MALI CRISIS: A MIGRATION PERSPECTIVE

June 2013

Wrien by Diana Carer Edited by Sarah Harris Review Commiee Patrice Quesada Peter Van der Auweraert Research Assistance Johanna Klos Ethel Gandia ! ! !! ! ! ! ! !! Birak Dawra UmmalAbid Smaracamp ! ! I-n-Salah Laayoune ! June 2013 ● www.iom.int ● [email protected] CRISIS: A MIGR!!ATION PERSPECTIVE ! ! Smara ! Dakhlacamp Reggane Lemsid ! Illizi ! Tmassah ! BirLehlou ! Pre-crisis Patterns and Flows Marzuq

! ! ! Chegga Arak EUROPE BirMogrein Malian Diaspora ! 6 68,7863 Ghat 2,531 MALIANS  FRANCE ● 2010 ASYLUM SEEKERS ! Jan - Dec 2012 Djanet ! Malian Diaspora Tajarhi 185,144 301,027 21,5893  SPAIN ● 2010

! TOTAL MALIAN CROSS BORDER MOVEMENTS TOTAL INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS) InAmguel INTO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES ● as of May 2013 INSIDE MALI ● as of April 2013 228,918 as of 14 Jan 2013 ALGERIA

TOTAL MALIAN REFUGEES 176,144 ! ! ! ! Tamanrasset FderikZouirat as of May 2013 30,000 Malian Returnees from Libya12 144,329 as of 10 Jan 2013 as of Dec 2012 11,248 assisted by IOM 4 TOTAL OTHER MOVEMENTS OF MALIANS 9,000 as of May 2012 MALI 1,500 Malian Refugees 10 as of 1 Apr 2013  registered with UNHCR Malian Diaspora 3 ! 1,500 as of 10 Jan 2013 12,815 Malian Diaspora MAURITANIA ● 2010 Djado 69,7903

! Malian Diaspora NIGER ● 2010 Atar 17,5023 SENEGAL ● 2010 ! Malian Diaspora 9 ! 3 Malian Diaspora ! Malian Diaspora 68,295 15,624 Refugees  BURKINA FASO ● 2010 3 15,2763 133,464 9 5 10,000 Malians ● 2010 NIGERIA ● 2010 2,497 Asylum Seekers  ! Malian Diaspora as of 3 Apr 2012 inside Mali ● as of Jan 2012 STRANDED AT ALGERIAN BORDER 440,9603 Araouane COTE D’IVOIRE ● 2010 MAURITANIA ! ! Malian Diaspora Malian Diaspora 1 Arlit 3 6,0113 ! 31,306 Tidjikdja 28,645 IDPs  GABON ● 2010 REP. OF CONGO ● 2010 H as of Oct 2012 Anefis !

74,108 Malian Refugees 8 Legends and Description 1 as of 5 May 2013  registered with UNHCR 21,764 IDPs  as of Oct 2012 Movement of irregular migrants ! ! 54,259 as of 10 Jan 2013 ! Gourma-Rharous Bourem ! ! ! from Africa to Northern Africa MagtaLajar ! ! Agadez H Ber 1 ! Cross-border movements 11 ! RaselMa and Europe through Mali ! ! 25,977 IDPs  ! Kiffa AyounelAtrous Nema Goundam ! as of Aug 2012 Dire ! ! H Internal movement of displaced Human trafficking going through ! Timbedra ! Kaedi Niafunke Menaka Mali 13 14 ! Gossi ! populations Lere ! !! ! Ansongo ! !! N'Tillit ! Inabao ! Anderamboukane NIGER Movement of Malians entering ! M'Bera Youvarou ! ! ! ! Regions affected by human NioroduSahel Nara !Nampala Yelimane ! ! ! Europe (Asylum Seekers) Koundel ! ! 1 ! ! trafficking activities ! 1 Douentza Selibaby 54,084 IDPs Konna ! ! ! 27,983 IDPs  Gandafabou ! ! ! as of ! ! 1 Sokolo Apr 2013 ! ! as of Apr 2013 ! !!! !! Tahoua Seasonal movements of Movement of Malian returnees 5,252 IDPs  Diema !Diabaly Koutougou !! Abala Diboli as of Apr 2013 ! ! Sangha Fer!rerio pastoralist and labour migrants from Libya ! H HSevare ! !! ! Mangaize Niono ! GoromGorom ! ! Bandiagara Damba ! Bankass ! ! Dori ! Nguigmi ! ! Tillaberi Goure Didieni Djenne Djib!!o !! !! Mao Bafoulabe ! ! Madaoua Mali ! Urbanization tendencies ! ! Mentao Goudebo ! ! Tambacounda Banamba ! BirniNkonni Zinder Goure ! SEGOU ! ! ! Ouenkoro Ouahigouya ! \! 7 ! H San Tominian ! ! ! 50,515 Malian Refugees  Maradi ! Bol ! Sebba 1 Niamey Diffa Kita ! as of 20 May 2013  registered with UNHCR ! KOULIKORO ! ! ! 46,817 IDPs  REFUGEE! S LOCATIONS ! ! ! Camp ! Settlement ! Centre Undetermined SENEGAL Tougan ! Kaya 49,7D4o8s asos of 10 Jan 2013 Sokoto 1 H as of Apr 2013 Yako Bogande Katsina ! ! 77,501 IDPs ! B! URKINA FASO Nguru Gashua Satadougou  ! ! ! ! \! Nouna ! !OUAGBoAulsDa OUGOU 7 ! as of Apr 2013 Koutiala ! ! Kedougou ! Ziniare 5,000 Malians  Koundara ! ! ! Dedougou \! BirninKebbi ! ! as of ! Reo ! 20 May 2013 ! ! Zorgo Sources: 1. CMP, 2013a; 2. IOM internal documents; 3. IOM, 2013h; 4. IOM, 2011b; 5. OCHA, 2013d; Solenzo Somgan! de Koupela ! ! Gusau \! Kangaba ! Mali ! FadaNgourma Diapaga 6. UNHCR, 2012a; 7. UNHCR, 2013a; 8. UNHCR, 2013c; 9. UNHCR, 2013e; 10. UNHCR, 2013f; 8 ! ! 7 Kano ! ! ! ! 49,975 Malian Refugees  Gaya 11. Ballo, 2009; 12. UNSC, 2012; 13. IRIN, 2012a!; 14. USDOS, 2012 Maiduguri NDJAMENA  ! Gaoual ! Tenkodogo 3,991 Nigerien Returnees Dutse ! Potiskum Damaturu Bougouni as of 22 Apr 2013  registered with UNHCR Manga ! Azare ! ! SIKASSO as of 20 May 2013 ! ! Sapouy ! Funtua Bama ! Tongue ! !! H 38,776 as of 10 Jan 2013 Koko Spatial data sources: http://geoportal.unhcr.org/arcgis/rest/services/unhcr/Refugee_Camp/MapServer; ! ! Labe Dinguiraye ! ! ! ! ! http://geoportal.logcluster.org/; http://www.naturalearthdata.com/ 8 Faragouaran BoboDioulasso Po ! Pita  ! ! Leo Kandi Zaria ! 26 Malian Refugees 1 Bawku Orodara Diebougou ! Telimele as of 11 !Jan 2013  registered with UNHCR 13,004 IDPs  BENIN ! ! ! Bolgatanga This map is for illustrative purpose only. Names and boundaries on this map do not imply official endorsement or Dabola as of Apr 2013 ! ! Dalaba Banfora acceptanc!e by IOM. Biu ! Maroua ! ! ! ! Kaduna ! ! ! Fria Mamou Mango Kontagora ! ! ! ! Gaoua Natitingou Bauchi Gombe Mubi Bongor ! ! ! 8 ©IOM, 2013 ! Faranah Wa  ! Kumo ! GUINEA 20 Malian Refugees Jos Guider ! ! GHANA as of 11 Jan 2012  registered with UNHCR ! ! ! Djougou \! ! ! Ferkessedougou ! Minna ! ! Odienne ! Garoua ! Korhogo Numan ! ! ! Forecariah ! Tamale Yendi ! ! ! 2 Parakou ! Pala SIERRA Kerouane Bassar Kelo Kissidougou 4,000 Malians  ! Yola Langui ! ! \! NIGERIA Bida ! ! as of Nov 2012 Sokode ! Jalingo Makeni ! ABUJAKeffi LEONE Gueckedou ! ! !! ! Beyla ! ! ! ! \! !Ma!ce!nta!! Sotouboua Ilorin Lafia Koidu Voinjama ! CÔTE D'IVOIRE Ogbomosho FREETOWN Kouankan Touba ! ! !! ! ! ! ! TOGO Oyo ! Mbe ! Nzerekore Bondoukou ! Oshogbo ! Bo Seguela ! Iseyin ! ! Makurdi Kontcha ! Bouake ! Kenema ! !! Wukari ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Table of Contents

T TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acronyms 4 Introducon 5 1 PART I: MIGRATION TRENDS AND FLOWS IN MALI PRIOR TO JANUARY 2012 6

1. Internal Migraon Trends: Increased urbanizaon and food insecurity 7

2. Circular Migraon: Important and complex flows including pastoralist movements 8

3. Migraon Routes through Mali: From cross-border movements to smuggling and trafficking of people 8

4. Foreign Populaons in Mali: Centred on regional migraon 9

5. Malians Abroad: A significant diaspora 9 2 PART II: MIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRISIS AND RESPONSE IN MALI AND BEYOND 11

1. Large Scale Internal Displacement 13

2. Cross-Border Flows and Impact on Neighbouring Countries and Beyond 15

3. Other Crisis-affected Mobility Paerns and Flows 17

4. Response to the Crisis in Mali and Beyond 18

5. Post-Crisis Transion and Stabilizaon 19 3 PART III: RECOMMENDATIONS 20

1. Ensure a Two-Pronged Approach: Humanitarian assistance and protecon as well as support for transion and recovery 20

2. Strengthen Informaon Collecon and Management 20

3. Establish a Regional Approach to the Migraon Crisis Affecng Mali 20

4. Support Stabilizaon and Transion Acvies as an Immediate Strategic Goal inside Mali 21

5. Plan for Durable Soluons, Including Return and Reintegraon Acvies, in a Careful and Strategic Manner 21

6. Invest in Building Peace and an Open Democrac Process 21

7. Address Migraon and Border Management in Mali and in the Region from a Security Perspecve, and Complement with Livelihood and Income-Generaon Support for Border Communies 22

References 23

page 3 Mali Crisis: A Migration Perspective Internaonal Organizaon for Migraon

A ACRONYMS

ACTED Agency for Technical Cooperaon and UEMOA West African Economic and Monetary Development Union AGIR Sahel Global Alliance for Resilience Iniave - UNCTAD United Naons Conference on Trade Sahel and Development CAP Consolidated Appeal Process UNDESA United Naons Department of Economic and Social Affairs CERPOD Centre d'Etudes et de Recherche sur la Populaon pour le Développement UNDP United Naons Development Programme CMP Commission on Populaon Movements UNEP United Naons Environment CNCR Naonal Commission for Refugees Programme CRS Catholic Relief Services UNHCR United Naons High Commission for DTM Displacement Tracking Matrix Refugees ECHO European Commission, DG for UNOM United Naons Office for Mali Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protecon UNSC United Naons Security Council ECOWAS Economic Community of West African UNWTO United Naons World Tourism States Organisaon EPAM Enquête Emploi Permanente Auprès USDOS United States Department of State des Ménages WASH Water, Sanitaon and Hygiene FEWSNET Famine Early Warning Systems Network WFP World Food Programme GDP Gross Domesc Product GNI Gross Naonal Income IDP Internally Displaced Person IDMC Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre IOM Internaonal Organizaon for Migraon MINUSMA Muldimensional Integrated Stabilizaon Mission for Mali MNLA Naonal Movement for the Liberaon of MPLA Mouvement Populaire de Libéraon de l’Azawad MSF Médecins Sans Fronères NRC Norwegian Refugee Council OCHA United Naons Office for Coordinaon of Humanitarian Affairs OECD Organisaon for Economic Co- operaon and Development SAARA Service d’Aide et Assistance aux Réfugiés et Apatrides page 4 Introduction

I INTRODUCTION

This paper aims to broaden policy discussions and research on and malnutrion in 2012 (due to a drought in 2011, high food the Mali crisis through a disncve analysis of the various prices and low agricultural producon) and the chronic nature paerns of human mobility that have been generated or of food insecurity, malnutrion and erosion of resilience in the affected due to the crisis in Mali since January 2012. It does so region (UN, 2013b). In addion, the crisis in Libya in 2011 and by drawing upon a range of exisng materials and data, the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire in 2010 have both had wide- bringing them together in one framework focusing on the ranging impacts on the region. All of this has resulted in migraon dimensions of the crisis. In line with IOM’s Migraon growing insecurity and complex migratory flows characterized Crisis Operaonal Framework (MCOF), recently approved by by increasing levels of internal displacement, refugee move- Member States at the IOM Council in November 2012,1 this ments, and the disrupon of exisng migraon paerns in the paper uses the “migraon crisis” approach to comprehensive- country. ly analyse the crisis in Mali through a migraon lens. This In order to construct a comprehensive picture of human paper expands on IOM report “Mali Migraon Crisis at a mobility flows and paerns in and around Mali, this paper will: Glance” from March 2013 (IOM, 2013d). This is intended as a working paper, and may therefore be updated in the coming PART I Provide a snapshot of the migraon environment in months. Mali prior to January 2012, highlighng migraon drivers as well as paerns and trends such as increasing urbanizaon and food insecurity, circular migraon including pastoralist movements, transit “MIGRATION CRISIS” APPROACH migraon through Mali, and the large Malian diaspora. IOM uses the term “migraon crisis” as a way to refer PART II Take a closer look at the crisis from January 2012 to and analyse the oen large-scale and unl today, exploring the complex internal and unpredictable migraon flows and mobility paerns external mobility consequences of the conflict, caused by conflict or natural disasters. These typically burdens on the displaced and host communies, and involve significant vulnerabilies for individuals and challenges that restrict or hinder movement and affected communies and generate acute and longer- return, as well as the current humanitarian response term migraon management challenges. A migraon and issues regarding the post-crisis transion and crisis may be slow in onset, can have natural or man- stabilizaon in Mali. made causes and can take place internally or across borders. By capturing paerns of human mobility in PART III Idenfy relevant recommendaons for dealing with their full complexity and revealing a more nuanced the different migraon-related issues within Mali and picture of the vulnerabilies and condions that the region, including an approach that includes emerge in the context of different forms of humanitarian aid as well as transion and recovery involuntary movement, a migraon crisis analysis support; strengthened informaon collecon and allows policymakers to develop an integrated management; planning for durable soluons for response to the crisis, including humanitarian, those displaced; supporng stabilizaon and transi- migraon management, transion and recovery, on; invesng in the peace process; and addressing peace and security, and development concerns. migraon and border management.

Mali has been in a state of turmoil since the beginning of 2012, fuelled by the armed conflict and on-going insecurity in Mali, which has prompted a significant migraon crisis. The conflict started in January 2012 with renewed fighng in northern Mali between Tuareg secessionist and radical Islamist groups on one side and government forces on the other, leading to a military coup d’état in March 2012. This crisis has had far-reaching impacts on a region already challenged by other crises such as recent acute food insecurity

1 The MCOF document (MC/2355) was approved through Resoluon 1243 at the IOM Council in November 2012 (IOM, 2012a; IOM, 2012b).

page 5 Mali Crisis: A Migration Perspective Internaonal Organizaon for Migraon

PART I: MIGRATION TRENDS AND FLOWS 1 IN MALI PRIOR TO JANUARY 2012

Mali has a long history of emigraon, and has also become an migraon including pastoral and nomadic movements. This important transit point for migratory flows within the region secon will examine different aspects of internal and cross- and beyond. The country is characterized by migraon trends border migraon paerns in Mali prior to the crisis that began that range from cultural pracces that promote migraon as a in January 2012. rite of passage for young men, to circular and seasonal

permanently or seasonally. Mostly recently, severe drought in 2011 generated acute food insecurity across the Sahel region, leading to a significant decline in agricultural producon in Mali. Since the Malian economy is mainly based on agriculture, environmental changes can have significant impacts on livelihoods, parcularly in the rural areas. For example, substanal outward migraon from Mali occurred following severe droughts in 1973 and 1984, which together caused 40% of the populaon in the most affected areas (mostly men) to migrate. Of these, 70% migrated out of Mali, which inevitably had repercussions on the agricultural sector due to the depleted labour force (Ballo, 2009). At the same me, the financial support of migrants may have helped to migate the negave impacts of these droughts (IRIN, 2006). MIGRATION DRIVERS IN MALI Conflicts and disputes: The Sahel has experienced a Factors that drive migraon in Mali include interrelated significant number of conflicts in the post-colonial era, economic and environmental pressures, as well as the from large-scale wars to small-scale disputes between impact of recent conflicts in the region: communies or localized fighng. When Mali gained independence in 1960, the North was united with the Economic factors: Mali is one of the poorest countries in largely darker-skinned African south. Since then, the world, with 43.6% of its populaon below the government power has been concentrated in the hands naonal poverty line (World Bank, 2013). Poverty levels of ethnic groups from the South, who allegedly neglected are parcularly high in rural areas, where the majority of the northern populaons and exploited the resources of migrants originate from. Unemployment in Mali was northern regions. This has led to aggravated tensions 9.6% in 2011 and 15.4% for those aged 15-39, which can between the South and the North of Mali (Blair, 2013). be aributed to high populaon growth (3.6% a year), Conflicts in neighbouring countries that receive large low economic growth, migraon out of rural areas, and number of Malian migrants can prompt their return, as lack of training and educaon possibilies (African seen in the recent war in Libya that led to the return of Economic Outlook, 2012). In addion, the post-2010 an esmated 30,000 Malians (UNSC, 2012).2 This conflict elecon crisis in Cote d’Ivoire and the 2011 Libya crisis also led to the proliferaon of arms in the region and the contributed to increased prices in oil and food, further freezing of Libyan investments in West Africa, which straining the resources of local populaons. These inevitably affected prices of commodies and local economic factors have led to both internal and external economies (UNSC, 2012). In addion, cross-border migraon of Malians, whose remiances help to support migraon can also be a source of tension between local economies, meet the needs of families, and transhumant livestock breeders and inhabitants in somemes provide capital to set up small enterprises. pastoral areas (UNEP, 2011). Environmental factors: In recent years, chronic droughts 2 In 2011, IOM assisted in the return of over 212,000 migrants from throughout the Sahel region have led to large Libya to Sub-Saharan Africa, including 11,248 Malians (IOM, 2012a; movements of people on a regular basis, either IOM, 2011b).

page 6 Part I: Migration trends and flows in Mali prior to January 2012

1. Internal Migraon3 Trends: Increased families have reportedly moved from tradionally coon- urbanizaon and food insecurity producing areas (Kouala and Yorosso circles) experiencing reduced availability of pastures for livestock and increasing Bamako and other urban areas were the major desnaon land disputes, to other agricultural areas that have been more points for internal migrants, with an increasing trend towards recently developed (Yanfolila and Kolondieba circles) (Ballo, urbanizaon in Mali in the years before the outbreak of the 2009). conflict in 2012 (World Bank, 2013). In 2011, 35% of the Malian populaon lived in urban areas (UNDESA, 2011). The most important migraon flows were towards Bamako; in 2004, 33% of the city’s populaon were migrants (Ballo, Mali at a Glance 2009). The proporon of the urban populaon is expected to rise to over 60% of the total populaon by 2024 (World Bank, Populaon 15,370,000 (2010) 2013). Before the conflict, Malians migrated internally mainly in order to live closer to their family members and to pursue Populaon growth 3.6% per year (2011) professional and educaonal opportunies. According to the Land area 1,240,192 sq. km 2004 Survey on Permanent Employment of Households Populaon density 10.5 per sq. km (2009) (Enquête Emploi Permanente Auprès des Ménages, EPAM) carried out in Bamako as well as in other urban centres, Major cies Bamako, Ségou, Mop, Kayes, Sikasso, Koulikoro, Timbuktu, women were most likely to migrate for family reunificaon Gao whereas men were more likely to migrate internally for Urban populaon 34.9% (2011) studies or professional reasons (Ballo, 2009). In the rural areas, migraon was predominantly for family reunificaon Urban annual growth rate 5.0% per year (2005-2010) purposes. There are also notable paerns of internal Major ethnic groups Bambara and Malinké (48.8%), movements of children, as many children are commonly Peulh (Fulhani) (11%), Senoufo placed in foster families to connue their educaon and and Minianka (9.6%), Soninké (7%), Songhai (7%), Tuareg and vocaonal training, which can put some of them at increased Maure (5%), Dogon (4.4%), Bozo risk of exploitaon and violence (IOM internal documents). (2.8%), Diawara (1%), and Xaasongaxango (Khassonke) (1%) Internal migraon paerns have historically and culturally been more seasonal and of short duraon based on the Religion Around 90% of Malians pracce Islam, 6% tradional beliefs, and economic possibilies offered by the cies, and the 4% Catholic or Protestant opportunity to diversify skills and incomes and thus also adapt Chrisanity to the climac difficules in the region. However, over the Median age 16.3 (2010) past few years, this tradional and seasonal migraon has been replaced by a more permanent rural to urban migraon Life expectancy at birth 51.9 (2012) of farmers, herders and fishermen (UNEP, 2011). This GDP 10.59 billion USD (2011) urbanizaon trend was fostered also by the larger context of GNI per capita (Atlas method) 4 610 USD (2011) severe food insecurity across the Sahel region, which by 2011 Human Development Index 175 out of 187 (2011) had developed into an acute crisis with pockets of famine. While difficult to fully assess in the current context, this food Unemployment 9.6%, and 15.4% for 15-39 year crisis has clearly influenced mobility paerns. Pastoralists olds (2011) groups have been parcularly affected given their dependence Border countries Mauritania, Algeria, Niger, on livestock, impacng in parcular on their health and Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal nutrion status in a context of limited access to basic health care. Farmers in the Sahel region have also experienced the stark impact of the drought cycle on their livelihoods and their Sources: African Economic Outlook, 2012; Minority Rights Group resilience. Mobility induced by the drought towards urban Internaonal, 2007; UN Data, 2013; UNDESA, 2011; UNDESA, centres has placed addional pressure on the infrastructure 2012; World Bank, 2013; ECHO, 2013 and services available in urban areas. At the same me, it is important to note that there were also strong rural to rural migraon tendencies in Mali, given its 3 Internal migraon is “a movement of people from one area of a country to largely agricultural economy. Internal migraon flows vary another area of the same country for the purpose or with the effect of from one region to another based on the type of poverty establishing a new residence. This migraon may be temporary or (savings, income levels, living condions or opportunies permanent. Internal migrants move but remain within their country of origin (e.g. rural to urban migraon)” (IOM, 2011a, p. 51). available), while the seasonal migraon paerns from one region to another also vary according to the different 4 The Atlas conversion factor reduces the impact of exchange rate fluctuaons agricultural acvies in each region. For example, enre in the cross-country comparison of naonal incomes for the Gross Naonal Income (GNI).

page 7 Mali Crisis: A Migration Perspective Internaonal Organizaon for Migraon

2. Circular Migraon:5 Important and complex flows facilitate both irregular migraon9 and the illicit flows of including pastoralist movements goods. Mali is a vast territory with limited State presence in the remote areas of the country. During the 2011 Libya crisis, The high level of outward and inward movements between a large number of small arms and weapons were able to pass Mali and neighbouring western African countries, in parcular unnoced into neighbouring countries. The outbreak of Côte d’Ivoire, reflects the importance of circular migraon for conflict in Mali can also be partly linked to the possible the Malian populaon. In the delta region of Mali, one third of involvement of Tuareg returnees, who had fought as the rural workforce migrates during the dry seasons from the mercenaries alongside Libyan troops (BBC, 2012; BBC, 2011). rural areas to the cies, as highlighted above but also outside Prior to the conflict in Libya, Chadian and Mauritanian of Mali in search of employment (UNEP, 2011). Tradionally, authories had been reinforcing borders and dispatching seasonal labour migraon from the arid parts of Mali includes special military units to track movements, while Mali and labour migraon to plantaons and mines in Cote d’Ivoire, Niger had both appealed to the internaonal community for Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal. The seasonal and circular assistance in order to beer secure and protect their borders. migraon has long been considered a posive adaptaon This situaon illustrates the lack of naonal and regional strategy to climate variability in the region, including coordinaon mechanisms, as well as capacity and tools pastoralists and nomadic groups who move in search of beer needed to effecvely manage borders, including the flow of land, pastures, or water (Ballo, 2009). Approximately 500,000 large and frequent cross-border movements of Tuaregs and other pastoralist groups in Mali, such as Soninke, undocumented migrant workers (UNSC, 2012). Maure and Peuls, move along tradional routes from the North to the South of Mali, as well as towards coastal These irregular migraon and smuggling flows have grown countries and western Africa (UNEP, 2011). These processes since the beginning of the 1990s, using exisng illegal have been facilitated by the ease of travel between ECOWAS contraband routes (for drugs, arms, cigarees) within the countries due to the lack of a visa requirement for the cizens region (Carnegie, 2012). The flourishing flows of both illicit of its member states (Ballo, 2009). While difficult to fully goods and irregular migrants permied the emergence of assess in the current context, the current food crisis across the carriers specializing in off-road transport and increased the Sahel has influenced these circular mobility paerns. corrupon of customs and immigraon officials. Compeon Pastoralist groups have been parcularly affected given their over the control of smuggling routes and the reported dependence on livestock, impacng in parcular on their tolerance of some government officials towards criminal health and nutrion status in a context of limited access to acvity are seen as factors which have contributed toward the basic health care. establishment of extremist groups in Mali (Lacher, 2012). Recently, kidnapping has also been a major source of revenue for criminal and terrorist networks within the region. These factors combined have allowed organized crime to wield 3. Migraon Routes through Mali: From cross- 6 increasing power and polical influence in the country border movements to smuggling and trafficking (Carnegie, 2012). of people7

Mali has been an important regional transit point for cross- border movement and trade. The country does not have strict 5 Circular migraon is “the fluid movement of people between countries, immigraon policies, perhaps due to the interest of the Malian including temporary or long-term movement which may be beneficial to all government in supporng regional integraon and ease of involved, if occurring voluntarily and linked to the labour needs of countries movement throughout the region. Naonals from the 15 of origin and desnaon” (IOM, 2011a, p. 19). countries of the Economic Community of West African States 6 Smuggling is “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a (ECOWAS) have the right to enter and reside in Mali without a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State visa or resident permit for 90 days, as no legislaon or Party of which the person is not a naonal or a permanent resident” (IOM, regulaons governing the acquision of residence permits in 2011a, p. 92). Mali has been put in place. Mali also has several bilateral 7 Trafficking in persons is “the recruitment, transportaon, transfer, agreements with other African countries, perming naonals harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or from those countries to enter its territories without visas. other forms of coercion, of abducon, of fraud, of decepon, of the abuse of power or of a posion of vulnerabilies or of the giving or receiving of These immigraon policies, combined with its geographical payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over locaon, have also made Mali an aracve transit point for another person, for the purpose of exploitaon” (IOM, 2011a, p. 99). irregular migrants heading to Europe,8 whether crossing the 8 Mali has convenons with Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, desert into North Africa or travelling via sea routes from Cameroon, and Libya. There are also convenons with France and Spain, Senegal, Mauritania or Libya (Ballo, 2009). These same factors although these do not necessarily permit free entry. There are also have also unfortunately contributed to the use of Mali as a agreements to remove visa requirements for Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, transit point for illegal trade. Limited capacies for data Cameroon, Cuba, Macao, Hong-Kong, Gambia and Chad collecon and idenficaon and the porous borders stretching 9 Irregular migraon is “movement that takes place outside the regulatory for thousands of kilometres are addional factors that norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries” (IOM, 2011a, p. 54). page 8 Part I: Migration trends and flows in Mali prior to January 2012

Consequently, Mali has been increasingly characterized by a given that very lile informaon exists, and most of it is high level of human smuggling and trafficking of Malians and outdated or is only based on general migraon paerns. other naonalies for the purpose of sexual exploitaon and According to the Naonal Commission for Refugees forced labour. The country has been a source, transit and (Commission naonale chargée des réfugiés, CNCR), the desnaon country for human trafficking. Some of the number of refugees10 and asylum seekers11 in Mali since 2003 irregular migrants who travel through the region in hopes of had remained relavely stable, fluctuang between 16,000 to reaching Europe are at risk of being trafficked (Ballo, 2009). 13,000 people (Ballo, 2009). As of January 2012, there were While there are no figures available to determine the true 15,624 refugees and 2,497 asylum seekers in Mali (UNHCR, breadth of this phenomenon, the limited data gathered by 2013e). According to the UN High Commission for Refugees IOM provides some insights. IOM registered 656 Malians as (UNHCR), there were 12,000 registered refugees from vicms of trafficking between 2001 and 2008 (Ballo, 2009). Mauritania in Mali, following the 1989 Mauritanian-Senegal The vast majority (72%) were trafficked internally in the war (UNHCR, 2013d). Even though an extensive repatriaon country, while the others were trafficked into neighbouring programme was not in place, many Mauritanian refugees may countries. Sixty four per cent were between the ages of 18-24, have been going back and forth between Mali and Mauritania, and 23.5% were between the ages of 14-17. Women made up living alongside the border as herders and pastoralists (IOM 23.6% of the vicms (Ballo, 2009). internal documents). Another 2,000 refugees were from Cote Some informaon also exists concerning the nature of the d’Ivoire (since the outbreak of civil war in 2002) and 1,000 trafficking. Within Mali, women and girls are forced into from (following internal conflicts in the 1990s). domesc servitude, agricultural labour, sex trafficking and support in arsanal gold mines. They are also sent to other African cies and subjected to prostuon (Ballo, 2009). Boys, 5. Malians Abroad: A significant diaspora from Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Niger were also found in forced labour and the informal commercial sector in Mali as Mali has a long tradion of emigraon. As of 2005, there were well as in neighbouring countries, such as in the gold mines in nearly 4 million Malians living abroad, which represented the Senegal or Guinea and the coon or cocoa farms in Cote equivalent of one third of the populaon of the country (Keita, d’Ivoire (USDOS, 2012). Vicms from different ethnic groups 2009). A number of cultural tradions in Mali promote the are also reportedly subjected to another type of trafficking, migraon of young men as a rite of passage, with some even involving debt bondage or slavery-related pracces that are requiring youth to migrate before they are allowed to marry. It tradionally embedded into society and that are oen passed is also believed that this me abroad will allow young Malians from one generaon to the next, with children of slaves being to build a sense of worth. During his me abroad, the man born into slavery (USDOS, 2012). must be able to save enough to be able to return and sele in Mali, compelling many to remain abroad for some me unl they can become economically stable (Ballo, 2009; IRIN, 4. Foreign Populaons in Mali: Centred on regional 2006). In a study from 1993, 30.8% of households had at least one family member living abroad. The number of Malian migraon students abroad was also increasing. In 2006, 10% of Malian Prior to January 2012, immigraon flows into Mali were students in higher educaon were studying abroad, which was relavely minimal. Historically, Mali has received relavely low more than double the number from 2000 (from 1,464 to numbers of labour migrants, mainly from the African 3,051). connent. Most immigrants in Mali were predominantly from Given the growing importance of the Malian diaspora, the the ECOWAS region, likely influenced by the ease of entry Government established the Ministry of Malians Abroad and provided by the free movement protocol, with some African Integraon in 2004. The Ministry esmated that there immigrants from other parts of Africa. In 2005, the United were nearly 4 million in the diaspora as of 2005, with the Naons Development Programme (UNDP) esmated that the majority residing in other African countries (96.5%), and migrant stock represented just 1.4% of the populaon (Ballo, another 2.7% were in Europe (Keita, 2009). In Europe, the 2009). The annual growth rate of the immigrant stock during 2000-2005 was 0.2%, according to UNDP figures (Ballo, 2009). 10 A refugee is “a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecuon for In 2010, according to data from the World Bank, the foreign reasons of race, religion, naonality, membership of a parcular social group populaon in Mali was esmated at 162,677 (1.1% of the or polical opinions, is outside the country of his naonality and is unable or, populaon) – including 77,549 naonals from Côte d’Ivoire, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protecon of that country” (IOM, 2011a, p. 79). and 22,365 from Burkina Faso (World Bank, 2011). Immigraon to Mali may have been driven by connued 11 An asylum seeker is “a person who seeks safety from persecuon or serious economic growth in the country and the increase of direct harm in a country other than his or her own and awaits a decision on the foreign investments due to tax reforms benefing certain applicaon for refugee status under relevant internaonal and naonal instruments. In case of a negave decision, the person must leave the country economic sectors such as mining, the energy sector and public and may be expelled, as may any non-naonal in an irregular or unlawful transport before the crisis (Ballo, 2009). However, it is difficult situaon, unless permission to stay is provided on humanitarian or other to draw a complete picture of the immigraon paerns in Mali related grounds” (IOM, 2011a, p. 12).

page 9 Mali Crisis: A Migration Perspective Internaonal Organizaon for Migraon

majority of the Malian diaspora resided in France where they countries, and 35 from the US and Canada (Ballo, 2009). The made up the most important African diaspora group, with well high number of returns from Morocco, Libya and Algeria likely -organised associaons or groups. Overall, however, the vast reflects the role of these countries in supporng EU policies majority of the diaspora were in Cote d’Ivoire (Vincent, 2013). focused on securing the EU’s southern Mediterranean border and fighng against irregular migraon (IOM, 2013b). Remiances from the diaspora have a significant impact on the Malian economy. In 2007, the Malian diaspora sent home 212 million USD, which accounted for 3.3% of GDP according to the World Bank (Ballo, 2009). The level of remiances grew MALI AND THE LIBYA CRISIS rapidly in the following years; in 2009, Mali received 405 Mali, like many countries in West Africa, was heavily million USD in remiances from the diaspora (World Bank, impacted by the 2011 Libyan crisis, which led to in- 2011). Most remiances are used for individual consumpon, creased food prices, insecurity due to a proliferaon whether sent directly to families or indirectly through of arms within the Sahel region and the return of Ma- associaons, although some remiances also fund collecve lian cizens fleeing the violence. Libya’s strategy prior projects at the local level (Ballo, 2009). In 2011, remiances to the conflict was to invest heavily in sub-Saharan fell slightly due in part to general economic problems within Africa, and when these investments suddenly ceased countries of residence as well as the situaon in Cote d’Ivoire as the regime collapsed there was a sharp increase in and Libya, where Malians had been residing (African Economic basic commodity and transportaon costs. About Outlook, 2012). See text box on Mali and the Libya Crisis. 30,000 Malians returned from Libya in 2011, includ- ing 11,248 who received return assistance from IOM. Countries with the highest numbers of Malian diaspora The two main areas of emigraon to Libya were Kita 440,960 133,464 69,790 68,786 68,295 and Gao, and some Malians (parcularly from Kita) saw Libya as a transit point to Europe. The vast ma- jority of Malians (90%) were male between the ages Cote Nigeria Niger France Burkina Faso of 20-40 and had only a basic level of educaon. d’Ivoire While most migrants gained valuable skills in Libya

12 (including agriculture, irrigaon, modern gardening) Source: IOM, 2013h these have reportedly not been put to use in Mali. Refugees and Asylum Seekers: Among those Malians abroad, Most Malians who fled Libya le behind the majority some have applied for refugee status. Prior to the outbreak of of their belongings and savings, and returned home conflict in January 2012, the latest figures (as of 2012) in a vulnerable state, oen requiring assistance in or- indicated that there were 4,295 refugees and 397 asylum der to socio-economically reintegrate in their com- seekers from Mali (UNHCR, 2013e). Data from 2007 indicated munies of origin. that most Malian refugees (42.3%) were in France, 22.4% in Even today, two years aer the crisis in Libya, the the United States, 18.7% in Italy, 6% in South Africa and 3% in consequences of the crisis connue to reverberate in Malta. Even so, the number of asylum seekers from Mali sll Mali and throughout the region. These mass returns remained small. In 2011, Mali ranked 27 out of 40 countries in put tremendous pressure on families and communi- terms of number of asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2012a). es who had depended on remiances from their Irregular and Returning Migrants: With such a large diaspora, family members abroad. On average, returnees were return migraon to Mali is also an important phenomenon. In reming about 195 USD a year, resulng in an es- recent years, the post-elecon violence in Cote d’Ivoire and mated loss of 5.85 million USD in annual remiances. the 2011 conflict in Libya both affected the Malian diaspora. Communies have not only lost financial support, but While there had not been massive returns from Cote d’Ivoire, must also provide for returnees who have not been despite the large size of the Malian diaspora in that country, able to find jobs or livelihood acvies. Many families the large-scale return migraon from Libya in 2011 had clear have reported needing to request food assistance. consequences, not only in short run but also in the long-term. Many returnees have reported facing humiliaon in See text box on Mali and the Libya Crisis. Return migraon also their communies as they return home without any- includes Malians in an irregular immigraon status and who thing to show for their efforts abroad, with many now voluntarily or through deportaon returned back to their migrang again to Libya or to other countries. country. Between 2002 and 2008, irregular Malians who Sources: IOM, 2013c; 2012e, 2011b; UNSC, 2012; Diombana, 2011 returned home included 46,151 from various African countries, the large majority of which came from Cote d’Ivoire (40,237), followed by Libya (2,670), Morocco (1,455), Algeria (686), and Angola (632). Large numbers also returned from 12 This is based on data from the World Bank as of 2010, compiled from infor- France (2,174) and Spain (2,572), in addion to 413 from maon provided by consulates. Since this data does not take into account the number of Malians residing abroad in an irregular status, the actual figures Saudi Arabia, 21 from Israel, 35 from other European are likely much higher. For a discussion of this issue, see Ballo (2009). page 10 Part II: Migration Consequences of the Crisis and Response in Mali and Beyond

PART II: MIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF 2 THE CRISIS AND RESPONSE IN MALI AND BEYOND

The armed conflict that started in the North of Mali in January The key characteriscs of the current migraon crisis include 2012 caused a migraon crisis of significant size and scope, large-scale displacements, with paerns of displacement both within and outside of Mali. Fighng broke out in the largely corresponding to ethnic similaries. Many darker North of Mali in January 2012, between Tuareg secessionist skinned farmers chose to flee to Mali’s southern cies, while and radical Islamist groups on one side and government forces refugee groups are mostly composed of pastoralists from on the other, followed by a military coup d´état in Bamako in Tuareg and other Arabic-speaking groups fleeing into March 2012. As a result of the defeat of government forces in neighbouring countries where the local populaons are the North, insurgents took control of Mali’s three northern composed of similar ethnic groups. Given these key regions (Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal), occupying the major cies. differences, disnct but complementary response and This led to a large-scale displacement of the populaon within recovery strategies are needed for IDPs and refugees. Mali’s three northern regions, towards the central and Consequently, these crisis-induced mobility paerns southern parts of Mali as well as into neighbouring countries. contribute to increased urbanizaon trends and the disrupon Nearly half a million people were displaced as of the end of of pastoralist, nomadic and seasonal migraon routes. April 2013, including 301,027 (62%) internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 185,144 (38%) displaced into neighbouring Total Number of Displaced Malians within Mali and in countries, including 176,144 refugees. Neighbouring Countries (as of the end of May 2013) In January 2013, a new phase in the Mali crisis was iniated when internaonal military forces intervened through the Bamako 77,501 (30.04.2013) deployment of French and Chadian troops, at the request of Kayes 5,252 (30.04.2013) Malian authories. This intervenon permied the government to regain control of the cies and surrounding Koulikoro 27,983 (30.04.2013) areas, driving the armed groups into the mountainous areas of Mop 54,084 (30.04.2013) the North. While the insurgents have been mostly driven out of the urban areas, they are sll acve in communies within Segou 46,817 (30.04.2013) the North and connue to carry out aacks (UNSC, 2013b). Sikasso 13,004 (30.04.2013) Insecurity is reported in areas around Timbuktu such as Ber, Léré, Goundam, and Bintagoungou (IOM, 2013a; UNHCR, Gao 25,977 (Aug 2012) 2013b), and there are reports of growing ethnic tensions and Timbuktu 21,764 (Oct 2012) roaming gangs who raid and aack villages (Chrisan Aid, 2013). The situaon in Mali remains unpredictable as the Kidal 28,645 (Oct 2012) military intervenon persists, and as displacement remains 301,027 widespread across the country. According to the Commission Total IDPs on Populaon Movements (CMP), condions for the return of Algeria 1,500 (01.04.2013) displaced populaons are not yet in place, although some spontaneous returns have been observed. Niger 50,515 (20.05.2013) This conflict also occurs within the broader food insecurity and Burkina Faso 49,975 (22.04.2013) malnutrion crisis affecng the enre Sahel region, which Mauritania 74,108 (05.05.2013) compounds the impacts of the humanitarian crisis. At the same me, Mali is undergoing a polical transion and Guinea 26 (11.01.2013) stabilizaon process, including preparing for elecons that are Togo 20 (11.01.2013) expected to take place later this year. To support these transions, on 25 April 2013 the UN Security Council approved Total Refugees 176,144 the establishment of a peacekeeping mission in Mali Côte d’Ivoire 4,000 (Nov 2012) (MINUSMA) effecve from July 2013, as French troops gradually withdraw from Mali (UNSC, 2013a). Finally, a Niger 5,000 (20.05.2013) number of other factors combine to drive mobility paerns in Total Other Cross Border Movements 9,000 Mali during the crisis, including the economic and environmental context, access to basic services, and security TOTAL 486,171 and protecon concerns. See the text box on Migraon Sources: CMP, 2013a; UNHCR, 2013a; UNHCR, 2013c; UNHCR, 2013f; IOM Drivers. internal documents

page 11 Mali Crisis: A Migration Perspective Internaonal Organizaon for Migraon

MIGRATION DRIVERS IN MALI DURING THE CRISIS closed and social services were shut down. Some civil servants have since acquired posts in the South, and as A variety of drivers have shaped migraon paerns in of April sll had not resumed their posts in the North Mali during the crisis. These factors combine to influence (IOM internal documents). In the North, the health sys- the decision and the ability of affected populaons to tem virtually collapsed, health centres were looted (MSF, flee, where they flee to, and whether and when to return 2013), and prevenon programmes were suspended, to areas of origin. including child immunizaon and prenatal care. Food insecurity: The impact of the recent conflict is com- Limitaons regarding access to basic social services such pounded by the chronic food security crisis affecng the as water, educaon and health persist because of the enre Sahel region. The food crisis became acute connued absence of government officials, the lack of following severe drought in 2011 and the resulng poor equipment to deliver basic services, and destroyed harvests. In 2012, 4.6 million people in Mali were infrastructure (OCHA, 2013f). In the South, social services affected by food insecurity and malnutrion. While have been strained by the large influx of displaced harvests were reasonable in 2012 in Mali (OCHA, 2013g), populaons. For example, the educaon of 700,000 the phenomenon of malnutrion is sll alarming and children was disrupted across the country (OCHA, families’ ability to cope has been crippled by the com- 2013g). Most IDP children in the South had access to pounding effects of the conflict. This year, according to schools (80%) as of February 2013 (IOM, 2013e), while in WFP, 1.3 million people will be affected by food the North only 37% of the schools had re-opened as of 8 insecurity in Mali and 585,000 of these will be in the May (OCHA, 2013c). The lack of social services is also an North (OCHA, 2013f). The crisis could worsen throughout important deciding factor for return movements. For Mali if farmers miss another planng season, and the many displaced Malians, the return of civil servants and next one started in May. Furthermore, due to negave the resumpon of government services is a precondion coping strategies at the start of the crisis, such as selling for safe return. Many will also base their decision on the assets in order to flee, many families, if they decide to do school calendar for their children (IOM, 2013e). so, will return to very lile in their places of origin. The Security and protecon factors: During the occupaon of food crisis of 2011-2012 will also have rippling effects in the North by armed groups, human rights violaons have terms of loss of livestock, employment, and reducon of been rampant and women have been subjected to economic acvies. gender based violence. Many acts of sexual violence Economic context: Impacts of the crisis were already against women and adolescent girls by armed groups evident in 2012, when the Malian economy shrunk by have been reported in the North, and IDP women and 1.5% (Fletcher, 2013). Lack of access connues to pose children have been sexually exploited or forced into economic challenges in the North, the Algerian border prostuon (UNSC, 2013c). There are also reports of was closed on 14 January 2013 (an important children and adolescents being recruited into rebel commercial border for the North), and businesses were armed groups, as well as self-defence milias supporng shut down as their owners fled. As a result, there is a the government (UNSC, 2013c; Amnesty Internaonal, shortage of basic necessies (flour, milk, oil and sugar) 2012). Following the military intervenon in January and inflated prices, making most goods unaffordable to 2013, there are connued reports of human rights the populaon who remained behind and prompng violaons and ethnic conflicts due to ‘revenge aacks’ connued displacement (Jourdain, 2013). The economic against members of groups associated with the rebels. situaon is dire in many locaons such as Kidal, where Within displaced communies, both in Mali and outside, the populaon depends heavily on markets (94%) to there are also reported tensions with hosng meet their food needs due to generally poor agricultural communies as displacement connues to exert pres- condions (OCHA, 2013f). Given the impacts on sure on limited resources. A MINUSMA mission also agricultural producon and livestock herding (OCHA, recently gathered evidence of violaons of the human 2013f), displacement will likely connue in the longer rights of Malian refugees in Niger, to be included in an term and will contribute to higher levels of vulnerability upcoming report to the UN Security Council (UNSC). within the North. Further assessments were planned for Mauritania and Burkina Faso (IOM internal documents). Basic services: Prior to the crisis, broad segments of society already had rudimentary and oen insufficient access to social services, parcularly outside of Bamako, a situaon exacerbated since 2012 by the crisis (BTI, 2013). As civil servants and health workers fled the conflict, government offices and health centres were

page 12 Part II: Migration Consequences of the Crisis and Response in Mali and Beyond

the long-term. As of April 2013, most IDPs reported having fled due to the armed conflict (96%), while the remainder fled OVERVIEW OF NORTHERN MALI due to food insecurity (IOM, 2013b). The economic situaon is Given that the North of Mali is sparsely populated, another prominent factor influencing displacement. Among those displaced represent a significant proporon movements recorded at the flow monitoring points in Bamako (36%) of the overall populaon in the North. Though and Mop, 30% reported moving to the South due to the lack Northern Mali makes up 66% of the total naonal ter- of work and livelihood opportunies in the North. An inter- ritory, it was home to only 8.6% of the total popula- esng characterisc of displacement in Mali is that 19% of dis- on in 2010, esmated at 1.3 million people. The placed families have reported coming and going from their populaon is mostly rural, with just 8% living in ag- point of origin (IOM, 2013g). This is oen carried out by one glomeraons of more than 10,000 residents (OECD, member of the household who then checks on other family n.d.). Only 5% of GDP and 0.5% of tax revenue is gen- members, property or livestock, or carries out economic acv- erated in the North (Fletcher, 2013). ies, such as agriculture or commerce (IOM, 2012d). Tourism was an important economic acvity for Mali, The current IDP total reflects recent registraons carried out and one of the most promising sectors in the North, in the South between January and April 2013. However, es- with naonal tourism revenues rapidly increasing be- mates for the North (Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu) remain un- tween 2002 and 2010. In 2007, the sector generated changed since last year as informaon collecon in the north- more than 131 million EUR, which is ten mes the ern regions is challenging due to insecurity and the fluid amount acquired through tourism in 2002 (Lacher, movement of populaons. Efforts are on-going between the 2012). In 2010, tourists spent 240 million Euros in CMP and partners working in the northern regions to establish Mali (OECD, n.d.). However, even before 2012, tour- a system in which regular informaon on populaon move- ism in the Sahel and had already nearly col- ment can be reported. Data tracking and monitoring exercises lapsed prior to the crisis due to criminal acvies in Sikasso, Kayes, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal are currently being and, more notably, the increase in hostage taking in planned (CMP, 2013a).

the region (Lacher, 2012). The number of tourists vis- ing Mali drascally declined from 200,000 in 2011 to only 10,000 in 2012, thus presenng a major loss of COMMISSION ON POPULATION MOVEMENTS (CMP) income for the Malian populaon and adding further to the stress on communies (The Guardian, 2013). The Commission on Populaon Movements (CMP) is a Working Group within the Protecon Cluster, with The North is also home to many different ethnicies, government parcipaon and led by IOM. It was including lighter-skinned Tuaregs, Songhai, and Fulani established to collect and analyse available (Welsh, 2013). The vast majority of the Tuaregs and informaon on IDPs and populaon movements in other lighter-skinned and Arabic-speaking groups live Mali following the crisis in the North of Mali that in the Northern areas (Larson, 2013). There, both in- began in January 2012. Members of the Commission tra- and inter-tribal tensions exist, for example be- include the General Directorate of Civil Protecon tween the Tuareg tribes Ifoghas and the Imrad vas- (DGPC) and the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, sals as well as between Tuaregs and Arabic-speaking Solidarity and the Elderly (MAHSPA), IOM, UNHCR, groups (Boukhars, 2013). Aggravated tensions have OCHA, WFP, UNICEF, ACTED, NCR, Handicap also persisted between the North and the South. Eth- Internaonal, and CRS. nic groups from the South, who have held most of the power since Mali achieved independence in For updated informaon, please refer to: 1960, have allegedly neglected the populaons in the mali.humanitarianresponse.info North and exploited resources in the North (Blair, 2013). 13 Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in parcular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situaons of generalized violence, violaons of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an 13 1. Large-Scale Internal Displacement internally recognized State border” (IOM, 2011a, p. 52).

As of May 2013, 301,027 individuals were internally displaced 14 Figures are gathered from registraon acvies carried out under IOM’s within Mali (CMP, 2013a). Displacements occurred mostly be- Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), which uses a methodology approved by tween March and June 2012, reaching a peak in April 2012 the Commission on Populaon Movements (CMP). The number of displaced persons registered by the DTM as of April 2013 increased in comparison to aer rebel groups gained control of the cies of Timbuktu and previously published results. This increase is mainly due to the fact that IOM Gao. While there has been some increase in the IDP popula- has expanded its areas of operaons to other parts of the country. At the on since the January 2013 military intervenon (72,109),14 same me, and in connecon with the improvement of the security there have not been any massive populaon movements in environment in the North, we can observe a decrease in the number of people moving from their places of origin to sele other parts of Mali.

page 13 Mali Crisis: A Migration Perspective Internaonal Organizaon for Migraon

ORIGIN AND DESTINATION was 7 people, which is higher than the average family size of 5 to 5.5 persons in the northern regions according to the 2009 From March to June 2012, when most of the new census, indicang that IDP households likely include extended displacements occurred, most of the IDPs came from or non-family members. The esmated IDP populaon was Timbuktu (56%) and Gao (40%), with very few from Kidal and 51% women and 49% men, with this distribuon nearly Mop (2% each). While movements connued from Gao, Kidal idencal for all age groups. The majority of IDPs were children and Timbuktu, there were also increasing numbers coming under the age of 18 (53%), followed by adults aged 18-64 from Mop and Ségou as insurgents advanced southward (44%), and only 2% were more than 65 years old (IOM, (CMP, 2013d). In April 2013, the majority were sll from 2013b). This is largely similar to demographic data from 2011 Timbuktu (51%), followed by the Gao region (36%) and the for the enre Malian populaon, although the age groups do Mop region (10%), with minimal numbers from Kidal and not match exactly between the stascs: 47% were under the Ségou (IOM, 2013b). age of 14 and 7% were over 65 years old (UN Data, 2011). Most IDPs have fled to southern regions to escape violence in In general, the situaon of IDPs has been marked by security the North, with the majority in Bamako (26%), followed by and humanitarian constraints, including lack of access to and Mop (18%), Ségou (16%), and Koulikoro (9%). Another 4% of limited availability of basic services and supplies such as food, IDPs are in Sikasso and 2% are in Kayes. The remaining one- clean water and health care (IDMC, 2013). Of those registered fourth of registered IDPs are displaced within the three under the DTM, most reported a need for food (79% of Northern regions (Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal), although these households), following by non-food items (9%) and cash figures have not been updated since late 2012 (CMP, 2013a). (5%).15 Only 21% of IDPs reported receiving humanitarian Most IDPs have fled to urban areas, complicang their assistance (IOM, 2013b), although this varies greatly across idenficaon and the provision of assistance and protecon. It and even within regions. IOM and the CMP are currently is parcularly difficult to idenfy IDPs in urban areas in the working with humanitarian partners to analyse and compare South, as they have not gathered in displacement sites but this data, and to beer map the assistance to displaced rather have integrated into families or live in rentals in urban persons as CMP partners have agreed on criteria to capture areas where they are less visible for humanitarian support. Of vulnerabilies within the registered IDP populaon. those registered by IOM as of December 2012, most (65%) The April DTM registraons have reported a total of 26,559 reported renng a house, 27% lived with host families who vulnerable individuals (13% of IDP populaon), which are were oen relaves and 8% stated “other,” which included found in 47.5% of total households. By far the greatest living in collecve housing such as community centres (IOM, vulnerability among the IDP populaon involves separated16 2013g). It had previously been esmated, a few months aer and unaccompanied17 children (43%), with 11,295 separated the conflict broke out, that the vast majority of IDPs (97%) children and 675 unaccompanied children. Other were living with extended family members in the South of vulnerabilies included lactang and pregnant women (24%), Mali (OCHA, 2012). As their displacement situaon connues, persons with a chronic disease (20%), persons with a physical there have been reports of some IDPs moving away from host disability (5%), and unaccompanied elderly persons (1%) as families and the urban centres in search of affordable housing well as female headed households (8,675 households) and in more remote peri-urban neighbourhoods, which concurs households headed by a minor (366). IDPs were also with the increasing numbers of IDPs reporng that they are economically vulnerable, with 38% of the households renng rather than staying with host families (IDMC, 2013; reporng no income in their place of displacement, and 29% Refugees Internaonal, 2013). reporng an irregular income. Of all registered households, While the majority of IDPs managed to flee the North, others 50% reported needing food assistance, while 39% expressed a were unable to flee from those regions due to the security need for cash assistance. In Bamako and Koulikoro, the concerns posed by insurgent groups and the limited majority of households requested monetary assistance, while transportaon networks (OCHA, 2013d). Many are sll in Segou and Mop the majority of households cite food displaced within or near their region of origin, with 9% of the assistance as their primary need (IOM, 2013b). total IDP populaon is in the Gao district, 10% within Kidal district, and 7% within the district of Timbuktu (figures as of 15 It is important to note that this reflects the percepons of IDP households late 2012), including some 10,000 stranded by the closed regarding assistance, and they may tend to report more direct and immediate Algerian border (OCHA, 2013a). It is also expected that many assistance (such as food and cash) as opposed to assistance at the community level (such as for educaon). others have been financially incapable of leaving or too vulnerable (elderly or physically incapacitated) to make the 16 Separated children are “children who are separated from both parents, or journey. from their previous legal or customary primary caregiver, but not necessarily from other relaves. These may, therefore, include children accompanied by COMPOSITION AND VULNERABILITY other family members” (IOM, 2011a, p. 90).

According to the latest data from the CMP, there were 43,084 17 Unaccompanied children are “persons under the age of majority in a IDP households containing 301,027 individuals (CMP, 2013a). country other than that of their naonality who are not accompanied by a As of April 2013, the average size of registered households parent, guardian, or other adult who by law or custom is responsible for them” (IOM, 2011a, p. 102). page 14 Part II: Migration Consequences of the Crisis and Response in Mali and Beyond

RETURN MOVEMENTS AND INTENTIONS 2. Cross-Border Flows and Impact on Neighbouring A return intenon survey carried out by IOM in February 2013 Countries and Beyond had indicated that returns to areas of origin were likely by the As of the end of May 2013, at least 185,144 Malians had fled end of the year - security situaon perming (IOM, 2013d). In to neighbouring countries, including 176,144 registered as the survey, 93% of IDPs indicated that they wanted to return refugees with UNHCR. Most refugees were in Niger, to their place of origin, with the majority (62%) stang that Mauritania and Burkina Faso (174,598), with a few in Guinea they would base their final decision on the security situaon (26) and Togo (20) (UNHCR, 2013c). In Niger, another 5,000 (IOM, 2013e). Although mass returns have not occurred due Malians were living in spontaneous sites near the border, in to the prevailing security situaon in areas of origin, as of April Mentes and Midal (UNHCR, 2013a). An esmated 1,500 2013 the majority of IDPs (95%) connued to express their Malian refugees had fled to Algeria, according to UNHCR desire to return. For 76%, the decision to return will depend (2013d), and an addional 4,000 Malians were reported on improved safety condions, while 11% give priority to the fleeing into Cote d’Ivoire (IOM internal documents). Cross- improvement of economic condions. Another 3% reported border displacements connue today, although the number of that an improvement in the food situaon is the primary need new displacements remains relavely low since the January (IOM, 2013b). Among the spontaneous returnees to the North 2013 military intervenon (UNHCR, 2013g). recorded at flow monitoring points established by IOM in Bamako and Mop, the lack of social services in the South is ORIGIN AND DESTINATION cited as the principal factor movang the decision to return The majority of refugees are pastoralists from Tuareg or to the North, while others are apparently movated by Maure ethnic groups, and were thus more drawn to security improvements in certain northern areas (IOM, neighbouring countries rather than to Southern Mali given the 2013a). The protocol for the upcoming elecons may also be a broadly similar livelihood and environmental condions in the factor influencing return, since it has been uncertain whether neighbouring countries (ECHO, 2013). The desnaon of IDPs will be able to vote from their area of displacement. Also, Malian refugees in neighbouring countries was chosen based most of those who have indicated that they want to stay in on a) the proximity and accessibility from their respecve the South are people who have been directly affected by region of origin in Mali, b) similar ethnic background (for violence – vicms of rape, amputaons or torture (IOM instance, Malian pastoralists who sought refuge in Hodh el internal documents). Charghi, Mauritania share some ethnic roots with the Movements to the North also include those who are returning Mauritanian pastoralists from that region), and c) presence of temporarily in order to assess local condions or to maintain Malian diaspora communies in countries of the region (for in- and repair their houses in advance of the rainy season. Shelter stance, in Burkina Faso) (IRIN, 2012b; IOM internal are an important factor to be taken into account in the documents). The majority of refugees are women and context of return movements. Even though the majority (92%) children, as the men stayed behind to take care of family of those surveyed in February wished to return to their former properes (UNHCR, 2013h; IOM internal documents). house, many respondents (30%) indicated that their habitat The largest concentraon of registered refugees has been had been damaged or destroyed, likely due, in addion to near the border with Mali, in either makeshi camps or official destrucon related to the fighng, to the temporary neglect ones. In order to decrease the risk of tensions at the border of houses made of mud (banco) that normally require regular linked to waves of incoming refugees, UNHCR has worked with maintenance. Many houses will likely require repair work, governments to relocate these populaons to official camps given that only 7% indicated that they intended to build a new that are oen further inland (UNHCR, 2012b) – for instance, in home or live with relaves. It is also important to keep in mind Niger from spontaneous sites along the borders in Tillabery that many IDPs, having sold their assets in order to flee, do and Tajoua Regions to official camps in Abala, Mangazie, not have the means to return should they want to (IOM, Ayorou and Intekan (IOM internal documents), in Burkina Faso 2013d). from Damba and Gandafabou selements and spontaneous The CMP does not encourage return since the condions are sites to official camps like Mentao or Goudébo and in not yet in place to support mass return movements. Some Mauritania from Fassala transit centre to Mbéra refugee spontaneous returns have been observed, even as further camp. Some Malians who fled into neighbouring countries displacement connued. There were reports of free buses also seled in urban centres, as for example in Mauritania, being adversed through the radio (Radio Aadar Koima) for where an esmated 15,000 Malians reportedly moved to Gao residents wanng to return home (Jourdain, 2013). It was Nouakcho as of 9 January 2013 (IRIN, 2013d). also reported that buses and food were provided for free by NEEDS AND IMPACTS some policians, in preparaon for the elecons later this year (IOM internal documents). According to UNHCR, the needs of the refugees remain great and are not fully met. For example, 80% of the refugee children are not receiving primary educaon (UN, 2013b) due to the fact that the schools around the camps are insufficient and government schools are too far away. The refugee popu-

page 15 Mali Crisis: A Migration Perspective Internaonal Organizaon for Migraon

laons have also had significant impacts on local host available and could not be replenished from Mali, communies. Given the food crisis within most of these there were concerns that the region could face countries, the influx of refugees or returnees (such as Nigeri- problems (IOM, 2013f). While there have been ens who had been residing in Mali) who somemes bring live- recent improvements in the nutrion situaon in stock has weakened already fragile communies, by pung refugee camps, addional water and sanitaon addional pressure on natural and economic resources and facilies are needed and shelters need to be leading to an exhauson of coping mechanisms among host improved. Currently, the refugees in Niger do not communies (UN, 2013b). In Niger, the interrupted food trade consider it safe enough for them to return to Mali with Mali also contributes to the food insecurity and (IOM internal documents). malnutrion. Furthermore, there is a risk of inter-community tensions due to the exisng food insecurity crisis and the Burkina Faso: There were 49,975 Malian refugees in Burkina impact on social services, highlighng the importance of Faso as of the end of April 2013 (UNHCR, 2013c). ensuring that humanitarian support balances the needs of Refugees have stated that they are not yet host populaons and the refugees (IOM internal documents). considering return as they do not think it is safe enough (IOM internal documents). As in Niger and The following informaon is available per country: Mauritania, more financial support is required to meet the needs of the refugees (UNHCR, 2013h). Mauritania: As of May 2013, there were 74,108 Malian Local populaons remain vulnerable to food refugees in Mauritania (UNHCR, 2013c). As of insecurity and malnutrion, and with the rainy February, 1,500 refugees were crossing into season arriving they are at risk of the expected yearly Mauritania on average each week (UNHCR, 2013g). floods (IOM internal documents). This large flow of refugees has had an impact in the southeast of the country, where the refugees are Guinea and Togo: The number of refugees in Guinea (26) and located (IOM, 2013f), exacerbang the environmen- Togo (20) remained very minimal as of January 2013 tal pressures on the local eco-system and on the (UNHCR, 2013c). economic sustainability of the local populaon (IOM internal documents). The livestock brought by some Algeria: Although the border with Mali has been officially refugees could create further degrade of the pastoral closed since 14 January 2013 (Oxfam, 2013a), some lands and may force local herders to move earlier Malians have sll been crossing into Algeria to seek than expected to find other pastures (FEWSNET, refuge. As of April 2013, UNHCR reported that there 2013). In addion, Mauritanian herders who have were 1,500 Malian refugees in Algeria (UNHCR, tradionally crossed into Mali with their herds can no 2013f). Those entering Algeria in January 2013 were longer do so (IOM internal documents). Primary mostly women and children, who went to places such needs within the camp include shelter support, water as Timayawen or Tinzawaten where they rented and sanitaon and health, as residents receive homes (UNHCR, 2013i). insufficient water and there are too few latrines to service the populaon which could lead to risk of Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire: There have been no reports of disease. In addion, out of the 12,000 Mauritanian Malians entering Senegal, and only limited numbers refugees registered by UNHCR in Mali, about 8,000 have been reported in Cote d’Ivoire. Conngency have expressed the wish to return (UNHCR, 2013d). plans have been put together for a mulsectoral response in the case of an influx (IOM internal Niger: Niger had received 50,515 Malian refugees, documents). Based on a joint assessment undertaken according to the most recent figures from May 2013 by IOM, UNHCR and the Service to Assist Refugees (UNHCR, 2013c). Another 5,000 Malians were and Stateless People (Service d’Aide et Assistance aux esmated to be living in spontaneous sites near the Réfugiés et Apatrides, SAARA) in November 2012, border (UNHCR, 2013a). Refugees are mostly in the about 4,000 Malians had crossed the border into Tillabéri and Tahoua regions, which are highly Cote d’Ivoire as a result of the conflict. All of these vulnerable to food insecurity and malnutrion were staying with family members and in host (UNHCR, 2013c). Refugee numbers have connued to communies, and there was no request for asylum or increase this year. Since the start of the military refugee status. Since then, it appears that most of intervenon in Mali in January 2013, 10,000 new them have been returning to Mali as the security arrivals of Malian refugees were reported in Tahoua situaon improves (IOM internal documents). region, where water is scarce and no health facilies are available (UNHCR, 2013f). In addion to Malian Countries beyond the region: So far, there have not been refugees, 3,991 Nigeriens who had been living in Mali significant flows of Malians into countries beyond the have also crossed back into Niger (UNHCR, 2013a) As region. Europe and the United States have not of February 2013, since food stocks were not locally registered large influxes of Malians seeking asylum

page 16 Part II: Migration Consequences of the Crisis and Response in Mali and Beyond

since the conflict. Both Switzerland and France impacted tradional movements and livelihoods. For instance, removed Mali from the list of “safe” countries at the the conflict has caused pastoralists to abandon their usual end of 2012, thus allowing Malians to apply for migratory routes and not return to pastoral lands north of the asylum (Forum Refugies, 2012; Slate Afrique, 2012). (IRIN, 2012a). Many have also had to abandon In 2012, 2,531 Malians applied for asylum in Europe, their tradional tents due to fighng (OCHA, 2013e), leaving a low figure in comparison to asylum-seekers from many without shelter. Insurgents would take livestock at will other countries. Mali ranked 35th out of 44 in during the occupaon, and now pastoralists do not have industrialised countries that received asylum seekers enough money to feed their remaining livestock. Since they in 2012, a significant reducon in rank as compared cannot afford to keep them, many have been forced to give to 2011 when it was 27 out of 40. Mali was among away or sell their livestock at a very low price. This situaon the top 10 countries or origin of asylum seekers only will have negave and potenally irreversible effects on their in Italy (9th) and Spain (6th) (UNHCR, 2012a). livelihoods, and may lead to permanent migraon flows to urban areas (IRIN, 2013a). RETURN MOVEMENTS AND INTENTIONS Circular migraon flows: Very lile informaon exists Most refugees do not yet consider it safe to return, although pertaining to the impacts of the crisis on regular circular some Malian refugees have reported that they wish to return migraon flows, such as between Cote d’Ivoire and Mali. It home and there are some reports of refugees returning to would appear that labour migraon flows to Guinea of Mali. Sll, while figures are not available, it appears that there Malians from the South to Guinea, where they work in gold are far less refugees returning than IDPs (IOM internal mines in Northern Guinea, have connued uninterrupted documents), which can be partly due to the ethnic during the conflict (IOM internal documents). In Senegal, composion of the refugee populaon. As for IDPs, the return while no official figures exist, it is possible that migraon flows of Malian refugees is not encouraged since condions are not have decreased, parcularly as there has been a decrease in yet in place to support mass return movements. Addional commercial flows between the two countries (IOM internal protecon concerns are raised by the fact that most Malians documents). Within Mali, it appears that there has been a refugees are Tuareg and Maure pastoralists, ethnic groups reversal in circular migraon flows between the North and which are, oen wrongly, widely associated with the rebel South. According to IDP interviews, in the past men would groups. During 2012, some Tuaregs that fled the conflict travel south for economic reasons, leaving their families in the stayed within Mali, but as tensions increased, they tended to North. Aer they were displaced, these trends were reversed: flee to neighbouring countries, such as refugee camps in as their enre families moved south, the men now travel Mauritania or Niger (Blair, 2013). Some armed groups, such as north to check on property and assets (IOM internal Ganda Koy, the leader of the Songhai milia, have used the documents). conflict to publicly blame them for supporng MNLA rebels, in Urbanisaon: The conflict has further increased the trend of an aempt to weaken Tuaregs. Since the military intervenon urbanisaon, with many of those internally displaced fleeing in January 2013, there have been reports of human rights towards urban centres in Mali, where they are likely to stay for violaons and ethnic conflicts due to ‘revenge aacks’ against now and may remain permanently if the condions for return Tuaregs and other light-skinned Northerners that are do not improve. Given that a high percentage of IDPs are in perceived to be associated with the rebels, leading to further the cies, this puts addional pressure on the infrastructure displacements and presenng challenges for the return of and services available both for the local populaon and the refugees. newly arrived. Urbanizaon trends can also be seen in the neighbouring countries where Malian refugees are fleeing. For instance, as menoned previously in the case of Mauritania 3. Other Crisis-affected Mobility Paerns and Flows and Guinea, many Malians escaping the conflict have moved In addion to displacing large populaons of Malians internally directly into cies (Nouakcho and Conakry) instead of staying and into neighbouring countries, the conflict has significantly at the border in refugee camps. Addionally, as the arrival of impacted a variety of mobility paerns and flows. refugees puts pressure on limited resources in host communies, many local populaons may also follow this Pastoralists and nomadic migraon flows: Pastoralists and trend of moving to cies. In Mauritania, the government is nomadic groups have clearly been affected by the conflict, asking for increased support for the local populaon, in order with insecurity causing these groups to disperse throughout to avoid mass displacement towards the urban centres (IOM the North of Mali as well as across borders (IRIN, 2013a). The internal documents). majority of refugees are in fact pastoralists from Tuareg or Maure ethnic groups. Many more have been internally Irregular and transit migraon flows: Mali has been an displaced within Mali’s northern regions, although it is difficult important country for irregular and transit migraon, although to determine to what degree given the lack of access. There it is unclear how these migraon paerns have been affected are also reports of nomadic selements outside of Bamako by the conflict, or how they may been affected as the situaon (IOM internal documents). This large-scale displacement has progresses in the North. Some degree of irregular migraon reportedly connues. For instance, Malians and other

page 17 Mali Crisis: A Migration Perspective Internaonal Organizaon for Migraon

migrants connue to transit through Niger to cross the Libyan Even in areas where access is unhindered (such as in the border (IOM internal documents). The current crisis has South), support to IDPs and host communies is oen heightened public awareness within the region of the risk of hampered by a serious lack of funding and capacity (IDMC, terrorism and further insecurity. This general concern has 2013). The CAP for Mali is only 30% funded thus far (OCHA, given some governments the public support to send troops to 2013b). The Mali CAP is also linked to other country CAPs Mali (for example, Burkina Faso and Senegal). In addion, throughout the region (Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger and Guinea has reinforced its borders with Mali, while Algeria has Mauritania) through the Sahel Regional Strategy 2013, in closed its border. Furthermore, the instability of the Sahel order to cohesively address needs stemming from the food region could also lead to an intensificaon of illicit migraon crisis and the Mali conflict, and these are also only 29% flows and drug smuggling into the Mediterranean, as well as funded (OCHA, 2013b). The CAPs and the Sahel Strategy are potenal threats of insurgent aacks in that region (Melly, frequently updated to reflect changes in the situaon, and the 2013). Mali CAP will be updated this month (May 2013). The UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel Region, which is expected to Vicms of Trafficking: Currently no informaon exists on soon be presented to the UN Security Council, will also changes in human trafficking in Mali or the region due to the provide a framework that encompasses governance, security, conflict, although some reports have indicated that children humanitarian, human rights and development (UN, 2013a). are now at a higher risk of being trafficked, due to the hasty departure of families fleeing the crisis, the abandonment of Support from the diaspora: The Malian diaspora has also property and children separated from the head of household played a role in migang both the humanitarian and polical or other family members (IOM internal documents). effects of the crisis. The Malian diaspora has been notably ac- ve in France, where they advocated for the internaonal

military intervenon (Keller, 2013). They supported the estab- 4. Response to the Crisis in Mali and Beyond lishment of schools and raising donaons through a group called Collecf des Maliens de France. On 7 April 2012, “the Humanitarian needs and support from internaonal actors: March for the Peace and Unity of Mali” was organized in Paris Humanitarian access has slowly improved since the end of to raise awareness about the on-going crisis in Mali. At the January 2013, following the military intervenon and beginning of the conflict, the diaspora also played a role in try- improved access to the North of Mali, allowing humanitarian ing to explain the ethnic make-up of Mali, clarifying that there actors to scale up acvies and beer assess the situaon. are many ethnic groups in the North other than the Tuareg. Sll, while access to the North has improved, this is primarily The diaspora has also worked on awareness-raising within in the urban areas and security cannot be guaranteed outside Tuareg populaons and on addressing many of the issues in the cies. Access in the North was also impeded due to the the North that are not Tuareg-specific, including under- insecurity and the breakdown of commercial transport development, poverty and conflict resoluon. According to systems during the conflict. Public bus transportaon has the Ambassador of Mali to France, there is strong inter-Malian since resumed between Bamako and Gao, and boats have solidarity among the enre Malian diaspora and such events started to serve the cies of Mop and Timbuktu (UNHCR, have also been taking place in other parts of the world (OECD, 2013g). However, landmines and improvised explosive devices 2012). For instance, donaons from the Malian diaspora in along these routes make access risky both for civilians as well Burundi, Equatorial Guinea and Senegal were given to the as for humanitarian actors (UNSC, 2013c; IDMC, 2013). government for distribuon. According to the government, Humanitarian assistance has been an important factor in financial contribuons were also provided by diaspora groups supporng the displaced, since many sll do not receive to support military acons (Government of Mali, 2013a). sufficient services given that social services throughout the Support from governments and the private sector: The country have been overwhelmed or have shut down Government of Mali received donaons from Algeria, China, completely (MSF, 2013; IOM internal documents). While the Morocco and Turkey to assist the displaced populaons. Some North may have borne the brunt of the occupaon and support also came from the private sector, including experienced a major breakdown of services, the South is now Moneygram, SOPAM Energy Mali, and the water and juice hosng 224,641 displaced persons, and chronic food company Kirene. These donaons oen consisted of food insecurity and malnutrion are affecng the enre Sahel packs and water that were distributed to displaced region. Mop, Gao and Timbuktu are oen affected each year populaons in the North (Government of Mali, 2013a; IOM by cholera epidemics (between June and September), and the internal documents). Governments in the region, the African recent migraon flows could bring increased risk of spreading Union and ECOWAS are heavily involved in discussions the epidemic this year. Taking into account this reality, the concerning the situaon in Mali, although the security and humanitarian appeal for funding, the Consolidated Appeal polical aspects of the crisis are at the forefront of these Process (CAP) for Mali, includes the following priority needs dialogues. throughout the country: food security; nutrion; water, hygiene and sanitaon (WASH); and protecon (UN, 2013c).

page 18 Part II: Migration Consequences of the Crisis and Response in Mali and Beyond

5. Post-Crisis Transion and Stabilizaon displaced populaons and refugees and to ensuring that their needs are met, while also focusing significant aenon on the While humanitarian needs connue, the country is also faced return and reintegraon process. with the challenges of polical transion and stabilizaon. The country is preparing for elecons, expected to take place later The UN Security Council recently established a United Naons this year, and the United Naons Office for Mali (UNOM) has Muldimensional Integrated Stabilizaon Mission in Mali established offices to support the polical process (Feltman, (MINUSMA), which will become effecve on 1 July 2013. Its 2013). In the past, there have been relavely frequent mandate will encompass supporng the transional uprisings including by the Mouvement Populaire de Libéraon authories of Mali to re-establish government administraon, de l’Azawad (MPLA) in 1990 and then in 2000, indicang that as well as supporng efforts to rebuild the Malian security the current situaon is not an isolated event and that there is sector, stabilize key populaon centres, restore state a need to idenfy durable soluons for peace. authority, deter threats and take acve steps to prevent the return of armed elements (UNSC, 2013a). A decisive step in the polical process occurred in January 2013, when the Government of Mali adopted a road map for In order to come up with a long-term soluon to the chronic the transion. This road map highlights the humanitarian crisis in the Sahel and to beer prepare communies for needs of displaced populaons and refugees, and the need to future crises, the “resilience agenda” has been put forward ensure the facilitaon of return once condions are in place to with the intenon of addressing both humanitarian and support such returns. The Durable Recovery Plan for Mali development objecves. While discussions are sll on-going 2013-2014 (Government of Mali, 2013b), established in April regarding how to put resilience into pracce, the EU launched 2013, provides a clear picture of the way forward for the the “Global Alliance for Resilience Iniave – Sahel” (AGIR transion phase. The recovery plan makes reference to Sahel) in June 2012 to move this resilience agenda forward.

page 19 Mali Crisis: A Migration Perspective Internaonal Organizaon for Migraon

3 PART III: RECOMMENDATIONS

To overcome the current crisis, Mali needs to address a wide foreseeable future. The most likely scenario today is that variety of challenges simultaneously, including, amongst displacements will become protracted due to the connuaon others, launching a polical process that is genuinely of low-level conflict and insecurity in the North, the me it will parcipatory and promotes reconciliaon and peace, re- take for basic services such as health and educaon to establishing the provision of basic public services in the North become more widely available in the areas of displacement, and improving their delivery in the South, kick-starng and constraints imposed by the agricultural cycle on displaced economic development and modernizing the agricultural populaons that depend on farming for their livelihood. The sector, and reforming the security services. Addressing all fact that communies and local authories in the North need aspects of human mobility related to the crisis in an integrated to be ready for the return and reintegraon of both refugee manner is one of those challenges, and one that is directly and IDP populaons further increases the challenge in this linked to sustainable peace, the improvement of stability and respect. Such protracted displacement would require human security, and the promoon of humanitarian connued provision of support and assistance to the most protecon and assistance. Concretely, IOM recommends the vulnerable populaons. following areas for aenon, support and assistance:

2. Strengthen Informaon Collecon and Manage- 1. Ensure a Two-Pronged Approach: Humanitarian ment assistance and protecon as well as support for In order to beer plan acvies along the spectrum of transion and recovery humanitarian aid to recovery and transion support, it is The relave calm brought by the internaonal military essenal to further invest in tracking populaon movements; intervenon has rightly shied aenon to what needs to be monitoring and assessing the needs and intenons of IDPs and done to put Mali firmly on the path towards sustainable peace returnees, as well as the needs of host communies in areas and economic development. The Malian transional of displacement and return; monitoring protecon concerns; government has clearly indicated that it needs support from and profiling migrants along with their intended movements. the internaonal community in order to move the country In addion, expanding the monitoring of cross-border and forward and implement an ambious Durable Recovery Plan internal populaon flows is recommended to capture any for Mali 2013-2014, which provides a comprehensive spontaneous returns of refugees and IDPs. In parallel, the CMP overview of the many challenges Mali needs to tackle in the will need further financial support in order to increase its coming months with a parcular focus on the need for capacity in informaon management. economic development. At the same me as preparing for the longer-term transional 3. Establish a Regional Approach to the Migraon and recovery needs in both the North and the South of the country, the Malian transional Government and the Crisis Affecng Mali internaonal community need to ensure that the immediate Due to the large number of people displaced across the life-saving needs of the displaced and other crisis-affected region, the porous nature of the borders throughout the persons are being met through smart and efficient Sahel, the important trade routes and cross-border acvies humanitarian assistance. If done well, it can also serve to that support the regional economy (including illegal trade), reduce pressures on communies and avoid increased and finally the migraon (including trafficking) and tensions and unrest during the transion period. The most transhumance routes, it is essenal to establish a regional vulnerable populaons have urgent needs such as for food, approach to the migraon crisis affecng Mali. In parcular, shelter, health care, educaon and livelihood support. this implies the development of complementary and Intervenons should aim to reduce aid dependency and consistent approaches to address the issues of refugees and protect these vulnerable populaons from abuses including IDPs, while recognizing the important differences between the gender-based violence, human trafficking and the recruitment IDP and refugee populaons. of children by armed groups. It is important that strategies and acvies to support displaced populaons take into Moreover, the food insecurity crisis that affects the enre account the predominantly urban nature of displacement in Sahel region also requires a beer integraon of mobility Mali. within humanitarian and transional approaches in Mali and within the broader context of the regional resilience agenda. This two-pronged approach likely needs to connue into the Addional informaon is needed to fully address the impacts

page 20 Part III: Recommendations

of the current crisis in Mali on regional mobility paerns and iniaves related to access to basic social services including migrant groups such as the pastoralists and seasonal migrants, shelter and non-food items delivery, educaon, health, and and to further understand how the crisis has worsened pre- water, hygiene and sanitaon (WASH) acvies. This strategy exisng harmful migraon dynamics, such as the smuggling should be in place for returning migrants, including refugees and trafficking of people. Such efforts would also assist in as- and IDPs, with balanced support to both groups as well as to sessing the impact that the crisis has had on trafficking and host communies in order to avoid potenal tensions. smuggling operaons, which in turn may support the develop- ment of medium- to long-term strategies of prevenon and assistance to vicms of smuggling or trafficking. 6. Invest in Building Peace and an Open Democrac Process 4. Support Stabilizaon and Transion Acvies as Given the growing tensions within communies faced with an Immediate Strategic Goal inside Mali displacement, as well as the historical tensions and inequalies between the North and South, it is essenal to It is essenal that the strategy of the internaonal community also facilitate the peace-building, conflict migaon and includes community-based stabilizaon iniaves, as these confidence-building process – between different ethnic are crical to help prevent the occurrence of further communies, as well as between the enre populaon and grievances that could potenally fuel another conflict and limit the government instuons and their partners. The the power of various spoilers. As long as return cannot be en- establishment on 30 March 2013 of the Naonal Commission couraged, the main objecve must be to migate and address for Dialogue and Reconciliaon is a posive and crucial step the root causes of conflict (for instance, through community forward taken by the Government. Efforts are needed to dialogues, peace dividends distribuon, or improving access to ensure that it is used effecvely and seen as a legimate basic social services and economic opportunies). At the same process by all relevant pares. me, community stabilizaon acvies should be priorized In addion, a number of emerging priories must be ad- as these will lay the foundaon for enabling the return of dressed in order to promote peace: displaced populaons, and can further contribute to reducing the potenal for addional displacement and/or secondary Elecons: In the context of the consolidaon of the demo- displacement among spontaneous returnees. In this context, it cratic process, an urgent effort is recommended to is vital that relaonships and trust are built between local enable disenfranchised, displaced populaons to populaons and local authories in the North. Rapid support register and vote in the July 2013 presidenal to the rehabilitaon of community infrastructure and the re- elecons, in order to encourage people to regain establishment of basic services and government presence in trust in the Government and to obtain confidence the North can also contribute to the broader resilience agenda in democracy. set forward by the internaonal community. Vulnerable Youth and Ex-combatants: A naonal peacebuilding process and security sector reform through gov- ernance, disarmament, reintegraon and targeted 5. Plan for Durable Soluons, Including Return and livelihood support for disaffected and/or vulnera- Reintegraon Acvies, in a Careful and Strategic ble youth and ex-combatants will also be required Manner – with a special focus on demobilizing and reinte- grang child soldiers back into their communies. Although the volume, pace and nature of returns will connue This area will need a complete framework formed to be conngent primarily (but not exclusively) on the security by inter-Ministerial Circulars and measures of the situaon, longer-term stability will depend on three key 1612 Resoluon of the UN Security Council in variables: the availability of basic services in communies in coordinaon with the integrated UN mission. the North, livelihood opportunies, and increased confidence in the government. As long as the condions for return are not Malian Diaspora: The Malian Diaspora has played an important in place, the humanitarian community will not promote role during the conflict by advocang for the inter- return, although efforts must sll be made to support venon. The diaspora can be a key stakeholder in spontaneous returns through the provision of humanitarian moving forward and stabilising the situaon in Ma- assistance en route. li, and this should be capitalised on. Peace building, reconciliaon and development acvies should Once condions for return are met from a security and include the diaspora to tap into their skills and humanitarian perspecve, urgent efforts should be made to networks at the naonal and community levels and support the return and reintegraon of displaced populaons promote durable peace even beyond the country’s in their communies of origin. This iniave should be borders. encompassed within a larger durable soluon strategy for the displaced, which takes the development strategy into account and includes all relevant stakeholders. This would include

page 21 Mali Crisis: A Migration Perspective Internaonal Organizaon for Migraon

7. Address Migraon and Border Management in criminal groups. Since cross-border illegal acvies flourish in Mali and in the Region from a Security Perspec- the context of weak governance, it is also important to invest in alternave livelihoods and income-generang opportunies ve, and Complement with Livelihood and Income for marginalised border communies, whose members are -Generaon Support for Border Communies currently engaged acvies such as the cross-border traffick- The propagaon of arms in the region from the previous con- ing of weapons and people. At the same me, policies must flict in Libya, together with the lack of control of those arms also accommodate the cross-border migraon paerns of and weapons coming into the region, enabled the outbreak of pastoralist and nomadic groups, so as not to hinder their the conflict in January 2012. Some governments, including in movement and negavely impact on their livelihood. countries neighbouring Mali, have already made requests for support and have developed naonal integrated programmes related to Security Sector Reform (SSR). It is crucial to imple- "Do no harm” approach: All acvies should ment these programmes in order to establish adequate mech- incorporate the needs of both the displaced and host anisms to control and secure naonal borders across the communies to reduce the risk of tension over Sahel: to address transnaonal organized crime, to build limited resources in a context of food insecurity that government capacity to organize disarmament programmes, could be perceived as ethnic discriminaon. to provide protecon mechanisms for the most vulnerable migrants and to combat money laundering and financing of

page 22 References

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