TURKEY'S NOVEMBER 2002 ELECTIONS: A NEW BEGINNING? By Ali Carkoglu*

Turkey's November 2002 elections ended with a stunning victory for the new Justice and Development Party. Since only one other party reached the 10 percent minimum necessary to hold seats in parliament, the victorious group was left with close to a two-thirds' majority. This article analyzes the meaning of the election, the fate of the different parties, and the attitudes of the electorate

Turkey's November 3, 2002, general about 39 percentage points of electoral elections ended with a predicted but still support from the April 1999 elections. impressive victory for the Justice and The two major opposition parties did not Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma perform much better. While the pro-Islamist Partisi-AKP), the first party since 1987 to Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi-SP) suffered a secure a clear majority in Parliament. The loss of 12.9 percentage points, the True rapid rise of AKP support marks another Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi-DYP) lost step in the electoral collapse of centrist 2.5 percentage points. Besides CHP and politics in the country. The left-leaning AKP and to a lesser degree the Democratic Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet People’s Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi- Halk Partisi-CHP) is the only other party DEHAP), all opposition parties incurred passing the 10% nationwide electoral significant losses of electoral support. support threshold to gain seats in the Consequently, all the leaders of those losing Parliament. AKP got about 34 % of the centrist parties, except the leader of the SP, votes compared to 20% for CHP. The were forced to step aside. remaining 46% of votes did not elect The leadership of the winners seems anyone since all other parties did not gain committed to integrating Turkey into the minimum 10% needed. (See Table 1 Europe. However, their religiously below). conservative constituency is known to be The incumbent government's coalition skeptical toward EU membership. From the members suffered the heaviest losses. perspective of economic interests, AKP Compared to the 1999 election, the largest supporters seem to reflect resurgent incumbent coalition partner, the Democratic conservative Anatolian capital against the Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti-DSP), secular establishment of Istanbul, the shrunk down to about 1.2%. It may have set largest city of Turkey. The influence of a world record for being the largest party in upwardly mobile Anatolian firms may aim one election and losing almost all its to shift the power balance in their favor support in the next one. Among the other through advocating irresponsible populist coalition partners, the Nationalist Action social and economic policies together with Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi-MHP) lost revitalized pro-Islamist actions and a push 9.6 percentage points, while the junior for private business gains through access to partner the Motherland Party (Anavatan or effective control of the government. Partisi-ANAP) lost 12.9 percentage points. If AKP does not keep a neutral stand in Hence, the coalition partners together lost such a power struggle among the top

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economic players it would be politically post-1980 Turkish party system. The self-destructive since the perception of electoral preferences reflected in election honesty is one of its main attractions. The outcomes are very volatile. On average, corruption associated with the previous over the more than half-century of liberalization period under the centrist competitive multi-party elections, nearly ANAP and DYP was one of the main 23% of the electorate changes its reasons for declining trust in the centrist preferences from one party to another in parties among the electorate. each election. In the early 1980s high Besides the issue of EU membership-- volatility was primarily due to a changing which the AKP leadership started to push as menu of parties facing the electorate due to soon as their electoral victory became the closing and merging of different parties. certain--a number of other issues present However, for at least the last three the new government with potentially elections--1995, 1999 and especially in explosive problems. Most obvious among 2002-- we observe that the electorate shifts those are the long-lasting Cyprus conflict from one party to another for reasons other and the impending military engagement in than the nonexistence of a previously Iraq. available party. On the domestic front, AKP’s Given the available election results and consultative meetings with a wide variety of expectations concerning the impact of civil society organizations seem to have continuing economic crisis on party pleased public opinion as a first step in the preferences, it should be hardly surprising direction of a more inclusive and open that an even higher level of volatility government. At the same time, though, the compared to 1999 preferences took place in AKP's overwhelming power coupled with November 2002. As Table 1 below shows, its Islamist politics could create serious nearly half of the electorate seem to have internal conflicts. In short, the message of shifted from one party to another from the the election may either be the end of 1999 to the 2002 elections. If we divide the politics in Turkey as it has been practiced party system into four ideological groups-- for decades, or a temporary deviation, extreme left, center-left, center-right, and which voters will reverse at the next pro-Islamist and nationalist party groups-- opportunity. we observe that about 20% of the voters This article provides a short overview of seem to have switched from one group to the main characteristics of the Turkish party another between the1999 and 2002 system and electoral behavior. The elections. Besides CHP, and DEHAP, November 2002 election is evaluated in which inherited its predecessor HADEP’s light of these historical patterns. Next, the electoral tradition of representing Kurdish campaign period will be critically ethnicity in the country, there are no parties considered and linked to characteristic which gained on their 1999 vote level. AKP patterns of the Turkish party system. and the Young Party (Genc Parti-GP) are Finally, I will venture into a speculative the other two newly established parties that appraisal of the near-term implications of gathered significant electoral support. GP the new AKP government. was the dark horse of the November 2002 elections and relied on no previous electoral PARTY SYSTEM tradition. AKP clearly had the RP/FP CHARACTERISTICS AND VOTE constituency as their target and competed DETERMINANTS with the SP for that base. In short, Looking at the Turkish electoral scene increasing volatility seems to benefit new after the November 2002 elections and right-of-the-center parties. trying to foresee what lies beyond, one In 2002 the pro-Islamist and nationalist needs to bear in mind characteristics of the group of parties peaked in electoral support

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reaching nearly 53%, an all-time high in support for getting representation in the Turkish politics. As such, this group is parliament, more and more parties were about 3.3 times larger than the center-right able to attract voters’ support in elections parties and about 2.5 times larger than the and ultimately winning representation. This center-left parties. However, the real is usually achieved by splits in parties after question is whether and when will the elections. Factions that could not get 10% electoral support become consolidated and nation-wide support first get in on a party stabilized behind these new parties. If the list and then become independents or create past pattern continues, the next election is a smaller party. Larger centrist parties could bound to create not only some deterioration get representatives of smaller fractions into of electoral support for AKP but rather a the parliament under an umbrella ticket. major one creating yet another new right- However, they could not keep them under of-center winner. the same umbrella for long since their

Table 1: Election results and aggregate party system characteristics 1999-2002 Seats in the Vote Share (%) % wins Parliament and 1999 2002 losses 1999 2002 Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti-DSP) 22.19 1.22 -20.97 136 0 Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi-MHP) 17.98 8.34 -9.64 129 0 Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi-FP)* 15.41 2.48 -12.93 111 0 Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) 13.22 5.13 -8.09 86 0 True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi-DYP) 12.01 9.55 -2.46 85 0 Republican People's Party (Cuhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP) 8.71 19.40 10.69 0 178 People's Democarcy Party (Halkin Demokrasi Partisi-HADEP)** 4.75 6.23 1.48 0 0 Grand Unity Party (Buyuk Birlik Partisi-BBP) 1.46 1.02 -0.44 0 0 Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-AKP) 0.00 34.28 34.28 0 363 Young Party (Genc Parti-GP) 0.00 7.25 7.25 0 0 Independents*** 0.87 0.99 0.12 3 9 Total 96.60 95.89 550 550 Other Parties 3.40 4.11 0.71 Volatility 20.15 50.91 **** Fractionalization 85.15 81.44 ***** % of vote unrepresented in the Parliament (%) 18.32 45.33 Extreme-Left (EL) 6.02 7.27 Center-Left (CL) 31.35 21.77 Center-Right (CR) 26.77 16.13 Pro-Islamist & Nationalist (PIN) 34.85 53.37 Ideological Volatility 12.70 20.00 **** *In 2002 Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi-SP) **In 2002 Democratic People's Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi-DEHAP) ***In 1950 9 independents gained seats in the Parliament, in 1954 10 and in 1969 13 independents won seats. **** Highest (ideological) volatility ever in the Turkish party system. *****Lowest fractionalization since 1991 elections. inner-party democratic character does not The Turkish party system of the post- allow factions but rather pushes them out to 1980s is also increasingly fragmented. Until become outsiders. the November 2002 elections, despite the Besides fragmentation in the parliament, very limiting 10% nation-wide electoral increasing fragmentation in election

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preferences can also be seen. More and position of the local component in election more parties were able to obtain vote shares results continues in the Turkish party within the range of 4 to 14 percent. In 1987 system. The AKP and CHP vote there were two parties within this range experienced a significant rise in their (DSP and RP) and one at around 3% national component and in the case of AKP (MCP). In 1991 DSP reached about 10% the national component is now the and the RP-MHP coalition got about 17%. dominant factor shaping its electoral In 1995, CHP, DSP, HADEP and MHP support. As such, AKP becomes the first were all within this range. Finally, in 1999, party in Turkish electoral history to gather ANAP, CHP, DYP, HADEP and FP fell behind it a uniform swing across the nation into this range while MHP and DSP were in its favor. close with about 18% and 22% Another striking characteristic of the respectively. Looking back at the 1999 aggregate election outcomes across Turkish elections, it is clear that given the volatility provinces is its clear geographical of the electorate it was not possible that the regionalization pattern. Recent overall party system could maintain that many evaluations of the results for the 1950-1999 parties within such a close range of support. period show that Turkish provinces reflect Coming into the 2002 elections however, three regions. One that covers the so-called we observe that only two parties get “deep” East and Southeastern provinces; significantly above the 10% threshold while another covering the coastal provinces from 5 parties (ANAP, DYP, MHP, GP and the Eastern Black Sea down to Eastern DEHAP) remaining between 4 to 10 Mediterranean including the whole of Trace percent and DSP and SP getting about 2%. and Aegean provinces; and lastly a large In other words, while the electoral number of provinces that seem to have been preferences remained very volatile, they squeezed in between these two regions. In also remained highly fragmented. terms of their socio-economic Compared to 1999 and 1995 the party characteristics as well as political system is less fragmented. However, it still preferences these three regions reveal a is more fragmented than the results of the clear pattern as well. The East and 1991 election. Southeastern provinces are the least Many experts have claimed that the developed in all respects and have an ethnic electorate could unite the fragmented reflection in their political preferences. system behind one or two major parties in Their clear preference for DEP/HADEP in November 2002. This expectation would the 1990s and DEHAP in the last election have been valid if there were no social, have its roots in the early 1950 and 1960s economic, ethnic, sectarian and thus also when this region also showed a distinct regional differences in electoral preferences inclination for either the opposition parties dominating the election results. Over the or personalized minor parties. past nearly half a century it has always been The coastal provinces are typically the local and regional factors rather than most developed and modern in their socio- national ones that shaped election economic backgrounds. Their political results.(1) It would have been a real preferences are centrist. The Anatolian surprise if this general trend had changed in plain provinces fare relatively better in November 2002. terms of socio-economic development As Table 1 shows, fragmentation compared to the “deep” Southeast but remained high despite a downturn in that significantly worse off than the coastal trend and a relatively increased focus on regions. These provinces are the hotbeds of one or two parties. Looking at the unofficial Turkish nationalist and pro-Islamist election results from provinces, my electoral support.(2) The results from the calculations show that the overall dominant provinces indicate that a similar pattern is

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again observed in the last election. The Constitution with little difficulty. However, distinct preference of the “deep” Southeast AKP's seat advantage in the Parliament for DEHAP is again obvious but this time does not translate into a vote majority in we observe a significant rise in its level as electoral support. Therefore, any time AKP well as its spread across the provinces of fails to obtain CHP’s cooperation in such the East and Southeast. The changing of changes, CHP and other opposition parties electoral forces that in a sense challenge the are justifiably going to question the system applies not only to the Kurdish legitimacy of such changes made by a party electoral base but even more so for the pro- with only minority support and pressure Islamist electoral base that seem to have AKP to back down. In other words, AKP’s advanced from the East into the West and single party government needs to build a the coastal regions. In a sense, the consensus in and also out of the Parliament conservative preferences of the Anatolian in order to maintain its legitimacy as a steppes have expanded onto the coasts and government. Western provinces where we still observe Among the parties that remain out of the some, but significantly shrunken, centrist- Parliament the ethnic Kurdish DEHAP has right or centrist-left support. always suffered from the 10% nationwide The election system, which requires representation threshold. As a 10% nation-wide support to gain predominantly regional party obtaining its representation, consistently kept 14 to 19 support from the East and Southeastern percent of the electorate unrepresented in provinces it nevertheless consistently the parliament since 1987. The largest share increased its vote share over the last three of the unrepresented votes in elections prior elections (running under the HADEP to the last one occurred in 1987 (19.8%) banner in the first two). DEHAP has leaving the centrist DSP as well as right of enlarged its support significantly and the center MHP and RP out of the reached a larger vote share than ANAP, SP, parliament. In 1991, the pre-election DSP and the Grand Unity Party (Buyuk coalition between the RP and MHP kept the Birlik Partisi-BBP). As such, it is now the unrepresented votes at a bare minimum. sixth largest party in the system. But since However, in 1995 the two extreme ends of HADEP and DEHAP’s regionally the Kurdish issue--that is the nationalist concentrated electoral support is MHP and the ethnic Kurdish People’s unrepresented in the Parliament this factor Democracy Party (Halkin Demokrasi favors the parties that capture the second Partisi-HADEP)--remained out of the largest vote shares in those provinces. In parliament, with total unrepresented votes 1995 and 1999 the pro-Islamist RP and FP reaching 14.4%. In 1999, MHP got in and benefited from HADEP being left out of the this time CHP remained out of the Parliament. In 2002 it was AKP which on parliament, which meant 19% of the votes average gained less than half of the cast did not get represented. electoral support that DEHAP obtained in Given the fact that no large pre-election East and Southeastern provinces that coalitions were formed before November benefited from this representational 2002 and the persistent fragmentation in threshold. preferences, the unrepresented portion of Another important pattern that emerges electoral preferences in the parliament from the aggregate data is a high correlation reached a peak with about 45% of the vote. between incumbent party’s or coalition’s What is remarkable about this large electoral support and the performance of the unrepresented segment is not only its sheer economy during its tenure. In other words, size but also its ideological nature. AKP the worse (or better) the economy performs together with the independent MPs could during inter-election periods, the largest is conceivably make changes even in the the drop (or gain) in the electoral support

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for the party or coalition held responsible European traditions. The second dimension for this performance.(3) Not surprisingly, is the ethnic-based nationalist cleavage we also observe a great deal of effort on the placing the Turkish and Kurdish identities part of the incumbents to manipulate the as opposed to one another. economic policy tools in such a way as to On the first dimension, as an individual please their target constituencies. becomes more religious in terms of Reflections of these manipulations are attitudes, behavior and worship practice as typically observed in agricultural support well as self-perception, we observe an prices, government employment and salary increasing tendency to support a distinct raises, delay of price increases in goods and group of pro-Islamist parties. Declining services controlled by the public sector.(4) religiosity of the same variants also Typically, however, incumbents fail to stay differentiates the voters’ tendency to in power and only get the economic support center-left parties of strict secularist balances worsen. policy preferences. Similarly on the second Such manipulations in the economy have dimension, nationalistic attitudes and become very difficult under the present feelings concerning not only the Kurdish economic austerity program. Intricate issue but also the EU membership and public bidding and spending arrangements Copenhagen criteria that binds these issues implemented just before elections and in together, differentiate an individual’s such a way as to support a certain party likelihood of support for the right-wing constituency is always possible. However, parties. In other words, despite the fact that having been in power during the deep EU remains an obscure and technical issue economic crisis of 2001, the DSP-MHP- for most Turkish voters, the Copenhagen ANAP coalition which, in the aftermath of criteria and the legislative arrangements 1999 elections, had an electoral support of required to meet them concerning about 54% obtained only about 15% of the abolishment of the death penalty and votes in November 2002. This is the largest minority rights provide a convenient anchor drop in Turkish electoral history for an for nationalist circles to exploit a incumbent or coalition in two consecutive eurosceptic rhetoric to their advantage. elections. The heart of political competition thus Over the past nearly two decades we see seems to be shaped around pro-Islamism a consistent shift of voters from centrist and secularism blended with varying dozes left-right ideological positions to the of Turkish nationalism. While the extreme-right end of the spectrum.(5) The overwhelming majority of the Turkish average Turkish voter now places himself electorate is located around ideological or herself on a clear right-of-center orientations that reflect these issues, the ideological position and nearly 20% of the traditionally state-centred Turkish left is voters seem to be placed on the far right still far from such arguments. The two position; i.e., at 10 on a 1 to 10 left-right important minority groups, the Alevi and ideological scale. Kurdish communities, seem isolated on the Individual preferences seem to reflect Turkish ideological map. While two dimensions that command the HADEP/DEHAP undertakes the ideological competition in the Turkish party representation of the Kurdish constituency, system.(6) The first and the relatively more CHP, still seems the closest party to the dominant is the secularist vs. pro-Islamist Alevis. The Sunni pro-Islamist AKP and SP cleavage. It is noteworthy that this cleavage are the most distant party from the Alevi largely overlaps with the center vs. constituencies. periphery formations in Turkish politics and The electorate's rising disenchantment also the left and the right wing orientations with the existing parties is also evident. For similar in many respects to the Western a long time surveys showed a large segment

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of voters undecided as to which party to given by future events. Below, I speculate support while an equally large segment on possible developments on the basis of refused to vote for any one of the available the above analyses. parties.(7) The inability of governments to respond to emergency needs after the A CRITICAL TURNING POINT? devastating earthquakes in 1999 and the In order to assess whether the November following economic crisis obviously occupy 3, 2002 election was a turning point in an important place in popular anger towards Turkish electoral history, we need to politicians and politics at large. The Turkish consider two historical developments. One electorate seems unhappy with their lives is the economic crisis and ruling coalition's and outraged with the inability of the ineptitude that created impatience and anger politicians to solve their problems. toward the Ankara establishment. The other It remains to be seen whether the AKP is the surprising initiative taken by the can do better at these tasks and hold its outgoing Parliament to pass the legal support in the April 2004 local elections adjustment package before the elections. and those that follow. The rise of the AKP The Ankara establishment's willingness to in a consistent pattern across the Turkish bring the EU adjustments to the election provinces can be seen as a continuation of agenda reflected a need to reshape the the peripheral challenge to the statist centre debate with an eye toward meeting the of Turkish politics.(8) The resistance of the challenges of becoming a viable EU centre a la Mardin (1973) has never been candidate. this weak in the past elections. However, to Regarding the two-year-long economic what extent the peripheral forces have come crisis plaguing Turkey, the centrist parties, under the AKP's banner and accept its ideas reluctant to make populist promises, lost and policies is not yet clear. AKP now their appeal. No matter how incredible the inherits not only the pro-Islamist tradition promises of AKP and GP might have been, but also the Democrat Party (Demokrat they nevertheless signaled the masses that Parti-DP), Justice Party (Adalet Partisi-AP) they would change the status quo and adopt and the DYP tradition together with that of more caring policies for the masses. The the market developmentalist ANAP of the incumbent coalition partners could not 1980s. credibly respond to such a rhetoric simply How the AKP leadership can balance because they had already had their chance these hardly reconcilable orientations is and had not acted effectively. Even the unclear. Would the alienated masses hurt by challenging opposition parties such as DYP, the economic crisis of the 2001 remain CHP and SP were unable to come up with behind AKP or move to another new or credible alternatives that could attract the already existing party? Could a leader, new suffering masses. or already in politics, mobilize them or SP’s problem was different than those of would they be attracted by a traditionally the CHP and DYP. SP’s adoption of a pro- centrist party or yet by another pro-Islamist Islamist rhetoric under the leadership of or nationalist one? Would the cumulative now banned Necmettin Erbakan seem disenchantment of the masses with the simply to have left the impression of inability of the parties to respond to their reactionaries unable to achieve anything in basic needs and expectations lead to a practice. Besides a few nationalist left-wing further abandonment of centrist tendencies? parties such as the Workers’ Party (Isci How fast would this movement to one of Partisi-IP) and the Turkish Communist the extreme ends be? How would the Party (Turkiye Komunist Partisi-TKP) a existing parties and the powerful state left-wing perspective in the economy could bureaucracy react to these developments? not be underlined during the campaign. Answers to these questions can only be These extremist perspectives also were seen

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as adventurous and non-credible given the might have ended nearly after 18 months of foreign aid dependent Turkish economy. work by him but much of the economy has DYP’s credibility was equally blemished not felt any improvement. His image as a given the past performance of its leader “World Bank man” could not easily “sell” Tansu Ciller in office when the 1994 among an increasingly angry and alienated economic crisis hit the country. The only electorate. If the election was about the credible party that could have used the future of the economy, then Dervis needed economic alienation of the masses for to project a new fresh team of experienced building an electoral base was CHP. specialists in the CHP lists, which he also However, CHP also failed to deliver on this did not provide. front despite, or perhaps because, of the fact Dervis’s charisma might also have been that it had the widely popular Kemal Dervis exaggerated. Old-style campaigning with who runs the economic program already. mass meetings and hand-shaking might still At one point in early summer 2002, the be more important in Turkey than making a electoral appeal of Dervis was seen as good impression on television interviewers. tremendous. However, as the summer Moreover, Dervis projected a disillusioning, progressed and the campaign began, the almost authoritarian pro-militaristic, image choices made by Dervis at critical junctures in perhaps the only “uncooked” interview disillusioned many. First came his he gave to Nese Duzel in Radikal daily distancing from the New Turkey Party newspaper on October 21, 2002.(9) For (Yeni Turkiye Partisi-YTP). Despite his those wanting a fresh left perspective on not damage control efforts, in the minds of the only economic policy matters but also on Turkish voters this may have seemed too larger social issues he simply seemed to be slick a move. After all, Dervis had been projecting an old statist view. Dervis might involved in a failed attempt to eliminate have all the credentials for a successful DSP and Bulent Ecevit from the political savior on the economic scene but he failed scene, trying to discredit him in an to provide a larger vision. unprecedented campaign bordering on While Dervis was trying to focus naively character assassination. This plan collapsed only on economic policy matters ignoring once MHP leader Devlet Bahceli called for the underlying struggle for enlarging the early elections. Unprepared for such a country's democratic agenda AKP, was move, the other coalition partners could appealing to mass disillusionment. This only play along. After the election, Ecevit strategy was far less successful than the called this decision “political suicide”. In AKP's appeal to the masses' unhappiness. the eyes of Turkish public opinion, Dervis As Tarhan Erdem aptly noted in an suffered for the maneuvers that created this interview with Nese Duzel, “Dervis chose situation. to reconcile with the status quo”.(10) In Next came his new party of choice; contrast, AKP made a populist call for CHP. Now that Dervis had broken away economic equality, while only scarcely from YTP, the CHP leadership did not need using such controversial Islamist-related him or his obscure team. For its part, since issues as the wearing of headscarves in Dervis failed to attract significant schools. newcomers, CHP continued to project an In retrospect, the decision to go to early image of being unchanged. Dervis added elections, DSP's loss of credibility, and little. Dervis' effort to push CHP might Ecevit's passing from the scene, gave the have been wrong from the start. If this AKP what it needed to win the majority in election was about the economic crisis, the Parliament. Neither Devis, nor ex- corruption and Ankara's clumsiness about foreign minister Ismail Cem, nor the old- helping the people, Dervis may never have time CHP insider Deniz Baykal could fill had much to offer. The financial panic the vacuum. Baykal’s insistence on relying

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on his party's old guard ensured it would anybody else, saw an electoral pay-off that not be revitalized. Instead of being an no one dared to touch and took its chances alliance of young, dynamic agents of by taking the initiative to pass critical change in Turkey adopting democratic, pieces of legislation from the Parliament egalitarian and progressive issue stands, the before the election campaign actually CHP became a faction of resistance to started. change. The EU-oriented legislation passed just Another important observation concerns before the election included limiting the use developments on the EU front. The most of death penalty and opening the way for surprising development of Summer 2002 teaching and broadcasting in native came with the unexpected passage of an languages other than Turkish (in principle impressive EU adjustment package from allowing the use of Kurdish in such Parliament. This package was passed after activities). The EU adjustment package was the Parliament had taken the decision to go seen by some as democratizing new for an early election. Even the most regulations bringing the country closer to optimistic were not expecting such a move. EU membership, while an opposing group With large number of resignations from the portrayed these as one-sided concessions largest coalition partner DSP in Summer undermining Turkey's unity and 2002 and the resulting New Turkey Party independence. The parties in Parliament (Yeni Turkiye Partisi-YTP) under the were clearly divided. MHP alone rejected leadership of former Minister of Foreign all the legislation, while AKP opposed only Affairs Ismail Cem, EU and EU related the death penalty change, knowing this vote issues seem to be pushed to the forefront of would not impede the package's passing. political debate in the country. However, ANAP was the new laws' main advocate, other political party leaders have by that hoping it would lead to electoral support time only tangentially dealt with this issue and the EU's agreement to advance in front of the electorate. Besides Cem, Turkey's membership application. ANAP leader Mesut Yilmaz stood in favor ANAP's hopes, however, were not of this issue in his campaign. MHP realized. It assumed that voters would leadership openly questioned the worth of reward it for acting on the EU issue and that EU membership. At the time, ill-looking the EU would also be pleased. But any Ecevit did not seem to care about the EU action by the EU bureaucracy would only issue or was simply unable to push behind take place after the election. Similarly, any issue he believed in. Although publicly public opinion was little affected since the in favour of EU membership, DYP leader measures would not be implemented until Tansu Ciller seemed reluctant to push the later. The November 2002 election was not issue perhaps considering backlash of the determined by EU issues. Even ANAP’s conservatist constituencies in their campaign was not effective in pushing this competition with the AKP and MHP. AKP issue since the party organization was 's core constituency was known to be falling apart on the expectation that it skeptical about EU issues and thus the would not survive the 10% nationwide leadership was not willing to take the lead threshold. Many influential names resigned on this issue. In short, if the EU issue were and joined AKP, MHP or became going to shape the electoral agenda in the independent. next general elections, the political elites' One of the emerging new parties was willingness to raise the salience of the EU Cem Uzan’s Young Party (Genc Parti-GP), issues would be a major factor behind this which few took seriously at first. When a development. If one believes that politicians polling result was published on September only move by electoral incentives then one 30, however, GP seemed to be above the would also claim that ANAP, more than

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threshold and one of the few parties likely influence many. The people wanted change, to gain seats.(11) blamed the establishment, and sought to This situation revealed some of the express their anger. Uzan, and in some problems in contemporary Turish politics. ways the AKP, seems to have given them GP was and is a typical one-man show and exactly what they wanted. completely funded by Uzan. Its campaign At first sight Uzan’s 7.25% seemed to was a slick commercial show using Uzan’s have been largely attracted from MHP. television and radio stations, as well as his However, Uzan’s power base did not turn cellular phone network. Many tenets of this out to be anywhere close to traditional campaign were in direct violation of the law MHP strongholds. Rather, GP gets most of of political campaigns but no serious steps its support from the western coastal were taken to stop it. Uzan’s speeches were provinces where CHP dominates the polls. full of irresponsible populist promises, It seems that GP appealed to the including: increasing the number of uneducated, unemployed masses hardest hit provinces from 81 to 250; 200 square by the economic crisis and angry at the meters of state-owned land to be given to ruling coalition. Although it is impossible every family; cheap credits for every family to say what would have happened if the GP to be paid back in 30 years; distribution of had not been in the election, it is clear that all school books for free; abolishing VAT the votes it received helped prevent other on foodstuffs; no tax on minimum wage parties, probably centrist ones, from passing and an overall reduction of taxes; and the 10% threshold. higher support prices for agriculture. Where did AKP get its vote? Some of these points--like no taxes on Geographically speaking, AKP’s vote is minimum wage--were shared by MHP and concentrated in the central Anatolian DYP. Uzan’s promise of a university for provinces. However, unlike the traditional every province was matched by DYP and conservative provinces this time AKP led in even surpassed by promising new ones in large metropolitan cities like Istanbul, provinces that already had one university. It Ankara and Bursa. AKP voters appear to be seems however, that once this bidding game religious, young, shantytown dwellers who started, others--especially DYP’s Tansu do not support EU membership. CHP Ciller--followed suit with her own version supporters, on the other hand, appear to be of populism like promising a tractor for secularist leftists who are not particularly every farmer and shifting the state banks for young and who support EU membership. agriculture and small merchants to farmers and small merchants. END OF POLITICS AS WE KNOW IT? These populist promises were blended The November 2002 election brought to with anti-establishment rhetoric reminiscent power a very different group of leaders and, of Ross Perot in the United States and for the first time since 1991, a single-party Sylvio Berlusconi in Italy. Uzan, and to government. While AKP's core some degree Erdogan, turned their constituency is skeptical about EU campaign speeches into expressions of membership, the new rulers began with an hatred against the establishment and impressive tour of European capitals and a government. Obviously, none of Uzan’s push for a starting date on negotiations promises could be realized within the regarding Turkish membership. Similarly, austerity program. But this type of they seemed to move forward on supporting campaigning was meant to convince voters a solution to the Cyprus issue. A success for that leaders cared about them and intended AKP on either issue would strengthen the to do something about their suffering. A new government. Since the real difficulty sophisticated argument about the lack of that is expected to shortly become binding resources to achieve such goals would not is on the economic front, if these efforts

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succeed, AKP would have started its tenure crisis of confidence and thus more internal with a first minute goal. Consolidation of economic problems. EU-Turkey partnership with the start of AKP’s big test is its ability to appeal to negotiations would lift the uncertainty average people through its economic surrounding Turkish economy’s direction policies while transforming itself from a and potential for the future. Even if the marginal to a centrist party. In rosy much-expected military engagement in Iraq scenarios, AKP’s challenge will be to materializes, its impact on the Turkish maintain a long-term growth strategy rather economy could be kept at a minimum. than just exploiting a short-term Under this rosy scenario AKP would be opportunity. In gloomy scenarios, AKP much more powerful to conduct the much- could face internal conflict and opt for more needed reforms in public administration, extremist policies. In all likelihood, agriculture, education and many other whichever direction events take, Turkey's policy areas. politics are likely to be far different than Under such circumstances, the only they were before the November 2002 opposition party in parliament, CHP, could elections. find little on which to gain popularity by resisting the government. If the economy * Ali Carkoglu is an associate professor of goes well, AKP could afford to move political science at Sabanci University and slowly on such Islamist issues as that of the research director for TESEV. He is co- headscarf. And if AKP follows a moderate editor of Turkish Studies journal Vol. 4, path in beneficial circumstances it could Number 1 on Turkey and the European replace the centrist parties of the Turkish Union which will also be published as a party system. Although harder-line book by Frank Cass. elements within AKP might not like this policy, they would find it hard to overturn NOTES it. This would be the most likely course of 1. Ali Carkoglu and Ilgaz Eren, “The Rise events if AKP's victory would prove a long- of Right-of-Centre Parties and the term, basic shift in Turkish politics rather Nationalisation of Electoral Forces in than a temporary aberration. Turkey,” New Perspectives on Turkey, With a much weaker center in Vol.26, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp.95-137. parliament and a populist right-of-center in 2. Ali Carkoglu, “24 Aralik 1995 power, the post-election period is more Secimlerinde Bolgesellesme, Oynaklik, likely to see several crises, including an Parcalanma ve Temsil Adaleti” uneasy relationship between the prime (Regionalisation, Volatility, minister and a president known to be a Fractionalisation and Representational liberal secularist. Another is the Justice in Turkey’s December 24, 1995 headscarves or turban issue. However, for Elections) in Turkish, Gorus TUSIAD this to become a major issue, the CHP or (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen other parties would have to challenge the Association), Istanbul, Turkey, April 1996.; AKP. Pressure might also come from the Ali Carkoglu and Gamze Avci, “An AKP's own constituency to take action. Analysis of the Turkish Electorate from a Regarding such issues as Cyprus, EU Geographical Perspective”, in Yilmaz conditions, and Turkey's relations with the Esmer and Sabri Sayari (Eds.), Politics, United States or Israel, the military might Parties and Elections in Turkey (Boulder, also again become a factor if it believes the CO: Lynn Rienner , 2002), pp.115-136. AKP is acting in too Islamist a fashion. 3. Ali Carkoglu, “Macroeconomic Another possibility of crisis could come Determinants of Electoral Support for from international criticism of government Incumbents in Turkey, 1950-1995”, New economic policies which could lead to a

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 2002) 40 Turkey's November 2002 Elections: A New Beginning?

Perspectives on Turkey, Vol.17, No.2, Siyaset” (Religion, Society and Politics in (1997), pp.75-96. Turkey) in Turkish, Turkish Economic and 4. Ali Carkoglu, “The Interdependence of Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) Politics and Economics in Turkey: Some Publications, Istanbul, 2000.; Ersin Findings at the Aggregate Level of Kalayciglu, “The Shaping of Political Analysis”, Bogazici Journal, Review of Preferences in Turkey: Coping with the Social, Economic and Administrative Post-Cold-War Era,” New Perspectives on Sciences, Vol.9, No.2, (1995), pp.85-108; Turkey, Vol.20, No.1 (1999), pp.47-76. Ustun Erguder, “Politics of Agricultural 6. Ali Carkoglu and Melvin J. Hinich, “An Price Policy in Turkey,” in Ergun Ozbudun Analysis of the Ideological Space and Aydin Ulusan, (Eds.) The Political Underlying Turkish Party Preferences,” Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol.1, No. 1 (NY: Holmes and Meier Publishers (Spring 2002), pp. 87-100. Ltd.,1980), pp.169-196.; A. A. Gurkan and 7. Ali Carkoglu, “The Turkish General H. Kasnakoglu, “The Political Economics Election of 24 December 1995,” Electoral of Agricultural Price Support in Turkey: An Studies, Vol.16, No.1 (1997), pp.86-95. Empirical Assessment”, Public Choice, 8. For a conceptualisation of the centre- Vol.70, No.3 (1991), pp. 277-298. periphery paradigm in Turkish politics see: 5. Ustun Erguder, Yilmaz Esmer and Ersin Mardin, Serif “Center Periphery Relations: Kalaycioglu, “Turk Toplumunun Degerleri” A Key to Turkish Politics?,” Deadalus, (Turkish Values) in Turkish, TUSIAD, Vol.2, No.1 (1973), pp.169-190. Istanbul,1991.; Ali Carkoglu, “The Turkish 9. Radikal, November 1, 2002, p.9. Party System in Transition: Party 10. Radikal, 23 September, 2002, p.6. Performance and Agenda Transformation,” 11. Milliyet daily newspaper, p.4.; See also Political Studies, Vol.46, No.3 (1998), Tarhan Erdem’s account of the results in pp.544-571.; Ali Carkoglu and Binnaz Radikal, October 1st, 2002, p.11. Toprak “Turkiye’de Din, Toplum ve

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