MALI Northern Takeover Internally Displaces at Least 118,000 People

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

MALI Northern Takeover Internally Displaces at Least 118,000 People 1 October 2012 MALI Northern takeover internally displaces at least 118,000 people Few could have predicted that Mali, long considered a beacon of democ- racy in West Africa, would in less than a year see half its territory overrun by Islamic militants and a tenth of its northern population internally dis- placed. Instability and insecurity result- ing from clashes between government forces and Tuareg separatists and pro- liferation of armed groups in northern Mali in the wake of a coup d’état have combined with a Sahel-wide food crisis to force some 393,000 Malians from their homes since January 2012, some 118,800 of whom are estimated to be Malians who fled the unrest in the northeastern city of Gao wait at a bus internally displaced. station in Bamako to return to Gao, September 2012. REUTERS/Adama Diarra Some 35,300 people are displaced across Mali’s vast three northern regions, living in town with host fami- lies or out in the open in makeshift shelters. Most of the 83,400 IDPs who have taken refuge in the south are staying with host families. Both IDPs and host families face severe shortages of food, access to health care and basic necessities. Many IDPs have lost their sources of livelihoods and children’s education has been severely jeopardised. The nascent government of national unity, which took power in August 2012 after prolonged instability, has taken some steps to respond to health, nutrition and education needs but serious concerns remain for the vast majority of the displaced who still lack access to basic services. State functions have virtually ceased in conflict-affected regions and civil servants have fled, further limiting capacity to meet the needs of the vulnerable. The displaced have urgent needs which are not being met due to widespread insecu- rity, lack of sufficient humanitarian access and grossly insufficient funding. www.internal-displacement.org MALI MALI National capital ALGERIA Regional capital Town, village Taoudenni Poste Maurice Cortier Major airport International boundary Regional boundary Main road Bordj Mokhtar Other road MA URITANIA Track Railroad Timéiaouîne Ti-n-Zaouâtene 0 100 200 300 km Tessalit In Guezaam sî m le Aguelhok i 0 100 200 mi T Assamakka u TOMBOUCTOU d KID AL e é l l Tidjikdja a V Kidal E djéri ak Aleg Tombouctou ou Bourem za Lac A Rosso Faguibine (Timbuktu) GA O l' Kiffa 'Ayoûn el 'Atroûs e Néma Râs el Mâ Gourma- d r e e é Kaédi ig Rharous l N l Goundam a Gao V Léré Niafunké Ménaka S Lac e Niangay n Ansongo Andéramboukane eg Sélibabi Tinabao al Nara Nampala Aourou Nioro Douentza Tahoua du Sahel Nayé MOPTI Kayes Mourdiah Mopti Oullam NIGER SENEGAL Diéma Bandiagara Birnin Madaoua Niono Djibo Dori Tillabéri Konni Tambacounda KAYES KOULIKORO Djenné lé Tera bu SEGOU Bafoulabé Ba Ouahigouya Niamey ani Ségou B N San Dosso Sokoto Kita Kaya i Lac de Koulikoro Tougan Bogandé g B e Manantali a k r o g y Kati B URKIN A F ASO Birnin Kebbi n Bamako i e Koundara f CAPITAL ir Dédougou Gummi a Koutiala o OuaV gadougou Balaki B r DISTRICT é Diapaga e l N o u Koudougou l ig a t Fada- o t a Kamba Gaoual é l N a B o o Kombissiri N'gourma B l g V a Siguiri L. de a n Tenkodogo Labé Dinguiraye Bougouni B Bobo- c Koko Sélingué Sikasso h Tinkisso SIKASSO Dioulasso Pô e GUINEA Diébougou Léo NIGERIA Yanfolila Kolondiéba V o T BENIN The boundaries and names shown and the designations l t Navrongo Kontagora used on this map do not imply official endorsement or Banfora a O Kainji N Djougou acceptance by the United Nations. G Reservoir Kankan o i Gaoua r GHAN A O Wawa CÔTE D'IVOIRE e Map No. 4231 UNITED NATIONS Department of Peacekeeping Operations October 2004 Cartographic Section Source: UN Cartographic Section (with some cities added by IDMC) More maps are available at www.internal-displacement.org/countries/mali/maps Mali: Northern takeover internally displaces at least 118,000 people Background in turn, formed a new government of national unity in August. Considered a beacon of democracy in West Africa less than a year ago, Mali has plunged into a series Mali’s political and security situation is set against of entrenched political, security and humanitarian a backdrop of a large-scale food crisis affecting crises in the space of a few months. Since January millions across the Sahel. The UN Office for the 2012 and the onset of a new Tuareg rebellion, Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) the fourth since 1960, Mali has seen roughly half estmates that 4.6 million Malians (out of some its territory (three of eight regions, populated 15 million people) are affected by the crisis, with by some 1.6 million people) overrun by Tuareg some 175,000 children at risk of severe acute separatists and Islamist militants and its elected malnutrition (OCHA, 29 August 2012). Hunger is government overthrown by a military coup. exacerbated by ongoing insecurity which has led to sharp price increases and suspension of regular The Tuareg are a Berber people with a tradition- commercial food deliveries to Islamist-controlled ally pastoral lifestyle who live across the Saharan northern areas. interior of West Africa. Although they have held key posts in national administrations, their leaders (in Mali and elsewhere) have often complained Causes of displacement of being marginalised by national governments. In recent years the weak presence of the Malian Internal displacement has occurred intermittently army in the vast northern desert has permitted in Mali during periods of severe drought and po- extensive armed banditry and drug trafficking, litical conflicts, notably previous Tuareg rebellions. including by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Prior to Malian independence in 1960, the Tuareg (AQIM). AQIM has succeeded in establishing sev- started seeking greater autonomy, recognition eral bases in Mali as well as in the broader Sahel of their language and culture and economic (The Jamestown Foundation, 28 October 2010). development (Minority Rights Group, 2007). They staged a series of insurgencies against the Malian The demise of the Qadhafi regime in Libya in government: in 1962-1963, between 1990 and 2011 sparked the return of heavily armed Tuareg 1996 and between 2007 and 2009. fighters, who trickled back into Mali in early 2012 intent on establishing an autonomous region. The 2012 Tuareg rebellion and subsequent They quickly overran several towns, displacing coup d’Etat thousands of people. They soon received backing On 17 January 2012, Tuareg rebels of the from Islamist groups said to have close links with Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad AQIM. In late March, mutinous Malian soldiers, (MNLA), a separatist group formed in October dissatisfied with the government’s handling of 2011 and bolstered by the influx of fighters return- the rebellion, forced Malian president Amadou ing from Libya, launched an offensive against the Toumani Touré to step down. Amid the ensuing Malian army to secure independence of the north security vacuum, Salafist groups outflanked the (The Daily Telegraph, 19 January 2012). Fighting Tuareg, secured control of the three northern re- affected all of northern Mali, including the towns gions, imposed a hard-line interpretation of sharia of Ménaka, Tessalit, Aguelhok, Tinzaouaten, Léré and provoked international outrage by desecrat- and Niafunké. Within three weeks at least 30,000 ing historic mosques and tombs of importance people were displaced (ICRC, 8 February 2012). to Sufis. In mid-April, the military junta handed Civilians primarily fled the clashes between gov- control to an interim civilian government, which, ernment forces and Tuareg combatants as well 1 October 2012 3 Mali: Northern takeover internally displaces at least 118,000 people as the violence and retaliation by army troops control of several northern towns and imposing (UNHCR, 23 February 2012). By mid-March, some hard-line Islamic law. Their conflicting goals (the 93,433 people had been displaced within Mali’s MNLA seeks a state of Azawad while Ansar Dine borders and some 99,000 people had sought aspires to Islamise the current state of Mali) led refuge in neighbouring states, primarily Algeria, to abandonment of a planned merger. Further Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger (OCHA, 15 displacement resulted when armed clashes took March 2012). Most cited violence by armed place in Gao on June 27 between MNLA combat- groups, the fear of sharia law and shortages of ants and those of the Movement for Oneness available and affordable food as reasons for flight. and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), an offshoot of AQIM with aspirations to Islamise all of West On 22 March, disgruntled members of the Africa. The MNLA lost control of Gao, its transi- Malian military formed a Comité National pour le tional capital, and removed its fighters from the redressement de la Démocratie et la Restauration outskirts of Timbuktu, Ménaka and Kidal (Jeune de l’Etat (CNDRE). They launched a coup d’état in Afrique, 4 July 2012). By 12 July, the MNLA had Bamako and ousted President Amadou Toumani been entirely evicted from northern Mali and Touré, who had been scheduled to step down af- they later dropped their claim for independence, ter presidential elections on 29 April. The CNDRE, leaving the Islamists in full control of the region led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, justified their (LeMonde.fr, 12 July 2012). putsch by deploring the government’s handling of the northern rebellion and inability to counter In parallel, a new unity government headed by the MNLA (BBC, 22 March 2012). Under pressure President Dioncounda Traoré and Prime Minister from the international community, particularly Cheick Modibo Diarra was created in August with the Economic Community of West African States the priority of taking over north.
Recommended publications
  • The Conflict's Complexity in Northern Mali Calls for Tailored Solutions
    Policy Note 1, 2015 By Ole Martin Gaasholt Who needs to reconcile with whom? The Conflict’s Complexity in Northern Mali Calls for Tailored Solutions PHOTO: MARC DEVILLE/GETTY IMAGES While negotiations are taking place in Algiers, some observers insist on the need for reconciliation between Northern Mali and the rest of the country and particularly between Tuareg and other Malians. But the Tuareg are a minority in Northern Mali and most of them did not support the rebels. So who needs to be reconciled with whom? And what economic solutions will counteract conflict? This Policy Note argues that not only exclusion underlies the conflict, but also a lack of economic opportunities. The important Tuareg component in most rebellions in Mali does not mean that all Tuareg participate or even support the rebellions. ll the rebellions in Northern Mali the peoples of Northern Mali, which they The Songhay opposed Tuareg and Arab have been initiated by Tuareg, typi- called Azawad, and not just of the Tuareg. rebels in the 1990s, whereas many of them cally from the Kidal region, whe- There has thus been a sequence of joined Islamists controlling Northern Mali in reA the first geographically circumscribed rebellions in Mali in which the Tuareg 2012. Very few Songhay, or even Arabs, joined rebellion broke out a few years after inde- component has been important. In the Mouvement National pour la Libération pendence in 1960. Tuareg from elsewhere addition, there have been complex de l’Azawad (MNLA), despite the claim that in Northern Mali have participated in later connections between the various conflicts, Azawad was a multiethnic territory.
    [Show full text]
  • Security Council Distr.: General 28 December 2020
    United Nations S/2020/1281* Security Council Distr.: General 28 December 2020 Original: English Situation in Mali Report of the Secretary-General I. Introduction 1. By its resolution 2531 (2020), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) until 30 June 2021 and requested me to report to the Council every three months on the implementation of the resolution. The present report covers major developments in Mali since my previous report (S/2020/952) of 29 September. As requested in the statement by the President of the Security Council of 15 October (S/PRST/2020/10), it also includes updates on the Mission’s support for the political transition in the country. II. Major developments 2. Efforts towards the establishment of the institutions of the transition, after the ousting of the former President, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita on 18 August in a coup d’état, continued to dominate political developments in Mali. Following the appointment in late September of the President of the Transition, Bah N’Daw, the Vice-President, Colonel Assimi Goïta, and the Prime Minister, Moctar Ouane, on 1 October, a transition charter was issued. On 5 October, a transitional government was formed, and, on 3 December, President Bah N’Daw appointed the 121 members of the Conseil national de Transition, the parliament of the Transition. Political developments 1. Transitional arrangements 3. On 1 October, Malian authorities issued the Transition Charter, adopted in September during consultations with political leaders, civil society representatives and other national stakeholders. The Charter outlines the priorities, institutions and modalities for an 18-month transition period to be concluded with the holding of presidential and legislative elections.
    [Show full text]
  • Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali
    United Nations S/2016/1137 Security Council Distr.: General 30 December 2016 Original: English Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali I. Introduction 1. By its resolution 2295 (2016), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) until 30 June 2017 and requested me to report on a quarterly basis on its implementation, focusing on progress in the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and the efforts of MINUSMA to support it. II. Major political developments A. Implementation of the peace agreement 2. On 23 September, on the margins of the general debate of the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, I chaired, together with the President of Mali, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, a ministerial meeting aimed at mitigating the tensions that had arisen among the parties to the peace agreement between July and September, giving fresh impetus to the peace process and soliciting enhanced international support. Following the opening session, the event was co-chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and African Integration of Mali, Abdoulaye Diop, and the Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Algeria, Ramtane Lamamra, together with the Under - Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. In the Co-Chairs’ summary of the meeting, the parties were urged to fully and sincerely maintain their commitments under the agreement and encouraged to take specific steps to swiftly implement the agreement. Those efforts notwithstanding, progress in the implementation of the agreement remained slow. Amid renewed fighting between the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA) and the Platform coalition of armed groups, key provisions of the agreement, including the establishment of interim authorities and the launch of mixed patrols, were not put in place.
    [Show full text]
  • 1St Reported Case of Ebola in Mali: Strengthened Measures to Respond
    Humanitarian Bulletin Mali September-October 2014 In this issue 1st case of Ebola virus disease P.1 Nutritional situation in Mali P.2 Food security survey P.3 HIGHLIGHTS Back to school 2014 - 2015 P.4 Information management trainings P.6 First confirmed case of SRP funding P.8 Ebola virus disease in Mali Clusters performance indicators P.8 Average prevalence of global acute malnutrition OCHA/D.Dembele reaches 13.3 percent National Food security 1st reported case of Ebola in Mali: survey : 24 per cent of households affected by strengthened measures to respond to the food insecurity epidemic KEY FIGURES On 23 October, the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene confirmed the first Ebola case in Mali; a two-year old girl who had travelled with her grandmother from Guinea # IDPs 99, 816 (Kissidougou) to Kayes city (Western Mali), transiting through Bamako. She had been (Commission on hospitalized in Kayes where she died on 24 October. Population Movements, 30 Sep.) In response to this Ebola outbreak, the Government, with the support of WHO and # Refugees in 14, 541 partners (NGOs and other UN agencies), have strengthened prevention measures while Mali (UNHCR 31 the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene and its partners immediately put under August) observation around forty people who had direct contact with the girl in Bamako and # Malian 143, 253 refugees ( UNHCR Kayes, while the tracking of other contacts continued. 30 Sep) Severely food 1,900,000 Experts from WHO regional office and headquarters, supported by the National Public insecure people Health Institute of Quebec (INSRPQ), USAID and CDC1, who were on a Ebola (Source : March 2014 Harmonized preparedness mission in Mali at the time, are supporting the response and the Framework) implementation of the National Ebola Emergency Plan.
    [Show full text]
  • Migrations De Transit Dans La Région D'agadez (Sahara Nigérien)
    UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 PANTHÉON-SORBONNE École doctorale de géographie de Paris U.F.R. de Géographie 2007 UN DÉSERT COSMOPOLITE. MIGRATIONS DE TRANSIT DANS LA RÉGION D’AGADEZ (SAHARA NIGÉRIEN) Thèse pour l’obtention du doctorat en géographie Présentée et soutenue publiquement le 19 décembre 2007 Julien BRACHET Sous la direction de Emmanuel GRÉGOIRE Membres du jury : - Jean-Louis CHALÉARD, Professeur à l’Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (président). - Brigitte BERTONCELLO, Professeur à l’Université de Provence - Aix-Marseille I (rapporteuse). - André BOURGEOT, Anthropologue, Directeur de recherche émérite au CNRS (rapporteur). - Jérôme LOMBARD, Chargé de recherche à l’IRD (examinateur). - Olivier PLIEZ, Chargé de recherche au CNRS (examinateur). - Emmanuel GRÉGOIRE, Directeur de Recherche à l’IRD (directeur). 2 SOMMAIRE SOMMAIRE ................................................................................................................................. 3 REMERCIEMENTS....................................................................................................................... 7 INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE............................................................................................. 9 PREMIÈRE PARTIE DES CIRCULATIONS ANCIENNES AUX NOUVELLES LOGIQUES MIGRATOIRES : SAISIR LA TRAME DE LA MOBILITÉ INTERNATIONALE AU SAHARA CENTRAL ............................................................................................................ 33 CHAPITRE I. DES MIGRATIONS SAHÉLO-SAHARIENNES DES INDÉPENDANCES AUX MIGRATIONS TRANSSAHARIENNES
    [Show full text]
  • Hafete” Tichereyene N-Oussoudare N-Akal, Moukina N-Alghafete Id Timachalene in Kel Tahanite Daghe Mali
    Humanitarian Action at the Frontlines: Field Analysis Series Realities and Myths of the “Triple Nexus” Local Perspectives on Peacebuilding, Development, and Humanitarian Action in Mali By Emmanuel Tronc, Rob Grace, and Anaïde Nahikian June 2019 Acknowledgments The authors would like to offer their thanks to all individuals and organizations interviewed for this research. Special appreciation is also extended to the Malians who supported this paper through their translations of the Executive Summary into a number of languages. Finally, sincere gratitude is expressed to the Malians who have lent their time, insights, and perspectives to this work. About the Authors The authors drafted this paper for the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative’s Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action (ATHA), where Emmanuel Tronc is Senior Research Analyst, Rob Grace is Senior Associate, and Anaïde Nahikian is Program Manager. About the Humanitarian Action at the Frontlines: Field Analysis Series The Humanitarian Action at the Frontlines: Field Analysis Series is an initiative of the Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action (ATHA) at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI). It aims to respond to the demand across the humanitarian sector for critical context analysis, dedicated case studies, sharing of practice in humanitarian negotiation, as well as overcoming access challenges and understanding local perspectives. This series is oriented toward generating an evidence base of professional approaches and reflections on current dilemmas in this area. Our analysts and researchers engage in field interviews across sectors at the country-level and inter-agency dialogue at the regional level, providing comprehensive and analytical content to support the capacity of humanitarian professionals in confronting and addressing critical challenges of humanitarian action in relevant frontline contexts.
    [Show full text]
  • DIRECTION NATIONALE DE L'hydraulique Région De
    MINISTÈRE DE L’ÉNERGIE ET DE L’EAU DIRECTION NATIONALE DE L’HYDRAULIQUE SITUATION DES POINTS D’EAU MODERNES AU MALI à partir de l'inventaire national réalisé en décembre 2018 Région de GAO Ministère de l’Énergie et de l'Eau Direction Nationale de l'Hydraulique Région de GAO 4 Cercles 23 Communes 696 Villages Situation des points d'eau modernes 2580 Points d'eau 41% Taux d'équipement 28% Taux d'accès Taux d'accès dans la région de GAO Cercle Population EPEM Total EPEM fonctionnel Taux d'eq́ uipement Taux d'acces̀ ANSONGO 230 246 300 175 37 % 26 % BOUREM 180 480 161 68 27 % 12 % GAO 363 073 976 614 50 % 38 % MENAKA 114 421 167 76 40 % 21 % Région de GAO Taux d'accès dans le cercle de ANSONGO Légende Réseau hydrographique Routes nationales Taux de desserte 0% - 20% 20% - 40% 40% - 60% 60% - 80% 80% - 100% Situation Region de GAO Cercle de ANSONGO Population 230246 Nombre de communes 7 Points d'eau 504 Taux d'équipement 37% Taux d'accès 26% Données collectées : Décembre 2018 Région de GAO Taux d'accès dans le cercle de ANSONGO Commune Population EPEM Total EPEM fonctionnel Taux d'eq́ uipement Taux d'acces̀ ANSONGO 40133 68 41 60 % 41 % BARA 20577 87 38 85 % 60 % BOURRA 24150 34 24 53 % 39 % OUATTAGOUNA 43297 37 28 34 % 26 % TALATAYE 44843 7 5 4 % 3 % TESSIT 29716 46 26 27 % 16 % TIN HAMA 27530 21 13 21 % 16 % Cercle de ANSONGO Types de points d'eau dans la commune de ANSONGO Légende Village Réseau hydrographique Route nationale Type de point d'eau SAEP PMH Forage non équipé Puits citerne Puits moderne Situation Cercle de ANSONGO Commune de
    [Show full text]
  • MALI - Cercle De Gao: Carte De Référence (Octobre 2013)
    MALI - Cercle de Gao: Carte de référence (Octobre 2013) KIDAL (KIDAL) Frontière internationale ALGERIE Limite de région Limite de cercle MAURITANIE Dabacar Chef-lieu de région Chef-lieu de cercle Kel amassine Kel takaraghate kalawate Icharamatane Chef-lieu de commune SENEGAL Kel taborack Village NIGER Kel sidalamine foulane Ilokane BURKINA FASO samit Cercle (autre région) Ifoghas GUINEE Kel bandaf 2 Cercle Gao Ibokalitane inouly Imrad divers MENAKA Forgeron Kel tafoulante Kel bandaf 1 Imilicha Ikefoutane COMMUNE Kel Imagrane talmen Inarwarene aboubakrine Ichadenharene Ikarbaganene Igawelene ANCHAWADI Kel Ighanagassane 1 tondibi GABERO Imagrane tikli Cheriffen haoussa BOUREM GAO Kel tanderbatene GOUNZOUREYE Ibohanane N'TILIT Kel ahad Imididaghane 2 SONI ALI BER Igorarene Ighanagassane 2 Imididaghane 1 TIILEMSI Kel Ikadeyane tadjalatt Cheriffen Fleuve Kel gourma TIILEMSI amdiliss Route principale Akodaka adinebangou Kareibandia Koygourou Badji Route tertiaire M'balde haoussa Kareibandia-ile Delega Goura Adineme Barissadji Meataha Aéroport international Kounsoum Barissadji Ile-goudelbaria Silwali Piste d'atterrissage Doumbaria SONI ALI BER Bagnadji Bossobon Gabame Lamboubero Hoyangaraba Djeboubero Kochakarei Kabanna DEMOGRAPHIE (2013) Baringouna AlizegameTondiagame Katia koima Seina ANCHAWADI Seyname Kel Total tanoukassane Taraykongo Berrahile Bella Ikalawatene cherifen kel doro GAO Ikayawane Chateau Kel razzaf Korogoussou Kosseye 8 472 157 8 472 157 16 806 999 Sidibe Mali Peulguelgobe Boulgoundie Bagoundie 2 Wabaria Norbene GOUNZOUREYE
    [Show full text]
  • Algeria–Mali Trade: the Normality of Informality
    101137 DEMOCRACY Public Disclosure Authorized AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ERF 21st ANNUAL CONFERENCE March 20-22, 2015 | Gammarth, Tunisia 2015 Public Disclosure Authorized Algeria–Mali Trade: The Normality of Informality Sami Bensassi, Anne Brockmeyer, Public Disclosure Authorized Matthieu Pellerin and Gael Raballand Public Disclosure Authorized Algeria–Mali Trade: The Normality of Informality Sami Bensassi Anne Brockmeyer Mathieu Pellerin Gaël Raballand1 Abstract This paper estimates the volume of informal trade between Algeria and Mali and analyzes its determinants and mechanisms, using a multi-pronged methodology. First, we discuss how subsidy policies and the legal framework create incentives for informal trade across the Sahara. Second, we provide evidence of the importance of informal trade, drawing on satellite images and surveys with informal traders in Mali and Algeria. We estimate that the weekly turnover of informal trade fell from approximately US$ 2 million in 2011 to US$ 0.74 million in 2014, but continues to play a crucial role in the economies of northern Mali and southern Algeria. Profit margins of 20-30% on informal trade contribute to explaining the relative prosperity of northern Mali. We also show that official trade statistics are meaningless in this context, as they capture less than 3% of total trade. Finally, we provide qualitative evidence on informal trade actors and mechanisms for the most frequently traded products. JEL classification codes: F14, H26, J46. Keywords: informal trade, Algeria, Mali, fuel, customs. 1 The authors would like to thank Mehdi Benyagoub for his help on this study, Laurent Layrol for his work on satellite images, Nancy Benjamin and Olivier Walther for their comments and Sabra Ledent for editing.
    [Show full text]
  • Climatic Information of Western Sahel F
    Discussion Paper | Discussion Paper | Discussion Paper | Discussion Paper | Clim. Past Discuss., 10, 3877–3900, 2014 www.clim-past-discuss.net/10/3877/2014/ doi:10.5194/cpd-10-3877-2014 CPD © Author(s) 2014. CC Attribution 3.0 License. 10, 3877–3900, 2014 This discussion paper is/has been under review for the journal Climate of the Past (CP). Climatic information Please refer to the corresponding final paper in CP if available. of Western Sahel V. Millán and Climatic information of Western Sahel F. S. Rodrigo (1535–1793 AD) in original documentary sources Title Page Abstract Introduction V. Millán and F. S. Rodrigo Conclusions References Department of Applied Physics, University of Almería, Carretera de San Urbano, s/n, 04120, Almería, Spain Tables Figures Received: 11 September 2014 – Accepted: 12 September 2014 – Published: 26 September J I 2014 Correspondence to: F. S. Rodrigo ([email protected]) J I Published by Copernicus Publications on behalf of the European Geosciences Union. Back Close Full Screen / Esc Printer-friendly Version Interactive Discussion 3877 Discussion Paper | Discussion Paper | Discussion Paper | Discussion Paper | Abstract CPD The Sahel is the semi-arid transition zone between arid Sahara and humid tropical Africa, extending approximately 10–20◦ N from Mauritania in the West to Sudan in the 10, 3877–3900, 2014 East. The African continent, one of the most vulnerable regions to climate change, 5 is subject to frequent droughts and famine. One climate challenge research is to iso- Climatic information late those aspects of climate variability that are natural from those that are related of Western Sahel to human influences.
    [Show full text]
  • Are the Fouta Djallon Highlands Still the Water Tower of West Africa?
    water Article Are the Fouta Djallon Highlands Still the Water Tower of West Africa? Luc Descroix 1,2,*, Bakary Faty 3, Sylvie Paméla Manga 2,4,5, Ange Bouramanding Diedhiou 6 , Laurent A. Lambert 7 , Safietou Soumaré 2,8,9, Julien Andrieu 1,9, Andrew Ogilvie 10 , Ababacar Fall 8 , Gil Mahé 11 , Fatoumata Binta Sombily Diallo 12, Amirou Diallo 12, Kadiatou Diallo 13, Jean Albergel 14, Bachir Alkali Tanimoun 15, Ilia Amadou 15, Jean-Claude Bader 16, Aliou Barry 17, Ansoumana Bodian 18 , Yves Boulvert 19, Nadine Braquet 20, Jean-Louis Couture 21, Honoré Dacosta 22, Gwenaelle Dejacquelot 23, Mahamadou Diakité 24, Kourahoye Diallo 25, Eugenia Gallese 23, Luc Ferry 20, Lamine Konaté 26, Bernadette Nka Nnomo 27, Jean-Claude Olivry 19, Didier Orange 28 , Yaya Sakho 29, Saly Sambou 22 and Jean-Pierre Vandervaere 30 1 Museum National d’Histoire Naturelle, UMR PALOC IRD/MNHN/Sorbonne Université, 75231 Paris, France; [email protected] 2 LMI PATEO, UGB, St Louis 46024, Senegal; [email protected] (S.P.M.); [email protected] (S.S.) 3 Direction de la Gestion et de la Planification des Ressources en Eau (DGPRE), Dakar 12500, Senegal; [email protected] 4 Département de Géographie, Université Assane Seck de Ziguinchor, Ziguinchor 27000, Senegal 5 UFR des Sciences Humaines et Sociales, Université de Lorraine, 54015 Nancy, France 6 Master SPIBES/WABES Project (Centre d’Excellence sur les CC) Bingerville, Université Félix Houphouët Boigny, 582 Abidjan 22, Côte d’Ivoire; [email protected] 7 Doha Institute for Graduate Studies,
    [Show full text]
  • Annuaire Statistique 2015 Du Secteur Développement Rural
    MINISTERE DE L’AGRICULTURE REPUBLIQUE DU MALI ----------------- Un Peuple - Un But – Une Foi SECRETARIAT GENERAL ----------------- ----------------- CELLULE DE PLANIFICATION ET DE STATISTIQUE / SECTEUR DEVELOPPEMENT RURAL Annuaire Statistique 2015 du Secteur Développement Rural Juin 2016 1 LISTE DES TABLEAUX Tableau 1 : Répartition de la population par région selon le genre en 2015 ............................................................ 10 Tableau 2 : Population agricole par région selon le genre en 2015 ........................................................................ 10 Tableau 3 : Répartition de la Population agricole selon la situation de résidence par région en 2015 .............. 10 Tableau 4 : Répartition de la population agricole par tranche d'âge et par sexe en 2015 ................................. 11 Tableau 5 : Répartition de la population agricole par tranche d'âge et par Région en 2015 ...................................... 11 Tableau 6 : Population agricole par tranche d'âge et selon la situation de résidence en 2015 ............. 12 Tableau 7 : Pluviométrie décadaire enregistrée par station et par mois en 2015 ..................................................... 15 Tableau 8 : Pluviométrie décadaire enregistrée par station et par mois en 2015 (suite) ................................... 16 Tableau 9 : Pluviométrie enregistrée par mois 2015 ........................................................................................ 17 Tableau 10 : Pluviométrie enregistrée par station en 2015 et sa comparaison à
    [Show full text]