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AFRICA “The Return of the National Army to Kidal... Is... a Strong

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AFRICA “The Return of the National Army to Kidal... Is... a Strong AFRICA Mali Army Returns to Kidal after Six Year Absence OE Watch Commentary: Malian armed forces recently returned to the northern city of Kidal six years after effectively being driven out of the region. The announcement was one of the highlights of the Algiers Peace Accord Follow-up Committee held in Bamako in January 2020. According to the committee, “the return of the reconstituted army to Kidal will be a reality beginning January 24, 2020.” Although it took another few weeks to fulfill the mandate, the units that entered Kidal in mid-February, known as “reconstituted” include former rebels integrated into the Malian army in accordance with the 2015 Algiers peace agreement. The return of the army to Kidal is intended as a prelude to the deployment of other reconstituted units to Ménaka, Gao and Timbuktu. There is a lot at stake. According to Africa News, Kidal, 1,500 km northeast of Bamako, is the Tuareg cultural stronghold and the historical cradle of the most influential Tuareg clans. It is also a region that has been Malian soldiers stand in formation during the closing ceremony of Exercise Flintlock in Bamako, marginalized since Malian independence in 1960, and where Mali, November 20, 2008. the various Tuareg rebellions were born. Source: Staff Sergeant Samuel Bendet, U.S. Africa Command via Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Malian_Soldiers.jpg, Public domain Since the federal government suffered a significant military defeat in May 2014, Kidal has been controlled by the Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA), a Tuareg-dominated alliance of former rebel armed groups. The CMA is a signatory to the 2015 Algiers Agreement with an alliance of pro-government armed groups, called the Platform. The return of the reconstituted Malian army made up of the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) and ex-combatants is a necessary positive step for several reasons. First, according to local media outlets, Malian public opinion towards the government and the armed forces has become more and more negative in recent months as the Malian army suffered a number of battlefield setbacks. The inability of the armed forces to beat insurgents, secure territory and provide security to the population has been a major stumbling block in the government’s efforts to maintain credibility and hence order. The move back into Kidal could reverse that negative trend as it is in effect regaining lost territory and restoring national sovereignty over part of the country that until recently had no real federal presence. Second, the move to put the Malian army back in Kidal might be a small positive step for a renewed trust in foreign military and political efforts, i.e., the UN mission and the French Operation Barkhane. Many Malians also believe that the French forces were specifically keeping the Malian army out of Kidal the last six years to establish a partnership with the Toureg and other elements governing Kidal to secure the country’s natural resources for France’s benefit. Finally, the article concluded that the return of a federal presence to Kidal could help regional stability and relations between Mali and its neighbors. The issue has been causing tension as Mali’s neighbors have claimed that Kidal served as a rear base for jihadist attacks into neighboring countries. End OE Watch Commentary (Billingsley) “The return of the national army to Kidal... is... a strong affirmation of a restoration of authority of the Malian state...” OE Watch | March 2020 66 AFRICA Continued: Mali Army Returns to Kidal after Six Year Absence Source: “L’armée malienne est de retour dans la ville symbole de Kidal (The Malian army is back in the symbolic city of Kidal),” AfricaNews, 13 February 2020. https://fr.africanews.com/2020/02/13/mali-l-armee-vient-d-arriver-dans-la-ville-symbole-de-kidal- commandement/ The Malian army returned on Thursday to Kidal (north), a symbolic city from which it had been absent for years and where its return is supposed to demonstrate the restoration of state sovereignty over the territory... In a context of serious security deterioration in Mali and the Sahel, the return of the national army to Kidal, today under the control of ex- Tuareg rebels, is anticipated as a strong affirmation of a restoration of authority of the Malian state, which is no longer exercised over large areas of the country. It is also supposed to give the appearance of reconciliation in the country at war since 2012. The units that entered Kidal, known as “reconstituted”, include former rebels integrated into the Malian army in accordance with the peace agreement of Algiers of 2015. The return of the Malian army to Kidal must be a prelude to the deployment of other “reconstituted” units in Ménaka, Gao and Timbuktu. The implementation of the Algiers agreement, with its provisions for the integration of ex-combatants, as well as the recovery of the authority of the State are considered as political components essential for an end to the crisis, in more than the purely military action carried out by the Malian, French, African and UN forces. Mali has been confronted since 2012 with separatist, Salafist and jihadist insurgencies and inter-community violence which has left thousands of people dead and hundreds of thousands displaced. Departing from the north of the country, the violence spread to the center and to neighboring countries, Burkina Faso and Niger. Kidal, 1,500 km northeast of Bamako, is the Tuareg cultural stronghold and the historical cradle of the most influential clans. It is also a region that has been marginalized since Malian independence and where the various Tuareg rebellions were born. The Malian army had not recovered since May 2014. A visit by the Prime Minister at the time, Moussa Mara, had given rise to fighting which had resulted in his heavy defeat against the rebels. Kidal has since been controlled by the Coordination of Movements of Azawad ( CMA ), a Tuareg-dominated alliance of former rebel armed groups. The CMA is a signatory to the 2015 Algiers agreement with an alliance of pro-government armed groups, called the Platform. The conditions for the deployment of “reconstituted” Malian forces in Kidal were the subject of months of negotiations between the CMA , the Malian state and its foreign partners. Yvan Guichaoua, researcher at the University of Kent, underlines the importance of the return to Kidal. “There are many symbolic obstacles that must be removed to create the minimum cohesion required to form a viable counterterrorism front, and the return of forces to Kidal provided for in the peace agreement was one of those obstacles,” he said. The situation in Kidal is also a source of strong tension for Mali’s neighbors who suspect or denounce alliances between separatists and jihadists. For them, Kidal served as a rear base for jihadist attacks. Kidal also gives rise to accusations against... France, because of its presumed links with the Tuareg rebels... These accusations appear in speeches hostile to the French presence, [which have] become louder in recent months. OE Watch | March 2020 67.
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