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PDF | 1.25 MB | English Version MALI 2013 Credit: UNHCR / Helene Caux 11 March i TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. SITUATION OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................. 1 2. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION ........................................................................................................ 1 3. CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS ............................................................................................ 2 4. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND TOP PRIORITIES ..................................................................... 3 Table I: Requirements and Priority Needs by Cluster ............................................................ 4 5. SUMMARY OF PRIORITIZED CLUSTER PLANS ......................................................................... 5 Coordination and Common Services ........................................................................................... 5 Education ........................................................................................................................................ 6 Emergency Telecommunications ................................................................................................. 7 Food security ................................................................................................................................. 8 Health .............................................................................................................................................. 9 Logistics ....................................................................................................................................... 10 Nutrition ........................................................................................................................................ 11 Protection ..................................................................................................................................... 13 Shelter / NFI .................................................................................................................................. 15 Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)..................................................................................... 16 Table II: List of Priority Projects by Cluster ......................................................................... 18 6. HOW TO FUND ............................................................................................................................. 26 ii MALI CONSOLIDATED APPEAL – PRIORITY ACTIONS 11 March 2013 1. SITUATION OVERVIEW The complex emergency facing Mali has changed considerably since January 10, with significant political, security and humanitarian consequences. As a result, the operating environment has become even more complex and less predictable. Political instability persists, and the potential for rising social or inter-communal tensions is a serious concern unlikely to be resolved in the near future. Judging from recent suicide attacks, mine incidents and gun battles in the north, security conditions will conceivably remain volatile for many months and could deteriorate even further. These risks represent a grave threat to local people and to humanitarian partners trying to assist them. They have also severely restricted transport and commerce in the north, reportedly driving numerous traders to flee the area altogether. As a result, prices are rising as the availability of food and essential items dwindles. 2. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION Before the beginning of the conflict in early January, the Committee on Population Movement estimated the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Mali at 227,000. The recent conflict has exacerbated pre-existing humanitarian needs across the country, particularly in areas directly affected by the conflict. Since the beginning of January, around 38,000 people have fled northern Mali (nearly 16,000 IDPs and nearly 22,000 refugees). With heavily restricted access and persistent insecurity, partners have been unable to fully assess the humanitarian situation in many northern locations. Several humanitarian partners in the north were able to maintain their most essential programmes throughout the crisis, notably those for health, emergency food assistance and nutrition. Based on localized multi-sectoral rapid assessments in Ségou, Mopti and Kidal and other available information, the humanitarian situation in the north appears fragile and at risk of rapid deterioration. In central regions, NGO multi-sectoral assessments in the regions of Ségou, Timbuktu and Mopti (Konna and Douentza) do not indicate an acute crisis. They do however reveal important protection, nutrition, food security, health, WASH and education needs. In other words, central and northern parts of Mali are in such a state of fragility that if new tensions emerge, if commerce is not resumed or if humanitarian aid is insufficient, the most vulnerable will be harmed. Promoting activities to strengthen local economic capacities and livelihoods in these regions is therefore critical. In Kidal region, NGO multi-sectoral assessments indicate acute humanitarian needs, particularly around Tin Zaoutin at the Algerian border, where over 6,600 IDPs are living in precarious conditions. Humanitarian partners are already providing assistance that covers these people‟s most urgent needs. However important needs remain for water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter, protection and basic services. 1 MALI CONSOLIDATED APPEAL – PRIORITY ACTIONS 11 March 2013 Grave protection concerns have emerged in Mali. Before the January military intervention, reports had already surfaced of gender-based violence and children being recruited by armed groups. Since January 10, armed groups have reportedly committed serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights. Other forms of violence against civilians and destruction of civilian property have also been observed. These developments may be linked to a disturbing rise in ethnic tension that has fuelled new displacements since the beginning of the year. Very few IDP returns have been observed to date. IOM flow-monitoring points have registered 2,300 returns, constituting only 13% of population movement observed between January 12 and February 10. The remaining 87% is displacement from northern to southern regions. The main destinations for people returning from the south to the north are Timbuktu (45%, 1,028 people), Mopti (42%, 962) and Gao (13%). According to an IOM survey of IDP families in Bamako and Koulikoro, the vast majority of IDPs wish to return home, but are mainly waiting for better security. Other major concerns of potential returnees include the availability of basic services (especially education), access to food and transport. Most surveyed IDPs came from the urban centres of Gao and Timbuktu. As for refugees, available information indicates a more cautious “wait and see” attitude towards returns. Prevailing security conditions in the north are not conducive to returns. Given the current volatility, it is impossible to measure total refugee and IDP returns with accuracy. The ability of AFISMA troops to hold major roads and urban centres could be decisive in this regard. Based on experiences in other emergencies, some 20 to 25% of the displaced – 80,000 to 100,000 people – could start to return as soon as security conditions improve. 3. CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS While humanitarian access is improving in the central regions, further north the scope of humanitarian operations is determined by security constraints. As a result, humanitarian partners must adapt to a dangerous and unpredictable security environment. These conditions are likely to persist for many months. The primary challenges in this context are: Lack of resources and capacity to address operational needs related to security and access in conflict-affected areas, both for NGOs and the UN system. Incomplete information on needs in conflict areas as a result of access limitations that have restricted the number of assessments. Lack of capacity to manage emergency response or large numbers of refugee or IDP returns. Risk of paying too much attention to the north of the country at the expense of humanitarian needs in other regions. Rehabilitation or reconstruction needs are certainly 2 MALI CONSOLIDATED APPEAL – PRIORITY ACTIONS 11 March 2013 considerable in some areas in the north, but the entire north does not need rebuilding and very significant needs in the rest of the country should not be forgotten. The presence of new humanitarian actors arriving in the north, in the belief that it is accessible, must not be allowed to endanger humanitarian actors who were active in the region while it was under control of armed groups. It is also important that the new actors coordinate amongst themselves and with those already on the ground, and that they take into account what was achieved by NGO partners during the year of occupation. This coordination will help avoid gaps and duplication. Risk of confusing humanitarian affairs with political and security agendas (e.g. ECOWAS humanitarian assistance). Lack of funding for humanitarian action (2013 CAP currently 6% funded). 4. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND TOP PRIORITIES The projections and analysis in the 2013 Consolidated Appeal remain relevant, including the strategic objectives. The humanitarian community in Mali must act to: Ensure an effective response to vulnerable people’s most critical needs across the country. Adapt programs to meet
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