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FHQ U2 Threat Assessment Main Supply Routes March 2018 Contents Introduction

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FHQ U2 Threat Assessment Main Supply Routes March 2018 Contents Introduction UN UNCLASSIFIED NATIONS UNIES UNITED NATIONS Mission Multidimensionnelle United Nations Intégrée des Nations Unies Multidimensional Integrated pour la Stabilisation au Mali MINUSMA Stabilization Mission in Mali FHQ U2 Threat Assessment Main Supply Routes March 2018 Contents Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 1 Threat levels .............................................................................................................................................. 1 Table 1: Overview routes and threat levels March 2018 ...................................................................... 2 Map 1: Mali Route overview and threat level ...................................................................................... 3 Protective measures ................................................................................................................................. 4 Introduction This Security Assessment (SA) for the Main Supply Routes (MSRs) in MALI is provided to facilitate the planning and preparation process for mainly logistic movements of MINUSMA elements, contractors and partners as well as to provide input for the emplacement of appropriate security measures for movements through different areas in Mali. This assessment takes into account both the number of incidents as the qualitative security assessments created by U2, the Sector HQ, the C-IED cell in the FHQ and other sources. This SA is not intended to specify the number or types of vehicles included in a framework operation. Furthermore, please note the recommendations are only recommendations and should be read as such. Threat levels For routes not assessed, the sectors are advised to conduct reconnaissance patrols to determine the usability of these routes to increase flexibility. Even on routes with a LOW threat level, single-vehicle movements are not recommended. Approaching the areas of the towns of GAO, KIDAL and ANSONGO the receiving MINUSMA troops should be prepared to provide additional security for the arrival of the convoys. To consider different threat levels along the MSRs, the roads are subdivided into sections named A to E (Table 1). FHQ U2 Page 1 of 4 UN UNCLASSIFIED UN UNCLASSIFIED Table 1: Overview routes and threat levels March 2018 MSR Route Threat level Main threat CAT A BOUREM GAO MODERATE BANDITRY CAT B GAO ANSONGO MODERATE MINES/IED CAT C ANSONGO BORDER NIGER MODERATE BANDITRY CROCODILE A ANSONGO MENAKA HIGH MINES/IED BANDITRY CROCODILE B MENAKA ANDERAMBOUKANE MODERATE MINES/IED ELEPHANT A BAMAKO SEGOU NEGLIGIBLE ELEPHANT B SEGOU MOPTI LOW ELEPHANT C MOPTI DOUENTZA MODERATE BANDITRY ELEPHANT D DOUENTZA GOSSI SIGNIFICANT MINES/IED BANDITRY ELEPHANT E GOSSI GAO SIGNIFICANT MINES/IED BANDITRY LION A SEGOU NIONO LOW LION B NIONO NIAFOUNKE SIGNIFICANT MINES/IED LION C NIAFOUNKE GOUNDAM SIGNIFICANT MINES/IED BANDITRY LION C 1 GOUNDAM TIMBUKTU SIGNIFICANT ARMED ATTACK OCTOPUS DOUENTZA TIMBUKTU SIGNIFICANT MINES/IED RACOON TIMBUKTU BOUREM MODERATE BANDITRY RHINO BOUREM TABANKORT LOW SQUIRREL MENAKA KIDAL LOW STORK KIDAL BOUGHESSA SIGNIFICANT MINES/IED and IDF TIGER A ANEFIS KIDAL MODERATE MINES/IED TIGER B KIDAL AGUELHOK MODERATE MINES/IED ZEBRA A GAO ANEFIS HIGH MINES/IED ZEBRA B ANEFIS AGUELHOK HIGH MINES/IED ZEBRA C AGUELHOK TESSALIT HIGH MINES/IED ZEBRA D TESSALIT IN KHAUL SIGNIFICANT MINES/IED FHQ U2 Page 2 of 4 UN UNCLASSIFIED UN UNCLASSIFIED Map 1: Mali Route overview and threat level March 2018 FHQ U2 Page 3 of 4 UN UNCLASSIFIED UN UNCLASSIFIED Protective measures The proposed protection measurements are a minimum standard but can always be more comprehensive. Consideration should also be given to road conditions in regard to seasonal and regional weather effects. The movement of vehicles is heavily affected during different seasons in various parts of MALI. No-go and/or slow-go areas make vehicles more vulnerable to attacks. The review of this assessment will occur every 30 days or if there are a drastic change to the security situation in a specific area. The minimum proposed C-IED protective measures are listed below (Not to ALL) and in table 1. Feel free to make an appointment with the CIED cell for further information. Content approved by Released by Chris KOBYRA Angel HERRERO GARCIA Lieutenant-Colonel (OF-4) Lieutenant-Colonel (OF-4) MINUSMA FHQ U2 Chief Production MINUSMA FHQ U2 Chief CCIRM FHQ U2 Page 4 of 4 UN UNCLASSIFIED .
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