third paragraph of his second letter can even be considered by this Committee. Personally, I shall come out openly against any suggestion of a discussion with him unless he tells us definitely whether or not he is prepared to accept the Conciliation Commission. It lo no use giving him an opportunity to have a discussion with the Advisory Committee if we do not know whether or not he in fact wants the Conciliation Commission. BC/rh 22-25

(Mr* Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

Hence, I personally feel that Mr. Kasavubu should now clarify that point. If a report is to "be made to the General Assembly, the Advisory Committee should be able to tell the Assembly that the President of the Republic of the Congo has expressed his willingness to receive the Conciliation Commission as the Head of State. Once he has said that he is willing to do so, details can be discussed; we could, for instance, discuss whether, in the light of new developments, certain changes in the arrangements should be made to allow Mr. Kasavubu time enough to return home and make the necessary preparations; after all, tempers have flared there and some further preparations may be necessary now. GSC/cw 26 •'- ...... (Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

But without knowing that particular point, I personally cannot feel disposed to treat with him now, at this point, "because I think the General Assembly and the members of the'Advisory Committee have conceded as much as we can concede with a certain respect still left, and to go beyond "that, I think that would be going to far. The United Nations is doing its best to help, I do not think, in the light of what has happened now, that we should go from a point where it <$fould be suggested that the United Nation has become eo emasculated that it has lost all the teeth that it has. It should at least be able to open it mouth and show .that thera are teeth present, even if it. does not bito. That is. what I would like to suggest Mr. Secretary-General.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I should like to make twp short observations before I give the floor to other members of the Committee. The first one is that when I referred to a report to the General Assembly, it was not my intention to indicate that I considered it necessary to have any' kind of«decision or clerification from the General Assembly In order to proceed as this Committee saw fit, because the Committee is acting on the resolution of 21 September, and it has to interpret it to the best of its understanding. It is reasonable that the General Assembly, especially after having expressed an interest, is informed, but. I do not feel that there is any need for any kind of demand for a decision. In fact, if I may add a personal observation, I would be rather against it, because I fail to see how such a decision could be taken without drifting again, into the dangerous area of whether or not we discuss the situation in the Congo.

Mr, Jaja WACHUKU (Nigeria): I meant the decision by this Committee.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; That is right. I thought there might be a misunderstanding. I Just wanted to clear it up. I felt that a report was in order, but it was not a report on which we should request either a1 debate or a decision. GSC/cw 27-30 (The Secretary-General)

The other point to which I would like to draw your attention ifl the one Just raised by the Minister of Nigeria, and that is, that I think that in the course of the evening we should also take a stand on whether or not, and if so, along which, lines a reply should be sent to the two letters, to President Kasavubu* I want to point out that now, when Ambassador Dayal has left, I am acting as your agent, so I would write to President Kasavubu only after consultation with you and in the spirit indicated by this Committee,

Mr, GEBRS-EGZY (Ethiopia): It saems to me that the General Assembly has already taken a decision, and that decision is half implemented. It is unfortunate that, in the vay of its full implementation, certain difficulties were put before it. That is very unfortunate, because it will make the work more difficult. But however unfortunate — and from our point of view it was a completely unrealistic approach that was arrived at in the General Assembly — I think it would be still sadder not to attempt to solve the. problem, as I have been saying for a long timo, the substance of the problem. Although it may be too fresh today, right here, to arrive at some sort of understanding, I would feel that the work would have to go on. TL/cn -: 31 (Mr* Qebre-Egzy, Ethiopia)

Ihere should be no pretense: no matter vhat the vote in the General Assembly, the situation remains all the same; the vote did not solve the problem, and I do not think it will solve it. v Therefore, if we have at heart the solution of the problem in the Congo, the solution, no doubt, lies in conciliation or reconciliation, whatever the name that may be given to it. So what I would say is that since a decision was arrived at by the Assembly -- a decision,which my delegation has tried to avoid — since-that decision'was arrived at late this afternoon, perhaps the best thing to do would be to think over-what has-happened and tomorrow, in the afternoon, to come together for-a short meeting to examine t^jte situation in the light of whatever may transpire. Maybe.I an too'slow^going in such matters, but I do not believe in taking hasty decisions in.the heat.of fresh feelings c.nd emotions. If the delegations do not-feel very, strongly, I-think we have to be realistic and come In tomorrow, v and pursue this .policy of bringing'about a peace in the Congo. I do not believe '-'•• that,one group> or one leader or another, should be considered so dee?'-:Vv?ly, because today it is one leader-and tomorrow it is another, and that could be a never*-ending proceos. I am told there are many of them. If ve go on like that, I do not know what the end ia finally going to be«

Mr. BOUCETTA (Morocco) (interpretation from French): Mr» Secretary- General, I just wanted to say, as you have pointed out, that the Advisory Committee has received instructions from the General Assembly which will enable you, through the conversations and discussions which we are having with you, to take certain decisions. One such decision which has been taken was the decision to send a Conciliation Conmission to the Congo, Today there arises a question which you have been good enough to explain to us: we have to inform the General Assembly and submit a report to it. I shall not go over the recent past and the decision this afternoon, upon which I have already spoken. I should only complicate the situation if I were to repeat that. But I wonder, since the mandate given to the Advisory Committee has not been withdrawn, what report we are going to submit to the General Assembly. Of what are we going to inform the General Assembly? How are we going to submit a report, and on exactly what subject? What have we done? TL/cn 52-55 (Mr. Boucetta, Morocco)

We have BO far taken one decision only, a decision to send a Conciliation Commission to the Congo. To describe the situation in the Congo to the General Assembly is unnecessary, for we have discussed that at great length and in depth over the last few days. Have we done anything to improve the situation in the Congo, I wonder? I am afraid the situation has only got worse. As concerns the Conciliation Commission itself, it is regrettable that it has already been deprived of the help of two delegations, as we know from the debates that have taken place. They have announced publicly— and we can only regret this — that they will not participate. I think that if our work continues to log as at present, ve may be deprived of the help of others, which would be equally regrettable. I think that since the decision has been teken, the Conciliation Commission should be sent. I for my part GDI convinced that it will have much to do in Leopoldville and that it will enable those of us who have not lived through the situation, through its report, to see exactly what the situation is. I era not speaking of anyone — Mr. Kasavubu or anyone else; but it is necessary that the General Assembly be informed in rather more precise and concrete terms. Consequently, I would ask you — summing up what I am saying --to implement the decision that has been taken and to stick to the decision already taken as to the timing of the visit; otherwise all our decisions will be without sense or value and no one will pay any attention to them. DR/gp -36-

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think I can clarify the situation. The decision of the Conciliation Commission this afternoon did not change the time for the meeting in Leopoldville. Under such circumstances, the general decision stands and it stands also as regards the timing, if I understand the stand of the Conciliation Commission correctly. The Conciliation Commission did not ask for a revision of the recommendations and instructions £iven to it. When I talked about a report, it was a purely formal one because obviously there cannot be any report on substance. That report would cover the decision as it stands and as it, as I guess it will, continues to stand. It will cover the composition, the terms of reference and t'.lso it will cover this, after all, net insignificant point of the exchanges between the Committee and President Kasavubu. That would be the whole. It is a purely formal act, it is an act of courtesy and also, of course, an act of good order, that is to say, there is nothing remarkable in it at all. If the Committee feels that there is anything to be added to it in substance, of course that is up to the Committee. For rr?y part, when I raised the question of a report, lc was only in the purely formal sense and very much under the impression of the fact that two delegations, Guinea and Mali, expressed a direct interest in the debate this afternoon in having further information on the activities.

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): There is no doubt that there is a necessity at this time to apprise the General Assembly of what we intend to do. Therefore, a report is quite in order. When you, Mr. Secretary-General, say that it is a formal report, I suppose you do not mean that the General Assembly is going to be reconvened to discuss the report and that your report will be sent to Member States of the General Assembly as a matter of courtesy. I agree with the representative of Nigeria that a new situation, a new complex has been thrown on the whole matter in view of the seating of the delegation from the Congo. If I remember correctly, when the Advisory Committee was formed, the Secretary-General addressed a letter to the Central Government asking it to nominate someone to represent the Congo on the Advisory Committee. In view of the fact that there is now a delegation in the United Nations, it is impossible for the Advisory Committee to ignore that fact, which means that DR/gp 27-lfO

(Mr. Quaison-Sackey, Ghana) paragraph 3 of the new letter, the letter dated 22 November, in vhich Mr. Kasavubu states that he ho£e$ that his delegation might discuss: , "with the Advisory Committee measures which might facilitate progress towards conciliation between the various tendencies which have arisen ,in the Congo" might be useful, in which case the only action which can be taken in this matter is to invite a representative to attend the Advisory Committee's meeting in order for him to be informed of all the' decisions which we have taken here .-- again as a matter of courtesy. I say as a matter of courtesy because one of our decisions is that no personality should have the veto, as it were, to mark any action which you might take. Secondly, it would be difficult for us if we are going to act as a Conciliation Commission to have any person or any group acting as an arbiter of elegance. GRR/mw (Mr. Quaieon-Sackey, Ghana)

Therefore, my delegation's view is that it is very vital for the'Advisory Committee to have a meeting with a member of the Congolese delegation in attendance, and soon after that meeting we should go ahead and implement the decisions we have already taken. . . ;

The SECRETARY-GEF53AL; I Would like to mention the following as a: clarification of the situation. Of course, as the representative of Ghana has pointed out, the delegation has now been seated "by the General Assembly.' The man who heads that very delegation has, in his second letter of today, directly declared himself interested in some kind of consultations with the Advisory Committee* That, of course, makes the background clear. However, the representative of Ghana referred to an earlier approach by us to the Central Government. That approach was by a letter from me, under a mandate from this Committee, addressed to Mr. Boaiboko Who was then Foreign Minister, and the reply, which by the way appointed Mr. Kanza, was signed by Mr. Bomboko. Now, Mr, Bomboko, according to the list of names to be found in the credentials' approved by the General Assembly, figures in that list, and I think that even without formalities, as men of common sense we should have to conclude that the " identity of 'nanes,' Bomboko-Bomboko, means that the later list overrides the first letter, also as regards this Committee. I mention this really for the record, because I think it is a point which should be clear as otherwise we would' have the somewhat extraordinary situation of competing credentials even here, although" sent by the same man. I think the common sense solution is the one I indicated and in such circumstances the previous correspondence would not stand in the way of arrangements in accordance with the suggestion of the representative of Ghana. GRR/mw

Mr. CISSB (Senegal) (interpretation from French): I am entirely in agreement with the Chairman of the Conciliation Commission, the representative of Nigeria. However, I personally think that ve should not repeat in this Advisory Committee the debate which has already taken place in the General Assembly, nor should we speak about the vote taken this afternoon. The representative of Ethiopia spoke of a regrettable attitude on the part of the General Assembly. I believe that each country represented in the General Assembly has an entire right to vote according to its convictions and we should not come here and speak about regrets. For us, there are no regrets. We have acted according to our conscience and according to the viewpoint which we consider equitable and in keeping with the interests of the African peoples, especially the Congolese people. Turning now to the questions which have been put, I do not think that it would be a retreat by this Advisory Committee if we were to re-examine the question in the light of the vote taken and, particularly, in the light of the second letter addressed to us by President Kasavubu. Of cov.rse, parag..\~ph 5 of that letter opens up a certain dialogue with the Advisory Committee. I think that that would be likely to create the best conditions for the good conduct and a successful outcome of the work of our Committee in accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly, particularly paragraph 3 of that resolution. I think that we shall leave for the Congo with a firm will to achieve our task of arriving at the unity and integrity of the Territory. In conclusion, I agree that the document received should be the subject of a report, for information purposes, to all the Members of the United Nations.

Mr. AIKBN (Ireland): I think it is rather beside the point to discuss whether we regret or welcome the decision taken by the General Assembly today. We are faced by a situation. The General Assembly has accepted President Kasavubu and his nominees as Members of this Organization, and President Kasavubu has asked the Advisory Committee to meet him to discuss how progress could be made towards a solution. MW/aJ 1^6-50 (Mr. Aiken, Ireland)

I do not think that invitation can be rejected. Might I suggest that it might shorten the work if you yourself, Mr. Secretary-General, met. with. President Kasavubu and gave him the information officially regarding our • work to date in this Advisory Committee, and discussed with him certain : ' possibilities-as to the future work of the Conciliation Commission* Then I think that it would be. appropriate for the Advisory Committee or the Conciliation Commission to meet with President Kas&vubu ar.d discuss with, him' dates, concerning the visit to the Congo. There is no doubt that it would be wise for the Conciliation Commission to start for the Congo after the ground has been prepared for an appropriately welcoming reception. Leopoldville is in a state of chaos at this moment, from what we hear, ard I think it is wise to have:the ground prepared so that when the Chairman of the Conciliation Commission and the members of the Commission go to Leopoldville they;will be receive^, in the proper manner* ,, - . , I think if you your.self, Mr. Secretary ^-General, met President Kasavubu or his representatives tomorrow.morning, had a talk with them about rlv.t > has been done and, what the Conciliation ,£ommiss.ion hopes to do to get to , - - Leopoldville by Saturday morning.,, that it would .save time and make more . fruitful the discussions when, the Coneilia,tion Commission meets President Kasavubu.: or his representatives. . ... , . .f ......

;Mr. GflBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): , .In my ea.li.er. statement I said .that we regretted the decision of the Genera}. Assembly. In so saying, I did not pass' • .-... judgement on the vote of any member delegation. From our point of view, however, it remains that the decision was regrettable because it is our opinion that . it creates certain difficulties. _.;.-.,• : •-:

Mr. JHA (India): , I think that there are two points which ve have to bear in mind. The first -- and,. I think,- the foremost one -- is the collective thinking of,the Advisory Committee in, the context of the two. letters that are before us;and which, of course, again have to be-.-examined in the context of what has been happening in Leopoldville. The.second point is what s.or,t of report we should make to the General Assembly in response to the request,of the delegation of Guinea to you -- what sort of report you should make really. HR/hh 51 (Mr. Jha, India)

I think, for the time being9 we might concentrate on the first aspect, which seems to me far more important, and the first letter of President Kasavubu -- actually I am not so surprised to see that the misapprehension persists -<- states: "I was surprised to learn that without any formal decision "by the United Nations General Assembly or the Security Council, upon the initiative simply of an Advisory Committee consisting of eighteen nembers and responsible primarily for providing information to the Secretary-General, the Conciliation Commission, on whose terms of reference and composition I have still not been consulted, would be coming this week to Leopoldville." He seems to think there is no authority from tho General Assembly, Actually, the Conciliation Commission is fully covered by the authority of the General Assembly, What the order of the General Assembly did in paragraph 5 was to delegate the right of nominating representatives to this Advisory Committee, and that delegation was not subject to any conditions. It was not subject to the condition that it would have to be reported back and ratified by the General Assembly, and I am sure that there is some misapprehension in the minds of President Kasavubu and his advisors, which this Committee, through you — and here I agree entirely with the representative of Ireland -- that the first thing is that after we have discussed this matter here, you should, get in touch with President Kasavubu as soon as possible. In the third paragraph of his first letter he raises another point: "it seems to me inopportune and dangerous to convene a Conciliation Commission at Leopoldville at the present time." This is certainly something which we ourselves have to judge in the light of the latest information that we have and I would not object to this point, although I do not agree with the previous point; I would not endorse that, but this part is something which we have to consider. That is to say, considering the circumstances there, whether it is dangerous for the Commission to go there and, certainly, speaking for my delegation, I would not like our representative there to be molested or beaten up, or something like that. That is something which we cannot countenance and should certainly avoid. HR/hh 52-55 (Mr, Jha, India) i In the third paragraph of the first letter -- the third and fourth paragraphs have to be read together -- there is an inference from his misunderstanding that if this Commission goes, it can only go under the authority of the Secretary- General. Therefore/ in paragraph k, if something happens it is the poor Secretary-General on whom the 'responsibility falls. i think both are based on misapprehensions. The key sentence in the first letter, in my opinion -- and that is what is really of great concern — is that he formally notifies the Secretary-General that the Republic of the Congo cannot give its agreement to an initiative of which it disapproves. That is really the most serious sentence in the first letter and we have to detemine cur attitude in consequence of that in relation to other circumstances mentioned there and the facts known to us. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned your conversation with him, end I i.ras very glad to hear that because that seems to indicate a great deal of real thinking and, if I must say so, real thinking along the right lines and in the right carters. But the' second letter does not go as 'far as his oral communicat.ion to you. I have been trying to understand this second letter and exactly what lies behind it. He says, in the first paragraph: "I have had the honour to notify you of ny concern regarding the very serious consequences which the despatch of a Conciliation Commission to Leopoldvilie might have in the present circumstances." But he does not reiterate 'the notice that this Commission is persona non grata, which was the first sentence of paragraph $• He mentions the- concern which was stated in 'the second sentence there and also in a preceding paragraph. Then, when he said, "I1 am surprised to learn that, without any prior consultation with the authorities of the Republic of the Congo, the Advisory Committee contemplates sending to Leopbldville this week a Conciliation Commission of whose nembership I am unaware."' ' This' is -again based' on the misunderstanding that the Conciliation Coiimission was to be appointed after prior consultation with the authorities of the Republic of-the Congo.; There is no such condition attached to the appointment of a Commissiori'by'tfie Advisory Committee in paragraph 5 of the resolution. AP/bg 56 (Mr* Jha, India)

This again seems to be some kind of misunderstanding. Actually, it could not be prior consultation with all the parties, for then ve would never reach agreement on who should be on the Commission. This point was made clear by me and by my Minister who sat here a couple of weeks ago; that is to say, that this was a matter to be judged by the Advisory Committee itself and it was not subject to any veto or any agreement of any person or any authority. The third paragraph says that he hopes that an opportunity will be given to the Congolese delegation to discuss either with you or with the Advisory Committee This is an admirable paragraph. I have no objection to that. And if I may say so, again I agree with the Foreign Minister of Ireland that we should welcome this. But if this is read with the first two paragraphs, I have the impression that what he wants to discuss is this whole question of composition and other related matters. If that is so, then I do not like it so much. And I think that the crux of the question is, as was stated by the Minister of Nigeria, that we must find out from him whether he agrees to this Commission's going. If he does that, then, of course, other things can be discussed. But if he does not agree, then the third paragraph of the second letter does not take us very far because it is not possible, eepecially after the Advisory Committee has taken a decision, for the Congolese delegation to come here and to discuss its composition or its terms of reference. These are matters, so far as the Advisory Committee is concerned, which do not call for any change. We consider that the terms of reference are excellent. Although the composition of the Commission is a bit too large, it is the best that we could devise in the circumstances. Therefore, Mr* Secretary-General, it seems to me that the first thing is that you should have a talk with President Kasavubu and try to remove his misunderstandings, explain the fact that this was a complete delegation to the Advisory Committee in whom the General Assembly had complete confidence, because they did not think fit to attach any conditions there, and this is as much a body of the United Nations as if it were itself appointed by the General Assembly, There is no condition of ratification of the composition in the terms of reference by the General Assembly. Of course, President Kasavubu should be given, official! as I believe he has been given, the names of the members of the Commission as well as the terms of reference. AP/bg 57-60

(Mr. Jhaf India)

The other point that was raised by our colleague from Ghana that was also important, I think simultaneously a standing invitation should be extended to the Congolese delegation; this might be mentioned to the President or you might write to him. The Advisory Committee would welcome at all its future meetings thaj a representative of the Congolese delegation — a member of the Congolese delegation — could sit here and he would be entitled to participate in our discussions, to advise us and to exchange views. This is a difficult situation in which we have been placed, but I feel that the second letter is hopeful. And what is even more hopeful is the talk that you are going to have with the President. It is only after that that we can have a further consideration of this matter in the Advisory Committee, and subsequent to that, a report can be made to the General Assembly. I might indicate the approach of my delegation, if it comes out that President Kasavubu still insists on the penultimate sentence of his first letter, that an entirely new situation will have been created, and I certainly vill not be able to answer the question as to what we should do. I will have to refer to my Government and it will be for them to decide what attitude to take. That is really the most serious thing in both these letters and we must know where we stand with regard to that. RH/rh 61

Mr. Mongi SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I wanted to take txp the question of the Conciliation Commission. I think that between the first letter and the second there has been a change of attitude with regard to the action of the Conciliation Commission and its departure. With regard to the last paragraph, in which President Kasavubu says that he cannot agree to an initiative of which he disapproves, that does not seem to'be a formal opposition but a failure to consent, a failure to agree, and that is not quite the same thing as a flat opposition. In reading the second letter, one finds a greater precision. According to the third paragraph of the second letter, the same expression is not used. Reference is made to a previous conservation which may facilitate progress towards conciliation. In other words, the door begins to open a little more, although I note that the door is not frankly wide open. I agree with the representative of Nigeria that it would be a very good thing for us to have a clear expression of the position of President Kasavubu, and an explanation from him that he does not oppose the conciliation action decided upon by the Advisory Committee under the mandate given to it by the' General As-sembly. • I have said that President Kasavubu1s understanding of this conciliation action, that it was not under a 0«n«ral Assembly mandate, is quite erroneous* It is clear, under paragraph 3 of the General Assembly resolution, that there is such a mandate. Furthermore, when we decided, in implementation of paragraph 3 — which left us free to decide or not to decide whether the situation was appropriate — upon this Conciliation Commission, the mandate of the Commission was given after that decision, a mandate by the General Assembly. Twenty-four hours afterwards, at the opening of the discussion of the general situation in the Congo, on the announcement in the General Assembly that the Advisory Committee had decided upon conciliation action in implementation of the General Assembly resolution, the General Assembly adjourned. In other words, it tacitly approved the decision taken by the Advisory Committee to send the Conciliation Commission, and the principle of conciliation was approved. Therefore, I think that from that point of view President Kasavubu did not have a sufficiently clear idea of the mission and of its value. , I think that although there may be certain motives connected with security at the present time RH/rh 62-65 (Mr. Slidj, Tunifllfl) in Leopoldville which may to some extend lead the Advisory Cbmmittee to reflect further upon this subject, upon the methods and means of carrying out this mission, I think It is very desirable that you, Mr. Secretary-General, should get in touch with President Kasavubu, if possible by a note or memorandum, in which it would be desirable to have the following points emphasized, after having clarified the situation regarding this Conciliation Commission, BC/cw 66 (Mr, Slim, Tunisia)

First, the Advisory Committee, while not considering that the latest letter from Mr* Kasavubu expresses formal agreement; does not regard the letter as a statement of opposition to the Conciliation Commission* We should like to have clear confirmation of this. Secondly, the Advisory Committee maintains the principle of sending the Conciliation Commission. In the light of present information it sees no reason to change its position on that score. Thirdly, the Conciliation Commission should not begin its work here. It was decided that the Commission should work in Leopoldville and should begin its work there. Fourthly, the Conciliation Commission remains the master of its means of action and its method of approaching the problem of conciliation. Of course, if it deems it desirable to do so, it can accept suggestions made to it by high Congolese personalities on the manner of its work, but it is for the Commission, and the Commission alone, to take account or not to take account of any particular suggestion. It is the Commission, and the Commission alone, which is responsible for the work of conciliation. Since the Commission has to discuss measures which may facilitate progress towards conciliation, it cannot start its work here. In Leopoldville it can hear whatever suggestions the President, the Head of the Government or any other political personality there may wish to make, but it will be for the Commission to decide, which suggestions to take into account and which suggestions to disregard. Fifthly, if we receive a precise reply regarding the definite acceptance of the Conciliation Commission, contacts may be made to work out the practical arrangements — the CommissionTs reception, and so forth. These arrangements may be made, either officially or unofficially, by members of the Commission or through the Secretary-General or the Advisory Committee* We should keep this distinction in mind: The Advisory Committee is one thing and the Conciliation Commission is another thing. For my part, I warmly approve of the suggestion made by the representative of Ghana and supported by the representative of India that we should inform the Congolese delegation that the Advisory Committee is prepared to receive a representative of that delegation. But we must make it clear that we are speaking of the Advisory I BC/cw 67-70 (Mr. Slim, Tunisia)

Committee. • The Conciliation Commission is another thing; it is a different organ, although some of. its members may also be members of the Advisory Committee* I would now sum up. If there are to be contacts for the purpose of facilitating progress towards conciliation, these contacts may "be made here'" •' -' through the Advisory Committee, but all work in connexion with conciliation proper must be done in Leopoldville •' • ..-•..;. I shall not det-J. with any of the other problems arising from the discussions of yesterday-and today or the deliberations that maybe going on in Leopoldville relating-to security and the possible action of the Conciliation Commission. ..,.•_ ^ . ! • ..••'.: \. GSC/cn 71

Mr, EL ZAYAT (United Arab Republic): Mr. Secretary-General, I had one point, which was raised already by Ambassador Slim, so I leave it. But another point is, seeing that the verbal conversations are as important as written letters, I wonder if I can bring to the notice of this Committee that when we met President Kasavubu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr, Bomboko, said — and I think this is an actual quotation: "The night ve are seated in the General Assembly, I au going to take a plane, with President Kasavubu, and go to Leopoldville, and there to prepare the ground and tell the public, including the military, that this Commission is coming without any intention to impose anything on the Congolese." He thought that he could not, from New York, permit or allow, or give or accept the Conciliation Commission, because, I was given to understand, he has to convince other people in Leopoldville that this Commission is going not to impose the will of any Member State or of any certain States, or any preconceived ideas it may have, but to see the situation and try to see what is best for the Congo- If this is still the stand of President Kasavubu, perhaps the suggestion made, -Uiat you, sir, see him tomorrow, can bring this about, that he also leaves for the Congo and makes whatever preparations he thinks advisable, and that the Conciliation Commission goes ahead, anyhow, and meets in the Congo on Saturday, as has been decided. We hope that before that, he will have been in the Congo and prepared the groundwork, as he promised^ Seeing, of course, that this was said verbally and that the written notes do not exactly accord with this declaration, It would be left, then, to the wisdom of the Secretary-General to see if he can write a third letter in this meaning, which would still be a step forward from the first to the second, and we may still have another one from the second to the third. But I thougjat it would be advisable to bring to your attention the verbal declarations which I heard, with our friends here, and which I stand corrected on if I have misquoted them* GSC/cn 72-75

Mr* HASAN (Pakistan): We have two letters here from the President of the Congo, and apparently they are not in accord with each other. By normal usage, a subsequent statement or letter rescinds the earlier one. That is probably also the general law, , In the second letter, President Kasavubu has asked for an opportunity to discuss with you or to discucs with the Advisory Consulttee u&.c .measures which might facilitate progress towards reconciliation». I for on& cannot read into this, letter any dispute about the composition of the Reconciliation Commission or its terms of reference. In fact, there is nothing to that effect at all in this . letter. ..,. . I sm sorry I missed a part of today1s discussion. I do not know if any. of our colleagues here have recalled that, s.t one of our earlier mettings,-we decided to have a representative of the Congo present at this Advisory Committee. We '•-. .1. ,-•'••'••'•' •• ; could, perhaps, now invite such a representative to be present, or, alternatively, you yourself could discuss the matter with the President of.the Congo, Mr* Secretary-General, ,_. - One may win all the arguments and yet lose the purpose. Let us hope that that does not happen to us; and let us not start ,w4.th the vi 11 and-the determination to disagree with President Kasavubu. We have, appointed a Reconciliation Commission, but we have not appointed an arbitrfu tribunal. There is a difference between these two, and therefore, a difference in -the spirit and the attitude, with which we have to approach the whole task, . - . . TL/gp -76- (Mr. Hasan, Pakistan)

So far as Pakistan is concerned, Mr* Secretary-General, so far as we are concerned, no personage involved in the conflict in that country means anything but a name to us. The only thing that means anything to us is the people of the Congo, The representative of the United Arab Republic has referred to certain remarks of the Foreign Minister of the Congo* I was, as ycv. might recall, present at that meeting myself$ and so far as I can recollect of what the Foreign Minister said, his remarks were almost exactly as the representative of the United Arab Republic has quoted them, I believe the purpose then was for him to emphasize the fact that he could not go back to the Congo without his delegation having b^en seated, and thus face his people and persuade them to accept the Conciliation Commission, He thought that if the delegation was seated it would facilitate the task for him of persuadJng his own people to accept this Commission He did say that he would leave the same night or the same morning, I do not know if he meant it quite literally, but he certainly did say that and I for one will confirm that he said that,

Mr, WTRJOPRMOTO (Indonesia): Thank you, Mr. Secretary-General, for the opportunity to make some observations. Frankly speaking, when our delegation this afternoon received the first letter of Mr. Kasavubu, we were upset. We are disappointed, and we have discussed the matter among the members of our delegation, and the conclusion was that at this meeting the Indonesian delegation should strongly insist on letting the Conciliation Commission go to Leopoldville as soon as possible, because of the first letter; and the reasoning was that we consider the Conciliation Commission as a kind of holy mission -- not because it is for the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly, in the first place, but rather because we are convinced that the Conciliation Commission has a holy mission. Because of this, we know beforehand that there will be many difficulties, but we are not afraid of the difficulties, even if we have to take some risks, because the situation in Leopoldville has now deteriorated; nobody is safe except the Belgians, So maybe the Conciliation Commission will take some risks. But even in tjtiat case, we would insist on letting the Commission go to Leopoldville as soon as possible. TL/gp 77-80 (Mr, Wirjopranoto, Indonesia)

This, frankly speaking, is what we have discussed in our delegation. But now when we come here, you give us the second letter, you make statements about the conversation, and again frankly speaking, our delegation would like to-congratulate Mr, Kasavubu. 81-85 (Mr» Wirjopranoto, Indonesia)

We have the conviction that by and by and step by step common sense will prevail, and it is a good sign* We are glad that there is no change, as I understand it/ in the time schedule; I mean ve have .decided that the first meeting of the Conciliation Commission will take place next Saturday.in Leopoldville; there is no change in that* There is another matter I should like to take up and that is if you, Mr. Secretary-General, have a meeting with Mr* Kasavubu, as he has requested -- and I agree that you should have a meeting with him --we expect to go further in this line> I mean in the line of persuasion with Mr. Kasavubu, to get rid of the confusion in his mind because ve understand that in the last few months there was some confusion in the mind of Mr. Knsavubu. He has lost, maybe not 100 per cent but a good part, in the activities and the good intentions of the United Nations. There is some indication that after this long debate in the General Assembly, I think that Mr. Kasavubu has had enough time to reconsider this. What I should like to stress is that I think that it is useful to remind Mr* Kasavubu about the situation, when he wrote his first letter to the United nations or to the Security Council in the beginning of July, when he asked for the assistance of the Security Council because the situation at that time — the situation that is still valid today -- was that there was Belgian aggression. Mr* Kasavubu asked for assistance in having the Belgian troops withdrawn from the Congo and, as everybody now knows, that is not yet completed. What I have in mind is that Mr* Kasavubu should give 100 per cent co-operation to all the efforts to get the Belgian troops withdrawn from the Congo as soon as possible* I mention this in my statement now because I stressed at the last meeting and in previous meetings that as long as Belgian intrigues still exist in the Congo there will always be disunity and our aim is to have national unity in the Congo* In order to achieve success for the Conciliation Commission it is essential that Mr. Kasavubu should give his assistance and co-operation toward the withdrawal of the Belgian troops. GRR/aJ 86 (Mr. Wirjopranoto, Indonesia)

The last point I would like to make concerns the arrival of our Conciliation Commission in Leopoldvillej if I may be allowed to make some suggestions. It would be better for the Conciliation Commission to arrive in Leopodville collectively, I mean all the members together, and that they should go directly to Leopoldville and not first to Brazzaville. Maybe the cancellation of the departure for this evening will be a good sign, because now the Conciliation Commission will have the opportunity to arrive in Leopoldville directly and all together. I would make another suggestion also, namely that they should not travel by Air France or some other airline, but in a plane chartered by the United Nationse Perhaps that is rather expensive, but it is necessary. The plane should fly the flag of the United Nations, because the Conciliation Commission is going there not on behalf of the respective Governments of its members but on behalf of the United Nations. So it should have the flag of the United Nations on a chartered plane. In that way not only will the security of the Conciliation Commission be guaranteed by the United Nations forces, but there will also be an element of prestige. In the Congo, where so many forces are contending and competing, if we can bolster the prestige of the United Nations in the eyes of the Congolese people^ it will be a good start for the Conciliation Commissions task.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): The suggestion of my friend from Indonesia has reminded me of the old adage which warns against putting all the eggs in one basket, so I would not advise the entire Commission to travel in one plane. That is all I wanted to say.

Mr. KAMIL (Federation of Malaya): When I was privileged to intervene very briefly in the debate this afternoon, I made the position of my delegation fairly clear and I would not like to waste the time of this Committee in reiterating what I said. In brief, we feel that the Conciliation Commission can do a world of good in the Congo. That is our sincere belief and I am glad that the sense of the meeting this evening is not to back out from what we have decided to do,namely, to send this Commission to the Congo. I do however support the views expressed and the suggestions made to the effect that it would perhaps be conducive to smooth and successful working by the Commission if you, GRR/aJ 87-90 (Mr. Kamil, Federation of Malaya)

Mr. Secretary-General, could see the President at your convenience tomorrow or at some other convenient time, just to explain to him what we have been doing here and what we intend to do. I feel that that is a move that would really be conducive to smooth and successful work. MW/bg 91 (Mr. Kamil, Malaya)

Secondly, I should like to add my agreement to the statements made by both Mr. Jha and Mr. Aiken. That Is all I have to contribute at the moment.

Mr. JHA (India)t I just want to Intervene very briefly. I listened carefully, as I always do, to the representative of Tunisia and I agree with all the points he made except as regards the first point. I was wondering whether - instead of his suggestion that we should specifically ask and pinpoint it: do you agree to this Commission?, which might put him in an awkward position and might put us in an awkward position — the Secretary-General could not say: It is our understanding from the talk that I he.d T/ith you and from your second letter that you now no longer object to the idea of a Conciliation Commission going to the Congo, and I should like to have confirmation. Something like that might be better than putting it in that very categorical way. The second point which I wish to make is that I would support what the representative of Indonesia has said. I do not think it is a question of putting all our eggs in one basket; on the other hand, if all the eggs are separate they would have a better chance of being crushed. I think it is not a bad idea. I suppose the Secretary-General's experience is extensive enough that he can get a reliable charter plane, with the flag of the United Nations, to go directly to Leopoldville. The security aspect and all that would be much easier and I think it is not a bad Idea. Of course, that does not preclude any member if he wishes to travel separately for some reason. For example, our representative actually happens to be in Rome now and I have sent a telegram saying: Please do not proceed to Brazzaville; we are meeting In the Advisory Committee. I hope it reaches him in time.

The SECRETARY -GENERAL: I have a feeling that this can be a meeting of unusual shortness, but I see that the representative of Liberia has asked for the floor and I would not try to hasten things as we have the time before us. MW/bg 92-95

Mr. SHERMAN (Liberia): I think we ought to support the idea of the Conciliation Commission going to the Congo. I have been in the Congo since July. I have an idea of the problems out there, and I have maintained here — and I think this has been the position of our delegation — that the question of seating a delegation was no solution to the problem. I think that we are in a position to go and help, but we ought to make sure that we get President Kasavubu on our side to begin with — that is, to convince him of the need of bringing his people together. He knows that better than anyone else. He has tried. Even Bombutu ; has tried. I was in Leopoldville when he took a plane and went to Katanga. He failed. Probaly he is still there. But certainly we have to be cautious because the Congolese people are a very sensitive people. They are quick to accuse not only individuals, but the United Nations, and it would be very helpful if we began to realize now the need of proceeding, when we are there, with every caution, the need to clear the ground before proceeding to the Congo. We know it is important, that.it is an important mission. We ought to take risks for it, but certainly we should not risk failure because the meeting is important and our mission there is very important. It would be helpful also to.realize that we are going on a fact-finding mission. We must be as dispassionate — or at least appear to be so if we are not - as possible in the Congo. Do not let us go in with preconceived notions or with any song about going to expel Belgium or anybody else. We are going to find out whether the Belgians are there, whether their paratroopers are there, and whether they are doing what they say they are doing. We must find that out and then make our report to the Secretary-General, with recommendations as to how best we can get them out. That is important. That is my advice. HR/hh 96 (Mr. Sherman. Liberia)

I agree that the Secretary-General should contact the President; not only the Secretary-General, but those who are in good relation with the President must use their good offices to get his co-operation. That is necessary for himself, necessary for the people of the Congo, it is necessary for Africa. That is all I have to say.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): With regard to the statement that was just made by the representative of Liberia, this is not a fact- finding commission. It is a Conciliation Commission. It is not a commission of inquiry. It is rather a Conciliation Commission. Naturally, it can study the situation, but it is by no msans a fact-finding commission or a commission of inquiry. There is a clear distinction. I wanted to point that out.

The SECRETARY-GEKERALs I believe at this stage I can put before you the conclusions which I have drawn from this debate. It is, as I say, one Which may lead to a very short meeting and one which certainly has shown a very great harmony of views. First of all, there has been no voice in favour of revision of any previous decisions. This means that the Committee maintains its view that a proper implementation of the resolution of 21 September is to send this Conciliation Commission* Further, there has been no voice in favour of a revision of the time-table as regards the meeting in Leopoldville. That is to say, we still should count on a meeting on Saturday in Leopoldville. Finally, while we note with regret that two delegations do not wish to take part,under present circumstances, in the Conciliation Commission, there is no voice in favour of any reconsideration of the composition of the Commission. With that in back of us we come to the question of practical action. I believe that there is unanimity as to the desirability of establishing contact with President Kasavubu. For my part, I attach a good deal of importance to the fact that the second letter followed very soon after the first. I think that gives us" reason to HR/hh 97-100

(The Secretary-Gernaral)

feel that the second letter means even more than the words seem to indicate, because we all know that when you revise a previous stand there Is no doubt that in the revision, or at leaot the expressed stand, you do not like very much to go the whole way backwards in one step — that is to say, I think that expressions in the second letter may be cautious in relation to the intentions. Under such circumstances, 1 believe that for this or that reason, which is none of our business, the^ President in fact in his second' letter accepts the going of the Ccatroission and the composition of the Commission. I cannot read it any other way after the first negative stand in the previous letter. Under such circumstances, the third paragraph in the second letter has its full weight." It is an invitation to consultation. I think it should be read, in fact, as an expression of hope for consultations with implied acceptance of the Commission as such. In fact, going back to the oral message to which I referred, 'that oral message was even more explicit. It stressed the desirability of seeing to it that the conditions for the work of the Commission were as favourable as possible. That is to say, that oral message implied — if I read it correctly — a promise of co-operatidn. Under such circumstances I conclude from this discussion' that I would act in accordance with the wishes of the Members if I sought contact with ; - President Kasavubu early tomorrow, meeting him at his earliest convenience. That would be the first active step. AP/rh 101

(The Secretary-General)

In the course of that discussion I think I could join together very easily what has been said by representatives, especially India and Tunisia, by pointing out the way in which I have felt free to read the second letter in the light of the previous conversation, and the way in which I gather also that this Committee hopes it is entitled to read it. If so, in fact there would be a record between President Kasavubu and myself, of his acceptance without, so to say, pinning him down in a way which may create very human difficulties which we should respect. If that workfl out, we would have the proper background. We know that handling the matters with prudence and in the way which should be ours,, we could count on the support which the representative of Liberia pointed out as being highly • valuable for the work. From that, so to say, starting point, I would like very much personally to follow the lines indicated by the representative of Tunisia ae I gather, rrom other reactions here that they meet with general approval. That is to say, it should be first of all clarified again what is the constitutional position. I think that is a very minor point, but I think it is just as well to have a clean record. Further, it should be pointed out, as I said at the beginning o£ ny summing up, that this Advisory Committee stands, on the basis of its mandates, by its previous decisions. That involves, as specifically pointed out by the representative of Tunisia, also that the Conciliation Commission does not meet or work here and will not meet with the President or any representative of his. Their work is in Leopoldville with a perfect balance between all those who may be parties on the other side in the conciliation operation. It should also be pointed out that this Conciliation Commission necessarily is master of its own methods of approach and cannot serve as a kind of arm of Mr. Kasavubu or anybody else. They are jointly an organ of the United Nations, not of any Member Government represented on the Commission nor of the Government of the Congo, whoenrs-r Is considered to represent it. It, of course, should be added, as Mr. Slim pointed out, that this does not at all mean that they are so conceited as not to tak« good advice from whatever source they get good advice. If, as I would hope, this will be fully understood by President Kasavubu and if, as I also hope, he will not raise any difficulties because of composition or mandate or things like that, about which, in fact, he has been informed for quite a long while, the road would be open. AP/rh 102-105 (The Secretary-General)

I could then turn to the practical arrangements. The practical arrangements are already included, in fact, in what he talks about in his letter and what was included in the oral message, bit they would cover also another point which has been mentioned here, and which I think is '

(The Secretary-General) We do not knov where Mr. Mobutu and others may stand in this matter. Whatever this or that member here may feel about him, he obviously has some possibilities to make himself heard on the spot, so I believe that to use .the authority which exists in the group here is a good thing. I mentioned this because it may come to have a practical bearing on the decisions of the Conciliation Commission. I believe that there is no reason for President Kasavubu to stay here any longer. There is nothing very much for him, I guess, to discuss, so probably he is intending to go back anyway. If so, I guess he will go back perhaps not tomorrow, but by Thursday or Friday, and that time-table from the point of view of this Committee, I think, vould not be too bad. However, obviously one must give him some kind of leeway, and for my part I would believe that it would be sensible and reasonable for the Conciliation Commission not to change its plan, but at least to have some latitude in its own considerations to take into account its own feelings as to what is practical in the light of the time-table of Mr. Kasavubu, about which we could certainly be informed tomorrow. I should perhaps add that in talfcing to Mr. Kasavubu, or whoever ia his representative in this case with regard to the preparations and arrangements which, given the proper background should be discussed, I should like to include, with very slight latitude, the time, I want, however, to stress that in saying that I, for my part, do not see any reason here and now to revise the idea about the meeting on Saturday. I think it should be firm enough to influence whatever time-tables there may be on the other side, because if we start opening the door, I do not know where we will end. It usually happens that one will adjust times mutually until nothing happens at all, and that cannot be. However, I would like here to go one step beyond what you have done yourself in the discussion. I come now to what I regard as the final point clearly covered by the discussion - that is to say, an explanation to Mr, Kasavubu, that after today's decision of the General Assembly a standing invitation to the Congo here to be represented, of course, now is extended to him or to the one he appoints for the purpose. I must say that seems to be one of the fairly 7

RH/cw 107-110 (The Secretary-General)

clear consequences of today's decision. After saying that, I think it would be reasonable from our point of view and from your point of view to open the possibility of an early meeting which has no other purpose than to give him or his spokesman the possibility to give this Committee -- I share entirely the view expressed here by the representative of Tunisia that it should not be the Conciliation Commission, but this Committee - the benefit of -what he may want to say before he leaves. It is certainly part of the background material from which we may profit. I do not want to invite him in that sense, but I do feel that if one says that he or his representative will be welcome in the way the previous invitation was extended and, in fact, under the cover of the previous invitation, we could at the same time indicate a willingness to have a meeting while representatives are here, but not to discuss the Conciliation Commission — I think that would not be in order -- but partly as a courtesy and partly for whatever value it may have for simple information. It might be of special significance as regards this question -of practical preparations, because if President Kasavubu were to raise a point, for example, concerning his time-table*it is,certainly,something which it may be very practical to

settle at the table, and not with me as % go-between. , ; I would not like here and now to ask you to take a decision on this.

.1 wanted to indicate my line of;thinking so I could feel reasonably free to try to see how things looked in order to tie it up neat, , . 7

BC/cn 111 (The Secretary-General)

Finally, we come to the question, of a report .to the General Assembly. Very few^of the members of this Committee have mentioned that question. .1, . myself, if eel that a very appropriate observation was made in. this connexion •-•-«• namely, that we should not make a report until we have tidied the matter up; that is to say, we should at least wait for the results of. my tails with; President Kasavubu and for my report to this Committee on -';hat talk. It may be —

I do not know — th&t there will have to be another letter from our side in. : . order to crystallize matters in such a way that there will be no further -., •..• * '• ' '<••','' .' •'"'''•. ' ' " ' ambiguity. I, myself, feel. rather tempted to have such a letter, which I should like to 'draft in the light of the discussion with President Kasavubu, so that -. • . : ', ..' : \- ' ' .•••-. .•'"'. •. - ' • later on no one can say that this or that, was not understood. If that is to be done, however, our report, no matter hov formal, to the Assembly must wait. - until we can give the Assembly the , full picture. What I do feel is that the : report should be sent — jbr information,. .and nothing but that i— to the General. ••<•

Assembly before all our friends of the ..Press sfrow in their newspapers —.ctures :. : of the departure and make their own comments. I think that it should be we, and not our diligent friends of tjne Press, who inform .the General Assembly.

The last practical point which, has been raised concerns the basket and :: . ...; ;. the eggs. Ihere is another question in. ithis, respect -- namely^ the cost and the availability of the baskets. Perhaps we could leave the matter in this way.v We shall look into the question tomorrow morning ...I think that, one way of ; •.-•-, flying the flag at small cost and without having too many risks on the same •;. horse — to change the metaphor — would be to .make at least the last leg from • the staging area in United Nations aircraft which we have available there already,^hich are known and on which the. United Ncx^ions flag is painted. That would, I think, take care of the matter just as well. But all this has to be explored, I am not an expert on flying in any .other sense than as a client. I shall therefore have to ask the advice of others on this matter* I shall inform the Committee as soon as possible of the results of that exploration — * > cost- wise, time-wise, plan- wise and timetable- wise. * BC/cn 112 (The Secretary-General)

Perhaps I have forgotten some of the points that have been brought up here, "but those were the notes I made as to the conclusions I had reached from the discussion this evening.

Mr* JHA (India): If I may say so, Mr. Secretary-General, you have summed up the situation very well* Your sunmary accords w?; jn the consensus here, and I really hava nothing to add to it and no suggestions to make* I do, however, wish to raise just one practical difficulty that I have. Our delegate to the Conciliation Commission is now cooling his heels in Rome; I am sure that he has arrived in Rome by now* I have sent .1 cablegram' asking him not to proceed to Brazzaville and to await further information. This whole thing is really rather awkward, from my point of view and from his point of view. I think that it would help this Committee as well as the Conciliation Commission if we were to have another meeting as soon as possible after you have met President Kasavubu and had some reaction from him*

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I did not have the guts to reveal my innermost thoughts -- but I Vas thinking *bhat, if the talk tomorrow morning works out as I hope it will, I might have the privilege of meeting with this Committee again tomorrow, let us say at 5 P»m», to round everything up and give the Committee all the information which we are to get for it. Incidentally, Mr, Jha, I must say that I do not have too much pity for your delegate in Rome, since, after all, Rome is quite all right at this time of the year. Perhaps we should end the meeting on this harmonious note*

The meeting rose at 11.5. P»nu CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No, 1^ 25 November 1960 ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ABVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 23 November I960, at 5 p.m.

60-29882 NR/mlt

' The SECRETARY-GENERAL (interpretation from French): Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, quite some time ago — two or three months ago — this Committee decided to invite a representative of the Government of the Congo to meet us, not as a member of the Committee, but to help us in the work of the Advisory Committee. On the basis of this decision and under the general terms of reference of the Advisory Committee, ,1 now have the honour and the privilege of welcoming President Kasavubu, who is the President of the Republic of the Congo. We all hope that because of these personal contacts we shall find the means of making good progresi .• : • • s *•••.*•in .a• . spirit...••.-., > of .cp-operatio . • n and that thus we may achieve more rapid and greater- success with respect to the assistance which the United Nations is giving to tae Republic of the Congo at its own request. (continued in English) Yesterday we had a meeting at which we had the opportunity to discuss a couple of letters which we had received from the President of the Congo. The *w Committee decided on that occasion that I should ask for a meeting with the President and explain the stand of the Committee, its character, its mandate and its decisions and also, of course, its constitutional position in the United Nations framework. I had the privilege this morning of having a long talk with the President about the task of the Conciliation Commission and the plans laid down for that Commission by this Advisory Committee. Obviously it is for our distinguished guest to speak for himself, but I promised the President to say a few words by way of introduction, and, if in some way in my summary I do not properly reflect your views, Mr. President, I em sure that you will correct me. The President wishes to regard this special initiative of the United Nations, taken first by the General Assembly and implemented by this Committee, as part and parcel of the assistance rendered to the Republic of the Congo. I DR/cv 3 (The Secretary-General)

We have military assistance, we have had also the civilian assistance in various technical fields and here we have another expression of the vish of the United Nations to help towards a happy solution of the problems of the Congo, in confirmation,and consolidation of its independence and the strengthening of its internal life. Looking at it in this way, I understood the President to regard the Conciliation Commission as something which naturally in principle had to be welcomed by the Government and the people of the Congo* From that point of view there is certainly a spirit of comprehension and, I. would say also, a basic common view on what this is and what this should bet If it is regarded as part of the assistance to the Congo -- and I still refer, to the views of the President — it is of course essential in this, as in other cases, that this assistance is so arranged, prepared and executed as to have a maximum success and to lay the groundwork for continued solid co-operation for common aims between the Republic of the Congo and the United Nations. In this respect, the President fsols,and feels strongly, that — for reasons for which I am sure you will explain yourself, Mr. President — there is a need for preparation* There are widespread misunderstandings about the role of the United Nations in this respect in the Congo, There are feelings of suspicion and hostility regarding this special part of the assistance which should be overcome in order to prepare the ground for the kind of contribution which you, Mr. President, as we, wish this Committee to make. There is thus, first of all, an explanatory work to be undertaken. I understood the President to mean that this explanatory work mej take cnly a ehort time, but will definitely require some short time. It is also a question which requires contacts with various personalities, all those who have leading positions and who have, first of all, to understand the task of the Commission and who have to learn to approach it in the right spirit and with the right background. This also, in the view of the President, was a preparatory DR/cw U-5 (The Secretary-General) task which would require some short time. The President felt that short of such preparation of course the Commission might go, but it was difficult to see how the Commission could hope to achieve anything which really would heJLp us forward for the purposes of the Commission and the United Nations itself. They might easily be stuck either in an atmosphere which was unfavourable or with a lack of contacts, which would hamper their work or limit the scope of their activities in a way which would be harmful to ito euccaes. However, all these points will be certainly better explained by our guest himself. I can, therefore go back to what I said at the beginning and sum it up in these words. ~1

MW/mtm 6 (The Secretary-General)

Understood as part of the assistance rendered by the United Nations to the Republic of the Congo, this mission, this initiative, is something which is accepted, and I dare perhaps even say welcomed, but that is with the hope that this will really be a successful operation and with the feeling that, in order to make it a success and create the maximum guarantee against this nor that kind of failure, there is a need for preparations which, as I said, will require some time, although they need not be so extensive. Obviously, these views of the President have an important bearing on the considerations of this Committee as the master of the Conciliation Commission. loir, with your permission, in amplification, in clarification, of what I have said, I should like to invite our distinguished guest to take the floor if he so wishes.

President KASAVUSU (Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville)) (interpretation from French): Obviously, I do nou have very much to explain because I have already said everything to the Secretary-General. What I would like to underline, perhaps, is that we have called for the United Nations. It is help that we have asked of the United Nations. We asked for assistance, and this presumes that there is work going on in the Congo and that we are being helped by someone else, and it is on this basis that the entire operation of the United Nations should be carried out in the Congo; and it is on such a basis that the Congolese may appreciate the work of the United Nations and understand it thoroughly. Therefore, this involves assistance, and since the people who are being helped are not prepared, that is why they have asked for a delay in order to consult among themselves first of all. What we seek is the success of this Commission, and it would be regrettable if it did not succeed. We have had experience of many commissions, whether they came from Belgium or the United Nations. They came to us and then went to Ruanda- Urundi, for example, and they came back here. They presented their reports, but the results were not what we had wished for because the inhabitants themselves did not give their co-operation and they were avoided. MVJ/mtm 7-10 '* v ; _ . » (President Kasavubu)

•therefore/ if you truly wish to help us you1 must wait for us W prepare the groundwork and have; talks among ourselves, unless this is'a fact-finding commission, which is no longer possible in an independent country, and I do not believe'that this would be in keeping with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. -But* I'enlphaBifee1 that'what is really involved is assistance. ; Therefore, it is up to the Congolese to find the solution to the-problem and for the United Nations to help them. It is the-Congolese who indicate what direction the ! problem:takes.and the United Nations may help as much as it can. Therefore, you could go to the Congo -- but what will happen when you get there? You might perhaps find some individual/-but I nust tell you that Belgium did not succeed i* in working in' such a fashion, and I should like to-inform you that if- you continue on the same lines as Belgium -- in other words, not taking into account either the opinions of the Congolese authorities or the opinions of Congolese leaders — you cannot succeed.' : ' i ;'' GRR/gd 12-15 (President Kasavubu)

These are the few points of view which should form the fundamental basis' for your consider at ion t Had you consulted us in advance, ve would have tfcld you what path youf ought to follow. That is ilot just because we wish to show you the path that you should follow, but because all we have in mind is the good of the country. It would be pointless and 'useless if we were each to work for the same gola but each with his back to the wall, because then we should never see each other. We must all start from one point of view and in doing so we must have some "sort of understanding in advance. Therefore, if We can agree on this £oint we can make some progress. ' : I have met certain American technicians who have asked me questions; Now/ we want help/we want technicians, but it is for the Congolese to do the thinking and for the technicians to translate their'wishes, through a technical formula, into what we need. If the technician, who is qualified, finds that there may be something objectionable or dangerous in what is proposed, it is his duty to explain to his chief how he sees the problem -- but it is always up to the Congolese to take the final Decision. : : ^ . . BC/bg 16 (President Kaaavubu)

The technician makes proposals and refers proposals to others, but he cannot take any steps if the proposals are not approved "by the Congolese themselves. I should like it to be understood that any help given to us which was not in line with our way of living and in keeping with our true needs would be a waste of effort. It would be like a doctor prescribing an eye remedy for a patient suffering from a stomach disease. It would be quite useless* The remedy must be applied to the place where the person is ill. That is what I wanted to tell this Committee at this point. I have not come here to discuss the problem but simply to explain some of the difficulties that would face a commission if it went to the Con^: without preparation.

The SECRBIARY-QgNERAL (interpretation from French): Thank you, Mr. President, (continued in English) Does any member of the Committee wish to speak now? Mr. SLIM (Tunisla)(interpretation from French): I should like to express my appreciation for this helpful contact between the Advisory Committee on the Congo and President Kasavubu. I am very much moved at this fact, and, in this connexion, I should like to pay a tribute to the delegation of Ghana for having reminded us yesterday of the decision which we took about two months ago to the effect that representatives of the Congo should participate in our work at certain times. This is certainly a most useful time to have President Kasavubu among us. The problem facing us is not only the problem of the conciliation which the General Assembly decided upon in principle at a special session and which was confirmed on 9 November by the Assembly when it voted to adjourn debate on the situation in the Congo. There is not only the problem of starting the work of conciliation, the assistance in the political field which we must give the fledgling Republic of the Congo. Recently, a number of unfortunate events have taken place in the Congo, in Leopoldvllle, which more particularly affect the United Nations elements. There have been incidents between United Nations and Congolese troops. Since yesterday, several officials of the United Nations have BC/bg 17-20 (Mr. Slim, Tunisia) been arrested, Interrogated and persecuted — that Is, if the information in the Frees is correct, and I would hope that it is not. This is a highly dangerous situation and calls for urgent action, in our opinion. It is directly related to the assistance in the political field which the United Nations-wishes to give to the young.Republic of the Congo to help it to achieve a stable and lasting situation -» what President Kasavubu has called a structural situation between the various trends and currents-of opinion that are stirring up the Congo. -. ;It seems-to us that conciliation action has become even more urgent in the light of .the situation in Leopoldville during the past two or' three days. f — — 1'I RH/cn 21 (Mr. Slim, Tunisia)

It is not that we are questioning the possibility of the leaders in the Congo to find themselves an adequate solution vhich is most appropriate and fitting for them. It is not that we are questioning at any time the wisdom of President Kasavubu and of other political persons who are leading very strong political currents in the Congo, We are not questioning this wisdom, we are not questioning their ability to find a good solution, and it would not be for us in the Advisory Committee to impose any given solution. But it seems to us that at a certain point, when members of the same family start to fight among themselves, rightly or wrongly, sometimes they find themselves in such a difficult situation as a result of the most recent events and quarrels that each one, though wishing pe^ce and conciliation, cannot make the first step. What quite frequently happens, not only within a republic or a government or State, but even between States, is that the situation becomes so poisoned, quite frequently on the basis of false premises, that both sides, while seeking a solution, become so bogged down in •'.iieir positions that, for the sake of prestige or standing, they cannot take the first step, and neither side is prepared to make the concessions which it was already prepared to make in order to find a peaceful and reasonable solution. It is at such a time that an outside or third element, alien to both of them and having good intentions, can come in and try to introduce some sort of peace, wisdom, stability and order and can decrease the animosity, probably false animosity, which exists between the members of the same family. They can try to bring the members of the same family together so that they can find the best solution, the one most in keeping with reality. President Kasavubu gave us a very good example. It is certainly not up to the doctor to deal with the illness of the patient himself. He cannot tell him what is wrong. The doctor cannot find a solution, and we are familiar with this. Sometimes when we, as patients, go to a doctor we have the impression that the illness comes from one side, but we find it comes from another. I can quote from my own case, A few days ago, I had toothache. I went to the dentist, and I thought the ache was in the lower jaw. However, after X-rays had been taken, the dentist found that the ache was in my upper molars, I hope the Congo is not in such a serious situation as it seems to us from the outside, but sometimes the patient himself, in describing the disease, finds himself in some difficulty, and that is where the outsider comes in in order to find out what disease is involved. RH/en 22-25 (Mr, Slim, Tunisia)

I can give another example. In some countries it is even forbidden for doctors to treat the members of their own families, not because they question the ability of the doctor, but because it is felt that a doctor may be influenced by his own personal emotions and feelings concerning his wife, -child or mother, and thus may make mistakes because of an excess of love and feeling for a member of his own family and thus prescribe the wrong medicine. That is why we recognize the need-for the Conciliation Commission. It is not here, and I should like to point out that we are meeting here as members of the Advisory Committee. The Conciliation Commission will only start its work in the Congo; we are meeting here as an advisory committee. AP/rh 26

(Mr. Slimy Tunisia)

And that is why I say that it seems to us that this Advisory Committee will have to help the Congolese people — through its most qualified and skilled representatives, who represent political trends and tendencies in the Congo — find a solution which will bring about some sort of stability and which will bring about a lasting restoration of peace, order and security in the country which are so necessary for the restoration of — this country which we love so much — its domestic internal life and its international life as well. But I should like to point out most respectfully here that any commission or body of the United Nations, any action of the United Nations designed to bring , . about assistance for any country, that this does not apply to the Congo only, this applies to any country whatsoever. Such assistance is subject to the opinion of the country concerned. In the present case it would be the Congo. But after all is said and done, it is that Committee which is responsible to the Waited Nations for such activity. I presume that it will listen to the opinion of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, and in particular, the very wise opinions, which we appreciate greatly, of the Head of the Government of the Congo, for whom we have the greatest respect. But let us not forget that we are all human* We are not perfect. To err is human. Let us assume the Committee does make a mistake and that at the end of its mission, coming here to the United Nations in New York, it presents the result of its mission. It will have the right to say that, "If I am mistaken, it is not my fault, it is the fault of those who advised me." No delegation of the ninety-nine delegations of the United Nations would admit to such a theory. The responsibility for the results will fall upon the Commission and its members — and only upon the Commiegion and the members of the Commission. I would go even further, Mr, Secretary-General. You know to what extent we have a personal respect for you and how we respect your office as well, which is the result of instructions given to you unanimously by the United Nations. Even having said all this, even if Conciliation Commission were to follow your advice and make a mistake, it would not be entitled to relieve itself of any mistake or of the responsibility of a mistake, trying to put it on your shoulders and say, "It is not our fault, it is because the Secretary-General or his permanent representatives gave me such instructions.*1 AP/rh 27-30 (Mr. Slim, Tunisia)

That is why, most respectfully; I should like to point out to the. President that, of course, we shall advise the Conciliation Commission to follow all opinions, to.get thq opinion of the most, distinguished persons in the Congo, but In particular, to consider themselves as being responsible, and not persons from whom they would have asked-their opinions. If, they were to.ask for help, the responsibility would still be .theirs and not ths responsibility of the Congo Republic. = . .. . ., . . Having made these remarks — I felt I had to make them now — we recognize- ; full well, in so far as my delegation is concerned, that this Conciliation- Commission, set up by the Emergency General Assembly and confirmed by the regular General Assembly on 9 November, must act in order to assist, in keeping with paragraph 3 of the resolution of the General Assembly, to help the Congolese to find the proper solution which will bring about .stability and order in the - Congo on a sound, brotherly: basis and within ;.the framework of the territorial :. integrity and unity of the Congo. But I cannot fail to think of what will happen afterwards. ••.< . ;•• ...,-. (: . „•;•••,•• .-..-•., HA/aj 31 (Mr. Slim, Tunisia)

It seems to me that the ideas just expressed by President Kasavubu are ideas which are very just and very valid. Such a Commission must have a preparation: that is understood. But, unfortunately, I notice another point. .;o are confronted with a situation in the Congo which is becoming more and more dangerous. Will we have the right, we delegations which are responsible to the General Assembly, to say tomorrow that we have not done our duty of conciliation, that we have not started our work of conciliation, whereas we know quite well that there is a situation which, unfortunately and most regrettably,is becoming more and more disturbing? I say this with all the respect which I have for the Head of State of the Republic of the Congo. I am not speaking now as a Tunisian; I am not speaking because there are Tunisians who were wounded in the struggle. These Tunisians no longer belong to Tunisia; these are elements of the United Nations, and only of the United Nations. But the events which have occurred in the past few days raise very serious problems for us, and we should be very happy to recommend to the Conciliation Commission that it start its work in the Congo as soon as possible. Perhaps this might be something useful, which might yield some results. I am very thankful to President Kasavubu for the sympathy which he has expressed concerning this work of conciliation. I should like to ask him most respectfully that, as a son who has a love for the Republic of which he is the President, he should help us to activate and to speed up the preparations which are necessary to start this work of conciliation, help us to activate it as soon as possible in order to allowthlB work to yield some fruit. This is the third form of assistance. There was the purely technical assistance given by civilians. There was military assistance, the purpose of which was to get the Belgian troops out and then to help the Congolese Government in the maintenance of law and order throughout the country. This time, there is a third ffcm of assistance, which is political in nature — essentially provisional -- which must go on for about ten or fifteen days at the most to help our brothers in the Congo to find a solution for themselves. The more quickly we act, the more effectively will we be acting in the interests not only of the Congo but of the entire African continent, and in the interests of all neighbouring continents as well, because otherwise there would be a very serious danger for them. HA/aj 32-35

Mr* JHA (India): May I, first of.all, say how very pleased we are to welcome President Kasavubu in the Advisory Committee* We are most grateful,to him for his gracious presence, and we are sure that his presence here and bis willingness to exchange views vith us vill yield ths very best results* ' ' ' •' • ' : • ' ••'•':.. Ws were very encouraged to hear the Presidentfs words. The President has- told us. that he agrees to the principle of the Conciliation Commission as a form;.of assistance by.the United Nations in pursuit of the. objectives for whi ph. the ..United Nations went into the Congo at the request of the President, HG/mlw p6 (Mr, Jha, India)

We feel that that really brings us very close to the solution of the main problem for which this Advisory Committee has met today. The only point on which I would like to join the vary eloquent appeal by the representative of Tunisia is the time of the visit of the Conciliation Commission. The President has told us that perhaps some delay is necessary so that preparations might be made. In this connexion, I would like to say that this Conciliation Commission is really an offer of assistance. I think that all of us here and the whole of the United Nations agree that this was something which was present in our minds when the idea of a Conciliation Commission was thought of in the resolution of 20 September -- that the problems of the Congo must be settled by the people themselves; there can be no other way. The leaders and the people of the Congo must find the best solutions to their problems; the United Nations must offer its assistance. The idea of sending a Conciliation Commission, which would be of some help and seme service to the Congolese people in the solution of their difficulties, was endorsed unanimously by the United Nations, even in the debates that took place in the General Assembly, although there were some differences of opinion -- but there were no differences of opinion that the Conciliation Commission should try and help in solving the difficulties. There is another factor, to which Ambassador Slim referred, which is of great concern to the Members of the United Nations -- and I do not speak of one Member or two Members, I think it is the whole of the United Nations -- and that is the unfortunate happenings in the Congo during the last two or three days. In the context of those happenings, we feel that the effort and initiative embodied in the constitution of the Conciliation Commission should not be delayed, The President has said that some preparation is necessary. There is no doubt that without preparation results cannot be achieved. But, on the other hand, this Commission was constituted a long time ago. The members of the Commission have arrived here; they are waiting. The General Assembly was of the view that this task generally should not be delayed; and the Conciliation Commission, I believe, is prepared to devote a great deal of patience and time to this enterprise, even if it has to wait awhile for things to clear, for the i most propitious circumstances and conditions to come into being. I think it will be prepared to wait. HG/mlw 37-Uo (Mr« Jha. India)

I would like to submit to the President that we feel that this is a matter: which can be worked out after the Commission ha's gone to Leopoldville. It is ... quite clear in our minds that the Commission will function within the framework of the legal and constitutional structure'of the Congo; and there is no doubt that at the top of that structure is the President of the Republic. The Commissioyi will certainly have a great deal to do with the President --'to .talk with him, to take his advice and perhaps to' advise him, too, in some respects,;, if they can. • GSC/ratm Ifl (Mr. Jha, India)

But we believe that psychologically, and especially in the present context, when certain things have happened which the President himself has deplored, it would be better not to delay this initiative. I- think it will be in the interests of everybody. We certainly would like to get the blessings of the President himself to this whole enterprise and the initiative of the United Nations, if this initiative is put into effect with a minimum of delay. While I am on this subject, I would like to refer to another matter which has been touched upon by the Ambassador of Tunisia, and I do so very respectfully, because we have this great occasion of President Kasavubu being in our midst' and that is, the tremendous concern that is felt not only by countries which have contributed contingents and other personnel, but by the whole of the United Nations, at the very distressing incidents that took place a couple of days ago and are, according to newspaper reports and according to the information that some of us have, continuing in the Congo. We are sure that the President regrets it as much as any one of us, but we do feel that now that the President is here in our midstf and there is a Congolese delegation now in the United Nations, it is of utmost importance that there should be an assurance that the United Nations personnel and others who have to go to the Congo will have an assurance of a guarantee of safety. I am referring not only to those who have gone as part of the regular troops, but in other capacities. They have gone there only to help-} there is no other motive behind their going. I appeal to the President to assure us that these personnel -- which are not personnel of one country or another; they are personnel of the United Nations, the world body to which we all belong -- will have an assurance of a guarantee of safety. I would go even further. If the President could assure us here that he will take all steps to ensure that there is no further repetition and that the United Nations personnel will have personal safety and will be able to work in conditions of dignity, I think that that would be the finest contribution to the entire effort of the United Nations in the Congo and, if I may say so, it will at once raise the whole question of the Congo and the whole position on to a very much higher plane. It will cause satisfaction all around and will redound to the credit of the Republic of the Congo and, if I may say so, of the President himself. GSC/nmtm 1*2-1*5 (Mr, Jha, India)

I hope to be forgiven for .mentioning this matter, "but this is a very painful subject; I did not-wish to do that, but I think this is very much in the minds of us all, and I thought this was an opportunity which the President would not mind my taking for making this appeal to him.

President KASAVUBU (Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville)) (interpretation from French): Now, with respect to everything that has been said, I should like to clarify two points. There is the question of responsibility. The question has just been raised again about guarantees per se. You must allow me to arrange everything, because if I spoke to you of the question of timing, of preparation, it was specifically because there is a lot to be done concerning this. Preparation means that the Congolese must accept you willingly, that you are coming to help them. I must prepare them. Why? Because'opinion has been falsified, distorted. There have been other interventions of friends who came. Vie have had declarations made here,by people who came to the Congo, to such an extent that the idea pf conciliation has been distorted and perverted* It was here that the idea of conciliation was distorted and perverted by statements and clear stands on positions that were taken so that the Congolese looked upon this not as a sort of conciliation,but more as something else. (President Kasavubu)

That is specifically why I must do this work, to guarantee and assure you on your arrival and see to it that your mission will be a fruitful one, Therefore, what I need is to re-form Congolese public opinion, which was deforced here by positions that were taken, with which you are fully familiar. Others felt that conciliation only meant me and a few other leaders. That is not so» That is really skirting the issue. Therefore, it is now our obligation to prepare the groundwork psychologically. We must condense the population of the ' Congo« The United Nations is there; there are representatives of the United Nations there5 why are not things going well? Do you think that your presence is enough to settle everything and clear things up? Do you think that we are going to hold a meeting in Leopoldville to regulate the Commission? It is here that the Commission was set up, and here everything must be established, and, before you leave, all your own trends should be cleared up, and there we can prepare the ground and do the spadework. Then we must re-form Congolese public opinion, which has been distorted and perverted -- and I need not tell you how this has been done. While you were discussing this, we were following from afar the positions that were taken which affected the people of the Congo, who could no longer look upon this Force as something beneficial, because positions had been taken. Others came before you, another conciliation commission, whose sole purpose was not to listen, to what the Congolese had to say but to put forward their own preconceived ideas. That is the situation. Thus, if I do not succeed -- I must tell you we are a democratic country, and this means patience, because the people must understand. We cannot impose ourselves at all times. Of course, we are leaders, but the people must understand us as well. If they understand us, they follow us; if they do not understand us, they do not follow us. Specifically, the decision was taken without consulting us. We were not prepared. You had time to prepare yourselves. We did not have time. You are catching us unprepared, and if we do not have the necessary time in order to change Congolese public opinion we will have to decline our responsibility. If the Committee has responsibilities, as we were told, we too have our own responsibilities in our own NPx/cw; , .... :, . 1*7-50 (President Kaeavubu) •'.-'.. j. j i ,'.!•:• country. .That is why, if you take precautions to see to it that your responsibility is justified, and safeguarded, we too should be allowed to take our own precautions to see to it that our responsibilities' are safeguarded as • well, .>.•.. -. . ; ...... If you leave, tommrrow or the day after tomorrow that does not mean that the problem .will be solved. . We want the problem to be settled satisfactorily, and that, is why we need ,this time.. I do not believe that it is your intention to wave any magic wand or.anything like that. The mere presence of a commission of the United Nations is not a factor* The United Nations has been there for two months, and we still have our difficulties. This is not the case merely in the,Congo; this applies to all countries. Moreover, allow me to draw your attention to the news reports you get here,#.;-which dramatize :the facts. If yqu were on the spot you could <)udge better, But., since this involves a Committee, of course, a distinction must be'made, W " •• • 1 . , 't,\'-j ' '*•'-' ',""."' f • t t ! L ' ,Wf • - ,. I It is not a, fact-finding cpmmission going to the spot after the events to see; what:has, occurred. I belieye that what you are offering is assistance. ' DR/mh 51.55 (President Kasavubu)

Thus events are always taking place, They will occur in all countries. This does not mean that whenever events take place that someone has to take advantage of rliem to come to the Congo. We must follow the order that we have decided upon, and we must take into account the things which may occur. Our request for delay is based only on the need for preparation so that you can be properly received and welcomed in the Congo and so that your mission may be a fruitful one* It is understood that the Commission has its responsibilities, but we also have ours. If we neglect our responsibilities and if you neglect yours, the result will be null and void. Therefore, it is by respecting each other's responsibilities that we will find a reasonable solution. In so far as we are concerned, our responsibility has not been prepared as yet because we have a great deal to do with respect to you and with respect to the people.

Mr. WIRJOPRANOTQ (Indonesia): I think that it was not by accident that we are meeting together this evening in this room around this table. This table is rather round. So I hope, because we are sitting around the table with one aim, to support and assist the Congolese people in their struggle to maintain its complete independence. I hope that we can find some common ground in this matter* I represent Indonesia, a country which is far away from the Congo. When our country received the news that the national independence of the Congolese people was in danger because of the aggression of the Belgian forces, our Government and our people and the whole of Indonesia expressed their willingness to assist the Congolese people in its struggle. This expression came from the heart because .Indonesia, too, was a colony of the Dutch, a neighbour of the Belgians. Indonesia has had more or less the same experience with difficulties before independence and also after independence. For this reason our Government offered to send troopfl through the United Nations and our soldiers are araaa^ In the Congo. MW/aJ 56-60 (Mr> Wir.lopranotoj Indonesia)

'.';; .ButMthere is something more. The national independence of Indonesia •*3 the fruit of our national struggle during forty or fifty years. We have proclaimed our independence; we did not receive our independence as a Christinas gift from the Dutch. , In spite of that, we must say that, we have to give credit to the United Nations."because the United Nations has done a great deal to strengthen our independence. ' , , As you know, after the proclamation of independence we had so-called police action, but in fact' it was pure military action by the Putch. Even after the Dutch recognized Indonesia, we still had trouble with them, but because the ^United Nations has given assistance to Indonesia we have been able to negotiate with the Netherlands and. the Netherlands has recognized our independence. Thus, Indonesia lias confidence in the United Nations. For all these reasons, the approach of the Indonesian delegation in the United Nations concerning the Congolese problem has been motivated by one aim only: to help the Congolese people to 'maintain real and complete independence. We fully- understand the. difficulties l,n.the Congo, We understand their difficulties which.come..from the inside, but we understand also the difficulties which come from the outside* For .this reason I am glad to have a frank discussion this evening with Your Excellency as the Chief of State of '• ' • •• ' • o^ •' ••..,.•''•-.• the Republic of_the Congo, If I am not mistaken,, you have understanding about the steps whicb the United Nations has taken and will take concerning the Congo. 61.55 (Mr. Wirjopranoto, Indonesia)

But, if you will allow me to disagree, maybe that is not quite correct. :. feel that this understanding is not yet complete. I would like to have a complete understanding, and I think this discussion is useful in that direction, to hat I have in mind, Your Excellency, is — as I emphasized yesterday in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly — that in the opinion of the Indonesian delegation the United Nations is altruistic; it has no interest other than to help the Congolese people. Furthermore, referring to the Conciliation Commission, we have also decided that the Commission shall go as a Commission of the United Nations, under the United Nations flag; its members will in no way be representatives of their respective Governments. There is,therefore, sufficient guarantee that the United Nations and its Conciliation Commission in the Congo will be impartial. What I would like to emphasize this evening is that the United Nations is re.ady to do its utmost, and because it is ready we expect you, Your Excellency, as President of the Congo, to be ready to be with the Conciliation Commission and the United Nations and be the motive power for a new life in the Congo, in writing a new page in the struggle of the Congolese people. Since July we have had a lot of experience, some of it bitter experience, but because of this bitter experience we should be able to make a new life and I think it is no mistake to stress again here in this room that the precondition for a strong country — and this is true for the Congo, as it is for Indonesia and every other country — is the preservation of national unity. For this reason the Conciliation Commission is going to the Congo to preserve and strengthen the country's national unity. Suppose we are now hesitating, if that is not too strong a word; if we are hesitating now, the prospect before us will not be bright, but will be dark. We have seen the withdrawal of the Belgian troops is not yet finished and now from many sides come objections about the budget for the Congo operation. So far no decision has been taken about the funds we need for the Congo. BC/cn 66 • - - (Mr» Wirjopranoto, Indonesia)

In conclusion, I vould say'that I fully understand'' the" "viewpoint of the >'L^8ident of the Congo that, since he feels a great responsibility for the ; buceess of this mission, there must be time for preparation. However/ we do not wish to give the impression that we are hesitating in this matter, and I would therefore ask the following question. Would it not be possible for Kis Excellency, shortly after this meeting at which he has heard the opinions of the Advisory Committee, to make a statement about the real meaning, the real aim, of the Conciliation Commission? I understand that His Excellency has followed all the debates on this subject in the General Assembly, and I think that this morning the Secretary-General gave him full information about the task and aim of the Conciliation Commission. Would it not be possible, therefore, for him to make a statement favourable to the Conciliation Commission, a statement which would dispel any misunderstandings among the people and leaders of the Congo concerning our mission? I think that that would be very useful and could be regarded as paving the way for the Conciliation Commission. Such a statement could, I think, also be regarded as part of the preparations.

Mr, HASAN (Pakistan): My delegation is extremely happy that it has been possible for His Excellency the President of the Congo to attend this meeting of the Advisory Committee. Most of the countries represented round this table have suffered the travails of rebirth through which the Congo is passing today. We sympathize with the Congo. But it is at least in this fortunate position: Almost the whole world has rallied round the Congo in the hour of its need — and that is much more than occurred in the case of most of our countries. It has been the good fortune of my own country to be able to contribute two companies to serve the United Nations in the Congo. We consider it a privilege to have been of some little service to the Congo. Now that the General Assembly has decided to Invite the delegation nominated by the President of the Congo to sit in the Assembly, we have no doubt that the President will be as anxious as any other Member of the United Nations and as any member of the Advisory Committee to see that the General Assembly resolutions on conciliation are implemented. The President desired his delegation to be BC/cn 67-70

(Mr« Hasan, Pakistan) seated In the Assembly, That has been done. This invitation to be seated in the 'r'?embly confers privileges, but it also imposes responsibilities. We are sure '/;i.it that fact is fully recognized. RSH/mlw ,. . 71-75 (Mr. Hassan. Pakistan)

I recall, Mr. Secretary-General, having understood that the President of >.e Congo was of the view that the.fact of his delegation being seated in the .^neral Assembly would immediately clear the minds of the Congolese people and that he would "be in a position almost at once to go back and almost take along with him the Conciliation Commission. We hope that it will happen so. The President has referred to several missions. May I submit that it is unjust to this Advisory Committee, to us all, to compare our Conciliation Commission with those to which His Excellency referred, commissions coming from Belgium and other places.which did not play their part properly. I come from a country,if I may submit that to the President, which has an absolutely detached and objective view towards the affairs of the Congo, although we have the greatest solicitude for its welfare. May I, in that position, beg the President to reciprocate to the invitation, extended .to him by the General Assembly for the seating of his: delegation by, helping in the implementation of the resolution about reconciliation* Our view is that any delay ^i the implementation of that resolution would be misunderstood,, and that would be sad.

Mr* JA-JA WACHUKU (Nigeria): Along with others who have spoken, I want to say how happy my delegation is to see in the Advisory Committee this evening the President of the.Congo Republic. We welcome him in our midst here and we sincerely hope that the discussion that is .taking place now will bear

fruitful-re suits...... :

The subject matter oft.our discussion tonight is a matter which is of great concern to all of us, here,-to all the smaller States in the United Hat ions, the younger States, the less, developed States and the weaker States, because the '• ' . . . i "• : sorrows of the Congo are our sorrows and their joy will be our Joy. The majority of us here, in fact the whole eighteen Member States in this Advisory Committee, without any exception, have gone through in one form or another a forced ^tutelage under an imperial Power. I think the tutelage may have been forgotten in the

case of Norwayy I think if. was Sweden some time.ago. I think most of us have gone through a kind of forced tutelage. As for Canada, I think its tutelage was settled somehow or other, partly by the sword and partly by diplomacy. I think Ireland, where I studied, still feel it has some thorns in its flesh and that they have not completely graduated, They are still complaining about something. AP/aj 76-80 (Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

As for my colleagues that had Just spoken, and also our Asian countries, we all know they have just emerged from the same process. As I have already :'aid, I happen to be the last of the list of those who have just emerged from ..he same type of tutelage. So, we speak not "based on theories, but based on ssrperience. We have gone through the mill and we know what we are talking about. Mr. President, when we received your two letters, particularly the first one, If myself, and I think all members of this mission were very much perturbed because it did not tally with what we had known by a direct contact with you individually, and in our respective private capacities when we paid our respects to you and had the opportunity to exchange views. In those letters we gathered the impression that you considered this body to be a kind of private body set up by the Secretary-General and not by the United Nations. But from the speech which we heard from you this evening I am happy to learn now that you seem to agree that this Committee is just like any other subsidiary body of the United Nations set up by the General Assembly, because the Advisory Committee was set up by resolution of the General Assembly. And the Advisory Committee in trying to implement the mandate given to it by the General Assembly, by the same authority set up the Conciliation Commission as a sub-committee because it is not expected that the whole Advisory Committee can do that work. The next important point which impressed me favourably, and I think all members of this Commission, is that you correctly interpreted the purpose of this Conciliation Commission and what it is. It is a form of assistance. You have military assistance, you have economic assistance, you have technical assistance, and you have reconciliation assistance. Indeed, I would sgy that this is the greatest assistance the Congo can have now because •with t2ie military assistance, the economic assistance and all other assistance which you have, you have not been able to solve the one problem that is facing the Congo Republic today: the question of reconciling conflicting interests, divergent views, clashing personalities, different organizations, political parties, and structural differences, as you mentioned here, that exist in the Congo. HA/mh 8l v "r.v: :•/,:: . . .v.;; ... • / (Mr 4 Jaja WachukUj Nigeria)

All these hfere created tMs^tbitfpie^ problem whicli-iB^re suiting not '.' var'of' words tut' in actual physical war; resulting 1& the1 destruction not only of material things' "but of human beings. I-am^sUre this mtfsf'be causing you a.,:

good deal 6f pain. •''*•••"•• •""" - '• •:•••••••>• '•'* • • :• :• = .••.. ; •v-v--^.-: : ...-•> . :. .-..,•. .r.: 7 Looking through the' provisibnal Constitution of the Congo, *e find' that £ou • • have the: six* Provincial Governments intact. The PreBiaency is intactj the '; headship of the State 1 6 intact,' The legislative bodies ' in the centre are tfae^e. They ti*e intact, even tnough they are hot meeting now because oF the -troubled '•-•'••• situation. But there is :on6 thing that' is missing, ' onax-thing that isrla'ckingr . . there is no central government of the kind that is known in any other State, That is what is causing us these headaches. I would be failing in my duty if I did not point this out categorically. There is no intention on the part of the Advisory Committee, as representing the will of the General Assembly of the United Nations, to impose any person or any government on the Congolese Republic* I think I am expressing correctly the attitude of this Committee. If there has been any misconception of this idea, let me dismiss it now, once and for alL There is no intention on the part of anybody here to leave New York in order to go to Leopoldville, pick somebody and say: "You must accept this man as the accredited representative of the Congo people, to speak for them as the Government of the Congo." If there is any such conception, I will not serve on such a body. I think I am expressing correctly, and perhaps religiously, the proper attitude of this Committee. That is why some of us have agreed to serve on this Conciliation Commission. Since you have recognized that this Conciliation Commission is not the Secretary-General f s Commission, for his own purposes, and that it is indeed the Conciliation Commission of the United Nations, and since you recognize also that the Conciliation Commission is a form of assistance which the United Nations has offered to the Congolese Republic --a form of assistance falling in the same category as other assistance it has offered, but different in nature -» thfcre arises a question which I personally and the Committee, I think, would like you to answer categorically, because we have not yet received a categorical answer to it. HA/mh 82-85 (Mr* Jaja Wachutai, Nigeria)

You are the Head of the Congolese State, whose status has never been Impugned and /hose position has not been questioned by anybody here, whether he is your opponent •:•: not. You are the father of the nation: that is how we look at you. You are iot the Head of the Government; you are the father of the nation. In this hour of •uivvT.oil, in this hour of agony, in this hour of pain and suffering of the Congolese Republic, the people have a right to expect that you, as the father of •ihe nation, should stand forth as their rallying point. We would like you to answer this question: Do you accept this Conciliation Commission as an assistance, one of the forms of assistance, that the United Nations has offered to the Congolese Republic? HG/rh 86

(Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

This is very, very material to us. We cannot go into the questions of timing or departure unless we are satisfied here that you, not as Mr. Kasavubu, as a person, but as the father of the nation, that you, as an institution « the Presidency is an institution in itself — accept as a genuine gesture on the part of the United Nations its offer of such assistance to the Congolese Republic that would help the Congolese Republic regain its soul. That is one question which I would like you to answer tonight; because once we are sure that this form of United Nations assistance is acceptable to the President, then the questions of preparation, timing, and the rest of those matters, which are matters of detail, can be easily worked out. In so far as this discussion is concerned, there have been allusions to acceptance but no categorical statements with regard to this acceptance; and this is one question I would like answered here. This is extremely material to me because I have been appointed, by the unanimous consent of the members of the Commission, Chairman. I believe you were there when I spoke at the meeting of the General Assembly. I said that justice must not only be done but must appear to be done. Nigeria is in the happy position of having been admitted to the United Nations not long after these difficulties arose. It has never had any hand in interfering in any manner and could not be suspectedof anything. We have never done anything which could be considered detrimental to the interests of the Congolese Republic. , What it has done so far is what it has been requested to do by the United Nations. Nigeria has done so in accordance with the obligations which it contracted under the Charter of the United Nations and in the interests of the Congolese people. That being the case, we feel that our hands are clean in every respect; and if we are called upon to perform some functions within the United Nations, we are duty-bound to accept our responsibilities as Members. Therefore, we accepted that office willingly. It will fortify my spirit and my soul, in a desire to be as fair as humanly possible, when I am personally assured, along with the Commission, that you, as the Head of the Congolese State, the father of the nation and the rallying point of the people of the Congolese State, accept the Commission and also believe in its good intentions. -' HG/rh 87-90 (Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

If the answer is yes> I think it would "be.helpful if you could give us an idea of the period of time you think tfill.be neceesary to make adequate preparations for the Commission to have a healthy and fair start. I,do not say a successful conclueicn; that will be a matter of fact. - Those questions must .necessarily "be answered because the answers to them will,help us in determining our attitude in serving on this commission. We cannot spend time haggling, bickering, quarrelling and making rhetorical speeches when the Congolese people- want bread aad clothes. They want to live in happy homes; they do not want to. live in perpetual fear. We cannot be responsible people, competent to govern our own States, if-.-.our .people look up to us for succour, and we cannot offer it* GSC/bg 91-95 (Mr« Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

In the General Assembly, those of us who are serving in this Commission, we have been taken out of our delegations to serve. There are a number of questions in this session of the General Assembly affecting all African States and all Asian States. We have in the First Committee a subject, "Africa: a United Nations programme for independence and development". This is of primary concern to all African States. Then there is another subject, "Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples". These are vital questions. We are also discussing the question of having seats in the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. These are very, very weighty subjects; very important to the Afro-Ajian States, and, indeed, very important to the Congolese b-iate. Now, the timing of the Commission naturally will affect arrangements and matters of this nature in one form or the other, because some of us are playing a very important role in this subject. Then we have also to consider that recently the Secretary-General made a statement on the financial position of the United Nations in relation to the responsibilities it has taken in the Congo. The funds are not inexhaustible — indeed, we have already read of the attitude of some of the great Powers about contributions. Now that the United Nations is in a position to finance the army and the other assistance that is being given to the Congo, I think this is the time when this particular assistance which will give solidity and firmness to the Congolese State should perform its duty as expiditiously as possible, as further delay might result in something which would be rather disastrous. And so tonight we would like to be' certain that it is the desire of the President of the Congolese Republic and the leader of a young nation that a central authority that will command respect throughout the world be set up as quickly as possible to enable the Congolese State to begin to play its role more effectively in the community of nations.

. NR/cn 96 (Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

Without that central authority firmly established, it would be impossible for the republic to develop harmoniously, to develop its economy, its education and all its essential services. It would be absolutely impossible. The mere fact that you have United Nations troops in the Congo derogates from the sovereignty itself. Therefore, I think that what the United Nations is trying to do through the Advisory Committee is to see that the full sovereignty of the Congolese Republic is not only in theory but in fact, that these troops should be withdrawn as quickly as possible; the Congolese army should take charge of the Congolese State, and the Congolese police and the economic structure and everything should function nomally. But the present state of things cannot be regarded as normal, to put it mildly, In my own opinion, the greatest assistance that the United Nations can offer the'Republic of the Congo is this: the assistance of reconciliation, the type of assistance that vill bring the Congolese leaders together and make them see that, as an elder statesman who is now the Governor-General of Nigeria said, it is not so much who is right or who is wrcr.g but it is what is good for the people of Nigeria, and it is what is good for the Congolese nation. It is not a question of who is right now or who is wrong or what has happened in the past. It is what is best for the Congolese people now. That is what we are after. We cannot determine it. We may be able to create the type of atmosphere that will enable the Congolese leaders to meet together and decide the question of what is best for us. They will say "us"; we will say "we" -- because we are outsiders. But we would like to enable them to meet. At the moment one does not want to look at the other, and the other one sees the other as an enemy. We would like to create an atmosphere that would make them feel that there is something that connects us, however much the divergencies in views and however much they may disagree personally, that there is one connecting link. So long as you want to participate in the politics of the Congolese Republic, there is a central idea that connects you, as an ideal. There is a purpose, and that purpose is building the new nation. It should be a matter of pride and privilege that someone is born in an era when he can participate in building a nation. Nation-building is a great thrill. That is why some of >us play at politics. Personally I regard politics as a game. Sometimes you lose; NR/cn 97-100 (Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria) sometimes you win. You do not expect to win at all times. You will have people "being defeated in elections, and they prepare themselves against the next one. So I am saying this in all seriousness, because, in case the President of the Congolese Republic is in doubt as to the way our minds are working in this Advisory Committee — and I am sure he has read the terms of reference of this Commission -- I would say that nowhere is it suggested that we should become interventionists. Everything we do must be within the framework of the constitutional and legal authority of the State* We know that under your constitution, Sir, there is the office of the Head of State; as the central authority, you have the Head of State, you heve the Senate and the House of Representatives with elected members. DR/mtm 101 (Mr, Jaja WachuKu, Nigeria) • ' . * • •> ' • ...

Then you have the Government. You have six provincial authorities, with six Presidents heading the respective Governments and six Presidents of the Assembly, You-have your judiciary and you, sir, will know other responsible authorities which may-not be known to us. Surely it would be impossible to set up reconciliation if this body does not take-cognizance-of the existence of these various bodies. : I am only saying this-to give you an indication of how our minds are working. There is' no intention on the part of this. Commit tee to come to the Congo and tell you, "We support this political party and we oppose this, one11. Indeed we find that from the report the.-*/we have had, there are in the central House about twenty parties and there-is not one L-bat has. an over-all majority, .Again, it is quite clear that only the leaders of these.; respective parties and their followers, together with the President, whose office is, not challenged by anybody,.that can settle matters. All we are asking is to be enabled to be there to create the conditions that will enable all to meet and think of the Congolese State and the Congolese people,and forget theirr.elves for the time being. That is what I have to say. I should like to be assured categorically that Your Excellency accepts the mission and accepts it as a form of aid or assistance, as you correctly Interpreted it,that you also believe in our good faith and that there IB no intention on the part of the Commission to come to dabble in the internal politics of the Congolese State. Once we are sure of these facts, the question of timing is a simple one; we can settle that very easily because we want to arrest matters and, if possible, to neutralize everything now and not allow anything to grow worse than it is at the moment because anything that grows worse than what exists now will simply be chaotic and certainly catastrophic. We do not want to start a chain reaction.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I believe that we cannot count on having our distinguished guest with us for very much longer, and for that reason I would invite the members, if you will permit me, to concentrate on the practical question which I believe is the one of what delay, if any, is desirable in the view of the i President. Our attention was drawn by the representative of Nigeria to that very important and practical question. I believe, for my part, that as regards the DR/mtm 102-105 (The Secretary^General) question of the general attitude of the President to the Commission, ve have already heard his views on that and I have tried to interpret them myself. Before calling on the next speaker, I would, all the same, wish to ask the President if there is anything that he wishes to say, especially perhaps on the question of what time he would consider desirable for the preparations. It is up to the President whether he wishes to speak or not. MW/cw 166

President KASAVUBU (Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville)) (interpretation from French): Obviously, as I pointed out a short time ago, I must prepare matters. It is the preparation which will indicate the time. It is the consultations which I must have in the country which will decide how much time is needed.

Mr. COOPER (Liberia): After all that has been said it would be somewhat superfluous on my part to say anything more except that I heartily approve of all that has been said. But, as the President of the Congo is here, and we are happy to have him here, I think I must say something in this regard. We have heard all the reports from the Congo, which have come either through our emissaries there- or through the United Nations, This is the first time that we have had first hand information .from a Congolese himself, who represents the Congolese people. After all, we may all love the Congo, but nobody can lov>i the Congo more than the Congolese themselves. Therefore, we are happy to have President Kasavubu here. We have had many exchanges between us and a sort of doubt has been created in the minds of some members here as to whether the Congolese Government would accept the Conciliation Commission. President Kasavubu has said that we formed this Commission without consulting him at all. If we have done so, we should like to apologize to the President of the Congo and to say that we did it not with the idea of ignoring the Congo, but because of our zealous efforts to assist the Congolese people, since we have heard from there that they have no central government, that they have factions, and this created, in the minds of the countries interested in the Congo, a serious problem because no country can function if it has not a stable government. It was with this in mind that I think this Conciliation Commission was formed. The idea of the Conciliation Commission was to go to the Congo, as I understand it, to assist the Congolese people in getting together. You know it is said that there were two knights who were fighting one another on opposite sides of a shield. One contended that the shield was red and the other contended that it was blue, and they fought from morning till night, until the shield was reversed and it could be seen that one side was blue and the other was red. I think that that is one of the points of the Conciliation Commission's MW/cw 107-110 (Mr. Cooper, Liberia) going to the Congo, We might be able to turn the shield so that the Congolese could see both sides and could see that one side is blue and the other red. We should like to assure President Kasavubu that there is no intention that this Commission or the United Nations should interfere in the domestic affairs of the Congo. When you declared your independence, despite our anxiety for your welfare, we could not have gone there without your assistance, and if we have gone there and some of our actions have not been to your liking, I hope that you will attribute it to our keen interest in your welfare, I am happy to hear you say that you have not rejected this Commission's going to the Congo. The only thing that you have asked for is time to prepare to receive the Commission* Naturally, in view of all the arguments here and the debates in the General Assembly, you would be somewhat skeptical, but we hope that, through the speeches mads here today, we will have somewhat allayed this skepticism and that you will have no doubt that this Commission is going to the Congo solely in order to assist the Congolese people. If you do not require assistance, there is nothing for the Commission to do but to come back, but I hope, Mr. President, that you will, as soon as possible, prepare the ground for receiving this Commission. We can assure you that we Shall go to the Congo and we shall not, as you say, look at the eye while the foot is hidden. If it is the foot that is hiding, that is what we shall look for, I assure you, and not at the eye. GR/mlw 111-115

Mr. ADCEN (Ireland) I think, since President Kasavubu has been in New York for.a week, that he will realize that it is very important to conciliate the Members of the United Nations, and I would appeal to him to give us help in that direction. I think :Lt is much more Important than the problems of the Congo. I heard President Kasavubufs wise speech in Leopoldville a few months ago, and we have heard him tonight, and I need not therefore say to him that the reason the United Nations offered to go to the Congo was not only to help the Congolese people to help themselves but principally, and very importantly, to try to prevent another world war arising or being set aflame in the Congo. The United Nations has decided, in its wisdom, fa-it a Conciliation Commission should be set up and that it should proceed to the Congo. I wholeheartedly agree with what .President Kasavubu said here tonight as to the need for preparations, the need to see not only that the United Nations Conciliation .Cpuuission will ba welcomed --as he said in his opening remarks and has repeated -- but that it wil»X go and reach the Congo in the conditions necessary for success. I personally feel that if President Kasavubu could repeat in a statement to the Press what he has said in that regard, it would help us all greatly. It would help us to keep the United Nations together by supporting the United Nations effort to restore calm in the Congo so that the Congolese may regulate their own affairs. That is going to be difficult, very difficult, because there are two points of view in regard to constitutional legitimacies in the Congo. What comes out eventually in the Congo is a matter for the Congolese people. I believe that if we can keep the great Powers from taking their rivalries to the Congo or to Africa, the Congolese will find their own feet in due course, and I think it is remarkable, in the state of confusion in which they were left, that they have been so successful. I feel that if President Kasavubu co-operates with us in keeping the United Nations together he himself, and the other Congolese leaders, will look after the Congo in their own good time, in their own way, and no one here, and no wise person in the General Assembly, wants anything else. BC/aJ 116 (Mr* Aiken, Ireland)

But I want to say to President Kasavubu today that we are having some difficulty in keeping together in the United Nations. The Conciliation Commission was appointed in good faith to conciliate .not to impose any settlement upon anyone in the Congo. I believe that it vill take some time for the preparations to be made which will seem appropriate to the President and the other Congolese authorities and which will give some promise of a good reception for the Commission when it reaches the Congo and of the success of its work. Might I, therefore, make the following suggestion? If the President thinks fit,'could he not make some public statement for the Press that he would welcome the Conciliation Commission under the conditions which he has set out and that, meanwhile, he would invite some representative of the Secretary-General or a member of the Conciliation Commission — that could be settled between the Secretary-General and the President --to ccme to the Congo as soon as possible in order to collaborate with him in making the necessary preparations to receive the Commission in circumstances which would make for the success of its work?

Mr. EL-ZAYAT (United Arab Republic): In the name of my delegation I vish to welcome His Excellency the President of the Republic of the Congo to this meeting. I would merely say this: Since President Kasavubu states that he vill have to consult with people in the Congo, I would appeal to him to convey to them that the only concern of all the members of the Conciliation Commission, of the Advisory Committee, and indeed of the United Nations, is to see that the integrity of the Congo is preserved and that it continues to enjoy a full and healthy independence. As for the so-called intervention — I think that "assistance" is really a better word — of the United Nations, I may say that my own country had occasion to welcome the assistance of the United Nations, and, indeed, we remain grateful to the United Nations for that assistance. We do hope that the assistance which the United Nations may render to the Congo will be equally fruitful. BC/aj 117-120

Mr. IBRAHIM (Federation of. Malaya): In the name of the . ; . _, Federation of Malaya I should like, to express my appreciation, to His Excellency, President Kasavubu, for taking the trouble to be present this evening and to assist this Committee., We of the Federation of Malaya are grateful that-President Kasavubu .,-.. • appreciates the.real purpose for which the Conciliation Commission was ... • established and we are pleased to note that he regards this initiative as part and parcel of United Nations assistance which would be acceptable to and welcomed by the people of the-Congo and by frLm personally. , . ; ".: • RSH/mh 121 (Mr. Ibrahim^ Federation cf Malaya)

We appreciate the need for preparation, especially the psychological preparation of the people in the Congo in order that they might accept and welcome this Conciliation Commission, and I think that we should take heed of the views that have "been expressed hy President Kasavubu, and I am sure that those views will he most helpful to us in the Advisory Committee in our decisions regarding instructions or recommendations to the Conciliation Commission regarding the planning of the date of its departure and so on. In associating myself with the sentiments that have been expressed by the Foreign Minister of Ireland and other 'speakers before me, I should like to make an appeal on behalf of the Federation of Malaya that President Kasavubu, and I am sure he will, will try to make this preparation as soon as possible so that we can start helping in this work of conciliation in the Congo and produce the desired successful results that he himself has said he wishes to see.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; The President Informs me that he will now have to leave, and I think that in these circumstances this part of our discussion tonight will have to be concluded. That does not in any way preclude a continued discussion to take into consideration what we have learned from the President. Before thanking you, Mr, President, for your gracious attendance, I may perhaps say a few words myself. I think that there has been one important result of this discussion, and that is the meeting of minds as to the character of this mission and as to its desirability. Mny I be permitted, Mr. President, CUE Secretary-General, to emphasize the views expressed by the Foreign Minister of Ireland regarding the wider aspects of this problem, aspects of which I know you are quite aware but which, all the same, we will always have to keep before our minds, I think that for that reason it is essential that the initiative taken by the United Nations, in the spirit which you have heard eloquently expressed here, is followed through, and followed through without any unnecessary delay. Seeing it, as you do, as part of an assistance offered with the best rill in the vorld to help, but also with great concern about the general aspects of thie problem, I am sure that you will lend your valuable assistance towards making this mission a success. .1 RSH/mh 122-125 (The Secretary-General)

You will certainly wish to take into consideration the views expressed here regarding how that can be done* • . . . ..'•-. -.:••-..• We have a front here in the United Nations which is not quite easy to handle, • We have a front also in relation to the public and public opinion, which has,to be kept: in mind. There is one thing I think which should-be carefully avoided, ! ' either in the Congo or here, and that is to permit aa. impression to develop' that . there is a split between the Government and the country you represent and the i- Organization which is trying to help that country and you. Tor that reason,. I think that a first, very helpful'step would be if you could see your way to .explaining •••'•• publicly where Ve are at present in this cnae. We will have to do it on our side, but your word will carry a special authority, especially, of course,.in • the Congo/ and, I would cay, generally with public opinion. ' I think that after the further-discussion which.the numbers of this .. . . Committee may wish to have now, which undoubtedly will lead to certain conclusions, it would be most helpful if you would'grant me the privilege of having a renewed talk with you in order to 'tell youj about what developed in this 'Committee and; in order to see what can be done--in co-operation to further..-the-object we all have • ,-:- in mind and-to facilitate-the w6rk of the Commission and to prepare its . worls, in such a way as to give it the maximum chance.of success. For that reason,vif you will permit me, I would, like to call upon you...later tomorrow and before you leave, in order to inform you about what developed here and also to. consult'with you about what steps can be- taken by the two sides to further the common objective.. With these words, I'think I have summed up what can be said at £his stage,,,., and I wish agaia^ to tell, you what has been told to you fr.onr many representatives at this table, how happy and gratified we. have been to have-had this chance, of an.exchange of views with vcu, .1' wish to express, on behalf of all the members of the Committee, and on behalf of the United Nations, our gratitude for your attendance. '••''• ••••.•..*••:• '.•'..•••:/ T : ... -.*••• • ..••.. '••"•. ••••.•-•- . .= . AP/rh 126

President Kasavubu withdrew, The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I think we must now return to our own immediate and practical tasks* We have all listened with attention to this discussion and to the views expressed "by the President. I think that we should note in more professional language, unlike the language which is natural, when directly addressing him, that we have made progress in one important respect: there is no basic split of views between the President and us as regards the usefulness of this operation, if properly staged and carried through. I think also that this discussion has helped very much to clarify the views of the Committee in a way which would make it easier for the President, in his turn, to explain to others where we stand and what we are aiming at. However, there was a "but" which we all noted, and the "but" was a very serious one. He felt, and felt, I think, with the greatest sincerity, if you permit me to say so, that if this Committee were to go as matters now stand, without his having had any chance to prepare the ground on the spot, the chances for a useful operation were very limited indeed. It is not a question of ascertaining the degree of co-operation from his side. That, I think, we can take for granted. But it ic now c question of ascertaining the right kind of reaction and response from those many others who are important to the work. I feel for my part that this Committee must take into the most serious consideration these views expressed by him and must take into the most serious consideration also the possible value for the success of the operation of his co-operation on the lines which he indicated. I do not know, and I do not want to try to anticipate, the conclusions of this Committee as regards the practical arrangements. I feel for my part that if there is a decision on a delay, such a delay need not be a long one or should not be, so to say, indefinite; because, certainly, the views expressed here as to the urgency are very relevant; and in my private conversation with the President I did my best to impress on him the importance, also from the point of view of the Congo, that this is carried through without postponements which can be avoided with a bit of goodwill and a bit of energy. AP/rh 127-130

(The Secretary"General)

.I.now leave the floor to you because it is for you to see what you want to. conclude from this discussion as regards especially the time of departure and what other steps may "be considered desirable in.this context* 131-135

Mr. Jaja WACHUKU (Nigeria): I do not know whether the Secretary-General himself can give any indication, considering the conversation he had, as to what might be a suitable time. When the President was asked how much time he thought would be sufficient for his preparation, he said that it was the nature of the preparation that would determine the time• Well, that is not very helpful to us as a Commission. I do not know whether he discussed any details as to the difficulties that he has to overcome/other than the general psychological preparations., and so on. But all he offered was a rather broad expression that does not pin anybody down to any particular point, I am saying this because there are members of the Commission who have come especially from their respective States for this purpose* If it is going to take a week or two, we should know that, so that those who have to go back may go back. All of us have put off certain commitments. My affairs have been dislocated in regard to many matters. I should know definitely whether I must stay here. I have certain engagements which I have to postpone, and one cannot go on doing that indefinitely. If it will take two weeks or three weeks or a month, if it is something that we are going to do during the recess, we should have some idea about that. The situation in the Congo is changing from day to day — in fact, from hour to hour. I hope that the President appreciates the position fully. Prom the discussion that we have had, it is quite clear that tomorrow's departure must be cancelled. There can be no doubt that that is off, and that certain administrative measures are necessary in relation to airlines, and all that. I.think it is necessary now for the Advisory Committee to rescind its decision that the Commission must leave this week; it was on that basis that we arrived at the decision to assemble in Leopoldville. HG/cn 156 (Mr, Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

I think that this Committee -will also necessarily have to revise its .,.-..,. former decision, and then let the Commission itself decide on the date,.."based upon the information which it may get -from the Secretary-General, because .-;-,'. -. everything is open now. • - • ......

The SECRETARY«GEHERAL! It is very difficult for me to reply. . Obviously, it is for the President, not myself, to explain what kind of difficulties, he .might have. But may I venture a guess?, I would say that he has, after a lajjse of quite some time> come to the point where he is reasonably convinced of the , usefulness of this mission* Those in the Congo have not had the same. experience, the same contacts, and I guess that is the whole story. He will have to be a little bit of a missionary for his-new .faith. , . As regards to time, the President himself said that it depended upon his experience on the spot. I feel, however, that for the reasons you indicate it is necessary to try and be a little bit more firm about it* And that is. one . reason why I asked .him to have a meeting ..tomorrow — not.here around this table, but directly with him — because I do believe that it can be mode understood that there must be some kind o£. an agreement between us and him as regards a timetable — at(least a tentative timetable... For us to make plans without at . this stage haying his support, 4-t seems to me, would be a very vain .exercise. On the other hand, it is impossible.not to make any plans at all. Therefore, we are forced to come to some kind of an understanding with him as regards c. reasonable timetable. ,

.For my part, I would.then wish to start out from what he said himself. %I would like, in that context, very much to have the advantage, if I could, of the support of the Chairman of the Conciliation Commission; that is to say, Mr. Minister, if the two of us could have a talk with President Kasavubu, I think that would be very practical because you can then bring out all those complications which worry you,

Mr* COOPER (Liberia): T think we have to decide now whether this Commission will stay in New York for a week or two weeks, or whether the members of the Commission will go to their respective countries pending the decision of (Mr. Cooperj Liberia)

President. KasaVubu. So I fully agree with ydur suggestion, Mr. Secretary- General, that you, together with the Chairman of the Conciliation Commission, contact President Kasavubu to determine this matter. If it is a week, the Commission is prepared to wait. If it is more than a week, the Commission will have to disband or will have to go to the Congo and wait until he is ready.

Mr. Jaja WACHUKU (Nigeria): Oh, no.

Mr. COOPER (Liberia): We have to make up our minds as to whether we wait here a week. It will be useless to go there against his will, ik he is not prepared to receive us, the Commission would be in a bad spot. What would it do then? Therefore, we have to find out whether he is prepared to receive us in a week. In that case, the Commission will wait here. If it is longer, then the Commission will disband and reconvene when we get notice that he is prepared to receive us. GSC/mtm

. Mr, IBRAHIM (Federation of Malaya): Mr. Secretary-General I think . there is a lot of merit in your suggestion that perhaps the Chairman of the Conciliation Commission might accompany you tomorrow in your meeting with President Kasavubu and try to see if it would be possible to agree to a time table, I agree as to the difficulty that has been raised by the representative of Liberia, Some of us have been sent specifically for this purpose. We have our own jobs at home, and if the delays exceeds two. weeks, it might be wiser for us to go home and come later to join the Commission. However, if it should be a wait of not exceeding ten days or two weeks, it might be cheaper for us to remain hera and to do some work on our own, getting ready to go to the Congo. But if is more than two weeks, it certainly would present some difficulties to some of us remaining, cooling our. heels here. Perhaps we might have to go home , and Join the Commission when it would be ready to start working.

Mr. AIKEN (Ireland): I take it that it is. part of your functions to. send somebody ahead of the Commission, if President Kasavubu agrees with that procedure. If both of you agreed, I think it would be important to fill this interim, so that something is happening, that preliminary steps are being taken towards the reception of the Conciliation Commission, and that, I think, would have a good public effect. It vould cause some consolidation of opinion, perhaps, in the Congo, and the General Assembly, I think, would appreciate it.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French) : I believe that it would be wiser to refer to another point, to wit, President Kasavubu felt -• quite correctly,! believe — that he must do some psychological ground work in advance. I believe that the suggestion made in our discussion, that before his departure, and perhaps tomorrow, it would be advisable for him to make a statement according to which he accepts the Conciliation Commission which was indicated as a form of assistance coming from the United Nations, and that this work could be of great help to the Congolese in finding a proper solution, because everything which we Bay refers to the Congo. Even before he got there he could prepare the psychological atmosphere. , GSC/mtm

(Mr. Slim, Tunisia)

Taking into account what the President pointed out, ve could not take into account all the factors he referred to and which must confront him in bringing about this preparation. There are two important points: the psychological element, concerning the intentions of this Commission, which has been distorted and perverted in the minds of the people; and as a result of the recent disturbances, I think it would be reasonable for the Commission to postpone its arrival in Leopoldville from a week to ten days, I fully support your suggestion, Mr, Secretary-General, that you and the Chairman of the Conciliation Commission should confer with President Kasavubu tomorrow, and we ask you to find a solution representing about a week or ten days. Once that has been done, we could take all necessary precautions and steps concerning the arrival of the Conciliation Commission, ffi t!Mt« iiT

NR/cw

• " Mr, EL ZAYAT (United Arab Republic): I was wondering, Mr. Secretary-General, whether it would help at all if we fixed Saturday next instead of this Saturday for a meeting in the Congo and leave it. at that,. . unless we get any other delays such as have been happening up to now. The reason. I am asking that is this. Suppose that the President cannot commit himself to any 'tmme or refuses to commit himself to any time. What would then happen ... to us? I mean those who'came from far away to assist in the work of the : ..._.-. Conciliation Commission. This is Just a practical matter;, I wanted1.to know if we were going to be sent back to our countries or stay here. < , ;

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Is it not reasonable to try to look at the • situation again after the talk with President Kasavubii tomorrow, because .it ••-.. has been left a little too vagu* now-really to reach.a decision? . r I wonder whether this timetable on our side is not better expressed as a . wish to see the Commission starting its work at such and such a time, combined with emphasis on all the changes in the situation which would come about if we could not stick to that timetable: that we would have to disband the Commission, that we would have a much more difficult problem to explain, that we would have certainly this and that kind of problem in the General Assembly, and so on and so forth. That is to say, no kind of formal pressure on the date but a very real pressure which is, so to say, built into the very situationt I hope that that will make it possible to arrive at a clarification and, if possible, even an agreement. NR/cn (The

I would, however, like to add that my ^bolJVvimpre&cion is that the President would find it exceedingly.. .difiUxKukli -.£o3PMftliy to tie his hands as to a certain timetable. In fact, I would say, as you will have observed from what he said concerning his acceptance of the Commission as such, it is not what the representative of Nigeria wanted, a formal acceptance. It is a declaration of a generaj. attitude and stand.

Mr. COOPER (Liberia): Mr. Secretary-General, could we not say to Mr. Kasavubu that the Commission would be prepared to stay in New York for ten days, providing he can get his arrangements concluded by that time but that for any period longer than that the members of the Commission would have to return home pending his decision?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; That is what I meant by the, so to say, built-in pressures, which are not of our creation but are in the very nature of facts.

Mr. Jaja WAGIIUKU (Nigeria): Before I say anything, I would like to ask if the Secretary-General can help me in this particular respect. Can he give us an idea of when the General Assembly is supposed to adjourn for the recess?

The SECRETARY -GENERAL; According to a decision taken by the General Assembly in its wisdom, the final day of this session is 17 December. Nobody believes in it as regards the First Committee and perhaps one or two other committees, but I guess that, if you will permit me a slight frivolity, the final date will at least be the day when we take a recess.

Mr. Jaja WACIIUKU (Nigeria): This date is 17 December. The President says he requests at least a week, and perhaps, if he says "at least", we may give him, another week, to be able to get home and make the necessary contacts he NR/cn . (Mr, Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

requires. That would give us two weeks, and we would be getting near;to • ; 17 December. In that case, would it not be'firmer than anything else if we .. .; used this particular date which has been fixed by the General Assembly to be.the,-

date of departure, 17 December — which is a little over two weeks -- so that-; ..

the Commission can go and report later? .: ; DR/mlw 151

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; If you will permit me to say so, I think that that is a very radical idea and I am not sure that the members in general are quite ready for it.

Mr. Jaja WACHUKU (Nigeria): I am saying this because I do not believe that the 17th will "be the final adjournment date of this session of the United Nations; it will be a recess. Certainly the General Assembly will reassemble in the New Year. I cannot see how they can get through all the work they have on the agenda between now and 17 December, It is virtually impossible, and therefore it would be possible for the Commission to go before the General Assembly reassembles; they should have something to report to the General Assembly when it reassembles.

Mr. GEBRE-EG2.Y (Ethiopia); I think that to put it off for two and a half, three and a half weeks actually, is going to create a psychological situation that is going to be very regrettable. First, it will create the impression that the Advisory Committee of the United Nations makes a decision and then somehow goes back on its decision. Some of this of course has been, so to speak>unavoidable. But now to postpone the whole thing for three and a half weeks is, from our point of view,really going to create great difficulties. I think that the solution is for you and the Chairman of the Conciliation Commission to see the President again. I do not think it would be wise to try to get either a categorical affirmative, an acceptance or a rejection. It is just going to create a difficulty. From my point of view, he hae never said, "I do not agree with the idea, I refuse it completely," Therefore, if we find out when he is going, we can give him five or six days. Then it seems to me that the United Nations operations is there, the Conciliation Commission can go. If we make this conditional upon the acceptance of every individual in the Congo, then I think we might as well face the inevitable, that the whole thing is dead. I do not think it should be dead, and the way to make it work is to find out when he is going. He has already accepted the idea, and then five or six days later the Conciliation Commission can go. If we try to get a more DR/mlw 152-155 (Mr. Gebre-Egzy. Ethiopia) affirmative reply, I think we face'the danger of a "no'1 , .-which Is going to be rather seri6us. Instead of wanting some sort of written and sealed'agreement —-f he has given us his acceptance, he has never rejected it. I think we .should-malte use of it. Of course, it is quite good to get some more definitive agreement, but at'the same-time I think the danger is there -that we sho.uld not 1?.e .throvn back again. • •: •• '• • '•:•'• . . ' -.-. •• ' :.:.:;.:. -:\:- ;.- GRR/aJ 156

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I repeat what I said before. I believe it VOUld be wise to postpone this discussion until after a further talk with President Kasavubu. I regret to have to ask you to come to a meeting tomorrow, but I think it is unavoidable. There are also two other things which I think we should consider. We should look at the situation which prevails-at the present. We have had a series of regrettable incidents, not only the one around the Ghana Embassy but also other things in which the United Nations has been involved. Further, we have to take a stand, I think, on the question of some kind of a report. I have a draft, which I could have circulated tomorrow. Of course, it was made in the light of what we knew this morning, but it may yet serve as a starting point for an agreement on what kind of a report should be presented. I believe that this report, which I considered necessary already as mattera stood yesterday, today has become even more necessary because now something simply must be said and some kind of a statement made to the General Assembly -when there is what may be interpreted as a change of policy. We certainly have to counter any misunderstandings so I would therefore suggest to you that we agree on a time tomorrow when we can review the situation in the light of the further talks -with President Kasavubu and also look at these two other matters. From your point of view, I suppose the evening is the best time; shall we say 5 o'clock?

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I would suggest k o1clock or perhaps 3 o'clock; we have to go to our homes after the morning meetings.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; There are no committees tomorrow afternoon, so let us say 3 o'clock. There is another matter which I should mention, perhaps for the sake of good order; I take it that it is the consensus that your departure tomorrow is cancelled. It should be on the record.

The meeting rose at 7.55 p.m. CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York, .on Thursday, 2k November 1960, at 3 p.m. FGB/gd

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; In accordance with what was said yesterday, I believe that we can consider ourselves as having an informal agenda comprising three points — the question remaining from yesterday concerning the time of departure of the Conciliation Commission; the question of recent incidents and their impact on various contingents; and, finally, the question of a report to the General Assembly. If that is agreeable to you, I shall start with the first item, which certainly is the most urgent. Mr. Wachuku and I had this morning the advantage of a long conversation with President Kasavubu. I do not think it is necessary to go into any detail. We made, I think, very fully the point for a decision on the time of a first meeting of the Conciliation Commission in Leopoldville. I do believe, Mr. Minister, that there was really no argument which was not used of those arguments which are valid. The reaction of President Kasavubu was as follows. He would cancel his plans to visit various capitals on the way back to Leopoldville, He is leaving tonight. He would thus return to Leopoldville as quickly as possible. He would engage in the preparations which he promised. He could not say how successful or speedy those preparations might be, but he could give a definite commitment to communicate with us at the end of next week, roughly a week from now. He would then tell you, through me, what his impressions were concerning the preparations, and thus what his conclusions were as to the proper time of arrival. I pointed out to him that that took care of one thing and one set of difficulties -- his own uncertainty about what situation he would meet in the Congo -- but that it did not take care of the other side of the difficulty, the one which we have here, the difficulty here referring not only to the practical complications for the members of the Conciliation Commission, which have already assembled here, but also to the work of the General Assembly, the discussion of the Congo in the Assembly, and related matters. For that reason I made the point that if he, on his side, gave the promise to communicate with us on the basis of preparations undertaken at once, and we could expect his observations by the end of next week, on its own responsibility, if it so pleased the Advisory Committee, the Advisory Committee could anticipate . FGB/jvm ;> (The Secretary-General) a favourable outcome, or at least hope for a favourable outcome, of these first preparations, and on that basis fix a date for a first meeting in Leopoldville which we would try to stick to, but which, of course, would be conditional in the sense that if the information received at the end of next week were too discouraging the time for the meeting might have to be reconsidered. President Kasavubufs' reaction to this was that he would never on his ovn responsibility propose a date, because he simply did not know. He could foresee that we might find such a date was unnecessarily late. He could also, for his part, foresee that it night be found that such a date was unwisely early. All the same, Mr. Wachuleu and I stuck to this line that the preliminary fixing of a date was reasonable, and I think also we used those arguments which could well be brought forward in favour of the view that if this ComnHtee, on the basis of the promise that we would have a report from President Kasavubu ~: at the end of next week, made a preliminary decision that the Commission should-" * meet, let us say a fortnight from now, on the 8th, then it really would be up to the Congolese authorities — in the first place, of course, the President and the Government --to try to meet that deadline and to do what they could really do to make it possible for the Committee to follov the plan decided upon. That is to say that while, on the one side, I took on your behalf — but with reservations for your own final stand -- the responsibility for fixing a date now, he, on the other hand, should recognize that the fixing of such a date did introduce an element of moral pressure. They would have to try to live up to it. That is the shape, I think, in which we had to leave it, because we could not get out of the basic difficulty that the President found that he just simply had not the basis for any firm commitment. From my own point of view, I would say that this has moved us forward from yesterday because there was, perhaps, more a note of hope than of conviction in our interpretation of what the President said yesterday. I would, for my part, say that what was said today, and the whole reaction, including this clear commitment to communicate with us on the stage of preparations at the end of next "week, means that there is at present no question about the acceptance of this part of the United Nations assistance. FGB/jvm

(The Secretary-General) It is a question) perhaps> of some days earlier* or some week later than the date mentioned* It does not solve our practical problem, but it certainly brings us over the hump as regards the touchy question of policy. Before inviting you to take the floor for whatever comments or suggestions you may have, I should like to address myself to Mr, Wachuku in order to ask him if he would amplify or clarify, or perhaps in some respects correct, the picture I have given of our conversation.

Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria): I think that your statement was an accurate account of the position, Mr. Secretary-General, and that it would be best for •ambers to comment on it as you have suggested. DR/cw 6

._: Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): I would say that there is definitely a ray of hope as far as our dealipgs with President Kasavubu is concerned. I have no doubt that he .is a reasonable man, and that, left to himself, the attempt which.we are trying to make to.help resolve the situation would be very easy indeed. .But I am sure that everyone here knows -- at least my delegation and my country, knows -- that the real issue is a military one, that at the moment the strongman in the -Congo, for that matter in Leopoldville, is Colonel Mobutu. It is true that President Kasavubu has been a very good politician in the sense that he. is. very astute and has not attempted to stand in the way of Colonel Mobutu, and therefore his position has been preserved as such as President. Colonel Mobutu's position has been quite clear up to now: that he is completely opposed to any United Nations action in the Congo and^if he ' ' were to have his own way I am sure that he would like to drive the United Nations troops out of the Congo. •.- I hope, that this background is understood by the Committee, that it is not that President Kasavubu is not willing to have conciliation but that there are impediments in his own way; his own position is involved in this. That is why it is important for us to consider whether we want conciliation; in other words, the United Nations would force its offer of conciliation. If Colonel Mobutu still maintains his opposition to this effort at conciliation -- I am saying that the real trouble is not President Kasavubu -- because we are painfully aware that Colonel Mobutu, does not want to seize political power — who has always expressed -- and we know this very well -- the view that the time must soon come when parliamentary institutions should be worked out in the Congo and that it would be necessary for him to maintain his position as a military power. DR/cw 7-10 (Mr. Quaison-Sackey. Ghana)

Secondly, he himself is having difficulties in his army, because he by no means controls the entire army in the Congo. As long as politics and all this work is confined to Leopoldville, he is in a very strong position. Thus the gist of my intervention is that we are definitely going to face difficulties which would be without index, difficulties which President Kasavubu himself will face --in which case, if Colonel Mobutu does not give in to superior counsel on the part of President Kasavubu, who at the moment depends on Colonel Mobutu for his power because he is maintained there for military action, then what is the move to be taken by this Advisory Committee? To my mind there are two main considerations. We are the Advisory Committee advising the Secretary-General about UN action in the Congo, militarily and technically; secondly, we are advising on the question of conciliation, and I feel that these two elements in the situation are mutually related. I think that as far as conciliation is concerned we have gone very far indeed. The ground is prepared,, we have appointed a Conciliation Commission, we have got the officers and so on. NR/ds H

' '• '•-.-' '• (Mr. Quaison-Sackey, Ghana) The' second aspect is: would 'We want to pursue conciliation without having proper Security safeguards? In other words, is the United Nations Command in the Congo prepared to make its position felt toy the Congolese Army, which, as Ghana has always said, is at the moment irresponsible and not properly organized and heeds to be properly organized? Would the 'United Nations; be prepared'to restrict the movements of the Army, which may very well stop us from helping people like President Kasavubu who'themselves may want some conciliation? I am: afraid I have talked very expansively and on wide ground, but it is \' because there lurk in my mind so *any imponderables, and I feel that we cannot •"• ' very well discuss this natter without understanding the position as clearly as possible both from the military aspect and from the political aspect,

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I would add two bits of comment on what you said, Sir. The first is that I would take it for granted that the reaction Cf President Kasavubu a week from now would be a reaction which very largely would reflect Just what you say, the result that he has achieved with Colonel Mobutu -- also with others, of course, but certainly that is part of the picture and as he is the one it is most easy for him to meet of all the people who serve. For that reason, in the event of a favourable report from President Kasavubu, I think that we can forget about the worry you have pointed to now. The other point -- "make its military power felt?" -- is, as you know, a much more complicated one because from the beginning we have been guided by two principles, both of which I think are sound: that the United Nations troops should not take military initiative, and that the Congolese Army remained under the control of the constitutional authorities jf the Congo, and for that reason we could not, unless requested to do so by the constitutional author it iea,inmobilize the Army. That remains the dilemma. It has been before us all the time, and we all remember an early stage when some military experts felt very strongly that the ANC should be taken into what I might call safe custody, but where we on the United Nations side said, "it doesn't matter very much what we think, because we \ have no right to do it, given the theory." It may be a good theory or a bad theory. I think it is a good theory because I think that with the opposite theory no country in the world would ever dare to invite United Nations trcops again. NR/ds 12-15

(The Secretary-General) Any Anyway, Sir, I permit myself these two observations in the margin, not to change the tenor of what you wanted to say but because they are Just pieces of additional information which we may all wish to recall.

Mr. JHA (India): Mr. Secretary-General, thank you very much for your report of the conversations you had with President Kasavubu. It seems quite clear that no date can be fixed for the departure of the Commission, especially after we have established contact with President Kasavubu and had talks with him. I understood you to mean that he will send a communication to you, and perhaps through you to the Advisory Committee, a week hence. MW/rl '-.16 ••••' ''•-.*.. ••'*• '"••'•' (Mr» Jha, India) If that is so, I am afraid that we shall have to wait for this week, A date might be set for the Advisory Committee to meet after a week to consider vhat, if any, reply has come from President Kasavubu. But meanwhile, it seeins also essential/ provided conditions in Leopoldville do not continue to be as chaotic and dangerous as they have been reported during the last few days, and provided the United Nations is functioning there in the way that •it has been, that every effor't should'be made by your Special Representative, in contact with Mr, •Ke.^.vubu, to ensure that the arrival of the Conciliation Commission is as-surecU - ' Whafc I fear is that the President,who, as you said, was largely persuaded here,.barring the fixation of the date, might be dissuaded, after he goes to Leopoldville, under other' advice. That is the great danger, and I think perhaps some daft steering at the other end might be necessary. But, naturally, it is for you to consider how best that can be done. Even apart from President Kasavubu's agreement as to a date, I think there is the larger question of the conditions in Leopoldville. Can the Commission go when it is the favourite pastime of the ANC forces, who, at any rate at the present moment, seem to be completely out of control and roving the city as a disorganized rabble, to catch hold of anybody they can get, overturn cars, arrest United Nations people and beat them? Surely in those conditions, neither would it be appropriate for the Commission to go, nor would it be inconsonant with the dignity of the United Nations to send a Conciliation Commission to a country to parley with a Government which is not able to ensure the minimum security and personal safety of the members of the Commission, I think that we shall have to reconsider the whole situation and it seems to me that, right now, the whole emphasis has shifted to this very dangerous situation that has arisen in Leopoldville, lou are fully aware of that; all members of the Advisory Committee are aware of it — this question was raised even in the Assembly — and, from all reports we have had, the situation seems to be getting much worse. When I say "we" I mean my Government. i I have had a number of communications from my Government informing me, and expressing grave concern, about these incidents according to which — and I should like to know from you what the latest situation is and whether those MW/rl 17-20 (Mr. Jha, India) reports are confirmed — personnel of the Indian army vho are not part of the combatant forces — all our forces are unarmed — have been molested and beaten, and there are reports of some being very seriously injured. I do not think that I exaggerate this situation when I say that all this news — including of course, the injuries to our own personnel whom we have contributed to the Congo — has created great shock and distrust among the people of India. Our Parliament is nesting right now and there is great agitation there, and I myself do not know exactly what the final reactions of my Government will be* But I can say here that it is very seriously considering this whole situation, with particular reference, of course, to the treatment of Indian personnel for whom my Government and Parliament have paramount responsibility* GR/rh - 21 (Mr. Jha, India)

So the situation, I would like to inform you, Mr. Secretary-General and members of the Advisory Committee, is a very serious one. It is a situation vhose seriousness does not arise merely because our personnel have been asaauuted; it arises from the whole complex of events in Leopoldville and our anxiety is certainly increased by. the fact that Indian personnel have been treated in this fashion -- personnel who have gone in the service of the Itoited Nations,, most of whom are unarmed and are doing humanitarian work in hospitals and that kind of thing. I wanted to bring this to your attention and I would be very grateful if you could tell us flrtt about the iacts of the -situation and secondly what steps, what measures, what so.yaence of future action you yourself contemplate to deal with the situation. It is obvious that this thing cannot be allowed to rest where it is. There will be a cert&in -rsasuvc of involvement, perhaps in the not very distant future, of the Gener&l AsvoHftly itself, which is now seized of the matter and has to give appropriate dir^c-bives and take appropriate decisions. I am not suggesting right now that we should iJnmediately rush to the General Assembly, but the whole situation is very grave; United Nations personnel are being attacked, their operations are being made impossible, and it is an affront to the dignity and authority of the United Nations and the World Organization. These are matters which are fraught with the gravest consequences for the future of the Organization. I would therefore like, Mr. Secretary-General, to place it plainly before you and the Advisory Committee. I would have come to it later, but I think that even the going of the Commission is very intimately connected with this aspect of the matter which really deserves very serious consideration. You will have to do a lot of thinking; the reactiocs from my Government, at any rate, are likely to be very strong. I have already had an opportunity of meeting you this morning and expressing to you my Government's grave concern. We would like to know the real news from Leopoldville, we would like to know what is happening and we should be grateful also to know what you think should be the next step. One small suggestion I might make is really in regard to a matter for your consideration, quite apart from what can be done in the General Assembly or by the diplomatic means which are open to you. It seems to me essential that there should be a greater deployment of United Nations forces in Leopoldville.'itself. I believe GR/rh 22-25 (Mr. Jha, India) the present figure for the Congolese army in Leopoldville is put at It-, 000, whereas the United Nations forces number only 2,500. It is not my intention to euggect that the United Nations force should fight the Congolese army, hut in the present situation the fact that they are in numerical inferiority, that they are subject to natural and very legitimate restrictions on their right of taking action — because they are not supposed to fire, they are an army of pec.ce — all these things must be very demoralising factors and have their effect on the morale of ths United Nations force» Perhaps also; contrarivias; they may be factors encouraging the other s1.de really to take the !>.•:* into their own hands and assault, molest and beat up United Natiocg personnel* 1 do not know vhewh-ir anything will be possible, but it seems at present that the trouble centra is mainly Lecpoldville and it is a matter for consideration vhc«h*r frteps should not be taken to see that protection and security are provided for tiie 'fcxitsd Nations personnel serving in Lecpoldville. However, as I said, that is s. mtcer for you to consider within the nature of the present operations and see what can ba done. For the present, I will confine myself to these remarks. RSH/bg 26

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I had intended to revert to the broad and important subject which you raised in your intervention in connexion with the question of reconciliation under, so to say, the second point of our agenda, because it certainly merits study, consideration and discussion in its own right. I felt that it was perhaps more practical to take stock of the situation as regards the tine-table question first. However, if it would be the wish of the members of the Committee that we go into the other matter, we can, of course, do so now. If we do that, I would separate two aspects of it. One is what we know, which, in fact, is very little, and the other one is what we h^rfc, on the Advisory Committee beeIs, should do about it. The second point I think we can leave for consideration somevhat later during our meeting, because it is cnly indirectly related to the question of reconciliation, while, of course, on the other hand the facts are directly related and, therefore, may hsvo to coiae into consideration now. I said that in fact we know very little. We kno-w surpricingly little, and I do not know exactly why. *'"'- '.••,'• ... Quite apart from the incidents round the Ghana Embassy, which are very fully documented in the report to the General Assembly, we got to know on Tuesday about a series of other incidents, the locking up of officers at Camp Leopold, keeping others under house arrest, the stopping and the confiscating of cars, ransacking, manhandling, taking away United Nations licence plates, and what not. The information was fairly broad and rather imprecise. It was, however, sufficiently definite for me to protest formally to President Kasavubu in writing and this protest can, of course, be made available to you if you are interested in it. I also had the matter borught up directly in conversation with President Kasavubu himself, first on Tuesday, and then again yesterday Indirectly and then again today* RSH/bg 27-30 (The Secretary-General)

Today, I pointed out that there must be a decision based on a choice. Was there a wish to have the co-operation and the assistance of the United Nations7 If so, incidents of this type must be completely ruled out, public reaction must be disciplined, and so on. On the other hand, if there was no wish to have the United Nations assistance, then it was better to say so than to have this kind of thing going on. There was, of course, no question about what was the choice of President Kaeavubu and Mr. Bomboko. Again, it is a question which is concentrated in some few people in Leopoldville. I think we must regard these recent incidents very much in the light of the highly volatile temper of the Leopoldviille people which has been incensed by the incident on Monday night. But, all the same, it is deeply worrying because it indicates that a deep misunderstanding of the United Nations operation and position has been permitted to spread. What I have said indicates the information we had as of Tuesday morning, and three or four reactions which I have shown to President Kasavubu, the first one formally and the ethers personally. I expected to get more detailed information on these various things, which obviously must be clearly on record, in the course of yesterday. I did not get it. When I heard especially the Indian experience, which I did not learn about directly from Leopoldville, ,I sent a cable requesting detailed information of these incidents and other similar incidents regarding other United Nations personnel. I have so far not had any reply to these requests, and this is a point which I do not know exactly how to explain. It may be that the explanation is a simple one, that they feel It is more essential to give fairly full, precise and accurate accounts than to rush in with this and that additional information which does not add very much to the general indications they have already given. Bc/hh -31

(The Secretary-General)

I hope that that Is the explanation. It is, however, quite obvious that, when we have the concrete details, these various developments maybe considered to be so serious as to call for a further, formal reaction. That may very well be a reaction based on advice from this Committee. I hope that nothing in the situation would warrant a sharp reaction of the type that'would undoubtedly be forthcoming if at this stage the matter were to be put before the General Assembly. Of course-, there could be a situation in which the matter simply would have to be reported to the Assembly. However, in view of the kind of debate that ths,1: would provoke — a debate which would not be constructive for efforts to straighten the matter out with more quiet diplomacy — I would rather that the quastion should not be taken up in that form until we have a more definite pattern than the one we now have, which, as I have said, may to a large extent l>e explained as a reaction to the death of Lieutenant Colonel Kokolo rjad others on the Congo side. As an illustration of the atmosphere, I feel that I should mention the transcript which we have Just received of a Press conference given by the Interior Commissioner, Mr. Nussbaumer, in Leopoldville. It is, of course, an all-out attack on our people for the incident on Monday; that was to be expected, because it is the only way in which, in this kind of warfare by words, one's own people can be exculpated. I shall not go into that, but I think that I should Just read out the following passage from the transcript of what Mr. Nussbauraer said: *The Congo was not at war against the UN, and the regrettable incidents would fade into the past. He said, however, that he was wondering whether the UN presence was still needed. The UN had come at a moment of friction between the Belgian and the Congolese armies. It wished to stay here now because of good pay and good conditions. In some respects UN assistance was, of course, needed, but all these generals and all these contingents certainly were not." I do not think that there is need for any comment, beyond the sad note that they obviously do not know what the situation in the Congo is. BC/fah

(The Secretary"Q^n.eral)

That is really all that I can aay regarding these incidents. As nay be seen, I leave open the question of what kind of conclusions might be drawn from these facts as to further action that should be taken pending the receipt of detailed information* I should like to revert to that after the discussion about conciliation. Another question was raised concerning the estimated strength of the United Nations force in Leopoldville. It is as follows: the Tunisian brigade, 2,400; a Sudanese battalion, 500; a Malayan contingent, 650; an Indonesian company, 150; and miscellaneous (Canadian, Indian and Pakistani), 500 — which gives a total of lj-,200. It should also be remembered that the quality of thsee troops is a great deal higher than the quality o.f the troops that may be put up on the Congo side* Thus I think, if we are to talk in such unpleasant terras, ihat the military superiority in Leopoldville is on the United Nations side. HG/mh 36

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana); I wish to address nysalf specifically to the timing of the Conciliation Commission's visit since I see that we are finding it a bit difficult to speak on this matter. If we maintain our position that there shall not be any veto 'of .our actions or decisions, then I am afraid we cannot act. It is very difficult for us to act here. If we get a favourable reply on Friday of next week, then the Conciliation Commission can go, as you suggested, Mr. Secretary-General, by the 7th or 8th. There is no question at all about that. But suppose that on Friday of next week the response is unffavourable. What do we do then? I think that this is the issue which the Cojimittee should consider. If the response next week is unfavourable --in other words, if President Kasavubu says that there is no need for any conciliation -- what is our next action? I believe that if the Committee will discuss this matter on the basis I have stated, it might be helpful. I cannot see how we can oppose President Kasavubu now that he and his delegation are seated. He is recognized as an authority; he no longer is a mere combatant, a mere personality in the conflict. His hand has been strengthened by dint of his being seated here. Therefore, if there is any opposition to conciliation, then I am afraid we have no way out. I would urge my distinguished friends to consider the issue along these lines. If the answer is definitely yes, the Conciliation Commission can go in a week, by the 7th or the 8th. If there is an unfavourable reply, then I cannot see what can be done, unless, of course, we want to maintain our position that no personality should maintain a veto over our actions,

Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia): First of all, I would like to recall my statement in one of the previous meetings when I was considering the first letter of President Kasavubu. I said that our delegation was of the opinion that the Conciliation Commission must go to the Congo. After having met Mr. Kasavubu, and after having read the second letter, our delegation still insists that the Conciliation Commission depart as soon as possible for the Congo, j HG/mh 37-1*0 (Mr. Wirjopranoto, .Indonesia)

We have here a draft of a report for the General Assembly, and we have to fix the date for the first meeting of the Conciliation Commission in Leopoldville. Of course, we have to be patient. We are patient; but too much patience, I think, will be detrimental to the United Nations and to the Congolese people themselves. TL/jvm In

(Mr. Wirjopranoto, Indonesia)

I would agree to fixing the date in the first week of December for the first meeting of the Conciliation Commission. I have no reason for exploinirg the reasoning behind this idea, because everyone is already familiar with the matter. The only point I would like to state now is this -- and it is not quite a new one. The United Nations is now confronted with two kinds of effort. The first effort is to have the Belgian troops withdrawn from the Congo as soon as possible — immediately. This effort has military aspects. The other effort is now on the political front, confronting the Belgians. In the opinion of our delegation, it is the intrigues of the Belgians -that now make the situation more complicated and more deteriorated. Perhaps in our effort on thin political front we shall be obliged to make another effort, a stronger effort, just as on the military front. I think perhaps that is necessary too, but I do hope — I do hope -• it will not be necessary. For 'this reason — because it is a kind of political move and political countermove between the United Nations &nd the Belgians -- our delegation would propose that the Conciliation Commission be sant as soon as possible.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): Mr. Secretary-General, we have been caused considerable anxiety and concern by what Ambassador Jha told us concerning utterances to Indian personnel* What might happen to Indian personnel might also happen to other people, other personnel* We have people, as you know, in the Congo, and we depend on you, Mr. Secretary-General, for full and detailed reports about the utterances to our people. Therefore, may I request that we be kept in touch with and properly informed of all these utterances. We realize that, as Mr, Krishna Menon said here one day, soldiers are intended for this purpose — to be killed at times/to be maltreated and to suffer all these things, but certainly not unnecessarily and not at all if it can be avoided. There is one thing I would like to say. I do not wish to indulge in gratuitous advice, but, Mr. Secretary-General, at a time like this it is particularly important that we be extremely careful even in our discussions and in the choice of our words. Words cause wounds at times which are not easily healed, and they can harden attitudes. We are passing through a stage in the i affairs of the Congo where some leaders might think -- quite wrongly of course — (Mr. Hasan, Paki atan) that they have reached a position where they might very well disregard the United Nations — I think wrongly, and I think it would be harmful for t^e people of the Congo, "but those leaders might not appreciate that at firot. However, we, on our side, should

Mr. BARNES (Liberia): I believe that the Advisory Committee has made a great step forward and that it has overcome a great hurdle in being able to convince President Kasavubu of the need forthe Conciliation Commission to go to his country and also in having had President Kasavubu accept this Conciliation Commission. Thus I do not think that there is any ground for undue pessimism.; as to President Kasavubufs ability to convince Colonel Mobutu or such other leaders in the Congo of the necessity for such a Commission^ coming to the Congo• President Kasavubu has been here. As a result of the contacts which have been made with him, he, I believe, now understands the true intentions of the Conciliation Commission, and that fact was evinced by his suggestion that time be allowed for him to go to the Congo and prepare the ground for the acceptance of the Conciliation Commission. I think that we all know that recent developments in the Congo make.it rather unpropitious for us to hasten the departure of the Conciliation Commission now, but until, such, time as President Kasavubu has returned to the Congo and laid this groundwork* So I think that what we should do is to follow the suggestion of the Secretary-General and designate 8 December as the date either of departure of the Conciliation Commission or the time of its meeting in Leopoldville, tentatively, and with the reaction of the President since, as I have already said, I do not think there is any need for undue pessimism that he will not be able to convince Colonel Mobutu and the others of the need of this Conciliation Commission to go to the Congo. We could set December either aa the time of departure for the Conciliation Commission or for its time of arrival there and wait and hear from President Kasavubu as to the time he feels is desirable for us to come.

' Mr* CI35E (Senegal) (interpretation from French): It is important for my delegation that we examine the situation with a certain objectivity. We all know that the recent incidents in Leopoldville, which we all regret, have created in that part of the Congo a special situation in which we feel we must calm the feelings of the people, Mr. Kasavubu has honoured us with his presence in this Advisqry Committee, and he has told us in measured terms of his determination to do all in his power to create a healthy atmosphere which would permit the Advisory Committee to attain a positive objective. GR/ds 51

(Mr. niesef Senegal) This leads ire to nay that wo must bo patient. In particular we must not .envonoB. the pr-eaent situation frcn the United. Nations side. As c^reryor.-?. knows, an> as I repoat, public opinion in tho Conge seems to be hardening against the United Nations, and we must do all we can to avoid complicating the situation further. As regards the date, we should await a reply from President Kasavubu, so that wa may fix a date at which the CommisBion ca\i go to Iftopoldville at the eari.vsst possible time.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Does any other Member wish to speak on this subject?

Mr. WACHUK.U (Nigeria): It appears that the consensus of opinion is that we should wait until next weekend, when we receive a communication, before deciding on a date. I think there is another matter that flows from that, if that is the decision that is going to be taken. I refer to the question of what will happen to the Members of my Commission; will they stay here, or will they disperse until they are reassembled? If they disperse, I think it will have a bad effect psychologically, but if they stay on here, may I ask at whose expense? Will it be at the expense of the Governments which nominated them, or at the expense of the United Nations? In the interests of the Members themselves, I think they should know, so that when we take decisions on this line that aspect of the matter should also be considered. I do not want to say anything about the actual fixing of details, since as I said it appears that the Advisory Committee seems to be inclined to leave the other side open. Touching on the other matter concerning the security of the United Nations personnnel in Leopoldville, I do not know what the strength of the United Nations Forces as a whole in the Congo is, but if it is true that Leopold ville is the real centre of trouble at the moment, I do not consider that a strength of I*,200 is enough to keep these turbulent elements in check. I think that for psychological and many other reasons, the United Nations personnel, whether civilian or military, must be given an assurance that as messengers of peace they will not be broken, to pieces by elements of disorder. I do not agree T GR/ds 52-55

(Mr. Wachuku, Nigeria) that that nurrber is sufficient. They must be given an assurance t.hat vhile thsy are ou a nissicn for ths United Nations they will "be protected by the United Nations. That vould not amount to interference in Coagolsse affs-irsj no one is asking the Congolese to protect United Nations personnel; because the machinery of Governmant is not functionning. I 56 (M.r. Jaja Waetoku, Nigeria)

Unrl?r nor/r.3. clr".Dmstaroes, crre of the en.tvrane.^.s whi~.'n the vnttel Nations wculd go'-, froru any go ^rnme;it is that i^s penonneJ v.-,•? .promoted, but If. r.ppearii that the United Nations is giving the protection to everybody, and If -->ome people do not want that protection, surely the United Nations should be :".n a ;:.-,sition to protect .Its own personnel. Thus, not i-nly v:\ll they have e. force I-.-; ke^p in check those people who are likely to disturb the peace of the United Nations personnel, but also enough force to be able to assure strength as a deterrent. I am a man of peace, but, at the same time, I like to prepare for war if necessary. This kind of thing that is going on — ransacking peopleT s houses, disturbing their peace at night, upturning cars, and so on — cannot be conducive to the purpose of the United Nations in trying to serve the Congolese people, I think also that if there is an increase in the Force in the United Nations there, that may give the President certain assurance that the United Nations really vants to strengthen his hand since he has been seated here* I do not know what was the formal decision of the United Nations — whether non-interference means complete surrender to certain elements that do not want to maintain normal peace and tranquillity, I should like the Secretary-General, if possible, to give us, apart from the figure which he gave before, an indication of the total Force which we have in the Congo, their disposition, and whether it will be necessary to send more to Leopoldville, which is the centre of trouble now, in order to strengthen the present Force there and to give assurance to United Nations personnel that their lives will not be endangered unnecessarily.

The_P7!!CRE^AHY>GENEPAL; Before turning to the last point --on which I think our military experts may be ready to give information — I wonder if we cannot wind up the discussion regarding the Conciliation Commission and the time of its departure. I would tentatively like to phrase it this way, which takes .us really to the final phrase of the report: that after further contacts with President Kasavubu, the Advisory Committee will consider the proper time for departure in the light of the report on preparations to be received at the MW/rl 57-60 (The Secretary-General)

end of next week; tentatively, departure in tho fte'; yeeT. of D ^sjnbis.' taa been mentioned , I think that covers everything as far as we have gone; that is to say, ve shall consider it in the light of the report -which has been promised and, tentatively, the week after that has been mentioned o It does not make us ridiculous if ve then have to back out of it; on the other hand, it goes 'on the record that President Kasavubu has promised us this report which, in fact, by implication means acceptance of the Commission, even if it has not been said in so many words.

Mr» JAJA WACHUKU (Nigeria); The first week, or the second week of December?

The 3ECRETAEY~GENERAL! The first week of December — from three to ten. We can be more precise — the week which- begins 5 December.,

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): What precisely is the undertaking. vhich President Kasavubu has given? Is it that he will come here with his advisers and let you know whether he is prepared to accept the Commission?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL t No, not at all. His acceptance is now clearly implied* He goes home directly tonight in order to prepare the ground. That already implies acceptance of the Commission. He will work through the week for preparation. He does not exclude the possibility that, with some luck, he would be able to say: you can come right away. He does not exclude, on the other hand, the possibility of his meeting with difficulties which would make him advise the Committee to wait a little bit longer. He has promised to give his Judgement on the time in the light of his experience in the efforts to prepare the ground at the end of next week. His only commitment is to report on the state of preparation. Again, obviously, that does not make sense short of his having accepted the coming of the Commission. MR/bg 61

Mr» Fu\~AN (rakietrji): Would he be willing or in a portion to overrule'

r The SECREgL-\F;i rGETggAL; That is a subtle question about which I have no rJ.ew.

Mr. HA&AJJ (Pakistan): What I mean is that, if it takes him two, three or six months to make the necessary preparations, that will virtually mean non- acceptance of the Commission, whether or not by courtesy he accepts it; in effect it neans a refusal* I hope he will not do so. I am sure he will not

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I have no doubt about his good faith.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): Nor have I.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; And for that reason, when he expresses himself in this way, it means that it is a question of fairly short time margins. If he were to report at the end of next week, "I have not got anywhere", that is to say, "I, President Kasavubu, may accept but I have not been able to convince the others who wield some power in the country", that is a new situation. But, as I have said, there is no question about his good faith; there is no question about his promise; and I understand the consensus here to be that a final decision should be taken in the light of what he says under those circumstances.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I made known the position of my delegation on this point last night, but there is something that puzzles me. The Head of State of the Congo has accepted the Commission and he has said for all practical purposes that he will receive it. What puzzles me is this. Once he has accepted it, what is the necessity for making 'it conditional upon the acceptance, at least by Implication, of some other people 7 He is the Head of State and he has the authority now. NR/bg

The srgRET/.EY-GEMSRALr Without Interrupting, may I surest that the

Ambassador of Ghana has already given the reply. That Is to say; the formal position is one thing. The distribution of political power in the country floes rot perhaps exactly rhyme with the Constitution. If I may just add one thing, in n.y own words I would say that naturally here we are facing a j.e facto situation. When the President for his part ie agreed; it rcaans quite a lot. It does not, on the other hand, mean that he can guarantee co-operation from all the others that have to co-operate, and they are constitutional or on the margin of the Constitution, let us say. For that reason, as he has no possibility to order them around, even with his constitutional rights, he has felt that he should — to use my term of yesterday — act a little like a missionary for a faith. That is my interpretation. I understood the stand of this Committee to be that he should have a fair chance to be a missionary for such conversions as he may consider necessary. That.Is what I believe is the reply.

Mr* SNOIBSI (Morocco)(interpretation from French): I want to express a little anxiety about this psychological preparation that Mr. Kasavubu has mentioned. If I have understood this psychological preparation, it is a matter of reaching agreement with the various parties which in principle would have to be met when the Conciliation Commission reaches Leopoldville. You know, Mr. Secretary-General, that an attempt at psychological preparation has already taken place once and unfortunately it was destined to failure. I am cpeaking of the round-table effort. President Kasavubu tried to bring togethar around the round table the representatives of the various political groups, and, in view of the military situation that prevailed at the time and the refusal of most of the political chiefs of the Congo, that round-table conference was never held. RSH/bh 66 (Mr* Snousfli. Morocco)

I am very much afraid that If we tie the action of our Conciliation Commission with a psychological preparation which is rather hypothetical, in ray opinion w lain the risk of creating a serious precedent and of prejudicing the work of the Commission* I think that what should concern us, a priori, is the agreement of one of the parties which must "be conciliated, I think that, thanks t • y:uir in^srvertion, tfe hav:< this agreement with one ?arty, Mr, Itesavubu. He is o?iiy one ;.>o?i_it1 cal leader, but he has takoa a e^ep fcrwardo I am af r

Mr, ADEEL (Sudan): I have a little question to ask about the military aspect, and I hope the experts will be able to help ma to understand, I was a little surprised that Colonel Mobutu was able to raise a force of ^,000 troops round him in Leopoldville, Our understanding was that the .Force Publiquo tteo disintegrating and that when he started his so-called coup d'etat he had only 300 soldiers round him, and that was why he was not able to stage a proper coup d*etat. Judging from the photographs I saw a few days ago of this parade in Leopoldville, they impressed me as being a disciplined and very well armed force, I have a little military experience, and sometimes I can get impressions even from photographs, I wonder if any light can be thrown on that,

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I should like to refer that general military question to Dr. Bunche, who probably knows more about it, and then I think that Major Bowitz could give the figures.

Mr. BUNCHE; The strength of the Congolese armed forces in the Leopoldville garrison at Camp Leopoldville has always been in the neighbourhood of 5,000, with the possibility of quickly increasing the strength of that garrison by bringing troops up from Thysville, which is not far away. The question you raised as to how many of these troops may have been subject to the command and authority of Colonel Mobutu is a matter of conjecture, RSH/hh 67-70 (Mr, Bunche) and I do not doubt that this la in no sw.O.1 meamire &Xro related to the question of th>2 source oi' their.: ;pay, vhich h'u been fro:? :;he becv.r.ing •! derisive factor vlth regar-1 to this forca* It was not, I think,, surprising that very substantial numbers of these troops should appear in a parade, Tills has happened "before, and since independence, It happened at the time of independence, and it happened in sorae 3iilil:r..ry displays in Julyo Io was not an unusual night on any Sunday in July t'jid August to see two or three thousand of these '-.roopi'- 'lined up on the parade ground in Camp Leopoldville, How disciplined they would be when faced with a particular situation or crisis, no one could say, and I do not know whether it is possible for any one to say with any authority now what the situation would be. But there were no great numbers of troops involved in the incident on Monday at the Ghana premises. If you were relating the parade to that, I think it should be pointad out very clearly that there were not great numbers of troops Involved in this fighting on Monday on either side — a couple of hundred at the most. BC/mh 71 (Mr* Bunche)

As regards the situation in Leopoldville I would ask Major Bowitz to indicate the deployment of the total United Nations force in the Congo, which numbers about 19,500, This force is deployed in all six of the Provinces. It is said that the situation is critical in Leopoldville, but one should not lose Bi'.ght of •'-.he fact that there are other areas on the Congo today where the Biliuatl'.c regarding fighting and the maintenance of law and order is also serious. The United Nations Command has indicated a rather acute•shortage of troops in, for example, North Katanga, where the situation has been bad for some time. The United Nations Command is, of course, in a position to reinforce the United Nations troops in Leopoldville, at the expense of other areas and to the extent that air transport permits, when the need arises. In this respect I think that I might say t&at, at tftic stage, it is riot primarily a question of the total number of United Nations troops in Leopoldville but, rather, a question of the activities which those troops can legitimately pursue, the extent to which they can properly exercise authority under this functi« of assisting in the maintenance of law and order. The question is: with whom must they share responsibility for maintaining law and order? In that respect it is well to bear in mind that there are Congolese troops, on.the one hand, and provincial police, on the other hand, involved in Leopoldville. The mixed patrols which had been started and had shown some promise suddenly ended a few days ago. They are not functioning now. This may also be a factor. I would now ask Major Bowitz to indicate the deployment.

Major BOWITZ: The total strength of the United Nations force in the Congo is now about 19,500. That includes the two Nigerian battalions which have Just been airlifted into the Congo, but does not take into consideration the Mali battalion that has just left the Congo or the Ghana police force there. Of these 19,500, about 16,500 are infantry troops. The difference represents logistical, transport, ordinance and hospital units, and so forth. The Supreme Commander is of course located in Leopoldville. As has already been mentioned here, the total strength of the United Nations force in Leopoldville is about ^,200. However, in the Province of Leopoldville we have the Moroccan brigade deployed. The total figure for the Province of Leopoldville BC/nb 72-75

(Major Bovits)

IB 3,2l*O. Thus, the Supreme Commander has the possibility of reinforcing the troops in the City of Leopoldville with troops from the Province of teopoldville. •• The United Nations force in the Congo is divided into conmandsV North of the Province of Leopoldville, we have the Guinea battalion of about 750 men. North of the Guinea battalion we have the Indonesian battalion, lees two companies, which hoe itft headquarters in Coquilhatville. HQ/jvm 76 (Major Bowits) The United Arab Republic battalion is in the province of Equator. That battalion has about 500 men. In Oriental province, vlth headquarters in Stanleyville, we have the Ethiopian brigade. The Ethiopian troope total 2,500 men. The brigade headquarters and the two battalion headquarters are in Stanleyville. The troops, however, are deployed in the province. In the Kasai area, with headquarters at Luluabourg, we have the Ghana brigade, with the company from Liberia under its command. Up to now the eastern provinces have been organized from Elisabethville, but these days, because we now have the Nigerian brigade in that area^ they are reorganizing the command there. The headquarters will still be in Elisabethville, under the command of Colonel Byrne. The Swedish battalion in Elisabethville will take charge of the southern part of that area. The Nigerians will be located in northern Katanga, at Albertville, and the Irish troops, in northern Katanga, in the Kindu area. In the main base at Kamina we presently have infantry troops from Morocco and from Indonesia. In addition to this breakdown, of course, we have logistical units deployed all over the area. We have seven hospitals, some movement control teams MPfs, supply units, transport units and air force units. The air force base is in Kamina, but air force units are stationed also in Leopoldville and in Stanleyville. I think that is all, sir.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Thank you. Are there any questions?

Mr. RITCHIE (Canada): First of all, I should like to echo the concern which a number of representatives have voiced about the actual security of United Nations personnel in Leopoldville and at the same time to express my sympathy to the representative of India for the treatment which has been meted out to some of the Indian personnel there. HO/Jvm 77-86 (Mr> Ritchie, Canada) I should like, if I may, to put whet is perhaps too general a question. There had been suggestions round the table from some quarters that perhaps a show .of force by the United Nations troops or a greater concentration of troops- in Leopoldville, an attempt to restrict the activities of the Congolese armed forces, perhaps some change in the orders or functions of the United Nations Forces,, would in some way contribute to the security and safety of the United Nations personnel in the city. Quite apart from any political implications that there* might be in such actions, I wonder whether it would be possible for us to have an appreciation, on purely grounds of the security of the personnel, of the likely effects of such a more positive, if I may put it that way, approach. It is possible, of course, that such, actions or such a change of approach might start counter-reactions, and I suppose itr would be a question of weighing risks. But I wondered, Mr*-Secretary-General,whether it would be possible to make any comment on that, I' am afraid, rather general point*': TL/cw 81

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Mr, Ambassador, it is a very difficult question. So far the philosophy has been that a show of force was sufficient to keep the situation under control, because there was superiority and as it was not only our policy to avoid all military initiative but there was also obvious reluctance on the other side to resort to military means. This has worked out all right, with a few exceptions such as troops running wild around Luluabourg, in one or two cases. Now, however, the situation on Monday was slightly different. It indicates the risk involved in this technique. At a certain stage and a certain state of emotion a show of force is provocative, and even if there was no will to initiative on our side, obviously in the state of mind in*which the Congolese troops found themselves, they regarded the accumulation of strength on the United Nations side as something which, so to speak, could release, their military initiative. How the balance should be struck I dare not say, I think one has to have a good knowledge not only of military matters but also of the general mentality and its changes from time to time. I would say a show of force in a situation where the United Nations is reasonably popular is all rightj touta show of force in a situation where the United Nations is, for some obscure reason, regarded as a threat, I think may have very much the opposite effect. I/hat I do feel, however, is that there should be general knowledge among Congolese military people of our military superiority and of the fact that we do not take military initiative. Those two things together should, at least in the long run, maintain a proper kind of attitude on the Congolese military side in relation to the United Nations troops: that is to say, they will never be attacked; on the other hand, if they resort to action they will have no chance of success. I think that is the kind of view which is reasonable to maintain. The curious difficulty we have at present, as I see it, is that, as I have already mentioned -- I do not remember whether it was here or in the Conciliation Commission — the curious difficulty is that people whom I characterized to President Kasavubu as people who were friends neither of the Congo nor of the United Nations, have managed to instill the idea that the United Nations works towards some kind of trusteeship. If that is the feeling, then of course the idea lies close to people who are not too well informed about this world, that this is a Kind of occupation force. And you will see how that way influence the effect of a show of force. TL/cw 82-85

Mr> JHA (India): Mr. Secretary-General, if I may say so, I think the general philosophy as you have put it is certainly acceptable to us. But we have to consider two possible situations -- rather, we have to surmise, because we do not have the full facts in our possession. First, is it that the Congolese Army as such, the organized Army, has now gone against the United Nations and its .personnel? -- whatever may be the reasons, whether it is an emotional outburst or a calculated move; or secondly, is it that units of the. Arrcee Nationale Congolaise have got out of hand, with roving bands, of these

soldiers molesting United Nations personnel, beating them up and .all;that.Kind

of'tiling? . .,,. . , ,. • ., . ,, • . • . ;.-.. ...: .

,rik>w,; if it, is the situation that the organized Congolese Army has now .. gone against the United Nations and is willing to fight the United Nations and put the United Nations under all kinds of military pressures, then it seems to me that, in,the future the continuance, of the, United Nations, is very, very difficult, because it is not the function-of the United liations to fight the- army pf -the country;. : . ; : - , ; . L RGB/da 86

(Mr. Jha, India) On the other hand, if it is the second set of circumstances -- that is to say that there are these undisciplined soldiers who, without orders from their superiors, are doing very much as they please -- then it seems to me that the United Nations is perfectly justified in taking action for the protection of security. As far as we know, and this is a point where we would like some enlightenment from you, Mr. Secretary-General, Colonel Mobutu himself, whatever may be his ambitions -- and he is probably a pompous man as far as one can judge from here -- has not ceased to be on talking terms with the United Nations Command, and perhaps Brigadier Rikhye has been in touch with him. Mobutu has, at least during the recent crisis and perhaps even before, shown some signs of co-operation, and it may b3 that it is bands of the Arme'e Nationale Congolaise that go about and do all this mischief. That being the situation, although I quite agree that the United Nations should hot really show itself off as a very important military force ready toflgfc ta t the slightest provocation, we have to take all possible measures for the security of the personnel, and no more. If that should involve the redeployment of forces -- I must say thab I speak with great diffidence on this point because these are complicated matters and I have really no military training at all -- that might be a desirable thing. Exactly to what extent, and how quietly or how demonstratively -- that is a matter for judgement according to the local circumstances. The point that we would like to make clear is that this is something which my Government and other Governments having contributed personnel .to the United Nations have the right to expect of the United Nations. In other words, those who have volunteered -- and it is not merely volunteering by Governments but also volunteering by the Army officers and other personnel whom ve could not have sent had they not volunteered -- are entitled to have a reasonable assurance of security. Of course, accidents can always happen, but that is absolutely a sine qua non because without it I do not see how the United Nations operation can function anyway. If that cannot be done then it has to be decided -- and naturally the decision would not be yours, Mr, Secretary-General, but would have to be taken by all of us — whether we could really continue to undertake operations where the most elementary necessity of providing security for United Nations personnel was not possible of fulfilment. RGB/de 87-90

(Mr. Jha, India) Again i would say that I speak "with diffidence, but I think that if it is"" a question 6£ undisciplined bands of Congolese soldiers attacking United Nations personnel then we have to get the minimum extra personnel into Leopoldville, not with a view to fighting the Congolese Army but with a view to giving ' preventive protection to the personnel in different cirumcustances -- those who are''going'"to work, those who are going out on some other duties, and so on -• so that they may carry on the'ir normal avocations.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; It is impossible, without further reports, to say to what extent the regrettable incidents which followed the conflict around the Ghanaian Embassy were actions of groups under discipline or of other groups which had, so to say/ broken loose from the Army. We have had previous examples of groups breaking loose in that way, and for that reason it is quite possible that much of it may be' explained by irresponsible soldiers without proper control from officers/ Anyway, as"you know, the number of officers is still very small, and the number of* experienced officers nil. "" " However, the problem to wtiicii you 'point is 'a very real one. llobse bands, of course, can" be fought'with all bur means, but are riot there to fight the Congolese National Army. 'Oh this'last point I 'would say that if a Situation is maintained in which the AraSy regards us as: '& kind of occupying £ower which it is supposed to push around, that would,1 indeed, create an untenable situation and woUldfreopen the whole question of United Nations assistance, because I cannot see the withdrawal-, for such reason^,'of United Nations military assistance without; the simultaneous withdrawal of civilian assistance. . DR/rl 91 (The Secretary•General)

We are certainly not there yet. There is an in-between case which is the real risk, and that is the case vhich we saw on Monday, where units of the National Army are ordered into an operation where they, so to say, try to push aside or break through UN troops which are there under orders and on a legitimate task. That is not a wholesale attack on the UN, it is a specific operation and I think that in such an operation we simply have to resist, the general rule being that we are not to be pushed away if we are there for a legitimate purpose defined by the Security Council. Such stories must be avoided and they can be avoided by proper preventive action between the two military commands and also politically and diplomatically. What went wrong on Monday is difficult to say, but I hope it will not in any vay be regarded as a precedent. Therefore, if I try to sum up my reply to your questions, I would distinguish between three different cases. The first one, the case of general hostilities and actions of the Congolese National Army against the United Nations, does reopen the whole question of our co-operation with the Congolese authorities. I have brought that home very clearly to President Kasavubu as late as today. The second case is when, in the absence of any such general attitude, we run into situations where those in power in the Congo wish units of the Congolese National Army to take action which we must resist because we consider Ht to be a use of military violence and in contravention of normal laws and normal decent procedures* The risk of such clashes does exist and will remain with us. The only way I can see how we can overcome it is, as I have said, by non-military means or by negotiation on a military level or on the diplomatic level. I do not consider such incidents in themselves as being sufficient reason to put in question the whole UN operation. Finally, we have those who break loose, and there I think that we should be able to feel that when we act against them, as we should, we do so indeed with a positive support of the authorities because any responetbie military leadership which accepts roving bands of soldiers is of course not worth very much respect. I assume that they regret such illegalities just as much as we do and for that reason there should be a possibility for co-operation between the Congolese command and our command in order to stop such incidents. DR/rl 92-95 (The Secretary-General)

For the moment it'Is a b'it difficult to' say where we are. I feel that we are ih fact somewhere between Case 2 and Case 3.1 refuse to believe that* we are between Case 1 and Case 2. * '; ''' '"

•.-'•'•'- 'Mr.'KAMIL (Federation o'f Malaya): MrV!Secretary-General, 1 have one very small question to ask. Have we — when I use the word "we"' I mean the United Nations operation in the Congo — included as part of the operation any- form of public-relations work in order to clear up vbat may bfrveaid nov to be a'lot of misunderstanding of the proper UN role in the Congo amongst the ., •. . -.i ••' ... ••••••; •' C6rigoles'e 'public? '.-••.. . • ..

' "The SECRETARY "GENERAL; We have indeed, but we have obviously not .. ""^ff^mmmm^^fmm^ff ...... • i done enough. On the other hand, I read"to you a quotation from a Press conference statement of one of the commissars. It is a little bit below our dignity to start on a Press conference race, and our statements, I fear, under . ' •• ••;•'•• ,.-.- • ..•.•,:.:•.-.•.•.'• •• , '• :-.» - : :.>••;:•(:.!•"'-•'.:: .'.:,-1' "": :.- ciich circumstances cannot be as effective as the "attacks r~ GR/rh 96

Mr, QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): We are told that the United Nations troops are still protecting Mr. Lumumba and Mr. Kasavubu — of course; Mr. Kasavubu is here now but he had Ghana troops for his protection — and I would like to know what the position is now.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: We are definitely protecting Mr. Lumumba, and I do not know how many others we are protecting — it is quite a lot.

Mr. QUAISQN-SACKEY (Ghana): So far, our discussion has been confined to the protection of United Nations personnel and so on, and where there has been an attack on the United Nations troops we have had to defend our position. There is no reason why we ourselves should indulge in speculation, but there is a ronour that an attempt will be made to arrest Mr. Lumumba this weekend. If that happens, and if United Nations troops are there, what are you going to do? Are you going to resist?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: The entire matter rests on our main function of maintaining law and order. We cannot interfere with due process of law, if it is due process of law. ' If it is an abuse of military force, in order to erupt into a house and arrest somebody, I think we have to risk the same situation we had with the Ghana Ambassador. That is to say,our people are then under general instructions which would force them to resist. They would not start shooting and I hope the others would not; that is to say, it would probably develop into a deadlock which would force negotiation. In such negotiations we would not budge from our position. If, on the other hand, they act in a way which we have to respect, of course we have no right to interfere with normal, regular and legal procedure. That is true of everybody. Even here we cannot interfere in the arrest of someone for things in respect of which he is not protected by immunity. If, on the other hand, he is protected by immunity, we protect him. I am speaking about New York now.

Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria): Last time the Congolese army had a parade I read in the papers that it was being trained by the United Nations. I wonder whether that is correct? I had wondered whether their appearance was due to the QR/rh 97-100

(Mr. Wachuku, Nigeria) training the Ifoited Nations had been giving them. That is one aspect.of it, and I would like to know whether the report is correct. Surely, if somebody is training somebody, he must give them a 'certain amount of leadership and discipline* I have also read somewhere in one of the newspapers that there was a kind . of Scarlet Pimpernel somewhere whose name is never mentioned although he is supposed to be behind Colonel Mobutu. His name never comes to the surface. I.', do not know how far the United Nations is aware of this particular type of person. I am s.aying this because we may be laying the foundation for democracy in the. Congo only to wake up one day to find that something worse than exists now has. reared its head. : There is another question. We have been told every now and then that we do not know how the army gets its pay, but we have also he'ard rumours that there are some influential Members of the United Nations who are financing them behind the scenes. How far is this true, and does this kind 6f thing constitute some - '••''••'••• .•-•'...• -.-,:*: •;.•... «.'.,.•.'.:...... of the obstacles we shall have to overcome in trying to solve the problem of reconciliation? Is it correct that financing is being done through business and commercial sources? I do not know whether this has come to you in the Secretariat, but what attempts are being made to check whether these things are true or false? It is an extraordinary situation to find that an army like this can have finances from dubious sources and it is yet impossible to trace those sources' and poeatbly check them, as a means of bringing them to reason. We would like to have an idea about this, because this is an Advisory Committee. If the facts are.not available, will the Secretary-General see to it that an attempt is made to unravel these mysteries that seem to shroud the whole Congolese situation? Mtf/bg 101

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; As to the training of the people in the parade, I do not believe there were many who could have come out of whatever training arrangements have been made by General Kettati. Of course, there may be. Tnera are also troops from Thysville and I think it is in the Dayal report that ths troops from Thysville have recently been trained by four or five Belgian officers, That is all I can say about the training. However, they had a good basic training. What is lacking are officers and discipline,but there is good training and I think if you put them out on parade they will function all right there. As to the "pimpernel", as you called him, such rumours are all around. We have no knowledge about it; we can, of course, have our guesses but they are not worth anything because they are nothing but guesses. Finally, as regards the financing, it is in various roepects a mystery because, as you know, this is a country with a heavy budget deficit, which we have appealed to Member Nations to cover, and all the same, it seems that they can afford quite a lot of technicians and quite a lot of military arrangements from sources which we certainly do not cover. What those sources are I do not know. It is anybody's guess. There is one interesting point regarding all this which I want to bring home. We have, both for practical reasons and for reasons of principle, not established any intelligence service ourselves. I would guess, knowing the world as it is, that many others have, but we have not. Under such circumstances, we have all the advantages of innocence — and also the disadvantages.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): The description of the deployment of United Nations troops which was given to us a little while ago is very interesting. It disabuses one's mind at least of one thought, a thought which has been expressed here many times, and a view often expressed — Mr. Jha has expressed it a few times, and others also — namely, that almost anyone in the Congo who can muster 300 or 1+00 persons around him proclaims himself a ruler. One's mind is disabused about that because now we have been told authoritatively that there is a well- trained army of 4,200. So it would seem that it is not quite a rabble, not as much of a rabble as we were at times led to believe. MW/bg 102-105 (Mr. Hasan, Pakistan)

The concern for the safety and security of United'nations personnel in thd Congo is very legitimate; we all share that'concern. But we must not forget one ' thing, which is that, since the United Nations intervenes only when conditions in a country are chaotic and desperate remedies are needed, the calling of any foreign troops, albeit United Nations troops, is the most desperate of all ; remedies.. Therefore, we must recognize that conditions, when United Nations 'troops are called or foreign troops are called, cannot be normal, they are extremely ;' subnormal; they are extremely chaotic. Therefore, we must be prepared for'the ' conditions which would prevail in a country which calls in foreign troops for' various purposes — maintenance of order, etc. And althciugh we all share anxiety and we all regret that United Nations troops should suffer indignities, hardships, and their lives are incQcui°e — It reminds me of a story, which I shall not tell now, because it might create political involvements. It was in old days when India was undivided India, and a regiment of a certain State sought police protection — I shall not tell it now as it would take too much time. NR/hh 106 (Mr. Hase.n, Pakistan)

However, troops normally look after themselves and they do not need police to look after them. Building up or deploying more troops or concan^rtatirg more troops in one area might create a challenge, which all of us would like to avoid* We do not like to create conditions vhich vould be a challenge to the sort of emotional, volatile temperamsnts that the Congolese evidently hav3P I do not know them, but according to all descriptions they are that type of people. Even at the risk of our personnel suffering insecurity, their lives being now and then in danger or their security being now and then in hazard, my submission would be: let us not take measures which would be intended to create a balance between them and the Congolese army, because that might be taken as a challenge and might cause a further deterioration in relations.

Mr. ADEEL (Sudan): I would like to correct one point. With regard to the discipline of the troops, it was just the photographs I saw that gave me that impression.

The SECRETARY GENERAL; I would like to make another correction. The now famous expression "rabble", refers, of course, to the fact that soldiers, even if they are very well trained, without officers certainly lose some of their discipline and, being highly emotional, may deserve that term. There is, therefore, no contradiction between the fact of training and their behaviour as rabble4

Mr. JHA (India): Mr. Secretary-General, in the General Assembly, when there was an adjournment motion, or just before that adjournment motion — I do not remember exactly in what sequence — you made a statement in which you said that full information was not available and without further investigation it was not possible to tell the Assembly exactly what happened in Leopoldville a few days ago in these shooting incidents. Thereafter you circulated a report by Brigadier Rikhye giving an account of these incidents. Are you contemplating or have you ordered any further and fuller investigation and report from your Special Representative? Brigadier Rikhyefs report was, I believe, in the nature of a preliminary report, because he does not say definitively what NR/hh 107-110 •. (Mr, Jha, India) happened; he refers to various versions, and all that. Is it your intention, or have you undertaken action, to get a fuller report, after further investigation from the Special Representative? The second point I wish to raise is about the incidents that have been reported in the Press here and, particularly, in the Press in India about attacks on personnel, including Indian personnel. Would you be so good as to inform the members of the Advisory Committee — I am spe.aking particularly for myself but I assume you/would like to give the same information to all the members of the ' ' • • -' Advisory Committee — about the latest information that you might be receiving, because my Government — I do not,know what sort of Press reports have gone from Leopoldville,— is very .seriously concerned,? My Government is going to consider the whole situation. I do not know what its consideration will lead to, but I am authorized to say that it .is giving consideration to the vrhole new situation that has arisen, .,. , So, I wonder whether you would .keep us posted as soon as you receive reports on matters germane to the point tha.t we have raised here.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL;. On. that .last point, Hr. Ambassador, I would say that it.is .definitely our intention to keep you posted on all we know, and that stands not only for this^series, of. Incidents but also, naturally, for other incidents in which national continents may be involved, As regards, the question of the report, I have not requested from them anything in the nature, of a formal, report, I have in my own mind kept open the possibility of at least an addendum to. the previous report, which was made somewhat hastily but I have.,made the. request for such a report dependent on what furt'her we get. . . , ...... RSH/mb

(The Secretary-General)

As I told you earlier, information has been very slow in coming, in addition to what we had on Tuesday, and for that reason a "brake has teen put on thi kind of reaction. I think, however, we are due to have it, in reply to requests which I sent yesterday,in the course of this afternoon or tomorrow, and in the light of that, dependent upon wha^ these new pieces of information reveal, I ehall decide if it is such an important edlitiOLV,! picture, confirming some new? r^nor^ going beyond what was said in the Rikhye report on Tuesday, that an addendum is necessary. On the other hand, if it is on the borderline, the question of whether or not an addendum should be circulated should, I think, also be influenced by the effects such an addendum would have on the current efforts to normalize relations. If we were to give the Congolese people -- I mean now, the authorities and the army leadership -- the impression we were after their heads in some way, it certainly would not. I think you can see that it will have to be a question of judgement in the light of the further information, the question of judgement involving a consideration also of what is required for the normalization of our relations. Such normalization, I hope, is under way. Perhaps I should earlier have mentioned, when there were some words said about contact between the two military commands, that to my knowledge all through the crisis, even while things went wrong on Monday, Colonel Mobutu and Brigadier Rikhye were in touch. I believe that this outbreak on Monday was something outside the control of and certainly outside the direct orders cf Colonel Mobutu, because I think he was at our headquarters at that time. At all events, you will be fully posted on everything we get to know which touches the welfare of your contingents in such respects as we have now been considering. I think we should now look where we are. I mentioned at the beginning that we had three matters to consider, the question of the departure of the Conciliation Commission, the question of the report to the General Assembly, and the question to which we have devoted the last half hour or so, that is to say, the question of the incidents and what our reactions should be. I believe that the first question was clearly settled and that there was agreement on the summing up which I gave. That took us over into the question of the report and the text which I suggested as the final sentence in the draft, RSH/mh 112-115 (The Secretary-General) which has been put before you. I put it down myself later, but I would-like to repeat it: "it was considered.that a final decision on the time of departure of • the Cpmmission would be taken on receipt, at the end of next week, of a communication which President Kasavubu has promised to send at that tiirie regarding the state reached in, the preparation of the Commission's work;' Provisionally it was envisaged by the Advisory Committee that a first meeting in Leppoldville of the Commission would be held in the week "beginning 5 December. 1969." ...... ' ' : ' : That is the way I summed.it up. If that, from your point of view, is'ah' accurate summing up of that stand, I would like to ask you if you have any observation^ on the rest of the report. It is a very routine report, but, all the same, it requires the usual care. I have, as you see, stressed rather " 11 ' * • ' • : ' •'-.••••..'•;.,•. strongly the part of the General Assembly in the matter, and'I think that Is x ' right;witfc a,,view .to the misunderstandings which I have seen oh'the'Congolese •'•"•••••••'• « - , • ;... .• / " >>'•• i'-'.. •{ • :• ., . ••, ...... side. .-.. ,- .;..-....-,, . •. •,...... ' ' "•' ' ^':- BC/jvm 116

Mr. JHA (India): I would refer to the first two sentences of the last paragraph of the draft report, which read: "At a meeting of the Advisory Committee on 23 November 1960, the Committee consulted with President Kasavubu as head of the delegation of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) to the General Assembly. In order to give time for preparations in the Congo, considered desirable in order to facilitate the work of the Commission, the Advisory Committee decided to postpone the first meeting in Leopoldville". Of course, I do not want to go beyond diplomatic decorum, but I wonder if we could not insert a sentence between those two sentences which would contain the gist of what President Kasavubu said to us about the Conciliation Commission, It seems to me that his statement here last evening was the most important one we have had in all these exchanges. The letters themselves are really not so enlightening as what he told us here. I do not say that the sentence should be very elaborate, but, at the same time, the General Assembly ought to know the gist of what President Kasavubu told us. This seems to me a very important point in the entire proceedings and something of which the General Assembly should be informed. We would not have to say much more than what ie said in the second letter from President Kasavubu, but what he told us yesterday was reassuring and I think it should be included somehow in the report,

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: We have a verbatim record of yesterday's meeting, and we may perhaps be able to find in it a sentence from President Kasavubu1 s statement that could, so to speak, be crystallized in this report. With the fine nuances which we have in this case, I would not wish to improvise a sentence to be included in a formal report. If that were to be included in such a way, I think that President Kasavubu would have to be given an opportunity to look at it. However, it may be all right to paraphrase something which he actually said here -- without, of course, using quotation marks. As I have said, I would not like to improvise here .and now, and perhaps the representative of India would be willing to let us look into the matter. BC/Jva 117

* Mr. 'JHA (India): I'ciefiniteiy reniember, although I-cannot find-the place in the verbatim record at the moment, that President KasaXoibu said'that he '.ma agreeable'to having the Conciliation Commission go to the Congo but wished:- some time for preparations to be made so that the Commission might be received ; properly. I think that he said that, although, as I have stated, I cannot locate the place in the verbatim record of yesterday*s meeting.

The SBGRETARY»GENSRAL! That is why I think we should find in the verbatim record exactly what President Kasavubu said. Frankly, Mr. Jha, I think that your formulation would worry President Kasavubu a little bit. Perhaps it would come closer to his thought if we said — and this again is taken from his statement yesterday -- that the President regarded the work of the Conciliation Commission as part of the assistance offered to the Congo, the usefulness of which would depend upon the proper preparations, Perhaps we could say something to that effect; it does not go beyond what he stated.

Mr. JAJA WACHUKI (Nigeria): At the beginning of his statement yesterday, President Kasavubu said: "What we seek is the success of this Commission" (p.6, meeting No. 1*0. He also accepted the fact that the Conciliation Commission is a form of aid to the Congolese State. Those are the factors which determine the necessity for preparations by President Kasavubu. I think that those two ideas should be incorporated in the report.

- Mr* JHA (India): I think that the formulation suggested by the Secretary- General would be quite all right. I find in the verbatim record of yesterday's meeting this sentence from President Kasavubu's statement: "That is why I emphasize the fact that if the Commission does go to the Congo there must be a slight delay so that we can meet and have talks among ourselves", (p.11, meeting No. 1^) I think that it would be quite fair to state this in the way that the Secretary- General has suggested. There would be no risk of our being unfair to President Kasavubu if we added such a sentence between the first two sentences of the last paragraph of the report. BC/jvm 118-120

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: For practical reasons I would suggest that I be permitted to phrase this in the light of the discussion we have just had here. As I have said, I would not like to improvise in such a case. After all, we do have the verbatim record, in which we can follow very closely what was said* ii fei'lr' i^I'litii

HG/cw - -;--': • (The Secretary-General)

The final point was the'one which was brought'up/by Ambassador Jha. -. I think the two points have been'clarified: that-you will have all the . ;• , available information when we receive it, so that you-can inform your Governments as to what exactly has taken place3 further, that the question of an addendum to the'Rikhye report will be considered as soon- as we see where we stand* 'For1 my'part, I will be appreciative of such assistance you may - wish to give regardir.^ the judgement to be passed on > whether or not it is in the interests of the United Nations operation to circulate an addendum in the light df sucli'further facts as we may receive. : ;-.. •I can mention-cpa thing which has a'bearing on it. Obviously, there is- a development going on all'the-time. We have not had-this yet from our own; people, but here is a UPI ticker, which starts out as follows: :- "Congolese array strongman, Colonel Mobutu, ordered his troops today to hand back more than ;fifty vehicles seized-from the United Nations •••,-•*.

in an attempt to ease the tension that still runs high in the wake pf ; Mondayfs battle". It is very badly phrased but it shows that there is a climbing down. If we •Bere to present a report in the middle of such climbing down, it may stop the clinking down, and it vould also be unfair. To make amends does not change what has happened. But, of course, if and when representatives judge the situation, they should know how it is all winding up; that is to say, there is a question of timing, too. I do not think that there is anything to be added here. I would like, if there is a need for it, to consult with you -- informally, at least — regarding the question of an addendum to the report. However, there is the other point. There was, as I said, one formal protest on Tuesday, which I can send to you for your information. There were three discussions about the matter. Of course, it may be that, in the light of such further information we receive, there should be a further formal protest, especially if what I call the "climbing down" does not continue at a reasonable speed. If there is still anybody locked up, if there is still material damage, if there is still property held, and so on and so forth, we simply must act. In case such action is taken, I think this time it would strengthen the action of the United Nations if the protest could indicate that it was made after consultation with the Advisory Committee. HG/cw 122-125 (The Secretary-General)

Therefore, if in the light of further news or information we felt that there should be a second formal protest .— and I do not exclude that at all — I would like to get in touch with you. It may "be that I can just circulate it as a draft so that you can have a look at it. It may be that we should meet. It all depends again on what the picture is when we get the full information. But I would like to put before you the possibility that a second form of protest, referring also to the views held by this Committee, should be made.

Mr. JHA (India): Regarding the item that you read out earlier about the recent incidents, Mr. Secretary-General, I would like to understand exactly what you propose in that connexion. Am I right in thinking that you do not propose at present anything more than the diplomatic protests and demarches that you have made and that you are awaiting more detailed reports from your Special Representative and are watching the situation before you take any further steps? That is the first point. —' .—»—ra— ^

TL/ds 126

(Mr.Jha, India)

Also, would I be right in thinking that you consider that existing Unitedr; Nations troops are enough to protect the United Nations personnel, end that you • do not really see the need for strengthening any security precautions or measures, including the augmentation 'of United Nations personnel? : - I would just like to "be clear, because I was not at all very clear as to what steps you are proposing to take.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; On the 'first point, I felt that we should wait for fuller and more definite information. As I have said, we have already made one formal protest and three informal ones, the last one mild .in tone but very strong in substance, as it raised the whole question of the continuation "• of the United Nations operation. I would not like to add to that any further - protest without having a firm basis on which to stand and which gives us a clear picture of where we are. That picture will be decisive in- several respects. You will have it at all events; so much is certain. The second point1: :< Is'"the1 picture, when we - get it/complete enough to warrant an additional'report or an addendum to the'old report? That is partly-' a factual question, partly a political question. Further, is it auch that it warrants a new pretest? — which I do not at all exclude* That would then be a question that I would like to raise with you and consult you about, as I feel that che Advisory Committee's authority'should be added to the weight of the protest. And the fourth question Would be: Does 'the situation indicate such developments, such attitudes, as to raise the wider political problem of how we operate in the area, or if we can continue to operate? I hope that is not the case. The final and fifth question would be: What conclusions can be drawn regarding the military deployment in the Congo? That is in the first instance a question for the Command. They have the responsibility, they have the -first- hand knowledge, and they must Judge for themselves. I would not like to impose anything on them in that respect. I would like, however, in the light of this discussion, to draw their attention to the interest shown by the members of this Coranittee in this problem and to ask for their opinions and their-1 plans on this point. Such opinions and such plans would certainly also be of interest to all the llii.I.MW

TL/ds 127-150

(The Secretary^General) members of this Committee and might, of course, be communicated to you when we have them. I would not like to say that we should strengthen and I would not like to say that we should not strengthen, because there are much better judges than we can possibly be on that issue. On the other hand, we would, of course, like to know what their conclusions are. I think that covers the five possible points which arise because of such further information as may be forthcoming. That ends my agenda. You may have more to add to it.

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): Mr. Secretary-General, unless there is a matter of life and death involved, please do not call a meeting for Saturday morning.

The SECRETARY -GENERAL; I had in mind Saturday night',

Mr. BARNES (Liberia): I would like to enquire whether all of the members of the Conciliation Commission are here in New York.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Not all of them, no.

Mr» BARNES (Liberia): Would it not be desirable for us to follow the example of those who are not here and let our members return to their various posts and await hearing when the Conciliation Commission can meet in Leopoldville?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think that is a very individual problem because the situation is certainly different for different members. Some may wish to stay, some may wish to go home,pending further information. I find it very difficult to lay down a rule on how Governments should react to this situation. Mr* WACHUKU (Nigeria): I think that that relates to my question. I pointed out that these members were appointed in their individual capacities by their Governments, and I asked -what their position was.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; May I give some thought to that? With the daily experience of the Fifth Committee I have, of course, strong views on it, but I am not ready to say here and now where we are. It is both a little bit shocking for a Government to keep somebody in New York for nothing, and a little bit shocking for the United Nations to say that they can stay here at our cost. We shall have to find a fair solution to it. I am not prepared to improvise it.

Mr» WACHUKU (Nigeria): That is right, of course. I am sure that I shall be asked that question sooner or later.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): May we have a Thanksgiving holiday now?

The SECRETARY "GENERAL; We leave that question to the representative of Ethiopia.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I just wanted to raise this question. When the members of the Conciliation Commission were appointed we were told that they were serving in the name of the United Nations, and that was one of the clear decisions we transmitted to our respective Governments. I do not know how I can, for my part, account for keeping an Ambassador here, and at the same time go back and ask the Foreign Office to make appropriations. I myself do not know —-

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; We have to consult with the Governments, Mr. Ambassador, but I must say that, in spite of the Fifth Committee, I feel that there is a presumption in favour of the United Nations paying for extra costs involved in this way for the representatives. However, 1 think you agree with me that the Fifth Committee has a right to have the view that they should not be here unnecessarily. That is to say, if they could wait elsewhere, doing useful work and costing less money, the Fifth Committee certainly would bless it. FGB/rl 132

Mr, GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Quite right. I do not want to prolong this, but at the same time the Fifth Committee will have to know that if we wish them to go back and forth —

The SECRETARY -GENERAL; The travel costs must be ours; that goes it is just a question or per diem,

Mr. GEBRE-E5ZY (Ethiopia): It is for their own good, because they will have to go and then come back again —

•The SECREIARY-GEKERAL; But we have to look into these as individual cases with the Governments.

The meeting rose at ^.kO p.m.