Approved October 24, 2018

Recommended Citation: Kouider, Noémie, and Anne Toussignant-Miller. “Conflict Sensitivity Analysis and Implementation Strategy.” Prepared for USAID’s Integrated Health Program by subcontractor International Rescue Committee (IRC), under contract to Abt Associates Inc., Rockville, Maryland, original September 6, 2018, revised Oct 10, 2018, approved October 24, 2018.

Submitted to: Richard Matendo, COR, Maternal & Child Health Program Specialist, Health Office, USAID/Democratic Republic of the Congo, (+243 81 555 4514), , DRC.

Cover Photo: Photos by International Rescue Committee (IRC)

Abt Associates Inc. 1 6130 Executive Boulevard 1 Rockville, Maryland 20814 1 T. 301.347.5000 1 www.abtassociates.com

With:

International Rescue Committee (IRC) Pathfinder International BlueSquare Training Resources Group (TRG) Mobile Accord/Geopoll i+Solutions Viamo Matchboxology

USAID’S INTEGRATED HEALTH PROGRAM Conflict Sensitivity Analysis and Implementation Strategy

Contract No.: 72066018C00001

DISCLAIMER: This report is made possible by the support of the American People through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS...... VI EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... VIII 1.1 BACKGROUND ...... VIII 1.2 METHODOLOGY ...... VIII 1.3 FINDINGS ...... IX 1.4 RECOMMENDATIONS ...... XI 1. BACKGROUND ...... 1 2. METHODOLOGY ...... 2 2.1 DESK REVIEW ...... 2 2.2 PRE-WORKSHOP QUALITATIVE DATA COLLECTION ...... 2 2.3 CONSOLIDATION WORKSHOP ...... 3 2.3.1 CONFLICT CAUSAL PATHWAYS ...... 4 2.3.2 CONFLICT MAPPING ...... 4 2.3.3 DIVIDERS AND CONNECTORS ...... 5 2.3.4 SCENARIO PLANNING ...... 5 2.3.5 RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES ...... 5 2.3.6 RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 6 3. FINDINGS ...... 7 3.1 CONTEXT ANALYSIS ...... 7 3.1.1 DRC CONTEXT ...... 7 3.1.2 REGIONAL AND PROVINCIAL CONTEXT ...... 7 3.2 CONFLICTS IN USAID IHP AREAS OF INTERVENTION ...... 11 3.2.1 MAIN CAUSES OF CONFLICT ...... 11 3.2.2 LOCAL CONFLICT ANALYSES ...... 13 3.2.3 EASTERN CONGO REGION ...... 13 3.2.4 KASAI REGION ...... 26 3.2.5 KATANGA REGION ...... 33 4. RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 37 4.1 CONFLICT SENSITIVITY IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY ...... 37

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | III 4.2 NEXT STEPS ...... 43 ANNEX A: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS ...... 44 ANNEX B: CONSOLIDATION WORKSHOP AGENDA ...... 47 ANNEX C: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS ...... 51 REFERENCES ...... 55

TABLES

TABLE 1: Dividers and Connectors between Bafuliiru and Barundi (Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom Conflict) ...... 16 TABLE 2: Scenario Planning – Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom Conflict ...... 16 TABLE 3: Dividers and connectors between community members and land owners/customary leaders (land conflicts in Walungu Territory) ...... 19 TABLE 4: Scenario Planning – Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom Conflict ...... 20 TABLE 5: Dividers and Connectors between Batwa and Bantu People in Tanganyika ...... 24 TABLE 6: Scenario Planning – Batwa-Bantu Conflict in Tanganyika ...... 24 TABLE 7: Dividers and Connectors between Kamwina Nsapu Militia and the Population of Kasai (Customary Power Conflict) – Sankuru Situation ...... 28 TABLE 8: Scenario Planning – Kamwina Nsapu Insurgency in Kasai ...... 29 TABLE 9: Dividers and Connectors between the Populations of the Territories of Kabeya Kamuanga and Ndimbelenge (Land Conflict) ...... 31 TABLE 10: Scenario Planning – Land Conflicts between the Territories of Kabeya Kamuanga and Ndimbelenge ...... 32 TABLE 11: Dividers and Connectors between Opposition Political Parties and the Presidential Party/Central/Provincial Government (Katanga region) ...... 34 TABLE 12: Dividers and Connectors between Ethnic Associations in Katanga ...... 35 TABLE 13: Scenario Planning – Political Conflict with Ethnic Undertones in Katanga ...... 36 TABLE 14: Risks of Conflicts on Program and Mitigation Actions ...... 37 TABLE 15: Risks of Program on Conflict and Mitigation Actions ...... 40

FIGURES

FIGURE 1: Workshop in Kalémie on August 13, 2018 ...... 3 FIGURE 2: Key informant interview with a representative of the Bilomba Health Zone in Kasai Central on August 14, 2018 ...... 3

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | IV FIGURE 3: Conflict Sensitivity Analysis workshop in ...... 3 FIGURE 4: Conflict causal pathway exercise – Kasai region ...... 4 FIGURE 5: Do No Harm Framework ...... 5 FIGURE 6: Conflict Mapping South (Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom Conflict) ...... 15 FIGURE 7: Conflict Mapping (Land Conflicts in Walungu Territory) ...... 19 FIGURE 8: Conflict Mapping Eastern Congo (Batwa-Bantu conflict in Tanganyika) ...... 23 FIGURE 9: Conflict Mapping Kasai (Customary Power) ...... 26 FIGURE 10: Conflict Mapping Kasai (Land Conflict) ...... 30 FIGURE 11: Conflict Mapping Katanga (Politico-Ethnic Conflict) ...... 33 FIGURE 12: Conflict Mapping Katanga – Cultural Associations (Politico-Ethnic Conflict) ...... 34

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | V AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFDL Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo–Zaïre (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo–) BCZ Bureau Centrale de la Zone CAC Cellule d’Animation Communautaire (intermediary level between RECO (community health workers) and CODESA (health committee) CAID Cellule d’Analyses des Indicateurs de Developpement CDA Collaborative for Development Action CNDP Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple CNL Conseil de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Council) CODESA Comité de Développement de la Zone de Santé (Health Committee) CSA Conflict Sensitivity Analysis CSO Civil Society Organization DNH Do No Harm DPS Division Provinciale de la Santé (Provincial Health Division) DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo ECZ Equipe Cadre de la Zone de Santé (Health Zone Management Team) EEI Equipe d’Encadrement Intégrée FARDC Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo) FDLR Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) FNL Forces de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Forces) GBV Gender-based violence GDRC Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ICT Integrated Care Team INGO International Non-Governmental Organization IRC International Rescue Committee IRRI International Rice Research Institute IDP Internally Displaced Person M23 Mouvement du 23 mars (March 23 Movement) MCZ Médecin Chef de Zone MOH Ministry of Health MONUSCO Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo ( Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) MSI Management Systems International NGO Non-governmental organizations OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs PNC Police Nationale Congolaise (National Congolese Police) RCD Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy) RECO Relais Communautaires (Community Health Workers) SGBV Sexual and Gender-Based Violence SPR Solutions for Peace and Recovery (USAID-funded) UN United Nations

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | VI UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund USAID United States Agency for International Development USAID IHP Integrated Health Program for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (USAID) WASH Water, sanitation and hygiene ZdS Zone de Santé

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | VII EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 BACKGROUND This Conflict Sensitivity Analysis provides the USAID Integrated Health Program (USAID IHP) team and its client, USAID, with insights into the four primary types of conflicts present in the program’s three regions of implementation. This analysis and the resulting implementation strategy will inform program partners of the challenges of working in conflict-affected communities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and ensure that a conflict-sensitive approach is employed to mitigate potential risks. USAID IHP is being implemented by Abt Associates, International Rescue Committee, Inc. (IRC), and Pathfinder International, with a four-year base period from January 31, 2018 to May 29, 2022 and a three year option period from May 30, 2022 to May 29, 20251, in the regions of Eastern Congo (provinces of Tanganyika and South Kivu), Kasai (Kasai-Oriental, Lomami, Sankuru, Kasai-Central, and Kasai), and Katanga (provinces of Haut-Lomami, Lualaba, and Haut-Katanga). The purpose of USAID IHP is to strengthen the capacity of Congolese institutions and communities to deliver quality, integrated health services to sustainably improve the health status of the Congolese population.  Objective I is to strengthen health systems, governance, and at provincial, health zone, and facility levels in target health zones.  Objective 2 is to increase access to quality, integrated health services in target health zones.  Objective 3 to increase adoption of healthy behaviors, including use of health services, in target health zones.

1.2 METHODOLOGY The information presented in this report was collected through desk review and qualitative data collection in USAID IHP’s three regions. Key informant interviews were used to gather primary data from individuals in specific positions within various Divisions Provinciales de la Santé (DPS), Zones de Santé (ZdS), or civil society organizations (CSO). Focus group discussions were used to gather information from community members, usually separating women from men, and youths from adults, so everyone in the group would feel comfortable speaking up. In the Eastern Congo region, in South Kivu, several face-to-face and phone interviews were conducted from August 15-24, 2018 with the Bagira Médecin Chef de Zone (MCZ), a representative of the DPS, and representatives of Search for Common Ground. Information from the USAID-funded Solutions for Peace and Recovery (SPR) project was also used as background information. In Tanganyika, a current IRC- employed Governance and Rights Coordinator held a workshop in Kalémie on August 9 with representatives from the DPS, the Kalémie Bureau Centrale de la Zone (BCZ), the Nyemba BCZ, Food for the Hungry, Commission Diocésaine Justice et Paix, Search for Common Ground, and the IRC.

1 Per Modification1 to the contract, pending execuition.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | VIII In the Kasai region, a Pathfinder international consultant coordinated key informant interviews and focus group discussions from August 13-18 in Kasai Central, Lomami, and Sankuru with representatives from DPS, MCZ, health providers, local authorities (Administrateur de Territoire), community leaders, CSO representatives, and women. In the Katanga region, another IRC-employed Governance and Rights Coordinator familiar with Katanga organized workshops in each province from August 12-21, 2018. From August 20-24, a five-day consolidation workshop was organized at Hôtel Horizon in Bukavu, South Kivu, with participants from the IRC, Pathfinder International, and Abt Associates. Facilitated by IRC’s Governance Technical Advisor, the workshop tapped into participants’ contextual knowledge through a series of conflict analysis and Do No Harm (DNH) exercises that would allow USAID IHP to draw conclusions and recommendations for its implementation: a Conflict Mapping exercise, a Connectors and Dividers exercise, and Scenario Planning exercise. After each of the first two exercises, participants identified risks and opportunities for USAID IHP. At the end of the workshop, participants discussed recommendations to be considered during the design of the USAID IHP Year 1 Work Plan. These recommendations focused on all programmatic and managerial aspects of USAID IHP—including staffing, staff training, staff and partners’ behaviors, and activities—and were used to develop the implementation strategy found at the end of this report.

1.3 FINDINGS The DRC, a country almost the size of Western Europe with a wealth of natural resources, is plagued with challenges that include poverty, weak governance, and political instability. The absence of functional state institutions partly explains the Government of DRC’s (GDRC) inability to manage these challenges, and compounds the impact of conflict. The conflicts that affected the country in the 1990’s and 2000’s have turned into cyclical crises affecting, in particular, Eastern Congo and the ex-province of Katanga, with the Kasai region becoming the theater of a particularly bloody conflict from 2016 to 2017. Conflicts affecting the program’s three regions of implementation mainly center on land, natural resources, inter- community disputes, and/or authority or power struggles. Eastern Congo Region: South Kivu is at the epicenter of the conflict that has been affecting Eastern Congo since 1994 and has caused an estimated 5.4 million deaths (a large majority of them civilians) and displaced of three million people. In 2017 alone, 647,000 people were displaced in the province. Violent conflicts driven by inter-community tensions, political grievances, access to natural resources, and regional dynamics plague the province. Inter-community tensions are especially present in and Fizi territories. In 2017, Tanganyika was the province third most affected by internal displacement, with 631,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Like the other provinces included in USAID’s IHP, Tanganyika is home to a number of violent conflicts. The triangle formed by the towns of Manono, , and Mitwaba is known as the “death triangle,” where the Mai Mai Bakata Katanga (“Cut off Katanga”) and the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) fight regularly, leading to displacements and destruction of infrastructure. At a larger scale, the conflict among the Batwa and the Bantu (in particular the Luba) ethnic groups since 2013 has affected five of the six territories of the province, with hundreds of deaths and rapes, and about 20% of the population (approximately 600,000 people) displaced. Kasai Region: Prior to their division into five distinct provinces in 2015, the original two provinces of Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental were relatively stable. The current five provinces—Kasai, Kasai Central, Kasai Oriental, Lomami and Sankuru—are among the country’s poorest, seldom taken into consideration

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | IX by the central government. As of 2016, Kasai’s population suffered from lack of infrastructure and services, including little or no access to water and electricity, education, and health care, and high levels of poverty, all partly linked to the region’s economic and political distance from Kinshasa. The Kamuina Nsapu insurgency in Kasai Central stemmed from increased tensions between the state’s authorities and traditional authority. As of July 2017, eight provinces and 1.4 million IDPs, including 800,000 in the Kasai Region, were affected by the crisis, and more than 30,000 Congolese had sought refuge in . There are now approximately 3.8 million people, 2.3 million of whom are children, in need of humanitarian assistance. Katanga Region: With an estimated population of 8.1 million, the three provinces of the Katanga region, like Kasai, are the result of the implementation of the découpage policy in 2015. While infrastructure is relatively developed in mining areas of Haut-Katanga and Lualaba, Haut-Lomami is one of the country’s least developed provinces. A significant part of the region’s economy relies on mining. A number of conflicts affect the Katanga region. The data collection exercise conducted as part of this conflict sensitivity analysis revealed a significant number of small-scale conflicts over limits between chiefdoms as well as inheritance conflicts. In addition, although they are not as visible as in the , armed groups are active in Katanga, especially in Haut-Katanga and Haut-Lomami, where the Kivus-based Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and Mai Mai Yakutumba still operate. Most of the violence in the “death triangle” is likely due to Bakata Katanga, which was particularly active between 2011 and 2014, when the number of IDPs in Katanga rose to approximately 600,000. In 2017, IDPs approximated 322,000 in the three provinces. Political tensions between opposition parties and the majority party are also increasing as the December 2018 presidential, legislative, and provincial elections draw closer. Election irregularities or contested results could stir up frustrations and lead to violent protests and conflict. The main causes of conflict in USAID IHP’s regions of implementation include:  Land conflicts: These can take different forms, including politicized community-level conflicts rooted in a history of patronage politics that have forced small-scale farmers off their land; violent inter- community conflicts, made possible by the organization of space on the basis of ethnicity following colonization, and leading to conflicts where land and ethnicity are mingled; individual land disputes between farmers, complicated by the partiality and corruption of the justice system and the use of alternative conflict resolution mechanisms that have at times involved armed groups.  Intercommunal conflicts: While land is often the main dimension of intercommunal conflict, it may play a lesser role in conflicts that originate from a combination of issues and grievances around power, including discrimination, representation, access to resources, and economic exploitation.  Power/authority conflicts: With the GDRC still unable to establish its authority in some parts of the national territory, and the prevalence of patronage governance, access to power is a source of conflict that can become violent.  Natural resource conflicts: Beyond land, other natural resources such as water and minerals, are a common cause for conflict in the three regions. Mining is also a source of conflict, whether tensions are between mining companies and artisanal miners, or between communities or armed groups regarding control and access to mineral resources.  International, regional, and national forces and dynamics: Involvement of regional and international forces and interests have also interposed themselves on these local-level tensions, complicating the web of conflict drivers that may escalate into violence. Foreign and foreign-backed

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | X rebel forces such as the M23 (Mouvement du 23 mars, or March 23 Movement) have contributed to a proliferation of armed groups allegedly created to protect their communities, which in turn fuels local violence driven by the above-listed factors. This report presents in-depth analyses for a select number of conflicts that represent one or more of the above types of conflicts in each of the three USAID IHP regions. These case studies provide insights into the actors at play and the relationships among them, the dividers and connectors among the main parties in conflict, and the ways in which these conflicts may evolve.

1.4 RECOMMENDATIONS The potential security risks that could negatively impact USAID’s IHP and recommended mitigation actions include:  Limited to no access to target areas by program staff and Ministry of Health (MOH) staff: Developing security management protocols and contingency plans for both the program and the MOH and ensuring communication with beneficiaries about facility closures during periods of insecurity so beneficiaries don’t interpret this as a form of partiality in the conflict.  Disrupted/interrupted supply of services: Ensuring ownership of facilities by beneficiaries to prevent looting/destruction of facilities during violent conflict, communication with beneficiaries to explain of stock-outs when insecurity prevents delivery, and well-balanced (ethnic, gender, age) representation on the Comité de Développement de la Zone de Santé (CODESA).  Sudden increase/change in demand for services due to a crisis, or lack of access by one group for fear of discrimination: Supporting DPS and BCZ with contingency planning for emergencies, ensuring health staff are trained on and apply MOH standards of professional conduct from their human resources guidance manual, supporting DPS/Zones de Santé (ZdS) to develop a strategy for increased recruitment of female health staff, coordinating with authorities providing protection and/or humanitarian assistance in each locality, and with other donors/agencies’ programs that support SGBV prevention and response and mental health.  Need for additional/different services: this could include developing a mental health strategy and ensuring MOH health staff and community health workers are trained on identifying and treating or referring mental health conditions.  Lack of access by program beneficiaries due to a crisis or lack of perceived ownership of or responsibility for the facility: Ensuring that Community Health Workers are trained and have supplies for emergency situations, supporting DPS and ZdS to put in place and implement a fee structure (tarification) that allows access of the majority of the population to basic healthcare, ensuring that facility staff apply the vulnerability criteria (to receive free care), considering testing drones to deliver supplies where security would allow, ensuring representative (ethnic, gender, age) Comités de Développement de la Zone de Santé, or Health Committees (CODESA), making initial contact at the onset of a crisis and maintaining contact with authorities providing protection and/or humanitarian assistance in each locality, and ensuring that complaints mechanisms and systems function in each facility, including that safeguards are in place to prevent retaliation.  Security risks to program personnel and suppliers: Developing security protocols, with guidance from the USAID IHP program security staff, for transportation of medical supplies and ensure, to the extent

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | XI possible, well balanced (ethnic, gender, age) representation on project teams, especially Integrated Care Teams (ICTs) or Equipes d’Encadrement Intégrées (EEIs). The potential programmatic risks that could negatively impact USAID’s IHP and recommended mitigation actions include:  Lack of neutrality of MOH staff at facility level during selection of CODESA/or partiality during recruitment of BCZ and facility staff: Ensuring that all staff are trained on and understand the standards of professional conduct. These policies and guidelines are in the MOH human resources guidance, but are generally poorly disseminated, not well understood, applied infrequently and not enforced by supervisory oversight. USAID IHP will work with the counterpart organizations to convey this information, coach staff and supervisory managers on implementation, and help institute the MOH’s recommended mechanisms, including for enforcement. USAID IHP will also consider supporting DPS/ZdS to develop and display a code of conduct in supported facilities. The program has already planned to support the MOH to set up complaints mechanisms at the facility level.  Perceived partiality in procurement: Ensuring transparent, professional procurement processes, as well as purchasing small supplies locally when possible. The project will ensure communication with communities on selection criteria and develop and use the Security Management Strategy of Community Acceptance as guidance.  Perceived partiality in targeting of facilities for support in different technical areas, rehabilitation, and equipment: Ensuring each facility has a functioning complaints mechanism, ensuring that clear targeting principles are consistently applied, and using the Security Management Strategy of Community Acceptance as guidance.  Lack of access/availability of services: ensuring representatives of all groups in conflict are included in/informed of the definition of indigence criteria; ensuring health staff and Relais Communautaires (RECOs) are informed and apply the policy on free healthcare for IDPs.  Supply of services: ensuring sufficient community sensitization, and coordinating with other programs supporting women’s protection including around domestic violence to prevent services such as SGBV response or family planning to be perceived as inappropriate by some community members or to lead to increased domestic violence,  Misappropriation of the program by politicians: ensuring communities are aware of the origins of funding for program activities, especially for infrastructure and other visible activities, to avoid politicians seeking to claim credit. Community ownership of health facilities and health zone activities and input into resource decision-making through strong community engagement activities will also have a mitigating effect. This implementation strategy will be used to update the Year 1 Work Plan once all relevant program staff are hired.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | XII 1. BACKGROUND

This report presents conclusions drawn from the first phase of a health conflict sensitivity analysis exercise conducted in August 2018 as part of the start-up phase of USAID IHP. USAID IHP is being implemented by Abt Associates, International Rescue Committee, Inc. (IRC), and Pathfinder International and is funded by USAID from May 2018 to April 2025. The purpose of USAID IHP is to strengthen the capacity of Congolese institutions and communities to deliver quality, integrated health services to sustainably improve the health status of the Congolese population. USAID IHP’s Objective I is to strengthen health systems, governance, and leadership at provincial, health zone, and facility levels in target health zones. Objective 2 is to increase access to quality, integrated health services in target health zones, and Objective 3 to increase adoption of healthy behaviors, including use of health services, in target health zones. USAID IHP is implemented as three regional activities:  Eastern Congo, in the provinces of Tanganyika and South Kivu;  Kasai, in the provinces of Kasai-Oriental, Lomami, Sankuru, Kasai-Central, and Kasai.  Katanga, in the provinces of Haut-Lomami, Lualaba, and Haut-Katanga; and This Health Conflict Sensitivity Analysis (CSA) is among the first USAID IHP technical deliverables. In its Request for Proposals, USAID requires this CSA “to inform USAID IHP design and ensure that conflict sensitive approaches are incorporated throughout implementation. From this analysis, the Contractor will develop an annual implementation strategy as a component of the Annual Work Plan.” This report is an annex to the work plan and will be updated annually, and its elements are included in the work plan schedule of activities. As such, this report represents the first phase of the complete Year 1 CSA exercise, which will also include the following activities:  Training of Do No Harm (DNH) focal points on Conflict Sensitivity Analysis and Do No Harm principles.  Revising the Year I Work Plan based on the present report and the data collected by DNH focal points. This will ensure a high-quality, comprehensive Conflict Sensitivity and Do No Harm Analysis during Year 1 of USAID IHP. The purpose of the first phase of this Year I Health Conflict Sensitivity Analysis exercise is to provide USAID IHP and USAID with recommendations, both programmatic and management-related, to ensure conflict-sensitive implementation during Year 1. This means that USAID IHP does not increase existing tensions, trigger conflict, or create new tensions, and more generally that it “does no harm” to the people it serves.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 1 2. METHODOLOGY

2.1 DESK REVIEW The authors of this report conducted a desk review of the literature on the conflict contexts in the target areas of USAID IHP in July and August 2018. This review provided the author with a deeper understanding of the conflicts, their timelines, their causes, and their actors.

2.2 PRE-WORKSHOP QUALITATIVE DATA COLLECTION The activities for this first phase of the Year I Health Conflict Sensitivity Analysis included data collection exercises that took different forms in each province based on knowledge needs to prepare and conduct a final, five-day consolidation workshop. IRC’s Governance Technical Advisor, Noemie Kouider, used key informant interviews to gather primary data from individuals in specific positions within various Divisions Provinciales de la Santé (DPS), health zones, or civil society organizations (CSO). She used focus group discussions to gather information from community members, usually separating women from men, and youths from adults, in order for everyone in the group to feel comfortable speaking up. The interview guide is available in Annex C.2 In the Katanga region—where none of the consortium partners had any offices before the start-up of USAID IHP—Deogratias Rukeba, an IRC Governance and Rights Coordinator familiar with Katanga, organized workshops in each province from August 13-20, 2018. Participants at these workshops included representatives of the Provincial Ministry of Health, DPS, Inspection Provinciale de la Santé (Provincial Health Inspectorate), Health Zone Management Teams (Equipe Cadre de la Zone de Santé, [ECZ]), various provincial divisions (Interior, Decentralization, and Planning), Territory authorities, Chiefdom authorities, community leaders, CSOs, Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO), International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), and contractors, including Chemonics (implementer of the USAID-funded Global Health Supply Chain Program-Procurement and Supply Management project and the USAID-funded Accélère Education project). Tanganyika’s conflict context was well-known by several participants in the consolidation workshop, as the IRC is currently implementing the Peacebuilding and Health project addressing the Twa-Bantu conflict in Kalémie and health zones. Another IRC Governance and Rights Coordinator, Bienfait Muhigirwa, facilitated a workshop in Kalémie on August 9 with representatives from the DPS, the Kalémie BCZ, the Nyemba BCZ, Food for the Hungry, Commission Diocésaine Justice et Paix (an IRC partner on

2 To minimize investigator bias, the facilitator of the consolidation workshop was an IRC technical advisor based in New York who is familiar with the DRC but does not have any personal connections with the groups in conflict. The only consultants hired were enumerators in Kasai. In Eastern Congo and Katanga, IRC used its current staff. The comment still applies as these staff and the consultant are Congolese and may indeed have personal connections with the groups in conflict. A mitigating factor against bias was the number of people present at the consolidation workshop, including several per IHP region, which provided a variety of perspectives and experiences. In addition, the facilitator of the consolidation workshop and authors of the report conducted a thorough literature review, enabling them to balance findings from the data collection and workshop when necessary.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 2 FIGURE 1: Workshop in Kalémie on August 13, 2018 the health and peacebuilding project implemented in Kalémie and Nyunzu health zones), Search for Common Ground, and the IRC. In South Kivu, Bienfait Muhigirwa conducted several face-to-face and phone interviews from August 15-24 with the Bagira Médecin Chef de Zone (MCZ), a representative of the DPS, and representatives of Search for Common Ground. Information from the USAID-funded Solutions for Peace and Recovery (SPR) project, implemented by Management Systems International (MSI), International Alert, and the IRC, was also used as background information, in particular its Do No Harm Analysis report. In the Kasai region, Pathfinder International FIGURE 2: Key informant interview with a representative of consultant Aimé Tshibanda coordinated key the Bilomba Health Zone in Kasai Central on August 14, 2018 informant interviews and focus group discussions from August 13-18 in Kasai Central, Lomami, and Sankuru with representatives from DPS, MCZ, health providers, local authorities (Administrateur de Territoire), community leaders, CSO representatives, and women. The complete list of participants can be found in Annex A.

2.3 CONSOLIDATION WORKSHOP From August 20-24, the consultant organized and facilitated a five-day consolidation workshop at Hôtel Horizon in Bukavu, South Kivu, with participants from the IRC, Pathfinder International, and Abt Associates. Provincial Directors were the only FIGURE 3: Conflict Sensitivity Analysis workshop in Bukavu USAID IHP staff outside of Kinshasa hired at the time of the workshop, but both IRC and Pathfinder have ongoing projects in South Kivu, Tanganyika, and Kasais. USAID IHP therefore invited the most relevant of each project’s staff to the workshop, particularly those with experience in Health, Peacebuilding, and Gender-Based Violence. The workshop aimed to tap into participants’ contextual knowledge through a series of conflict analyses and Do No Harm (DNH) exercises that would allow USAID IHP to

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 3 draw conclusions and recommendations for its implementation. The workshop agenda can be found in Annex B.

2.3.1 CONFLICT CAUSAL PATHWAYS The Causal Pathway method is a tool to FIGURE 4: Conflict causal pathway exercise – Kasai region help ascertain the major conflict dynamics at play and how the issues are inter-connected. Ultimately it allows practitioners to identify underlying, or fixed factors; the driver of conflicts, or dynamic factors; and the triggers of conflict. The purpose of using this exercise at the start of the workshop was two-fold:  Have participants agree on their region’s main underlying and dynamic factors of conflict as well as conflict triggers; and  Identify, from the list of conflict drivers in each region, the main causes of conflict, and select between one and three conflicts per region to be analyzed throughout the course of the workshop.

2.3.2 CONFLICT MAPPING The facilitator used the Conflict Mapping exercise as a first step for analysis of each of the selected conflicts per province/area. A conflict map simplifies a conflict and allows practitioners to visualize the conflict theme, the conflict actors and their level of influence on the conflict, and the relationships among these actors. It represents the specific viewpoint of the person or group mapping, of a specific conflict situation, at a specific moment in time.3 The conflict maps developed during the workshop are presented in a subsequent section on conflict mapping.

3 Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. “Conflict Analysis Tools.” 2005.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 4 2.3.3 DIVIDERS AND CONNECTORS FIGURE 5: Do No Harm Framework CONTEXT OF CONFLICT Dividers Connectors Options Options Tensions/Capacities for War Relief/Development Local Capacities for Peace MANDATE Redesign and  Systems & institutions FUNDRAISING  Systems & institutions Redesign  Attitudes & actions  Attitudes & actions check options HEADQUARTER and check  Different values &  Shared values & on their interests Why? interests options on effects on  Different experiences Where?  Common experiences their effects Connectors  Symbols & occasions What?  Symbols & occasions on Dividers When? With whom? By whom? How?

Resource transfers/ Resource transfers/ or Implicit ethical Implicit ethical or messages messages

Source: CDA Collaborative While the “Do No Harm” (DNH) Framework developed by Mary B. Anderson and her team from Collaborative for Development Action (CDA) is a key tool for conflict analysis, comprehensive DNH analysis can only be undertaken once activities have started. Consequently, workshop activities focused on Dividers and Connectors among the groups in conflict for the two targeted conflicts per province, as well as on the impact of USAID IHP activities on these conflicts, and their impact on USAID IHP activities. The facilitator also presented the DNH concepts of Resource Transfers and Implicit Ethical Messages— the actions and attitudes of aid agencies and their staff that may affect conflicts—for participants to keep in mind when reflecting upon the inter-relations between conflicts and USAID IHP.

2.3.4 SCENARIO PLANNING Scenario Planning is a methodology to anticipate and plan for future context changes that may impact a program. It helps practitioners mitigate risks and respond more rapidly to changes. Workshop participants used Scenario Planning to reflect on the different ways in which each analyzed conflict could evolve over Year 1 of the program and potential USAID IHP’s responses to these changes. This allowed participants to think through the implications of each scenario in terms of potential impact on USAID IHP and ways in which the program could adapt its activities to mitigate risks and build on positive developments.

2.3.5 RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES After the above exercises (except for Scenario Planning where reflecting on risks and opportunities is already a part of the exercise), participants identified risks and opportunities for USAID IHP. These were

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 5 expressed both in terms of risks for USAID IHP and risks for the project to increase tensions or create new conflicts. This exercise served as the basis for the final session on recommendations.

2.3.6 RECOMMENDATIONS At the end of the workshop, participants discussed recommendations to be considered during the design of the USAID IHP Year 1 Work Plan. These recommendations focused on all programmatic and managerial aspects of USAID IHP, from staffing, staff training, and staff and partners’ behaviors, to activities, and the consultant facilitator used them to develop the implementation strategy found at the end of this report.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 6 3. FINDINGS

3.1 CONTEXT ANALYSIS

3.1.1 DRC CONTEXT The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), a country almost the size of Western Europe with a wealth of natural resources, is plagued with challenges that include poverty, weak governance, and political instability. DRC ranks among the poorest countries in the world at 176 out of 187 countries on the 2015 Human Development Index. Governance in the DRC is especially weak, and the country is undergoing a political crisis, with President staying in power beyond his constitutionally mandated two-term limit and delaying presidential elections from 2016 to 2018. The country ranked 48th out of 54 African countries on the 2015 Ibrahim Index of African Governance. Corruption is widespread and impacts the Government of DRC’s (GDRC) ability to provide basic services. Patronage networks and cronyism dominate public management. Democratic space is reduced, with the marginalization and repression of opposition figures, and restrictions in freedom of the press and independence of the judiciary.4 The absence of functional state institutions partly explains the GDRC’s inability to manage conflicts. As a result, the conflicts that afflicted the country in the 1990’s and 2000’s have turned into cyclical crises affecting in particular Eastern Congo, with the Kasai region becoming in 2016-2017 the theater of a particularly bloody conflict. Congo’s protracted crisis is the result of a combination of historical, political, and socioeconomic factors that play out and influence each other at regional, national, and subnational level. The largest United Nations peacekeeping force in the world has been unable to stabilize the country. By January 2018, the DRC hosted more than 540,000 , and 4.5 million internally displaced people (IDPs).

3.1.2 REGIONAL AND PROVINCIAL CONTEXT Eastern Congo With a population of 5.7 million, South Kivu is a province rich in natural resources such as minerals, petrol, methane, and resources from and Lake Kivu. Contrary to the Katanga region, mining in South Kivu remains largely artisanal. The other main economic activities are agriculture and trade. Basic infrastructure is lacking, including roads, which further limits commercial activities. Unemployment is above 50%, and higher among youth. South Kivu is at the epicenter of the conflict that has been affecting Eastern Congo since 1994 and has caused an estimated 5.4 million deaths (a large majority of which are civilians) and 3 million IDPs. In 2017 alone, 647,000 people were displaced in the province. Violent conflicts driven by inter-community tensions (including customary authority and succession disputes), political grievances, access to natural resources, and regional dynamics plague the province. Inter-community tensions are especially present in Uvira and

4 GSDRC: Political Economy and Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Birmingham. 2015.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 7 Fizi territories.5 Foreign groups such as Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the National Liberation Forces (FNL) take advantage of the security vacuum to expand their influence in the region. Weak state authority and rule of law drive communities to rely on armed groups for self-defense. These include Raia Mutumboki (initially created to fight the FDLR, it has since divided into several factions along ethnic lines) and Mai Mai groups. The lack of economic opportunity provides all armed groups with easy recruitment. Conflicts in South Kivu take a particular toll on women and children, who represent more than 50% of the displaced population.6 As in other provinces of DRC where conflicts are active, sexual and gender- based violence (SGBV) is used as a “weapon of war” by armed groups in order to “intimidate and ultimately destroy the targeted group”.7 63% of cases of SGBV reported in 2013 took place in the Kivus, with 6,612 cases in South Kivu.8 The province of Tanganyika was among the poorer districts of the former . With a population of three million, the economy of Tanganyika relies on semi-industrial fishing, agriculture, livestock farming, and mining. In 2017, Tanganyika was the province third-most affected by internal displacement, with 631,000 IDPs. Like the other provinces of the program, Tanganyika is home to a number of violent conflicts. Participants to the workshop organized in Kalémie identified the main drivers of conflicts in the following clusters of health zones:  Manono, Kiambi, and Ankoro health zones: interethnic; mining; land (farmers vs. new buyers); customary power succession (in the chiefdoms of Bakongolo and Kiluba).  Moba and Kansimba health zones: intercommunity; authority (FARDC vs. community); customary; land (agricultural farmers vs. livestock farmers); political (presidential party vs. opposition parties).  Mbulula, Kongolo, and Kabalo health zones: power and succession; natural resources. In the area known as the “death triangle,” formed by the towns of Manono, Pweto, and Mitwaba, the Mai Mai Bakata Katanga and the FARDC fight regularly, leading to cases of SGBV, 9 displacements and destruction of infrastructure. At a larger scale, the conflict among the Batwa and the Bantu (in particular the Luba) ethnic groups since 2013 has affected five of the six territories of the province, with hundreds of deaths and rapes, and about 20% of the population (600,000 people) displaced.

5 MONUSCO: “South Kivu Factsheet”. 2015. 6 OCHA: The Human Face of Violence and Insecurity in South Kivu. 2017. 7 LOGiCA: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo: Insights from Former Combatants. September 2013. 8 GoDRC - Ministère du Genre, de la Famille et de l’Enfant: “Ampleur des violences sexuelles et basées sur le genre en RDC et actions de lutte contre le phénomène en 2013”. Kinshasa. 2014. 9 OCHA and UNHCR reported that a majority of the 305 survivors of SGBV identified during a profiling in Pweto in 2013 had not received medical assistance. See OCHA: D.R. Congo’s neglected “Triangle of Death” – The challenges of the protection of civilians in Katanga. Kinshasa. 2013.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 8 Kasai Prior to their division into five distinct provinces in 2015, the original two provinces of Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental were relatively stable. 10 The current five provinces—Kasai, Kasai Central, Kasai Oriental, Lomami and Sankuru—constitute one of the country’s poorest regions, seldom taken into consideration by Kinshasa’s governing bodies.11 The region of Kasai, home to an estimated 29 million people, boasts a wealth of natural resources,— including diamonds, iron, and oil—little of which has been extracted or exploited on a large scale. As of 2016, Kasai’s population generally suffered from lack of infrastructure and services, including little or no access to water and electricity, education, and health care, and high levels of poverty, all of which are partly linked to the area’s distance, both economically and politically, from Kinshasa. 12 As of 2014, individuals in Kasai completed four to five fewer years of school than their counterparts in Kinshasa.13 Families throughout the region subsist on livestock and crop farming, or agriculture, small businesses and crafts, and hunting and fishing. Larger businesses focus on the sale of manufactured goods, pharmaceuticals, and alcohol, and the transportation of goods. In Kasai Central specifically, artisanal diamond extraction has drawn such a massive migration of youth from rural areas that agricultural production has decreased significantly, increasing food insecurity. While the entirety of Kasai has not been affected by the insurgency that began in 2016, Kasai Central’s formal and informal socioeconomic activities were greatly disrupted by the crisis.14 Kasai Oriental, like the province of Sankuru, is relatively calm, and small-scale extraction of diamonds constitutes a larger part of the economy than in the other provinces of greater Kasai. The state of Lomami’s services, infrastructure, and economy is similar to its neighbors in Kasai; however, it hosts the largest population of the region, just over 9 million in 2016, and has become host to many of those displaced from Kasai Central. The Kamuina Nsapu insurgency in Kasai Central was the result of increased tensions between the state’s authorities and customary authority.15 As of July 2017, eight provinces and 1.4 million IDPs,16 including 800,000 in the Kasai Region,17 were affected by the crisis,18 and more than 30,000 Congolese had sought refuge in Angola.19 There are now 3.8 million people, 2.3 million of which are children, in need of

10 UNICEF. “Kasai: A Children’s Crisis.” UNICEF Child Alert. May 2018. 11 International Crisis Group. “Kamuina Nsapu Insurgency Adds to Dangers in DR Congo.” 12 International Crisis Group. “Kamuina Nsapu Insurgency Adds to Dangers in DR Congo.” 13 UNDP. Rapport national sur le développement humain 2016. 14 Cellule d’Analyses des Indicateurs de Developpement (CAID), Province du Kasai Central. 2017. 15 International Crisis Group. “Kamuina Nsapu Insurgency Adds to Dangers in DR Congo.” 16 ReliefWeb. “Humanitarian crisis in Kasai region, DRC Congo.” 17 IRRI. “Conflict and Displacement in the Kasai.” January 2018. 18 ReliefWeb. “Humanitarian crisis in Kasai region, DRC Congo.” 19 OCHA. “Complex Emergency in the Kasai region, DR Congo.” Situation Report No. 8. June 2017.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 9 humanitarian assistance, as well as a perceived increase in cases of SGBV with new perpetrators, in particular armed groups and FARDC20. Food insecurity has been aggravated by families’ inability to plant and harvest crops for at least three seasons.21 A UNICEF report published in May 2018 states that 770,000 children, or nearly half of all children under five years old in the Kasai region, suffer from acute malnutrition; 400,000 of these suffer from severe acute malnutrition.22 The conflict not only prevented children from enrolling or continuing in schools where they originally lived and families from accessing health centers, but has also resulted in the destruction of infrastructure, including 500 schools and 200 health centers. As a result, 440,000 children did not finish their 2017 school year, and measles and cholera have taken hold where vaccinations could not be carried out due to insecurity.23 Katanga With an estimated population of 8.1 million, the three provinces of the Katanga region are the result of the implementation of the policy of découpage in 2015. The former four districts of Katanga—Tanganyika, Haut-Lomami, Haut-Katanga, and Lualaba—became provinces themselves. While some of these new provinces, like Haut-Katanga, see découpage as a way of dividing Katangans and fueling conflict, others, especially the poorer provinces, consider it a chance to assert their autonomy. Découpage also stoked the already tense relationship between opposition political parties and the presidential majority party, as well as between Kinshasa and the provinces of the region. While infrastructure is relatively developed in mining areas of Haut-Katanga and Lualaba, Haut-Lomami is one of the country’s least developed provinces. A significant part of the economy of the region relies on mining, with , copper, tin, radium, uranium, and diamonds the main minerals. , the second largest town in the DRC, is also its mining capital, acting as a hub for most major mining companies, including Gécamines, the state-owned copper-cobalt mining company. A number of conflicts affect the Katanga region. The data collection exercise conducted as part of this conflict sensitivity analysis revealed a significant number of small-scale conflicts over limits between chiefdoms as well as inheritance conflicts. In addition, although they are not as visible as in the Kivus, armed groups are active in Katanga, especially in Haut-Katanga and Haut-Lomami, where the Kivus-based FDLR and Mai Mai Yakutumba still operate.24 The Bakata Katanga (“Cut off Katanga”) armed group, led by Kyungu (also known as Gédéon), allegedly seeks to protect the region against exploitation by the central government. Most violence in the “death triangle” is likely due to Bakata Katanga, which was particularly active between 2011 and 2014, when the

20 Oxfam. Kasai: “The Forgotten Province of DRC – Gender Assessment”. November 2017. 21 ReliefWeb. “UN Agencies in Urgent Bid to Prevent in Kasai.” January 2018. 22 UNICEF. “Kasai: A Children’s Crisis.” UNICEF Child Alert, May 2018. 23 UNICEF. “The Future of Kasai Children at Threat.” December 2017. 24 ICG. “Katanga: Tensions in DRC’s Mineral Heartland”. International Crisis Group. 2016.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 10 number of IDPs in Katanga rose to 600,00025. In 2017, IDPs numbered 322,000 throughout the three provinces. Political tensions between opposition parties and the majority party are also increasing as the December 2018 presidential, legislative, and provincial elections draw closer. Indeed, with the end of President Kabila’s term approaching, and his support weakening, Katangan elites increasingly believe that they may need different alliances to keep power.26 These tensions have been stoked by the measures taken by the GDRC to prevent Moïse Katumbi from initiating his candidacy for the Presidential elections before the August 10 deadline.27 Irregular elections or contested results could stir up frustrations and lead to violent protests and conflict.

3.2 CONFLICTS IN USAID IHP AREAS OF INTERVENTION

3.2.1 MAIN CAUSES OF CONFLICT Although causes of conflict often overlap—for example, land or natural-resource management conflicts often have inter-community aspects—workshop participants identified the following causes of conflicts in the regions of Eastern Congo, Kasai, and Katanga. Land conflicts Conflicts related to land ownership, occupation, and use appear as one of the main sources of conflict in all three regions of the program. These conflicts can take the following forms:  Politicized community-level conflicts. Political or identity-based conflicts are rooted in a history of patronage politics and weakness of state institutions that dates back to the Mobutu era, when land was integrated into patronage networks. This was reinforced during the Congo Wars as land gradually became a resource of war, 28 resulting in land grabbing by powerful political officials and land redistributions to political and economic elites in exchange for political loyalty. Influential military leaders reinforced the phenomenon, driving small-scale farmers off their land. Without any power to claim their rights, these farmers were forced to seek alternative livelihoods. This type of land conflict is common in South Kivu.  Violent inter-community conflicts. Colonization contributed to the further organization of space on the base of ethnicity, with land being governed by specific communities with separate authority structures ruling over territories with defined limits. This reinforced the relationships among rule, territory, and identity,29 and resulted in conflicts where land and ethnicity are mingled. Such is the case in Kalehe’s Hauts Plateaux (High Plateaux), where communities who left the area during the

25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 On August 3, Moïse Katumbi was refused entry at the border between Zambia and the DRC as he was returning to the DRC. 28 Rift Valley Institute: ‘It’s not all about the land’: Land disputes and conflict in the eastern Congo. DRC. 2016. 29 Ibid.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 11 Rwandan because of attacks from armed groups found their land occupied upon their return. Conflicts in the Ruzizi Plain also illustrate this phenomenon, with groups fighting over ownership of the land, such as the Bafuliiru using arguments of autochthony against the Barundi that they present as “foreigners.” Disagreements over limits between two or more Chiefdoms, territories, or other administrative limits also fall under this category. These are frequent throughout the program’s regions. For example, the data collection conducted in Katanga revealed that in Haut- Lomami, there are currently 11 conflicts related to territorial limits, in particular between Chiefdoms. These types of conflicts are also prevalent in the Kasai region.  Individual land disputes. Land disputes between individual farmers are widespread in the DRC, in particular in Eastern Congo. The partiality and corruption of the justice system makes it harder for these disputes to reach a peaceful resolution. As a result, alternative conflict resolution mechanisms have developed, with armed groups playing a significant role. This has been the case in Bunyakiri in South Kivu, where factions of the armed group have rendered justice on individual land disputes. Inter-community conflicts While land is often the main dimension of intercommunity conflicts, it may play a lesser role in some conflicts that originate from a combination of issues and grievances around power. This is the case of the conflict between the Batwa and the Bantu in Tanganyika and northern Haut-Katanga. Although the Batwa were the first inhabitants of the Basin, authority over land is not at the root of the conflict. Grievances center on discrimination, representation, access to resources, and economic exploitation. When ethnic groups pitted against each other in a particular conflict are present over large parts of the territory, these conflicts are likely to spread out quickly and lead to large-scale conflicts. Power/authority conflicts Another important type of conflict in the program’s implementation areas is related to power and authority. With the GDRC still unable to establish its authority in some parts of the national territory, and the prevalence of patronage governance, access to power is a source of conflict that can become violent. In addition, since the Belgian colonial administration integrated customary chiefs into its administration, identity and ethnicity have become guiding principles of social, political, and administrative organization. As a result, ethnicity often (although not always) plays a key role in power and authority conflicts. In the Kasai region, the Kamwina Nsapu insurgency originates from a contestation of authority between a customary leader and the GDRC. In the Katanga region, identity (both Katangan and ethnic) plays a key role in the tensions between opposition parties and the majority party. Natural resources Beyond land, other natural resources such as water and minerals are a common cause for conflict in the program’s areas of implementation. In the Ruzizi Plain, water access and management are strong grievances among communities in conflict. Mining is also a source of conflict, whether tensions are between mining companies and artisanal miners, or between communities or armed groups regarding control and access to mineral resources. One of the many grievances that contributed to escalated conflict in Tanganyika, for example, is that the Bantu can require the Batwa to pay taxes to access mines. International, regional, and national dynamics have also interposed themselves on these local-level tensions, complicating the web of conflict drivers that may escalate into violence, especial in Eastern Congo. At the regional level, foreign and foreign-backed rebel forces such as the M23 (Mouvement du 23

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 12 mars, or March 23 Movement) or the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) both backed by Rwanda, 30 have contributed to a proliferation of armed groups allegedly created to protect their communities, which in turn fuels local violence driven by the above factors. They have also weakened Congolese state authority by occupying and administering entire swathes of territory. At the national level, policies of the national army are another factor contributing to the formation of armed groups.31 The practice of integrating members of armed groups into the national army as a compensation for the dissolution of armed groups appears to have become an incentive for creating such groups.

3.2.2 LOCAL CONFLICT ANALYSES This section provides insights into the conflict contexts in the areas of intervention of USAID IHP and presents one to three conflicts per program region. These conflicts were chosen because they are either large-scale conflicts whose dynamics need to be clearly understood by USAID IHP implementers, and/or because they are (even if small scale or not currently active) representative of the dynamics of conflicts in the region in question. The analyses below follow the same process as the one followed during the consolidation workshop. The analysis starts with a presentation of conflict dynamics and actors using the conflict mapping done during the workshop; an analysis of dividers and connectors for the groups in conflict follows; and a presentation of three scenarios (negative, intermediary, and positive) concludes the analysis. Information from the reviewed literature and the data collected by workshop participants enrich the analyses produced during the workshop. It is worth noting that this was the first time most workshop participants used these tools. Additionally, although they provide a useful overview of the situation in all three USAID IHP regions, they should be considered as the first step towards a deeper analysis.

3.2.3 EASTERN CONGO REGION The territory of Uvira is home to one of the highest number of armed groups in Eastern Congo, a situation that dates back to the First and Second Congo Wars (1996-2003), when the region was overrun by armed groups.32 Two main conflicts currently bedevil the territory: those related to the Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom; and those over succession to the throne in the Bafuliiru Chiefdom. The Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom conflict was selected for analysis because of its large-scale impact on intercommunity conflicts, insecurity, and instability in the Ruzizi Plain. Because of its complex timeline and multitude of actors, a detailed overview of the origins of the conflict is presented below. The origins of the Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom conflict date back to the second half of the nineteenth century, when a sub-chief of Burundian king Mwezi Gisabo settled in the Ruzizi Plain. The area was not

30 Netherlands Institute of International Relations: Going Around in Circles – The Challenges of Peacekeeping and Stabilization in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. DRC. 2015. 31 Rift Valley Institute: A Microcosm of Militarization – Conflict, Governance, and Armed Mobilization in Uvira, South Kivu. Nairobi. 2016. 32 Rift Valley Institute: A Microcosm of Militarization – Conflict, Governance, and Armed Mobilization in Uvira, South Kivu. Nairobi. 2016.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 13 inhabited by Bafuliiru, but some Fuliiru chiefs saw the area as belonging to their sphere of influence. As some Fuliiru chiefs fled the Plain following the arrival of colonizers, Rundi chiefs started occupying the vacated areas, which sparked conflicts in 1920. At the time, conflicts were not seen as based on ethnicity, and intermarriages, friendship pacts, and commerce led to integration between the two groups. However, the arrival of large numbers of Bafuliiru in the Plain from the 1920’s onward meant Bafuliiru became demographically dominant and started claiming political leadership over the Ruzizi Plain.33 In 1928, colonial authorities established three chiefdoms according to the ethnic groups living in the Plain: the Bafuliiru, the Bavira, and the Barundi.34 In 1960, Moïse Marandura, a member of the provincial parliament of Kivu became acting head of the Fuliiru and Rundi chiefdoms after their paramount chiefs fled to . In 1961, the Bafuliiru chief came back, which sparked the Guerre des chèvres (war of goats), where Bafuliiru attacked Barundi and their belongings. Marandura continued to claim the Barundi chiefdom, and created a rebellion movement that joined forces with the National Liberation Council (CNL), that aimed to take over the Congolese government and was defeated in 1967.35 Tensions between the two communities rose with the passing of a 1981 nationality law that excluded from Congolese nationality communities not present on national territory before1885. The Barundi also lost their right over land, which increased the contestation of their leadership over the Ruzizi Plain. In 1991, the Barundi effectively lost this leadership when their paramount chief (mwami), Floribert Ndabagoye, was suspended on accusations of “doubtful nationality.”36 In 1998, he came back and was said to be allied with the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), a foreign-backed rebel movement supported by Rwanda and . From 1998 to 2001, the Bafuliiru and the Barundi mwamis played two different cards, the Bafuliiru supporting “Mai Mai” groups resisting the RCD, and the Barundi supporting the RCD. In 2004, the central government suspended Ndabagoye when he served as national member of the parliament for the RCD, and a Fuliiru chief was appointed by the Administrateur de Territoire of Uvira territory, allowing Bafuliiru to control customary power in the Ruzizi Plain.37 The interim administrators sold large swathes of land, which left many small-scale farmers without any access to land. In 2012, following the reelection of President Joseph Kabila, Bafuliiru groupement chiefs were dismissed. Just before Ndabagoye’s reinstallation in power, he was assassinated, allegedly by a network of Fuliiru leaders. These then aggravated the conflict by encouraging Fuliiru youth to (unsuccessfully) prevent Ndabagoye’s son from acceding to the throne. A pro-Rundi armed group (formed of Barundi and ) and several Fuliiru local defense groups emerged as a result of this conflict. However,

33 Ibid. 34 International Rescue Committee: Analyse de l’Economie Politique de la Plaine de la Ruzizi. DRC. 2017 35 Rift Valley Institute: A Microcosm of Militarization – Conflict, Governance, and Armed Mobilization in Uvira, South Kivu. Nairobi. 2016. 36 Ibid. 37 International Rescue Committee: Analyse de l’Economie Politique de la Plaine de la Ruzizi. DRC. 2017

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 14 fighting does not necessarily pit these two groups against each other. Various Fuliiru Mai Mai groups also compete and fight over spheres of influence. 38 As shown in the conflict mapping in Figure 6, and as revealed by the history of the conflict above, violent conflicts in the Ruzizi Plain today exist mainly between the Bafuliiru and the Barundi as well as between the Banyamulenge and the Bafuliiru. These conflicts center on customary power, political power, economic interests, and issues of discrimination. There are also tensions between the Bafuliiru and the Bashi, in particular around economic interests. The Bafuliiru have a good relationship with the Bavira, and a strong relationship with the Banyindu. As a result of these Bafuliiru alliances, relationships are broken between Banyamulenge and Bavira, between Banyamulenge and Banyindu, and between Barundi and Banyiundu. Armed groups, local authorities, and politicians play a significant role in the two relationships characterized by FIGURE 6: Conflict Mapping South Kivu (Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom violent conflict, i.e. between the Conflict) Bafuliiru and the Banyamulenge, and between the Bafuliiru and the Barundi. The involvement of armed groups makes resolution of these conflicts all the more difficult. National and provincial politicians, business people, and officers in the FARDC also hamper conflict resolution by pressuring parties in conflict to maintain their stance and by providing financial support to armed groups.39 As a result, it is important to highlight that the conflict of the Ruzizi Plain is not simply an ethnic or intercommunity conflict, but above all a political conflict between the leaders of the Bafuliiru Chiefdom and those of the Barundi dynasty ruling the Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom. In fact, many community members on each side do not view the other side as the enemy.40 Dividers and connectors between the two main groups in conflict in the Ruzizi Plain, the Bafuliiru and the Barundi, support this argument. Indeed, many of the dividers involve powerful actors with political interests, whereas connectors are mostly related to day-to-day relationships between individuals.

38 Rift Valley Institute: A Microcosm of Militarization – Conflict, Governance, and Armed Mobilization in Uvira, South Kivu. Nairobi. 2016. 39 Ibid. 40 Rift Valley Institute: The Making of Conflict in the Eastern Congo: Trouble in the Ruzizi Plain. DRC. 2015.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 15 TABLE 1: Dividers and Connectors between Bafuliiru and Barundi (Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom Conflict)

DIVIDERS CONNECTORS Systems and Institutions Systems and Institutions • Customary power • Schools • Provincial and national politicians • Markets • Languages (Kirundi and Kifulero) • Health centers • Provincial and national government (interact with • Belonging to the same area (Ruzizi Plain) both the “legal” and the “illegal” chefs de • Inter-marriages groupement) • Swahili language • Local public figures (notables) within provincial and national institutions • Denial of nationality (for Barundi)

Attitudes and Actions Attitudes and Actions • Illegal possession of weapons on both sides • Traveling together/sharing vehicles to get to • Barundi cattle destroying Bafuliiro crops Burundi, Bukavu, Rwanda, Uvira, etc.

Values and Interests Values and Interests • Unequal access to water for field irrigation and • Water points (bornes fontaines) for giving water to cattle • Health • Commerce with Burundi • Development projects • Noyaux de paix, where women gather to resolve conflicts and promote peace

Experiences Experiences • Discrimination • Poverty • Congo wars • Youth unemployment

Symbols and Occasions Symbols and Occasions • Killing of leaders on both sides • Flag • Massacre of population (Bafuliiru) at Mutarule • Election card Katemaka • Natinal anthem • Mutarule cemetery and cemetery of the mwami of Mutarule and Katemaka All three scenarios developed below for the Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom conflict include some elements of continued conflict, often violent, as it seems unlikely that this crisis of local power will reach a positive outcome in the next year. However, progress is possible and, as shown in the positive scenario, dialogue supported by prominent leaders and populations on both sides may lead to significant improvements. TABLE 2: Scenario Planning – Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom Conflict

SCENARIO EVENTS IMPACT ON USAID IHP • Fueled by provincial and national politicians, the • Frequent and prolonged conflict between the leaders of the Bafuliiru inaccessibility of target Chiefdom and those of the Barundi dynasty ruling health zones and facilities the Ruzizi plain continues to cause frequent fighting by project staff and between armed groups and attacks against the DPS/ZdS) staff due to Negative population, including cases of SGBV. insecurity. (most likely) • No peaceful dialogue occurs between parties in • Significant demand for conflict. SGBV response services. • The campaign for and the results of the December • Regular attacks on health 2018 presidential, legislative, and provincial staff. elections as well as subsequent elections, kindle

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 16 SCENARIO EVENTS IMPACT ON USAID IHP tensions among parties in conflict, leading to • Potential kidnapping of targeted assassinations and attacks. project staff or suppliers • Inter-community conflicts related to natural (especially in situations of resources, including water and land, continue to perceived transportation occur regularly. of valuable goods). • Frequent population displacements due to attacks. • Frequent stock-outs of • Kidnappings, lootings, robberies, and other violent drugs and supplies due to attacks are frequent on roads, making supply of insecurity. goods and services more difficult and at times • Potential impossible, including health services, which looting/destruction of undergo long periods of interruption in some health facilities. areas. • Potential boycott by one or both groups in conflict of activities organized by ZdS or facilities if the other group is present. • Fear by beneficiaries that drugs delivered by drones may be poisoned or that drones are used for espionage. • The conflict between the leaders of the Bafuliiru • Regular inaccessibility of Chiefdom and those of the Barundi dynasty ruling health zones and facilities the Ruzizi plain causes fighting between armed by project staff and groups and attacks against the population, but the DPS/ZdS staff due to intensity progressively decreases as dialogue insecurity. resumes between the two . • Demand for SGBV • Some prominent leaders (whether political, response services. religious, or other) call for peace. • Infrequent attacks on • The campaign for and the results of the December health staff. 2018 presidential, legislative, and provincial • Regular stock-outs of elections as well as subsequent elections, kindle drugs and supplies due to Intermediary tensions but these remain manageable and actual insecurity. election-related violence is rare. • Potential • Inter-community conflicts related to natural looting/destruction of resources, including water and land, become less health facilities. frequent and are resolved through local conflict • Potential boycott by one resolution mechanisms. or both groups in conflict • Kidnappings, lootings, robberies, and other violent of activities organized by attacks decrease as tensions between the two ZdS or facilities if the leaderships are diffused. The delivery of services, other group is present. including health, is at times difficult, with periods of interruption. • Fostered by prominent leaders, dialogue starts • Rare and temporary between the leaders of the Bafuliiru Chiefdom and inaccessibility of health those of the Barundi dynasty ruling the Ruzizi plain. zones and facilities by • The two parties reach an official agreement that is project staff and DPS/ZdS supported by populations on both sides. staff due to insecurity. • Most armed groups are progressively disarmed and • Rare attacks on health Positive their members are rehabilitated and reintegrated staff. within society. The remaining armed groups are • Rare stock-outs of drugs weakened and receive less support. and supplies due to • The campaign for and the results of the December insecurity. 2018 presidential, legislative, and provincial elections as well as subsequent elections are

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 17 SCENARIO EVENTS IMPACT ON USAID IHP mostly peaceful, with isolated incidents that do not cause widespread violence. • Inter-community conflicts related to natural resources, including water and land, are rare and are resolved through local conflict resolution mechanisms. • Kidnappings, lootings, robberies, and other violent attacks decrease significantly, and the delivery of services is rarely interrupted. Workshop participants identified the following risks related to the impact that USAID IHP may have on the Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom conflict.  The ethnic group of project staff may matter in the relationships they will build with ZdS management teams (BCZ). If all staff belong to the same ethnic group as the majority of the BCZ, there may be a risk of perceived or actual partiality in the conflict by other ethnic groups, thus leading to increased tensions. However, if all staff belong to a different ethnic group than the majority of the BCZ, the risk is that this may lead to difficulties in communication.  The MOH policy of free access to healthcare for internally displaced persons (IDPs) may lead to tensions between IDPs and host populations if they are from different communities.  The lack of access to facilities by project staff and/or BCZ may cause a perception of partiality (i.e. a refusal to visit these facilities, rather than an incapacity), which may increase tensions among parties in conflict. The same is true for stock-outs of drugs and other supplies, which may be perceived as intentional.  The use of drones may be seen as an attack by the other party to the conflict. The second conflict in Eastern Congo selected for analysis is the issue of land conflicts in Walungu territory. In South Kivu, land is both a cause of conflict and a factor that perpetuates conflict.41 As such, the conflict dynamics around land in Walungu territory represent other land conflicts in the province. Demographic pressure42 and a phenomenon of land-grabbing have had a dramatic effect on small farmers. Under President (1965-1997), land was integrated into patronage networks, gaining increasing political value, as in exchange for political loyalty, political and economic elites received access to large plots of land in complicity with customary authorities. This led to the birth of a new class of large- scale landowners. The phenomenon grew during and after the Congo Wars, with political-military leaders receiving land, making it a resource of war.43 As a result, small-scale farmers have either lost their land or seen the size of their plots drastically reduced. Although large-scale violent conflicts are unlikely to result from this situation, the unresolved grievances of small-scale farmers contribute to the instability of the

41 International Alert: Land, Power, and Identity: Roots of Violent Conflict in Eastern DRC. London. 2010. 42 The population density in some parts of Walungu territory (as well as Kabare and Kalehe) can reach 400 inhabitants per km². 43 Rift Valley Institute: ‘It’s not all about the land’: Land disputes and conflict in the eastern Congo. DRC. 2016.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 18 province. In addition, women’s lack of FIGURE 7: Conflict Mapping South Kivu (Land Conflicts in Walungu access to land 44 increases their Territory) vulnerability, especially for women who have been rejected by their families or communities following a rape and who have no resources to support themselves. Such lack of access is exacerbated by this land grabbing phenomenon, and may lead women to resorting to negative coping mechanisms. The actors involved in land conflicts in Walungu territory (see Figure 7) include communities—in this case, farmers and small-scale land owners— perceived as the main victims of the situation. Tensions between these communities and land purchasers (grands concessionnaires) result from forced eviction and loss of title over land tenure concessions. This land- grabbing takes place under the influence of political leaders and government authorities, and in agreement with customary leaders seen as complicit in, or agreeing to, these evictions (despite regular tensions they themselves may have with land purchasers). Politicians from the opposition and religious leaders support communities in their claims. Because land conflicts affect relationships among communities and both land owners and customary leaders, the dividers and connectors exercise focuses on these three groups, specifying which of the two latter groups is concerned when a divider or connector only applies to one of them. TABLE 3: Dividers and connectors between community members and land owners/customary leaders (land conflicts in Walungu Territory)

DIVIDERS CONNECTORS Systems and Institutions Systems and Institutions • (Out of date) land law • Sharecropping/tenant farming (“kalinzi”, • Unexploited prestigious properties (specific to land “bwasa”) owners) • Religion • Bad governance and poor land conflict • Mediation by religious leaders/entities (specific to management customary leaders) • Lack of leadership by customary leaders who • Local human rights defense groups favor their own interests to the detriment of communities

44 Although women have a right to own land, traditional practices often prevent them from doing so.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 19 DIVIDERS CONNECTORS

Attitudes and Actions Attitudes and Actions • Type of crops (food producing vs. industrial) • Small community projects funded by land (specific to land owners) owners (specific to land owners) • Unequal distribution of land (specific to customary • Local development planning (specific to customary leaders) leaders) • Lack of incentives for community members to remain farmers

Values and Interests Values and Interests • Habitat (land owners and customary leaders often • Culture live outside of the community) • Groupe des sages (group of wise men) (respected • Lifestyle notables and leaders providing advice on • Relationship with authorities (land owners and community affairs) customary leaders have easy access) • Agriculture and livestock farming • Unequal opportunities

Experiences Experiences • Social inequality (specific to land owners) • Common geographical origin • Inferiority complex of community members vis-à- • Common history vis customary leaders (specific to customary leaders) • Abuse of power (specific to customary leaders)

Symbols and Occasions Symbols and Occasions • Ritual power (specific to customary leaders) • Mubande (traditional celebration of seeds) (specific to land owners) • Sports and hobbies • The Chiefdom • Funerals and weddings • Markets (specific to customary leaders) • Church (specific to customary leaders) The scenario-planning exercise considered how the situation could evolve over the next two years, identifying the scenario in which the current situation—latent conflict without violence but with disastrous consequences for community members— remains more or less the same as the most likely. TABLE 4: Scenario Planning – Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom Conflict

SCENARIO EVENTS IMPACT ON USAID IHP • Big land owners try to purchase more land • Frequent but temporary that is being used by small-scale farmers. inaccessibility of target health • Communities have less access to land, which zones and facilities by project increases poverty, food insecurity, and staff and DPS/ZdS staff due to malnutrition, and paralyzes the local socio- insecurity. economic dynamics. • Sharp although progressive • Communities rebel by attacking land owners’ increase in malnutrition and Negative representatives. morbidity. • Political and local authorities support land • Community members use owners. coping mechanisms such as • Police forces are sent to quash the rebellions. prostitution to maintain their • Communities and police forces clash. standard of living. • Sharp increase in difficulties by most beneficiaries to pay for health services and drugs.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 20 SCENARIO EVENTS IMPACT ON USAID IHP • The current situation persists, with complaints • Infrequent and temporary from communities against land grabbing by big inaccessibility of target health land owners. zones and facilities by project • More land is taken away from food production staff and DPS/ZdS staff due to to industrial farming for export. insecurity. • Communities struggle to access food products • Progressive increase in Intermediary at affordable prices, increasing food insecurity. malnutrition. (most likely) • Communities struggle to maintain their • Community members use standard of living. coping mechanisms such as prostitution to maintain their standard of living. • Increased difficulties by some beneficiaries to pay for health services and drugs. • New legislation and/or advocacy by influential • Progressive improvement in leaders lead customary chiefs and politicians to nutrition and overall health of drastically reduce land grabbing and eventually beneficiaries. to return some land to small-scale farmers. • Communities have improved access to land. Positive • Local food production increases. • Access to local food products at affordable prices increases. • Social cohesion improves among communities, their customary leaders, and land owners. Workshop participants identified the following risks related to the impact that USAID IHP may have on land conflicts in Walungu territory.  Health staff at health facilities, hospitals, and within the BCZ may be seen as having benefitted from preferential treatment if they are family members of land owners responsible for land-grabbing.  Awarding of USAID IHP contracts for rehabilitation, construction, equipment, or other goods or services may be seen as preferential treatment if family members of land owners are contracted. With customary power conflicts and land conflicts representing a large number of conflicts currently plaguing the province of South Kivu, the third conflict in Eastern Congo selected for analysis is the conflict between the Batwa and the Bantu in Tanganyika, which has also spread to parts of Northern ex- Katanga. The conflict is rooted in the long-standing marginalization of the Batwa people (also referred to as Pygmies), who were the first inhabitants of what is today known as the DRC. The migration of Bantu (mostly Luba) tribes to the Congo River Basin at the beginning of the first millennium progressively displaced the Batwa towards more remote forest areas. The Bantu tribes established customary power structures that excluded the Batwa and ruled access to land and resources. As these structures underlie

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 21 today’s local governments in DRC at the village, cluster and Chiefdom level, Batwa people today are largely excluded from local decision-making processes and access to land.45 The Batwa (also known as Twa) originally lived as nomadic hunter-gatherers, but the destruction of forests has forced them to progressively become sedentary or semi-sedentary. They thus depend on access to land for their livelihoods and are expected to pay tributes or taxes to Bantu chiefs for access to land, hunting, fishing, or artisanal mining activities. Other common grievances of Twa people include discrimination, feeling “underestimated” by the Bantu, and not being paid sufficiently (or at all) for farm work done on Bantu land.46 Although the exact origins of the current conflict are contested, they can be traced back to 2012-2013 in Manono territory, when a combination of grievances at the local level and broader political conflict led to an escalation of long-standing tensions between the Batwa and the Bantu. The main trigger of the conflict appears to have been a revenge attack against Twa villages near the villages of Lwela Kalunga and Nsange in Manono territory in May 2013. The attack was carried out by members of the Bakata Katanga movement, an armed group fighting for the independence of the former Katanga province.47 The Bakata Katanga suspected Twa self-defense groups of collaborating with the FARDC in their repression of the Bakata Katanga insurgency.48 During the attack, 200 Twa houses were burnt, and some Twa women and children were allegedly burnt alive.49 This led Twa self-defense groups (which first formed in 1996-1997 with encouragement by the Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo–Zaïre (AFDL) and later fought on the side of the Congolese government against various rebellions during the Second Congo War) to remobilize and attack Bantu villages. By mid-2016, the conflict between Bantus and Batwa had reached an acute phase, affecting five of six territories in the province of Tanganyika. The conflict has resulted in the destruction of over 400 villages, the murder and injury of hundreds of people, the rape of more than 200 women, and the displacement of an estimated 600,000 people. The conflict mapping (see Figure 8) shows Twa communities, Bantu communities, and their respective armed groups as the main actors of the conflict. Because conflict dynamics vary from one territory to the next, and sometimes within a territory, the conflict mapping reveals that relationships between Batwa and Bantu vary between violent conflict and a broken relationship. Similarly, both Batwa and Bantu have strong relationships with their allied armed groups (the “Hapa na pale” Mai Mai group is supported by the Twa, whereas other Mai Mai groups, including Mai Mai Yakutumba, are allied with the Bantu), but have tense

45 International Rescue Committee: A Silent Crisis in Congo: The Bantu and the Twa in Tanganyika. New York City. 2017. 46 International Rescue Committee: Theory-Based Evaluation Report of the Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Programme in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. London. 2018. 47 Ibid. 48 The Bataka Katanga movement is also assumed to have served certain political interests in the struggle over control of the former province and its rich resources. 49 International Rescue Committee: Theory-Based Evaluation Report of the Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Programme in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. London. 2018.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 22 relationships with other armed groups. The fluidity of armed groups’ allegiances also makes these relationships changeable. Other actors include politicians who influence the conflict to serve their own interests by tapping into different grievances in each town, FIGURE 8: Conflict Mapping Eastern Congo (Batwa-Bantu conflict in village, or territory, explaining the Tanganyika) conflict’s multiple facets. Some politicians have also promoted hate and in some cases violence against the Batwa, fueling the conflict.50 The UN Peacekeeping force, MONUSCO, also appears as an important actor, with both sides having accused it, as well as various humanitarian actors, of favoring the other side. A Congolese CSO, the Organisation Nationale de Défense des Peuples Autochtones (National Organization for the Defense of Native People) has allegedly contributed to fueling violence. Finally, some FARDC soldiers have been accused of human rights violations on both sides.51 With the conflict still active, it is perhaps unsurprising that the following table of dividers and connectors shows more dividers than connectors, and that some dividers correspond to important conflict drivers and potential triggers. For example, unidirectional inter-ethnic marriage is referred to in some narratives as one of the triggers of the conflict. Other elements are more surprising, such as the sedentary lifestyle of the Twa, which could be perceived as a symbol of their inability to maintain their traditional lifestyle. However, workshop participants felt that being sedentary allowed for more contacts with Bantu and improved mutual understanding. Mistrust, prejudice, and fear of the other are still strong on both sides and will require particular attention. Finally, health services and its community networks were highlighted as being especially important for interaction and increased understanding between the two groups. The IRC, one of USAID IHP’s consortium members, is implementing a peacebuilding project in Nyunzu and Kalémie health zones that builds on improved access to and participation in health services (via CODESA and RECOs) and conflict-

50 International Rescue Committee: A Silent Crisis in Congo: The Bantu and the Twa in Tanganyika. New York City. 2017. 51 International Rescue Committee: Linking health humanitarian assistance to long-term development opportunities in – Baseline Report. DRC. 2018.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 23 management activities to foster social cohesion between the two groups. This project, which will last until December 2020, could be leveraged by USAID IHP. TABLE 5: Dividers and Connectors between Batwa and Bantu People in Tanganyika

DIVIDERS CONNECTORS Systems and Institutions Systems and Institutions • Religious movements • State institutions • Schools (low school enrollment of Twa) • Health infrastructures and services • Parent committees (lack of Twa representation • Community networks (CODESA, RECOs, • Local authorities (lack of Twa representation) RECOPE (Child Protection Community Network) • Luba language • Market

Attitudes and Actions Attitudes and Actions • Inferiority complex (Twa) and superiority • Peace activities complex (Bantu) • Sedentary lifestyle of Twa • Mutual fear

Values and Interests Values and Interests • Inter-ethnic marriage (can only happen between • Religion Twa women and Bantu men, not the other way • Commerce with Angola around) • Life as an important value • Access to employment based on education level • Community radio stations (many Twa are illiterate or have a low education level) • Eating habits

Experiences Experiences • Mistrust • Consequences of the violent conflict (killings, • Prejudice rapes, destruction of infrastructures and goods) • Economic exploitation of Twa by Bantu during agricultural work • Threatened livelihoods (Twa) • Twa women being burned alive by Bantu forces in 2013

Symbols and Occasions Symbols and Occasions • Customary power • Football games • The Congo River Regarding the evolution of the conflict over Year I of the program, the most likely scenario appears to be a continuation of the current situation, with areas where violent conflicts are recurrent, little to no dialogue other than at the community level, and insecurity in large parts of the province. Both the negative and the intermediary scenarios may impact the ability of USAID IHP to be implemented in a consistent manner while the needs of the population are likely to be even higher. TABLE 6: Scenario Planning – Batwa-Bantu Conflict in Tanganyika

SCENARIO EVENTS IMPACT ON USAID IHP • Conflict between Batwa and Bantu • The health zones of Nyunzu, worsens and becomes violent throughout Manono, Kiyambi, Kabalo et Negative most of the province as well as northern Ankoro are particularly affected Haut-Katanga (Pweto, Mitwaba), with and most health facilities in these community members on each side ZdS are closed.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 24 SCENARIO EVENTS IMPACT ON USAID IHP responsible for assassinations and • In the most unsafe areas, project destruction of infrastructure. staff and ECZ are regularly unable • Dialogue is broken between the two to visit facilities. communities and their respective leaders. • Health facilities that remain open • There is little to no political will to end are faced with frequent stock-outs the conflict at the national and provincial and insufficient staff. level. • Morbidity and mortality increase. • Armed groups regularly further fuel the • In particular, nutrition worsens for conflict and insecurity through violent pregnant/nursing women and attacks on one or both parties in conflict, children under 5. kidnappings, rapes, and robberies • Cases of SGBV increase. throughout the province. • There is little to no ownership by • Shadow actors, especially politicians, fuel Batwa communities of project the conflict by promoting hatred and activities. violence to serve their interests. • In some territories, most roads are inaccessible. • Throughout the province, damages to infrastructure and displacement of civil servants cause basic services (health, education, water and sanitation) to be unavailable/inaccessible. • The conflict continues to affect some • In the pockets of insecurity, health territories in Tanganyika province, though facilities are frequently inaccessible not all. and the supply of drugs and • There is little dialogue between Batwa and equipment is difficult. Bantu leaders. Some dialogue and joint • In the most unsafe areas, project activities occur at the community level. staff and ECZ are at times unable • Insecurity makes some main and to visit facilities. secondary roads inaccessible. • Acute and chronic malnutrition Intermediary • In some areas, armed groups are active increase. (most likely) and contributing to the conflict through • Some health infrastructures are violent attacks on communities and roads, damaged, but these damages do not including SGBV. significantly reduce access to health • There is little political will at national and services. provincial level to end the conflict. • There is little ownership by Batwa • Some politicians are still fueling the communities of project activities. conflict, but most have stopped viewing the conflict as an effective tool to win votes. • Dialogue between Batwa and Bantu • Health facilities and services are communities and leaders takes place, generally available and accessible. contributing to progressive conflict • Health interventions by external resolution and improved social cohesion. actors evolve from emergency to • There is strong political will to end the development. conflict at the national and provincial • There is a need for mental health level. and psychosocial services to Positive • Grievances on both sides are addressed address trauma due to the conflict. by the other side and by the GDRC and local authorities. • Despite some pockets of insecurity not related to the conflict, roads are practicable and most areas of the province are safe.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 25 Workshop participants identified the following risks related to the impact that USAID IHP may have on the conflict between Batwa and Bantu in Tanganyika.  Visible project activities, such as rehabilitations, equipment, or trainings, may be claimed by politicians trying to further their electoral ambitions, which may fuel the conflict or contribute to USAID IHP being perceived as partisan.  Critères d’indigence (indigence criteria) that determine who can receive free healthcare could create tensions if they are defined in a non-inclusive manner (i.e., especially without Twa participation), or if they are perceived by the Bantu as unfairly favoring the Batwa.  Local authorities may try to influence the selection of health staff, especially at the BCZ, to reap benefits of the project. Beyond its unethical dimension, this issue could increase tensions if members of one of the two groups in conflict are seen as benefiting from it.

3.2.4 KASAI REGION Although violence and insecurity had greatly FIGURE 9: Conflict Mapping Kasai (Customary Power) subsided at the time this report was written, the Kamwina Nsapu insurgency is indicative of the existing tensions between the central government and local authorities in the Kasai region. These represent a high risk of renewed conflict related to power and authority at the local level in the region that could easily be triggered during the course of USAID IHP. As such, this conflict constitutes an important case study and was analyzed in detail by workshop participants. The results of this exercise are presented below. The conflict stemmed from the 2016 appointment of Jean-Pierre Mpandi, chief of Bashila, a local customary chief in Kasai- Central and the provincial governor’s refusal to meet this traditional leader. Violence escalated in August 2016 when Mpandi was killed by the state’s security forces and his militia, composed largely of youth under 18 years of age, sought revenge. In December 2016, the Kamuina Nsapu militia escalated their attacks on state institutions (the military, police, and government officials) in Kananga and Tshikapa, the capital of Kasai, moving the violence into the previously stable provinces of Kasai, Kasai Oriental and Lomami, and affecting approximately 150,000 people. The National Armed Forces (FARDC) and the Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC) responded by deploying what has been described by observers as “disproportionate force” against the militia and those considered as its allies.52

52 IRIN: The Conflict in Kasai, DRC. Kinshasa. July 2017.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 26 Other village authorities created their own militias in support of Kamwina Nsapu. As these newer militias appeared to target people based on their ethnicity (especially the Chokwe and Pende, with Kamwina Nsapu militia being Luba), the conflict took on ethnic undertones.53 The Bana Mura militia, largely composed of Tchokwe and supported by the government, responded by killing and mutilating Luba, accused of supporting the Kamwina Nsapu militia. Despite the clear ethnic dimension, it is important to bear in mind that the situation is more complex. Bana Mura appears to have targeted not just Luba people, but also Tchokwe civilians.54 Additionally, as shown on the conflict mapping in Figure 8, manipulation by politicians hoping to further their interests at both the local and national level has contributed to the escalation of the conflict. Peace accords were signed in March 2017 between the Congolese Government (GDRC) and Mpandi’s family. However, violence continued as numerous militias did not abide by the Kamwina Nsapu movement. A peace forum organized in Kananga in September 2017 was attended by customary chiefs and politicians, including President Kabila. Despite several opposition figures refusing to attend, the situation has been calmer in the Kasai region. However, tensions remain between different ethnic groups.55 Key informant interviews and focus group discussions in Lomami have revealed that the conflict reactivated tensions between but also within ethnic groups that did not exist in peace time, and which led to denunciations to militias, resurgence of land conflicts, and road blocks to prevent the movement of goods and persons. The conflict also led to increased cases of sexual violence as well as forced and child marriages committed by armed men. Because of a fear of retaliation and the stigma attached to having been raped, which undermines a woman’s chances to get married, these cases were under-reported.56 The list of dividers and connectors presented below between the two main groups in conflict, identified by participants as the members of the Kamwina Nsapu militia and the population, shows that connectors are more numerous than dividers, representing potential leverage points for USAID IHP. Note that the list was developed based on the current situation in Sankuru province.

53 Ibid. 54 International Rights Initiative: Conflict and Displacement in the Kasai. January 2018. 55 International Refugee Rights Initiative: Conflict and Displacement in the Kasai. January 2018. 56 GBV Sub-Cluster: Gender-Based Violence Situation and Response in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): The Kasai Crisis. August 2017.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 27 TABLE 7: Dividers and Connectors between Kamwina Nsapu Militia and the Population of Kasai (Customary Power Conflict) – Sankuru Situation

DIVIDERS CONNECTORS Systems and Institutions Systems and Institutions • Central and provincial government • Markets • Political parties • Churches (both churches as an institution, and • Customary chiefs the role of priests in peacebuilding) • Nepotism based on clan in ministries and • Schools government services • Local civil society • The UN (UNICEF, MONUSCO), who contributed to the liberation and rehabilitation of militia children • Hospitals • Community committees (e.g. CODESA) • Road between Kasai and Angola • Inter-tribal marriage • Inter-tribal alliances • Quotas among tribes within the Governorate • Tshiluba language

Attitudes and Actions Attitudes and Actions • Denunciation, exclusion, and arrest of former • Acceptance of the reintegration of ex-militiamen militiamen by village chiefs within communities • Participation by ex-militiamen in community activities (sanitation, health, etc.)

Values and Interests Values and Interests • Different aspirations (former militia values taking • Religion over power by violence while the population • Commerce with Angola values peace and obedience to authorities) • The railroad • Different ideologies

Experiences Experiences • Revenge killings of customary leaders by • Isolation of the Kasai region militiamen • Poverty, youth unemployment • Lack of infrastructure and basic services • Suffering caused by the conflict • Burnt health centers • Presence of security and authorities

Symbols and Occasions Symbols and Occasions • Villages burnt and deserted • Peace conference • Memory of violence between Kamwina Nsapu • Independence Day and FARDC • National anthem and national emblem • Sport events • Community activities • Common ancestor (Ilunga Mbidi) To assess the risks and opportunities for USAID IHP in Kasai, workshop participants conducted a scenario planning exercise, identifying what the context would look like in the event a similar conflict breaks out (negative scenario), if the situation worsened, with sporadic violence (intermediary scenario), and if the situation remains as it is today (positive scenario).

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 28 TABLE 8: Scenario Planning – Kamwina Nsapu Insurgency in Kasai

SCENARIO EVENTS IMPACT ON USAID IHP • The same conflict as the 2016-2017 • Significant damages to infrastructure conflict or a similar power conflict (including burning and looting) and between customary authorities and the displacement of civil servants cause central government breaks out, reigniting basic services (health, education, violence through the (re)activation of water and sanitation) to be militias on both sides and a unavailable/inaccessible. disproportionate response by FARDC. • Health facilities that remain open Negative • For several months, attempts at fostering are faced with stock-outs and dialogue and peace fail. insufficient staff. • The conflict lasts at least 12 months, • The prevalence of diseases such as leading to large-scale displacement and malaria, cholera, and typhoid, casualties. increases dramatically. • Most main roads are closed. • Cases of SGBV increase sharply. • Acute and chronic malnutrition increases sharply. • Tensions from the 2016-2017 conflict • In the pockets of insecurity, health reappear or a new conflict between facilities are frequently inaccessible customary authorities and central and supply of drugs and equipment government breaks out. is difficult. • Sporadic and moving fighting occurs, with • Acute and chronic malnutrition Intermediary cases of killings and pockets of insecurity. increases. • Dialogue is possible between the parties • The prevalence of diseases such as in conflict. malaria, cholera, and typhoid, increases. • Cases of SGBV increase. • The 2017 peace accord is respected and • Health facilities and services are no other violent and large-scale power generally available and accessible. conflict between customary authorities • Evolution of health interventions by Positive and the central government breaks out. external actors from emergency to (most likely) • Roads remain open. development. • Basic services, including education, water, and sanitation are available. The potential impact that USAID IHP may have on a conflict of this sort was also discussed by workshop participants, who identified the following risks based on a number of assumptions related to the behavior of health staff and the issue of resource transfers.  If health staff would not respect MOH guidelines for CODESA and Relais Communautaires (RECO) selection, and selected members of their own family, increased tensions among communities or ethnic groups could ensue. Participants identified this risk because it is a situation that has occurred and is known for creating conflicts. This was mentioned during key informant interviews with the Bilomba MCZ representative and a religious representative in Bilomba ZdS.  Health staff partisanship may also become a risk with regards to political involvement. According to workshop participants, in the Kasai context, being in good terms with a traditional chief involved in a conflict related to customary power could increase tensions within the community. Additionally, a community leader in Sankuru claimed during an interview that partisanship may lead beneficiaries who are members of a different political party to stop attending the health facility.  Unsurprisingly, participants identified targeting as a potentially significant risk. Although USAID IHP will target all health zones in each province, some health zones will receive “full support” while others

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 29 receive “minimal support.” Additionally, some health zones may share borders with health zones located outside of the province. Given the scale of USAID IHP, information and rumors will spread quickly among communities, and the risk of misunderstanding regarding the targeting of health facilities is high. The second type of conflict selected for further analysis in Kasai is land conflicts, or conflits champêtres, as they are usually called in Kasai. This type of conflict was selected because it is prevalent throughout the four target provinces in the Kasai region. Land conflicts are also of a different nature from the power conflict analyzed above: they are more localized, involve communities often from the same ethnic group, and yet can be disruptive when they escalate.

Land conflicts in the Kasai region are FIGURE 10: Conflict Mapping Kasai (Land Conflict) prevalent in:  Sankuru, where land conflicts are common and take on a political dimension, especially in the territories of Lubefu (Kondjo locality), Katako Kombe (Kuwa locality), and Lubefu (Songo Loseke community)  Kasai Central, especially in the territories of Ndimbelenge, Dibaya, Kazumba (Bilomba health zone), in the town of Tshibala, and in Mikalayi health zone.  Lomami (throughout the province)  Kasai Oriental (throughout the province) The land conflict chosen for analysis is a border conflict between the territories of Kabeya Kamuanga in Kasai Oriental, and Ndibelenge in Kasai Central, where the conflict centers on a border that is not just between the two territories, but also between their two respective provinces. Apart from its cross- provincial nature, it is representative of other land conflicts throughout the region. Conflict triggers include stepping into what the other community considers its land and stealing crops, sometimes violently attacking members of the other community in case of resistance. Actors involved in the conflict (see Figure 10) include the populations of these two territories, as well as their customary chiefs and public figures (notables), who tend to defend their respective communities. When they are unable to solve the conflict, they call on territorial or provincial authorities, who often recommend police or army intervention. When they try to restore peace, the FARDC and national police are often seen as enemies by one or both communities in conflict, who may end up targeting them in return. Churches, civil society, and NGOs play a positive role in appeasing tensions through conflict mitigation. Similar to the Kamwina Nsapu insurgency analysis above, connectors are more numerous than dividers between the communities of the territories of Kabey Kamuanga and Ndimbelenge. Experiences—including those related to the consequences of this land conflict—and symbols/occasions in particular can strengthen cohesion between the parties in conflict.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 30 TABLE 9: Dividers and Connectors between the Populations of the Territories of Kabeya Kamuanga and Ndimbelenge (Land Conflict)

DIVIDERS CONNECTORS Systems and Institutions Systems and Institutions • Land ownership • Language • Land inheritance • Religion • Common border (provincial and territorial) • National authorities • Absence of border markers • Intercultural marriage

Attitudes and Actions Attitudes and Actions • Verbal provocations • Alliances between families and communities • Failure to respect perceived border, incursions • Failure to respect fallow land principles • Theft of crops • Retaliatory killings

Values and Interests Values and Interests • Verbal agreements on borders • Land titling (perceived/remembered differently by each • Validity of ancestors’ word group) • Membership to same political party

Experiences Experiences • Different experiences of past confrontations • Loss of ancestral land (or at least perceived as between communities such) • Population displacements towards urban centers during fighting • Destruction of infrastructure (health centers, water points, markets, schools, etc.) during fighting • Insecurity • Inaccessibility of health centers and apparition of diseases

Symbols and Occasions Symbols and Occasions • Memories of past conflicts • National emblem/National anthem • Political leaders • Construction of basic infrastructure (schools, health centers, water points • Community participation/contribution • Cellules d’Animation Communautaire (CAC), which play an important role in conflict reporting • Diamond The scenario planning exercise presented below reveals the impact that land conflicts can have on people’s ability to access land, water points, and basic services, and the impact these may in turn have on people’s health and on a project like USAID IHP. Because land conflicts in Kasai have similar root causes and dynamics, understanding how the Kabeya Kamuanga vs. Ndimbelenge conflict may play out in coming months and years provides valuable insights into how most conflits champêtres may change the context in Kasai and impact USAID IHP.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 31 TABLE 10: Scenario Planning – Land Conflicts between the Territories of Kabeya Kamuanga and Ndimbelenge

SCENARIO EVENTS IMPACT ON USAID IHP • Tensions between communities around land • Basic services become and territory boundaries become violent (use inaccessible due to increased of weapons) leading to loss of lives and insecurity and staff being destruction of infrastructure. assaulted. • Breakdown in communication between one • Resurgence of epidemics, Negative community and their chief on the one hand, malnutrition, and famine. and the other community and their chief on the other hand. • Internal displacement. • Fields and crops become inaccessible. • Tensions between communities around land • Basic services become and territory boundaries are unpredictable. inaccessible due to increased • Violent fighting is targeted and periodic insecurity and staff being (during harvest). assaulted. • Communication remains possible between communities and their respective leaders. • Communities regularly lose access to land and Intermediary water points. • Accessibility to basic services is reduced during fighting. • Inter-community mediators are nominated and able to operate. • Dialogue between parties in conflict takes place. • Communication between the two • Health facilities and services communities is open. are accessible and available. • Dialogue activities lead to a stop in fighting. Positive • Communities are able to access land and water points. • Basic services are continuously accessible.

As for the potential impact that USAID IHP may have on land conflicts in Kasai, participants identified three main risks, two of which are similar to the ones identified for the Kamwina Nsapu insurgency, although with different practical applications.  The potential lack of respect for MOH guidelines in CODESA and RECO selection (e.g. favoring members of one of the two communities in conflict) appears as a significant risk.  Health staff partiality is seen as an important risk, especially as it relates to service delivery (i.e. refusing or being reluctant to provide services to members of one of the communities in conflict), as well as to the potential inequality in the way equipment (bicycles, office supplies, rain clothes) is provided to RECO.  Targeting may be risky in that communities in conflict around land borders may perceive the opposing community’s health facility receiving support such as equipment, rehabilitation, training, or water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) as unequal if their health facility does not receive similar support. A decision to move a health facility from one village to another was also mentioned during an interview with a CSO as the trigger of a conflict in the Dionga Chiefdom in Sankuru.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 32 Beyond the two types of conflicts presented above for the Kasai region, participants also highlighted the risk of conflict between communities or beneficiaries and health facilities. If management committees are not sufficiently involved in the management of facilities, misunderstandings are more likely in this context.

3.2.5 KATANGA REGION The three provinces of the Katanga region are home to a wide array of conflicts, with qualitative data collection revealing a large number of small-scale FIGURE 11: Conflict Mapping Katanga (Politico- conflicts related to limits/borders between chiefdoms or Ethnic Conflict) secteurs, and to customary power (succession). Among other significant information uncovered during the qualitative data collection was the existence of strong political tensions (especially between followers of the presidential party and those of opposition parties) with an ethnic dimension which, combined with the specificity of the Katangan identity, could contribute to an explosive situation in the context of the 2018 elections. This political conflict with ethnic undertones was deemed both most specific to the region and most likely to have a large-scale impact. Ethnic associations are an important factor of this potential conflict. They were originally created to organize mutual aid and foster the cultural values of the ethnic groups they represent, especially in the context of migration from rural areas to urban centers. Since the re-establishment of democracy in the , they have started acting as interest groups that try to influence the distribution of jobs and other resources towards their members.57 Ethnic associations can be both a source of conflict—through ethnic mobilization and the production of autochthonous discourse—and a resource for resolving crises. For example, the Tshota association was created to foster social cohesion among five communities from the former Lualaba district.58 In the context of the political conflict analyzed here, given the variety of their alliances with political parties on both sides and dynamics among them (see Figure 11), their role could go either, or both, ways.

57 Gobbers, Erik: Ethnic associations in Katanga province, the Democratic Republic of Congo: multi-tier system, shifting identities and the relativity of autochtony. Brussels. 2016. 58 Ibid.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 33 Political parties would also play a significant part in a potential conflict, with opposition parties and the presidential party both capable of mobilizing their voters - including through cultural associations, which have strong links with them - to protest elections results. Some sections of civil society and churches, despite being regularly repressed by the government, have played a major role in calling out the GDRC on various topics, particularly around respect for the constitution. They could play a strong part in FIGURE 12: Conflict Mapping Katanga – Cultural contesting election results and mobilizing the Associations (Politico-Ethnic Conflict) population, while other sections (such as the Eglises du réveil, evangelical churches) would likely support the presidential party and candidates. Customary authorities are likely to play a strong role in a potential political conflict due to their influence and legitimacy with cultural associations, the government, and churches. Dividers and connectors between opposition political parties and the presidential party reveal grievances from opposition parties over the targeting of former Katanga governor Moïse Katumbi by the central government. These are likely to persist given Katumbi’s exclusion from running for presidential elections. There are fewer connectors, although those that do exist are related to strong values and symbols of Congolese and Katangan identity. TABLE 11: Dividers and Connectors between Opposition Political Parties and the Presidential Party/Central/Provincial Government (Katanga region)

DIVIDERS CONNECTORS Systems and Institutions Systems and Institutions • Political ideology • State institutions • Ethnic associations • Professional associations (i.e. unions) • Churches • Language

Attitudes and Actions Attitudes and Actions • Exclusion of presidential candidates such as • Running for elections: being a candidate can be a Moïse Katumbi connector whereas everything that follows—the • Violence and destruction of infrastructure during elections themselves and the results—are more anti-government protests likely to be dividers • Mistrust among tribes • Inferiority/superiority complex (e.g. people originating from view themselves as superior because of the mining-related wealth of their region) • Elections proceedings and results

Values and Interests Values and Interests • Ethnicity • Economic activities • Mineral resources/mining • Katangan identity

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 34 DIVIDERS CONNECTORS • Regionalism/secessionism

Experiences Experiences • Discrimination and attacks against non-natives • Sport events (Mazembe football club) (e.g. people from Kasai) • Blockade of the Zambia-DRC border to prevent Moïse Katumbi from returning to DRC.

Symbols and Occasions Symbols and Occasions • Copper • Gécamines (Government-owned mining company headquartered in Katanga) • National emblems (flag and ) Because this political conflict also involves ethnic associations that could oppose each other, a second set of dividers and connectors was developed. These show how ethnicity can easily become a factor of tensions while at the same time ethnic associations can play a strong role in confining acute flare-ups of disagreement between ethnic groups. TABLE 12: Dividers and Connectors between Ethnic Associations in Katanga

DIVIDERS CONNECTORS Systems and Institutions Systems and Institutions • Tribal ideology • Congolese law

Attitudes and Actions Attitudes and Actions • Superiority and inferiority complex (e.g. between • Role of diffusing tensions between ethnic groups the Rund and Chokwe ethnic groups; or between the Sanga and Bemba ethnic groups)

Values and Interests Values and Interests • Ethnicity • Katangan identity • Mineral resources/mining • Local language • Regionalism/secessionism • Belonging to the same territory

Experiences Experiences • Matriarchy (of the Rund, Sange, Lemba, Bemba) • Sport events (Mazembe football club) seen negatively by patriarchal ethnic groups

Symbols and Occasions Symbols and Occasions • Copper • National emblems The scenario planning exercise for the political conflict in Katanga reveals how different pre- and post- elections scenarios could impact USAID IHP. Although many other different scenarios could unfold and the nature of the exercise makes it is impossible to list them all, the below provides an overview of some of the main risks related to election violence.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 35 TABLE 13: Scenario Planning – Political Conflict with Ethnic Undertones in Katanga

SCENARIO EVENTS IMPACT ON USAID IHP • Moïse Katumbi comes back and is • Health services are inaccessible arrested. Kyungu releases his militia in because of insecurity. protest, while Gédéon does the same to • Damages to infrastructure and support the GDRC. This leads to fighting displacement of civil servants cause among opposing militias as well as basic services (health, education, repression by FARDC of opposition water and sanitation) to be militia and protesters. This crisis would unavailable. be even more acute if Kabila decides to • Health facilities that remain open remain in power (despite having are faced with stock-outs and Negative announced he would step down), with insufficient staff. generalized protests throughout Katanga. • Health facilities in areas hosting IDPs • There are population displacements. see a sudden increase in the number • Infrastructure is destroyed by protesters of patients they receive. and militia. • Program staff and ECZ staff are • Killings, rapes, and lootings are unable to visit facilities. committed on both sides. • Beneficiaries need gender-based violence (GBV)-related services. • Malnutrition increases. • The presidential party wins the 2018 • In some areas, services are elections and the results are contested temporarily unavailable or Intermediary by opposition parties, but in a limited inaccessible. (most likely) manner, with few protests and violence • In some areas, program staff and in large urban centers such as ECZ staff are unable to visit Lubumbashi. facilities. • All political actors accept elections • Health facilities and services are results generally available and accessible. Positive • There is little to no violence. Any cases of violence are localized and confined. The following are potential impacts USAID IHP could have on the conflict.  Given the sensitivity of both the 2018 elections and any other upcoming elections, any appearance of political partisanship may spark tensions among groups in opposition - whether political parties or ethnic associations.  Targeting of facilities, especially with regard to rehabilitations and equipment, may be perceived as the result of influence by powerful actors on ethnic or political grounds.  Similarly, recruitment, whether for project staff or health staff, including at the BCZ, may be seen as influenced by powerful actors within local authorities. Other challenges related to the local political economy that the project could encounter include the following:  The procurement of goods and services not done locally despite local capacities may spark conflicts between communities and health staff.  Disappointed expectations related to benefits to be obtained from the project given its size and budget may lead powerful actors within health and other government/local institutions to react by blocking or destabilizing project activities.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 36 4. RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 CONFLICT SENSITIVITY IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY Based on the analyses above and the experience of IHP, IRC, and Pathfinder staff implementing health programs in conflict areas of the DRC, the following Conflict Sensitivity Implementation Strategy is proposed. The first table (Table 14) provides a detailed list of risks, sorted into categories, of conflicts impacting negatively the program. For each risk, a number of mitigation actions is proposed. The second table (Table 15) provides a detailed list of risks, sorted into categories, of the program impacting negatively existing conflicts or exacerbating tensions. For each risk, a number of mitigation actions is proposed. TABLE 14: Risks of Conflicts on Program and Mitigation Actions

RISKS OF CONFLICTS ON MITIGATION ACTIONS PROGRAM Access by program staff and DPS/ZdS staff • Develop contingency plan for IHP response in such situations. • Develop and implement strong security management protocols, including establishing contacts with key informants. Frequent and prolonged • Support DPS and ZdS with contingency planning, including inaccessibility of target health zones communication protocols (internal and with communities) and and facilities by project staff and alternative communication tools (phones, SMS, etc.). DPS/ ZdS staff due to insecurity • Ensure proper communication with beneficiaries about facility (active fighting, risks of kidnapping or closure during periods of insecurity so beneficiaries do not robberies). interpret this as a form of partiality in the conflict. • Ensure flexible international travel (via Rwanda or Burundi to reach otherwise inaccessible areas of South Kivu) for project staff. • Support host health zones with temporary re-assignment of staff Staff from health facilities are from other health zones. displaced to other health zones. • Support health zones affected by insecurity with contingency activities. Supply of services Looting/destruction of health • Give specific attention to and/or develop activities that may facilities. improve beneficiaries’ sense of ownership of the facility.

• To avoid robberies of vehicles transporting drugs or other products, ensure all groups in conflict are informed of the Frequent stock-outs of drugs and modalities of access to/distribution of these products. supplies due to insecurity. • Ensure proper communication with beneficiaries about drug stock-outs so beneficiaries do not interpret this as a form of partiality in the conflict. Boycott of activities organized by • Ensure CODESA are representative of all groups, including ZdS or facilities by one or both women, in conflict. groups in conflict if the other group • Ensure CODESA sensitize all groups to the importance of the is present. activities in question.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 37 RISKS OF CONFLICTS ON MITIGATION ACTIONS PROGRAM • Gradually attempt to bring groups back together, applying Do No Harm principles. • Consider organizing separate activities if groups refuse to interact. Disappointed expectations related to • Ensure proper communication, including with non-health public benefits to be obtained from the authorities, on the objectives, scope, and implementation project leading powerful actors modalities of USAID IHP. within health and other government/local institutions to react by blocking or destabilizing project activities. Demand for services • Support DPS/ ZdS with contingency planning for emergencies, including allocating staff from other facilities to temporarily Sudden increase in the number of support facilities in areas with high influx of IDPs. patients visiting health facilities in • Make initial contact at onset of a crisis and maintain contact areas hosting IDPs. with authorities providing protection and/or humanitarian assistance in each locality. • Support DPS/ ZdS with contingency planning for emergencies, including GBV response. Sudden increase in the need for GBV • Coordinate with other donors/agencies’ programs that support response services in health facilities SGBV prevention and response. located in conflict areas. • Make initial contact at onset of a crisis and maintain contact with authorities providing protection and/or humanitarian assistance in each locality. • Support DPS/ ZdS with contingency planning for emergencies, including allocating staff from other facilities to temporarily Sudden increase in morbidity and support facilities in affected areas. mortality in health facilities located in • Make initial contact at onset of a crisis and maintain contact conflict areas. with authorities providing protection and/or humanitarian assistance in each locality. • Support DPS/ ZdS with contingency planning for emergencies, including allocating staff from other facilities to temporarily Sudden increase in malnutrition in support facilities in affected areas. health facilities located in conflict • Make initial contact at onset of a crisis and maintain contact areas. with authorities providing protection and/or humanitarian assistance in each locality. • Support DPS with developing a mental health strategy (including care in conflict/post conflict situations), and implementing it, Increase in need for mental health with a focus on treating trauma related to living in situations of and psychosocial services in areas of conflict, physical violence, and SGBV. conflict or post-conflict. • Make initial contact at onset of a crisis and maintain contact with authorities providing protection and/or humanitarian assistance in each locality. • Ensure communities from all groups in conflict are informed and Beneficiaries belonging to one of the understand the standards of professional conduct that health groups in conflict refusing to access staff must follow. facilities for fear of being • Ensure all staff are trained in, understand, and apply the mistreated/poisoned by health staff standards of professional conduct that they must follow, belonging to the other group. including gender sensitivity.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 38 RISKS OF CONFLICTS ON MITIGATION ACTIONS PROGRAM • Ensure each facility has a functioning complaints mechanism, and that complaints are handled according to best practice. • Ensure CODESA are representative of all groups in conflict as well as women. • Ensure this risk is included in the Security Management Strategy of Community Acceptance and use this document to mitigate any issues related to this risk. • Support DPS/ ZdS to develop a strategy for increased Women refusing to be examined by recruitment of female health staff. male health staff. • Ensure all male staff receive training or coaching on the soft skills required to treat all patients. • Ensure all staff are trained in, understand, and apply the standards of professional conduct that they must follow, Women fearing being disrespected including gender sensitivity and confidentiality. or that their visit and medical • Ensure each facility has a functioning complaints mechanism, and information will not remain that complaints are handled according to best practice. confidential. • Sensitize communities on women’s rights, including their rights regarding their own bodies, and on family planning. Program beneficiaries • Ensure RECO are properly trained and have sufficient supplies and drugs for emergency situations when healthcare services Beneficiaries unable to access health are unavailable or inaccessible. facilities because of insecurity. • Make initial contact at onset of a crisis and maintain contact with authorities providing protection and/or humanitarian assistance in each locality. • Support DPS and ZdS to put in place and implement a fee structure (tarification) that allows access of the majority of the Beneficiaries facing difficulties paying population to basic healthcare. for health services and drugs. • Ensure indigence criteria are developed, shared, and applied in all facilities. Beneficiaries fearing that drugs • Given the high risks in South Kivu highlighted by workshop delivered by drones may be participants, consider piloting the approach in areas not affected poisoned. by ongoing conflict or tensions. • Ensure indigence criteria are developed, shared, and applied in Use of coping mechanisms such as all facilities. prostitution by beneficiaries to • Ensure quality healthcare services are available. maintain their standard of living. • Coordinate with other donors/agencies’ programs that support women’s protection and empowerment. • Ensure CODESA are representative of all groups in conflict. • Ensure CODESA sensitize all groups to the importance of health and the standards of professional conduct health staff are adhered to. Little to no ownership by one or • Consider supporting DPS/ZdS to develop and display in all both groups in conflict (e.g. the USAID IHP supported facilities a code of conduct (charte de Batwa in Tanganyika) of project bonne conduite) to be signed and followed by staff working in activities. these facilities. This would include banishing all discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, gender, political affiliation, etc. • Ensure each facility has a functioning complaints mechanism available to all (include illiterate people), and that complaints are handled according to best practice.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 39 RISKS OF CONFLICTS ON MITIGATION ACTIONS PROGRAM • Ensure this risk is included in the Security Management Strategy of Community Acceptance and use this document to mitigate any issues related to this risk. Program personnel and suppliers Kidnapping of project staff or • Develop security protocols for transportation of valuable goods suppliers (especially in situations of and conduct in situations of kidnapping. perceived transportation of valuable goods). Ethnic group of project staff leading • Ensure diversity and representation of various ethnic groups to: within project teams, especially ICTs. This requires posting - Difficulties in positions locally. communication or tensions if most project staff in an area is from a different ethnic group than most of the ECZ. - Manipulation, or a perception of partisanship, if most project staff in an area is of the same ethnic group as most of the ECZ. TABLE 15: Risks of Program on Conflict and Mitigation Actions

RISKS OF PROGRAM ON MITIGATION ACTIONS CONFLICT AND GENDER Personnel/Recruitment • Consider supporting DPS/ ZdS to develop and display in all USAID IHP supported facilities a code of conduct (charte de Lack of neutrality of health staff at bonne conduite) to be signed and followed by staff working in facility level: these facilities. - in political views and • Ensure each facility has a functioning complaints mechanism, and relationships that complaints are handled according to best practice. - in the way services are • Ensure all staff are trained in and understand standards of provided (perceived professional conduct and that the program’s support to MOH discrimination or lack of human resource policies include clear guidance on staff respect) behavior, including mechanisms for enforcement. - in the selection of CODESA • Hold all staff accountable for respecting these standards. and RECO • Ensure that CODESA are representative of all groups within the - in the distribution of community (including women). supplies for • Ensure that the literacy requirement for CODESA is not to the CODESA/RECO detriment of having a representative CODESA. - in distributions (e.g. of • Consider liaising with other stakeholders providing literacy nutrition products) classes. • Ensure CODESA are involved in decision-making processes related to distributions. Local authorities trying to influence • Ensure MOH Human Resources policies on the topic are clear, selection of health staff, especially well understood, and applied. at the BCZ, to try and reap some • Make MOH staff loyalty a priority to prevent high turnover. of the benefits of the project. • Pay attention to hearsay from DPS/ ZdS staff on this topic.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 40 RISKS OF PROGRAM ON MITIGATION ACTIONS CONFLICT AND GENDER Health staff at health facilities, • Ensure MOH Human Resources policies on the topic are clear, hospitals, and within the ZdS well understood, and applied. perceived as having benefitted from • Promote proper communication on the topic as needed with preferential treatment if they are communities. family members of land owners responsible for land-grabbing. Health staff perceived as trying to • Ensure sufficient community sensitization before the start of change social norms around gender new services, as well as time (both during community meetings or as providing inappropriate and as one-on-one appointments) for questions and answers services to women and girls. by both men and women. • Support the DPS in integrating psychosocial services within the intervention areas as well as the female staff dedicated to Lack of dedicated staff (female staff) delivering these services; to provide psychosocial support at • Coordinate with partners offering psychosocial services in the the health center level. intervention areas • Continuously raise awareness on the availability of services.

Procurement • Procurement of goods and • As feasible, ensure small supplies are purchased locally. services not done locally despite • Ensure clear communication with communities on criteria for local capacities, fueling conflicts procurement. between communities and health • Ensure transparency throughout the procurement process. staff. • Support MOH’s audit and oversight functions. • Procurement of goods and • Ensure this risk is included in the Security Management Strategy services seen as preferential of Community Acceptance and use this document to mitigate treatment if family members of any issues related to this risk. land owners are contracted. Targeting • Consider supporting DPS/ZdS to develop and display in all USAID IHP supported facilities a code of conduct (charte de bonne conduite) to be signed and followed by staff working in these facilities. Targeting of facilities perceived as • Ensure each facility has a functioning complaints mechanism, and the result of influence by powerful that complaints are handled according to best practice. actors on ethnic or political grounds, • Communicate targeting criteria for rehabilitations, equipment, especially with regard to and “full support”. rehabilitations and equipment. • Ensure that targeting criteria are understood by all staff and properly applied. • Ensure this risk is included in the Security Management Strategy of Community Acceptance and use this document to mitigate any issues related to this risk. • Consider supporting DPS/ZdS to develop and display in all USAID IHP supported facilities a code of conduct (charte de Perceived lack of neutrality in bonne conduite) to be signed and followed by staff working in selection of facilities for: these facilities. - Different technical areas • Ensure each facility has a functioning complaints mechanism, and (nutrition, maternal and that complaints are handled according to best practice. child health, WASH, etc.) • Ensure that criteria for different types of support are clearly - Rehabilitations explained and understood by all CODESA members. - Any other equipment • Ensure this risk is included in the Security Management Strategy support of Community Acceptance and use this document to mitigate any issues related to this risk.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 41 RISKS OF PROGRAM ON MITIGATION ACTIONS CONFLICT AND GENDER Access/Availability of services • Ensure all groups that are parties to a conflict are included in the decision-making process defining these criteria. • Ensure criteria are well understood by staff responsible for applying them. Indigence criteria (determining who • Ensure community members are informed and understand these can receive free healthcare) creating criteria. tensions between groups in conflict. • Tap into IRC’s experience in health programming in conflict areas (especially in Tanganyika). • Ensure each facility has a functioning complaints mechanism, and that complaints are handled according to best practice and Do No Harm principles. • Ensure health staff as well as CODESA and RECO are aware of MOH policy of free access to the policy. healthcare for internally displaced • Establish communication protocols for reaching out to persons (IDP) leading to tensions humanitarian actors supporting IDPs to access healthcare. between IDPs and host populations • Ensure contingency plans in high-risk areas are in place and if they are from different that support is provided to ZdS and facilities to implement communities. these. Drones being perceived as an • Ensure large-scale communication with communities takes attack or espionage as part of an place before first using drones. ongoing conflict. • Ensure women are included within the community relay and Feedback provided by women and complaints committees girls is not taken into account • Train the members of these committees on the transversal within the community relay nature of protection and on certain notions of gender committee and the complaints • Identify and train complaints committees on the complaints committee: process.

• Encourage health centers to develop an effective internal referral system; • Equip health centers with consultation areas that include Lack of secure and confidential curtains, doors with locks, as well as sanitation spaces that space to ensure the consultation of adequately separate men and women. women and girls thus reducing their • Encourage health providers to be sensitive to the needs of attendance at health centers women and girls and to support women and girls in their search for care related to their needs.

Supply of services SGBV and/or family planning • Ensure sufficient community sensitization before the start of services perceived as inappropriate new services. by male community members, • Coordinate with other donors/agencies’ programs that leading to tensions and potentially support women’s protection, in particular domestic violence. an increase in domestic violence. Girls and young women do not • Raise awareness on the availability of services and also ensure have access to reproductive health community sensitization on the benefits of accessing these care including post-abortion care or services contraceptive information due to • Train service providers to understand the transversal nature of the attitudes of service providers protection to help them take into account the needs of girls who treat them poorly or disclose and young women and offer these services to teenage girls and patient information, thus young women without judgment; aggravating the situation for girls • Train service providers on guiding principles of confidentiality and young women, who are no and neutrality. longer protected from unwanted

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 42 RISKS OF PROGRAM ON MITIGATION ACTIONS CONFLICT AND GENDER pregnancies, stigma and social exclusion.

Misappropriation of Program Politicians claiming credit for visible • Ensure communities are aware of the origins of funding for project activities-—such as program activities by following the approved USAID IHP rehabilitations, equipment, or Branding Strategy. trainings—to further their electoral • Improve community ownership of facility and health zone ambitions. activities through project community engagement activities.

4.2 NEXT STEPS Implementing these actions may require changes to the Work Plan and other program management, planning, and monitoring and evaluation tools. At minimum, the following activities should be implemented once relevant program staff are hired and operational:  Developing role descriptions for Do No Harm (DNH) focal points. These focal points will have appropriate authority and/or efficient communication access to project management in order to alert management to issues and recommend changes to procedures and approaches. As possible, there will be strong female representation within these focal points, and all focal points will receive training on gender issues.  Training of DNH focal points on Conflict Sensitivity Analysis, Do No Harm, and gender.  Revising the Year I Work Plan based on the present report and the data collected by DNH focal points. Once DNH focal points are trained, they will have the capacity to constantly monitor the program’s conflict sensitivity, whether it is related to its activities, its personnel, its partners, or its beneficiaries.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 43 ANNEX A: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS Members of Assessment Teams Pathfinder Consultants (Kasai Region) Aimé Tshibanda Consultant Germaine Sombamania Consultant Patrice Wembolenga Consultant Jean Benoit Mutshe Consultant Benjamin Kinombe Oyombe Consultant Yvonne Ngudia Consultant IRC Staff Deogratias Rukeba (Katanga) Governance and Rights Coordinator Bienfait Muhigirwa (Eastern DRC) Governance and Rights Coordinator Consolidation Workshop Participants Noémie Kouider Governance Technical Advisor Ndalambo Kanku IHP Katanga Regional Director Janvier Barhobagayana IHP Eastern DRC Regional Director Armand Utshudi IHP Kasai Regional Director Matthieu Bahati IRC M&E Officer Nkonzi Mastaki IRC Governance and Health Manager Marlène Bahizire IRC Women’s Protection and Empowerment Manager Joëlle Bisiimwa IRC CBO Officer Justin Mugisho IRC VSLA Officer Ishukwe Wasolu IRC Reproductive Health Supervisor John Mirindi IRC Reproductive Health Supervisor Cris Baguma IRC Health Deputy Coordinator John Bahati IRC Health Senior Manager Aimé Tshibanda Pathfinder Consultant

Participants in Interviews, Focus Group Discussions, and Provincial Workshops Kasai Faustin Longe Edingo UDILO Assistant Pascal Mangomango Omanyama State Representative André Lopepe Tshoha Farmer Olela Fumbe Village Chief Wumbe Dowo Community Liaison Akonga Osako Teacher Mbutshu Walo Mère Chef Jean Paul Kalambay Numbi Health Zone Supervisor Andre Pierre Lokadi Kondjo Public figure (notable) Donatien Mutebwa Teacher Henriette Monya Kalema Mère Chef Gilbert Djamba Ndjate Village Chief Pierre Otshudi Odimba Teacher Joseph Ombobo Onema Public figure (notable) Joseph Osomba Olamba Public figure (notable) Francois Okitaloma Omambo Public figure (notable) Joseph Kayongo Loseke Teacher Joseph Shako Kayongo Secteur staff Joseph Omanyondo Kimbolo Planning Officer Marcelline Hiete Omanyondo Homemaker Jean Petit Okolongo w’Okolongo Doctor Laurent Ahuka Lundja Nurse Osombo Otshudi Methodist Pastor Lomami Kasende Teacher Odimba Shongo Community Liaison Djuwa Shongo Village Chief Mbase Odimula Community Leader Akale Mumba Community Leader Emile Kalembu Pastor and Church Representative Ambroise Bakabutunga Doctor/Head of Bolomba Health Zone

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 44 Filista Nskink Farmer Sophie Ngalula Farmer Madelène Ngalula Business Woman Marie Mbombo Business Woman Angèle Kapinga Farmer Poline Nzeba Business Woman Suzane Nzewu Community Worker/Teacher Adele Nyemba Community Worker/Business Woman Marie Tshilomba Community Worker/Farmer Jeannette Mujinga Farmer Marie Misenga Teacher Sylvie Mbuyi Nurse Thomas Mutuile Mangole District Administrator Cindaya Cindaya Student Cindaya Bukumba Student Mbuyi Mbuyi Student Mbuyi Kanku Student Tubajuka Zefe Student Kangodia Muteba Student Mulumba Ntumba Any Student Bakandowa Musawu Student Kabongo Kayaya Student Mulunda Sombamanya Surveyor Ngalamulume Lussangu Student Balite Gael Balite Student Cimanga Tite Graduate Cisungu Mbuyi Graduate Cisungi Beya Graduate Longo Lumingu Graduate Longo Kapinga Graduate Mulunda Sombamanya Surveyor Ntumba Buren Nurse Michou Masengu Community Worker Anto Bitota Community Worker Aimee Mbuyi Farmer Aimee Tshianda Independent Anny Mbuyi Independent Tshilenge Tshilenga Independent Rachel Kabanga Independent Jacques Tshibangu Independent Dr. Yanda Lycien Mwene MCZ Manyamanga Tshibangu Mayor of Musadi Commune Elie Nganga Tshibuabua Municipal Chief Kaymebe Evariste RACOJ Coordinator Germain Kanumbi Teacher Tridon Muamba Tukushi Nurse Emery Luhano I.T. Laurent Kabeya Laborer Mutonji Kambaba Village Leader Longo Shimatu Joint Village Leader Alexandre Mukadi Community Member Kabobo Musasa Community Member Constantin Kabeya Community Member Michel Tshibanda Community Member Jean Kayinda Community Member Cleophace Muamba Community Member

South Kivu Dr Cuma ATPNSR Technical Assistant Léon Irenge Conflict Sensitization Coordinator (Search for Common Ground) Pichou Kujirawwinja Conflict Sensitization Program Assistant

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 45 Dr. Yolande Nshombo Bagira MCZ

Tanganyika Search for Common Ground Staff Food for Hungry (FH) Staff CDJP Staff IRC Staff BCZ Staff BCZ NYEMBA Staff Division Provinciale de la Santé Staff

Katanga Provincial Ministry of Health Staff Ministry of the Interior Staff Provincial Division of Health Staff Provincial Inspection of Health Staff Health Zones: Staff Kaminam Baka, , Manika, Lualaba, Kanzenze, Kipushi, Kambove, , Camilemba, . Provincial Division of the Interior Staff Provincial Division of Decentralization Staff Provincial Division of Planning Staff Kipushi Territory Community Members Kaponda Chieftancy Community Members Manika and Kamina Communes Commune Members Community Leaders Community Leaders Civil Society Civil Society Members/Staff MONUSCO MONUSCO Civil Affairs EUP Caritas CDJP FHI 360 Linkages ACCELERE 1 CHEMONICS SANTE IHAP DAI IGA PACT CONGO WORLD VISION SWAA ICAP

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 46 ANNEX B: CONSOLIDATION WORKSHOP AGENDA

Jour 1 – 20 août 2018 Heures Thème Contenu Produit 8h00 – 8h30 Arrivée des participants 8h30 – 9h30 Introduction - Présentation des participants (par groupe de 2, chacun présente l’autre) - Règles de l’atelier - Objectifs de l’atelier - Agenda et processus d’analyse des conflits 9h30 – 10h00 Présentation du projet Présentation en plénière IHP 10h00 – 10h30 Comprendre les - Définition conflits - Causes - Nature du conflit 10h30 – 10h45 Pause café 10h45 – 13h00 Intro à l’analyse des - Objectifs de l’analyse des conflits conflits - Cadre d’analyse des conflits d’IRC Chemins causaux des - Outil d’analyse 1 - Chemins causaux des conflits conflits : présentation - Exercice en groupes (par province) sur les chemins causaux des conflits 13h – 14h Pause déjeuner 14h – 15h15 Chemins causaux des - Suite des exercices de groupe Les principaux conflits (suite) - Présentations des travaux de groupe types de conflits par province sont identifiés 15h15 – 15h30 Pause café 15h30 – 16h00 Priorisation des conflits Priorisation en plénière des principaux conflits Les 2 conflits par à analyser par zone (drivers) à partir d’une liste de province à critères analyser sont sélectionnés

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 47 Jour 2 – 21 août 2018 Heures Thème Contenu Produit 8h00 – 8h30 Arrivée des participants 8h30 – 10h30 Cartographie conflit 1 - Présentation de l’exercice Carte conflit 1 - Exercice en groupes (par province) pour chaque - Présentation en plénière des cartes de province chaque groupe 10h30 – 10h45 Pause café 10h45 – 11h30 Identification des A partir des cartographies de chaque groupe, Risques et risques et opportunités identification des risques et opportunités du opportunités pour pour le projet IHP projet IHP en termes : le projet IHP - D’impact du projet sur chaque conflit - D’impact de chaque conflit sur le projet 11h30 – 12h15 Cadre d’analyse Do No Présentation du cadre d’analyse Do No Harm Harm (les 7 étapes, connecteurs, diviseurs) Présentation sur le Transfert de Ressources et les Messages Ethiques Implicites 12h15 – 13h00 Etude de cas DNH Discussion en plénière (Tadjikistan) 13h00 – 14h00 Pause déjeuner 14h00 – 15h Etude de cas DNH Discussion en plénière (Tadjikistan) (suite) 15h45 – 16h00 Pause café 15h – 16h Analyse des diviseurs et - Présentation d’exemples du SK connecteurs conflit 1 - Exercice en groupes

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 48 Jour 3 – 22 août 2018 Heures Thème Contenu Produit 8h – 8h30 Arrivée des participants 8h30 – 9h30 Analyse des diviseurs Présentations en plénière des travaux de Connecteurs et et connecteurs conflit groupe diviseurs du conflit 1 (suite) 1 par province 9h30 – 10h Risques et A partir des diviseurs et connecteurs, Risques et opportunités pour le identification des principaux risques et opportunités pour projet IHP opportunités pour le projet IHP le projet IHP 10h – 10h30 Scénarios d’évolution Présentation de l’exercice du conflit 1 10h30 – 10h45 Pause café 10h45 – 13h Scénarios d’évolution - Exercices en groupes (par province) Scénarios du conflit 1 (suite) - Présentations en plénière des scénarios d’évolution du d’évolution conflit 1 13h – 14h Pause déjeuner 14h – 16h Recommandations Identifications des recommandations pour le Recommandations projet IHP à partir des risques et pour le projet IHP opportunités identifiés au cours des exercices sur le Conflit 1

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 49 Jour 4 – 23 août 2018 Heures Thème Contenu Produit 8h – 8h30 Arrivée des participants 8h30 – 10h30 Cartographie du conflit - Exercice en groupes (par province) 2 - Présentations en plénière des cartes du conflit 2 10h30 – 10h45 Pause café 10h45 – 11h45 Identification des A partir des cartographies de chaque groupe, Risques et risques pour le projet identification des risques et opportunités opportunités pour le IHP pour le projet IHP projet IHP 11h45 – 13h15 Analyse des diviseurs et - Exercice en groupes (par province) Connecteurs et connecteurs conflit 2 - Présentations en plénière diviseurs du conflit 2 par province 13h15 – 14h15 Pause déjeuner 14h15 – 14h45 Risques et opportunités A partir des diviseurs et connecteurs du Risques et pour le projet IHP conflit 2, identification des principaux risques opportunités pour le et opportunités pour le projet IHP projet IHP 14h45 – 16h Scénarios d’évolution - Exercices en groupes (par province) Scénarios du conflit 2 - Présentations en plénière des scénarios d’évolution du d’évolution conflit 2

Jour 5 – 24 août 2018 Heures Thème Contenu Produit 8h – 8h30 Arrivée des participants 8h30 – 9h15 Risques et opportunités A partir des scénarios d’évolution de chaque Risques et pour le projet IHP conflit, identification des principaux risques opportunités pour le pour le projet IHP projet IHP 9h15 – 10h30 Recommandations Identifications des recommandations pour le projet IHP à partir des risques et opportunités identifiés au cours des exercices sur le Conflit 2 10h30 – 10h45 Pause café 10h45 – 13h Recommandations Voir ci-dessus Recommandations (suite) pour le projet IHP 13h – 14h Pause déjeuner 14h – 15h Parking

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 50 ANNEX C: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

Date de l’entretien : Type d’informateur clés :

Localité, département et région : Preneur de notes :

Facilitateur : Langue utilisée :

Traduction ? Oui / Non

Bonjour. Mon nom est ______, je mène une collecte d’informations sur la sensibilité aux conflits liées à la santé pour le compte d’IRC intitulé : « The Integrated health program for DRC» financé par USAID pour une période de cinq ans.

Ce projet va répondre à d’importants besoins en soins de santé primaire et Wash dans 9 provinces de la RDC à savoir :  Lomami  Kasaï Occidental  Kasaï Oriental  Sankuru  Lualaba  Haut Lomami  Tanganyika  Sud-Kivu

Ce qui va faire un total de 117 zones de santé.

Votre participation est volontaire et vous pouvez choisir d’arrêter la discussion à tout moment. Si vous acceptez de nous parler, vous êtes libre de décider de ne pas répondre à une ou à plusieurs questions spécifiques. Toutes les informations que vous nous donnez seront strictement confidentielles, ce qui veut dire que votre nom ne sera pas inclus dans nos archives ni dans des rapports. En procédant avec cette discussion, vous acceptez que nous utilisions les informations que vous fournissez.

Cette discussion durera environ 1H30.

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 51 I. Le contexte, les connecteurs, les diviseurs

Clarifier le contexte Identifier les facteurs Identifier les facteurs de d'union division/tensions

Généralités : EIC etFGD 1. Dans de nombreuses 1. Pouvez-vous me dire quels 1. Vous est-il déjà arrivé de communautés, il existe des sont les éléments contribuant connaître une tension entre personnes différentes les à relier les groupes qui sont groupes différents dans unes des autres. Quels sont différents dans votre votre communauté ? les différents groupes dans communauté ? Quels sont les 2. Qu'est-ce qui cause cette votre communauté ? (Tels éléments qui contribuent à tension entre les groupes ? que : Ethnie ? Religion ? des relations harmonieuses ? 3. Les groupes sont-ils en Modes de vie ? Profession ? 2. Quelles sont les activités qui concurrence pour quelque Affiliation politique ? Classe vous fédèrent ? chose ? (tels que : Des

? Statut ? Clan ?) 3. Quelles institutions les ressources ? Des bénéfices 2. Ce groupe de travail groupes ont-ils en commun ? économiques ? Un pouvoir compte-t-il des personnes 4. Quels intérêts, espoirs ou politique ?) différentes les unes des préoccupations les groupes 4. Existe-t-il des systèmes ou autres ? ont-ils en commun ? structures qui exacerbent 3. Comment décririez-vous 5. Que, quand et comment les les tensions ? Au sein de la les relations entre les groupes célèbrent-ils communauté ? Extérieurs à différents groupes ? ensemble ? la communauté ? (Tels que : 4. Comment les groupes se 6. Quelles personnes ou une discrimination, une perçoivent-ils les uns les groupes soutiennent privation des droits et autres ? activement une communauté libertés, la mondialisation 5. Quelles sont les questions pacifique et y travaillent ? économique ?) conflictuelles les plus 7. Quel rôle les différents types 5. Existe-t-il des systèmes ou destructrices dans votre de personnes jouent-elles structures qui menacent des communauté ? dans l'atténuation des vies ou des moyens de tensions et la maîtrise de la subsistance ? violence ? (Tels que : 6. Qu'est-ce qui empêche les différents groupes d'âge, groupes d'être en mesure Veuillez noter que dans certains femmes, hommes, de résoudre leurs contextes, le facilitateur peut responsables religieux) différences ? devoir définir la portée de la 8. Qu'est-ce qui aide des 7. Quelles actions exacerbant communauté pour ces questions, personnes à éviter la violence les tensions au sein de la en particulier dans des zones et à régler le problème communauté les individus lorsqu'un conflit se produit ? ou groupes entreprennent- comptant des populations 9. Qui bénéficiera d'une ils ? Extérieurs à la migrantes ou illégales. communauté pacifique ? Qui a communauté ? intérêt à la paix ? 8. Quel type d'actions aggrave 10. Vers qui vous tournez-vous le conflit, le faisant évoluer lorsque vous avez besoin de de la tension à la violence ? conseils quant à la façon de 9. Quelles attitudes existantes résoudre des problèmes ? aggravent les relations entre 11. Existe-t-il des individus ou des les groupes ou mènent à la structures jouant un rôle de violence ? conciliateur traditionnel ? 10. L'une de ces tensions mène- t-elle à la violence ? Si tel est le cas, quelles tensions causent le plus de violence ?

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 52

Clarifier le contexte Identifier les facteurs Identifier les facteurs de d'union division/tensions

12. Comment la communauté 11. Y'a-t-il des armes dans la résolvait-elle les litiges par le communauté ? Qui les passé ? contrôle ? D'où viennent- 13. Quelles actions ont été elles ? entreprises dans la 12. Quelqu'un pourrait-il tirer communauté afin d'atténuer parti de la tension en cours les tensions ou de favoriser ? Qui pourrait sortir une réconciliation ? gagnant du conflit et 14. Quelles sont les attitudes comment ? actuelles tendant à réduire la 13. Est-ce que les groupes violence ou à encourager la connaissant des tensions réconciliation ? aujourd'hui sont les mêmes 15. Quels sont les facteurs actuels que par le passé ? Est-ce que limitant la violence dans les quelque chose a changé ? communautés ? 14. Avez-vous constaté une 16. Avez-vous constaté des augmentation des tensions améliorations dans les au fil du temps ? Pouvez- relations au fil du temps ? vous décrire comment les Pouvez-vous décrire les choses se sont aggravées ? changements ? Quand les Quand les changements se changements se sont-ils sont-ils produits ? produits ? 15. S'il n'y a aucune violence 17. Y’a-t-il autre chose que vous dans la communauté souhaiteriez me dire sur des aujourd'hui, il faut célébrer éléments qui encouragent la et protéger cet état de fait. coopération au sein de votre Pensez-vous que les communauté ? tensions pourraient mener à de la violence à l'avenir ? Que pourrait-il se produire ? Qu'est-ce qui empêcherait ceci de se produire ? 16. Souhaiteriez-vous me dire autre chose sur les tensions dans votre communauté ?

II. Santé et conflits

- Pouvez-vous me parler de conflits qui ont impacté l’accès et l’utilisation des services de santé dans les 3 dernières années dans les zones de santé où vous intervenez ? Si oui, lesquels ? - Pouvez-vous décrire les causes de ces conflits ? - Pouvez-vous me parler de situations d’urgence qui ont impacté l’accès et l’utilisation des services de santé dans les 3 dernières années ? Si oui, lesquels ? - Pouvez-vous me parler de situations où l’accès aux services de santé a donné lieu à des tensions, voire à des conflits entre groupes ethniques/sociaux/politiques, ou entre usagers et prestataires de services ? - Pouvez-vous me parler de cas de discrimination dans l’accès aux services de santé par les prestataires ? - Quels sont les groupes (ethniques, sociaux, religieux, politiques) qui préfèrent ne pas utiliser les services de santé (de peur d’être discriminés, mal traités, ou parce qu’ils ne croient pas que cela puisse améliorer leur état) ?

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 53 - D’après vous, qu’est ce qui divise les communautés dans cette zone ? - D’après vous, qu’est ce qui unit les communautés dans cette zone ? - [Lister les principales activités du projet IHP avant de poser cette question] Quels sont les risques pour un projet tel que IHP d’augmenter les conflits ou les tensions dans la zone ? o Liés au staff (ethnie du staff, compréhension de la langue locale, comportement du staff (favoritisme de certains groupes, etc.)) o Liés aux ressources distribuées par le projet o Liés au ciblage des communautés o Liés au comportement du personnel/des comités des structures appuyées (infirmiers, RECO, CODESA) o Liés à la récupération politique des activités du projet o Liés aux activités de planification familiale, lutte contre les VBG, etc. (auxquelles les hommes ou leaders traditionnels pourraient s’opposer ?) - Que pouvez-vous recommander au projet IHP en termes de mesures de mitigation pour éviter de nuire ou éviter ces risques ? - Quels sont les risques pour que l’insécurité, les conflits, ou d’autres situations d’urgence empêchent la mise en œuvre des activités du projet ? o Impact de l’insécurité sur la capacité du personnel du projet IHP à se déplacer sur le terrain o Impact des situations d’urgence ou de l’insécurité sur la capacité des communautés (ou de certains groupes ethniques/sociaux/politiques) à se rendre dans les FOSA o Impact des situations d’urgence ou de l’insécurité sur la capacité du personnel des FOSA à se rendre sur leur lieu de travail o Impact des situations d’urgence ou de l’insécurité sur la capacité du personnel des ZS et de la DPS de participer aux activités du projet - Pensez-vous que les zones d’interventions d’IHP connaissent les problèmes de sécurité ? Si oui, lesquels ?

Merci pour votre participation !

USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 54 REFERENCES

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USAID IHP: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY USAID.GOV | 55 Mathys, Gillian; Vlassenroot, Koen. “‘It’s Not All about the Land’: Land Disputes and Conflict in the Eastern Congo”. Rift Valley Institute. OCHA. 2013. “D.R. Congo’s neglected ‘Triangle of Death’ – The challenges of the protection of civilians in Katanga”. Kinshasa. OCHA. 2017. “The Human Face of Violence and Insecurity in South Kivu”. Toma, Iulia Andreaa. 2017. “Kasai: The Forgotten Province of DRC – Gender Assessment”. Oxfam. Refugees International. 2014. “DR Congo: Katanga in Crisis”. Field Report. SDC. 2005. “Conflict Analysis Tools” Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. Sterns, Michael; Vogel, Christoph. 2015. “The Landscape of Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo”. Center on International Cooperation. Unicef. 2018. “Kasai: A Children's Crisis: Coping with the Impact of Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”. ReliefWeb. USAID. 2012. “Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Assessment of the Democratic Republic of the Congo”. Verweijen, Judith. 2015. “The Making of Conflict in the Eastern Congo: Trouble in the Ruzizi Plain” ReliefWeb. https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/making-conflict-eastern-congo- trouble-ruzizi-plain ———. 2016. “A Microcosm of Militarization – Conflict, Governance, and Armed Mobilization in Uvira, South Kivu.” Rift Valley Institute. Vlassenroot, Koen. 2013. “South Kivu: Identity, Territory, and Power in the Eastern Congo.” Usalama Project Report: Understanding Congolese Armed Groups, Rift Valley Institute. London. WFP; Unicef; FAO. 2018. “UN Agencies in Urgent Bid to Prevent Famine in Kasai”. ReliefWeb.

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