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UN Peacekeeping in Mali Time to Adjust Minusma’S Mandate Denis M NO. 23 APRIL 2019 Introduction UN Peacekeeping in Mali Time to Adjust Minusma’s Mandate Denis M. Tull The mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (Minusma) ends on 30 June 2019. There is little doubt that the UN Security Coun- cil will extend the mission. Less clear is how Minusma contributes to Mali’s stabilisa- tion and how the mandate could be altered to increase the mission’s effectiveness. In light of changing conditions in Mali, the Security Council should consider a stronger Minusma engagement in central Mali. But for this to happen, cuts must be made in the north. Operating since 2013, Minusma currently reduce the overall budget for UN peace counts 15,365 personnel and a budget of operations, worrying developments in Mali around $1 billion. Its strategic priority is to make an in-depth review of Minusma’s support the implementation of the Algiers mandate necessary, particularly its contri- Peace Agreement, signed in 2015 between bution to the peace process and its response the Malian government and the Coordina- to the country’s deteriorating situation, tion des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), especially central Mali. an umbrella of northern rebel groups. At a practical level, Minusma is assisting the restoration of state authority in northern Context and Current Challenges Mali, the establishment of a new institu- tional architecture for the Malian state, The implementation of the Algiers Agree- security-sector reform, the demobilisation ment has made little progress since 2015, of combatants, and national reconciliation. although some headway was made in Other objectives include the protection of recent months in demobilising combatants civilians as well as facilitating national and and establishing transitional administra- local dialogue. Counter-terrorism is not part tions in northern Mali at the district level. of the mandate. However, incessant terror- On the positive side, over the past two years ist attacks have severely limited Minusma’s or so, no fighting has occurred between ability to carry out its mission effectively. the parties to the Algiers Agreement, that The renewal of the mandate will not be is, the government, its allied forces (Plate- straightforward, nor should it be. Whilst form), and the CMA. Violence in the north the US has exerted significant pressure to is exerted by jihadist forces operating under the Groupe de soutien à l’islam et aux mu- vices in central Mali more than tripled sulmans (GSIM), which constantly targets between 2017 and 2018. In addition, the both the Algiers signatories and Minusma. Katiba exerts violence against representa- On 20 January 2019, for example, 10 blue tives of the state (administrators, teachers, helmets lost their lives in an attack on the village chiefs, etc.) as part of its strategy to Minusma camp in Aguelhok. further thin out the feeble and ineffective The peace process – understood as the state presence. In the Mopti region, only 30 political integration of northern elites into to 40 per cent of the territorial administra- the state – is fragile and reversible, though tion personnel is present, and only 1,300 peace dividends in the guise of financial security forces are stationed across the vast and material incentives contribute to stabi- region (spanning 79,000 km²). lising the situation at a low level. Moreover, Jihadists instrumentalise local inter- the cooperation between the CMA and the ethnic conflicts to gain sympathizers and government during the 2018 presidential recruits. The ethnicisation of quite different elections made clear that the conflict is pri- conflicts reinforces the stigmatisation of the marily elite-based and that mutual accom- Peul as “terrorists”. Meanwhile, the state modation of these actors’ interests is pos- does not assume its responsibilities and is sible. strongly suspected of bias against the Peul. Arguably more alarming than the situa- Several observers have alleged that the tion in the north are current trends in the army has tolerated – and even cooperated regions of Mopti and Ségou in central Mali, with – the very Dogon militia supposedly where violence is increasingly spreading responsible for the Ogossagou massacre. towards the south-west (Koulikoro) and The “Plan de Sécurisation Intégrée des Ré- across borders towards Niger and Burkina gions du Centre” (PSIRC), proclaimed by Faso. Two closely intertwined drivers of the government in 2017 and supported violence can be distinguished: interethnic by the European Union, has so far failed to violence and jihadist violence against the produce tangible results. The Joint Force state and its supporters (Minusma). of the G5-Sahel States, which has no head- The first and most important type is vio- quarters since the attack on Sévaré in June lence against civilians, mainly by militias 2018, is unlikely to contribute meaningfully associated with ethnic groups (Dogon and to stabilisation in the foreseeable future. Peul). Their motives range from self-protec- tion and score-settling to simple criminality, though competition over scarce local re- The Limits of Minusma sources provides the structural background for conflict. For the past two years, a string In this multi-layered context, the benefits of attacks on villages has taken place across and effectiveness of Minusma are uncer- the Mopti region. In the last 12 months tain. Last year, a “Strategic Review” of the alone, 600 civilians have been massacred mission commissioned by the UN Secretary- and thousands have been newly displaced, General was a lost opportunity to shed light according to the UN. In January and Feb- on the role of the mission. The review was ruary 2019, 70 per cent of all human rights neither published nor did it affect the man- violations in the country took place in the date. central part of Mali. On 23 March, 160 Peul Public opinion in Mali is very critical of were slaughtered in the village of Ogossa- the mission. Malians have accused Minusma gou (Mopti), allegedly by a Dogon militia. of passivity, in particular denouncing that The second driver of violence is the the blue helmets place their own security jihadist Katiba Macina, which is part of the above that of civilians. The government, for GSIM. It directs violence primarily towards its part, occasionally succumbs to the temp- the Malian security forces and Minusma. tation to use the mission as a scapegoat for The number of improvised explosive de- its own failures. However, it appears more SWP Comment 23 April 2019 2 recently that it has recognised that the mis- the integration of civilian and military sion brings more advantages than incon- components has received much needed veniences. If anything Minusma’s presence attention. is an important factor in mobilising and sustaining international aid. Many Western diplomats in Bamako are Options for the New Mandate generally supportive of Minusma. They stress that the mission and its chief, Maha- Adjustments to Minsuma’s mandate must mat Saleh Annadif, play an important role be based on the premise that the mission as mediators both in Bamako politics and will be asked to do more without benefiting with respect to the peace agreement. More- from increased resources. To begin with, over, the mission is credited with contrib- the mission should continue to provide sup- uting to Mali’s stabilisation, though this port to the implementation of the peace assertion remains diffuse and uncertain. It accord. However, this does not necessarily is plausible to maintain, as is often the case, require a comprehensive military presence, that the situation would be much worse especially in the northern sector (Tessalit, without Minusma. Yet, this only says that Aguelhok, and Kidal), where Minusma has Minusma is able to slow rather than stop deployed more than 2,000 troops that play the universally acknowledged deterioration a very limited role as a security provider. of the security situation, much less redress it. The effectiveness and efficiency of these There is no doubt that Minusma operates already scarce military resources are rela- within a difficult and hostile environment. tively low there, especially since the mis- Around half of all blue helmets killed sion cannot engage in counter-insurgency. worldwide through malign acts since 2013 From a political, geographical, and demo- have lost their lives in Mali, most of them graphic point of view, central Mali is as in the north. Moreover, Minusma has to much of a challenge to the stabilisation expend enormous military and logistical of the country today as the north. Though efforts to be present in northern Mali. The the mission should continue its support of situation imposes security precautions that the peace process, it would make sense to tie up scarce resources which are no longer reduce its military footprint in the northern available for carrying out the mandate. sector in favour of increased engagement Around 80 per cent of its military resources in the Mopti region, where it could bring are devoted to securing its own infrastruc- greater added value. ture and the convoys on which the mission So far, the UN military force has hardly depends to supply its bases. been present in central Mali. Three prior- Furthermore, the caveats of the various ities could be envisaged: first, the protec- national contingents – including those of tion of civilians; second, and upon Malian the German army – and a lack of mobility request, support for regional and local con- in the form of helicopters and armoured flict mediation; third, stabilisation based carriers make it impossible for the mission on a much more ambitious cooperation to expand its scope beyond the vicinity of between the civilian and military pillars of its bases. By and large, Minusma is more a the mission, the UN country team, and the target than an anchor of stability. At best, Malian government. This last point is key: it stabilises places where it is physically If Bamako and the UN do not act together, present (Gao, Kidal, Timbuktu, etc.).
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