Deterring Space War an Exploratory Analysis Incorporating Prospect Theory Into a Game Theoretic Model of Space Warfare
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Dissertation Deterring Space War An Exploratory Analysis Incorporating Prospect Theory into a Game Theoretic Model of Space Warfare Bonnie L. Triezenberg This document was submitted as a dissertation in September 2017 in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the doctoral degree in public policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. The faculty committee that supervised and approved the dissertation consisted of Geoff Torrington (Chair), Aaron Frank, and Scott Pace. Partial funding was provided by the U.S. National Reconnaissance Office Survivability Assurance Office and the RAND Corporation’s Project AIR FORCE. PARDEE RAND GRADUATE SCHOOL For more information on this publication, visit http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD400.html Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. R® is a registered trademark Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. 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Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Abstract If outer space becomes an active theater of war, the impact to daily life on earth would be substantial. Unintended consequences of attacks in space are hard to contain and are not always readily reversible—debris or radiation generating attacks render specific orbits unusable, not just for the duration of the war, but for the foreseeable future. With the loss of those orbits, our lives would be very different—accurate weather maps, overhead imagery, access to breaking international news, and navigation services that guide our cars, airplanes, and ships would all disappear. Even in the absence of catastrophic attacks, war in space would have a chilling effect on commercial uses. Deploying new capability in space is risky, and war would make it infinitely more so. Space entrepreneurship would grind to a halt, denying mankind capabilities we have yet to dream of. In this dissertation, I use a game theoretic model of space war to examine how sentiments in multiple dimensions impact state decisions regarding whether to expand a ground war into the space domain. Key innovations of this model are a) the use of prospect theory in lieu of rational choice and b) the assumption of non-unitary actors with independent sentiments regarding different dimensions of national interests. I offer a new way to visualize and think about how sentiment impacts the ability to tailor a deterrence strategy to specific circumstances. These innovations enable a rich exploration of how space war might play out across a wide range of futures. Based on that exploration, I recommend specific steps spacefaring nations should take to robustly deter the expansion of wars into the space domain. My recommendations are applicable across a wide range of opponent capabilities and sentiments under both rational choice and prospect theory. iii Table of Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iii Figures........................................................................................................................................... vii Tables ............................................................................................................................................. ix Acknowledgments.......................................................................................................................... xi Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................... xiii Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 The Policy Issue .............................................................................................................................. 5 Background ..................................................................................................................................... 8 A History of Space Weaponization .......................................................................................................... 8 Space and Warfare – A Historical Perspective ....................................................................................... 12 Grand Strategy and Theories of Decision Making in War and Conflict ................................................ 17 Game Theory, Rational Choice and the Study of Cooperation and Conflict ......................................... 21 Prospect Theory and the Role of Perception in Deterrence .................................................................... 25 Space and Warfare – A Future Perspective ............................................................................................ 30 Research Objectives ...................................................................................................................... 33 Methodology ................................................................................................................................. 34 Combining Prospect and Game Theory .................................................................................................. 35 Modelling Sentiment in Space War Deterrence ..................................................................................... 37 Dimensions of Warfare and State Power............................................................................................ 37 Reference Point Definitions ............................................................................................................... 39 Keeping Score .................................................................................................................................... 39 Objective Functions ............................................................................................................................ 40 Research Design for Exploring the Impact of Sentiment on Deterrence of Space Warfare ................... 44 Defining the Base Cases. .................................................................................................................... 44 Exploring the Impact of Sentiment. ................................................................................................... 46 Understanding the Impact of Prospects in a Multi-Dimensional Frame ................................................ 47 Modelling Political Consequences in Space War Deterrence ................................................................ 50 Research Design for Exploring the Role of Politics in Deterrence of Space Warfare ........................... 53 The Role of Sentiment in Deterrence ............................................................................................ 54 The Role of Political Stigma in Space War Deterrence ................................................................ 57 Implications for Space Policy ....................................................................................................... 62 Final Thoughts .............................................................................................................................. 65 Appendix A. Structure and Rules of the Space Security Game Theoretic Model ........................ 66 Appendix B. Game Mechanism and Computational Challenge ................................................... 70 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 72 v Figures Figure 1. Debris ring (red) created by China’s 2007 anti-satellite weapon demonstration continues to interfere with space operations. .......................................................................... 5 Figure 2. Factors that determine the deterrence of an act. ........................................................... 20 Figure 3. Prospect Theory vs. Rational Actor Theory ................................................................. 26 Figure 4. Comparison of Red payouts when considering a 1st strike under Rational Choice and under Prospect Theory for different reference points. .......................................................... 35 Figure 5. Definition of the Nine Offensive-Defensive Balance Cases. ....................................... 45 Figure 6. Sentiment Map for a player considering an attack when military gain equals political loss. ....................................................................................................................................... 48 Figure 7. The duration of stigma significantly impacts