New Political Parties and the Reconfiguration of Turkey's Political Landscape

NO. 22 MAY 2020 Introduction New Political Parties and the Reconfigu- ration of Turkey’s Political Landscape Salim Çevik The recent emergence of two splinter parties from the Justice and Development Party (AKP) points to a deepening crisis within the party and growing discontent toward party leader and president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Although the leaders of the two new parties, Ali Babacan and Ahmet Davutoğlu, are both former high-ranking AKP politicians, they differ significantly in their style of politics and ideological leanings. Babacan is trying to position himself at the center of Turkey’s ideological spectrum and emphasize issues of good governance and the rule of law. Davutoğlu is aiming for the more conservative voters, focusing on the moral shortcomings of the current regime. Davutoğlu’s strategy has better chances in the short term, whereas Babacan is poised for a long game. The importance of both parties relies on their potential to attract votes from the AKP base. In a country that is deeply divided into two almost equal-sized camps that support Erdoğan and oppose him, even a small fraction of votes shifting from the AKP to the opposition can be a game changer. On March 11, former Deputy Prime Minis- The launching of the new parties fell ter Ali Babacan announced the formation short of expectations in terms of raising of his long-awaited political party. Former the public’s interest. Particularly DEVA President Abdullah Gül is known to be sup- attracted little attention on the day of its portive of the party, even though he and his founding. This was mostly due to public close associates did not have an official role fatigue, as its debut had been postponed in its formation. The party name, DEVA several times last year. Once it was officially (“remedy”), is also the acronym for the formed, the party could have generated Democracy and Progress Party. Earlier last interest, but the coronavirus epidemic December, former Minister of Foreign began dominating the public debate and Affairs (MFA) and later Prime Minister (PM) DEVA disappeared from the headlines. Ahmet Davutoğlu formed his own Future However, these parties still have more Party (GP). Both will compete for the elec- potential than other opposition parties torate that has been disappointed by the to attract votes from the AKP base. AKP – a group that is slowly but steadily Currently, the political system is domi- growing. nated by the ruling conservative-nationalist People’s Alliance, comprised of the AKP and hard to replicate. The AKP’s success was the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and the result of a series of economic and gov- the opposing Nation Alliance, composed ernance crises that discredited all the major of the secularist Republican People’s Party political parties. (CHP) and the centrist-nationalist Good One reason both DEVA and the GP were Party (IP). The Nation Alliance is supported recently formed is due to increased aware- by the Islamist Felicity Party (SP) and the ness that Turkey is currently going through pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party a similar governance problem, with the (HDP) on an ad hoc basis. What unites these potential to worsen. Amidst a deteriorating parties is their opposition to Erdoğan and economic crisis, the Syria foreign policy the presidential system. The divisions be- disaster, the huge influx of refugees, and tween the alliances had been so deep that heightened social tensions, Erdoğan’s swing votes moved within alliances and approval rates are falling. Moreover, un- almost never between them. decided voters now constitute one of the There are two reasons why the old largest voting blocs. Disagreements of opposition parties cannot draw more sup- Babacan and Davutoğlu with Erdoğan go port from the AKP. First, they do not appear back years, and the current formation of to be capable managers. Second, the coun- the new parties is closely linked to this try is deeply divided over identity issues, crisis. Thus, the fate of both parties will most significantly between the secularists be determined more by the performance and the conservatives, and the Turkish of Erdoğan than by their own actions. nationalists and the Kurdish political movement. This polarization has enabled the AKP to consolidate its votes, despite the Political Baggage of the Leaders emerging problems of governance and economy. However, the new splinter parties As senior members of past AKP govern- now present an option for disillusioned ments, both leaders’ records will have AKP supporters. Such voters can oppose an impact on their future. Compared to Erdoğan and defect from the AKP without Davutoğlu, Babacan has two considerable leaving the conservative camp. Given that advantages. Davutoğlu was the mastermind Erdoğan only reaches the required 50 of Turkey’s increased involvement in the percent vote threshold in the new system Middle East. Thus, he is largely associated when in alliance with the MHP, such a with the ill-planned Syrian quagmire – 3.6 defection could be detrimental to his rule. million Syrian refugees in Turkey is a daily Sensing the gravity of the threat, Erdoğan is reminder of that failed policy. The issue is heavily attacking both parties. becoming a major source of public discontent, as shown in the AKP’s electoral defeat in last year’s municipal elections. Potential of the New Parties In contrast, Babacan is remembered as the steward of a successful economic pro- In Turkish politics, splinter parties usually gram, a legacy that becomes ever more pre- fail to attract significant numbers of voters. cious in the current economic crisis, which Several senior figures from across the politi- he argues is due to deviation from his poli- cal spectrum have formed new parties cies. Among the array of opposition politi- with much fanfare, but they have failed to cians, Babacan has the most credibility attract voters. One exception, however, is regarding governance issues. the AKP, which was formed as a splinter Babacan’s second advantage over Davu- party from the Milli Görüs tradition in 2001 toğlu is his popularity among Kurdish and came to office within a year of its voters. The AKP’s slide into ethnic Turkish founding. Arguably, the circumstances for nationalism and the adaptation of a secu- the AKP victory were quite exceptional and rity-oriented paradigm toward the Kurdish SWP Comment 22 May 2020 2 question started during Davutoğlu’s term in turn, increase Davutoğlu’s visibility and as PM. Davutoğlu is also associated with stature. the cycle of violence and state repression in Babacan’s emphasis on technocratic Kurdish cities that followed the AKP’s elec- expertise is also visible on the list of the toral defeat on June 7, 2015. In contrast, party’s founders. There are several key Babacan was sidelined during that process bureaucrats, such as İbrahim Çanakcı, and might therefore still appeal to Kurdish former Undersecretary of Treasury, and voters. In fact, discontented Kurdish voters Birol Aydemir, former Head of the Turkish of the AKP are expected to constitute the Statistical Institute. However, DEVA fell largest voting bloc and the backbone of short of drawing political heavyweights. DEVA during this phase. Even among former AKP dissidents, the party includes only a handful, and not the most important ones. Whereas Babacan Ideologue vs. Technocrat aims to present himself as a team player, Davutoğlu’s style of politics is at the other Other factors distinguishing Babacan and end of the spectrum. Throughout his term Davutoğlu are their style of politics and as the MFA and PM, Davutoğlu performed their ideological leanings. Davutoğlu, a a one man show, as no one else was signifi- former academic, is more ideologically cantly visible. As a prominent academic oriented than Babacan. In Davutoğlu’s with a clear-cut worldview, Davutoğlu is worldview, Islam and conservative values known to be an overconfident person who constitute the core values. In contrast, does not listen to advice or different view- Babacan, though he personally follows a points, as he rarely doubts his own wisdom. conservative lifestyle, has a less ideological Throughout his tenure as the MFA, he approach to politics. He has a technocratic worked with a smaller than usual team touch and emphasizes his expertise on of advisors, often former students of his. economy management as being his greatest Given all these features, one can say that asset as a politician. Babacan tries to con- Davutoğlu’s style of politics greatly resem- nect with voters by focusing on the rule of bles Erdoğan’s. He is self-centered, plays law, good governance, and bread and butter on conservative values and identity-based issues. issues, and his style is confrontational and These different attitudes also shape their at times polarizing. In contrast, Babacan criticisms of the AKP. Whereas Babacan presents himself as an antidote to Erdoğan criticizes the authoritarian, conspiratorial, and the confrontational style of politics that and anti-Western turn that the AKP has has become his trademark. Thus, Babacan taken, Davutoğlu makes a moral critique can appeal to the segments of society that and focuses on individual corruption and are wary of Erdoğan’s fervent and polariz- increased nepotism. In a direct extension, ing politics. However, this also implies that Davutoğlu’s criticism of the AKP and Erdo- Babacan would not have the rousing, elec- ğan is more personal. He openly criticizes trifying effect on the masses that Erdoğan Erdoğan and his immediate family, where- has – and to an extent Davutoğlu. With his as Babacan shies away from such direct non-confrontational style and his decision critiques, aiming to avoid the wrath of the to avoid the cultural polarizations that government. Arguably, Davutoğlu’s per- dominate political life, Babacan will have sonal criticisms irritate Erdoğan and have difficulty mobilizing people.

Load more