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1 the Last Ottoman? : 2019 Local Elections in Turkey

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1 the Last Ottoman? : 2019 Local Elections in Turkey 1 The Last Ottoman? : 2019 local elections in Turkey Written by Leo Sikharulidze 04.04.2019 After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent unbarring of the border between Georgia and Turkey, Georgia’s southwestern neighbor once again emerged as an active geopolitical entity in the context of the newly regained independence of our nation. A number of key aspects underline the importance of maintaining good relations for Georgia with Turkey, more precisely, Turkey is the only neighboring state of Georgia with whom the official demarcation of the state border has been successfully agreed upon.1 Turkey is the second largest trading partner of Georgia, taking up to 8.7% of the total Georgian exports reaching 202.5 million US Dollars.2 Finally yet importantly, Turkey is the only NATO member state bordering Georgia. The above mentioned is a clear indicator that Georgia should closely follow the political developments in Turkey. The opposition in Turkey, after a long dominance of President Erdogan and his proposed political agenda, has finally reached an electoral breakthrough, however how effective this breakthrough will be depends on both sides future actions. The configuration between the main political forces for the 2019 local elections was somewhat similar to the composition for the 2018 general elections, more precisely, the ruling AKP remained faithful to its “People’s Alliance” with the Pan-Turkist MHP. The oppositional coalition of “Nation Alliance” engaged the 2019 local elections with a slightly altered anatomy, namely only the CHP and IYI remain in the coalition from the initial four (CHP, IYI, SP and DP) founding political parties. “On 4 July, having won 189 seats in total, the İYİ Party General Secretary Aytun Çıray announced that the Nation Alliance had been dissolved, citing the lack of a need for a post-election alliance.” 3 while “In response, the CHP's spokesperson Bülent Tezcan said that the election alliance was no longer technically necessary, but the union of alliance parties under a joint set 1http://css.ge/files/Papers/Nika_Samkharadze,Georgian_State_Border_%E2%80%93_Past_and_Present,__Sept.__ 2012_eng.pdf (accessed 04/04/2019) 2 https://businessgeorgia.ge/trade-partners-of-georgia/ (accessed 04/04/2019) 3 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/iyi-parti-millet-ittifaki-sona-erdi-40886342 (accessed 05/04/2019) 2 of fundamental values (such as separation of powers and the rule of law) would continue.” 4 CHP and IYI remained faithful to this declaration and according to the initial electoral results, they have made the right political decision to do so. The period leading up to the elections to say the least, was tense. There was even death. “Two members of the small Islamist Felicity Party, a polling station official and an election observer, were shot dead in Malatya province, a party spokesman said. Media reports said one person had been detained.” 5 The electoral atmosphere has been described as polarized, which can be explained by the fact that President Erdogan has been the most popular yet the most divisive Turkish Leader in recent years. For President Erdogan, these elections carried a special meaning since these were the first elections after the successful further consolidation of his grip over Turkey, many have argued that these elections would serve as an referendum. President Erdogan has actively campaigned and has been criticized for the use of the Christchurch Mosque Attack footage during his rallies (three Turkish citizens were wounded during the attack). President Erdogan went even further and compared the tragic events of Christchurch to the World War One Gallipoli campaign, “In more inflammatory comments, Erdogan also said that Australians and New Zealanders travelling to Turkey with anti-Muslim sentiments would be sent back in coffins, “like their grandfathers” were in the Gallipoli campaign.” 6 Economy played an important role in the election campaign and the numbers are there to understand why. “Inflation has jumped to 20% while unemployment stands at 11%. One-in- five young people are unemployed. Polls show economy and unemployment are among voters’ biggest concerns. Food prices have increased by nearly 30% in Turkey over the last year, according to the Turkish statistical office. Turkey's benchmark stocks index dropped more than 5% on Wednesday. That slide came after the government directed Turkish banks to withhold lira liquidity in order to defend the currency ahead of the elections.” 7 Steady economic growth has been one of the pillars to President Erdogan’s political prestige, ongoing economic difficulties is largely seen as a direct responsibility of ruling political elite which in turn has forced Erdogan to “cleanse” his political party, leading to “Fatigue Resignations”. As 4 https://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/chp-parti-sozcusu-bulent-tezcan-gundemimizde-kurultay-yok-221919.html (accessed 05/04/2019) 5 https://www.france24.com/en/20190331-turkish-voters-polls-critical-municipal-elections (accessed 05/04/2019) 6 https://globalnews.ca/news/5076478/turkey-erdogan-new-zealand-mosque-shootings/ (accessed 05/04/2019) 7 https://www.euronews.com/2019/03/28/why-have-turkey-s-local-elections-have-become-a-key-national-battle- euronews-answers (accessed 05/04/2019) 3 a result, seven AKP provincial chairpersons have resigned8 following President Erdogan’s call, including the mayor of Istanbul Kadir Topbas, who has been in office since 2004.9 As for the opposition and its electoral campaign, there have been certain tendencies that have shaped the main messages. Ironically, the oppositional rhetoric has been built upon the narrative proposed by President Erdogan. Heavily concentrating on depicting the local elections of 2019 as an attempt by foreigner powers to disrupt Turkey’s domestic stability, President Erdogan unintentionally gave the opposition the ability to present themselves as Turkish patriots. In order to achieve a patriotic public image, the opposition has actively waved Turkish flags instead of their party symbols to underline their positioning. “According to Dalay, the Nation Alliance has carried out a low-profile strategy, without promoting the political identities of the CHP and IYI Party - the parties comprising the bloc.” 10 The economic problems were an obvious soft underbelly of President Erdogan. The opposition did not hesitate to take advantage of it, exploiting the negative effects the economic trouble has caused for the citizens of Turkey, “The citizens who will vote in the upcoming local elections should take the economic issues into consideration, main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu has said.”11 The opposition’s arguments for criticizing President Erdogan’s economic policies has been further complimented by the refusal on behalf of President Erdogan to enter negotiations with IMF and instead approaching the Gulf states for investment calls. The 2019 local election, which will be the last election to be held until June 23rd of 2023 and its result has the potential to be claimed as a substantial win for the opposition. More than 57 million voters have elected 22 000 local councilors, 30 Metropolitan and 1,351 district mayors. Even though the ruling AKP has managed to attract more than half of the voters and claimed 51% of the total votes, the symbolism which is carried by the loss of control over the capital Ankara, Izmir and most importantly the possible loss of the largest city of Istanbul (The cradle of President Erdogan’s political career) cannot be overlooked. The economic side of this political battle is on the other hand substantial, cities controlled by the opposition generate more than 60% of the gross domestic product.12 Both sides have scored their own respective victories after this elections, the opposition has gained an psychological advantage by defeating President Erdogan in major cities, however the ruling AKP and its allies have guaranteed their control of Turkey until 2023 since it is safe to say that no early elections will take place. The 8 "AKP'deki istifaların perde arkası!". www.sozcu.com.tr. (accessed 05/04/2019) 9 "Kadir Topbaş istifa etti.. Ak Parti'nin yeni başkan adayı o mu olacak?". www.hurriyet.com.tr. (accessed 05/04/2019) 10 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/economy-security-spotlight-turks-set-local-polls- 190330150248508.html (accessed 05/04/2019) 11 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/chp-tells-voters-to-mind-economy-141662 (accessed 05/04/2019) 12 http://time.com/5564174/erdogan-turkey-election-results/ (accessed 05/04/2019) 4 fact that President Erdogan built his electoral campaign on portraying the opposition as a foreign controlled destructive force brings even more humiliation and serves as a testament to his failure to convince the Turkish public, media being largely controlled by the ruling political party, makes the defeat even more bitter and complete. There is a positive aspect, which must be mentioned, more precisely, the election results are a clear indicator, that despite setbacks, democracy in Turkey is alive and well. .
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