Maria Palasik. Chess Game for Democracy: Hungary between East and West, 1944-1947. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011. xvii + 230 pp. $32.95, paper, ISBN 978-0-7735-3850-4.
Reviewed by Deborah S. Cornelius
Published on HABSBURG (January, 2014)
Commissioned by John C. Swanson (University of Tennessee at Chattanooga)
In East Central Europe the short postwar peri‐ vakia, 1945-1948 (2009), treats the years from od, from 1945 through 1948, has come under in‐ 1945 to 1948 as a particularly critical period in the creased scrutiny in recent years. Several central history of Czechoslovakia, in which the resurrect‐ questions have emerged. Did the Soviets have an ed Czech Republic tried to fnd its place in an in‐ established plan for the countries of East Central creasingly polarized Europe. Anne Applebaum, in Europe? Was there ever a possibility for the for‐ Iron C urtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe mation of multiparty democratic systems? Why 1944-1956 (2012), describes how the Communist was it that the Soviet Union suddenly changed its regimes of Eastern Europe were created in the approach from one designed to placate the West‐ years immediately following the war, and she ern Allies to one of open confrontation? Histori‐ portrays, in devastating detail, how all institutions ans have begun to portray these years as a time in of civil society at every level were quickly eviscer‐ which Soviet policy was not predetermined, but ated and destroyed. fuid, and in which Joseph Stalin was eager to In Hungarian historiography, the immediate maintain the alliance with the Western Allies. postwar years have been considered part of the In his study Dark Continent: Europe’s Twenti‐ takeover by the Communist Party. Mária Palasik’s eth Century (1998), Mark Mazower supports the work, Chess Game for Democracy, however, por‐ thesis that the Soviets had no overall strategy for trays Hungary in the years from late 1944 to 1947 Eastern Europe. In 1945, he argues, Stalin was fo‐ as full of hope for the establishment of a true cused on the question of creating a friendly Ger‐ democracy, despite occupation by Red Army many: other political parties would be tolerated troops and a Soviet-controlled Allied Control Com‐ and parliamentary elections held. James Felak, in mission (ACC). She counters the myth that com‐ his recent book, After Hitler, Before Stalin: munism was introduced immediately after the Catholics, Communists, and Democrats in Slo‐ war and highlights the eforts of those who led the H-Net Reviews struggle to establish a multiparty democratic sys‐ tially ended the rule of the Old Regime, fulflling tem. Her work follows in the wake of two fne his‐ the long-held desires of the peasantry for land of tories of the period: László Borhi’s Hungary in the their own. Cold War, 1945-1956 (2004) and Peter Kenez’s Despite abuses by the Communist-controlled Hungary from the Nazis to the Soviets: The Estab‐ political police, the population held great hopes lishment of the Communist Regime in Hungary, for the upcoming elections to be held in Novem‐ 1944-1948 (2006). Palasik’s work, a political histo‐ ber 1945. The outlines of a multiparty system had ry, is based on ten years of systematic research begun to evolve, and Western analysts called the and her unprecedented access to the State Securi‐ proposed law governing the elections the most ty Archives. democratic in the region. Quoting the Hungarian The strength of her work is the way in which-- Communist leader Matyás Rákosi, Palasik shows through her use of these sources and careful re‐ that at this time Soviet intentions were not yet search--she has managed to bring to life the per‐ clear: Stalin had instructed the leaders of the sonalities and political maneuvering of the two Hungarian Communist Party to set aside their most powerful parties in the government coali‐ revolutionary aims and--for the time being--to tion during this three-year period: the Indepen‐ give up the socialist transformation of society. dent Smallholders Party and the Communist Par‐ “‘The policies we are pursuing today ... these poli‐ ty. Her blow-by-blow account demonstrates exact‐ cies are the adaptations of Marxism to the circum‐ ly how the Communist Party--with occasional help stances, to this period in which we work.’ This is from the Soviet-administered ACC and the Soviet the line taken in the Soviet Union by comrade Union--operated to block the Independent Small‐ Stalin” (pp. 36-37). holders in their attempts to create and maintain Palasik describes the euphoria with which the the parliamentary system. The history of the population greeted the sweeping victory won by struggle reads like a series of moves in a dramatic the Independent Smallholders Party, and the con‐ chess game, where at the beginning “no one could sternation of the Communists, who had convinced have predicted the outcome for certain. Had the themselves, especially after the land reform, that outcome been clear ... there would have been no they would achieve a clear victory. In delineating need to resort to force in 1947, no need for the the moves in the elaborate “chess game” after the Communist Party to insist on Soviet help to take election, she highlights the interplay between over” (pp. xvi-xvii). members of the Smallholders Party and the Sovi‐ In her brief account of Hungarian history ets, who attempted to interfere in the formation from the end of World War I to the end of World of the government, demanding the formation of a War II, Palasik emphasizes the conservative na‐ coalition government, with equal power to the ture of the regime that came to power after the Communist Party. These demands included, most Peace Treaty of Trianon. The regime favored the important, the position of the Ministry of the Inte‐ aristocracy, landed nobility, and civil servants, rior. while neglecting the welfare of the large peasant Throughout the book Palasik questions the in‐ population. Thus the radical land reform in early activity of the Western Allies. According to the for‐ spring of 1945--pushed through by the Soviet ad‐ mula for the formation of the ACC, the occupying ministration to win peasant support--did bring power was granted control of the ACC in that about a true social revolution. The land reform, country. But she points out that the Western Allies initiated even before the fghting had stopped, liq‐ still had a certain amount of infuence in the ACC uidated the system of landed estates and essen‐ in Hungary. They remained silent in the face of
2 H-Net Reviews the increasing illegal measures taken by the Com‐ ACC found it necessary to call on Soviet forces to munist-controlled law enforcement agencies and eliminate Kovács. On the evening of February 25 the Soviet interference in the afairs of the coali‐ at the request of Rákosi and the ACC, Soviet mili‐ tion government. Quoting from a record of a tary authorities stepped in and arrested Kovács meeting between the American ambassador, on the charge of conspiracy. Arthur Schoenfeld, and Imre Kovács, the general The following trials led to the arrest of promi‐ secretary of the National Peasant Party, she re‐ nent leaders and the eventual destruction of the veals the hesitation of the American to support Independent Smallholders Party. Clearly political, the Hungarian politicians in any way. Schoenfeld the trial of the so-called conspiracy against the re‐ kept stressing to Kovács that members of his party public was the frst to have received countrywide should be good democrats. Kovács replied that publicity. It was followed by the trial of those So‐ they would like to, but the Communists and the cial Democrats who objected to the merger of the Russians would not allow it. “He [Schoenfeld] two workers’ parties that prefgured the Commu‐ pondered his answer and said that we should nist takeover. In Palasik’s view, the trial of the work with the communists, be on good terms with Hungarian Brotherhood Community was the frst the Russians” (p. 81). show trial, long before the well-known show trials At the end of 1946, with the peace treaty of Cardinal József Mindzszenty and of the Com‐ about to be signed in Paris, there was the wide‐ munist László Rajk in 1949. spread belief that the treaty would lead to the de‐ Palasik considers the Western powers deci‐ parture of the Soviet occupation troops. “Rákosi sion not to support the application of Hungary--as and his entourage seriously expected that, once well as those of Bulgaria and Romania--for mem‐ the peace treaty entered into efect, the Soviet bership in the United Nations the end to any troops would leave Hungary” (p. 101). In her anal‐ hopes for democratic government in East Central ysis of the efect on Hungarian Communists, Europe. She views the Western powers’ hesitation Palasik makes clear that this was a turning point to accept Hungary’s application as essentially sur‐ in the game of chess. Their fear that the departure rendering the entire region to the “mercy of the of the troops would weaken their position infu‐ Soviet Union” (p. 138). The fnal blow was the enced their decision to accelerate the pace of granting of permission for Soviet troops to remain transformation to the “people’s democracy.” in Hungary after the ratifcation of the peace The discovery in mid-December 1946 of a treaty. From then on, with the attempted appear‐ group called the Hungarian Brotherhood Commu‐ ance of legality, “salami tactics” against the rem‐ nity ofered the Communists an unexpected op‐ nants of the Smallholders Party and other opposi‐ portunity to declare a conspiracy against the gov‐ tion parties intensifed, with frequent resort to po‐ ernment. “Around Christmas time they became lice intervention. By 1949-50, every institution of aware of the potential for a purge” (p. 101). With the democratic republic had been eliminated and little evidence they created the pretence of a con‐ the dictatorship of the Hungarian Workers’ Party spiracy. Yet, even the use of quasi-legal measures established. and intimidation were inadequate to remove the A major strength of Palasik’s work is in bring‐ Communists’ main target, the popular general sec‐ ing to life the political game of chess being played retary of the Independent Smallholder Party, Béla and the maneuvering through which the Commu‐ Kovács. Despite all their eforts, the parliamentary nists were able to turn events to their favor, espe‐ representatives refused to remove the parliamen‐ cially through their control of the political police. tary immunity that protected him. Rákosi and the She includes a number of features to make her
3 H-Net Reviews work accessible to the Western reader, including search she brings to life the daily operations of summaries of the political parties and brief bi‐ the political parties, reconstructing their debates, ographies of key fgures. While she accords much the closed meetings of political parties, even pri‐ attention to the Independent Smallholders Party-- vate discussions, including those between Hun‐ perhaps since the party has not been well known garian Communists and Soviet leaders. By high‐ in Hungary--the Western reader might wish for a lighting the eforts of those that led the struggle to comparable explanation of the Communist Party establish a multiparty democratic system, she and its leaders--not as well known in the Western counters the myth that communism was intro‐ world. Her frequent use of “Rákosi and gang” or duced immediately after World War II and that “Rákosi and company” leaves the reader wonder‐ there was no chance for democracy. Her book will ing who the other leaders were and what were be essential reading for those interested in the their roles. How were they able to turn the work‐ unique period from 1945 to 1948 and the process ers for their purposes and how did they stage the by which the Communist Party came to power in mass protests that helped to enable them to weak‐ Hungary. en and fnally decimate the Independent Small‐ holders leadership? - Since her analysis remains focused on the po‐ of twentieth-century Europe, litical players and parties, she ofers little insight into the attitudes of the population. This lack is [255] somewhat compensated for in a section of her f‐ r nal chapter, “Risk of Freedom of Speech.” For this RON section, she examined documents from court pro‐ URTAIN ceedings against tens of thousands of people who saw ft to voice critical opinions of various mat‐ c ters: of the police, of Rákosi, of members of parlia‐ d ment, and even of the new currency. The charges - were mostly the crime of agitation, and those c brought before the people’s tribunals for the most part were “little” people--outspoken women, men p speaking with their acquaintances, and often the that poor. But the penalties were harsh. People’s tri‐ - bunals sentenced the “culprits” to months or years in prison, loss of much or all of their prop‐ , erty, and loss of civil rights. Palasik emphasizes the Archives of that her research is only a sampling, since the State Security Archives alone house over twenty- llied three feet of relevant material, not to mention col‐ ontrol lections in provincial archives. ommission In her case study of a single country, Palasik makes a major contribution to our understanding - of the process of Sovietization in Central and East‐ , ern Europe, as well as the changing relations be‐ c tween the superpowers. Through her careful re‐ p
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Citation: Deborah S. Cornelius. Review of Palasik, Maria. Chess Game for Democracy: Hungary between East and West, 1944-1947. HABSBURG, H-Net Reviews. January, 2014.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=40711
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